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CANADIAN DECISIONS IN A SHIFTING NORTH AMERICAN  
SECURITY LANDSCAPE

by

Bruce A. Johnson, Lt Col, USAF

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Advisor: Dr. Charles Pentland

Centre for International Relations

Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario

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## *Preface*

I came to Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, with the aspiration to research the bilateral security relations between United States and Canada. I spent my previous four years abroad working, most of it in the international arena of defense cooperation at Headquarters, U.S. European Command. It fascinated me to watch how other democratic governments and their militaries worked with the United States and other nations, and found it particularly intriguing to watch the clash of interests between social and security policy, between the press, public and government and within governments themselves. So I found it quite natural to continue my interest full time as a Visiting Defense Fellow at the Queen's Centre for International Relations, and focus my research on Canadian-American security relations.

I must particular thank those around me that help guide me through my research year at Queen's University. It was with great pleasure to work with the other Visiting Defense Fellows and the Senior Fellows. I must particularly thank Oberst Lieutenant Uli Scholz, Colonel Mike Smith, Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland and Lieutenant Colonel Dave Pittfield for those raging debates on Friday afternoon at the Grad Club. I am indebted to Brigadar General (retired) Don Macnamarra and Professor Joel Sokolsky for getting me access to the Department of National Defense and the Privy Council, again to Professor Sokolsky for asking me to teach the seminar portion of his Studies in National Security course. There is no better motivation to become an expert quickly than having to face a classroom full of fourth year honor students. I must also thank Ambassador Louis Devoie for stretching my thinking, Professor David Elders for

correcting my understanding of the Canadian government, and Dr. Charles Pentland, the Centre's director, for giving me this opportunity. Most importantly I must thank my wife for her support and patience. And lastly, I would like to thank those on "This Hour Has Twenty-two Minutes" who definitely piqued my interests in Canadian politics, if nothing else, just to be able to follow their satirical interpretation of the news.

Now for a few comments on the paper – I wrote the paper from mostly Canadian sources, to best capture the Canadian perspective on the relationship. It was also written from only public sources so not to compromise either government's sensitivities or classified information. When comparing financial figures, I used U.S. dollars, but when addressing only Canadian budget figures, I stated them in current year Canadian dollars. At the time the paper was written, the exchange rate was about 0.67 Canadian dollars to the US dollar. Last, the paper was written mostly in standard American English, with standard Canadian English is used for Canadian names and in quotes from Canadian sources.

*Abstract*

Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the Bush Administration has overhauled the U.S. National Strategic Policy and restructured the Department of Defense. Much of this was in response to the war on terrorism and the newly placed emphasis on homeland defense. Other changes have been in the Washington staffing process for years awaiting an appropriate opportunity to be promulgated. Together these changes altered U.S. security relationships with its allies and especially with Canada. The establishment of U.S. Northern Command, the elimination of U.S. Space Command and the deployment of the National Missile Defense have significant implications for NORAD and the U.S.-Canadian security relationship. The paper's objective is to capture and evaluate, from an American viewpoint, the Canadian perspectives on these changes, their implications for Canada, and the pending decisions the Canadian government will consider. The paper examines the shifts in the North American security landscape the U.S.-Canadian relationship. It analyzes the Canadian security interests, the government's motivations and the public perceptions. The paper will explore the Canadian security and sovereignty issues, and implications of the realignment of unified commands, the risk of marginalizing NORAD, and the deployment of the U.S. National Missile Defense. Lastly, the paper will outline Canadian decisions in pursuit of its national security interests and its collective defense arrangements with the United States.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire: I give you an assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.*

— President Franklin D. Roosevelt

President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke these words in a speech delivered at Queen's University in 1938 as a message to the Canadian government. The United States had concerns that with the deteriorating situation in Europe Canada could be an unacceptable liability to the security of the United States. Several days later, Prime Minister Mackenzie King felt obligated to respond:

Good and friendly neighbor, one of (the obligations) is to make sure that our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arrive, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canada.<sup>1</sup>

Prime Minister King had to ensure America that Canada would not become a strategic liability and that it would satisfy this security concern with its own defensive measures. King also recognized that Canada was approaching the crossroads between its current protectorate Great Britain and its new protectorate the United States, and wanted to ensure Canada would be able to defend itself on its own terms without compromising its national sovereignty.

Over the next 66 years, the United States and Canada would develop a close and complex security relationship. The Cold War and the threat of the Soviet Union aggression gave Canada

new strategic significance. The Soviet bomber scare shocked the governments into cooperating closely on air defense, and in 1958 with the signing of the North American Air Defense (NORAD) Agreement, the governments establish a bi-lateral air defense command. Subsequent Soviet missile threat resulted in expanding NORAD into its missile warning and space control missions, and NORAD became the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The end of the Cold War set the future of NORAD and continental security policy adrift.

That all changed on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon shocked United States like no event since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States found itself vulnerable and ill protected against this new threat. The US government overhauled its national security strategy, established a Department of Homeland Defense and restructured the Department of Defense. This was in response to the new War on Terrorism. It altered the security landscape of North America, and with it the US-Canadian relationship. NORAD's air defense mission took on new life, Northern Command stood up and included Canada in its area of responsibility, and President Bush committed the United States to deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) by the end of 2004. The paper will examine the shifts in the North American security landscape, evaluate the significance of the shifts in security policy, the effects of the Department of Defense restructuring, and the ramifications of deploying the NMD system on Canadian interest. The paper will then review the Canadian-American relationship from the standpoint of national interests, politics, defense and economics, and identify sources of friction, areas of compatibility and the common ground for continental security policy. Next the paper will analyze the Canadian government's perceptions and its motivations to formulate continental security policy, and the role of Canadian public opinion and debate will have in shaping that policy. This will all be done in the context of analyzing the

government's choices in making three critical decisions on the security of North America. First, how does Canada maintain its status in NORAD? Second, should Canada pursue expanding the bi-national command to include land and naval operations? And last, the most difficult question, should Canada support and participate in United States' National Missile Defense?

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<sup>1</sup> James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Vol II, Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p 183.

## Chapter 2

### Shifts in the North American Security Landscape

*Our great challenge is to protect the American people. The most basic commitment of our government will be the security of our country.*

— President George W. Bush

On September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2002 the United States came under a vicious attack. Three thousand people died at the hands of 20 al Qaida terrorists. President George W. Bush vowed to never let it happen again. In his effort to protect the American people, he had his National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, overhaul the National Security Strategy and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld restructure the military. Most of the changes were in direct response to the emerging terrorist threat and the “War on Terrorism,” although some of the accompanying changes had been in the policy review cycle before the attacks waiting for an opportunity to be implemented. The Department of Defense established U.S. Northern Command, and placed Canada in its area of responsibility. It disbanded U.S. Space Command, realigned the responsibilities of Joint Forces Command, and shifted the Canadian military relationship with the United States. The changes also altered NORAD’s command structure, and with the President Bush’s decision to deploy a National Missile system by the end of 2004, inherently altered the continental security arrangement with Canada. This chapter will examine the effects these shifts in policy and organization will have on Canada and Canadian security interests.

## **Overhaul of the US National Security Policy**

After the January 2001 inauguration of President George W. Bush, the new Republican administration began the task of developing its own *U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS)*. Bush's administration was in the final editing throes in September 2001 when terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The attack forced the administration to completely overhaul its NSS and delayed publishing it until the following September, a year after the attacks. The Secretary of Defense's *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report* is another insightful source into the Bush administration's formulation of a new security policy. The *QDR Report* defines the strategy and guidance for developing the U.S. military forces and capabilities. The *QDR Report* like the *NSS* is a Congressionally mandated document and it is required by U.S. Code to consider the role alliances, allies and coalitions might play, thus giving insight into the U.S. perceived role of Canada and NORAD in the security of North America.<sup>1</sup> Equally interesting is the fact that the *QDR Report* was published three weeks after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, and although it had been quickly revised to reflect the significance of the attacks, it primarily captures administration's perspective on the U.S. defense structure prior to the attacks.

In evaluating the Bush Administration's *NSS* from a Canadian perspective and in comparing it to the Clinton administration's *2000 NSS*, there are three distinct observations that stand out. First, the overwhelming magnitude the World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks had in reshaping American security strategy. The totality of the effects of enduring the catastrophic attacks and the American public feeling of vulnerability to future attacks meant that the Bush Administration had to undertake extraordinary measures to minimize the probability of such an attack occurring again. Second observation is the absence of Canada and NORAD in the

security dialogue. The absence is not to say Canada's role in the security of North America is unimportant. It is in perspective and as long as Canada is not perceived as a threat or security weakness to the United States, it does not require specific mentioning in the *NSS*. And last, the *NSS* places great emphasis on "igniting a new era of global economic growth" and "champion aspirations of human dignity" as a means to advance prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world.<sup>2</sup> This theme to achieve a more prosperous, safer, better world carries the overtones from Clinton's last *NSS*. One may even see similarities with Canada's former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy's human security agenda. But for President Bush, this better, safer world is to be achieved through Republican economic stimulus concepts such as encouraging business investment, removing trade barriers and lowering marginal tax rates. It is interesting to note that the only mention of Canada in the *NSS* is in the section discussing the importance of resolving ongoing trade disputes.<sup>3</sup>

It is difficult for foreigners including Canadians to comprehend the enormous impact the attacks had on America's psyche. The attacks shattered the American psychological myth of invulnerability. It changed how the United States perceived its security. It forced the United States to react to a direct threat to the territory of the United States and to resulted in a global "war on terrorism." In response to the threat, the Bush administration established a cabinet department for homeland security and restructured the military. Lastly, the Bush administration and *NSS* placed disrupting and destroying "terrorist organizations with a global reach" as the top U.S. security priority.<sup>4</sup>

To achieve the aim of destroying the terrorist organizations, the United States will work within the framework of multinational institutions like the United Nations, Organization of American States, and NATO and will look for "coalition of the willing" to augment these

institutions in the “war on terrorism.”<sup>5</sup> United States looks at Canada as a reliable ally, as a co-member of these institutions and part of the coalition of the willing. It also looks to Canada to fulfill its obligations in the security of North America. The NSS goes on to state quite controversially in the view of American allies, that “while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, (the United States) will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively.”<sup>6</sup>

Canada’s role in the defense of North America is small but politically important for both Canada and the United States. NORAD provides the duality of protecting Canadian sovereignty while giving the United States an integrated aerospace defense of North America. That the NSS does not mention Canada should not be viewed as an oversight, but a complement in terms of the faith the U.S. government places in Canada as a trusted ally defending the northern flank of North America. Canada is the only U.S. ally with a role in providing for the defense of North America and the territorial United States. The *QDR Report* states as part of the planning of the U.S. force structure, that the U.S. forces will provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defense and uphold U.S. commitments under NORAD.<sup>7</sup> United States recognizes that demographically Canada is difficult to defend by itself given a large geographic area and a relatively small population. Regardless some American officials, such as U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellicuci, view Canada as unwilling to pay for an adequate defense on its own, it is equally unable to afford to do so.<sup>8</sup> The key for Canada is to continue providing sufficient defense so that in light of the shifts in the North American security landscape, Canada does not become perceived as a security threat or vulnerability to the United States.

One final observation is how little the Clinton and Bush administration’s National Security Strategies really differ once the effects of the September attacks are put aside. For in Western


democracies, security strategies are mostly driven by national values, interests and perceived threats and are for the most part apolitical. Clinton's strategy like Bush's discussed the importance of enhancing security at home. This included countering asymmetric threats such as terrorism, developing a National Missile Defense, and pursuing democratization, open markets and free trade.<sup>9</sup> What is absent in Clinton's NSS are the effects of addressing a catastrophic terrorist attack within the United States. What is absent in Bush's NSS are Clinton's softer foreign policy words such as "engaging, shaping, responding and preparing," the lists of accomplishments, and the overwhelming detail. In both versions of the NSS, Canada and North American Aerospace Defense Command are not mentioned or discussed except in the importance of bilateral and multilateral defense and security arrangements. The real difference may lie in the implementation of the strategy.

### **The Restructuring of the Department of Defense**

The second major outcome of the terrorist attacks is the realization that the United States military was not organized to best defend and support the civil authorities. The U.S. Code, Title 10, provides the authority for the Chairman of the Chief of Staff to review the missions and responsibilities of combatant commands at least every two years, and recommends to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any necessary changes.<sup>10</sup> The Chairman's Directorate for Plans (J5) directs the review. Once approved by the President, the Chairman publishes the changes in the Unified Command Plan, the document that establishes the combatant commands, and provides the commanders their missions and responsibilities.<sup>11</sup>

On 17 April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Chairman of the Chief of Staff General Richard Myers announced at their press conference the most recent changes to the Unified Command Plan. It created a new unified combatant command, U.S. Northern Command

(NORTHCOM), and assigned it the mission of defending the United States and providing military assistance to the civil authorities. The plan also reassigned the geographic responsibilities and most of these changes were in response to establishment of NORTHCOM. The map in **Figure 1** shows the newly assigned areas of responsibility for the five regional unified commands. With NORTHCOM receiving the geographic responsibilities from U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the Chairman changed JFCOM from a regional into a functional command and assigned it the mission of transforming the U.S. military.<sup>12</sup>



**Figure 1. Unified Commands' Areas of Responsibilities**

Another noticeable change is the assignment of Russia, Canada and Mexico to a unified command for the first time. Previously, these countries were under the auspices of the Joint Chief of Staffs and were not assigned to a unified command. For several years the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff debated the merits of assigning Russia to the U.S. European

Command. Once that decision was made, and the need to establish a NORTHCOM developed, all countries including Canada were assigned to a unified command's area of responsibility.

