

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

GUIDE TO NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY

Edited by

J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.

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INTRODUCTION

J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.

This edition of the *U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* differs from its predecessor published in 2001, *The U. S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, in several respects. First, as the altered title suggests, the focus of the volume has expanded to include examination of the national security policymaking environment and process in addition to the earlier emphasis on strategy. Broadening the focus forced a necessary divergence from the tight alignment with the U.S. Army War College's (USAWC) strategy formulation guidelines that characterized the earlier volume. The guidelines are still fundamental to our approach to studying strategy and are included as Appendix I to this work—we have simply allowed ourselves to delve more deeply into the strategic policy environment, reflected in the chart showing the Army War College Strategy Formulation Model found as a figure in the appendix. Second, the authors, with the exception of Martin Cook, are all current or recently departed members of the Department of National Security and Strategy in the War College. (Martin recently left the War College's Department of Command, Management, and Leadership.) This allows a more coordinated examination of issues in a manner consistent with our current approach to thinking about and teaching national security and strategy. Finally, we have avoided where possible reprinting articles. Some are so basic to the Army War College's approach to thinking about and teaching strategy that they reappear; most are written for this book.

Although the Department of National Security and Strategy uses several of the chapters in this volume as readings for its core course "War, National Policy and Strategy," this is not a textbook. It does reflect, however, both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America's future senior leaders. As we continue to refine and update the *Guide*, we intend to increase course-oriented essays; however, that is a long-term project only the glimmer of which is visible in this edition. The book is also not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategy or the policymaking process.

The *Guide* is organized in broad groups of chapters addressing general subject areas. We begin with a look at some specific issues about the general security environment—largely international. The section on strategic thought and formulation includes chapters on broad issues of strategy formulation as well as some basic strategic theory. The third section is about instruments of national power, and the final section deals with selected issues about the U.S. national security policymaking process.

PART I

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER 1

SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Robert “Robin” H. Dorff

The study, analysis and planning of strategy require a basic familiarity with some essential concepts and approaches to the study of international relations. It is not so much the terms and the jargon that are important; rather, it is the conceptual understanding that they bring to the study that makes them useful. Using the precise terminology is less critical than grasping the essential, underlying foundations of nation-state behavior so crucial to explaining the interactions that interest us as strategic thinkers. This chapter introduces some of the basic concepts and approaches in order to make them accessible for future reference in our study of strategy.

Why do nation-states (and other significant actors in the international system) behave as they do? How can we explain this behavior and use those explanations to anticipate likely future behavior? What are the contemporary characteristics of the international system, and how do they affect the actors in that system? What are the ongoing trends (political, economic, military, and technological) in the international system? How are those trends likely to affect the interactions among those actors? What are the implications for U.S. national security strategy?

These are the kinds of questions we need to ask as strategic analysts. In order to answer them, we must be familiar with some basic concepts and tools of analysis. We begin with a discussion of the actors, their interests, and the ways in which those interests help determine how an actor behaves. We then turn to one very common approach to the study of international relations, the “levels of analysis.” Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of the two most common sets of assumptions about the behavior of nation-states in the international system: realism and idealism.

The Actors

The Nation-State

The nation-state is the central actor in the international system. Not everyone agrees with this premise. There is growing evidence that sub-state and transnational actors and forces in the international system are increasing in importance, and, in many cases, challenging the cohesiveness and effectiveness of national governments. Nonetheless, the nation-state appears unlikely to surrender its preeminent position in the international system anytime soon. Consequently, this chapter will devote considerable attention to those tools that help us understand nation-state behavior in the international system.

The concept of the *nation-state* provides a useful starting point. As the compound noun implies, there are two essential components to the nation-state. The state is generally defined as a group of human beings

possessing territory and a government. The state represents the physical and political aspects of a country. **Sovereignty** refers to the ability of a country to exercise preeminent control over the people and the policies within its territorial boundaries. To the extent that a state is sovereign, it is free to exercise its own control over its people without undue interference from external forces such as other states. The **nation** represents the human aspect of a country, or the concept of nationality. It suggests that the people living within the state share a sense of distinctiveness as a people; this distinctiveness may be seen in language, religion, ethnicity, or a more general and amorphous sense that “we are one people.” The modern nation-state has its origins in the seventeenth century. The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, brought a formal end to the Thirty Years War in Europe. That bloody conflict is generally viewed as the catalyst for consolidating what we think of today as the “countries” of Europe. Consequently, one frequently sees references to the “Westphalian” system of states or nation-states. Although the nation-state was already forming before and during the Thirty Years War, historical shorthand has provided us with a birth date for the concept—1648. The powerful nation-states that emerged from that conflict could raise and fund large militaries, and they soon spread worldwide as the means of organizing people within a defined territory under a distinct government. In the early days of the nation-state, the government was most often a monarchy headed by a king or queen.

The American and French Revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century added two new dimensions to the modern state. The first was **nationalism**, as evidenced especially in the Napoleonic Wars in which the masses of people were mobilized to fight for the country. No longer were wars limited to a small group of elite warriors. Whole nations were mobilized and fought against each other. The second dimension was **popular sovereignty**: the notion that the people were no longer simply subjects to be ruled but the very source of the government’s right to rule. Among other things, this led directly to an increase in public participation in virtually all aspects of political affairs and to the emergence of a new form of government, democracy. During the next two centuries, democracy took hold and evolved in countries such as the United States and Great Britain, while monarchies and authoritarianism continued to dominate in many other countries. Wars of national unification further consolidated the various nation-states, and great clashes among powerful states characterized both centuries, culminating in the two great world wars fought in the first half of the twentieth century. By the end of World War II, the nation-state had been the central actor in international affairs for roughly three centuries. But the twentieth century was to witness the emergence of other actors.

Other Actors

Clearly, the nation-state is not the only actor in the contemporary international system. International governmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations, are growing in number and importance. Regional organizations, such as the European Union, are in some cases assuming functions traditionally performed by the nation-state. Other functional organizations, especially in the areas of trade and economics, such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), play significant roles in contemporary international relations. Similarly, there has been an explosion in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private groups that play an important role in a variety of aspects of international affairs; groups such as the International Red Cross and Greenpeace come readily to mind. Some of the IGOs and NGOs are even visibly involved in military operations, as we have seen in Haiti, Somalia, and, of course, Bosnia. And hardly a day goes by that we don’t see, read, or hear about the actions of terrorists, transnational organized criminal groups, or religious and ethnic groups. While all of these other actors can be very important in international affairs, much of their impact still lies in how they affect the behavior of

nation-states. So it is this central actor—the nation-state—on which we focus our attention.

Interests

The behavior of a nation-state is rooted in the pursuit, protection, and promotion of its interests. So if one can identify accurately the interests of a state, one should be able to understand much of its behavior vis-à-vis other states and actors in the international system.

Most analysts begin with this notion that nation-states have basic, fundamental interests that underlie their behavior. They are most often referred to as ***national interests***. Exactly what those interests are and how they are determined is a matter of considerable controversy, however. What we should recognize here is that all states have core or vital interests, and the most readily seen and agreed upon are the basic survival interests of the nation-state—its territory, its people, and its sovereignty. While forces outside their own boundaries affect all countries—large and powerful, small and weak—a certain level of sovereignty is critical to the notion of national interests. A country that is unable to exercise effective control over its territory and its peoples, relatively free from the intrusion of other nation-states into its internal affairs, is lacking in this critical element of sovereignty. Historically, states and their peoples have been willing to risk much, including death and destruction, in order to protect and promote their sovereign rights.

Despite the controversy and debate surrounding the identification of specific interests, some agreement exists on what those interests are. Current U.S. policy, as formulated in the most recent version of the national security strategy, identifies three broad interests and three general categories of interests. The broad interests are: “protect the lives and safety of Americans; maintain the sovereignty of the United States with its values, institutions and territory intact; and promote the prosperity and well-being of the nation and its people.”¹ The three broad categories are vital interests, important interests, and humanitarian and other interests.² While almost everyone agrees on the centrality of the survival interests, considerable disagreement arises when one tries to be more specific about which economic or value-based interests to pursue. Is access to oil a vital U.S. interest? Many analysts would say yes because of the severe economic problems caused by the lack of such access. Others would disagree, arguing that such access is important but not vital. Does the United States have an interest in promoting democracy and individual rights? If so, is it a vital, important, or simply an “other” interest? Resolving such debates is part of the overall political process, and is central to any explanation of the behavior of nation-states.

Nation-State Behavior

The key questions a strategist asks about the behavior of nation-states in the international system are really rather few. They are essentially generic and broad questions, with other derived questions simply serving as variations. For example: Why do nation-states go to war? Why does peace obtain? Why is there conflict? Why cooperation? Why does a state choose to use military force? Why does it choose diplomacy instead? In the end, answers to these and other questions are sought in the interplay between a nation’s interests and the tools it has available to protect and promote them. To answer such questions, we must look at the different factors that affect the behavior of nation-states.

Levels Of Analysis

One of the most common frameworks for analyzing international relations suggests that these factors can be organized according to three levels of analysis. Commonly associated with the work of Waltz, the three levels are the international system, the nation-state, and the individual.³ Over the years these levels have been discussed, refined, and expanded, but in essence they remain the same. The purpose of the framework is to demonstrate that we can explain the behavior of nation-states in the international system by looking at three different general sets of factors. As we will see, the first level explains nation-state behavior largely on the basis of factors external to the country, while the other two levels emphasize internal factors.

The System Level

The first level (international system) suggests that nation-states behave the way they do because of certain fundamental characteristics of the system of which they are all a part. The idea is simply that the system itself exerts a kind of force on the states that compels them to behave and react in certain predictable ways. Theories such as the balance of power are based on this kind of analysis; for example, that if a single nation-state seeks to dominate the system (a hegemon), other states will join together to counter the power of that single state (balancing). Who possesses how much and what kinds of power (political, economic, military) at any given time are the critical variables. This leads to a basic focus on the distribution of power in the international system as a key explanation for system and hence nation-state behavior. The reasons for this are found in the characteristics of the international system.

The characteristics of the system that are most important are relatively few. First, the system is largely anarchic. In other words there is no collective decisionmaking body or supreme authority to manage conflict among the competing states in the system. States compete with each other and “manage” their conflicts through their own use of power. Second, this means that the system basically relies on self-help by the individual states, so the states must be concerned about developing their power relative to other states in the system. The more power one has, the more that state is able to achieve its goals and objectives; the less power one has, the more that state may be subject to the whims of other states. These two characteristics mean that each state has a basic goal of survival and must be the guardian of its own security and independence. No other actor in the system will look out for the state, a role performed for the individual by government in most domestic political systems. (So, for example, if another individual wrongs you, you have a legal system to use in order to right that wrong.)

To illustrate how the system level is used to explain nation-state behavior, such as the causes of war, let us use the example of World War II. According to this approach, Hitler’s Germany was a classic hegemonic actor. Its objective was to amass power (political, military, and economic) in order to dominate the European and, perhaps, Asian continents, and eventually the world. It saw in the weakness of other states (Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States) the opportunity to make its play for world domination. Yet the “inevitability” of system influences would ultimately frustrate German aspirations. For as Germany sought to dominate, other states in the system would eventually band together and “balance power with power.” So the unlikely alliance (unlikely in the sense that they were not natural allies) among those four against Germany, Italy, and Japan is seen as a nearly automatic occurrence that results from the necessity of balancing power: As Germany sought to dominate, other states in the system naturally sought to balance it. Despite the roles played by individuals such as Hitler, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt (a point to which we shall return in a moment), the decisions made by these countries were part of a broader pattern of system-determined behavior. The titanic clash that was WWII was destined to occur once Germany sought to dominate the system; natural system dynamics would see to that.

The Nation-State Level

The second level of analysis is commonly referred to as the nation-state level, although recently the term actor level has been used. The latter usage reflects the fact that in contemporary international relations there is a growing number of actors in the international system that are not nation-states, as we discussed earlier. While we focus here primarily on the nation-state, we are reminded that non-state actors do play an increasingly important role. This second level of analysis argues that because states are the primary actors, it is the internal character of those states that matters most in determining overall patterns of behavior. Because states are sovereign entities, they act relatively independently; because they are part of the same system, the interaction of those independent decisions is what leads to war or peace, conflict or cooperation. One of the most common state-level approaches emphasizes the nature of the political system as a major determinant of state behavior. So for example, we have the premise that democracies behave differently than do authoritarian political regimes. This is precisely the notion that underlies the “Theory of the Democratic Peace,” a central component of the current United States national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. If democracies do not go to war with other democracies (so runs the “democratic peace” argument), then it is only natural for the United States to want to promote more democracies in the world as a way of increasing peace and stability in the system. Other nation-state level explanations include cultural and social factors.

The second level can also be used to explain the causes of WWII. In this case what is important is not the systemic influences of balance of power, but the specific character of the major actors. The totalitarian regimes in Germany, Japan, and Italy were compelled to undertake aggressive foreign policies in order to pacify the oppressed peoples living under them. If the leaders didn’t create external enemies for the people to fight against, the people would soon focus on how oppressive their regimes were and they would eventually revolt. The democratic regimes of Great Britain and the United States were similarly compelled to oppose the totalitarian regimes’ expansionist desires because that is what democracies do—they fight against the evils of totalitarianism and for the good of freedom. So in this view, WWII was fought to protect the freedom-loving democracies of the world, not simply to balance power against the expansionist desires of a potential hegemon. An alliance with Russia was a “necessary evil” to be endured in the short-term in order to achieve the defeat of the immediate aggressor.

The Individual Level

Finally, the third level of analysis emphasizes the role played by individual leaders. Recently this level has been referred to as the decisionmaking level, which tends to point to factors more general than the idiosyncrasies of individuals, and to the fact that decisions about war and peace, conflict and cooperation are made by individuals, organizations, and institutions within a society. But the primary emphasis remains the same: real people make decisions that determine the pattern of behavior among states in the international system. This level of analysis is frequently seen in “Great Man” historical explanations or in the philosophical analyses of human nature. The former emphasizes the critical role played by certain individuals who happen to be in the right place at the right time to exert fundamental influence on the unfolding events. The latter tends to hold, as did Hobbes and others before him, that there is a basic, aggressive tendency in human nature, and that tendency will emerge time and again no matter how much we wish to keep it suppressed. War occurs because individuals are inherently aggressive, and therefore war (not peace) is the natural state of affairs among groups of individuals interacting in the international system as nation-states. This is the basic view of human nature held by most analysts who consider themselves **realists**. Alternatively, and with the same focus on human nature, one can assume that individuals are

inherently peace loving and perfectible, and that peace is therefore the natural state of affairs, and the abnormal departure from it is war and conflict. This is the basic view of human nature held by most analysts who consider themselves *idealists*. (We shall return to these two views in the final section of this chapter.) This level also focuses our attention on the perceptions and misperceptions of key actors (how they see the world, how they see the motivations and goals of other actors in the system, and so on). It also stresses the types of decisions being made (different policies generate different kinds of decisions) and the processes with which they are made (whether public opinion plays a role, whether the process is open or closed, etc.). If you want to know why a nation-state behaves as it does, you need to ask questions such as: Who are the most important decisionmakers, what are their motivations and perceptions, and what are they trying to achieve? What is the type of decision being made? What kind of process is required to reach a decision?

One analysis employing a third-level approach offers a fairly straightforward explanation of the causes of WWII. Hitler, seen from this perspective as the embodiment of evil that exists in human nature, decided to pursue world domination and dragged the German people (afflicted by the same frailties of human nature that affect us all) into his scheme. Churchill and Roosevelt, viewed as those altogether rare examples of good prevailing over evil, saw it as their calling to rally their democratic and freedom-loving peoples to the cause of eradicating evil from the system. According to this level of analysis, there was nothing inevitable about the causes or the outcomes of the war. Had Hitler not come on the scene, no power vacuum would have drawn Germany toward domination. Had Churchill and Roosevelt not been leaders of their countries, no necessities of balancing power or opposing evil would have ensured a set of foes that would in the end prevail over Hitler's Germany. According to this admittedly simplified third-level perspective, the fact that we had these particular individuals on the scene at that particular point in time is what explains the causes and the outcomes of that Second World War.

Elegant theories and models have been developed using these levels of analysis, most of which have focused on the system and the nation-state levels (elegant theories of idiosyncratic individual behavior are hard to come by, but psychological approaches come the closest). Trying to discern the compelling forces that drive nations to behave in certain ways is the goal. For the strategic analyst, however, elegant theories are less important than accurate assessments of current conditions and predictions of likely future courses of action. As a consequence, we typically employ all three levels in attempts to understand and explain international politics. Explanations drawn largely from the first level (such as balance of power) interact with variables drawn from the other two levels (such as the nature of the regime and the profiles of current leaders) to produce a strategic assessment and derivative policy recommendations. Ultimately the goal is to explain why nation-states might pursue certain courses of action, and what should be done to counter those actions that are detrimental to one's own interests or to encourage those actions considered favorable. To do that requires familiarity with all three levels and the factors drawn from each that can help lead to a better strategic assessment. In most cases, that will require an understanding of some general system factors, characteristics of the actors in the system, and attributes of individual leaders.

Realism And Idealism

No discussion of basic concepts and approaches would be complete without some treatment of the two most prominent sets of competing assumptions about behavior in the international system. Although adherents of these schools of thought often speak as though their views are statements of fact, it is important to realize that they are actually assumptions. They provide the underpinnings for explanations of nation-state behavior, but for the most part they cannot be proven. What one assumes about nation-state behavior

is, of course, central for the explanations that derive from them. Therefore, we shall briefly outline the core assumptions of the two approaches and compare and contrast them, particularly in terms of where they lead us in our strategic analyses.

Realism

Realism, frequently identified with scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and, more recently, Kenneth Waltz, considers anarchy the primary characteristic of the international system; in other words, there is no central authority to settle disputes among the competing member states, as there is in domestic political systems. Given this lack of central authority, states compete with one another within a loose system that includes some rules, norms, and patterns of behavior, but which ultimately causes the individual nation-state to look out for its own interests (the system of “self-help” described earlier). The means for protecting, preserving, and promoting one’s interests (the ends) is power, hence states will be preoccupied with their own power capabilities and how they relate to the capabilities of other states. Not surprisingly, realists tend to view the world in terms of competition and conflict, a recurring struggle for power and its management.

In trying to explain why power and struggles over it are the central feature of nation-state behavior, proponents of realism fall into two general groups. One group, perhaps best epitomized by Morgenthau, argues that human nature is the key explanation. In their view, human nature is fixed and unchangeable, and it is inherently focused on the quest for ever more power. Consequently, conflict among people competing for power is inevitable. And since states are simply aggregations of individual humans and statesmen are the leaders of those groups, nation-states will exhibit this same lust for power in their behavior with one another. No matter what one does, this lust for power anchored in human nature will make some conflict inevitable. The best we can hope for is to manage that conflict because it can never be eradicated.

The second group of realists, today most clearly associated with the writings of Waltz, finds the explanation for the centrality of power relations in the structure of the international system. This view, called **structural realism** or **neorealism**, is essentially what we have outlined in the first paragraph of this section and in our earlier discussion of the international system level of analysis. The primary characteristic of the international system is anarchy: the absence of a central authority to make and enforce rules, settle disputes, and generally regulate and manage the conflict that is inevitable in a system of individual sovereign nation-states. All states possess some level of military power, and ultimately each state has the option of threatening or actually using that power. To some extent, then, each state must be concerned with the power capabilities of other states. To the realist, this creates a system in which all states to varying degrees will be distrustful of other states. The more one state increases its power capabilities, the more insecure other states will feel. This leads directly to the **security dilemma**: the actions undertaken by a state to increase its security (such as expanding its military capabilities) will lead to counteractions taken by other states, leading eventually to the paradoxical outcome that all states will in fact feel (or actually be) less secure. The classic example of this dilemma is an arms race.

This second school of realist thought is by far the largest, and its proponents generally reject any notion of human nature as an underlying explanation for the prominent role played by power in international relations. Neorealists tend to locate most, if not all, of the explanations for nation-state behavior in the structural characteristics of the international system, not in the internal characteristics of nation-states or individuals. But regardless of their positions on this issue, all realists come to the same conclusion about power in the international system: the distribution of power is the most important variable explaining nation-state behavior, and the best way of managing conflict in the system is by balancing power with

power. Various **balance of power** theories all assume that the only effective way to prevent war is to prepare for war; one must be willing to threaten and to use force in order to reduce the likelihood that such force will in fact be used. Hence the common dictum in international relations, “If you want peace, you must prepare for war.” Whether through increasing individual state capabilities or multiplying those capabilities through a system of changing alliances, states must be constantly on guard against a shift in the overall balance of power that would tempt the momentarily strong to exploit their advantage over the weak. To the realist, a country has “no enduring allies, only enduring interests,” and those interests can only be protected through its own vigilance and preparedness.

Idealism

Idealists can trace their modern heritage to the tenets of Woodrow Wilson, although, like realism, its origins go much further back in history. Often referred to as Wilsonian liberalism, idealist thought frequently views human nature as a positive force. It is precisely the power politics of nation-state behavior that is the problem, so the cure is to find a way to reduce or eliminate altogether that particular form of interaction. To the idealist, there is a natural harmony of interests among nation-states, based on the inherent desire of most people to live in peace with one another. Only when the corrupting influences of great power politics, ideology, nationalism, evil leaders, and so on intervene, do we see international politics degenerate into conflict and war. The task, then, is to prevent the rise and control of such corrupting influences. How is this to be accomplished? First and foremost, it can be encouraged through the growth of democracy as a form of government that gives maximum expression to the voice of the people. After all, if most people are inherently peace loving, then governments that express the desires of the people will themselves be less warlike. A second means to the desired end is the use of international institutions to create forums in which nation-states can discuss their disagreements in ways that will reinforce the cooperative rather than the competitive dimensions of their relationships with one another. So the idealist finds great promise not only in institutions like the United Nations but also in the further development of international treaties and covenants, as well as common practice, as the bases for a system of international law. Such international institutions can be used to change the way states calculate their interests, hence they can encourage cooperation over conflict. At one extreme, some idealists believe that the creation of a world government is the answer; all we have to do is create the international equivalent of domestic government to regulate and manage the behavior of the actors in the system.

Idealism is too often, and generally inaccurately, portrayed as a “fuzzy-headed liberal notion” of peace and cooperation, in part because there are some idealists who do espouse what sound very much like “utopian” aspirations. Yet the contemporary counterpoint to realism is most accurately referred to as “liberal institutionalism,” which emphasizes the role played by states’ interests (the liberalism of the nineteenth century that comprised the core argument for conservative economic theory like that of Adam Smith) and international institutions. The more states can be shown that their interests are effectively pursued within international institutions, and that all states can benefit from such interaction, the more they can be induced to behave cooperatively rather than competitively. Much of the post-WWII international trade and economics regimes (Bretton Woods, GATT, and so on) are based precisely on this “idealist” approach.

Yet both schools of thought have some shortcomings when we look carefully at the assumptions and their implications. For example, while realists place great emphasis on the fundamental influence of national interests on nation-state behavior, not all realists can agree on what those interests are. For example, Morgenthau was an early and outspoken critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, arguing that there was no vital national interest being threatened. At virtually the same time, no less prominent a realist than Henry

Kissinger was arguing that it was precisely U.S. vital interests that were threatened by the possible communist takeover of Southeast Asia. How did realism help decide who was correct? And in a later attempt to justify the covert U.S. role in the overthrow of the leftist Allende regime in Chile, Kissinger is alleged to have said that Chile “was a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica,” which to many observers (including many realists) sounded like a politician bending over backwards to produce a realist-sounding defense for a rather silly policy decision. On the idealist side, we can return to our earlier historical examples. The hope that the voice of the people would establish more reason and peace in international relations seems a bit wishful when we consider that it was precisely the vengeance sought by the publics in France and Great Britain that helped produce the fatally flawed Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The punishment meted out to Germany in that peace agreement almost certainly paved the way for the eventual rise of Hitler and the subsequent explosion of the continent in World War II. And the same publics, so weary and fearful of war based on their experiences in World War I, helped produce the climate of appeasement in the 1930s that rendered any meaningful “balance of power” approach impossible to implement.