In a subsequent change to the Unified Command Plan, the Chairman transferred U.S. Space Command's responsibility to U.S. Strategic Command and dissolved U.S. Space Command effective 1 October 2002.<sup>13</sup>

### **Standing Up NORTHCOM**

The focus of Secretary Rumsfeld and the General Myers' 17 April 2002 press conference was the establishment of NORTHCOM on 1 October 2002. This announcement with the provision to include Canada in the command's area of responsibility raised concerns in Canada about the intent of the United States. The concern was overblown paranoia mostly generated from the Canadian political left who made the misguided assumption that Canadian forces would eventually fall under NORTHCOM. The reality was NORTHCOM was set up as solely a US only, unified command focused on the mission of homeland defense. The fact that Canada was assigned to NORTHCOM's area of responsibility has no more significance than Great Britain having been assigned to U.S. European Command's area of responsibility over 50 years ago. The geographic assignment is to give a combatant commander the responsibility for regional defense planning, and security cooperation and military coordination with friends and allies within the region.<sup>14</sup>

The Department of Defense created NORTHCOM to rectify a security vulnerability. Since the establishment of a unified command structure in 1946, the United States had never included the continental United States, Mexico or Canada in any regional combatant commander's area of responsibility. This changed with the establishment of NORTHCOM. This change was driven by the realization that the American military was not organized to best support homeland defense

and defend against the emerging terrorist threat from al Qaeda. While the establishment of NORTHCOM is predominantly an American phenomena, the event does have some implications for Canada to consider. As such, the remainder of this section will review the command's mission, the commander's responsibilities, the organizational structure and the implications for Canada.

U.S. Northern Command's mission is homeland defense and civil support. Specifically, the command's mission is to:

Conduct operations to deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility, and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.<sup>15</sup>

The mission is focused introspectively on the United States. The only exception would be if American interest outside of the United States were threatened including the security of Canada. This is not a divergence from but a continuance of American security policy to protect its interests in North America.


The NORTHCOM commander as a regional combatant commander has a broader, international charter with heavy emphasis on the U.S.-Canadian relationship. The NORTHCOM commander's responsibilities include: defending the United States against attack; conducting land and maritime defense planning; providing military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations; providing security cooperation, military coordination and military engagement activities with the countries in the geographic area of responsibility; assuming command of NORAD (unless a Canadian officer is designated commander); and in the event of war, becoming the combatant commander.<sup>16</sup> The commander's geographic area of

responsibility as shown in Figure 1 includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The command structure and organization is similar to the other eight unified commands except it has very few assigned forces and no service component commands. Outside of the command staff, there are only two joint tasks forces and a joint task force headquarters assigned to NORTHCOM. The Joint Forces Headquarters – Homeland Security (Joint Forces HQ-HLS) is the homeland security component headquarters that coordinates the land and maritime defense of the continental United States, and coordinates military assistance to civil authorities. Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS) provides the command and control for U.S. military forces deployed in support of a lead federal agency managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive incident in the United States. Lastly, Joint Task Force-6 (JTF-6) provides the Department of Defense counter-drug support to law enforcement agencies. In the event of a crisis requiring combat forces, the president or Secretary of Defense will operationally assigned forces from Joint Forces Command or other unified command as seen necessary.<sup>17</sup> **Figure 2 (next page)** show the command relationship and command staff organization.

Several observations can be made from the NORTHCOM's mission, responsibilities and structure. First to dispel the sovereignty concerns raised in Canadian media, there is no role for or intent to subordinate the Canadian Forces inside NORTHCOM, nor was NORTHCOM established to defend Canada. That remains the sovereign responsibility of Canada and the U.S.-Canadian bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command. Yet the Canadian government and military will want to work with NORTHCOM in planning for the bi-national U.S. – Canadian land and maritime defense, and in conducting joint military engagement

activities such as military exercises and continuing the military officer exchange programs. Good cooperation between NORTHCOM and Department of National Defence is increasingly critical as the complimentary functions performed at JFCOM and the operational planning role in NATO's Allied Command Atlantic were dissolved.



**Figure 2. NORTHCOM's Command Relationship**

And meanwhile, as the United States organizes its Department of Homeland Security, and NORTHCOM matures and the U.S. leadership shapes its missions, roles and responsibility, it is important that Canada protects and pursues its interests. And in fact, the Canadian government has done just that. As part of discussions between Canadian and U.S. officials to improve the safety and security of citizens through enhanced cooperation following the events of 11

September 2001, the governments have concluded an agreement to enhance Canadian security cooperation with the U.S. As part of the agreement, the Department of National Defence has established a bi-national Planning Group with the United States Department of Defense at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs to work together on contingency plans for defending against and responding to possible threats in Canada and the U.S. including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.<sup>18</sup>

### **Changing Roles for JFCOM and ACLANT**

As of 1 October 2002, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) surrendered its geographic area of responsibility it inherited from U.S. Atlantic Command to NORTHCOM, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command. It also transferred its responsibilities of providing the military assistance to civil authorities and planning the territorial land and maritime defense of the United States and Canadian region to NORTHCOM.<sup>19</sup> JFCOM was responsible for bi-national US-Canada defense planning. The bi-national land defense planning was mostly inconsequential. There was no viable land threat other than terrorism, and the U.S. and the Canadian armies only occasionally worked together. But JFCOM was the source of the close bi-national naval planning and coordinating of U.S.-Canadian naval exercises and operations outside of NATO. Now this planning has been transferred from JFCOM in Norfolk, Virginia, to NORTHCOM in Colorado Springs. Meanwhile the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Headquarters remains in Norfolk and is now nearly a continent away from the planning activity.

Thus, JFCOM was changed from a regional command with a geographic responsibility to a functional command responsible for developing joint doctrine, integrating joint forces, and joint training, and in the time of crisis or war, providing continental U.S. based forces to the combatant commanders. While Joint Task Force 6 and Joint Task Force Civil Support were

transferred to NORTHCOM, the component commands—Forces Command, Marine Forces Atlantic, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Air Combat Command – remained with JFCOM, the joint forces provider.

The second source of close U.S.-Canadian naval cooperation was likewise severed, but in this case the responsibilities are being transferred to Europe. The Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) was the NATO command responsible for trans-Atlantic naval planning, exercises and operations. It provided a close working relationship for the U.S. and Canadian navies under NATO. ACLANT headquarters was also conveniently located in Norfolk with JFCOM and U.S. Atlantic Fleet. ACLANT will transition into Allied Command Transformation (ATC) and “will lead NATO’s military transformation, enabling creative solutions to the operational challenges of coalition warfare against new threats and ensuring NATO forces are jointly integrated and interoperable with U.S. forces.”<sup>20</sup> Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, will become the sole strategic operational headquarters for NATO. SHAPE will be renamed Allied Command Operations (ACO). The NATO tether supporting close bi-national naval operations is now an ocean away from both National Defence Headquarters and U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

### **Standing Down USSPACOM**

Initially UCP 2002 made no provisions to modify United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), but a subsequent change transferred USSPACECOM’s mission and responsibilities to U.S. Strategic Command and dissolved USSPACECOM as of 1 October 2002 to correspond with the standing up of NORTHCOM. This Unified Command Plan changed only eliminated the USSPACECOM headquarters and its staff. All the subordinate commands and organizations were transferred to Strategic Command. This event combined by the Bush

Administration decision to pursue a National Missile Defense has several significant ramifications with long-term consequences for Canadian security interest.

The most significant ramification is the separation of the NORAD commander from space operations could result in the loss of Canadian access to U.S. space planning and operations. Before 1 October, the commander of NORAD was also the commander of USSPACECOM and the U.S. Air Force component command, Air Force Space Command. Over the years starting from the inception of USSPACECOM in 1985, Canadian military officers were assigned to USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command staffs. This inadvertent infiltration of the U.S. military staffs was part of an officer exchange program to give Canadian officers exposure to space operations. This was seen to benefit NORAD since all the sources of missile launch warning and space surveillance data come from U.S. space resources. This exchange was inherently easy to arrange since the same commander ran all three organizations. With USSPACECOM now gone and the Air Force Space Command reassigned to U.S. Strategic Command, this access is at risk and may be completely lost. With it, the Canadian military may lose access to U.S. space planning, operations and intelligence. The space planning and operations experience has assisted Canada in pursuing its own limited space program, but more importantly, the operations and intelligence give Canada an inside seat to world events and pending crises Canada would not otherwise have.<sup>21</sup>

The second implication is the risk of raising the Canadian nuclear allergy again. Now with the elimination of USSPACECOM, NORAD has been brought into closer relationship with U.S. Strategic Command, the owner of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Since 1 October 2002, U.S. Strategic Command, now the combat command of all Air Force space assets, provides NORAD with its missile warning and space surveillance data to support NORAD's Integrated Tactical Warning

and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission. Also U.S. Strategic Command now operates the Missile Warning Center, the Space Control Center and the Combined Intelligence Center that all operationally report to NORAD's Command Center. This close relationship has the potential to raise the nuclear discomfort the Canadian political left and public. But so far the Canadian public has been overall mute on this concern. Few people noticed that when the Air Force's Strategic Air Command was disbanded in the early '90s, the Air Force reassigned the intercontinental ballistic missiles wings to Air Force Space Command. Nor did many notice that Air Force Space Command was assigned as component command to both USSPACOM and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Nor did the public take notice that starting in the early '90s, the U.S. Air Force went one step further and integrated the missile and space career fields, and the Canadian officers were working with U.S. missile officers in space planning and operations. But the biggest bugaboo, National Missile Defense, could change public perceptions, when USSTRATCOM has both the offensive and defensive nuclear capability under its command, and the Canadian general officers in NORAD must take their turn in rotation as the potential assessors, ready to confirm that North America is under attack and authorize the employment of National Missile Defense interceptors.<sup>22</sup>

### **The Future of NORAD**

While America has modified its national strategy and restructured of its military, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) as a bi-national U.S.-Canadian command has functionally and organizationally remained unchanged. Its governing document is the NORAD Agreement that is renewed approximately every five years. The Agreement was last renewed early in June 2001, a year early as to avoid the pending contentious U.S. decision to deploy a National Missile Defense. Now with President Bush having withdrawn from the Anti-


Ballistic Missile Treaty and committed the Department of Defense to deploy a National Missile Defense system, the very nature and structure of NORAD is at risk.

NORAD is a military organization with the mission of providing the aerospace defense of the United States and Canada. That mission can be decomposed into space defense with the mission of providing ballistic missile warning and space surveillance, and into air defense of the territorial airspace of the U.S. and Canada against bombers and cruise missiles. Since 1991, NORAD received the additional responsibility to report counter-drug surveillance information to law enforcement agencies, and after the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, the importance of air defense has been revitalized with the additional responsibility to assist the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and Nav Canada in tracking North American air traffic and detecting internal aviation threats.<sup>23</sup>

NORAD is a bi-national military command with the commander, traditionally an American, and a deputy commander, traditionally a Canadian. The commander is the chief of the strategic aerospace defense forces for both countries. The commander reports to the national command authority for both countries. With the United States, the commander reports to the U.S. president through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs and the Secretary of Defense. With Canada, the commander reports to the Prime Minister of Canada through the Chief of Defence Staff and the Minister of National Defence. The NORAD agreement includes mechanisms to ensure effective political control from each government.

The headquarters is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, on the same installation that headquarters NORTHCOM. The daily command and control of NORAD forces is managed from Command Center in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex. The other NORAD centers process air, missile and space surveillance information and report to the NORAD

Command Center (NCC). The Air Defense Operations Center (ADOC) is the focal point for all air defense matters. Below the ADOC, NORAD's surveillance and control responsibility for North American airspace is assigned to three NORAD regions: Canada, Continental United States (CONUS) and Alaska. They use military assets such as fighter aircraft, radar sites, AWACS aircraft and other assigned resources. The command structure of NORAD is complex and diagrammed in **Figure 3**.



**Figure 3. NORAD Command Structure**

The space surveillance and missile warning missions use only U.S. assets and are under control of USSTRATCOM but are under operational control of the NORAD Command Center. The Missile Warning Center (MWC) provide ballistic missile launch warning only. Currently there is no ballistic missile defensive capability, and only the U.S. has a ballistic missile counter-strike capability. The Space Control Center (SCC) processes and provides space surveillance data to the Command Center. The other USSTRATCOM workcenters operationally reporting to NORAD's Command Center include the Combined Intelligence Center (CIC), System Center and Weather Support Center. All the centers are manned 24 hours 7 days a week.<sup>24</sup>

There are several things NORAD does well. Historically what it has done best is provide deterrence during the Cold War. But NORAD's importance also lies as a means to preserving Canada's sovereign role of defending its part of North America. Canada's large area and limited population and wealth inhibit it from providing a level of aerospace defense adequate to satisfy America's security interests. But Canada partnered with the United States is able to provide the air defense resources sufficient to maintain its own air sovereignty, and when necessary, can approve of additional U.S. military assets to augment Canada's air defense. In a way, some have viewed NORAD as providing Canada "defense against help" from the Americans.

A concern for both Canada and the U.S. is the future of NORAD. If Canada continued to balk at cooperating in the National Missile Defense (NMD) program, it could put the entire space-operations portion of NORAD at risk. Canada contributes extremely little to the space defense mission with no military space assets, and without Canada's political support for NMD, it is foreseeable that NORAD could be returned to an air-defense only command.<sup>25</sup> Canada would lose its access to Air Force Space Command and U.S. intelligence. Prime Minister Chretien has put off these concerns and has taken a politically safe approach to "wait and see"

before committing Canada one way or the other. This attitude so far has not strained the U.S.-Canadian relationship principally because there is no impetuosity to resolve the issue on either side of the border, and a delayed decision may defuse a possible Canadian anti-nuclear reaction.

Another concern for Canada is that U.S. Strategic Command will most likely become the command to operate the National Missile Defense, and when it does, it will have operational command over the missile launch warning and space surveillance mission and the means to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. This will in effect make the NORAD Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission redundant, and with Canada not offering any military space control or missile warning assets, this begs the question is the political value of continuing the NORAD missile defense mission sufficient?

The days of the Soviet bomber threat are long gone, but the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks did revitalize the importance of the air defense mission and ensured its continuance. The Canadian Forces contribute significantly to NORAD's air defense mission. They provide F-18s on alert for intercept, 280 military personnel assigned to NORAD, AWACS crewmembers and the North Warning Radar network.<sup>26</sup> The combined U.S.-Canadian aircraft surveillance and counter-air capability is adequate. The only significant vulnerability is cruise missile detection and surveillance and it is an area all three U.S. services and DARPA have on-going research and development activities to resolve, and a potential area for future Canadian military involvement.<sup>27</sup>

The future of NORAD will not have to be decided until the agreement comes up for renewal in 2006, and by then Canada should have made its decision whether to accept the National Missile Defence, and the United States should have made its decision that it still needs or desires Canada's contribution to part or all of the bi-national command.

## **Fielding a National Missile Defense**

*When I came to office, I made a commitment to transform America's national security strategy and defense capabilities to meet the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Today I am pleased to announce we will take another important step in countering these threats by beginning to field missile-defense capability to protect the United States as well as our friends and allies.*

— President George W. Bush

On December 17, 2002, President Bush announced plans to deploy the first ten interceptors of the National Missile Defense (NMD) by 2004. To the surprise of most Canadians, the next day Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham responded that Canada was ready to discuss the development and deployment of a North American missile shield with the Americans. In an apparent reversal of the Liberal government's position, Mr. Graham, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, went on to say that the renewed dialogue involving the Russians and Americans has changed the international climate allowing for further talks, and went on to say, "When it comes to preparing for potential threats to our shared continent, we're in this together."<sup>28</sup>

Since the days of President Reagan's Star Wars, Canada's position on strategic missile defense has at best been ambiguous and overall unsupportive. As part of its foreign policy, Canada has been a strong promoter of robust multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regimes to include the elimination of nuclear weapons. While the Canadian government has stated that missile defense need not be incompatible with arms control and disarmaments, it has stated that strategic missile defense capabilities are potentially destabilizing and may encourage states to renew a nuclear arms race. According to the Canadian government, its ultimate decision whether to support America's National Missile Defense lies with its own


national interests and its concern with operational concepts which alienated Russia and China or did not sustain gains in non-proliferation and disarmaments regimes.<sup>29</sup>

The United States government has been in consultation with the Russians, Europeans and Canadians to assuage their concerns and rethink of a new strategic framework. In addition, the United States pursued talks with the Russian government to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty while negotiating further nuclear arms reduction. While the American's were unable to negotiate changes to the ABM treaty to allow for further anti-ballistic missile testing and deployment of the NMD system, and decided to unilaterally withdraw from the treaty in December 2001. Although Russia government criticized the withdrawal, the United States and Russia were still able to agree to and signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty five months later in May 2002. Along with continued discussions for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III, the international fear of a new arms race with Russia has been muted.

The United States pursues a National Missile Defense program to mitigate the growing threat to the territory of the United States from the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles. To counter this threat, the U.S. is developing missile defenses to preserve freedom of action, prevent a state from using military coercion, "enhance deterrence by denial (as opposed to assured destruction) and mitigate the effects of attack if deterrence fails."<sup>30</sup> In addition, the Bush Administration views missile defense systems in a new framework supporting non-proliferation because missile defense systems marginalize the importance of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile by mitigating their asymmetric value, while a limited missile defense system is not intended to destabilize the strategic balance with Russia. Lastly, a missile defense system could provide the United States, friends and allies a means to protect against the event of an accidental

missile launch. The open-ended question is: does China view NMD as a threat to the viability of its limited nuclear ballistic arsenal, and how might China react?

The United States plans to deploy a system composed of five segments: the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR), the X-Band Radars (XBR), the ground based interceptors (GBI) and the Battle Management, Command, Control and Communications (BMC3) element. As depicted in [Figure 4](#), the architecture is designed to use the SBIRS satellites to detect and track the ballistic missiles and provide the initial launch data to NORAD for the Integrated Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) and to the NMD system. As the ballistic missile comes over the horizon, the upgraded Early Warning Radars will take over the tracking of the mid-phase flight of the missiles, until NMD system can hand over the missile tracks to the X-Band Radar to discriminate the warheads from the decoys and develop the intercept solution for the ground based interceptor missiles. The BMC3 element hosts the battle management staff that would assess whether the United States is under a ballistic missile attack and the decision to launch interceptors to destroy the incoming warheads. The planned initial capability calls for 20 interceptors based in Alaska; to upgrade the Early Warning Radars at Beale AFB, California, Clear Air Station, Alaska, Cape Cod, Massachusetts, Thule, Greenland and RAF Fylingdales, United Kingdom; and install the first X-band Radar on Shemya Island, Alaska. As the system matures, additional X-band Radars could be installed at Clear, Fylingdales, Thule and other possible other locations, and a second interceptor base established at Grand Forks, North Dakota. None of the facilities are planned to be in Canada.<sup>31</sup>



**Figure 4. National Missile Defense Architecture**

Canada still has many concerns with the deployment of the NMD system. Without a clear commitment between the Danish and American governments to upgrade Thule, Greenland, Canada is concerned that their commitment may come with additional unforeseen expenses. If Canada does tip its hat to NMD participation, it will weaken Canada's negotiation position, and may encourage the United States to pursue a site for an X-band radar and an Early Warning Radar in northeast arctic Canada. This in turn may encourage the United State to ask Canada to off-set some of the facility costs or permit the return of U.S. military personal into northern Canada as part of the price tag of integrating NMD command and control into NORAD for the Canadians. However it is important to note that this is only a concern and that the United States has not requested any Canadian contribution. On the other hand, it is in Canada's interests to

maintain a command director/assessor role in the Cheyenne Mountain Operational Center (CMOC) and stay involved in the space portion of NORAD, and this will mean participating in the command and control of anti-missiles capability. The alternative is for Canada to risk being relegated to only a marginalized air defense/sovereignty role and loss of Canadian influence and input.<sup>32</sup>

Canadian participation in NMD is desired and politically attractive for the United States, but it is no longer a prerequisite to fielding the system. None of the elements of the system require basing in Canada as long as Denmark and Great Britain agree to the proposal to upgrade the Early Warning Radars and in a later phase of the NMD system, install X-Band Radars. In view of events over the last year, and in light of closer bi-national military cooperation, the Canadian government has appeared more supportive of the deployment of the NMD system, and is becoming more inclined to view such a system as in its national interests. Canada is also well aware what is at stake in NORAD and if it declines to participate in NMD, Canada may lose its seat on the missile warning and assessment process.

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<sup>1</sup> *United States Code*, Title 10, Sec 118, Quadrennial defense review, and Title 50, Sec 404a, Annual national security strategy report. On-line. Internet, 26 Feb 03. Available from <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode>.

<sup>2</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, President Bush's Letter.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 Sep 2001, 18.

<sup>8</sup> Mike Blanchfield, "Military Relations with U.S. to be Probed," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 17 Jan 03.

<sup>9</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, Washington, December 2000, 2-3.

<sup>10</sup> *United States Code*, Title 10, Sec 161, Combatant commands: establishment.

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<sup>11</sup> Department of Defense, "The World with Commanders' Area of Responsibility, *Unified Command Plan 2002*," Press Release, Washington, On-line. Internet, 23 Dec 02, Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/g020417-D6570>, 30 Apr 02.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Jim Garamone, "Strategic, Space Commands to Merge," American Forces Information Service, News Article, On-line. Internet, 23 Dec 02, Available from <http://www.pentagon.mil/news/Jun2002>, 26 Jun 02.

<sup>14</sup> Department of Defense, "The World with Commanders' Area of Responsibility, *Unified Command Plan 2002*," Press Release, Washington, 30 Apr 02.

<sup>15</sup> Department of Defense, U.S. Northern Command Home Page, "Who We Are--Mission," On-line. Internet, 10 Nov 02, Available from <http://www.northcom.mil/>

<sup>16</sup> The responsibilities of the NORTHCOM Commander derived from Department of Defense press releases, NORTHCOM mission statement and General Richard B. Myers, "The New Unified Command Plan," Foreign Press Briefing, 18 Apr 02, On-line. Internet, 19 Mar 03, Available from <http://fpc.state.gov/9534pf.htm>.

<sup>17</sup> Department of Defense, U.S. Northern Command Home Page, "Who We Are—Our Team."

<sup>18</sup> Department of National Defence, "Enhanced Canada-US Security Cooperation," Backgrounder Documentation (BG-02.041), 9 Dec 2002, On-line. Internet, Available at <http://www.forces.gc.ca>.

<sup>19</sup> Sokolsky, Joel J., "Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US Naval Interoperability," *Choices*, Vol. 8, No. 2. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, April 2002, 20.

<sup>20</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "SACLANT Will Lead NATO Transformation," Press Release, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), Public Information Office, 21 Nov 2002.

<sup>21</sup> Jockel, Joseph T., "Four Commands and a Country: NORTHCOM, NORAD, SPACECOM, STRATCOM and Canada," St. Lawrence University, Canton, NY, (draft paper to be published), 2.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 2-3.

<sup>23</sup> Lieutenant-General George Macdonald (CF), "Canada-US. Defense Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan," Talking Paper for Speech for Senator Kenny and Committee, Department of National Defence, 6 May 2002. n.p. On-line. Internet: available at <http://www.dnd.ca/cng/archive/speeches/2002/>, 26 September 2002.

<sup>24</sup> Federation of American Scientists, "Cheyenne Mountain Complex," On-Line. Internet, 18 Feb 03, available at <http://www.fas.org>.

<sup>25</sup> Joseph T. Joseph, "After the September Attacks: Four Questions About NORAD's Future," *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2002), 12.

<sup>26</sup> Department of National Defence, "NORAD Backgrounder," On-Line. Internet, accessed 20 Jan 03, available at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/canada-us>.

<sup>27</sup> Joseph T. Joseph, "After the September Attacks: Four Questions About NORAD's Future," 13-14.

<sup>28</sup> "U.S. to Deploy Missile Defence in 2004," *Global and Mail*, on line edition, 17 Dec 02, Available at <http://www.globalandmail.ca>.

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<sup>29</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “U.S. Strategic and Missile Defence Initiatives,” n.p., On-line. Internet, 17 Jan 03, available at [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign\\_policy/usstrat-en.asp](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/usstrat-en.asp).

<sup>30</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 Sep 2001, 42.

<sup>31</sup> Federation of American Scientists, “National Missile Defense,” On-Line. Internet, 2 Feb 03, available at <http://www.fas.org>.

<sup>32</sup> Fortmann, Michel and David Hagland, “Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security,” Canadian Military Journal (Spring 2002), 680 & 683.

## Chapter 3

### The State of US-Canadian Relations

*Living with you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant: no matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.*

— Prime Minister Piere Trudeau

In a 1969 speech to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C, Prime Minister Trudeau was trying to describe his country's relationship with the United States. It is a difficult relationship for Canada. Inconsequential decisions in the United States can ripple through Canada. Even in the best of times, as bright as the Canadian light shines, it is always a challenge to see through the glare of the economical, political, and cultural beacon next door. For the last 60 years Canada has seen itself as a middle power, never expecting to be up to the standards of a major or global power, but still wanting to use its modest degree of influence on the world stage. Canada finds itself a regional power without a region, next door to a superpower that has grown stronger than all other nations. It is a relationship of unequals – one in which Canada tries to exert its influence, shape its environment, but finds it must always accommodate the “elephant” it has become ever so dependant on. Canada struggles within its own perspective to retain its identity and autonomy, as it struggles with its relationship with the United States. This section will look at the context of that relationship from the examination of national values and interest, the political relationship between governments and their publics, the military relationship, and

last, the economic relationship. The intent is to identify the sources of friction, areas of compatibility and the common ground for a mutual security policy.

### **Overlapping National Values and Interests**

One of the challenges Canada faces is its quest to differentiate itself from the United States. Often the quest to be “not American” creates difficulty for Canadians when they try to identify uniquely Canadian values and interests. Yet, those values and interests strongly overlap into a common set of “North American” values and interests, and the strength of the relationship between the two countries lies not in the differences but the similarities in their national values and interests.