Because it is virtually impossible to prove the accuracy of the underlying and competing assumptions in these two approaches, the arguments between realists and idealists will certainly continue. This will be the case especially in times of tremendous and profound change in the international system such as we are now experiencing in the most recent period of transition following the end of the Cold War. What we need to recognize, however, is the nature of the assumptions we are making and the implications they have for our analysis of nation-state behavior. In general, the differences between the realist and idealist schools of thought show up in the relative weight they give to the levels of analysis discussed earlier, and to the significance of the roles played by non-state actors, especially international institutions, in the regulation and management of interstate conflict. Not surprisingly, most realists give primary emphasis to the system-level of analysis. In fact, some realists continue to discount completely the influence of all domestic factors, such as the nature of the regime or the individuals who occupy leadership positions. To them, nation-states are rational, unitary actors who make decisions based on their interests and pursue them consistently over time regardless of who leads them. To many idealists, this is a great weakness of realist thought because they see the interests of nation-states growing out of a much more amorphous domestic competition among differing views about just what those interests are, let alone how best to pursue them. To the realist, the nation-state is all that really matters, and attempts to create supranational institutions (such as the United Nations) to help manage state behavior are doomed to fail. To the liberal institutionalist, it is precisely such institutions that can bring more orderly and less conflictual patterns of behavior to the international system.

Theorists will continue to debate which level (or levels) is most important, so the basic dialogue between realism and liberalism will go on. But for the strategic analyst concerned with current policy, the focus must be on the interactions across levels. While changes in the international system will create situations and circumstances to which nation-states can respond, how they perceive those changes and what they do in response will be shaped in part by domestic characteristics and conditions, including individual leadership. This ability to integrate the levels of analysis and to understand the assumptions underlying different views of what is important in international political behavior is essential to strategic thinking and analysis.

Notes - Chapter 1

1 The White House, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century* (Washington, DC: October 1998), 5.

2 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

3 Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

CHAPTER 2

MULTILATERALISM AND UNILATERALISM

James A. Helis

Our best hope for safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in American strength and will—the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them.¹

Charles Krauthammer

The paradox of American power at the end of this millennium is that it is too great to be challenged by any other state, yet not great enough to solve problems such as global terrorism and nuclear proliferation. America needs the help and respect of other nations.²

Sebastian Mallaby

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States enjoys a historically unprecedented accumulation of national power. The American economy is the largest in the world and even in a slowdown far outstrips that of any other nation.³ The prowess of America's armed forces has been demonstrated again and again, from Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq. In 2002, the United States accounted for 43 percent of the world's military spending, more than the total of the next fourteen together.⁴ Projected increases in American military spending will likely lead to the United States spending more on defense than the rest of the world combined, and the training and technological superiority of America's armed forces provide a quantum advantage that no nation is likely to even approach in the near to medium term. The combination of overwhelming economic and military power gives the United States enormous political influence throughout the world. There are few, if any, global issues that can be addressed or resolved without U.S. support and cooperation.

One central debate in U.S. foreign policy has been the degree to which the United States should be involved in the affairs of the world. World War II and the Cold War seemed to settle the question of isolationism or engagement in favor of the latter. After the Cold War, the issue of isolationism rose again, but only briefly. The real post-Cold War debate was and remains over the degree to which the United States should pursue its foreign policy alone or in partnership with other states. The debate has been framed in terms of multilateralism versus unilateralism and is heavily influenced by competing views on what the United States should do with its position of preeminent international power and influence. In one sense, "the differences [between the two views] are a matter of degree, and there are few pure unilateralists or multilateralists."⁵ However, there are clear differences between the two schools of thought on when and to what extent the United States should work with others. We should keep in mind that unilateralism and multilateralism are not strategies. Strategy is about matching ends, means, and ways. Unilateralism and multilateralism are competing ways to approach problems. This chapter will examine the advantages and disadvantages offered by each approach. The goal is to identify those conditions under which it is better to

work with others through coalitions and alliances and when it is might be best go it alone.

Unilateralism

People who advocate unilateralism tend to believe that the post-Cold War world is unpredictable and dangerous. They believe America must use its power to protect, and in many cases propagate, its interests and values. America no longer need constrain itself in the assertion and expansion of its influence out of fear of provoking a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War stand-off with its threat of nuclear war created an opportunity for the United States to apply its overwhelming military, economic, and political power to build an international order that will perpetuate America's preeminent position in the world.

Unilateralists contend that an assertive approach to foreign policy is justified on both pragmatic and ideological grounds. Charles Krauthammer concisely summarizes the unilateralist philosophy: "The essence of unilateralism is that we do not allow others, no matter how well-meaning, to deter us from pursuing the fundamental security interests of the United States and the free world."⁶ In other words, as a practical matter, the United States should not compromise when pursuing national security interests. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and America's subsequent pursuit of a global war on terrorism (GWOT) strengthened the belief that the United States was vulnerable to threats and needed to act aggressively to defeat those threats, irrespective of how the strategy played on the global stage. Ideologically, unilateralists argue that American values and ideals are essentially universal. Policies and actions intended to advance them are in the interest of not only the United States but people throughout the world. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that "the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere . . . America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity."⁷ The non-negotiability of interests and values calls for their uncompromising pursuit, preferably with the support of others, but alone if necessary. The United States, with its overwhelming aggregation of national power, can be a decisive player anywhere in the world on virtually any issue it desires. "It is hard for the world to ignore or work around the United States regardless of the issue—trade, finance, security, proliferation, or the environment."⁸ The United States should not squander its position and capabilities by compromising and diluting its objectives in order to attract allies and partners. If the cause is right and just, the United States should pursue it without compromise. Others states can either accept America's arguments and follow her lead or be left behind as the United States does what it should and must to advance its interests and values.

One of the main advantages of unilateral approaches to problems is that they provide maximum freedom of action. While allies and partners can bring extra capabilities to the table, they often bring constraints on how their tools can be used. Those who contribute to an enterprise normally expect to have a say in how it will operate. A common problem in UN military operations in the 1990s was the "phone home syndrome," under which commanders of forces assigned to UN operations had to seek approval from authorities in their home capital before accepting orders from the coalition commander. Unilateralists also point to the limitations that the NATO allies placed on air operations during the Kosovo campaign as an example of how multilateral approaches can be inefficient and reduce the effectiveness of American capabilities by restricting how they will be used. Because foreign militaries cannot approximate American capabilities, their military contributions are seldom worth the inevitable constraints they add.

Multilateralism

Multilateralists acknowledge that there are circumstances in which the United States should not rule out acting unilaterally, particularly when “vital survival interests” are at stake.⁹ On the other hand, multilateralists argue that most important issues facing the United States in the twenty-first century are not amenable to unilateral solutions. Transnational issues requiring multilateral approaches include terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, illegal drugs, and organized crime. Globalization has made management of international trade and finance even more important, as economic crises are susceptible to contagion that can have global impact, as was seen in the Asian financial crisis of 1997. And environmental and health problems, to include the spread of infectious diseases, can only be dealt with on a global basis.¹⁰

The reality is that American power, while overwhelmingly superior to that of any other state or present coalition of states, is not unlimited. Allies and coalition partners allow the consolidation and pooling of capabilities. A group of nations can almost always bring more tools of power to bear against a problem than one state can alone. While the NATO allies did place constraints on air operations over Yugoslavia, they provided the majority of the peacekeeping forces deployed to Kosovo following the air campaign. The price of their participation in post-conflict operations was a say over how the war was fought. While air planners may have chafed under the politically imposed limitations on their freedom of action, those limits were seen as an acceptable price to pay for cooperation in the peacekeeping effort. The United States certainly had the capacity to conduct the air campaign itself (in fact, the overwhelming majority of missions were flown by American aircraft). However, it was not in the interests of the United States to be the sole or main provider of ground troops for what was bound to be a protracted peacekeeping mission that would follow the air campaign. Going it alone may offer short term efficiency, but sometimes long-term interests call for multilateral approaches and making concessions in order to have committed partners. And measuring allies’ worth only in terms of their military capabilities ignores the importance of their political and diplomatic contributions.

Multilateralists agree that the United States should seek to protect and extend its status as the sole superpower. However, they believe that exercising power unilaterally could actually be counterproductive. Historically, dominant powers have faced efforts by other states to counterbalance their accumulation of power. “Balance of power theory makes a clear prediction: weaker states will resist and balance against the predominant state.”¹¹ For the United States to maintain its position in the international system, it should endeavor to secure the cooperation of other states in addressing global problems. Such a cooperative approach might negate or lessen any perceived need to counterbalance U.S. power. Multilateralists reflect a liberal institutionalist point of view in arguing that it is easier to gain the support and cooperation of others by working within a system of norms, rules, and institutions that assure others of America’s intention to act in good faith as a partner, not a hegemon. While unilateralists contend that the United States should use its power to impose an international order favorable to maintaining America’s long-term supremacy, multilateralists counter that eventually that approach will generate resistance and backlash. A system developed through cooperation is more likely to stand the test of time. Given America’s predominance of power, it would take a remarkable effort and investment of resources for any state or group of states to challenge America’s position. If America behaves as a cooperative member of the international community and does not create the impression that it threatens international stability, there is no reason for other states to seek to balance against American power. No one doubts American capabilities. What America does with its capabilities will determine how others will react, and if America’s position will be accepted or

challenged.

Alone or with Others?

The rhetoric in the dispute between multilateralist and unilateralist approaches obscures that there are few foreign policy decisions that are purely one or the other. Advocates for both positions agree that it is better to have allies in support of a cause than to go it alone. They disagree over what the United States should be willing to give up to recruit partners. Unilateralists favor staking out one's position and moving forward with whomever is willing to go along. Multilateralists favor rallying other nations to our cause and are more willing to accept trade-offs in building coalitions. Unilateralists and multilateralists agree that there is little room for compromise on such fundamental issues as survival interests. Time constraints may also limit the ability of the United States to drum up allies. Threats that are immediate and pose a serious threat to survival or vital interests may force the U.S.' hand.

Finally, both unilateralists and multilateralists agree that the United States should seek to build an international order that will favor the expansion of American values and help preserve America's dominant position in the world. The United States has a unique opportunity to establish international rules and standards that protect American interests. They differ on how the United States should attempt to build that order. Unilateralists tend to favor more assertive, even coercive approaches. They fall more into the realist school of international relations theory and argue that ultimately power is what matters and reliance on agreements or treaties in lieu of real power is dangerous. On the other hand, multilateralists favor moving ahead in a framework of international institutions and treaties that will bind all states, America included, to rules and commitments. They feel that restrictions on the United States will assuage concerns "about a global order dominated by American power—power unprecedented, unrestrained, and unpredictable."¹² And even within the constraints of a rules-based system, America will continue to enjoy a preponderance of power.

The Case of Iraq

The U.S.-Iraq War of 2003 was a showcase for the different approaches to foreign policy. The American position was clear: Iraq would comply with UN Security Council resolutions requiring it to divest itself of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and medium-range missiles or the United States, with whomever was willing to assist, would enforce the resolutions by force. Advocates for unilateral American action argued that the United Nations had been ineffective in enforcing its own resolutions. Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States, and the United States could no longer tolerate the international community's unwillingness to force Iraq to comply and disarm. While the United States welcomed other states that were willing to support the forcible disarmament of Iraq, the positions of other states, including key allies and the Security Council, would not influence the course of American foreign policy. The United States saw a need to act and was going to do so. And by acting alone, the United States could actually enhance stability in the Middle East and the globe. An America willing to use its power without the support of the international community would have greater credibility in dealing with other threats. No longer could potential adversaries hope the United Nations or America's allies could dissuade it from major military action. When the United States said it would act, that would be a credible threat. Knowing the consequences of defying America would deter states from doing so in the future, which could only contribute to stability and to American security.

Multilateralists approached the issue differently. While acknowledging Iraq's failure to comply with UN resolutions and the likelihood that Iraq was in possession of significant quantities of banned weapons, they questioned whether it was in America's best interest to take military action without broad support within the international community. While it would be faster and militarily more expedient for the United States to forge ahead with a unilateralist Iraq policy, the costs of such a policy were likely to be prohibitive in the long run. By acting largely alone and without broad international support, the United States risked weakening the international norm against unilateral use of military power to resolve political disputes. A war with Iraq had potentially global consequences, both political and economic. By undertaking such a war and assuming these risks for the international community without its approval, the United States would reinforce fears of unconstrained American power and increase the potential for a future backlash. Finally, the United States risked finding itself burdened with a lengthy and expensive occupation of postwar Iraq. There would be no guarantee of significant international support for post-conflict efforts following a war the United States started and waged largely on its own. Leaving the United States saddled with postwar Iraq would serve as something of a balancing tool. An America committed to a major military presence in Iraq would not find it as easy to exercise military operations in other parts of the world without support from allies. Also, a lengthy and costly overseas commitment could undermine domestic support for future actions.

In the summer of 2003 it was still too early to assess how the Iraq war would affect America's position in the world or how the world would react to American power. However, the unilateralist and multilateralist camps used the lead up to the war to make their cases for acting more or less unilaterally or within broader international coalitions. While the war and early phases of the occupation of Iraq have not settled the debate, both have established some measures by which to determine if, in this case, a generally unilateral approach to foreign policy and war helped or hurt America's long-term standing in the world. The end of the war may have opened the door for progress in the Israel-Palestine conflict, but there has been relatively little international support for postwar occupation, which may leave a substantial portion of America's ground forces committed to Iraq for some time to come.

Conclusion: Recent Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy

There is a growing view that American foreign policy has tended to be more assertively unilateral in recent years. America's refusal to join the international ban on antipersonnel land mines, its rejections of the Kyoto treaty on global warming and an inspection and verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention, and its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are offered as evidence of a policy of avoiding international commitments that might constrain America's freedom of action. Critics argue that the United States pursues its own international agenda without regard for the interests, views, or concerns of the rest of the world. The response is that the United States is acting, as all states should and must, in its own self-interests.

In spite of its overwhelming power, in the spring of 2003 the United States found itself embarking on a war with Iraq. While Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly one of the world's great villains, the United States found itself diplomatically at odds with important traditional allies, politically outmaneuvered and stymied at the United Nations, and opposed by public majorities in virtually every nation in the world. How did the United States, with all its advantages, become so politically isolated? One answer lies in the perception that the United States is using its national power more unilaterally than in the past. International opposition did not prevent the United States from going to war. However, the absence of allies has caused the United States

to bear the overwhelming burden of post-conflict operations in Iraq. In contrast, in Bosnia and Kosovo NATO allies and other partners provided the bulk of peacekeeping troops following U.S.-led campaigns.

The perceptions and reality of the extent to which the United States pursues unilateralist policies will undoubtedly affect America's strategic choices in the future. There are clear trade-offs between sacrificing freedom of action and lowering costs and adding the capabilities of other nations. Considering these trade-offs should be part of the strategic decisionmaking process for the United States as it wages a GWOT and confronts a range of critical global interests and issues. The United States cannot limit its options by clinging to notions about whether it should act unilaterally or multilaterally. There are times and circumstances for both approaches. The art is to recognize them and select the proper tool.

Notes - Chapter 2

1 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1990/91*, 70, No. 1. Available from Lexis/Nexis Academic Universe. Accessed 16 January 2003.

2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 40.

3 The World Bank, "Total GDP 2001." Available at www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GDP/pdf. Accessed 23 June 2003.

4 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "The 15 major spender countries in 2002." Available at www.projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf. Accessed 23 June 2003.

5 Nye, 154.

6 Charles Krauthammer, "Unilateral? Yes, Indeed." *The Washington Post*, 14 December 2002, A45.

7 The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, Sep. 2002), 3.

8 G. John Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony Right." *The National Interest* (Spring 2001). Available from Lexis-Nexis Univers. Accessed 16 January 2003.

9 Nye, 159.

10 Ibid., xiii-xiv.

11 Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony Right."

12 Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

ETHICAL ISSUES IN WAR: AN OVERVIEW

Martin L. Cook

Violent conflict among human beings is, unfortunately, one of the great constants in our history as a species. As far back as we can see, the human species has engaged in war and other forms of organized violence. But it is equally true that, as far back as human culture and thought have left written records, humans have thought about morality and ethics. Although cultures vary widely in how they interpret death and killing from a moral and religious perspective, every human culture has recognized that taking human life is a morally grave matter; every human culture has felt the need to justify taking of life in moral and religious terms.

In the modern world, a large body of ethical and legal thought attempts to limit, constrain, and to establish criteria that sanction the use of violence in the name of the state and society. Through the mechanisms of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Charter of the United Nations, military manuals such as the U.S. Army's "Law of Land Warfare," and similar documents, modern governments and militaries attempt to distinguish "just war" and just conduct in war from other types of killing of human beings. Morally conscientious military personnel need to understand and frame their actions in moral terms so as to maintain moral integrity in the midst of the actions and stress of combat. They do so in order to explain to themselves and others how the killing of human beings they do is distinguishable from the criminal act of murder.

Attempts to conduct warfare within moral limits have met with uneven success. Many cultures and militaries fail to recognize these restraints, or do so in name only. The realities of combat, even for the best trained and disciplined military forces, place severe strains on respect for those limits and sometimes cause military leaders to grow impatient with them in the midst of their need to "get the job done." In the history of the U.S. Army, events like My Lai in Vietnam show that even forces officially committed to just conduct in war are still capable of atrocities in combat—and are slow to discipline such violations.

Despite these limitations, the idea of just war is one to which the well-led and disciplined military forces of the world remain committed. The fact that the constraints of just war are routinely overridden is no more a proof of their falsity and irrelevance than are similar points about morality: we know the standard, and we also know human beings fall short of that standard with depressing regularity. The fact of moral failure, rather than proving the falsity of morality, points instead to the source of our disappointment in such failures: our abiding knowledge of the morally right.

Because of the importance of just war thinking, the general history, key provisions, and moral underpinnings of just war are things which every military person, and especially every senior leader, must understand and be able to communicate to subordinates and the public. It is important that senior leaders understand just war more deeply and see that the positive laws of war emerge from a long moral tradition which rests on fundamental moral principles. This chapter will provide that history, background and moral

context of ethics and war.

Background of Just War Theory

Most cultures of antiquity attempted to place some restraints on war. All recognized that there are some causes of war which are justifiable and others that are not. All recognized that some persons are legitimate objects of attack in war and others are not. All recognized that there were times, seasons, and religious festivals, etc., during which warfare would be morally wrong or religiously inappropriate.

The roots of modern international law come from one specific strand of thought emerging out of antiquity: the Christian Roman Empire that took shape after the conversion to Christianity of the Emperor Constantine in the year 312 AD. Although there were important ideas of restraint in war in pre-Christian Greek and Roman thought and indeed in cultures all over the world, it is the blend of Christian and Greco-Roman thought that set the context of the development of full-blown just war thinking over a period of centuries.

Christianity before this time had been suspicious of entanglement in the affairs of the Empire. For the first several centuries of the movement, Christians interpreted the teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount and other places quite literally, and saw themselves as committed to pacifism (the refusal to use force or violence in all circumstances). Although many appreciated the relative peace, prosperity, and ease of travel the Empire's military force made possible, Christians felt prayer on behalf of the Emperor was the limit of their direct support for it.

Much changed with Constantine. For many, war fought on behalf of a "Christian Empire" was a very different thing than war on behalf of a pagan one. Further, during the century following Constantine's conversion, the Empire began to experience wave after wave of invasion from the north, culminating in the fall of the city of Rome itself in 410 AD—a mere hundred years after Constantine.

It was in that context that Christian thinkers, most notably St. Augustine, a doctor of the church and bishop of Hippo in North Africa, first worked out the foundations of Christian just war thought. History, Augustine argued, is morally ambiguous. Human beings hope for pure justice and absolute righteousness. Augustine firmly believed that the faithful will experience such purity only at the end of time when God's kingdom comes. But until that happens, we will experience only justice of a sort, righteousness of a sort.

What passes for justice will require force and coercion, since there will always be people who strive to take more than their share, to harm and steal from others. In that world, the peacemakers who are blessed are those who use force appropriately and mournfully to keep as much order and peace as possible under these conditions. The military officer is that peacemaker when he or she accepts this sad necessity. Out of genuine care and concern with the weak and helpless, the soldier shoulders the burden of fighting to maintain an order and system of justice which, while far short of the deepest hopes of human beings, keeps the world from sliding into complete anarchy and chaos. It is a sad necessity imposed on the soldier by an aggressor. It inevitably is tinged with guilt and mournfulness. The conscientious soldier longs for a world where conflict is unnecessary, but sees that the order of well-ordered states must be defended lest chaos rule.

For Augustine and the tradition that developed after him, Just War is an attempt to balance two

competing moral principles. It attempts to maintain the Christian concern with non-violence and to honor the principle that taking human life is a grave moral evil. But it attempts to balance that concern with the recognition that, the world being what it is, important moral principles and protection of innocent human life require the willingness to use force and violence.

As it wends its way through history, the tradition of Just War thought grows and becomes more precise and more elaborate. In that development, it faces new challenges and makes new accommodations.

The Spanish in the New World, for example, were challenged to rethink the tradition as they encountered and warred against indigenous populations. Are such wars, too, governed by moral principles? Are all things permitted against such people? Or, it was seriously debated, are they even people, as opposed to some new kind of animal? Through that discussion came an expansion of the scope of Just War principles to populations that did not share common cultures.

After the Protestant Reformation, as wars raged throughout Europe in the attempt to restore religious unity to “Christendom,” some thinkers (most notably Hugo Grotius) argued that Just War must be severed from a distinctively Christian religious foundation. Human reason instead must provide a system for the restraint of war that will be valid despite religious difference, valid *etsi deus non daretur*, even if God did not exist! In other words, for Grotius and others, human reason is a commonality all people share, regardless of religious, ethnic, and cultural differences. That rationality, rather than revealed religion or religious authority, could suffice to ground moral thinking about war.

As a result of that “secularization” of Just War thinking in Europe, the foundation was laid for the universal international law of the present international system. As a result, the foundation was laid for that system in Natural Law (moral rules believed to be known by reason alone, apart from particular religious ideas and institutions) and in the *jus Gentium*, the “law of Peoples,” those customary practices which are widely shared across cultures. In current international law these accepted practices are called “customary international law” and set the standard of practices of “civilized nations.”

Since virtually all modern states have committed themselves by treaty and by membership in the United Nations to the principles of international law, in one sense there is no question of their universal applicability around the globe. But the fact that the tradition has roots in the West and in the Christian tradition does raise important multicultural questions about it.

How does one deal with the important fact that Muslims have their own ways of framing moral issues of war and conflict and even of the national state itself which track imperfectly at best with the Just War framework? How does one factor into one’s thinking the idea of “Asian Values” which differ in their interpretation of the rights of individuals and the meaning of the society and state from this supposedly universal framework? What weight should the fact that much of the world, while nominally nation-states on the model established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 in Europe, are in reality better described as “tribes with flags”? How does one deal with the fact that, in much of the world, membership in a particular ethnic group within an internationally recognized border is more an indicator of one’s identity than the name of the country on one’s passport?

All of these questions are subject of intense scholarly debate and practical importance. All have very real-world applications when we think about the roots of conflict around the modern world and attempt to think about those conflicts in the ways many of the participants do. But for our purposes, we will need to set

them aside in favor of making sure we understand the Just War criteria as they frame U.S. military policy and the existing framework of international law.

This limitation of focus is justified not only by the limitations of time, but also by legal reality. Whatever one might want to say about the important cross-cultural issues posed above, it remains true that the United States and its allies around the world are committed by treaty, policy, and moral commitment to conduct military operations within the framework of the existing Just War criteria. That fact alone makes it important that strategic leaders possess a good working knowledge of those criteria and some facility in using them to reason about war.

Ideally, however, strategic leaders will also have some grasp of the ongoing debate about cultural diversity and the understanding of war in fundamentally differing cultural contexts as well.

The Purposes of the Just War Framework

The framework of principles, commonly called “Just War Criteria,” provide an organized schema for determining whether a particular conflict is morally justified. As one might imagine, any such framework will inevitably fall short of providing moral certainty. When applied to the real world in all its complexity, inevitably persons of intelligence and good will can, and do, disagree whether those criteria are met in a given case.

Furthermore, some governments and leaders lie. No matter how heinous their deeds, they will strive to cast their actions in just war terms to provide at least the appearance of justification for what they do. If hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, it is testimony to the moral weight of the just war principles that even the most extreme lies follow the shape of just war principles. Just war language provides the shape of the lie even the greatest war criminals must tell. Rare indeed is the aggressor or tyrant willing to declare forthrightly the real causes and motives of their actions.

The twin realities of real-world complexity and the prevalence of lying about these matters suggest the importance not only of *knowing* the just war criteria as a kind of list, but also of skillful and careful reasoning using the just war framework as a strategic leader competency. Only if a leader is capable of careful and judicious application of just war thinking can he or she distinguish valid application of just war thinking from specious and self-serving attempts to cloak unjust action in its terms.

The Just War Framework

Moral judgments about war fall into two discrete areas: the reasons for going to war in first place, and the way the war is conducted. The first is traditionally called *jus ad bellum*, or justice of going to war, and the second *jus in bello*, or law during war. Two interesting features of this two-part division are that different agents are primarily responsible for each, and that they are to a large degree logically independent of each other.

Judgments about going to war are, in the American context, made by the National Command Authority and the Congress. Except at the highest levels where military officers advise those decisionmakers, military leaders are not involved in those discussions and bear no moral responsibility for the decisions that result. Still, military personnel and ordinary citizens can and do judge the reasons given for entering into military

conflict by those decisionmakers and make their own determinations whether the reasons given make sense or not. A morally interesting but difficult question arises concerning one's obligations and responsibilities when one is convinced that recourse to war is not justified in a particular case.

Just conduct in war concerns the rules of engagement, choice of weapons and targets, treatment of civilian populations and prisoners of war, and so forth. These concern the “nuts and bolts” of how the war is actually conducted. Here the primary responsibility shifts from the civilian policymakers to the military leadership at all levels. Of course political leaders and ordinary citizens have an interest in and make judgments about how their troops conduct themselves in war. Militaries conduct themselves in light of national values, and must be seen as behaving in war in ways citizens at home can accept morally.

Modern war, usually fought in plain sight of CNN and other media, is for good and for ill especially subject to immediate scrutiny. Political leaders and ordinary citizens react to virtually every event and require of their leaders explanations for why they do what they do and conduct war as they do. This fact, too, indicates why strategic leaders must be adept in explaining clearly and honestly the conduct of their forces within the framework of the Just War criteria.

I turn now to a discussion of the criteria of Just War in some detail. These are the “tests” one uses to determine the justification of recourse to war in particular circumstances.

We begin with the criteria for judging a war just *ad bellum* (in terms of going to war in the first place). In detail lists of these criteria vary somewhat, but the following captures the essential elements:

- Just Cause
- Legitimate Authority
- Public Declaration
- Just Intent
- Proportionality
- Last Resort
- Reasonable Hope of Success

Recall that the moral impulse behind just war thinking is a strong sense of the moral evils involved in taking human life. Consequently, the *ad bellum* tests of just war are meant to set a high bar to a too-easy recourse to force and violence to resolve conflict. Each of the “tests” is meant to impose a restraint on the decision to go to war.

Just Cause

Just Cause asks for a legitimate and morally weighty reason to go to war. Once, causes like “offended honor” or religious difference were considered good reasons for war. As it has developed, just war tradition and international law have restricted greatly the kinds of reasons deemed acceptable for entering into military confrontation. The baseline standard in modern just war thinking is *aggression*. States are justified in going to war to respond to aggression received. Classically, this means borders have been crossed in force. Such direct attacks on the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of an internationally recognized state provide the clear case of just cause, recognized in just war and in international law (for example, in the Charter of the United Nations).

Of course there are a number of justifications for war which do not fit this classic model. Humanitarian

interventions, preemptive strikes, assistance to a wronged party in an internal military conflict in a state, just to name some examples, can in some circumstances also justify use of military force, even though they do not fit the classic model of response to aggression. But the farther one departs from the baseline model of response to aggression, the more difficult and confusing the arguments become.

As one moves into these justifications, the scope for states to lie and try to justify meddling in each other's affairs grows. For that reason, international law and ethics gives an especially hard look at claims of just cause other than response to aggression already received. To do otherwise risks opening too permissive a door for states to interfere with each other's territory and sovereignty.

Legitimate authority restricts the number of agents who may authorize use of force. In the Middle Ages, for example, there was the very real problem that local lords and their private armies would engage in warfare without consulting with, let alone receiving authorization from, the national sovereign.

In the modern context, different countries will vary in their internal political structure and assign legitimate authority for issues of war and peace of different functionaries and groups. In the American context, there is the unresolved tension between the President as Commander in Chief and the authority of Congress to declare war. The present War Powers Act (viewed by all Presidents since it was enacted as unconstitutional, but not yet subjected to judicial review) has still not clarified that issue. But while one can invent a scenario where this lack of clarity would raise very real problems, in practice so far the National Command Authority and the Congress have found pragmatic solutions in every deployment of American forces so far.

The **public declaration** requirement has both a moral purpose and (in the American context) a legal one. The legal one refers to the issue we were just discussing: the role of Congress in declaring war. As we all know, few twentieth-century military conflicts in American history have been authorized by a formal congressional declaration of war. While this is an important and unresolved Constitutional issue for the United States, it is not the moral point of the requirement.

The moral point is perhaps better captured as a requirement for delivery of an ultimatum before initiation of hostilities. Recall that the moral concern of just war is to make recourse to armed conflict as infrequent as possible. The requirement of a declaration or ultimatum gives a potential adversary formal notice that the issue at hand is judged serious enough to warrant the use of military force, and that the nation is prepared to do so unless that issue is successfully resolved peacefully immediately.

The **just intent** requirement serves to keep the war aims limited and within the context of the just cause used to authorize the war. Every conflict is subject to "mission creep." Once hostilities commence, there is always the temptation to forget what cause warranted the use of force and to press on to achieve other purposes—purposes that, had they been offered as justifications for the use of force prior to the conflict, would have clearly been seen as unjustifiable. The just intent requirement limits war aims by keeping the mind focused on the purpose of the war. Although there are justified exceptions, the general rule is that the purpose of war is to restore the *status quo ante bellum*, the state of affairs that existed before the violation that provided the war's just cause.

Proportionality is a common sense requirement that the damage done in the war should be worth it. That is to say, even if one has a just cause, it might be so costly in lives and property damage that it is better to accept the loss rather than to pay highly disproportionately to redress the issue. In practice, of course, this

is a hard criterion to apply. It is a commonplace that leaders and nations are notoriously inaccurate at predicting the costs of conflict as things snowball out of control.

But here too, the moral point of just war criteria is to restrain war. And one important implication of that requirement is the demand for a good faith and well-informed estimate of the costs and feasibility of redressing grievances through the use of military force.

The requirement that war be the *ultima ratio*, the **last resort**, stems too from a commitment to restrict the use of force to cases of sad necessity. No matter how just the cause, and no matter how well the other criteria may be met, the last resort requirement acknowledges that the actual commencement of armed conflict crosses a decisive line. Diplomatic solutions to end conflicts, even if they are less than perfect, are to be preferred to military ones in most, if not all, cases. This is because the costs of armed conflict in terms of money and lives are so high and because armed conflict, once begun, is inherently unpredictable.

In practical reality, judging that this criterion has been met is particularly difficult. Obviously, it cannot require that one has done every conceivable thing short of use of force: there is *always* more one could think to do. It has to mean doing everything that seems to a reasonable person promising. But reasonable people disagree about this. In the First Gulf War, for example, many (including Colin Powell) argued that more time for sanctions and diplomacy would be preferable to initiation of armed conflict.

The last requirement *ad bellum* is **reasonable hope of success**. Because use of force inevitably entails loss of human life, civilian and military, it is a morally grave decision to use it. The reasonable hope criterion simply focuses thinking on the practical question: if you're going to do all that damage and cause death, are you likely to get what you want as a result? If you're not, if despite your best efforts it is unlikely that you'll succeed in reversing the cause that brings you to war, then you are causing death and destruction to no purpose.

An interesting question does arise whether heroic but futile resistance is ever justified. Some have argued that the long-term welfare of a state or group may well require a memory of resistance and noble struggle, even in the face of overwhelming odds. Since the alternative is acquiescence to conquest and injustice, might it be justifiable for a group's long term self-understanding to be able to look back and say, "at least we didn't die like sheep"?

This completes the overview of the *jus ad bellum* requirements of just war. Recall that the categories and distinctions of the theory are not simple and clear. Neither individually nor together do they provide an algorithm that can generate a clear-cut and obvious judgment about a particular war in the minds of all fair-minded people.

On the other hand, it is important not to overemphasize the difficulty here. Although the language of just war is used by virtually all states and leaders in the attempt to justify their actions, not all uses are equally valid. Often it is not that difficult to identify uses that are inaccurate, dishonest, or self-serving. While there certainly are a range of cases where individuals of good will and intelligence will disagree in their judgments, there is also a good range where the misuse is transparent.

Recall, for example, Iraq's initial (and brief) attempt to justify its invasion of Kuwait on grounds that there had been a revolution in the Kuwaiti government and the new legitimate government of Kuwait had requested Iraq's fraternal assistance in stabilizing the new government. Had this story been true, of course, Iraq would have been acting in conformity with international law and just war tradition by being in Kuwait.

It is important to note that Iraq did apparently feel obliged to tell a tale like this, since that itself is a perverse testimony to the need of states to attempt to justify their actions in the court of world opinion in just war terms. Of course the story was so obviously false that even Iraq stopped telling it in a matter of hours (how many of you even recall that they told it?).

My point in citing this example is to forestall an easy relativism. It is simple intellectual laziness to conclude that, because these judgments are hard and people disagree about them in particular cases, that the principles have no moral force or, worse, that all uses of them are mere window-dressing. In all moral matters, as Aristotle pointed out, it is a mark of an educated person not to expect more precision than the matter at hand permits. And in complex moral judgments of matters of international relations, one cannot expect more than thoughtful, well-informed, and good-faith judgments.

Jus in bello

I turn now to the *jus in bello* side of just war thinking. As I noted above, except at the highest levels of the military command structure, officers do not make the decision to commit forces to conflict. The moral weight of those judgments lies with the political leadership and its military advisors. On the other hand, strategic military leaders, whether they are technically responsible for decisions to go to war or not, will often be placed in the position of justifying military action to the press and the people. Further, thoughtful officers will often feel a need to justify a particular use of force in which they participate to themselves. For all these reasons, therefore, facility with just war reasoning in both its dimensions (*jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*) is a strategic leader competency.

The practical conduct of war is, however, the primary responsibility of military officers. They bear the responsibility for the training and discipline of military personnel. They issue the orders that determine what is attacked, with what weapons and tactics. They set the tone for how civilians are treated, how POW's are captured, confined, and cared for. They determine how soldiers who violate order and the laws of war are disciplined and what examples they allow to be set for acceptable conduct in their commands.

Because of this weight of responsibility, the officer at all levels must thoroughly incorporate thought about the *jus in bello* side of just war into standard operating procedure. It is an integral part of military planning at all levels, from the tactical issues of employing small units to the highest levels of grand strategy. U.S. policy, national and universal values, and political prudence combine to require officers at all levels to plan and execute military operations with a clear understanding of just war requirements.

The major moral requirements of just war *in bello* boil down to two: discrimination and proportionality. Together, they set limits in the conduct of war—limits on *who* can be deliberately attacked and on *how* war can legitimately be conducted.

Although we use the term “**discrimination**” almost wholly negatively (as in racial discrimination), the core meaning of the word is morally neutral. It refers to distinguishing between groups or people or things on the basis of some characteristic that distinguishes one group from another.

In the context of thought about war, the relevant characteristic upon which just war requires us to discriminate is **combatant status**. In any conflict, there are individuals who are combatants—actively engaged in prosecuting the war efforts—and there are non-combatants. The central moral idea of just war is that only the first, the combatants, are legitimate objects of deliberate attack. By virtue of their “choosing”

to be combatants, they have made themselves objects of attack and have lost that immunity from deliberate attack all human beings have in normal life, and which civilians retain even in wartime. I put “choosing” in quotes, of course, because we all know soldiers become soldiers in lots of ways, many of which are highly coerced. But they are at least voluntary in this sense: they didn’t run away. They allow themselves to be in harm’s way as combatants.

Of course in modern war there are lots of borderline cases between combatant and non-combatant. The definition of the war conventions is straightforward: combatants wear a fixed distinct sign, visible at a distance and carry arms openly. But in guerilla war, to take the extreme case, combatants go to great lengths to blend in to the civilian population. In such a war, discrimination poses very real practical and moral problems.

But the presence of contractors on a battlefield or combat in urban environments where fighters (whether uniformed or not) are mixed in with civilian populations and property (to point to only two examples) also make discrimination between combatants and noncombatants challenging both morally and practically.

It is less critical to focus on the hard case than on the central moral point. War can only be conducted justly insofar as a sustained and good faith commitment is made to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and to deliberately target only the combatants.

Of course civilians die in war. And sometimes those deaths are the unavoidable by-product of even the most careful and conscientious planning and execution of military operations. Intelligence may be mistaken and identify as a military target something that turns out in the even to be occupied by civilians or dedicated only to civilian use. Weapons and guidance systems may malfunction; placing weapons in places they were not intended to go.

Just war recognizes these realities. It has long used the “principle of double effect” to sort through the morality of such events and justifies those which, no matter how terrible, do not result from *deliberate* attacks on civilians. Such accidents in the context of an overall discriminate campaign conducted with weapons that are not inherently indiscriminate are acceptable as “collateral damage.”

What is *not* acceptable in just war thinking is the deliberate targeting of civilians, their use as “human shields,” or use of indiscriminate warfare on populations. In practice this means choosing weapons, tactics, and plans which strive to the limit of the possible to protect innocent civilian populations, even if they place soldiers at (acceptably) greater risk.

The other major requirement of *jus in bello* is **proportionality**. It, too, attempts to place limits on war by the apparently common-sense requirement that attacks be proportionate to the military value of the target. Judgments about these matters are highly contextual and depend on many dimensions of practical military reality. But a massive bombardment of a town, for example, would be disproportionate if the military object of the attack is a single sniper.

It is true, of course, that all sides violated these rules in World War II, especially in the uses of airpower. But the development of precision munitions and platforms for their delivery have, since that conflict, allowed the U.S. military to return to more careful respect for the laws of war, even in air war. Furthermore, it is a testimony to the moral need to do so that, at least in part, drove that development—along with the obvious point that munitions that hit what they’re aimed at with consistency and regularity are more

militarily effective as well.

Contemporary Challenges to the Westphalian Model of Just War

Recent history has put considerable pressure on the understanding of Just War described above. From World War II forward, a growing body of human rights and humanitarian law has evolved which, at least on paper, restrains the sovereignty of states in the name of protecting the rights of individual citizens. The Genocide Convention, for example, sets limits to what states may do to their own citizens and creates the right (and perhaps the obligation) of states to intervene to protect the rights of individuals when their violation rises to an unacceptable (and unfortunately, somewhat vaguely specified) degree.

The conflict in Kosovo was clearly an example of intervention by NATO into the “internal affairs” of Serbia (recall: Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia in the policy of all the states involved). Very little of the national interest of the NATO powers, narrowly conceived, was involved in Kosovo. It was a case where humanitarian causes and human rights were cited to “trump” Serbian sovereignty. Further, it was not authorized by resolution of the UN Security Council, to a large degree because the Chinese and the Russians feared the “porous sovereignty” precedent it would set.

Conversely, the failure to intervene in Rwanda was widely cited as a case where humanitarian concerns ought to have overridden sovereignty and national interest questions.

These examples point to one large and unresolved issue in contemporary international ethics and law: the harmonization of state sovereignty with issues of human rights and humanitarian intervention.

Another even deeper challenge is posed by the Global “War” against Terrorism. The terms “war” in quotations, of course, because in many respects the nature of the conflict with al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups of global reach departs markedly from the model of war between Westphalian sovereign states. Most obviously, terrorist groups are not state actors, so many of the conventions governing conflict between states apply imperfectly at best.

Of course unless terrorist groups are in international waters or in space, they necessarily exist in some relationship to states. Some states deliberately and consciously sponsor and encourage them; others harbor them unknowingly and perhaps even unwillingly; still others would like nothing better than to be rid of them, but have weak or non-existent governments with the capability to dislodge them.

For states that deliberately harbor them, no great stretch is required to extend the Westphalian paradigm to cover such cases. At some point the existence of a threat within the border of such states that the government is disinclined to rein in constitutes a just cause of war between the United States and its allies and the harboring state. One way of construing the conflict in Afghanistan is precisely this: that the Taliban government wished to shelter and protect al Qaeda on its territory and, after sufficient warning, placed its own continued existence in jeopardy.

For states that lack the power to dislodge terrorist groups, if they can be persuaded to request assistance from the United States or other powers to dislodge them, even if that “persuasion” results from considerable pressure, the formalities of the current international system are maintained.

But other possibilities present themselves. On one interpretation of the Bush administration’s National

Security Strategy, the nature of the terrorist threat, combined with the possible destructive power of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), warrants abandoning the “just cause” restriction to aggression received in favor of a more aggressive “preemptive” (or, perhaps better, “preventative”) use of military force. If this indeed becomes policy and customary international law, it might take one of two forms. It might be a simply assertion of U.S. military supremacy and lead to a fundamental recasting of the Westphalian assumption of the equality of sovereign states.

On the other hand, the nature of the threat might also lead to a reformulation of a common understanding of “terrorism” among the major powers that generates a multilateral agreement, implicit or explicit, that some threats warrant interventions that might not pass the inherited “just war” tests of recent centuries. In that respect, just war would be returning to its origins: rather than seeing war as a conflict among sovereign states in response to aggression, the international community might see itself once again (as Augustine did in the fifth century) as defending a “tranquility of order” in the international system against incursions of alien systems and ideologies whose sole purpose is a disruption and displacement of that order. In other words, the globalized civilization grounded in democracy, human rights, free trade and communication, technology, and science may be defending its civilization itself against forces that seek its complete destruction.

These aspects of the contemporary scene more than any others point to the need to think about just war in deeper historical terms than simply international law, precisely because existing international law has been formed almost entirely in the European, post-Reformation and Enlightenment, Westphalian system. If the second interpretation of the GWOT has some validity, the central point is precisely that those shared assumptions of the past several centuries may have less and less relevance, and the original concerns of defending the stability of a system of civilization against fundamental attack may be the better analog to present circumstances.

Conclusion

The moral tradition of just war, and its partial embodiment in the laws of war at any moment is part of ongoing evolution. They represent a drive to make practical restraints on war that honor the moral claim of individuals not to be unjustly attacked while at the same time recognizing that use of military force in defense of individuals and values is sometimes a necessity.

All military officers charged with the grave moral responsibility of commanding and controlling military units and weapons must, if they are to conduct war morally, have a good working knowledge of the just war tradition and of the moral principles it strives to enshrine.

Above all, strategic leaders who set large-scale military policy, control training and organizational culture, and supervise the preparation of operational plans for national militaries need to understand and think in ways deeply conditioned by just war principles. Because their responsibility is so great and because the weapons and personnel under their control are capable of causing such destruction, they above all bear the responsibility to ensure that those forces observe the greatest possible moral responsibility in their actions.

No amount of knowledge of the terms and concepts of just war will make morally complex decisions miraculously clear. But clear understanding of the concepts of just war theory and of the moral principles that underlie them can provide clarity of thought and a way to sharpen one’s thinking about those choices.

And in the rapidly changing international scene characterized by American military supremacy and non-state actor attack, it may be that we are entering into a rare fundamental shift in the understanding of the international system such as we have not seen in four centuries.

If our military is to conduct itself in war in ways compatible with American national values and if individual soldiers and officers are to be able to see themselves and their activities as morally acceptable, they must be able to understand the moral structure of just conduct in war. Further, it is imperative that they integrate that understanding into the routines of decisionmaking in military operations.

In the Gulf War, and in major operations since then, the language and concerns of just war are integrated increasingly into planning and execution of military operations. Military lawyers are fully integrated into modern targeting and operations planning cells of the U.S. military. In light of those realities, facility in just war thinking is, indeed, a strategic leader competency. This chapter is only an introduction to the terms and grammar of that thought. True facility in just war thinking will come from careful and critical application of its categories to the complexities of real life and real military operations.

CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER: REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY

Thomas W. McShane

We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.¹

President George H. Bush

World events since 1648 have reflected the political, social, economic, and military aspirations of people organized into sovereign states. Increasingly, they reflect the influence and authority, both real and perceived, of international law, a development which has become evident since the end of the Cold War, but whose roots go back much further. Recent international interventions in places as diverse as Kuwait, Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, and Kosovo, conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, regional organizations such as NATO, or by ad hoc coalitions, are shaped by a large and growing body of treaties, practice, and custom collectively referred to as international law.

Americans traditionally respect and support international law and have in fact been instrumental in its development for more than a century.² At the same time, they become frustrated when international law restrains or limits the pursuit of national interests. This was vividly illustrated in the debates and reactions surrounding American-led efforts to compel disarmament or regime change in Iraq throughout 2002 and 2003. Regardless, it is essential that strategic leaders understand the global environment as it exists today. International law constitutes an important element of the geopolitical environment, one we ignore at our peril.

This chapter traces the development and evolution of international law, its principal components and characteristics, and its relative influence on international politics and events over time. It proposes that international law has evolved to a level where it competes with sovereignty as an organizing principal of international relations. Although sovereignty is likely to remain a critical component of the international system, it faces a growing threat from international organizations and institutions that pursue international order and individual rights at the expense of traditional rights enjoyed by sovereign states.

Conventional wisdom would hold that this phenomenon sprung to life after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1990. To the contrary, as this chapter will demonstrate, the “recent” ascendancy of international law represents major developments in religion, philosophy, and law over centuries, and is shaped by the cataclysmic wars and associated excesses of the twentieth century. Critical components of today’s international system matured in relative obscurity during the Cold War as groups and nations sought self-determination, peace, democracy, and individual freedoms. While it is easy for scholars

and statesmen alike to overlook historical trends, we must examine how developments in international law have subtly but certainly redefined sovereignty and how states have adapted, or not adapted, to this reality.

Foundations of International Law

Humans seek order in life. Religion traditionally reflects our search for meaning and purpose, but social institutions also reflect this desire. In ancient times, families organized themselves into tribes, then cities, states, and empires. Social order implies security and a sense of predictability. Order promotes prosperity and growth — both individual and collective. At the same time, order discourages destructive social behavior and competition for scarce resources.³ Order requires a degree of cooperation and sacrifice, and by definition some inherent limitation on individual freedom. The political process is the means usually used to create order and determine social rules and mores. Laws are crafted to facilitate and support this process.

Order may be imposed within groups or nations or states. On occasion, international order may be imposed by hegemonic powers, for example, the Roman Empire, the British Empire at its height in the nineteenth century, and by American power since 1945. But scholars typically describe the international system as unstructured, or anarchic, in nature. States strive for supremacy, or hegemony, over other states. International politics is a “ruthless and dangerous business . . . [t]his situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic.”⁴ Others analyze the international system in different terms: the dynamic of how states establish international order, e.g., balance of power, bipolar, or hegemonic systems; the nature of state actors as determining state behavior, e.g., democracies act one way, revolutionary states another, etc.; and the influence of individual decisionmakers, e.g., great men drive events — Churchill, Hitler, etc.⁵

Rule of law is widely regarded as an independent basis of international order. The National Security Strategy of the United States tells us that the “nonnegotiable demands of human dignity” include “the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious tolerance; and respect for private property.”⁶ Establishing the rule of law was a stated objective of international efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, among others. Efforts to establish rule of law in places such as Kosovo and more recently Iraq, illustrate the tensions between international law and sovereignty which we will examine in detail later.