In Canada, there is no single overt statement defining national interests, but they can be derived from examining government documents. *The 1995 Foreign Policy Review, Canada in the World*, lays out the principle national values as: respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the environment.<sup>1</sup> W. D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald in their recent article, *A National Security Framework for Canada*, derived three additional Canadian values from the objectives in the Foreign Policy Review: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and, projecting Canadian values and culture.<sup>2</sup> The Department of National Defence document, *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* defines Canadian values as: democracy and the rule of law; individual rights and freedoms as articulated in the Charter; peace, order and good government as defined in the Canadian constitution; and sustainable economic well-being.<sup>3</sup> According to Sean Maloney in his article, *Canadian Values and National Security Policy: Who Decides?* Canada has three basic national interests: economic prosperity, protection of that economic prosperity, and the security of Canadian citizens home and abroad.<sup>4</sup>

The American values and interests are similar. The 2000 Clinton administration's *U.S. National Security Strategy for a new Century* states the American interests as: enhancing security at home and abroad, promoting prosperity and promoting democracy and human rights.<sup>5</sup> U.S. national interests are not overtly stated in Bush's *U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS)*, but are similar and can be derived from the *NSS* objectives: promoting global security, democracy, freedom, human dignity (to include the rule of law), development, and a strong world economy. The parallels between the U.S. and Canadian national interests are close and mutually supportive.

There are four reasons why even as similar as the two state's national interests are, the differences remains a source of friction. First, many Canadians find it politically fashionable to demonstrate their unique identity by developing unique Canadian values and interests, even when the real differences lie only in the means of achieving the interest. Secondly, as proposed in W. D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald's article, *A National Security Framework for Canada*, the Canadian government has not employed a structured practice of systematically transforming national values and interests into foreign and security policy. This leads to a discontinuity between foreign and defense policy and Canadian interests. The third are the actual minor differences in values and interests, mostly in areas of developing international law, such as the antipersonnel land mine treaty, global warming and Kyoto Treaty, preventing the weaponization of space, the ABM treaty and other nonproliferation efforts.



when the Liberals and Republicans are in power. Canadians have a greater interest in the social welfare of fellow Canadians and stronger social programs like a national healthcare than Americans. Canadians also believe they have a greater concern for environmental protection, human rights, and human security than Americans.

Overall, the U.S.-Canadian national values and interests are similar, and the differences are less in the objectives and more on the appropriate strategies for achieving security, freedom and economic prosperity.

### **Political Relations**

The political relationship between the heads of government of the two countries has been frequently frosty and at times downright acrimonious. Some of it is due to different political agendas heading in different directions and is probably the principal reason Liberals and Republicans have a history of being each other's antagonist. Part of it is the leaders' style and personality. As Prime Minister Jean Chretien has explained his relationship with the Presidents of the United States, "business is business and friendship is friendship and the two cannot be confused... The president of the United States is not there to be your personal friend."<sup>7</sup> And part of the difficulty lies in Canadian politics. While Canadians like their prime minister to foster good relations with the United States, they do not like him to be subordinate to the United States. But usually the leadership of each country is able to keep the mutual security interests above politics.

Differing party politics and government policies often led to cool relations between the American and Canadian heads of government. Republicans have an extensive history of clashing with Liberals, but not exclusively. Starting in the early 1960's, Democratic President Kennedy quarreled several times with Progressive-Conservative Prime Minister Diefenbaker.

They first collided over Kennedy's request for the application of extraterritorial U.S. law to a U.S. owned Canadian shipping company, then exploded with the Cuban Missile Crisis, and hit nadir will Prime Minister Diefenbaker balked at accepting U.S. nuclear weapons.<sup>8</sup> Likewise Republican President Nixon and Liberal Prime Minister Trudeau traded barbs. Nixon threatened to kill the Auto Pack and imposed stiff tariffs to right the trade imbalance. Trudeau retaliated with the Third Option and pursued closer European and Japanese economic and political relations.<sup>9</sup> When the politics aligned such as between Democratic President Carter and Liberal Prime Minister Trudeau, they got along fine.<sup>10</sup> But when Prime Minister Trudeau faced another conservative Republican, President Ronald Reagan, he roiled Canadian-American relations with the introduction of the National Energy Plan to buy back the American own Canadian energy companies, and annoyed President Reagan with his peace initiative with the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup>

At the same time, developing too close of a relationship with the U.S. president can become a political liability with the Canadian public. Prime Minister Mulroney, a Conservative, believed he could get along much better with like-minded President Reagan than his Liberal predecessor and he did. He dismantled Trudeau's National Energy Plan, encouraged foreign investment only to be dominated by Americans, and opened up free trade with the United States. But in fostering such good relationships with the United States, he came under increasing public and political suspicion. While Canadians like their Prime Minister to foster good relations with the United States, they do not like them to appear subordinate to the United States.<sup>12</sup>

Then came the 1993 elections. It radically reshaped long-term Canadian politics and destroyed the political base of the Progressive-Conservative Party reducing it to two seats in Parliament. It also devastated the liberal New Democratic Party, traditionally Canada's third party, and left the Liberals with an overwhelming majority in Parliament, and in sole control of

the new government. Jean Chretien became and is still the prime minister. He plans to retire at the next Liberal Party leadership convention tentatively scheduled for February 2004, 21 months before the next scheduled national election. During Prime Minister Chretien's first seven and a half years, he developed a warm relationship with Democratic President Clinton. With President George W. Bush, a degree of tension has reentered the relationship, and hit a low with the "moron comment" made by a Chretien aide at NATO's Prague Summit in November, 2002.

The Prime Minister has nevertheless established a good professional relationship with President Bush, but he is unlikely to develop a close relationship. Liberal prime ministers and Republican presidents seldom do. They may have similar styles – "folksy, instinctive and inarticulate, and unencumbered by great vision or big ideals"– yet their ideologies are polarized at opposite ends.<sup>13</sup> Bush is conservative with traditional values while Chretien is a liberal promoting rational-based values. President Bush had minimal knowledge of Canada before coming to office. His international experience as Governor of Texas, home to millions of Mexican Americans, was to look south to Mexico, and when he became President, his first state visit was not with Canada, but with Mexico. As Andrew Cohen points out in his article on Canadian-American relations, "In political terms, Canada has geography and history against it in Bush's Washington."<sup>14</sup>

Politics aside, the differences in government structures and sources of power make policy coordination challenging. Canada uses a Westminster parliamentary system of government where the executive and legislative branches of government are formed from the majority party in parliament, or in the situation no party retains a majority, a minority government is formed from a coalition of two or more parties. A parliamentary system is designed to enfranchise a broader range of the population with a multitude of parties to cover the spectrum. The leader of

the party or coalition that forms the government becomes the prime minister and Chair of the Cabinet. With strict party discipline enforced on the behavior and voting on the members of parliament, the prime minister retains much more control over the development and promulgation of policy than the president in the United States. When a prime minister forms his cabinet, he assigns the cabinet and key committee positions to his loyal party cronies. The new members of the party, the ill behaved and those who fall out of grace are relegated to oblivion on the backbench. Unlike the United States, the head of government, and all cabinet positions are members of parliament from the same party (or in a minority government, the coalition). All other parties are relegated to the opposition and have very little influence on daily governmental affairs. The prime minister can solely dictate policy and the legislative agenda. Getting policy direction or authority from the prime minister through the Cabinet and Privy Council Office into a minor department such as the Department of National Defense can take eternity. But once the Minister of National Defence, who is a member of parliament, has his authority, almost nothing must return to parliament for approval.<sup>15</sup>

United States uses a federal republic form of government where the powers are divided and balanced between the executive and legislative branches, and the members of Congress and the President are elected separately. The cabinet positions are appointed by the President and must be confirmed by Congress. The nature of this form of government favors a two-party system with the political center of gravity split between the parties. During governance, the parties are weak, and only really come together in the consensus building caucus process before elections. Unlike the parliamentary system, the Senate, House and the Presidency can be control by either party at the same time, and the members in Congress even in the minority party retain much more authority than the members of parliament. Congress also has a large say in executive

branch decisions, ranging from dictating the authorization and appropriations bills to confirming nominations. While US cabinet level policy usually can be quickly formulated, its promulgation and execution, especially with international issues, may be slowed to a glacial pace as it works its way through the congressional process, even if that process is only one to fulfill a statutory requirement of notification. Unlike Parliament, Congress is the center of American political action and not, as so would be often perceived in Canada, the Executive Branch.

In general, the political relationship is driven by party politics, and the leaders' style and personality. The expectation is that the Liberals and Republicans will clash on their political agendas, while the leaders' professional relationship should prevail, and agreements will be made on those security policies appealing to the states' interest. Beyond the clash of politics, the differences in government structures and the sources of powers add to the frustration and challenges of developing continental security policy.

## **Defense Relations**

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King laid the foundation for the American and Canadian security cooperation in the Ogdenburg Agreement in 1940. The agreement, written in the bleakest period of World War II, recognized the value of continental security and pledged mutual assistance in the event of hostilities. The document also established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). It is the beginning of a long and comprehensive defense relationship and the basis for today's close cooperation. It is unusual relationship of unequal partners each deriving its own unique benefits. Canada enjoys the benefits of working with the U.S. military and reciprocates by supporting U.S. led allied and coalition operations around the world. Over the last six decades, the relationship has spawned NORAD, over 80 treaty-level defense agreements and 145 bilateral forums.<sup>16</sup>

The two countries have developed a unique relationship that is close, complex and extensive as any in the world. As Lieutenant-General Macdonald, the Vice Chief of the Defense Staff, told the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “The United States is Canada’s most important ally and defense partner.”<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, the United States could not say the same of Canada and its fifty-some thousand strong military. It is not that the United States does not value Canada. It does in its strange, peculiar way. The United States does not look for Canada to provide forces or a military expertise. The United States looks to Canada to defend its own sovereignty as proposed in the Odgenburg Agreement, and to contribute to its portion of the continental air defense through NORAD. The integrated air defense gives the United States better security over North America without infringing on Canada’s sovereignty. And Canada’s support in U.S. led coalitions and naval operations lend political creditability and “political cover for the freedom to act in its own best security interest” in a multilateral world.<sup>18</sup>

After the Cold War, the US benefits from Canada’s participation began to wane with the reduction in threat to the North American continent. Some of that changed with the September 11 terrorist attacks. Canada as the junior partner has a very different perspective. As outlined in the Department of National Defence’s Defence Planning Guidance 2001, Canada ties the following four of its seven international objectives to the United States: maintaining the ability to operate with allied military forces, “and in particularly the United States;” contributing to NORAD; maintaining the U.S.-Canadian defense cooperation in armaments arrangements; and “with the US, develop options for government consideration on possible participation in ballistic missile defence program.”<sup>19</sup>

Both Canada and the United States receive a number of benefits out of the close defense relationship. According to the Defense Portfolio 2002, Canadian benefits include:

- enhanced air sovereignty and aerospace control capabilities;
- valuable training and operational experience;
- communication networks with links to the US and other allies;
- privileged access to U.S. military programs, intelligence and technical data;
- cost savings for Canadian Forces military space programs, and
- unique access to important defence-related technologies and the large U.S. market for Canadian companies.<sup>20</sup>

The 1994 Defence White Paper identifies as another important benefit, that through Canada's special defense relationship with the United States, it retains an influential voice in U.S. defense policy formation in areas where there is mutual security interests.<sup>21</sup>

As part of the close cooperation and in Canada's self-interest, Canada has supported many U.S. led multinational and NATO operations. Canada provided troops for the peace building operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as of late 2002, it still deployed 1,300 soldiers as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Canada participated in NATO's Operation ALLIED FORCE, the peace enforcement operation in Kosovo. As part of the air campaign, Canada deployed 18 CF-18s and flew ten percent of the strike. After the air campaign, Canada joined NATO on the ground, providing KFOR with 1,500 troops. Canada also supported the United States in coalition operations in Afghanistan by deploying 2,100 troops to Operation APOLLO, and in maritime interdiction operations in the Arabian Gulf.<sup>22</sup>

Over the last 63 years since the Ogdenburg Agreement was signed, Canada and the United States have signed over 2,500 agreements to further develop and strengthen the bi-national relationship. Some of the principle Canadian-US defense agreements defining the relationship are outlined below. The Ogdenburg Agreement is the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). It provides the highest bilateral forum to resolve the most complex defense issues at the diplomatic and senior military level. After World War Two, the two countries agreed to establish the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC). The MCC conducts

the detailed military planning for the defense of North America and maintains the critical joint planning documents such as the Basic Security Plan and the Combined Defense Plan. In 1958, the heads of government signed the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Agreement. It established NORAD and is updated and renewed every five years. The Mutual Support and Integrated Lines of Communications Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) addresses the means to support training and operations, and provides logistical support and transportation arrangements for non-routine situations.<sup>23</sup> There are also several agreements supporting armaments cooperation, defense trade, research, development, and weapons testing in each other's country.<sup>24</sup>

The countries recently signed three important agreements. The first two, the Canada-U.S. 30 Point Smart Border Accord and Anti-Terrorism Plan, address the civil aspects of continental security. And on 9 December, the Canadian government announced a new Canada and the U.S. Security Cooperation agreement that will establish a bi-national Planning Group in Colorado Springs. The Planning Group is intended to improve response to land-based attack and maritime threats. The group is assigned the following tasks:

- preparing contingency plans to ensure a cooperative and well-coordinated response to national requests for military assistance in the event of a threat, attack or civil emergency in Canada or in the U.S.;
- coordinating maritime surveillance and intelligence sharing to enhance our overall awareness of potential maritime threats;
- assessing maritime threats, incidents, and emergencies and advising the two governments;
- establishing appropriate planning and liaison mechanisms with civilian authorities involved in crisis response, such as police, fire fighters and other first responders;
- designing and participating in exercises;
- conducting joint training programs; and
- validating the practicality and effectiveness of plans prior to their approval.<sup>25</sup>

This bi-national planning group has an initial two-year charter that the governments will decide whether to renew, modify or terminate. The group is also tasked to make recommendations on improving bilateral security arrangements.