Defining International Law

Law prescribes norms of proper behavior, or as Blackstone says in his *Commentaries*, “a rule of civil conduct, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.”⁷ These rules may be prescribed by the sovereign, but they are usually based on religious, cultural, and moral values. As such, the law often depends on voluntary compliance, or more precisely on social pressure to conform. Sanctions may be imposed in cases where individuals will not or cannot comply.

Others feel that laws by definition require sanctions:

It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands, which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice. . . .⁸

Regardless, law provides a foundation for order, stability, predictability, and enjoys general acceptance by the population at large. Laws not generally accepted, perhaps because they do not reflect widely-held beliefs or morals, or serve no constructive purpose, are often ignored and prove particularly difficult to enforce.⁹ Lastly, law evolves; it is not static. Laws change regularly, and considerably over long periods of time. While all this is true with respect to municipal, or domestic, law, does it apply equally to international law?

International law has been defined as “the body of rules and principles of action which are binding on civilized states in their relations with one another.”¹⁰ Critics question, and we will examine later, whether international law can be “binding,” and the efficacy of its application outside its Western European incubator — the so-called “civilized” states. Yet a closer look reveals that international law plays an essential role in global trade and commerce, regulating disputes, compensation, banking, and laws applying to a given transaction. It is indispensable to international transportation, regulating sea and air routes, privileges and immunities, and claims for loss or damage.¹¹ International treaties establish standards for the sciences, health, and the environment.¹²

The law of war is most familiar to us as that branch of public international law regulating armed conflict between states, and increasingly within states suffering from civil war or intrastate conflict. This body of law provided the foundation for the war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II, and later for the international tribunals organized to adjudicate war crimes and crimes against humanity in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Even more recently, the Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court, a standing, rather than ad hoc, tribunal which recently became operational and whose jurisdiction may be unlimited.¹³

In most aspects, international law serves the same purposes as and shares common attributes with municipal law: it provides a foundation for order; is founded on religious, cultural, and moral values; serves to provide stability and predictability; and enjoys general acceptance among the international community. International law protects rights of states and individuals alike. In one important particular, however, the international legal system differs from municipal systems — there is no sanction for noncompliance, if by sanction is meant imposition of penalty by a higher authority. This theme recurs in any discussion of international law, although its relevance is often overstated.¹⁴

Sources of International Law

Classical Antecedents

Historians refer to the “laws” of ancient Greece and Rome and their influence on modern western institutions. Although recognizing that a sophisticated system of laws provided a foundation for order and stability, as well as for a wide-ranging commercial system that stretched from Britain to Asia Minor and ringed the Mediterranean, neither civilization understood the concept of international law as we apply the term today.¹⁵ Ancient Greeks, Romans, and Chinese did not customarily treat outsiders as their equals in an international system of equals. Greeks regarded non-Greeks as uncivilized; The Roman Empire didn’t negotiate acquisitions, it simply took them. The Chinese considered any group of peoples outside the “Middle Kingdom” as barbarians not worthy of their full attention.¹⁶

Natural Law, Feudalism, and Westphalia

Elements of modern international law existed before creation of the Westphalian system in 1648.

Ancient philosophers, the Romans, and their heirs believed in “natural law,” a higher law of nature that controlled all human endeavors, and to which all are bound, even kings and rulers. An expression of this concept is found in the term *ius gentium*, meaning a principle of universal application that all follow because it has been independently discovered by application of reason, a “natural law.” Our contemporary use of the phrase “human rights,” examined in this context, becomes for us a form of natural law, or *ius gentium*, and a fundamental principle of international order.¹⁷

Other elements of international order evolved during the Middle Ages, particularly concepts of property rights and loyalty to the sovereign, key elements of modern nation-states. Under feudalism, property rights of the ruler shaped feudal society, and dictated a network of complicated, but well-understood, relationships that provided stability and order. Feudalism depended on loyalty up and loyalty down the social hierarchy. All were bound by reciprocal responsibilities. While the Catholic Church provided legitimacy and support of feudal institutions, these principles survived the Reformation. The idea that states enjoy sovereignty and the right to control territory is a feudal legacy.¹⁸

Finally, following the self-destructive upheaval of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 provided needed order, stabilizing borders and relationships. Kings could dictate any religion they wished within their borders, but foreswore any rights to interfere in the religious affairs of other sovereign states. This principle was frequently violated for political, if not religious, reasons, but the Treaty achieved its purpose.

Once states became sovereign, a way had to be found for them to interact on a nominal basis of equality. Guiding principles of relations between sovereign states rested on five basic assumptions. States had the right to: make laws; act independently in international affairs; control their territory and people; issue currency; and utilize the resources of the state. Sovereignty thus became the organizing element of modern history.

International Law Hierarchy

The sources of international law are divided into four categories, arranged in a hierarchy.¹⁹ At the top are conventions, treaties, and agreements, such as the UN Charter, or the Law of the Sea Treaty. These represent contractual relationships between sovereign states, and states are bound by their obligations freely undertaken.²⁰

The second source of international law is the practice of states, referred to as customary international law. No hard and fast rule governs customary international law. It reflects the behavior of states over time, acting in accordance with what they believe to be the dominant rules of international order. Customary law exists independently of treaty law, although treaty law may help to shape customary law.²¹

The third source is principles of law recognized by the leading, or so-called “civilized,” nations. International politics help to define these principles, which are also shaped by the municipal law of states.²²

The fourth and final source of international law represents judicial decisions and the writings of jurists and scholars. These include the opinions issued by the International Court of Justice, its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). Writings of scholars supplement these decisions, illustrating and explaining the state of the law based on their experience and study. Changes in the law are often preceded by debate among jurists and scholars over what the law should

be. Their authority is persuasive and influential, not substantive.²³

International Law and Sovereignty—An Evolutionary Relationship

A Marriage of Convenience

International law has never existed in a vacuum. It reflects existing norms and mores, and illustrates the difficulty of constructing international order in a disordered world. The Westphalian system has provided the fundamental framework for order for over three centuries and has greatly influenced the development of international law. Over time sovereignty has ebbed and flowed, as prevailing practices and international politics shaped the behavior of the leading states. To the extent these practices and politics establish binding precedent, they help to define international law.

This portion of the chapter examines how recognized principles of international law and sovereignty developed simultaneously over time. Although sovereignty has provided the dominant basis for international order, it has consistently adapted to accommodate evolving concepts of government, freedom, human rights, and the quest for predictability and stability,²⁴ the historical attributes of international law.

Sovereignty and the Divine Rights of Kings

Early models of sovereignty were based on the prevailing form of government in seventeenth century Europe — monarchies ruled by hereditary dynasties of kings or emperors. Consistent with historical political and religious practice, individuals were subordinate to the state, represented by the King. Other precedents existed, going back to classical Greece and its democratic ideals,²⁵ but prevailing norms made Kings absolute rulers of their states, and they exercised their authority with little regard for the sensibilities of their subjects.

Contemporary writers described the nature of this relationship. Jean Bodin wrote in 1576 that law comes from the King, who, although not bound by his own laws, was not above the law of nature, an important exception bearing on future developments.²⁶ Thomas Hobbes wrote in *Leviathan*: “It appeareth plainly that the sovereign power . . . is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.”²⁷ Louis XIV of France, the “Sun King,” epitomized the classical sovereign — not merely the head of the state, but its very embodiment, anointed by God to rule. Subjects owed unquestioning loyalty to the King, who might or might not act in their best interests. More precisely, the King’s interests were the state’s interests. Hence the dynastic wars of Louis XIV, waged to expand the glory of France and of Louis XIV, were the business of the King and his advisors, not the people of France. As characterized in popular culture: “It’s good to be the King!”²⁸

Not everyone regarded sovereignty this way. Hugo de Groot, also known as Grotius, is referred to as the father of international law for his treatises on international law and the law of war. He was also a proponent of the law of nature and reason. He saw excesses in unbridled sovereignty:

I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which even barbarous nations should be ashamed; men resorting to arms for trivial or for no reasons at all, and...no reverence left for divine or human law, exactly as if a single edict had released a madness driving men to all kinds of crime.²⁹

As the culminating act of the English Civil War and the Thirty Years’ War, the British throne of Charles

I fell to the reformist Protestant armies of Oliver Cromwell. In 1649, one year after Westphalia, Cromwell had King Charles beheaded. Sovereignty was no longer coexistent with monarchy.³⁰

The Enlightenment and Age of Reason

During the eighteenth century, philosophers, scholars, and popular writers rediscovered the writings of the ancient Greeks, combining them with Christian philosophy and natural law into a doctrine of Enlightenment. Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson, among others, emphasized individual rights and the obligations of sovereigns toward their citizens.³¹ Their beliefs were incorporated into the Declaration of Independence and the American and French Revolutions.

The established order elsewhere did not change, but regime change in America and France, replacing monarchies with democratically-based governments, was a harbinger of things to come. It advanced the idea that sovereignty vested in the people, rather than in the government or the ruler, and demonstrated the efficacy of a higher law, themes that would resurface periodically in the nineteenth century and erupt in the latter half of the twentieth. International agreements and treaties began to recognize that individuals as well as states have rights.³²

The Concert of Europe, Industrialism and Colonialism

Following the 25-year struggle to suppress Revolutionary France and Napoleon Bonaparte, the major powers of Europe in 1815 sought to reestablish order, stability, and a balance of power. In response to Napoleon's imperial ambitions, the political leaders who met in Vienna created a system firmly grounded in sovereignty and balanced so as to preclude a return to revolution. Under the leadership of Prince Metternich of Austria and Lord Castlereigh of Great Britain, they succeeded in establishing a framework for peace that would survive essentially intact for a hundred years.³³

Other influences shaped the nineteenth century. Charles Darwin's scientific work on evolution stimulated development of a social philosophy known as social Darwinism, extrapolating Darwin's theories of natural selection and survival of the fittest species into international relations and politics. Those nations which were strongest were most likely and best suited to survive. Social Darwinism heavily influenced political leaders such as Bismarck and Theodore Roosevelt.³⁴ Sovereign states exerted a sort of muscular self-interest in their international relations, demonstrating their superiority by economic growth and territorial acquisition. The last great era of Colonialism was the result, as France, Great Britain, and Germany competed to acquire overseas colonies. The United States, too, succumbed to temptation at the end of the century, acquiring overseas interests in the Hawaii, the Philippines, Cuba, and Panama, among others.³⁵ The sovereign rights of underdeveloped, militarily weak states counted for little in this environment.

Facilitating economic expansion in an era of relative peace were the modern technologies of steamships, railroads, and telegraphs. The speed of communication and transportation caused the world to "shrink," as trade, commerce, and banking connected the continents, creating the first era of "globalization." The modern unified industrial state came into its own as the United States, Germany, and Italy consolidated their territorial boundaries and joined the ranks of the great powers.³⁶ In many regards, it was the apogee of sovereignty.

At the same time other, largely unseen, developments reflected the dark side of unbridled sovereignty and hinted at issues that would rise to prominence in the twentieth century. The industrial revolution

prompted upward mobility and increased the size of the middle class in most western nations, yet it also created a new urban underclass, with associated problems of disease, family breakup, and child labor. Visible disparity in wealth and power in developed states caused socialism to flourish, creating revolutionary pressures that threatened the established order. Karl Marx promulgated his economic theories preaching class warfare. Modest political reform helped to defuse tensions and postpone the final accounting for at least another generation.

Public international law played an important role in international affairs, particularly through treaties regulating trade, communication, and finance. Henri Dunant founded the International Red Cross in Geneva in 1863 to mitigate the destructive effect of modern war.³⁷ The first Geneva Convention covering treatment of sick and wounded on the battlefield was signed in 1864.³⁸ Based largely on the Lieber Code of 1863,³⁹ promulgating laws of war for Union armies in the American Civil War, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907⁴⁰ attempted to prescribe means and methods of warfare consistent with existing humanitarian principles. Concerns over certain acts in the recent war with Iraq — use of civilian hostages, fighting from protected places such as hospitals or mosques, combatants not wearing military uniforms — can be traced directly to the Hague Conventions.⁴¹

The Twentieth Century—Age of Conflict and Ideology

The twentieth century was marked by tremendous highs and abysmal lows. The best and the worst of human nature were on public display, often at the same time. The era was marked by three major world wars, two hot and one cold, and the clash of powerful ideologies. Socialism, Communism, Nazism, and Fascism emerged fully-grown on the world stage, competing with Democracy for primacy in the hearts and minds of nations. Tentative steps to form world government were taken. Natural law resurfaced in the guise of anti-colonialism, self-determination of peoples, the human rights movement, and demands for equality by the non-Western world. Change accelerated development, redefining political and cultural priorities. The second great era of globalization and progress brought the world closer, yet left others even farther behind. The similarities between 1903 and 2003 are striking, as are the differences. The maturation of international law and sovereignty's accommodation to change is one major highlight of the century that we will examine more closely.

The Great War—Changing of the Guard

The period immediately following World War I is essential to understanding the rest of the twentieth century. The issues facing the allied powers in Versailles, and the choices made then and over the next decade, dictated the course of events for the remainder of the century. International law emerged as a critical component of international order and would play a major role in international politics.

World War I, The Great War, caused tremendous upheaval in the established order. The victorious allies attempted to address these problems at Versailles in 1919. First was the unexpected scope of violence and destruction, prompting calls for vengeance — war reparations to be paid by the losers and trials of those responsible for the conflict. Second was the collapse of major empires — the German, Austrian-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires on the losing side, and the Russian Empire in 1917 on the allied side — and the emergence of the United States as the predominant military and economic power.⁴² The third problem was the creation of new nation-states out of the former empires. Lastly, lack of consensus concerning the goals of the war and what the allies had won plagued the peace and designs for international order.

Revolutionary efforts to create a world government fell short—the League of Nations was a start, but

not a sufficient one. President Wilson's visions for the postwar order clashed with the national interests of the allies and frustrated effective, unified action. The Versailles Treaty became a compromise. Complicating matters, Wilson failed to persuade the American public or the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty creating the League of Nations; and without American participation, the League proved too weak to enforce Wilson's vision of collective security — peace through the rule of law, supported by military force when necessary.⁴³ Wilson's vision would be revived in 1945 and again in 1990 with relatively greater success.

Attempts to try the Kaiser and others for War Crimes encountered similar problems. The Allies could not agree, and the Germans would not cooperate. Ambitious plans drawn up at the Paris Peace Conference in 1920 called for some 900 war criminals to be tried, but Allied disunity and German recalcitrance prevailed. As a compromise, 12 German soldiers ranging from private to lieutenant general were tried in German courts; six were convicted, with the most severe sentence being four years.⁴⁴

One encouraging development at Versailles was public debate over rule of law and ethics superseding national interests and international politics. The conflict between these poles of international order would continue throughout the twentieth century and still exists. As Kissinger characterizes it:

At the end of the First World War, the age-old debate about the relative roles of morality and interest in international affairs seemed to have been resolved in favor of the dominance of law and ethics. Under the shock of the cataclysm, many hoped for a better world as free as possible from the kind of *Realpolitik* which, in their view, had decimated the youth of a generation.⁴⁵

Efforts to enforce peace through rule of law continued for over a decade following Versailles. Arms control agreements took the place of serious collective security enforcement. Examples include the Naval Conferences at Washington in 1922 and London in 1930, regulating the number and size of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, then considered the major strategic weapons of the great powers.⁴⁶ In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the signatory parties agreed to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.⁴⁷

In the end, sovereignty and national interests proved too strong for the Wilsonians. International law became just another diplomatic tool as the great states rearmed themselves for World War II. Former President Theodore Roosevelt, still a keen observer of world events, captured the essence of power politics when he said: "As yet there is no likelihood of establishing any kind of international power . . . which can effectively check wrong-doing . . . I regard . . . trusting to fantastic peace treaties, to impossible promises, to all kinds of scraps of paper without any backing in efficient force, as abhorrent."⁴⁸

Sovereignty in the Nuclear Age

World War II and the Search for International Order

The world got a second chance in 1945 to recreate international order. The unprecedented destruction of the second major war in a generation dwarfed that of 1914-18 and brought modern war to the home front with a vengeance. Millions of noncombatants became casualties of war. The discovery of nuclear fission at the end of the war threatened even greater destruction in any future conflict. Sovereignty had to be checked, and international law was applied to the task. The problem was neatly defined by one study:

A sovereign state at the present time claims the power to judge its own controversies, to enforce its

own conception of its rights, to increase its armaments without limit, to treat its own nationals as it sees fit, and to regulate its economic life without regard to the effect of such regulations upon its neighbors. These attributes of sovereignty must be limited.⁴⁹

The creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the proceedings of the Nuremberg Tribunal immediately following were watershed events that permanently altered the nature of the debate regarding a state's right to wage war and its treatment of its citizens. Together they announced to the world that aggressive war would no longer be tolerated, and that individuals who commit aggression and crimes against humanity will be held criminally responsible for their acts. It was a sincere effort and a good start, enjoying almost universal support.

One of the United Nations' early proclamations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,⁵⁰ outlined fundamental human rights in terms reminiscent of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. It was intended as common standard for "all peoples and all nations."⁵¹ Although aspirational in tone and lacking an enforcement mechanism, it has served for more than 50 years as a beacon for people in search of freedom and justice. Over the following decades, International agreements outlawing genocide, recognizing the rights of minorities, and emphasizing humanitarian concerns consistently advanced individual rights at the expense of state sovereignty.⁵²

Collective security acquired new life after World War II with the creation of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States (OAS), and other international and regional organizations. Although the Cold War provided the initial impetus for NATO, it survives as a viable, productive organization. With expanded membership and new missions, NATO today provides collective security while extending democracy and prosperity to the nations of Eastern Europe, a development unimaginable a generation ago.

The Rule of Law and Human Rights Center Stage

The rule of law in international affairs is manifest in many ways: by actions of the UN Security Council and other UN organizations,⁵³ by NGO's advancing collective western values and international humanitarian law; by treaties regulating strategic nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, and chemical/biological weapons;⁵⁴ by international agreement on global warming; by creation of an international criminal court;⁵⁵ and by the number of "coalitions of the willing" contributing forces to intervene in intrastate conflicts.

A common misperception is that these developments emerged all at once in 1990 with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.⁵⁶ The incorporation of international law and human rights into international relations since 1945 stems from historical trends and events. It reflects timeless values, classical and modern philosophy, and the common experiences of mankind over centuries. Although it is true that the bipolar system and threat of great power veto limited the ability of the UN Security Council to take effective action throughout the Cold War, the quest for international order based on rule of law consistently influenced political developments and discourse.

The struggle to end colonialism and promote self-determination of peoples following World War II is illustrative. The UN Charter, firmly rooted in sovereignty, contemplated the end of Western colonialism.⁵⁷ The United States advocated renunciation of overseas imperial holdings and supported self-determination.⁵⁸ During World War II, in fact, our stance on this issue periodically created rifts within the Anglo-French-

U.S. partnership.⁵⁹ After the war, at the same time we were developing a Containment Policy against Communism, we were calling for an end to British and French rule in Africa and Asia. When newly independent colonial states lapsed into Communism, as happened in Vietnam, we suddenly found ourselves with a new problem on our hands, one as much political as military in nature.⁶⁰ The search for order, justice, and democracy stumbled on the rock of great power politics. International law alone could not preserve the peace.

Cold War arms control agreements⁶¹ reflected not so much American and Soviet optimism as they did global public opinion, uneasy over the prospect of annihilation at the hands of the two superpowers. With the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, mutual assured destruction became a fact. With satellite technology, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) acquired the capacity to place nuclear weapons in earth orbit.⁶² Many states became fervent practitioners of international law for purely parochial reasons, but the success of the international community, particularly non-aligned states, in framing global debate demonstrated the force of western values and the rule of law. These trends emerged in the 1950s and acquired prominence in the 1960s and 1970s. Neither the United Nations nor the international community could force the great powers to take specific actions against their interests, but this does not mean that the great powers, including the United States and USSR, were free to do as they pleased. Pressures to comply with world opinion were subtle and often invisible, but real nonetheless.

Contributing to the force of international law was the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, in the decades following World War II. NGOs pursued their own special interests, but most had an underlying humanitarian agenda, advancing the cause of human rights and promoting "International Humanitarian Law."⁶³ The International Committee of the Red Cross is the oldest and best-known of the NGOs.⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch, Doctors without Borders, CARE, and thousands of others effectively precipitated international intervention in what had been considered previously the internal affairs of sovereign states.⁶⁵

Two examples illustrate the power and influence NGOs have acquired. The first is the UN intervention in Somalia in 1992 under American leadership to ensure delivery of relief supplies and avert a humanitarian disaster forecast by NGOs and highlighted on television screens around the world. UN intervention alleviated the immediate problem, but failed to address the underlying problem of stability. When it did, too little and too late, it led to the battle of Mogadishu and eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The second example of NGO influence is the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines.⁶⁶ The preamble to the Treaty states in part:

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban landmines, and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world, *Basing* themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, . . .⁶⁷

NGOs and international celebrities like Princess Diana of Britain actively participated in the Conference process, dismissing security concerns raised by the United States. Humanitarian concerns over civilians killed or maimed by abandoned land mines preoccupied the Conference and carried the day. While not a party to the treaty, the United States has conceded substantial compliance by policy.⁶⁸

The State of the State— Sovereignty in the New Millennium

Trends and Developments

Trends evident in 2003 reflect the foregoing discussion. In advanced states, post-industrial society has replaced basic industry and manufacturing, which has migrated to less-developed countries with lower labor costs. Globalization draws nations and peoples closer, despite recent economic setbacks. The World Trade Organization is a powerful international force that influences decisions of the leading economic powers, including the United States.⁶⁹ International labor organizations demand basic standards and benefits for workers and workplaces. These trends undermine sovereignty and reflect a tightly structured international environment that constrains even the strongest states to behave in ways promoting international order.

Human rights influence international agendas and domestic actions. International humanitarian intervention, evident in Kosovo, East Timor, and possibly Iraq, is an emerging precedent that demands attention. It is not yet customary international law, but lively debate on the subject tends to redefine how we view sovereignty.⁷⁰ This represents, ironically, the triumph of values advanced by Woodrow Wilson at Versailles almost a century ago. The principles of the American and French revolutions have become universal, though not all states concede that individual rights supersede the welfare of the state, most notably China, the world's most populous state.

Themes for the Twenty-first Century

International law will play an important role in addressing issues and trends likely to persist for decades to come. The most important of these include a globalized economy, urbanization, intrastate conflict, clash of cultures, unequal distribution of wealth, environmental degradation, transnational crime, collective security, multilateralism, and humanitarian intervention. Global problems require global solutions; sovereign states cannot solve them, although they can address symptoms within their borders. Most, eventually, will require international cooperation.

Implications for Strategic Leaders

International law challenges strategic leaders to think globally, not nationally. The positivist approach to international law expressed in the S.S. *Lotus* case: "Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed,"⁷¹ is threatened by a new paradigm: "a law more readily seen as the reflection of a collective juridical conscience and as a response to the social necessities of States organized as a community."⁷² UN Secretary General Kofi Annan articulated this new paradigm as follows:

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.⁷³

The implications of this principle are staggering. Yet Kofi Annan is no revolutionary; his language is reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson's in the Declaration of Independence: "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed." States

exist to promote and protect individual rights and freedoms. The challenge for international leaders is what action the international community should take in those cases where states deliberately and systematically violate the human rights of their citizens.⁷⁴

None of this implies that sovereign states cannot guarantee, promote, and advance human rights. To the contrary, the American experience teaches us that individual rights and rule of law are mutually supportive and thrive in a strongly nationalistic, democratic environment. Ironically, the American experience also encourages internationalism in the promotion of democratic values. As President Bush has stated in his National Security Strategy: “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”⁷⁵ This sentiment resembles Woodrow Wilson’s and, indeed, those of most presidents since 1918. Kissinger portrays this as an essential element of American altruism motivating our actions abroad: “Wilson put forward the unprecedented doctrine that the security of America was inseparable from the security of *all* the rest of mankind. This implied that it was henceforth America’s duty to oppose aggression *everywhere*. . . .”⁷⁶

The current world situation encourages debate over the scope and authority of international law. Recent American actions in Iraq, taken contrary to international public opinion, without the endorsement of the UN Security Council, and against the wishes of longstanding allies such as France, Germany, and Turkey, support Mersheimer’s proposition that great powers behave as their interests dictate.⁷⁷ Perhaps sovereignty is alive and well after all.

Unilateral action can, at least in certain cases, achieve the same results as multilateral efforts. Proponents of international order and rule of law argue that lasting order cannot be imposed unilaterally. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, which created the “Concert of Europe,” was a collective, multilateral effort, albeit predicated on sovereignty. But it took enormous cooperation to maintain international order for a hundred years. Even the British Empire at its height in the nineteenth century realized its limitations and attempted to construct a favorable balance of power. John Ikenberry, in *After Victory*, analyzes the rebuilding of international order after major wars. He says the diplomats of 1815 created a “constitutional order,” which are “political orders organized around agreed-upon legal and political institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise of power.”⁷⁸

Ikenberry’s concept of “constitutional order” helps to explain how the current international system evolved after World War II, and how it operates today. At its heart was the sharing of power by the United States, by far the most powerful state in the world in 1945. The framework was an extensive system of multilateral institutions, including alliances, which bound the United States and its primary partners in Europe together. The Cold War may have accelerated this process, but it did not create it.⁷⁹

If this theory is correct, then the primacy of international law and institutions is no accident, but instead the direct and expected result of efforts to create a framework of mutually supporting and binding ties. As we have seen, these international institutions have performed as designed. It should come as no surprise, viewing the international system in this way, that international organizations and politics restrain the choices and actions of sovereign states. From this perspective, international order displays many of the characteristics of municipal order. Ikenberry explains this: “if institutions—wielded by democracies—play a restraining role . . . it is possible to argue that international orders under particular circumstances can indeed exhibit constitutional characteristics.”⁸⁰

The New World Order and American Hegemony

Who Owns International Law?

What is America's role as the sole superpower in the current environment? How will the international system respond to the threat of global terrorism? Can it maintain the security and prosperity created by American leadership since 1945? Can the rule of law accommodate the national interests of the great powers and protect the interests of weaker states threatened by demagogues, genocide, civil war, and internal armed conflict? The remainder of this chapter will attempt to suggest answers to these questions.

Dynamic, disparate forces challenge the international order. Globalization promises prosperity and freedom, but failed states, disease, pollution, and rising birthrates hold large segments of the world's population hostage. Furthering individual rights and enforcing collective security requires international cooperation, but depends at present on the good will and determination of powerful sovereign states.

A brief look at two recent developments illustrates the nature of the challenge and provides insights as to possible courses of action. The first of these is the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC); the second is the American-led war on terrorism.

The International Criminal Court is an idea whose time has come. It fulfills the hopes and aspirations of a majority of the world's nations. Eighty years in the making, from Versailles in 1919 to the Rome Statute in 1997, it reflects a new consensus on international justice and the rule of law. Recognizing that sovereignty protected rulers and their agents from accountability for crimes ranging from aggressive war to democide,⁸¹ the ICC provides a permanent forum for prosecution when state courts cannot or will not act. As of this writing, 139 nations have signed the treaty, and 89 have ratified it. The Court commenced operations on July 1, 2002, and according to its charter enjoys almost universal jurisdiction.⁸² Its potential impact is enormous, even without U.S. participation.⁸³

At the same time, the United States leads international efforts to locate, isolate, and destroy international terrorist groups with global reach. These groups threaten international order and prosperity. They promote extremist views and promise false hopes to states and individuals left behind on the road of progress.

While most states support and encourage American efforts to eradicate this plague, the international system is not well-suited for the struggle. There is no international agreement on terrorism, and none that even attempts to define the term. Several treaties address individual terrorist acts—hijacking, murder, money laundering, illegal crossing of borders, etc., but their solutions require state action—apprehension, extradition, and prosecution of individual terrorists.⁸⁴

To date, therefore, the international response to terrorism depends on American leadership, moral and physical. Coalitions are formed to fight terrorism, but they form and reform constantly depending on where American efforts are focused. In Afghanistan a multilateral effort enjoyed broad international support,⁸⁵ in Iraq, another theater in this global war, the coalition fell short of expectations, and the intervention remains controversial.⁸⁶ The search for order and the rule of law means different things to different states. America may lead, but others need not follow.

These events are closely related. They represent opposite poles of debate over how we are to pursue Ikenberry's "constitutional order" on a global scale. While most states agree in theory with multilateral

institutions, the utility of the United Nations, and the need for rule of law within and among states, international law must contend with the “friction” of sovereignty.⁸⁷ This uneasy relationship is likely to continue. Ironically, some states and prominent individuals have called for the ICC to investigate American intervention in Iraq as an “illegal” use of force in violation of treaty law and customary law.⁸⁸

Unilateralism: What Price Sovereignty?

This situation is unhealthy for international order. The new world order described in preceding sections of this chapter is real, and it is here to stay. The ties that bind the international community are strong and enduring, and international institutions enjoy unprecedented support and influence. Perhaps the most amazing point of all is that American values and leadership were instrumental in creating this environment. We are reminded once again that we have to be careful what we wish for.

American actions are well-intended, although many people sympathetic to American interests do not accept this proposition at face value. To the extent that American national interests must be served, we can continue to make unpopular decisions and execute American grand strategy without broad international support. But we cannot do so indefinitely. America may act unilaterally on a case-by-case basis, weighing costs and benefits. We need to be honest with ourselves when we do so, however. Others may perceive our actions as excessive and bullying.

The cost of military intervention can be high: proponents must establish a legal basis, a *jus ad bellum*, for action; they must apply force consistent with the laws of armed conflict and possible mandates of the UN Security Council; the fighting must be controlled both in time and in space; fallout and political reactions must be anticipated; and, lastly, those advocating intervention must expect the unexpected. Murphy’s Law applies to all human endeavors. Given the national interest in defeating terrorism and preserving international order, some degree of risk is normal and expected.

The Road Ahead: Surviving in the New World Order

We do not operate in a vacuum. The international environment outlined in this article demands our attention if not our cooperation. It provides several useful lessons to guide our conduct in the twenty-first century.

First, multilateral action is preferred in most cases. America lacks the political and military strength to go it alone in every instance. U.S. economic and military power provides the mobility and ability to go anywhere, but coalitions provide additional resources, political support, and legal justification and legitimacy for international operations. If international relations theorists are correct, states that pursue hegemonic order motivate other powers to combine to frustrate their efforts. Although such a backlash against American hegemony is not evident at present, no one can guarantee that further unilateral adventures will not produce one.

Second, the United States has tremendous capabilities at its disposal without employing the military element of power. Diplomatic, economic, and informational tools provide enormous flexibility in formulating strategy and handling complicated problems as they arise. Infrequent demonstration of American military power will suffice to remind opponents of military capabilities, while diplomats pursue peaceful resolution of disputes by other means. This approach will also reassure friends, allies and critics alike of American intentions and demonstrates a willingness to exhaust all reasonable alternatives before

applying force. It will preserve valuable goodwill.

Third, every crisis does not require international intervention or the use of military forces. Acknowledging the threat posed by global terrorist networks, most international crises are local and have little impact on terrorism or global security. Many of them, we need to remind ourselves, may be safely ignored and left to others to solve. Unless international stability is seriously threatened, mobilizing the international community and its resources might prove counterproductive. We have learned, since the heady days of 1991 and the great Gulf War Coalition forged by President Bush, that the new world order promised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has not come to pass, at least not in the way we imagined it. But there is a new world order, and nation-states have to live in it.

The fourth and final lesson we can draw from this analysis of international law and sovereignty is that the international system as it exists (and as it was designed) reflects American values and American visions for the future. It is a legitimate part of our heritage. When we presume that all institutions oppose our interests because some do, or presume that all treaties are suspect because some are, we deny that heritage. More often than not, international institutions and agreements further American interests.

It is important for us to remember that democracies tolerate differences, and in fact thrive on them. If the core of “constitutional order” in the world is Western democracy, then we must expect that there will be disagreements and heated debate among states. We will not always agree on everything. But in a constitutional system, everyone must play; the rules don’t allow a state to simply take its ball and go home whenever it doesn’t get its way. True, no referee will step in, blow a whistle, and impose a penalty, but true international order, just like domestic order, depends on mutual respect and cooperation and responsible behavior. Those who claim global leadership within the system have the greatest responsibility to ensure the system works. It is time to reassess America’s role and reclaim our rightful position as the leader of the world community. Struggling against the ties that bind us, like a modern Gulliver, is counterproductive.

Notes - Chapter 4

1 George H. Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf,” January 16, 1991, available at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91011602.html>, accessed 24 July 2003.

2 U.S. War Department, General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, April 24, 1863. The first comprehensive summary and codification of the humanitarian rules governing land warfare. Frequently called the “Lieber Code” after its author, Dr. Francis Lieber, G.O. No. 100 furnished inspiration for the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1929 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

3 Werner Levi, *Contemporary International Law* (Boulder, Westview, 1991), 14.

4 John J. Mersheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 2-3.

5 John W. Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th Ed. (Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996), 22.

6 George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, The White House, September 2002), 3.

7 Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, Book One, Chapter One, p.118. Available from The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone. Accessed 11 April 2003.

8 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist, No. 15,” *The Federalist* (New York, The Modern Library, 1941), 86.

9 E.g., The prohibition of alcohol, U.S. Constitution, amendment 18. It was repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment fourteen years later.

10 J.L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 6th Ed. (Oxford, Oxford Press, 1991), 1.

11 E.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention, 1944); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1982).

12 E.g., The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (9 May 1992); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (11 December 1997).

13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (United Nations Diplomatic conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998).

14 Horace B. Robertson, Jr., “Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today’s World?” *U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies*, Vol. 68, ed. John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner (Newport, Naval War College Press, 1995), 3.

15 Brierly, 17.

16 Levi, 6.

17 Brierly, 17.

18 Ibid., 3. See also Levi, 6-9.

19 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38.

20 The *SS Lotus Case* (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1927 (Ser.A), No. 10, at 18-19 (7 September): “The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law. . . .” International law scholars disagree on the fundamental nature of law. There are two distinct schools of thought. The Monist view holds that international law and municipal (state) law are simply parts of an integrated system. The focus is on the individual. Dualists believe that international law and municipal law are two distinct systems. The focus of domestic law is the individual; the focus of international law is on states. These views influence contemporary debate. See Levi, 22-23.

21 Levi, 35. Levi cites as an example the launching of Sputnik by the Soviet Union, which claimed that artificial satellites could fly unimpeded over state territory, and the general acceptance of this proposition.

22 Ibid., 5.

23 Brierly, 66.

24 Although both predictability and stability are encompassed in the phrase “rule of law,” the phrase is itself of fairly recent origins, representing the triumph of the western democracies since World War II. Historically, international law has concerned itself more with creating a stable, predictable world, rather than with a particular technique used to accomplish these ends.

25 Democracy in ancient Greece, notably Athens, was real and vibrant but limited in modern terms: only citizens could exercise political rights or hold land; women had few rights; slavery was an essential institution. None of this, however, diminishes the power and influence of Greek thought on leaders of the Enlightenment. See William Y. Elliott and Neil A. McDonald, *Western Political Heritage* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1955), 63-74.

26 Brierly, 7.

27 Ibid., 13.

28 Mel Brooks, Director, *History of the World, Part I*, Fox Films, 1981.

29 Levi, 10.

30 Bernard Grun, *The Timetables of History*, 3rd Ed. (New York, Touchstone, 1991), 294.

31 Levi, 8.

32 Ibid, 9.

33 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, Touchstone, 1994), 78.

34 Ibid., 40, 127.

35 See Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998), Chapter 5: “The New Diplomacy, 1889-1908.”

36 Ibid.

37 Eric. S. Krauss and Mike O. Lacey: “Utilitarian vs. Humanitarian: The Battle Over the Law of War,” *Parameters*, 32 (Summer 2002): 73, 76.

38 Ibid.

39 General Orders No. 100, *supra* note 1.

40 The Hague Conventions of 1899 were largely incorporated in the Conventions of 1907, of which five are important: (1) Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2259; (2) Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Annex, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; (3) Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2310; (4) Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2351; and (5) Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 6 July 1906, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2371.

41 Kenneth Anderson, “Who Owns the Rules of War?,” *New York Times Magazine*, 13 April 2003, 38.

42 Kissinger, 259.

43 Ibid., 247.

44 Department of the Army, Pamphlet 27-161-2, *International Law*, Vol. II (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1962), 221. These trials, known as the Leipzig trials, demonstrated the problem obtaining jurisdiction over war criminals—Germany was not defeated and occupied as in World War II. The Leipzig trials did motivate the allies in 1945 to establish an international tribunal at Nuremberg.

45 Kissinger, 247.

46 Ibid., 373. The Washington Conference of 1922 attempted to regulate capital ships; the London Conference of 1930 attempted to regulate submarines as well. See Department of Army Pamphlet 27-161-2, *supra*, at 16. For a detailed study of the Naval Treaties, see W. Hays Parks, “Making Law of War Treaties: Lessons from Submarine Warfare Regulation,” *U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies*, Vol. 75, Michael N. Schmitt, ed. (Newport, Naval War College Press, 2000), 339.

47 The Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris, is formally known as The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (27 August 1928), 46 Stat. 2343.

48 Kissinger, 40.

49 Brierly, 47, quoting from the International Conciliation Pamphlet, 1941.

50 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly, 10 December 1948.

51 Ibid, Preamble.

52 See the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art.VI; the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (four separate conventions—on the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, on the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War); and Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977). These conventions form the nucleus of what is commonly called “International Humanitarian Law.”

53 E.g., The Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the International Monetary Fund, to name only a few.

54 E.g., the START and SALT strategic arms negotiations and Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties with the U.S.S.R, and multilateral international agreements, including the Conventional Weapons Treaty (1980), the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), and the Ottawa Treaty on Anti-Personnel Land Mines (1997).

55 Notes 11 and 12, *supra*.

56 E.g., Ivo H. Daalder, “The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict,” in *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael E. Brown, ed. (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996), 461.

57 UN Charter, Chapter I, Article 2, para. 1 and Chapter XI.

58 Eric Larabee, *Commander in Chief* (New York, Touchstone, 1987), 632.

59 Ibid.

60 E.g., Vietnam. Our efforts to combat aggressive communist expansion encountered international opposition both at the UN and in other international forums. Agreements such as Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the UN Convention on Law of the Sea displayed a distinct anti-Western and anti-American bias, yet reflected the considered opinion and practice of many states. International law was no longer the sole province of the great powers and the “civilized” states, and traditional American leadership in international law began to fade.

61 SALT, START, ABM, START II, etc.

62 Nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction) have been banned from space, although space has not been “demilitarized.” Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty, 1967).

63 International Humanitarian Law essentially encompasses the principles enunciated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocols I and II of 1977.

64 See Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. II, 9 October 1996, Appendix B, for a detailed listing of NGOs and countries in which they operate.

65 There are many examples. International support of the Palestinians is one; international efforts to remove white racist governments in Rhodesia and South Africa are another.

66 The Ottawa Treaty, formally known as the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction,” December 1997. The Ottawa process featured active participation by NGOs and international celebrities. Their priorities were humanitarian, not utilitarian, in nature. See Krauss and Lacey, *supra*, note 36 at 81.

67 Preface to the Ottawa Treaty, *ibid*.

68 On 17 September 1997, President Clinton announced that the United States would develop alternatives to anti-personnel land mines by 2003, and would replace all “dumb” land mines in South Korea by 2006. The principle U.S. objection to the Ottawa Process was its failure to acknowledge U.S. fielding of “smart” or self-destructing land mines. The Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980 prohibits indiscriminate laying of mine fields and requires mapping, marking, and removal, among other requirements. The Ottawa Process is unlikely to stop rogue states and revolutionary movements from indiscriminately laying and abandoning mines.

69 World Trade Organization sessions have attracted enormous demonstrations by diverse groups ranging from environmentalists to religious organizations to unrepentant communists.

70 See, e.g., George K. Walker, “Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor Other Countries’ Imperiled Indigenous Nationals,” *American University International Law Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 35; John C. Yoo, “The Dogs That Didn’t Bark: Why Were International Legal Scholars MIA on Kosovo?,” *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Spring 2000, 149, accessed on line at www.proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?TS on 27 January 2003.

71 *Supra*, note 19.

72 *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, International Court of Justice, 8 July 1996, Declaration of President Bedjaoui at para. 13., quoted in Robert F. Turner, “Nuclear Weapons and the World Court: The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and Its Significance for U.S. Strategic Doctrine,” *U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies*, Vol. 72, Michael N. Schmitt, ed. (Newport, Naval War College Press, 1998), 309, 312.

73 Kofi A. Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” *The Economist*, 18 September 1999, p. 49.

74 See Thomas W. McShane, “Blame it on the Romans: Pax Americana and the Rule of Law,” *Parameters*, Vol. 32 (Summer 2002): 57.

75 Bush, National Security Strategy, *supra*, note 5, Preface.

76 Kissinger, 47.

77 Mersheimer, *supra*, note 3.

78 G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and The Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, Princeton University Press), 29.

79 Ibid, 163, 166. These institutions included the United Nations, NATO, The Marshall Plan, and the World Bank, among others.

80 Ibid, 4, 6.

81 Democide refers to the torture and killing of citizens by their own governments, generally despotic and totalitarian in form. One figure attributes 170 million deaths to democide over the course of the twentieth century, a number two to four times greater than the total number killed in war. See John Norton Moore, "Opening Comments," Vol. 149, *Military Law Review*, 7, 10 (1995). Professor Moore, Director of the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, made these comments in a symposium on "Nuremberg and the Rule of Law: A Fifty year Verdict" at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's School, 17 November 1995.

82 Universal Jurisdiction is based upon the principle that certain crimes violate international interests and norms and that states may take action regardless of the location of the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim. At present international law recognizes universal jurisdiction for certain offenses (e.g., crimes against humanity, war crimes) covered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The apprehension of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Argentina and his trial in Israel in 1961 is often used to illustrate the concept. Others would extend the principle further, to cover domestic crimes that violate humanitarian principles not formally recognized in international law. See *The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction*, the Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton, Program in Law and Public Affairs, 2001).

83 President Clinton signed the treaty on behalf of the United States on 31 December 2000. It was never sent to the Senate for ratification, and on 6 May 2002 the United States officially notified the United Nations of its intention not to become a party. See U.S. Department of State Press Statement containing the official notice, accessed on line at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968pf.htm on 29 October 2002.

84 See, e.g., Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 14 September 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), 16 December 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), 23 September 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564.

85 The United Nations Security Council endorsed, although it did not direct, efforts to remove the Taliban and destroy Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan.

86 The UN Security Council did not support intervention in Iraq beyond weapons inspectors. With at least two of the permanent members, France and Russia, likely to veto any Security Council Resolution sanctioning invasion, the United States led a "coalition of the willing."

87 As Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman stated on 6 May 2002, as he explained why the United States withdrew from the ICC Treaty: "We believe that states, not international institutions, are primarily responsible for ensuring justice in the international system." Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, distributed via email by Listmgr@PD.STATE.GOV on 6 May 2002.

88 This represents politics as much as law. UN Security Council sanction is not a prerequisite for intervention. Article 51 of the Charter permits state action in self defense, and customary law provides an independent basis for action. The Kosovo precedent of international humanitarian intervention without Security Council approval also supports American intervention to remove the rogue regime of Saddam Hussein. International law scholars do not agree on these points.

CHAPTER 5

REGIONAL STUDIES IN A GLOBAL AGE

R. Craig Nation

The New Regionalism

Twentieth century strategy was dominated by global conflict. The First and Second World Wars were implacable struggles waged on the world stage, and they were followed by the Cold War, a militarized contest between superpower rivals described by Colin Gray as “a virtual World War III.”¹ Not surprisingly, interstate rivalry propelled by Fritz Fischer’s *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (*Strike for World Power*) gave rise to theoretical propositions concerning the dynamic of international relations dominated by globalist perspectives.² From the founding of the first university department devoted to the formal study of International Relations at the University of Aberystwyth (Wales) in 1919 to the present, globalist and universalizing theoretical models have been at the core of the profession.

Such models have also defined the practice of American foreign and security policy. The venerable traditions of American isolationism and exceptionalism, integral to the founding of the republic and through most of the nineteenth century the inspiration for a cautious and discrete U.S. world role, were gradually pushed aside against the background of the Great War by the liberal tradition of benign engagement under the aegis of international law, international organization, and collective security. Though Woodrow Wilson’s project for a U.S.-led League of Nations was frustrated by congressional opposition, in the larger picture there would be no return from “over there.” America was a dominant world power from at least 1916 (when the United States became a creditor for the major European powers), and the range of its interests no longer permitted the luxury of an exclusively national or even hemispheric policy focus.

Already on the eve of the Second World War, in his seminal work *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, E. H. Carr argued that a relative neglect of the role of power and coercion in international affairs had paved the way for the rise of fascism.³ Carr’s “realist” perspective, lent theoretical substance in the United States by transplanted Europeans such as Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and Stanley Hoffman who viewed themselves as tutors for powerful but naive American elites, became the dominant conceptual framework for postwar U.S. policy.⁴ The classical realism of postwar theorists was never a vulgar philosophy of might makes right, though it is sometimes interpreted in that way. Its most prominent promulgators, often European Jews like Morgenthau who had fled the holocaust and were lucidly aware of what unchecked power set to evil ends could affect, were preoccupied with ethical concerns and the need to constrain the inherent violence of anarchic interstate competition.⁵ But the realist tradition made no bones about the need to place power, the global balance of power, and strategic rivalry between competing sovereignties at the center of a globalist worldview. During the Second World War, State Department planners carefully prepared for a policy of engagement based on the purposeful use of U.S. power to shape a congenial international environment.⁶ George Kennan’s containment doctrine, the backbone of U.S. security policy through most of the Cold War decades, was little more than an astute application of realist premises to the

management of U.S.-Soviet relations.⁷

Regional conflict was a significant part of Cold War competition, but it too was usually interpreted in a global perspective, as a projection of superpower rivalry into peripheral regions. Architects of U.S. Cold War strategy like Henry Kissinger could publicly opine about the marginality of third world regions, and assert a great power orientation that perceived the essence of foreign policy as an elegant game of balance between power centers in Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Beijing.⁸ Nuclear competition between the superpowers, and the theory of strategic deterrence that was crafted to direct it, encouraged ever more abstract modeling of interstate rivalry. These trends culminated in the 1980s with the emergence of “neo” versions of traditional theoretical paradigms that consciously sought to void international theory of its historicist and humanistic foundations. Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist argument used austere logic in interpreting interstate competition as an abstract calculus of power.⁹ The related schools of game and rational choice theory sought to use mathematical modeling to reproduce the dynamics of foreign policy decisionmaking. Neo-liberal institutionalist models built alternatives to realism on the universalizing trends of interdependence and globalization, sometimes based on a simplistic Benthamite utilitarianism.¹⁰ By the end of the Cold War, much of the rationale for U.S. foreign and security policy rested on assumptions integral to these approaches—the centrality of great power rivalry, the balance of power as the axis of interstate competition, the changing nature of power in an age of globalization where economic strength and various soft power options have accrued in importance, and the need for a competitive strategy to maintain and extend U.S. advantage.

Part of the reigning confusion surrounding the nature of post-Cold War world order derives from the fact that it is no longer defined by an all-consuming rivalry between peer competitors. With a Gross Domestic Product far outdistancing the nearest competitor, levels of defense spending superior to any imaginable combination of rivals, a clear-cut technological advantage, and a strong and stable domestic order, the United States stands head and shoulders above any real or potential rival. The current distribution of world power is objectively hegemonic, and American leadership is less a goal than a fact. In the absence, now and for the foreseeable future, of an authentic peer competitor capable of posing a serious challenge to U.S. dominance, balancing strategies such as that promulgated by Russia’s former Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov, seeking to regenerate a “multipolar” world order in which America would be limited to the status of first among equals, must remain essentially rhetorical.¹¹ Maintaining U.S. status and using the advantages of preeminence to good ends have become primary responsibilities for U.S. security planners.¹² These are tasks that demand different kinds of perceptions and priorities than those motivating policy during the Cold War.