The last notable feature of the defense relationship is how United States dominates the U.S.-Canada defense relationship. Part of the reason is that the U.S. contributes the vast majority of the defense investment and manpower into the security of North America, while the Canadian government has reduced the Canadian Forces to under 60,000 military personnel and reduced the budget below levels sufficient to recapitalize equipment. Canada also has lost its marginal influence in NATO. Canada closed its bases in Germany and withdrew its troops. Meanwhile the U.S. led NATO into peace enforcement and peace building operations in the Balkans, and pushed the NATO membership into Eastern Europe. Canada has also lost its peacekeeping expertise to the Americanization of peacekeeping in the 1990s. Canada's influence has waned and has left Canada, as Joel Soloksky said, "glued to its seat."<sup>26</sup>

Overall, the U.S.-Canadian defense relationship is still strong, and after the September 11 terrorist attacks, even more important to both parties. Both derived benefits from the relationship. The United States gains political coverage for its global operations and NORAD. Canada gains enhanced security at a lower level of investment, operational experience and intelligence. The relationship's bedrock remains NORAD but a new bi-lateral planning group with their charter could explore new ground, while National Missile Defense could be the defense relationship weathervane of the future.

## **Economic Relations**

The importance of the security relationship extends far beyond cooperation in the defense of North America. It also encompasses protecting Canadian and American economic security and

prosperity. Canada and the United States have the largest economic trade relationship in the world. A over billion dollars of trade crosses the U.S.-Canadian border each day – nearly one third of it across the Detroit-Windsor gateway. The September 11 attacks demonstrated the vulnerability of the bilateral trade. The borders were closed immediately after the attacks, halting trade and idling factories on both sides. Both governments recognized the importance of enhancing the security of the borders, and Canada has followed America on the Smart Borders Initiative. Both governments have also recognized that economic security goes beyond North America and NAFTA, and that U.S. and Canadian prosperity also depends on a stable, secure international economic and trading environment.

The United States' largest trading partner is Canada and vice versa, Canada's largest trading partner is overwhelming the United States. Over the last 15 years, the bilateral trade doubled between the two countries as a result of the Free Trade Agreement in November of 1988, followed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in August of 1993. In the first five years after implementing NAFTA, Canadian exports to the US jumped 54 percent.

While the economies integrated, the trade relationship grew imbalanced. Canada has become economically dependent on exports to the United States, accounting for 86 percent of all exports and 9 percent of the economy. The United States export dependency on Canada is much less at 16.5 percent. This imbalance means Canada has a greater investment in its relationship with the US, and Canada must be concerned more with the rise of protectionism than Washington has to care about its interests in Canada. Except for soft lumber and wheat subsidy trade disputes, this relationship has been rather harmonious.<sup>27</sup> Even the ongoing trade imbalance in Canada's favor is unlikely to raise a reaction from the United States. The details of the overall trade and economic picture are depicted in Table 1.

**Table 1 – Comparative Economic Data: Canada and the United States**

Statistic	Canada	United States
Gross Domestic Product	\$ 793 bn <sup>1</sup>	\$10,885 bn <sup>1</sup>
GDP per capita	\$ 25,090	\$ 37,600
Population	31.6 m	289.5 m
GDP growth	3.4 %	2.6 %
Inflation	2.5 %	2.2 %
Trade – Exports	\$ 244.9 bn <sup>5</sup>	\$ 973.0 bn <sup>4</sup>
– Imports	\$ 203.5 bn	\$1,408.2 bn
Trade Partners - Exports	U.S. 86 % <sup>2</sup> Japan 3 % UK 1 %	Canada 16.5 % <sup>4</sup> Mexico 13.9 % Japan 7.9 %
Trade Partners - Imports	U.S. 74 % <sup>3</sup> EU 9 % Japan 1 %	Canada. 15.0 % <sup>4</sup> Mexico 9.5 % China 8.9 %
Sources: 1 – The Economist - The World in 2003, “The World in Figures: Countries,” pg 85. 2, 3 – CIA’s The World Factbook 2002: 2 – data from 1999; 3 – data from 2000 4 – U.S. Census Bureau, <a href="http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/">www.census.gov/foreign-trade/</a> , data from 2002. 5 – Data derived from the CIA’s The World Factbook 2002 and U.S. Census Bureau to ensure a comparative baseline.		

However the relationship is more integrated than simple trade numbers. The largest segment of this trade is the automobile industry with parts for assembly moving back and forth across the boarder. This interdependency is time sensitive with inventories dependent on Just-in-Time deliveries. A lengthy backup at the border will bring assembly plants to a halt.<sup>28</sup> In addition to motor vehicles and parts, Canada’s leading exports to the United States include industrial machinery, aircraft, telecommunication equipment, chemicals, plastics, fertilizers, wood pulp, timber, crude petroleum, natural gas, electricity and aluminum. An interesting note is that Canada has become United States’ number one supplier of foreign oil, further tying the US and

Canadian economies. On the other side of the border, the principle U.S. exports to Canada are machinery and equipment, motor vehicles and parts, chemicals, electricity and durable consumer goods.<sup>29</sup>

The United States developed the Smart Border initiative to enhance the public and economic security of the United States. It was an outgrowth of the realization that the borders presented vulnerabilities and the United States has to develop means to ensure the secure and timely flow of people and goods. Canada recognized the importance of the Smart Borders initiative, and building on the long history of cooperative border management, joined the United States in implementing the Smart Border 30 Point Action Plan. It was very much in Canada's interest to join the Smart Border initiative and mitigate the risk of the disruption of the flow of goods and people to the United States, and the associated risk of losing business. To enhance the secure flow of goods, Canada and the United States have agreed to establish completely new and comprehensive measures for screening cargo before it arrives in North America, and clearing and tracking cargo from first port of entry, or from the production or distribution facility. Additionally, the initiative requires systems to identify high-risk cargo while expediting low risk cargo. It also requires further coordination and integration of law enforcement processes and sharing of intelligence.<sup>30</sup>

With the advent of NAFTA, the Canadian and American economies have integrated and bloomed into the largest economic relationship in the world. The security relationship has also expanded to protecting the Canadian and American economies with the Smart Borders initiative. Although the economic interdependency is somewhat one-sided, the degree of integration will bind the mutual national interests to protect the combined economies and resulting prosperity.

This blending of mutual national interests may translate into even closer defense relationship as the Chretien government looks at issues such as missile defense.

Overall, Canada finds itself in a challenging relationship with the United States. Canada finds itself the junior partner struggling for identity and autonomy. It shares a similar set of national values and interests with the United States, where differences lie more in the implementation than in the objective. The noticeable difference is where Canada is more of a balance of rational and traditional values, the United States is more traditional in its values.

This is the relationship Canada finds itself with the United States. One in which it tries to exert its influence, shape its environment, but finds it must always accommodate the “elephant” it has become ever so dependant on. Canada struggles within its own perspective to retain its identity and autonomy, as it so often finds itself struggling with its relationship with the United States. The political relationship has been temperamental, and with Liberals and Republicans in power, the ideology and political agendas are bound to clash. But if the leaders keep their relationship professional, the national interests should prevail. The defense relationship is strong and getting stronger since September 11<sup>th</sup>. The economic relationship has become overwhelmingly dominant and may influence the political and defense relationships. Now it is time to look at how Canada views its security and the roles the government and the public play in shaping Canadian security policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World, Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995, pg 2 of Summary, on-line, Internet, 20 Jan 03, available from [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign\\_policy/](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/).

<sup>2</sup> W. D. Macnamara, and Ann Fitz-Gerald, “A National Security Framework for Canada, *Policy Matters*, Vol 3, No 10 (October 2002): 12.

<sup>3</sup> Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*, June 1999, Part 1, p. 1, on-line, Internet, 10 March 2003, available at <http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/>.

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<sup>4</sup> Sean Maloney, "Canadian Values and National Security Policy: Who Decides?" *Policy Options*, December 2001, 47-48.

<sup>5</sup> The White House, The National Security Strategy for a Global Age, Washington, December 2000, 1.

<sup>6</sup> "Living with a Superpower," *The Economist*, (2 Jan 03), n.p. On-line, Internet, 3 Mar 03, available at [www.economist.com/printedition/](http://www.economist.com/printedition/)

<sup>7</sup> Norman Hillmer, and J. L. Granatstein. *Empire to Umpire*. Toronto: Irwin Publishing Ltd., 1994, 347.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 257-259.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 298-302.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 302.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 306-310.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 331-344.

<sup>13</sup> Andrew Cohen, "Canadian-American Relations: Does Canada Matter in Washington? Does it Matter if Canada Doesn't Matter?" *Canada Among Nations 2002*, ?????, 40.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 39.

<sup>15</sup> Commodore McNeil, Daniel (CF), "Privy Council Office and the Support to the Prime Minister," presentation to the Queen's Centre for International Relations, Privy Council Office, Ottawa, 18 October 2002.

<sup>16</sup> Lieutenant-General George Macdonald (CF), "Canada-US. Defense Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan," n.p.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. n.p.

<sup>18</sup> David L. King, "We Need a Romanow Commission for Defence and Foreign Policy," *Policy Options*, April 2002, 9.

<sup>19</sup> Department of National Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001 (DPG 2001)*, 11 April 2000. 2-4.

<sup>20</sup> Department of National Defence, *The Defence Portfolio, 2002*, 2002. 11, available at <http://www.forces.gc.ca>.

<sup>21</sup> Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 1994, Canada Communication Group – Publishing, Ottawa, 25.

<sup>22</sup> Department of National Defence, *The Defence Portfolio, 2002*, 2002, 14.

<sup>23</sup> Department of National Defence, "Defence Cooperation: Principle Agreements," n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 January 2003, available at <http://www.forces.gc.ca>.

<sup>24</sup> Department of National Defence, *The Defence Portfolio, 2002*, 2002, 12.

<sup>25</sup> Department of National Defence, "Enhanced Canada-US Security Cooperation," Backgrounder Documentation (BG-02.041), 9 Dec 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 January 2003, available at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/>.

<sup>26</sup> Joel J. Sokolsky, "Glued to Its Seat: Canada, Peacekeeping and the Western Alliance in the Post-Cold War Era," *The Transatlantic Link in Evolution: What has Changed Since 11 September 2001, Martello Paper 25*, ed. Charles C. Pentland, (Kingston, Ontario, Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2003), 33-43.

<sup>27</sup> Andrew Cohen, "Canadian-American Relations: Does Canada Matter in Washington? Does it Matter if Canada Doesn't Matter?" 39.

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<sup>28</sup> Greg Keenan, "Windsor-Detroit border: Road rage for auto makers," *Globe and Mail*, on-line edition, 8 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 9 March 2003, available <http://sympatico.globalandmail.com>.

<sup>29</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook 2002*, Sections on Canada and United States, on-line, Internet, 28 February 2003, available <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

<sup>30</sup> Derived from: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Building a Smart Border for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," Web Site, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 January 2003, available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/>, and Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., "The Smart Border Declaration," Web Site, n.p., on-line, Internet, 6 March 2003, available at <http://www.canadianembassy.org/border/declaration-en.asp>.

## Chapter 4

### Canadian Security Perceptions

*We cannot permit Canadian territory to be used as an avenue of attack on the United States.*

— Lieutenant-General George Macdonald,  
Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS)<sup>1</sup>

General Macdonald was speaking to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence about Canadian-US defense relations. The presentation was delivered in 2002, but it had many of the overtones from the days of Prime Minister Mackenzie King. The terrorist attack may have altered the security landscape, but some aspects of the Canadian-US relation have not changed. This chapter will look at the Canadian security perceptions starting with an assessment of the Canadian security interests and threats, followed by review of the influences and motivations of the three principle actors – the Liberal Party, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence. The chapter concludes with an examination of the public perceptions and debate shaping Canadian continental security policy. The perceptions will shape the decisions made by the Government of Canada.

#### Canadian Security Interests and Threats

For the majority of Canadians, the greatest threat to Canada is national unity. The Quebec referendum in 1995 nearly split the country into two. The plebiscite lost by one percent of the

vote. The majority of Canadians still worry about a breakup of Canada and the constitutional crisis still persists. The next most important security interest is the protection of the sovereignty of Canada to external threats. The end of the Cold War eliminated the conventional threat, leaving only non-traditional threats. The government of Canada does perceive a terrorist threat but not nearly to the level the United States is concerned. Then in priority comes the protection of North America with the Americans. The heart of this security interest lies with the Canadian economic prosperity and economic interdependency on the United States. Here Canada is very concerned with an attack on the United States and how it might affect Canada economically. The fourth and last security interest is maintaining global stability. Canada recognizes that its prosperity depends on a stable, secure international environment. With the end of the Cold War, a declining and under funded military, and limitations of being a middle power, Canada has turned to soft power to peddle its influence. And a principle part of the Liberal strategy is addressing “human security.”