Analyses of new directions in global security policy tend to similar conclusions concerning the kinds of threats to which the United States will be required to respond. In contrast with the focused strategic environment of the Cold War years, these threats will be dispersed rather than concentrated, unpredictable and often unexpected, and significantly derived from regional and state-centered contingencies. The threat of global terrorism, in particular, driven forward by widely dispersed terror networks, is rooted in failed states and marginalized regions denied the benefits of balanced modernization and development. These conclusions rest on shared assumptions about the emerging twenty-first century world order, the changing contours of global security, and the evolving U.S. world role. The new configuration of global power, which combines U.S. preeminence with considerable regional fragmentation and turbulence, ensures that major world regions will be an ever more important target for U.S. engagement—as sources of critical strategic resources, as platforms for geostrategic leverage, as breeding grounds for terrorism, as integral parts of an increasingly interdependent global economy, and as testing grounds for great power will and determination

to impose rules of the game. Preeminence does not imply total control. Influence in key world regions will be a significant apple of discord between the hegemonic leader, great power rivals, and influential local powers. Regions and sub-regions will remain the primary forums for armed conflict and instability, with a variety of small wars and protracted stabilization operations posing the greatest demands on a U.S. military committed to engagement and shaping strategies. Aspiring regional hegemonies, sometimes tempted by hopes of gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, will continue to promote disorder and pose direct threats to important U.S. interests. To navigate effectively under these circumstances, U.S. strategists will have to base international engagement on a sophisticated understanding of major world regions, viewed not only in regard to their place within an overarching structure of world power, but as entities in their own right, including the underlying social, political, and cultural processes that make the national and regional context unique.

For all of these reasons, regional studies will remain a necessary foundation for an integrated curriculum in national security policy and planning. If the twentieth century has been the century of global conflagration, the twenty-first century seems poised to become the century of regional disaggregation. New directions in international relations theory, cast around concepts such as turbulence and chaos theory, have been honed to highlight these trends.¹³ For U.S. policymakers, the challenge will be to integrate regional perspectives, and sensitivities to national and regional dynamics, into a realistic and balanced approach to the pursuit of global security; not to question the relevance of regional perspectives (which should be self-evident), but to better understand the ways in which they need to be joined to a comprehensive strategy for the pursuit of national interest.

What Is a Region?

Regions may be defined and distinguished according to an approximate combination of geographic, social, cultural, and political variables. Unambiguous distinctions, however, will always be elusive. As an analytical category in international relations, the “region” is fated to remain contingent and contentious. Geographic contiguity is clearly a prerequisite for regional identity, but drawing uncontested boundaries is usually an impossible task.¹⁴ The concept of “eastern Europe” once had a fairly high degree of integrity, but since 1989 it has virtually disappeared from the political lexicon. The phrase “Middle East,” which was originally the product of colonialist and Eurocentric world views, continues to be used (often rendered as a “Greater Middle East”) to describe an extremely diverse area stretching from the Maghreb into distant Central Asia. Meanwhile, the designation of an eastern Mediterranean Levant has fallen out of fashion. The Balkans has been regarded as a distinctive European sub-region for well over a century, but almost any Balkan state with elsewhere to turn rejects the designation unambiguously.¹⁵ “All regions,” writes Andrew Hurrell with some justification, “are socially constructed and hence politically contested.”¹⁶

One of the more influential recent attempts to delineate regions according to cultural criteria has been Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis. Huntington identifies nine world civilizational zones based significantly, though not entirely, on confessional affiliation.¹⁷ The argument that geostrategy will be increasingly dominated by civilizational conflict waged along the “faultlines” dividing these zones has been widely used to explain the apparent upsurge in ethnic conflict of the recent past. Huntington’s argument, however, is neither entirely novel nor altogether convincing. Geopolitical analysis has long used the idea of the “shatterbelt,” defined as a politically fragmented and ethnically divided zone that serves as a field of competition between continental and maritime powers.¹⁸ Great civilizations cannot be precisely bounded spatially, and they are rarely either entirely homogenous or mutually exclusive. Huntington’s attempt to

designate geographically bounded civilizational zones and to use these zones as the foundation for a theory of geostrategy rests on suspect premises.

Barry Buzan has developed the concept of the “regional security complex” in an effort “to offset the tendency of power theorists to underplay the importance of the regional level in international security affairs.”¹⁹ He makes the assertion that in security terms, “‘region’ means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”²⁰ The existence of a “subsystem” of security relations presumes high levels of interdependence, multiple interactions, and shared sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Any attempt to identify such complexes empirically, however, poses obvious problems.²¹ Regional security complexes are rarely, if ever, defined exclusively by geographic proximity, they are often dominated by external powers, and they are sometimes held hostage by national-cultural variables or systemic dynamics. The United States is the focus of functioning security complexes in both Europe and Asia. Turkey and Israel lie within different security complexes according to most of Buzan’s criteria, but they have developed a close bilateral relationship that impacts significantly on their relations with contiguous states. Transnational threats such as terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, or environmental disintegration also overlap regions and create dynamics of association that prevent security complexes from becoming significantly self-contained.

The United States makes an approximate distinction between geographic regions in the Unified Command Plan that lies at the basis of its warfighting strategy by fixing the contours of unified command areas assigned to combatant commanders. This approach originally evolved from the division of responsibilities adapted by the United States to fight the Second World War, and was formalized by the National Security Act of 1947. Over the years the geographic division of responsibility has been adapted repeatedly on the basis of changes in the international security structure, technological advances, and strategic calculation, but also bureaucratic infighting over areas of responsibility and access to resources. Combatant commanders have recently been required to draw up an annual Theater Engagement Plan defining regional shaping priorities, but they are primarily warfighters, and the division of responsibility that the current unified command plan structure embodies is geared to position the United States to prevail in armed confrontations. Contemporary U.S. national security strategy, mandating readiness to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, has concentrated the attention of the combatant commanders on the areas where such conflicts are presumed to be most likely—in the Middle East/Southwest Asian and Western Pacific/Northeast Asian theaters. The regional distinctions built into the Unified Command Plan are arbitrary, but they are geared to the performance of the functional tasks of warriors and do not always rest on careful conceptual distinctions.

David Lake and Patrick Morgan define region minimally as “a set of countries linked by geography and one or more common trends such as level of development, culture, or political institutions.”²² Their definition has the advantages of simplicity, but it is potentially too broad to be really useful and is also possibly misleading. The nation-state is sometimes an inadequate building bloc for regional complexes. Any viable definition of the post-Soviet Central Asian region would have to include China’s Xinjiang province, whose population is composed of 60 percent Turkic Muslims. Russia’s far eastern provinces are an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region, while the core of historic Russia is an extension, both geographically and culturally, of a greater Europe. Ukraine’s population is divided politically along the line of the Dnipro River, with the western provinces affiliating with an enlarged central Europe and the eastern provinces oriented toward the Russian Federation and Eurasia. Northern Mexico and southern California have become intimately associated as a result of high levels of economic interaction and cross-border movement of

peoples.²³ The European Union (EU) has even sought to institutionalize transnational communities by creating multistate districts designated as “Euro-regions.”²⁴ The commonalities used to distinguish regions cannot be terminated artificially at national boundaries, and “one or more common trends” is too weak a foundation for association to give regional designations analytical substance.

In its regional studies curriculum, the U.S. Army War College designates six major world regions on the basis of broad geographic criteria—Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Russia and Eurasia, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Americas. These are designations of convenience intended primarily for pedagogical purposes. Our working definition of what constitutes a region is, of necessity, broad and multidimensional. Geographic propinquity; a sense of identity and self-awareness based on shared experience, ascribed traits, or language; a degree of autonomy within the international state system; relatively high levels of transactions; economic interdependencies; and political and cultural affinity may all be cited as relevant criteria. It is presumed that there will be gray areas and significant overlap between regions however they are defined. The Turkish Republic, for example, is simultaneously part of a wider Europe, a greater Middle East, and post-Soviet Eurasia. No single set of associations is essential, and, in the best of cases, fixing the contours of major world regions and sub-regions will remain a problematic exercise.

World Regions and World Order

However regions are defined and differentiated, the impact of local, national, and regional dynamics on world politics is substantial and destined to grow larger. For the foreseeable future, effective strategy will require sensitivity to the various ways in which regional affairs condition the global security agenda, channel and constrain U.S. priorities, and affect a changing world order.

Regional Instability, Regional Conflict, and Embedded Terrorism

Regional instability poses diverse kinds of challenges to U.S. interests. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990 placed a critical mass of Middle Eastern oil reserves in the hands of an ambitious and hostile regional power, thus posing a clear threat to vital interests. Such dramatic scenarios will not occur very often, but the potential consequences are so great as to demand high degrees of readiness. “Rogue states,” which aspire to regional hegemony and whose leaders are often defiant of international norms, are now acknowledged as a distinct threat in their own right. The most persistent challenges of recent years have been the chronic instability born of flawed regional orders marked by severe impoverishment, unequal development, frustrated nationalism, ethnic rivalry, and the “failed state” phenomenon where weak polities lose the capacity to carry out the basic tasks of governance. Embedded terrorism, exploiting failed regional systems as sanctuaries for the pursuit of global agendas, has been a dramatic consequence.

In the post-Cold War period, the U.S. armed forces have been called upon to participate in an unprecedented number of complex contingency operations ranging from simple non-combatant evacuations to extensive, protracted, and dangerous peace enforcement and peacekeeping duties. The logic of U.S. engagement is usually impeccable. Unchecked regional or civil conflicts risk escalation with broadening consequences; threaten the credibility of the United States, its allies, and major international instances as guarantors of world order; and confront decisionmakers with horrendous and morally intolerable humanitarian abuses. But the United States should not feel obligated, nor can it afford, to take on the role of global policeman. Protracted and open-ended peacekeeping deployments risk undermining combat readiness by disrupting training routines, eroding the morale of the volunteer force, and posing the constant possibility of deeper and higher-risk engagement. *Shaping* regional complexes to head off resorts to coercive conflict

behavior, and *responding* to regional challenges, if possible, preemptively and under the aegis of international organizations or multinational coalitions, have, as a result, become pillars of U.S. security policy.

The challenges of civil war and low-intensity regional conflict will not go away or diminish. In a larger historical perspective, it seems clear that the total wars of the twentieth century have been exceptional events rather than typical ones. Prior to our century, technological limitations made the concept of “world” war unthinkable—warfare, of necessity, was waged within physically constrained theaters on the regional level. Ironically, the technological possibilities unveiled with the creation of massive nuclear arsenals during the Cold War have once again made the outbreak of hegemonic warfare between great power rivals highly unlikely, as well an eminently undesirable. The increasing lethality (and expense) of modern conventional armaments only further raises the threshold of total war. While the Kantian thesis that great power warfare has become obsolete may or may not be credible, it rests on substantial foundations.²⁵ If for no other reasons than those imposed by the evolving technology of violence, wars and armed confrontations are today once again being contested almost exclusively as low and medium intensity conflicts on the local and regional level. “In the foreseeable future,” write Lake and Morgan, “violent conflict will mostly arise out of regional concerns and will be viewed by political actors through a regional, rather than global, lens.”²⁶

In some ways, Cold War bipolarity worked to constrain regional conflict. Neither superpower could afford to tolerate an uncontrolled escalation of regional rivalry that risked drawing it into a direct confrontation, and regional allies were consistently pressured to limit their aspirations and bend to the will of their great power sponsors.²⁷ It is difficult to imagine that the anarchic disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation would have been allowed to proceed unchecked in 1991 had the fragile European balance of terror of the Cold War system still been at risk. The extent of such constraint nonetheless may be exaggerated. Many of the regional conflicts of the Cold War era—in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, the Middle East, or southern Asia—have perpetuated themselves into the post-Cold War period. Cumulatively, post-World War II regional conflicts have occasioned the deaths of over 25 million individuals, and the incidence and intensity of such conflicts continues to increase.

A composite portrait of post-Cold War regional conflict calls attention to the difficulties involved in programming effective responses. The large majority of contemporary “limited” wars are civil wars or wars of secession, waged with the ferocity that is typical of such contests. Combat operations often include the significant engagement of poorly controlled and disciplined irregular forces. The bulk of casualties are innocent civilians, sometimes including genocidal massacre and forced population transfers (ethnic cleansing). While often obscure in terms of their origins, such conflicts are usually highly visible. The modern mass media, commercially driven and chronically in search of sensation, brings regional chaos “into the living room” and generates popular pressure to respond that political leaders often find difficult to ignore. Limited and often frustrated or only partly successful intervention by the international community in the role of would-be peacemaker is another shared trait that gives many contemporary regional conflicts a fairly uniform contour. Wayne Burt notes correctly that, in comparison with the structured context of Cold War bipolarity, the “post-Cold War world is a much ‘messier’ world where limited conflict will be fought for limited and often shifting objectives, and with strategies that are difficult to formulate, costs that are uncertain, and entrance and exit points that are not obvious.”²⁸

As undisputed world leader, and the only major power with significant global power projection capacity, the United States is often compelled to react to such conflicts whether or not it has truly vital interests at stake. America’s ability to manage and shape the conflict process is nonetheless severely limited.

A decade of struggling with regional conflict in post-communist Yugoslavia, including intensive diplomatic efforts, punitive air strikes, large and open-ended peacekeeping deployments, and a full-scale war over Kosovo, has led to what may at best be described as a mixed result.²⁹ Peace enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities have been carried out with impressive efficiency, but the much more problematic and politically charged task of post-conflict peace building has proven to be something close to a mission impossible.³⁰

Since the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the phenomenon of embedded terrorism has become another manifestation of how regional instability may provoke intense political violence. U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been designed to strike at terror nests, but it has quickly become apparent that defeating designated enemies is only part of the challenge. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts have demanded an increasingly sophisticated awareness of local norms and values, and heightened sensitivities to the cultural context within which stability operations are being pursued. Army Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan have striven to develop closer working relations with local populations and build a foundation of trust based on mutual understanding that will make it more difficult for terrorist cells to relocate in the areas in the future.

The United States has made the maintenance of regional stability a pillar of its security strategy, but the forces of disintegration at work in many world regions are daunting. Effective responses will, first of all, require some selectivity in choosing targets for intervention. When we do elect to become involved, our efforts should be based on a much greater awareness of regional realities than has been manifested in the recent past. We will also need to make better use of friends and allies. Regional instability is often best addressed by local actors, who usually have the largest vested interest in blocking escalation, and in some cases regionally based conflict management initiatives can become a significant stimulus to broader patterns of regional cooperation. Engaging allies and relevant multilateral forums in managing regional conflict, as the United States has sought to do with the African Crisis Response Initiative, should be a high national priority.

Geopolitics

Many currently fashionable approaches to international relations assume the decline of territoriality as a motive for state behavior. The dominant trend in world politics is persistently, albeit vaguely, described as globalization, implying a rapid increase in interactions fueled by revolutions in communications and information management, the emergence of a truly global market and world economy, the primacy of economic competition as a mode of interstate rivalry, and an unprecedented space-time compression that places unique demands on decisionmakers.³¹ The globalization scenario is built on overarching generalizations about world order, and it rests on universalizing premises that leave little space for sticky concern with the intricacies of regional affairs. There are alternatives to theoretical perspectives cast on so high a level of abstraction, however, and they bring regional issues to the forefront of international discourse. Most important among them is the tradition of geopolitics.

The core challenge of geopolitical analysis is to link the systematic study of spatial and geographical relations with the dynamic of interstate politics. As a formal discipline, geopolitics dates from the late nineteenth century work of the Leipzig professor Friedrich Ratzel. His 1897 study *Politische Geographie* (*Political Geography*) presents states as organisms with a quasi-biological character, rooted in their native soil, embedded in a distinctive spatial context or *Lebensraum* (living space), and condemned to either grow and expand or wither away.³² In the works of various contemporaries and successors, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, Rudolf Kjellén, Halford Mackinder, Alfred de Severing, Klaus Haushofer, and Nicholas

John Spykman, these insights have been pushed in a number of directions. The strong influence of geopolitic categories, especially as transmitted through the work of Haushofer, on Adolf Hitler's strategic program during the 1930s has brought enduring discredit on the discipline, widely but unfairly regarded as a vulgar amalgam of social Darwinism and military expansionism. In fact, in its manifold and not always consistent manifestations, geopolitical analysis presents a range of alternative strategic perceptions whose common ground is a sense of the permanent and enduring relevance of spatial, cultural, and environmental factors in world politics.³³ These are also the factors that stand at the foundation of regional studies.

Geopolitics is rooted in the study of geography, broadly but relevantly defined by Saul Cohen as "spatial patterns and relations that reflect dynamic physical and human processes."³⁴ Geography is a rich and complex construct that provides a context for weighing the impact of a number of significant but often neglected variables. These include ethnicity, nationalism, and the politics of identity; access to natural and strategic resources; geostrategy and the role of lines of communication and strategic choke points; relations between human communities and their natural environment; and the strategic implications of increasing environmental stress. It encompasses demographic issues such as population growth, cycles of migration and changing patterns of population distribution, and "decisionmaking milieus" including Huntingtonian civilizational zones, political systems and political cultures, as well as the spatial distribution of power in the world system.

Geopolitical analysis is best known in the West as refracted by Halford Mackinder's heartland concept, which defines control of the Eurasian landmass as the key to world power. Mackinder distinguished between a *World-Island* encompassing the joined continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the Eurasian *Heartland* approximately equivalent to Russia and Central Asia, and the *Rimlands* (including east-central Europe) along the Eurasian periphery. "Who rules East Europe," he wrote in a famous passage, "controls the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the World."³⁵ Mackinder was not a fascist militarist, but a moderate professor and civil servant, whose thinking lay at the foundation of British strategy through much of the twentieth century. By calling attention to the spatial dimensions of grand strategy, his work points out the extent to which geostrategic concepts have been and continue to be at the heart of modern statecraft.

A striking contemporary illustration of the continuing impact of geopolitical perspectives is provided by the heartland power *par excellence*, the Russian Federation, where disillusionment with the gilded promises of globalization and integration with the U.S.-led world economy have led to a rapid and broadly influential revival of geopolitical theory.³⁶ The new Russian geopolitics has been dismissed in the West as a manifestation of radical extremism, a sort of Russian fascism born of the post-communist malaise.³⁷ In fact, core geopolitical perceptions (the need to maintain the integrity of the Russian Federation, the call to reassert a strong sphere of influence in the territories of the former Soviet Union, the cultural distinctiveness of the Russian Idea and its historical role as a force for integration in the expanses of Eurasia, the need for alliances to balance and contest American hegemony) have moved into the mainstream of Russian strategic thought and enjoy strong support.

Haushofer has written that "geopolitics is the science of the conditioning of political processes by the earth," and that "the essence of regions as comprehended from the geopolitical point of view provides the framework for geopolitics."³⁸ This is a *plaidoyer* for the concrete and substantial, for a theory of world politics built from the ground up. Effective geopolitical reasoning leads us back to the earth, to the distinctive political communities nested on it, to the patterns of association that develop between them, and to the conflicts that emerge from their interactions. It is not the only school of thought that prioritizes the

relevance of geography and regional studies, but it provides a particularly good example of the relevance of the textured study of peoples and places as a foundation for effective strategy.

The Cultural Dimension of Warfare

The maxim “know thy enemy” is often counted as the acme of strategic wisdom. It is unfortunately a maxim that has not always been highly respected in the U.S. military and security communities. War has organizational and technological dimensions that make it a rigorous, practical, and precise enterprise, but wars are also waged between calculating rivals in a domain of uncertainty, and by distinctive political communities in ways that reflect deeply rooted, culturally conditioned preferences.

During the Cold War, the United States made an intense effort to understand the societal and cultural dynamics shaping the perceptions of its Soviet rival, arguably to good effect. In general, however, in-depth knowledge of national and regional cultural dynamics has not been a strong point for U.S. strategy, which has tended to rest on the sturdy pillars of relative invulnerability and the capacity to mobilize overwhelming force.³⁹ In the volatile and uncertain security environment of the years to come, however, the assumption of technological and material advantage may not be a safe one, nor will these advantages always suffice to ensure superiority in every possible contingency. The People’s Republic of China represents a potential long-term rival with considerable assets and great self-confidence, derived in part from a highly distinctive and ancient culture.⁴⁰ Russia’s current Time of Troubles has temporarily brought her low, but eventually the inherent strengths that made the USSR so formidable a rival during the Cold War decades will reassert themselves. We confront a long-term struggle to manage the dilemmas of modernization in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and the associated dynamic of terrorism, that will demand sophisticated cultural awareness. The United States will need to know “what makes them tick” if it wants to successfully manage its relations with potential peer competitors and troubled world regions. Effective intervention in complex contingencies will likewise demand in-depth knowledge of real or potential rivals. Strategy is not uniquely the product of culture, and culture itself is not a lucid or unambiguous construct. But all strategy unfolds in a cultural context, and cannot be fully or properly understood outside it.

Colin Gray defines strategic culture as “the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions, habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation . . . that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community.”⁴¹ The foundations of strategic culture are the fundamentals of culture itself; shared experience, language, common governance, and values. The cultural orientation that derives from these commonalities, it can be argued, affects the ways in which polities conduct diplomacy, define and pursue interests, and wage war. In his controversial *History of Warfare*, John Keegan suggests that throughout history war has always been an essentially cultural phenomenon, an atavism derived from patterns of group identification and interaction rather than the purposeful activity implied in Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”⁴² Victor Hanson argues that the ancient Greek preference for physical confrontation and quick decision has created a “Western way of war” dominated by a search for decisive battle and strategies of annihilation, a tradition that remains alive to this day.⁴³ Such conclusions are extreme, but they are useful in underlining the fact that wars are conceived, plotted, and waged by socially conditioned human agents.

As a dominant global power the United States will be called upon to wage war in a variety of contexts in the years to come. A better understanding of the strategic cultures of real or potential adversaries will place another weapon in its arsenal and strengthen prospects for success. In Bernard Brodie’s classic formulation, “good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department.”⁴⁴ Knowing the enemy goes

well beyond order of battle, to the sources of strategic preference and military operational codes that are grounded in the social and cultural context of distinctive nations and regions.⁴⁵

Espaces de Sens: Regional Alliance and Association

The Cold War was a phase of intense global competition manifested in ideological polarization, arms racing, and militarized regional rivalry. It nonetheless offered a structure of purposeful endeavor for its leading protagonists, as well as for critics who sought alternatives to what they perceived as the dead-end of belligerent bipolarity. The USSR justified its international policy on the basis of a distinctively Soviet variant of Marxism-Leninism. The United States consciously developed its Cold War strategy as a defense of the values of freedom and democracy. Various non-aligned alternatives called for a plague upon both houses, and sought to develop a third way independent of either power bloc. Regardless of where one stood, world politics took on the contours of a moral tale infused with meaning.

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a certain euphoria captured by Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis, according to which the demise of the communist challenge meant "the end of history as such: that is, the end point in mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."⁴⁶ Fukuyama's sweepingly optimistic argument promised an era of global harmony in which interstate strategic rivalry would give way to cooperation under the impetus of democratization, development, and consumerism, promoted by a benign American hegemony. In place of a contest of values, Fukuyama's Hegelian vision looked forward to the unchallenged primacy of the culture of the West.

Needless to say, nothing of the kind has transpired. The post-Cold War period has been marked by regional turbulence, torturous and sometimes unsuccessful post-communist transitions, violent ethnic conflict, the rise of global terrorism as a major challenge to the premises of world order, and continued, if sometimes muted, great power rivalry. Western values are contested rather than embraced, and the absence of a compelling sense of overall direction, of a larger domestic or international project, of a source of signification and meaning, has arguably become a problem in its own right. Uncertainty about direction has also contributed to strategic confusion. The suspicion or rejection of large civilizational projects that has become so prominent a part of contemporary post-structuralist and social constructivist approaches to international theory, often accompanied by quasi-indifference to any kind of strategic analysis whatsoever, reflects the state of affairs with great clarity.⁴⁷

The United Nations, symbol of an earlier generation's aspirations for a more peaceful world order, has languished during the post-Cold War decade. In contrast, projects for regional association have flourished. Realist theory portrays the formation of alliances and regional blocs as an "outside-in" phenomenon, occurring as a response to real or perceived external challenges, whether via "balancing" efforts to correct a maldistribution of power, or "bandwagoning" whereby weak polities seek to dilute threats through association with a hegemonic leader.⁴⁸ Neo-mercantilist approaches follow an identical pattern in explaining regional association as a logical response to enhanced international economic competition. But regional association may also be understood as a function of "inside-out" dynamics driven by social and cultural trends. Zaki Laïdi has argued that, in the face of the universalizing tendencies of globalization, meaningful civilizational projects can only be constructed on a regional basis, as *espaces de sens* (spaces of meaning) bound together by a complex of historical, social, cultural, political, and economic associations.⁴⁹ These are contrasting arguments, but they are not mutually exclusive. Both "outside-in" and "inside-out" approaches to regional association need to be combined in an effort to come to terms with a phenomenon that has the potential to transform world politics root and branch.⁵⁰

The “new regionalism” is manifested both by the revitalization of traditional regional organizations and the creation of new forms of regional association. Large regional or sub-regional blocs with a history of institutionalization, such as the EU, the African Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), often have a strong security orientation, though today their focus is more often placed on internal conflict management than external threats.⁵¹ The proliferation of regional projects for economic integration, including some of the organizations listed above as well as others such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Arab Magreb Union (AMU), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Pact, the Central America Common Market (CACM), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), has an obvious economic logic, but also a strong cultural foundation; within these broadly drawn and sometimes overlapping zones of association one may observe a powerful revival of regional and sub-regional awareness and identity. In other cases, functionalist logic prevails. Regional associations are sometimes appropriate forums for approaching large global problems such as environmental disintegration, occasioned on the systemic level but not always effectively addressed on that level.

Regional alliances and associations play a critical role in U.S. strategy. The most important by far is the Atlantic Alliance, uniquely successful as a formal security association over many decades, but an organization whose *raison d'être* has been called into question in the new circumstances of the post-Cold War. NATO was originally built up and maintained as an organization for collective defense against a clear and present external threat. The collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact have made this aspect of its identity considerably less important, if not altogether irrelevant, but the Alliance has adapted by restructuring itself as a “new NATO” including commitments to enlargement, out of area peace operations, and gradual movement toward a broader collective security orientation. Former Secretary General Javier Solana describes the process extravagantly, as a “root and branch transformation” aimed to create “a new Alliance, far removed in purpose and structure from its Cold War ancestor,” inspired by the premise of “cooperative security.”⁵² This “new” NATO is arguably more important than ever in the broader context of U.S. security policy, as a platform for power projection, as a forum for managing relations with key allies, as an instrument for reaching out to the emerging democracies of eastern Europe, as the foundation for a new European security order, and as a context for engaging the Russian Federation in a cooperative security effort.

The Atlantic Alliance is also a regional pact, whose stability has always been presumed to rest in part on close historical and cultural associations between the United States and its European partners. Unfortunately, the new NATO will not have the luxury of assuming that a close cultural affinity will continue to link both sides of the Atlantic indefinitely. Changing demographic balances in the United States are reducing the proportion of citizens with European roots and heritage. Enlargement has made NATO itself a politically and culturally more diverse organization, where decision by consensus will be harder to achieve. Most of all, the project for European unification is moving slowly but steadily toward the goal of a more autonomous European subject possessed of the capacity to pursue an independent foreign and security policy. Managing regional conflict in the Balkans placed strains on alliance mechanisms. The Kosovo conflict generated considerable tension between the United States and its European allies, key allies were disappointed by the U.S. decision not to leverage the Alliance in a more significant way during its initial campaign in Afghanistan, and differences over the choice of a military option against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003 brought alliance partners to the brink of an overt break. NATO continues to rest on secure foundations, but friction in trans-Atlantic relations persists and it likely to grow stronger as the European

project continues to unfold and efforts to bolster a European defense identity progress. Alliance management, based on a careful appreciation of changing European realities and awareness of the cultural specificities of key European partners, will be an ever more important strategic task.

Other forms of regional association represent potential dangers. At least since the Iranian revolution of 1979, concern for an emerging “Islamic threat” has been prominent in U.S. policy circles. These concerns, to some extent understandably, have become considerably more prominent since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Somewhat less prominent, unfortunately, has been an informed understanding of what Islam is and is not, as a religion, as a philosophy of governance, and as a way of life.⁵³ The possible solidification of a Russian-Chinese strategic axis, which would rest in large measure on mutual alienation from the West, has the potential to effect global power balances significantly, and the European Union clearly aspires to challenge the United States economically. Contesting, co-opting, and counteracting these kinds of patterns will remain an important priority for U.S. planners.

There is an unmistakable momentum pushing in the direction of stronger local and regional identities and more robust regional association. For some analysts, the trend is part and parcel of a “retreat from the state” occasioned by changes in the locus of power in the global political economy, whose logical endpoint will be a “new medievalism” in which alternative forms of political association, with a more pronounced regional character, will eventually come to prevail.⁵⁴ Whether or not such forecasts are correct, shifting patterns of association and the heightened visibility of a variety of regional forums are clear manifestations of the increased relevance of regional perspectives in global security affairs.

Conclusions

The foundations of regional studies have changed remarkably little over time. Substantive understanding of major world regions demands a thorough mastery of the relevant specialized literature, careful and persistent monitoring of events and trends, appropriate language skills, and a period of sustained residence allowing for immersion in regional realities accompanied by periodic visits to keep perceptions up-to-date. Regionalists need refined skills that demand a considerable investment of time and resources to create and maintain. If the argument presented in this chapter is correct, however, and regional dynamics will, in fact, become an increasingly important part of the international security agenda in the years to come, the investment will be well worth making.

Although the confines of major world regions and sub-regions are difficult to fix with a great deal of consistency and rigor, the relevance of local, national, and regional perspectives in international political analysis is more or less uncontested. For U.S. strategists in the post-Cold War period, the importance of such perspectives is particularly great. In the absence of a peer competitor, significant challenges to U.S. interests are most likely to emerge from various kinds of regional instability, including threatened access to critical strategic resources, the emergence of “rogue” states with revisionist agendas, embedded terrorism, and persistent low and medium intensity conflict. In an increasingly integrated world system, geographic, cultural, and environmental factors that are importantly or uniquely manifested in the regional context will play an increasingly important role in shaping national priorities and international realities. Strategic culture is a vital context for warfighting, as relevant to contests with peer competitors as it is to clashes with less imposing adversaries in regional contingencies. Shifting patterns of regional association, often motivated by a heightened sense of regional identity and a search for meaning and relative security in the face of the impersonal and sometimes dehumanizing forces of globalization, is an important worldwide trend. None of these dynamics can be properly incorporated into U.S. security strategy without a solid understanding of

regional decisionmaking milieus and cultural proclivities.

To assert the importance of regional approaches in a balanced strategic studies curriculum is not to deny the relevance of alternative perspectives. Universalizing theory is essential and unavoidable. The formal and technical specializations necessary to make sense of political and military affairs are ineluctable. And there is the ever-present danger of regionalists falling into a narrow preoccupation with local problems and personalities, while missing the larger structural forces at work in the background. In context, however, and approached with appropriate modesty, regional perspectives have an essential place in strategy formulation.

The U.S. Army War College builds a regional studies component into its core curriculum, structured around the six major world regions mentioned above and focused on the effort to define and understand U.S. interests at stake on the regional level. Students are exposed to an in-depth study of a particular region and to an overview of all six world regions as a foundation for the school's capstone exercise, which tests their ability to manage a series of overlapping regional crises in an integrated political-military framework. Students are expected to become familiar with the general historical, cultural, political, military, and economic characteristics of the six major world regions; to evaluate U.S. national and security interests in these regions and to identify the kinds of challenges that are most likely to emerge; and to develop a regional strategic assessment that identifies alternative courses of action that can lead toward the achievement of U.S. national security objectives. The skills and expertise garnered during this bloc of instruction should make a vital contribution to the cultivation of future strategic leaders.

Regional strategic analysis is also of particular relevance to Army leaders. Though we live in the age of jointness, the Army remains the service branch primarily charged with placing boots on the ground in regional contingencies. Its operational environment is the land where people live and societies are rooted, and it must at a minimum come to terms with the geographical realities of the places where it is constrained to operate and the cultural characteristics of the peoples it is charged to fight or to protect. The emphasis on regional studies in the U.S. Army War College strategy curriculum stands out among our senior service schools. Experience, as well as common sense, shows that it is an emphasis well-placed.

Notes - Chapter 5

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- 39 See Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Strategy and Policy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. These preferences, of course, are an integral part of an American strategic culture.
- 40 See Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- 41 Gray, *Modern Strategy*, p. 28.
- 42 John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, New York: Vintage Books, 1993.
- 43 Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, New York: Knopf, 1989.
- 44 Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, New York, 1973, p. 332. Colin Gray describes this remark as "one of the wisest observations in the entire history of strategic thought." Gray, *Modern Strategy*, p. 131.
- 45 John W. Jandora, "War and Culture: A Neglected Relation," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 24, No.4, Summer 1999, pp. 541-556.
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PART II

STRATEGIC THOUGHT AND FORMULATION

CHAPTER 6

WHY IS STRATEGY DIFFICULT?

David Jablonsky

Colonel (Ret.) Arthur Lykke has taught an entire generation of U.S. Army War College students that strategy at any level consists of ends or objectives, ways or concepts, and means or resources. This three-element framework is nothing more than a reworking of the traditional definition of strategy as the calculated relationship of ends and means. Yet the student response is always overwhelmingly favorable, with Lykke's framework invariably forming the structure for subsequent seminar problems on subjects ranging from the U.S. Civil War to nuclear strategy. This is due, in part, to the fact that students weaned on the structural certitude of the five-paragraph field order and the Commander's Estimate naturally find such structure comforting in dealing with the complexities of strategy. But those students also know from their experience in the field that there are limits to the scientific approach when dealing with human endeavors. As a consequence, they can also appreciate the art of mixing ends, ways, and means, using for each element the part subjective, part objective criteria of suitability, feasibility, and applicability—the essence of strategic calculation.¹

The ends-ways-means paradigm also provides a structure at any level of strategy in order to avoid confusing the scientific product with the scientific process. The former involves producing propositions that are logically related and valid across time and space. The search for these immutable principles over the centuries by students of war failed, because they looked on classical strategy as something like physical science that could produce verities in accordance with certain regularities. This was further compounded by military thinkers who made claims for scientific products without subjecting those products to a scientific process. Both Jomini and Mahan, for instance, ignored evidence in cases that did not fit their theories or principles of strategy.² The strategic paradigm, then, serves as a lowest common denominator reminder that a true scientific product is not possible from the study of strategy. At the same time, however, that paradigm provides a framework for the systematic treatment of facts and evidence—the very essence of the scientific process. In this regard, Admiral Wylie has pointed out:

I do not claim that strategy is or can be a “science” in the sense of the physical sciences. It can and should be in intellectual discipline of the highest order, and the strategist should prepare himself to manage ideas with precision and clarity and imagination. . . . Thus, while strategy itself may not be a science, strategic judgment can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclusive, discriminatory, and perceptive.³

All that notwithstanding, the limitations of the strategic paradigm bring the focus full circle back to the art involved in producing the optimal mix of ends, ways, and means. Strategy, of course, does depend on the general regularities of that paradigm. But strategy does not always obey the logic of that framework, remaining, as the German Army Regulations *Truppen-fuhrung* of 1936 described it, “a free creative activity resting upon scientific foundations.”⁴ The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why, despite increasingly scientific approaches to formulation and implementation, strategy remains principally an art

rather than a science, and why within that art the “creative activity” of blending the elements in the strategic paradigm has become progressively more difficult over the centuries.

From Revolutions to Total War

In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, there was a growing recognition of the increased complexity of strategy, summarized in Karl von Clausewitz’s warning that “there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.”⁵ At the tactical level, the Prussian philosopher wrote, “the means are fighting forces trained for combat; the end is victory.” For the strategic, however, Clausewitz concluded that military victories were meaningless unless they were the means to obtain a political end, “those objects which lead directly to peace.”⁶ Thus, strategy was “the linking together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements into a single whole, for the final object of the war.”⁷ And only the political or policy level could determine that objective. “To bring a war, or any one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy,” he pointed out. “On that level, strategy and policy coalesce.”⁸ For Clausewitz, this vertical continuum (see Figure 1) was best exemplified by Frederick the Great, who embodied both policy and strategy and whose Silesian conquests of 1741 are considered to be the classic example of strategic art by demonstrating “an element of restrained strength, . . . ready to adjust to the smallest shift in the political situation.”⁹



Figure 1. The Policy Continuum.

With his deceptively simple description of the vertical continuum of war, Clausewitz set the stage for the equivalent of a Copernican shift in the strategic ends-ways-means paradigm. Now that paradigm was more complex, operating on both the military and policy levels with the totality of the ends, ways, and means at the lower levels interconnected with the political application at the policy level of those same strategic elements. This connection was the essence of Clausewitz’s description of war as a continuation of political intercourse (Verkehr) with the addition of other means. He explained that:

We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. . . . The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. . . . War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed, and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.¹⁰

The Industrial and French Revolutions

This growing complexity in dealing with the strategic paradigm was compounded by two upheavals. Clausewitz was profoundly aware of one, the French Revolution; he was totally ignorant of the other, the industrial/technological revolution. Prior to the French Revolution, eighteenth century rulers had acquired

such effective political and economic control over their people that they were able to create their war machines as separate and distinct from the rest of society. The Revolution changed all that with the appearance of a force “that beggared all imagination” as Clausewitz described it,

Suddenly, war again became the business of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens. There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects. . . . War, untrammelled by any conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury. This was due to the peoples’ new share in these great affairs of state; and their participation, in its turn, resulted partly from the impact that the Revolution had on the internal conditions of every state and partly from the danger that France posed to everyone.¹¹

For Clausewitz, the people greatly complicated the formulation and implementation of strategy by adding “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force” to form with the army and the government what he termed the remarkable trinity (see Figure 2). The army he saw as a “creative spirit” roaming freely within “the play of chance and probability,” but always bound to the government, the third element, in “subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”¹²

It was the complex totality of this trinity that, Clausewitz realized, had altered and complicated strategy so completely.




Figure 2. The Remarkable Trinity.

Clearly the tremendous effects of the French Revolution . . . were caused not so much by new military methods and concepts as by radical changes in policies and administration, by the new character of government, altered conditions of the French people, and the like. . . . It follows that the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.¹³

But while that transformation had made it absolutely essential to consider the elements of the Clausewitzian trinity within the strategic paradigm, the variations possible in the interplay of those elements moved strategy even farther from the realm of scientific certitude. “A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them,” Clausewitz warned in this regard, “would conflict with reality to such an extent that, for this reason alone, it would be totally useless.”¹⁴

Like most of his contemporaries, Clausewitz had no idea that he was living on the eve of a technological transformation born of the Industrial Revolution. But that transformation, as it gathered momentum throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, fundamentally altered the interplay of elements within the Clausewitzian trinity, further complicating the formulation and application process within the strategic paradigm (see Figure 3).

In terms of the military element, technology would change the basic nature of weapons and modes of




Figure 3. The Impact of Technology.

transportation, the former stable for a hundred years, the latter for a thousand. Within a decade of Clausewitz's death in 1831, that process would begin in armaments with the introduction of breech-loading firearms and in transportation with the development of the railroads.¹⁵

Technology had a more gradual effect on the role of the people. There were, for example, the great European population increases of the nineteenth century as the Industrial Revolution moved on to the continent from Great Britain. This trend led, in turn, to urbanization: the mass movement of people from the extended families of rural life to the "atomized" impersonal life of the city. There the urge to belong, to find a familial substitute, led to a more focused allegiance to the nation-state manifested in a new, more blatant and aggressive nationalism.

This nationalism was fueled by the progressive side effects of the Industrial Revolution, particularly in the area of public education, which meant, in turn, mass literacy throughout Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. One result was that an increasingly literate public could be manipulated by governments as technology spawned more sophisticated methods of mass communications. On the other hand, those same developments also helped democratize societies, which then demanded a greater share in government, particularly over strategic questions involving war and peace. In Clausewitz's time, strategic decisions dealing with such matters were rationally based on Realpolitik considerations to further state interests, not on domestic issues. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Rankeian Primat der Aussenpolitik was increasingly challenged throughout Europe by the need of governments for domestic consensus—a development with far-reaching implications for the conduct of strategy at the national level within the basic ends-ways-means paradigm.¹⁶

During much of that century, as the social and ideological upheavals unleashed by the French Revolution developed, military leaders in Europe generally attempted to distance their armed forces from their people. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Prussian cum German military, where the leaders worked hard over the years to prevent the adulteration of their forces by liberal ideas. "The army is now our fatherland," General von Roon wrote to his wife during the 1848 revolutions, "for there alone have the unclean and violent elements who put everything into turmoil failed to penetrate."¹⁷ The revolutions in industry and technology, however, rendered this ideal unattainable. To begin with, the so-called *Technisierung* of warfare meant the mass production of more complex weapons, for ever larger standing military forces. The key ingredients for these forces were the great population increases and the rise of nationalism as well as improved communications and governmental efficiency—the latter directed at general conscription of national manhood, which, thanks to progress in railroad development, could be brought to the battlefield in unlimited numbers.

At the same time, this increased interaction between the government/military and the people was also tied to other aspects of the impact of technology on the Clausewitzian trinity. Technological innovations in weaponry during this period, for example, were not always followed by an understanding of their implications, societal as well as military. Certainly, there was the inability on the part of all European powers to perceive the growing advantage of defensive over offensive weapons demonstrated in the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars. That inability was tied in with a trend in Europe at the time to combine elan with a military focus on moral force, bloodshed, and decisive battles. The result was that the military leaders of France, Germany, and Russia all adopted offensive military doctrines in some form.¹⁸

The fact that these doctrines led to the self-defeating offensive strategies of World War I ultimately had to do with the transformation of civil-military relations within the Clausewitzian trinity in their countries. In France, as an example, the officer corps distrusted the trend by the leaders of the Third Republic toward

shorter terms of military service, which it believed threatened the army's professional character and tradition. Adopting an offensive doctrine and elevating it to the highest level was a means to combat this trend, since there was general agreement that an army consisting primarily of reservists and short-term conscripts could only be used in the defense. "Reserves are so much eyewash," one French general wrote at the time, "and take in only short-sighted mathematicians who equate the value of armies with the size of their effectives, without considering their moral value."¹⁹ Although these were setbacks for those who shared this sentiment in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair and the consequent military reforms, it only required the harsher international climate after the Agadir crisis of 1911 for General Joffre and his young Turks to gain the ascendancy. Their philosophy was summed up by their leader, who explained that, in planning for the next war, he had "no preconceived idea other than a full determination to take the offensive with all my forces assembled."²⁰

Under these circumstances, French offensive doctrine became increasingly unhinged from strategic reality as it responded to the more immediate demands of domestic and intragovernmental politics. The result was France's ill-conceived strategic lunge in 1914 toward its former possessions in the East, a lunge that almost provided sufficient margin of assistance for Germany's Schlieffen Plan, another result of military operational doctrine driving policy. In the end, only the miracle of the Marne prevented a victory for the Germans as rapid and complete as that of 1870.²¹

There were other equally significant results as the full brunt of technological change continued to alter the relationship between the elements of the Clausewitzian trinity in all the European powers. The larger, more complex armies resulted in the growing specialization and compartmentalization of the military—a trend that culminated in the emulation of the German General Staff system by most of the European powers. It is significant that Clausewitz had ignored Carnot, the "organizer of victory" for Napoleon, when considering military genius. Now with the increase in military branches as well as combat service and combat service support organizations, the age of the "military-organizational" genius had arrived. All this in turn affected the relationship in all countries between the military and the government. For the very increase in professional knowledge and skill caused by technology's advance in military affairs undermined the ability of political leaders to understand and control the military, just as technology was making that control more important than ever by extending strategy from the battlefield to the civilian rear, thus blurring the difference between combatant and noncombatant.²²

At the same time, the military expansion in the peacetime preparation for war began to enlarge the economic dimensions of conflict beyond the simple financial support of Clausewitz's era. As Europe entered the twentieth century, new areas of concern began to emerge ranging from industrial capacity and the availability and distribution of raw materials to research and development of weapons and equipment. All this, in turn, increased the size and role of the European governments prior to World War I—with the result, as William James perceptively noted, that "the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nation is the real war, permanently increasing, so that the battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained during the 'peace' intervals."²³

Nevertheless, the full impact of the government's strategic role in terms of national instruments of power beyond that of the military was generally not perceived in Europe, despite some of the more salient lessons of the American Civil War. In that conflict, the South lost because its strategic means did not match its strategic ends and ways. Consequently, no amount of operational finesse on the part of the South's great captains could compensate for the superior industrial strength and manpower that the North could deploy. Ultimately, this meant for the North, as Michael Howard has pointed out, "that the operational skills of their

adversaries were rendered almost irrelevant.”²⁴ The Civil War also illustrated another aspect of the changes within the strategic paradigm: the growing importance of the national will of the people in achieving political as well as military strategic objectives. That social dimension of strategy on the part of the Union was what prevented the early southern operational victories from being strategically decisive and what ultimately allowed the enormous industrial-logistical potential north of the Potomac to be realized.

The Revolutions Joined: The Age of Total Wars

Strategy changed irrevocably with the full confluence in World War I of the trends set in train by the Industrial and French revolutions. In particular, the technology in that war provided, as Hanson Baldwin has pointed out, “a preview of the Pandora’s box of evils that the linkage of science with industry in the service of war was to mean.”²⁵ How unexpected the results of that linkage could be was illustrated by a young British subaltern’s report to his commanding general after one of the first British attacks in Flanders. “Sorry sir,” he concluded. “We didn’t know it would be like that. We’ll do better next time.”²⁶

But of course there was no doing better next time, not by British and French commanders in Flanders, not by Austrian troops on the Drina and Galician fronts in 1914, not by the Russian officers on the Gorlice-Tarnow line in 1915. The frustration at this turn of events was captured by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his novel, *August 1914*. “How disastrously the conditions of warfare had changed,” he wrote, “making a commander as impotent as a rag doll! Where now was the battlefield . . ., across which he could gallop over to a faltering commander and summon him to his side?”²⁷ It was this milieu that demonstrated the inadequacy of classical strategy to deal with the intricacies of modern warfare. Napoleon had defined that strategy as the “art of making use of time and space.”²⁸ But the dimensions of these two variables had been stretched and rendered more complex by the interaction of technology, with the elements of the Clausewitz’s trinity. And that very complexity, augmented by the lack of decisiveness at the tactical level, impeded the vertical continuum of war outlined in Clausewitz’s definition of strategy as the use of engagements to achieve policy objectives. Only when the continuum was enlarged, as the Great War demonstrated, was it possible to restore warfighting coherence to modern combat. And that, in turn, required the classical concept of strategy to be positioned at a midpoint, an operational level, designed to orchestrate individual tactical engagements and battles in order to achieve strategic results (see Figure 4). Now, a military strategy level, operating within the ends-ways-means paradigm on its own horizontal plane, was added as another way station on the vertical road to the fulfillment of policy objectives. This left the concept of strategy, as it had been understood since the time of Clausewitz, transformed into:

the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives. . . . Activities at this level link tactics and strategy These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.²⁹

At the same time, the full impact of technology on the Clausewitzian trinity in each of the combatant



Figure 4. The Continuum of War.

states during World War I substituted the infinitely more complex concept of national strategy for that of policy. To begin with, the growing sophistication and quantity of arms and munitions, as well as the vast demands of equipment and supply made by the armies, involved the national resources of industry, science, and agriculture—variables with which the military leaders were not prepared to deal. To cope with these variables, governments were soon forced to transform the national lives of their states in order to provide the sinews of total war.