The principal security concern for Canada is maintaining political unity of the federation. The political threat of Quebec secession is fueled by the historical anglophone domination of the francophone culture in *la province du Québec*. Beginning in the 1960’s amid a cultural awakening and transformation, the *Québécois* began to demand a special status for Quebec. An active left minority broke with the Liberals and formed the Parti Québécois with a platform for secession. In 1976, the party won the provincial elections and began to implement a series of controversial laws to strengthen the francophone culture, and in 1980, sponsored the first referendum for independence. The referendum lost by a sizable 60 to 40 margin, but threw Canada into a federal constitutional crisis. The Quebec government resisted the 1982 constitution over the provision for freedom of language in education, and in 1984 the Supreme Court ruled against

Quebec's schooling reforms. The federal government tried to make amends with Quebec with the Meech Lake accord in 1987, but Newfoundland and Manitoba rejected it. Then in 1992, Canadians turned down a constitutional referendum giving special recognition to Quebec as a distinct society. The Quebec government responded with a second referendum in 1995 that lost by only 5,000 votes.<sup>2</sup> Surprisingly as close as *Québécois* came to vote for its independence, the struggle has stalled and today it is waning. The public appears tired of debate and is finding the choices unacceptable. The secession question may have become irrelevant for the time being, but the constitutional impasse between the English and French-speaking regions remains.<sup>3</sup> Regardless, security decisions will have political ramifications through both the anglo- and franco-Canada, and the franophone perceptions are politically important for the unity of Canada.

The other traditional security interests are the responsibility of the Canada Forces. As stated in the *1994 Defense White Paper* and revalidated in the *Defence Portfolio 2002*:

The three roles of the Canadian Forces are to: defend Canada; defend North America in partnership with the United States; and contribute to global stability.<sup>4</sup>

Canadian Forces play a vital role in securing and protecting Canadian sovereignty. However the Cold War urgency and necessity to defend Canada has diminished with the threat. The Canadian government perspective of the threat is that the conventional threat is gone and the risk of such a threat re-emerging is very low.

Canada does foresee non-traditional threats to Canada. They are "terrorism, organized crime, drug smuggling, illegal migration, weapons proliferation and humanitarian crises."<sup>5</sup> Canada does see terrorism as a "new and growing threat,"<sup>6</sup> but not as seriously as the United States perceives the threat. The budgetary response to the terrorist threat included \$119 million (Canadian) increase over five years for Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2), Canada's terrorist response team, and \$570 million (Canadian) increase over five years to enhance DND's domestic

capability in signal intelligence, computer network defense, critical infrastructure defense and the military response against unconventional threats.<sup>7</sup>

Canada defends North America in partnership with the United States through NORAD and through bilateral operations with the US Navy. The Canadian government perceives the need to its enhance defense relationship with the United States. The Canadian government has noticed that since the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, the United States has increased defense spending significantly, is modernizing its forces, is developing a missile defense system, established a homeland security cabinet and “pursue aggressively the campaign against terrorism.”<sup>8</sup> Canada does not see a need to increase its capability to defend North America, but does see a need to coordinate better with the United States in its response to the threat of terrorism. Canada has a vested interest in ensuring economic effects on Canada are minimized.

In its last traditional security role, Canadian Forces contributed to global stability through multilateral institutions such as NATO in the Balkans and the UN. They also contribute to global stability in US led coalitions such as Operation APOLLO in Afghanistan.

Canadian’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has developed its own uniquely Canadian approach to addressing global instability and poverty. As in all governments, there is an appreciation for the non-military instruments of power and a regard for soft power. Canadian Liberal government believes it is vital to address non-military sources of conflict that generate societal instability. This requires working with the international community to strengthen the government institutions, encouraging rule of law, and holding the leadership accountable in fragile and poorly governed states. Canada calls their soft power approach “human security.” The formulation of much of this policy is credited to former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, and is based on a number of core principles that are known as

the Axworthy Doctrine. Fen Hampson and Dean Oliver in their article, Pulpit Diplomacy, summarize the principles as follows:

- the end of the cold war has fundamentally changed the nature of international politics;
- security goals should be focused around human security and not state security;
- soft power is the new currency of international politics;
- military force is of declining utility in international politics;
- public diplomacy is increasingly effective in a wired world;
- non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are in the vanguard of the 'new diplomacy';
- Canada can lead 'coalitions of the willing'; and
- international change will come through the promulgation of new norms of which the key priorities for Canada are small arms, children rights, international human rights, and peacebuilding.<sup>9</sup>

It is a controversial security strategy making several bold assumptions about the post-Cold War security environment, and is at odds with the traditional security strategy and Department of National Defence roles.

Overall, Canada's principal security concern is maintaining national unity. and security policy decisions must consider the interests of the *Québécois*. The Canadian forces have the responsibility to defend Canada; defend North America in partnership with the United States; and contribute to global stability. While the conventional threat is gone, Canada is responding to non-traditional threats. Canada does not perceive the terrorism threat as seriously as the United States but it has taken measures to increase its security. Canadian Liberal government has also formulated the Axworthy doctrine, a "human security" agenda, to address the causes of global insecurity.

### **Canadian Government: Players, Perceptions and Motivations**

As with all states, the Canadian government is not composed of one entity but of many players with their own perceptions of security policy and motivations to support or inhibit security decisions with the United States. This section will explore those perceptions and

motivations within three parts of the Canadian government – the Prime Minister and Liberal Party, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND).

### **The Prime Minister and the Liberal Party**

The principle interests of Prime Minister Chretien and the Liberal Party are to maintain political control of the federal government and when Prime Minister Chretien retires, conduct a successful transition of power. The prime minister is a cautious leader and will move slowly not to upset the current political affairs or accomplishments in the Federal Government over the last ten years. He runs the Liberal Party as any good parliamentary party boss – on a diet of strict party discipline and loyalty. Mr. Chretien is attuned to the nation’s security needs, and as long as the threat is perceived small, the Department of National Defense will continue to play a minor role in the government, and second fiddle on the Liberal Party agenda.

When the Liberals took office in 1993, the Progressive-Conservatives had left them a large federal deficit of \$750 billion (Canadian). Without a security threat and in line with the Liberal party policies, the federal government anxious to free scarce revenue for domestic concerns such as debt repayment, and had good reasons to play down the need for military preparedness. And in a post-Cold War environment, formulated new and innovative security solutions such as “human security.”<sup>10</sup> This allowed the government to justify cutting the defense budget more severely than other departments.

Ten years later, the deficit is still large but under control and the economy is booming at a robust 3.4 percent. The Liberal Party’s priorities have not changed. Health care, the economy, paying down the debt, families and children, education, and environment dominate the agenda.

Meanwhile national security and defense issues received a scant two paragraphs in the nine-page 2002 Speech from the Throne, the Canadian equivalent to the State of the Union Speech.

In foreign policy like his domestic agenda, Prime Minister Chrétien prefers to stay in his own comfort zone, and “Canadian foreign policy has reverted to a much more cautious and compact style at both the declaratory and operational levels.”<sup>11</sup> Usually the government wants to balance all policy alternatives, and often the government has motivation not to formulate clear, firm policy. It is not in the Cabinet or Privy Council’s interest to be decisive. When motivated through its interests, the Canadian government can move quickly as in implementing the Smart Borders agenda with the United States. The policy decision was simple, easy, clear-cut economics. National Missile Defense will be a much more difficult hurdle with more political risk.

Prime Minister Chretien plans to retire in February 2004 at the next party leadership convention. Paul Martin, his former finance minister and current political rival, covets the top job. Other potential candidates include Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, Allen Rock and Sheila Copps. The principal concern of the liberal party is the risk of a mid-election transition of power. Historically, it does not bode well for the party attempting to change prime ministers between elections. In the last two attempts, the parties of both Prime Ministers John Turner in 1984 and Kim Campbell in 1993 lost their bid to hold onto power.

With Prime Minister Chretien’s cautious leadership, all else looks well for the Liberals to repeat in 2005. The Liberals have won big in the last three consecutive elections, and even more significantly, destroyed their historical nemesis, the Progressive Conservatives (refer to [Table 2](#) for election results).

**Table 2 – Federal Election Results**

Political Party	Election Results – number of seats / percentage				Current Seats / percentage
	1988	1993	1997	2000	
New Democratic Party	43 15%	9 3%	21 7%	13 4%	14 5%
Liberal	83 28%	<u>177</u> <u>60%</u>	<u>155</u> <u>51%</u>	<u>173</u> <u>58%</u>	<u>169</u> <u>56%</u>
Progressive-Conservative	<u>169</u> <u>57%</u>	2 1%	20 7%	12 4%	14 5%
Reform / Alliance	-- --	52 18%	60 20%	66 22%	63 21%
Bloc Quebecois	-- --	54 18%	44 15%	37 12%	37 12%
Independent	-- --	1 0%	1 0%	-- --	3 1%
Total Seats	295 100%	295 100%	301 100%	301 100%	301* 100%

\* Note: one seat is currently vacant.

However the conservative parties contributed to much of their own undoing. First, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney ran the country in a severe recession in 1993 with free trade generated factory shut downs and double-digit unemployment. He nearly bankrupted the federal government, and continued to alienate the public with NAFTA and his overly close relationship with the United States.<sup>12</sup> When Prime Minister Mulroney handed the leadership over to Kim Campbell, the Progressive-Conservative political base was in severe trouble with its constituencies. To compound the problem, conservative political base was further fractured by the upstart conservative Reform Party in western Canada, and then with the momentum of the Quebec separatist movement, by the newly form Bloc Québécois Party in Quebec. The Tory votes were split and squander in the “first to the post” election rules, in which the winner in a riding (i.e. district) does not need a majority, but just the most votes, and that unlike other

parliamentary systems, there is no apportionment of seats based on the overall party election results.

Currently, the Liberal Party retains a commanding lead in Parliament and will not repeat the mistakes of the opposition in the 2005 federal elections, and on issues where public opinion is divided, the Liberal party will be reluctant to take a stand.

### **Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade**

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is the protector of Canadian interests abroad. Its objective is to enhance Canada's international influence as a middle power by preferring to operate in a multilateral, rules based framework. It is also charged with preserving Canada's political and diplomatic freedom of action, especially with the United States. DFAIT is considered an influential and important department in the Canadian government, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs is considered a highly desired, senior cabinet post. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs is William Graham.

Starting with the Mulroney government, there has been considerable impetus for Canada to draw closer to the United States. The shift was a means of coping with the "sheer complexity of the Canada-US connection" and "this shift in response has meant closer attention to Canadian-US relations."<sup>13</sup> With the arrival of the Liberal government in 1993, the close relationship was maintained. Albeit, the Chretien government has emphasized its commitment to multilateralism when it best suited Canada's interest. Canada has shown a degree of autonomy and an ability to resist important aspects of U.S. policy when they were not in Canada's interest.<sup>14</sup> Canada's support for the landmines treaty, International Tribunal on War Criminals, and the Kyoto Treaty were all departures from U.S. policy, and while they won little goodwill in Washington, they were in the best interest of Canada.

When it comes to security policy, DFAIT is responsible for pursuing a foreign policy to achieve “the protection of (Canadian) security, within a stable, global framework.”<sup>15</sup> In doing so, DFAIT comes into conflict and competition over security policy. While it promotes its own human security agenda, it must also pursue Canada’s more traditional security policy with DND. As pointed out by Louis Deloivoie in his article, “Curious Ambiguities: Canada’s International Security Policy,” DFAIT and DND appear to be in pursuit of two quite separate and distinct international and security agenda. The Department of National Defence and parts of DFAIT pursue a traditional approach to security while the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a small group of advisors forge ahead on the human security agenda and “downgrade the relevance and importance of traditional security issues.”<sup>16</sup> In addition, the *1994 Defence White Paper* appears to have been completely formulated separately of the DFAIT’s *Canada in the World, Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995*, with little apparent linkage on security policy. Unlike the United States, Canada does not develop and promulgated a cohesive national security strategy.

When DFAIT works with the Department of State on any highly controversial issue such as the National Missile Defense program, it moves slowly to consider all aspects of Canadian and Liberal government interests and develops the best position for Canada. The foreign service culture is very different from the military. It is cautious, distrustful and is willing to wait with calculated hesitancy. DFAIT would see greater wisdom in taking more time to reflect and evaluate its government’s decisions about NMD, and would prefer to wait until the United States had developed more concrete ideas about the methods, timeframes, and deployment of NMD, and then DFAIT would undertake a global polling to assess different views of the American plans before declaring its position.<sup>17</sup> DFAIT’s relationship with the Department of National Defence (DND) is one of trying patience. DFAIT mandate is to be the skeptic of American interests.

## **Department of National Defence**

The Department of National Defence (DND) has the focused mission of providing for the military security and defense of Canada, defending of North America with the United States and in its limited capacity, contributing to global stability. With the government's large deficit and no conventional threat, the government has not been willing or able to sufficiently fund the department. The defense budget will exceed \$12 billion (Canadian) for the first time in 10 years. Canadian Forces have lost a substantial portion of their Cold War capability, and have become even more dependent on the collective security and defense arrangements with the United States. Many of the senior officers in the Canadian Forces have worked closely with the American military, and have developed favorable disposition towards U.S. security policy and the Department of Defense. Although they are often the strongest advocates supporting US policy and initiatives, they have limited influence to shape Canadian security policy.

The reason is that the DND lacks influence in the Canadian government. The Minister of National Defence is considered a minor cabinet post relegated to a more junior cabinet minister. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs like most committees in the Canadian parliament is superficial and of questionable relevance. When issues are raised in the Cabinet there is no foreign affairs or defense union to address them, and the defense issues are farmed out to the appropriate Cabinet Committee, either the Economic Union or the Social Union. The department's influence in the Privy Council Office is equally minimal without a champion to advocate security policy. And as with all policy formulation in the Privy Council Office, it must be formulated through consensus and frequently the working relationship with DFAIT is adversarial, with DFAIT often having different objectives.<sup>18</sup>

## **Canadian Public Perceptions**

Prime Minister Chretien and the Liberal government will act on security issues only when it is in Canada's interest and when there is public support. This section will examine the public support for Canadian-US security issues as they pertain to North American security. In general, the Canadian public favors close military ties with the United States, continued participation in NORAD, even an expanded role for NORAD, but Canadians are polarized on support for the pending war on Iraq, feel US-Canadian relations have deteriorated over the past year and the majority of Canadians are against National Missile Defense. The section will conclude with an analysis of the opposing views on US-Canadian relations.

### **Public Opinion – Relations Should be Good, But...**

The Centre for Research and Information on Canada conducted a poll from 25 June to 16 July 2002 to examine Canadian views on Canadian-US security relations. The poll surveyed 2002 Canadians and found that the large majority (78 percent) of Canadians felt the military relations with the United States should be the same or closer. The results showed:

- 31% of Canadians said relations should be closer,
- 47% of Canadians said relations should be as they are, and
- 21% of Canadians said relations should be less close<sup>19</sup>

It also appears that the opinions Canadians have on this issue are fairly stable. The exact same question was asked 17 years ago with virtually the same results.

The poll also asked whether Canada should join U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Although this is not a possibility, being that NORTHCOM is not a bi-national command, the results of the poll would suggest Canadians would favor joining a bi-national military command like NORAD that integrated the land and maritime defense into a Canadian-US command structure. The poll asked the question two different ways with nearly the same results:

- 59% of Canadians felt Canada should join NORTHCOM to increase its own security
- 36% of Canadians felt Canada should not join as it will lose too much independence
  
- 60% of Canadians felt Canada should join NORTHCOM to ensure it has a say in US's North American security policy
- 35% of Canadians felt Canada should not join as it will lose too much independence<sup>20</sup>

It appears that Canadians would favor a bi-national command structure for the defense of North America. Canadians also felt that enhancing Canadian security and having influence in U.S. North American security policy were more important than the concerns about preserving national sovereignty. These trends were weaker in Quebec, but still the 51 percent of Quebecois favored joining a bi-national command structure.<sup>21</sup>

Support for the continuance of NORAD was found to be even stronger. In a poll conducted just after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks by the Department of National Defence in their annual national public opinion survey found that “92 percent of Canadians support Canada’s continued participation in NORAD.”<sup>22</sup> The results of the October 2001 poll might have skewed higher by the publicity of the terrorist attacks and role Canadian Forces played in NORAD, but regardless the extremely high numbers indicate the overwhelming support of NORAD among Canadians.

On the down side, Canadians are polarized on the support for war with Iraq and a majority of Canadians believe relations between Canada and the United States has deteriorated. In a poll sponsored by the Toronto Sun, Canadian Broadcast Corporation and La Presse and conducted from 2 to 4 December 2002, found Canadians split 41 to 40 percent against Canada supporting the United States in a war against Iraq. The same survey also found that even more Canadian had felt that relations between the countries had deteriorated over the previous year:

- 52% of Canadians felt that Canadian-U.S. relations were worse that they were a year ago
- 38% of Canadians felt that the relations were the same
- 7% of Canadians felt that the relations had improved<sup>23</sup>

More concerning for those seeking greater security cooperation are the latest poll results showing nearly half of the Canadian want their government to be less supportive of American policy. In a poll conducted by Ipsos-Reid from November 11 to December 14, 2002, 500 Canadians were asked whether their government should be more or less supportive of American government policies. The results were:

- 37% of Canadians felt that their government should be MORE supportive
- 48% of Canadians felt that their government should be LESS supportive
- 10% of Canadians felt that their government support should be the SAME as now
- 5% of Canadians don't know<sup>24</sup>

Much of this negativity has been generated from the Bush Administration's foreign policy, and a range of internationally unpopular decisions from abandoning the Kyoto accord to war with Iraq without UN approval.

Lastly, another Ipsos-Reid survey sponsored by the Global and Mail found a majority of Canadians said that the government of Canada should oppose the building of an anti-ballistic missile system. The survey sampled 1000 Canadians from 17 to 19 July, 2001. The results of the poll were:

- 58% of Canadians agreed that their government should OPPOSE the building of an anti-ballistic missile system by the United States
- 33% of Canadians agreed that their government should SUPPORT the building of an anti-ballistic missile system by the United States
- 9% of Canadians did not have an opinion<sup>25</sup>

The results reflect Canadian's concern that building a National Missile Defense (NMD) system could lead to another nuclear arms race. And Canadian history has taught the Canadian government to be very sensitive to the public's "nuclear allergy." So far, the Canadian governments have carefully walked the NMD fence since the days of President Reagan's Star

Wars program. Strong disapproval of NMD by the Canadian public will continue to make it difficult for the Liberal government to support NMD.

### **Public Debate – Security Policy, Northern Command and Missile Defense**

There are three ongoing public debates in Canada on security policy – the role of the military and security policy in general, the Northern Command debate and last, the debate whether to support United States ballistic missile defense. The two sides of the debate are characterized by the conservative position based on views espoused by Jack Granitstein, the Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, and the liberal position based on a blend of the work published from Lloyd Axworthy’s Liu Center for the Study of Global Issues, and by Steven Staples, Director, Project on the Corporate-Security State, Polaris Institute.

The first debate centers on the role of the Canadian Forces, whether Canada is taking care of its security responsibilities. The debate addresses issues of Canadian-U.S. security cooperation and the appropriate degree of cooperation. Tied up in the debate are the emotions of sovereignty. The conservative argument is that the public has become enthralled with Canada’s UN peacekeeping and human security agenda and has lost sight of the military’s responsibility to defend Canada, to defend North America and to contribute to global stability. As “The Peoples’ Defence Review” explains it, “self-interest and self-respect have nonetheless demand over time that Canadians protect their own territory. Canada’s sovereignty could not be someone else’s to guard.”<sup>26</sup> Canadian forces need to be combat capable and able to fight along side of Canada’s allies. And a military trained and equipped to fight wars is better suited for the full spectrum of military operations including peacekeeping.

The conservative position is that national interests should drive Canada’s security policy, and Canada needs to recognize the Canadian-U.S. relationship for what it is – a close, complex

and extensive relationship. Canada is economically tied to the U.S in the largest trading partnership in the world. Second, the United States will pursue its interests to defend itself, and that Canada must cooperate with the United States in Canada's own interests, and cooperate from a position of strength. Canadians cannot stand back and let America plan for the protection of Canada but have an obligation to participate in the planning and coordination of continental security. When contributing to global stability, Canada should act on its national interests and not base decisions predominantly on valid humanitarian concerns.<sup>27</sup>

The Chretien's government policy is close to the conservative position in rhetoric only. While the conservatives laud the Liberal's *1994 Defence White Paper*, it deplores the lack of investment in the Canadian forces. In the view of Jack Granitstein and others, the Liberal government has allowed the Canadian forces to hollow and degrade. The Liberal government had cut and restrict the defense budget out of fiscal policy, and because of public priorities, the cuts were more severe with the defense budget than the social program. As the budget deficit improved, the Liberal Party proposed to increase the defense spending by \$800 million (Canadian) in the 2003-2004 budget, nearly a seven percent increase. This appears significant until compared with the health care increase of \$6 billion (Canadian). Also in the views of conservatives, the Chretien government has too cautious with continental security policy, and should be endorsing the National Missile Defense.

The liberal's argument is that Canada's current defense policy based on the 1994 Defence White Paper is mired in Cold War thinking and is outdated. Canada has no threat to require it to wage wars beyond its borders and its global security interests would be better served supporting the traditional "blue-helmeted" UN peacekeeping role and investing in the uniquely Canadian "human security" agenda.<sup>28</sup> "Canadians distinguished what they were usefully doing in the

world from what the US was doing in the world” and “see peacekeeping as an element contributing to Canada’s national identity.”<sup>29</sup> The policy of equipping and maintain multipurpose combat capable forces is expensive and unrealistic. The military would be substantially less expensive if restructured around light forces that would be better suited for peacekeeping and humanitarian support.<sup>30</sup>

The liberal’s perspective on the U.S.-Canadian relations is that Canada is too dependent on the United States economically and for its security, and this limits Canada’s global influence and foreign policy. The liberal’s perspective is split on the appropriate degree of bi-national cooperation such as NORAD, with Paul Hellyer suggesting withdrawing from NORAD, while others call for a reduced air defense role only. In general, paraphrasing Steven Staples, defense policy should be the minimally necessary to ensure the country’s legitimate territorial defense and sovereignty.<sup>31</sup> The emphasis on security policy should be devoted to human security and not state security, and the United Nations should be come the preeminent collective security organization. The liberal’s argument diverges from the conservative argument in that it is value-based and altruistic as opposed to the conservative argument rooted in Canadian interests.

The Axworth Doctrine promoting a human security agenda is itself a target of debate. Advocates challenge that the principle causes of its ineffectiveness lay in failure to achieve “sustainable human security” and the lack of significant funding.<sup>32</sup> All too often the efforts to provide support have focused on the quick fix rather than in developing a sustained, long-term strategy. The detractors find that the core principles human security are based on are flawed, that state security cannot be replaced by human security, that soft power has its limitations and it must be backed up with hard power to succeed, and that the “news of the demise of military force to be greatly exaggerated.”<sup>33</sup> Others argue that the degree of social engineering required

entails enormous financial resources, and that if the resources were available, it would have no more than a modest chance for success.<sup>34</sup>

The second public debate arose out of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 17 April 2002 press briefing announcing the standing up of U.S. Northern Command and has been fueled by statements made by former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and a report published by his Liu Centre for the Study for the Global Issues, University of British Columbia. The focus of the debate is a report titled, “Canadian armed forces under US command,” where Mr. Byers makes some controversial claims. First he proposes that there were bilateral negotiations underway to place Canadian forces “under the operational control of a permanent, integrated but U.S. led command structure” and that “NORTHCOM ... is a logical precursor to an expansion that would include Canada and Canadian Forces.”<sup>35</sup> Mr. Byers goes on and states, “The creation of a U.S. led integrated command, or even less extensive or formalised arrangement, would thus constitute a major delegation of Canadian sovereignty.”<sup>36</sup> He goes on to list a series of political, legal, international problems if Canada subordinates its forces.

Mr. Byers claims raised much hullabaloo, and the Liberal government discredited his accusations. Then Defense Minister Art Eggleton said, “there’s no need to worry, Northern Command is only an internal structure for the American military.”<sup>37</sup> The assessment is correct that NORTHCOM is a U.S. only unified command structure, and it was set up to defend the sovereign territory of the United States and to provide support to civilian agencies in the United States. The bilateral negotiations Byer’s refers to in his report were the discussions to establish the bi-national Planning Group and led to the December 2002 U.S. Security Cooperation agreement. And there is no interest by either country to integrate their armed forces. As for the

concern about a loss of sovereignty in cooperation with the United States on continental security, Deputy Prime Minister Manley responded with:

Cooperation with the US on continental security is not an abrogation of sovereignty, rather it is the exercise of sovereignty. By discussing options, Canada can choose the scope, means and structure of such cooperation, and can play an active role in this evolving situation. The NORAD Agreement can serve as one potential reference point for such cooperation. It can help preserve Canadian sovereignty through a joint consultation mechanism, a regional structure respecting sovereign boundaries, access to US senior national security officials, limited assignment of standing forces, and national approval of actions on a case-by-case basis.<sup>38</sup>

The exercise of the right to cooperate in a bilateral agreement such as NORAD or the bi-national Planning Group agreement is in itself a form of exercising sovereignty. And in any agreement to cooperate, Canada like the United States will retain its national command authority and retain control over its sovereign territory.<sup>39</sup>

A third Canadian public debate is raging on the appropriateness of Canada participating or even endorsing America's National Missile Defense system. The conservative argument is that Canada has a choice to make. It can join the Americans in National Missile Defense (NMD), agree to integrate NMD command and control into NORAD, and participate in the ballistic missile defense of North America. Such a decision will increase Canadian influence in North America security policy. The alternative is for Canada not to support the NMD program, risk marginalizing NORAD and lose influence in continental security decisions, lose access to U.S. intelligence and operational experience, and abdicate the Canadian sovereign responsibility to defend Canada.<sup>40</sup>

The liberals argue that Canada should not entangle itself with the United States' anti-ballistic missile system. Canada has established a moral international reputation for arms control and disarmament. By accepting America's NMD system, Canada will turn its back on

international strategic stability, and accept complicity in a renewed nuclear arms race and the weaponization of space. In addition, the United States may want Canada to contribute financially and militarily, and if the United States is allowed to construct NMD sites in Canada, it could lead to the reintroduction of American forces back onto Canadian territory, constituting an erosion of Canadian sovereignty.<sup>41</sup> And finally, there are those in the liberal debate that see supporting the United States and its NMD as giving the United States greater freedom of action to pursue its national interests through its unilateral-centric foreign policy.

Canadians have a diverse range of perceptions about security issues, and with those perceptions comes motivations to shape policy and decisions in their interests. The Liberal government has promoted both the traditional and human security agenda and in the eyes of their constituents underfunded both. The party's principal objective for the Liberal government is to win the next election with a new party leader and prime minister, and the party will avoid unnecessary political risks in doing so. Frequently the government decision is to remain ambiguously on the fence. The DND avidly supports and promotes U.S. security policy, while DFAIT keeps a skeptical distance and protects the government's foreign policy independence. The public endorses an overall good security relationship, while maintaining its nuclear allergy and distrust of America's Nation Missile Defense system. Meanwhile the debate on Canadian security policy continues. The Liberal government will find security decisions easy where interests and public support coincide and difficult and undesirable where they collide.

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<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-General George Macdonald (CF), "Canada-US. Defense Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan," n.p.

<sup>2</sup> Derived from the following sources: "Origins of Quebec Separatism," *Uni*, n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 March 2003, available at [http://www.uni.ca/sep\\_origins.html](http://www.uni.ca/sep_origins.html); and "Quebec votes to remain part of Canada," *Associated Press*, 31 October 1995, n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 March 2003, available at <http://www.kstatecollegian.com/ISSUES/v100/FA/n051/ap-Canada-Quebec.html>.

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<sup>3</sup> Steven Pearlstein, "Quebec's Separatist Fire Appears Ready to Flicker Out," Washington Post, 9 March 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 March 2003 available at <http://www.vigile.net/00-3/wash-post.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Department of National Defence, *The Defence Portfolio, 2002*, 2002, 5.

<sup>5</sup> Department of National Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001 (DPG 2001)*, 11 April 2000. 1-1.

<sup>6</sup> Department of National Defence, *The Defence Portfolio, 2002*, 2002, 6.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 45.

<sup>9</sup> Fen Hampson, and Dean Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," *International Journal*, 53 (Summer 98), 380.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 393.

<sup>11</sup> Cooper, Andrew F., *Canadian Foreign Policy, Old Habits and New Direction*, Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997, 13.

<sup>12</sup> Norman Hillmer, and J. L. Granatstein. *Empire to Umpire*, 333, 341 and 346.

<sup>13</sup> Cooper, Andrew F., *Canadian Foreign Policy, Old Habits and New Direction*, 18.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 14, 78-83.

<sup>15</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World, Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995, pg 2 of Summary.

<sup>16</sup> Delvoie, Louis A., "Curious Ambiguities: Reflections on Canada's International Security Policy," *Policy Options*, January/February 2001, 37.

<sup>17</sup> Erika Simpson, "Rapporteur's Report, Canadian Pugwash Group Workshop," Thinker's Lodge, Pugwash, NS, 19 July 2002, n.p., Section, Major Themes: 1. The militarization of outerspace and the development of the National Missile Defense, on-line, Internet, 10 March 2003, available at <http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/forum/forumcontent/July1902.htm>.

<sup>18</sup> Commodore McNeil, Daniel (CF), "Privy Council Office and the Support to the Prime Minister," n.p.

<sup>19</sup> Centre for Research and Information on Canada, "Canadians Favour Close Military Ties With US," Press Release, Montreal, 9 September 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 March 2003, available at [www.cric.ca](http://www.cric.ca).

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, n.p.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, n.p.

<sup>22</sup> Department of National Defence, *The Defence Portfolio, 2002*, 6.

<sup>23</sup> Tim Harper, "Poll: Canadians sour on U.S.," *Toronto Star*, 7 December 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 March 2003, available at <http://www.ekos.com/media/files/Torstar-07-12-2002.html>.

<sup>24</sup> Ipsos-Reid, "Lonely America: Little Global Support for U.S. Government Policies," Toronto, 5 February 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 March 2003, available at [http://www.ipsos-reid.com/media/content/PRE\\_REL.cfm](http://www.ipsos-reid.com/media/content/PRE_REL.cfm).

<sup>25</sup> Ipsos-Reid, "Majority (58%) Oppose U.S. Missile Defence Shield," Press Release, Toronto, 23 July 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 March 2003, available at <http://angusreid.com/media/>.

<sup>26</sup> The Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, *The Peoples' Defence Review*, Calgary, 11 September 2002, 11.

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<sup>27</sup> Composed of concepts taken from: J. L. Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance: Canada-US Defence Relations Past, Present and Future," Commentary, C. D. Howe Institute, No. 166, June 2002, 1 & 11; and The Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, *The Peoples' Defence Review*, 23.

<sup>28</sup> Steven Staples, *Breaking Rank: A Citizens' Review of Canada's Military Spending*, The Polaris Institute, Ottawa, 2002, 13-14.

<sup>29</sup> Denis Stairs, "Canada in the 1990's: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig," *Policy Options*, January/February, 2001, 46.

<sup>30</sup> Steven Staples, *Breaking Rank: A Citizens' Review of Canada's Military Spending*, 14.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, 40.

<sup>32</sup> Denis Stairs, "Canada in the 1990's: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig," 48.

<sup>33</sup> Fen Hampson, and Dean Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," 393.

<sup>34</sup> Denis Stairs, "Canada in the 1990's: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig," 48.

<sup>35</sup> Michael Byers, *Canadian Armed Forces Under US Command*, Commissioned Report, Vancouver: Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies, University of British Columbia, 6 May 2002, 1. (Note: Byers draft report was released to the public on 26 April 2002 with many inaccuracies that garnered media attention and were later corrected in this final report).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

<sup>37</sup> "Closer ties with U.S. military threat to sovereignty, reports says," Canadian Broadcast Corporation News, 26 April 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 13 March 2003, available at [http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2002/04/26/northcommand\\_020426](http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2002/04/26/northcommand_020426).

<sup>38</sup> Quoted in Lieutenant-General George Macdonald (CF), "Canada-US. Defense Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan," n.p.

<sup>39</sup> Lieutenant-General George Macdonald (CF), "Canada-US. Defense Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan," n.p.

<sup>40</sup> J. L. Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance: Canada-US Defence Relations Past, Present and Future," 10.

<sup>41</sup> Michael Byers, *Canadian Armed Forces Under US Command*, 14-17.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Conclusion**

Since the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on the United States, the Bush Administration has overhauled the national security policy and restructured the department of defense. Many of these changes altered the security landscape of North America. The attacks had an enormous impact on the American psyche and shattered the American perception of its security. The attacks forced America to respond to a new and direct threat against the United States. The Department of Defense established U.S. Northern Command and placed Canada within its regional area of responsibility. This drew a sharp reaction in the Canadian media. The Department of Defense also closed U.S. Space Command and transferred its responsibilities to U.S. Strategic Command. These two actions inherently altered the command structure to NORAD. Meanwhile, the U.S. government unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and announced it would deploy the National Missile System, raising the stakes in the continental defense and Canada's future role in NORAD.

The changes have altered the US-Canadian security relationship, leaving Canada faced with an array of decisions. First Canada needs to decide how it wants to pursue its interests in the continental defense with the United States. Does Canada want to retain its current status in NORAD, return it to a bi-national air defense only command, or expand NORAD to include a land and naval bi-national command structure for the defense of North America. The second and

more difficult decision is to decide whether Canada will support and participate in the United States National Missile Defense system. These decisions are full of political risks for the Liberal government.

### **Security Interests and Political Risks**

Canada's geopolitical location makes it a vital interest to the United States, and the United States will ensure Canadian security as part of the US near abroad. Canada wants to ensure that Canada appears able to defend itself on its own terms without compromising its national sovereignty. Over the last 60 years, the defense relations have grown close, complex and extensive. The United States is Canada's most important ally and defense partner. Canada benefits from the collective security arrangement in several ways. It allows Canada to spend less on defense and reap the benefits in operational experience, in privileged access to US military programs and intelligence, and in having influence in US continental security policy. The United States looks at Canada as a reliable ally able to provide political coverage through NORAD and in coalition operations abroad. Canada's role in the defense of North America is small but sufficient. NORAD provides the duality of protecting Canadian sovereignty while giving the United States an integrated aerospace defense of North America.

The security relationship also extends to protecting the Canadian and American economic security. The economics are highly integrated, especially in the automotive sector, and a major reason the Canadian government accepted the Smart Borders initiative. The initiative give the United States the assurance that the movement trade and people across the border will be secure.

The historical trend shows that the political relationship is most adversarial when the president and prime minister come from opposing ideologies as such is the current case with a Republican president and a Liberal prime minister. Although Bush and Chretien's politics differ,

their styles and personalities are similar, possibly compatible, and their professional relationship could prevail in areas of mutual security interests.

However, there are several political challenges that may impede the Canadian government from making any bold decisions. Prime Minister Chretien will retire and be replaced at the Liberal leadership convention in February 2004, and the cautious prime minister and his successor may not have the political will to make bold decisions before the 2005 election. Second, DFAIT is likewise cautious and deliberate. The department is responsible for enhancing Canada's international influence and developing Canada's foreign and security policy, and this frequently brings it into conflict with the DND, especially when the objectives differ. Security policy that survives the Cabinet and the Privy Council Office will be a product of compromise. And last, where there is public support, the political decisions will be easier, but the Canadian public does not support the United States' National Missile Defense program. The decision to support National Missile Defense will be the most difficult, and in the near term the government will most likely postpone the decision and remain ambiguous to mitigate the political risk.

## **Canadian Security Decisions**

### **Maintaining the Status of NORAD**

The first and easiest decision for the Canadian government is to continue with NORAD. It is the most untenable to achieve. The relationship has changed, and although the attacks revitalized the importance of the air defense role, they have also reinforced the requirement for a National Missile Defense system. However if the Canadian government continues to put off the decision or decides against participating in United States' National Missile Defense program, the United States will field the NMD system with a command center separate of NORAD. This would make the NORAD space control (the Integrated Tactical Warning Attack and Assessment)

mission redundant, because the NMD system must accomplish the NORAD mission to be able to identify and track incoming missiles. Without a role for Canada in the missile warning mission, the United States may insist on eliminating the missile warning and space portion of NORAD. Since both the United States and Canada derive benefit from NORAD's air defense mission, it is foreseeable NORAD would revert to an air defense only bi-national command. This risk to Canada is significant. At stake is the loss of access to U.S. space planning, operations and intelligence, and Canada will lose influence on continental security policy. But that may all be a calculated risk the Liberal government may accept to win the 2005 election.

### **Northern Command and Expanding NORAD**

Another Canadian government decision to consider is expanding the bi-national command to include land and naval operations. Contrary to many press reports, this would not occur under U.S. Northern Command, but under a NORAD like bi-national command structure. Key here is protecting sovereignty by ensuring the respective countries retained the administrative control of their military forces, while in appropriate emergency situations, the host nation would be assign operational control of deployed forces. The timing is right for Canada to pursue interests in an expanded NORAD. The Canadian public is supportive. The question remains – does the benefits to Canadian interests outweigh the concerns of sovereignty. Both countries took an intermediate step with the signing of the Canada-U.S. Security Cooperation Agreement that established the bi-national Planning Group in Colorado Springs. This will allow both governments to coordinate land and naval planning against a terrorist attack, to ease the transition of the bi-lateral operational planning functions from Joint Forces Command to Northern Command, and to take the next two years to explore the advantages of closer land and naval coordination.

Also, the standing up of Northern Command offers several new opportunities for Canada. While Canada felt a loss of a special status when they were incorporated in a unified commander's area of responsibility, it could result in even stronger and more influential ties between the militaries. The NORTHCOM commander has a broader international charter than the previous U.S. Space Command commander. Regional combatant commanders have responsibility to develop regional defense plans and to conduct military engagement activities with the countries in the region. They frequently develop close relationships with the chiefs of defense in the region and another avenue of influence.

### **Whether to Support the National Missile Defense**

The Liberal government's most difficult decision is to whether or not support United States National Missile Defense. Canadians have a history of aversion to nuclear weapons, even when they possessed them from 1963 to 1982. Canadians have a non-proliferation reputation they highly regard. The Canadian public does not support the National Missile System, and see it as a threat to global nuclear stability. On the other hand, Canadian security interests benefit most from an early decision to participate. However the cautious Liberal government facing a tricky transition of power before the 2005 election would prefer to postpone any decision. Yet, the government has left the door open with careful political maneuvering and public rhetoric. The government is keenly aware of the stakes and the risk of marginalizing NORAD. Perhaps, the Bush Administration may find a way to frame the question to facilitate an easier answer.

## *Glossary*

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)
ACO	Allied Command Operations (NATO)
ADOC	Air Defense Operations Center (NORAD)
AFB	Air Force Base (American)
ATC	Allied Transformation Command (NATO)
AWACS	
BMC3	Battle Management, Command, Control and Communications
CFB	Canadian Forces Base
CIC	Combined Intelligence Center (NORAD)
CONUS	Continental United States
DARPA	
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
ITW/AA	Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (NORAD)
JCS	Joint Chief of Staff (American)
JFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command (American)
JF HQ-HLS	Joint Forces Headquarters – Homeland Security (American)
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-CS	Joint Task Force – Civil Support (American)
MCC	Military Coordination Committee (Bi-national)
MWC	Missile Warning Center (NORAD)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	NORAD Command Center
NMD	National Missile Defense (NORAD)
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHCOM	United States Northern Command (American)
NSS	National Security Strategy (American)
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board for Defense

QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review (American)
RAF	Royal Air Force ??? (Field) (British)
SBIRS	Spaced Based Infrared System (American)
SCC	Space Control Center (NORAD)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UEWR	Upgraded Early Warning Radar
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command (a.k.a JFCOM)
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command (a.k.a NORTHCOM)
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
XBR	X-band Radar

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