Looking back over fifty years later on the totality of this change in what Clausewitz had termed policy, Admiral Eccles defined the concept of national strategy that emerged in World War I as “the comprehensive direction of all the elements of national power to achieve the national objectives.”³⁰ The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is more explicit, defining the new level of strategy that emerged at the national level after 1914 as the “art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to secure national objectives.”³¹

National strategy, then, involves all the elements of national power. Those elements, in turn, can be conveniently broken down on a horizontal plane into the categories described in the DoD definition of national strategy: political, economic, psychological, and military (see Figure 5).

The linchpin in this horizontal design is the military instrument of power at the national strategic level—the apex, as we have seen emerging in World War I, of the vertical continuum of war (see Figure 6).

Thus, the mix of ends, ways, and means at the national military strategic level will directly affect (and be affected by) the same paradigm operating at each level of the vertical continuum. Adding to the complexity is the interplay on the horizontal plane of national military strategy with the other strategies derived from the elements of national power, each operating within its own strategic paradigm and all contributing to the grand design of national strategy, as that strategy evolves within its own overall mix of ends, ways, and means. That this horizontal and vertical interplay has rendered the formulation and implementation of strategy at every level more difficult has become increasingly obvious. “Because these various elements of power cannot be precisely defined, compartmented, or divided,” Admiral Eccles concluded about the “fog” of strategy, “it is normal to expect areas of ambiguity, overlap, and contention about authority among the various elements and members of any government.”³²

Conclusion



Figure 5. National Strategy: The Horizontal Plane.



Figure 6. National Strategy and the Vertical Continuum of War.

The United States is in an era in which the strategic landscape has changed and is continuing to change. Nevertheless, the core problems that make strategy so difficult for a global power remain essentially the same as they did for earlier powers ranging from Rome to Great Britain. To begin with, there are challenges to U.S. interests throughout the globe. In a constantly changing strategic environment, however, it is difficult in many cases to distinguish which of those interests are vital, not to mention the nature of the challenge or threat to them. In any case, there are never enough armed forces to reduce the risk everywhere; strategic priorities have to be established.

In addition, like the leaders of earlier great powers, U.S. Governmental elites have to grapple with the paradox of preparing for war even in peace time if they wish to maintain the peace. The dilemma in the paradox that makes strategy in any era so difficult is that to overdo such preparations may weaken the economic, psychological, and political elements of power in the long run. The solution is to so balance the total ends, ways, and means that the natural tension in national security affairs between domestic and foreign policy is kept to a minimum while still securing the nation's vital interests with a minimum of risk. This solution, as the leaders of the great global powers of the past would assuredly agree, is not easy to achieve. In an ever more interdependent world in which variables for the strategist within the ends-ways-means paradigm have increased exponentially, strategists are no nearer to a "Philosopher's Stone" than they ever were. Strategy remains the most difficult of all art.³³

Notes - Chapter 6

1 Arthur F. Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," *Military Review* 69, No. 5 (May 1989), pp. 2-8, and his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, *National Security Strategy*, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), pp. 140-145. See also *Sound Military Decision* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1942), pp. 32, 34, 164, 165; and Henry E. Eccles, *Military Power in a Free Society* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1979), p. 73.

2 John Shy, "Jomini," pp. 173-175, and Philip Crowl, "Mahan," p. 454, both in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). See also Stephen M. Walt, "The Search for a Science of Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 144-145; John 1. Alger, *The Quest for Victory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); Admiral J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 20.

3 Wylie, *Military Strategy*, p. 10.

4 Martin van Creveld, "Eternal Clausewitz," in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, Michael I. Handel, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1986), p. 41. "The formulation of strategy is the creative act of choosing a means, an end, a way to relate a means to an end." Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 50.

5 Original emphasis. Carl von Clausewitz, *Two Letters on Strategy*, Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, ed./trans. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1984), p. 9.

6 Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 142-143.

7 Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 16; Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 127-132.

8 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 111. "In the highest realms of strategy . . . there is little or no difference between strategy, policy and statesmanship." Ibid., p. 178. Winston Churchill relearned these lessons in World War I. "The distinction between politics and strategy," he wrote at that time, "diminishes as the point of view is raised. At the Summit, true politics and strategy are one." Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis 1915* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 6.

9 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 179.

10 Ibid., p. 605.

11 Ibid., pp. 592-593.

12 Ibid., p. 89.

13 Ibid., pp. 609-610.

14 Ibid., p. 89.

15 Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 63; Howard, *Clausewitz*, pp. 3-4; and Van Creveld, "Eternal Clausewitz," p. 36.

16 Handel, *War*, p. 82. See also Dennis E. Showalter, "Total War for Limited Objectives: An Interpretation of German Grand Strategy," in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, Paul Kennedy, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 110-111.

17 Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 107; Michael Howard, "The Armed Forces as a Political Problem," in *Soldiers and Governments*, Michael Howard, ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 16.

18 Martin van Creveld, "Caesar's Ghost: Military History and the Wars of the Future," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1980, p. 81. See also Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, p. 521; and Handel, *War*, pp. 21, 64-68.

19 Howard, "Armed Forces as a Political Problem," p. 17. See also Jack Snyder, "Civil Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914-1984," *International Security*, Summer 1984, p. 109.

20 Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 229; Snyder, "Civil Military Relations," pp. 110-111, 130, 132-133.

21 The French military elite made a mirror image of their disdain for reservists in their estimates of German strength. The German General Staff made extensive use of German reservists, however, and instead of the 68 German divisions that had been expected in the implementation of French Plan XVII, there were 83. Howard, "Armed Forces as a Political Problem," p. 17. Joffre's failure to use French reservists more fully in 1914 proved to be, as Douglas Porch has pointed out, "like going to war without your trousers on." See Porch, "Arms and Alliances: French Grand Strategy and Policy in 1914 and 1940," in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, p. 142. See also Snyder, "Civil Military Relations," pp. 108, 133. It is true, of course, that had the French Army remained on the defensive instead of plunging into Alsace, it could have brought its full weight to bear on the German Army at the French frontier. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security*, Summer 1984, p. 89. It is also true, however, that the French offensive ultimately caused Moltke to weaken the right flank that was supposed to "brush the channel with its sleeve." Moreover, as Michael Howard has pointed out, the general concept behind Plan XVII—that France should take the strategic initiative rather than passively await the German offensive—did provide the flexibility that enabled General Joffre to recover rapidly from his opening reverses and redeploy his forces for the battle of the Marne. Howard, "Men against Fire," pp. 522-523.

- 22 Handel, *War*, pp. 60, 79. "The interchangeability between the statesman and the soldier," General Wavell stated later in summarizing these developments, "passed forever . . . in the last century. The Germans professionalized the trade of war, and modern inventions, by increasing its technicalities, have specialized it." Archibald Wavell, *Generals and Generalship* (London: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 33-34.
- 23 Handel, *War*, p. 58.
- 24 Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, p. 977. See also Gordon A. Craig, "Delbruck: The Military Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, p. 345.
- 25 Hanson W. Baldwin, *World War 1: An Outline History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 159.
- 26 Gordon A. Craig, *War, Politics and Diplomacy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 197.
- 27 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *August 1914* (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), pp. 330-331.
- 28 David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 161.
- 29 JCS Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1, 1989), p. 264.
- 30 Henry E. Eccles, *Military Power in a Free Society* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1979), p. 70.
- 31 JCS Pub 1-02, p. 244. This is what Andre Beaufre long ago termed total strategy: "the manner in which all—political, economic, diplomatic, and military—should be woven together." Andre Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 30.
- 32 Eccles, *Military Power*, p. 70.
- 33 Kennedy, "Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition," p. 7. During the Roman Republic, for example, Roman foreign policy was affected by the distrust and fear felt by the ruling patricians for the plebians of Rome on the domestic front. Barr, *Consulting the Romans*, p. 6.

CHAPTER 7

A SURVEY OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT

J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.

A common language is the basis of any effective doctrine; people conversant in the doctrine habitually use words in the same way to mean the same thing. Such meanings may be unique to the doctrinal context even if the word has other non-doctrinal usages. Thus, the word *passion* used in a Christian context has an entirely different meaning than in secular usage. Similarly, doctrinal military terms, while hopefully used consistently by military individuals and organizations, may differ slightly (or even radically) in common usage. Strategy is such a word. Defining it is not as easy as one would think, and the definition is critical. Although strategy is commonly used in non-military fields—for example a business strategy or an education strategy—and a definition must be able to include such usage, this discussion focuses on the national security arena and particularly on grand strategy and military strategy. In that context, strategy has equal applicability for peace and war, although it is commonly associated more strongly with war. Surprisingly for such a significant term, there is no consensus on the definition of strategy even in the national security arena. The military community has an approved definition, but it is not well known and is not accepted by non-military national security professionals. As a consequence, every writer must develop his or her own definition or pick from the numerous extant alternatives. We will survey some of those alternatives.

Clausewitz wrote, “Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.”¹ This is not satisfactory—it deals only with the military element and is at the operational level rather than the strategic. What Clausewitz described is really the development of a theater or campaign strategy. Historian Jay Luvass used to say that because Clausewitz said something did not necessarily make it true, but did make it worth considering. In this case we can consider and then ignore Clausewitz.

The nineteenth century Swiss soldier and theorist Antoine Henri Jomini had his own definition.

Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of war. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradiction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.²

This again is military only and theater-specific.

Civil War era soldier and author Henry Lee Scott had an interesting definition derived from the basic Jominian concept: “. . . the art of concerting a plan of campaign, combining a system of military operations determined by the end to be attained, the character of the enemy, the nature and resources of the country, and the means of attack and defence [sic].”³ This actually has all the elements we look for and states them as a relationship that is more conceptually complex and satisfying than Jomini’s. However, Scott still limits strategy to military endeavors and to theaters.

Military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart has another unique approach to the subject. He defines strategy as: “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.” Also: “Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound *calculation and co-ordination of the ends and the means*. The end must be proportioned to the total means, and the means used in gaining each intermediate end which contributes to the ultimate must be proportioned to the value and needs of that intermediate end—whether it be to gain an object or to fulfill a contributory purpose. An excess may be as harmful as a deficiency.” He is talking specifically about military strategy, and he thinks strategy is something akin to but different from grand strategy.

As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of “grand strategy” . . . While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which should govern its objective, the term “grand strategy” serves to bring out the sense of “policy in execution.” For the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to coordinate all the resources of a nation, or a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.

Hart goes on to say,

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources—for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not the least, of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will. . . . Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace—for its security and prosperity. The sorry state of peace, for both sides, that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part *terra incognita*—still awaiting exploration and understanding.⁴

That is very close to modern doctrine, although the use of words is different. But Hart’s entire exposition was really a means to get past all this uninteresting grand strategic stuff and on to his pet theory of the indirect approach—a technique of implementation that we will consider later.

Contemporary strategist Colin Gray has a more comprehensive definition. “By strategy I mean *the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy* [emphasis in original].”⁵ The problem with that definition is that it is exclusively wartime and military. Gray ties himself down when he links the definition of strategy to force—in actuality he is mixing definitions of war and strategy.

The U.S. military has an approved joint definition of strategy: “The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater,

national, and/or multinational objectives.” Unfortunately, that definition only recognizes strategy as a national security function, and although it is significantly better than earlier definitions, it remains fairly broad. The explanation in the *Joint Encyclopedia* (on line) goes a little further: “These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means).” That is more satisfactory, although still focused exclusively on national security issues. However the joint definition of national military strategy shows that the joint community is divided or at least inconsistent on this subject. “National Military Strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace or war.” That is a pure “how to” definition—at best a correlation of objectives with methods with the emphasis on methods. There is no consideration of or recognition of the importance of developing means; there is also no consideration of developing military objectives to accomplish national objectives. The encyclopedia’s further explanation on that term goes into the formal document of the National Military Strategy rather than the concept.⁶

The U.S. Army War College defines strategy in two ways: “Conceptually, we define strategy as the relationship among ends, ways, and means.” Alternatively, “Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.” The second definition is really closer to a definition of grand strategic art, but if one cut it off after “means,” it would be essentially the same as the first definition.⁷

In my own view, strategy is simply a problem solving process. It is a common and logical way to approach any problem—military, national security, personal, business, or any other category one might determine. Strategy asks three basic questions: what is it I want to do, what do I have or what can I reasonably get that might help me do what I want to do, and what is the best way to use what I have to do what I want to do? Thus, I agree with the War College that strategy is the considered relationship among ends, ways, and means. That sounds deceptively simple—even simplistic. Is it actually more than that relationship? Is there some deeper secret? I do not believe there is; however, the relationship is not as simple as it appears at first blush. First, a true strategy must consider all three components to be complete. For example, if one thinks about strategy as a relationship of variables (almost an equation but there is no equal sign) one can “solve” for different variables. Ends, which hopefully come from a different process and serve as the basis for strategy, will generally be given. If we assume a strategist wants to achieve those ends by specific ways, he can determine the necessary means by one of the traditional exercises of strategic art—force development. If a strategist knows both the ends to be achieved and means available, he can determine the possible ways. People, particularly military writers, often define strategy in exactly that way—as a relation between ends and means—essentially equating strategy with ways or at least converting strategy into an exercise of determining ways. That was the traditional approach of people like Jomini and Liddell Hart, who unabashedly thought of strategy as ways. That is also the typical short-term planning process that a theater commander might do. He cannot quickly change the means available, so he has to determine how to best use what is on hand to accomplish the mission.

Tests for Strategy

One can test a possible strategy by examining it for suitability, acceptability, and feasibility. Those three adverbs test each of the three components of strategy. Suitability tests whether the proposed strategy achieves the desired end—if it does not, it is not a potential strategy. Acceptability tests ways. Does the

proposed course of action or concept produce results without excessive expenditure of resources and within accepted modes of conduct? Feasibility tests means. Are the means at hand or reasonably available sufficient to execute the proposed concept? A strategy must meet all three tests to be valid, but there is no upper limit on the number of possible solutions. The art becomes the analysis necessary to select the best or most efficient.

Of the three tests, suitability and feasibility are fairly straightforward and require no further explication. Acceptability, however, has some complicating features. The morality and legality of strategies is an obvious case in point—morality and legality vary widely by nation, culture, and even individual. But those are not the only complicating features of acceptability. For example, Colin Gray talks about what he calls the social dimension of strategy “. . . strategy is made and executed by the institutions of particular societies in ways that express cultural preferences.”⁸ That is really an expression of the relation of the acceptability of a strategy to the Clausewitzian trinity. Beyond morality and legality, a truly acceptable strategy must fit the norms of the military, government, and people. Strategies that only meet the norms of one or two of the legs are possible if they are not in major conflict with deeply held norms of the other legs, but they must be achievable very quickly to avoid possibly disastrous conflict over acceptability. The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 is an example of this phenomenon. It was an invasion of a sovereign foreign nation justified by fairly innocuous (certainly not vital) political issues. That was against the norms of all three legs of the American trinity; however, the government had convinced itself that action was necessary, and the military agreed or at least obeyed orders. The potential glitch was the response of the American people. Initial reaction was the predictable support for troops being deployed in harm’s way. That support could have quickly turned into opposition had the operation not been extremely rapid and relatively casualty-free. Even though one might occasionally get away with violating norms, one cannot safely violate deeply-held norms even briefly. Thus, the United States has a norm against assassination (reinforced by a self-imposed presidential directive that adds a legal dimension). Our current mode of declaring that the people of an adversarial country are good but their leader is evil screams for a decapitation strategy executed by assassination. That will not happen. Beyond the question of legality, it would never pass the acceptability test of any of the trinitarian elements.

Categorizing Strategy

There are several ways to categorize strategies. One has a conceptual basis: strategy can be declaratory, actual, or ideal. Declaratory strategy is what a nation says its strategy is. Declaratory strategy may or may not be the nation’s true strategy, and the nation may or may not actually believe it. A good example is America’s declared two Major Theaters of War (MTW) strategy. For years the official (declared) strategy of the United States was to be able to fight two near-simultaneous MTWs; however, most analysts were convinced such a strategy was impossible to execute with existing means. Regardless, the United States must maintain some form of a two MTW strategy, despite recent modifications, as its declared strategy even if the administration determines that it does not have and is unwilling to buy the resources to execute the strategy. A nation with pretensions to world power cannot easily change or back down from long-declared strategies, and a declared two MTW capability provides some useful deterrent effect. Actual strategy addresses the difference between the declared strategy and reality. It asks the question, “Assuming the United States cannot execute its declared two MTW strategy, what is its real strategy?” That real strategy would be an actual strategy. An ideal strategy is what a strategist would prefer to do if he had unlimited access to all the necessary resources (both quantitative and qualitative). It is a textbook strategy and may or

may not correspond to reality.

Another way, as mentioned briefly above, to categorize strategy is organizational or hierarchical. That is the method that talks about grand or national strategy at one level and theater, campaign, or operational strategy at another level. The term operational strategy is one historian Alan T. Nolan uses, but it is confusing, unnecessarily mixes terms, and is uncommon at best in the literature. We will omit it from further discussions, but it does highlight one significant issue. There is a basic theoretical question about the legitimacy of strategy at the operational level—we are purposefully mixing apples and oranges for no discernable gain in clarity, utility, or comprehension. While I personally oppose such usage, current U.S. military joint doctrine accepts it, and I will follow that doctrine.

Grand or national strategy is associated with actions at the state/national level. The U.S. Army War College defines it as “. . . a country’s broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system.”⁹ Good grand strategies include or at least consider all elements of national power. These are the means of grand strategy. One could develop a lopsided grand strategy that was purely military or purely economic, but that is not ideal even if some elements contribute only minimally to the final product. This broaches the subject of elements of power—a simple but useful way to classify or categorize power. Current U.S. military doctrine recognizes four categories of power available to a nation or strategist: military, economic, diplomatic, and informational. Other potential candidates include social/psychological, which was an accepted category until recently, and political. While political and diplomatic appear to be similar and are frequently used synonymously, I believe they are actually different. To me, political refers to the power generated internally or domestically, while diplomatic refers exclusively to power in the international arena—the ability to influence adversaries, allies, and neutrals. Political power is important for generating or sustaining support for the policy/strategy or popular will. Regimes with little domestic support (and thus little political power) have difficulty executing their international policies. Social/psychological power was very similar to political power in some respects, but also contained elements of informational power. Since its major components were subsumed in other terms, social/psychological power fell into disuse. In a war, the other elements of power (and the strategies developed for their employment) tend to support the military element; however, there is always a symbiotic relationship between the elements. Thus diplomatic strategy may support military strategy, but military success may be an essential precursor for diplomatic success. Similarly, economic strategy may be designed to provide military means, but the military capture or loss of economic assets may directly influence the effectiveness of the economic strategy. Additionally, different types of warfare emphasize different elements of power. For example, in a civil war, the political element becomes especially important.

Does (or should) one’s strategy necessarily change based on the type of war he is fighting? If strategy is a function of ends, then it ought to change or be different as the political ends change. The alternative view, however, is that destroying the enemy’s military force is always the best (to some theorists the only legitimate) objective for the military regardless of political goals. This gets to what Clausewitz called the supreme judgment about a war—its nature. “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”¹⁰ Based on the nature of the war, the military’s objective may or may not have anything to do with destroying the enemy’s military force. For example, one might have political goals that make avoiding battle at all costs, and instead maneuvering to seize specific locations, not only a viable but a desirable strategy. The strategist will only recognize this if he or she understands the nature of the war being waged, recognizes when that nature changes, and adapts strategy

accordingly. The inclusion of potential changes in the nature of a war during its conduct raises another important question. If the nature of a war can change, then is not trying to shape that nature into a form that suits the strategist a legitimate strategic exercise? Is Clausewitz overlooking a useful strategic tool when he warns against trying to turn a war into something alien to its nature? Strategists should certainly try to control or influence the nature of a war as much as possible. The problem is when they fail to recognize their efforts have failed and persist in fighting the wrong kind of war. Thus, in the 1960s the United States might legitimately have tried to turn the Vietnam war into a conventional international war between North and South Vietnam—that was the war the U.S. military was best prepared to win. However, when that effort failed, the strategists should have recognized that fact and adapted to the true nature of the war they were fighting. Unfortunately, that did not occur until it was too late to win that war, and paradoxically, the nature of the war changed again in 1975, and the war became precisely the conventional international war the United States had initially wanted.

Executing Strategy

Before we proceed, it is useful to address the issue of whether strategy is really necessary. It is certainly possible to conduct a war without a strategy. One can imagine very fierce combat divorced from any coherent (or even incoherent) plan for how that fighting would achieve the aims of the war—fighting for the sake of fighting. Alternatively, preemptive surrender is always an option for the state interested in avoiding strategic decisions; the only drawback is that preemptive surrender is incapable of achieving positive political objectives other than avoidance of conflict. Rational states, however, will always attempt to address their interests by relating ends with ways and means. Given the fact that they are fighting for some reason—that is, they have an end—there will be some (even if unconscious) design of how to use the available means to achieve it. Thus, while strategy may not technically be necessary, it is almost always present—even if poorly conceived and executed.

Next we need to consider a few potential ways to execute strategy. Knowing that strategy is a considered relation among ends, ways, and means is a necessary first step, but it does not help one actually do anything. Fortunately, hundreds of authors have given their thoughts on how to conduct strategy. Some are better than others. Most are “ways” determinations rather than comprehensive ends-ways-means analyses. Still, they are worth consideration. As a minimum a competent strategist should be aware of each.

Sun Tzu

The ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu did not define strategy, but he offered pointers on its practice. At times, Sun Tzu can be so straightforward, he is simplistic. For example, the statement, “Victory is the main object of war” is not especially informative. One can make all the tortuous interpretations one likes, but the statement is blunt and obvious in its intent. That is not to say it is trivial—in fact, it is well for anyone involved with war to remember that the object is to win—it is just wrong as an absolute. The object of war is not victory, but as Liddell Hart says, “a better peace—even of only from your own point of view.” One can strive so hard for victory that he destroys the subsequent peace. Hart again says, “A State which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future. If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.” Victory is

certainly better than the alternative, but it cannot be the exclusive aim of war. I expound on that for two reasons. First, Sun Tzu should be treated like Jay Luvass recommended using Clausewitz—the fact that he said something only makes it worthy of consideration. Second, the fact that Sun Tzu is both an ancient and an Asian author does not mean he had all the answers or even addressed all the questions. There is a tendency to read volumes into fairly straightforward passages of Sun Tzu on the assumption that there must be something of deep significance behind each phrase of the book. In many (if not most) cases, the phrases actually mean exactly what they say. Sun Tzu was not saying that war is a political act when he said, “War is a matter of vital importance to the State”—reading the rest of the quote makes it quite apparent he was simply saying war is important and must be studied.¹¹ That does not need tortured interpretation to be significant.

It is commonplace to acknowledge that Sun Tzu advocated deception and winning without fighting. For example, he wrote, “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Sun Tzu has become the intellectual father of a school of warfare that advocates winning by maneuver or by psychologically dislocating the opponent. The ancient Chinese soldier might not be as pleased about that paternity as his advocates believe. Sun Tzu expended lots of effort explaining how to maneuver and fight. In some respects, he is very like Jomini (of all people). For example, Sun Tzu advocates attacking portions of the enemy with your whole force: “If I am able to determine the enemy’s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his.” Sun Tzu thought that the defense was the stronger form of warfare but that offensive action was necessary for victory. “Invincibility lies in the defence [*sic*]; the possibility of victory in the attack. . . . One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant.” He sometimes did incomplete analysis and thus provided advice that might be wrong depending on the circumstances. For example, Sun Tzu said, “To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not protect.” It is easy to use that quote as an advocacy for Liddell Hart’s indirect approach. That is, attack where the enemy does not expect. The problem is that there is almost always a reason why the enemy does not defend a place, and it usually has to do with the limited value of that place. However, Sun Tzu was not setting up Hart. The line after the original quote changes the meaning of the entire passage: “To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy does not attack.”¹² We now have a statement on chance and certainty in war—that is, the only certain way to take a place is if the enemy is not there—not advice on the indirect approach. Nevertheless, Sun Tzu is known as the advocate of deception, surprise, intelligence, and maneuver to win without fighting.

Clausewitz

Clausewitz is generally more useful for his philosophical musings than his “how to” strategic advice. In that arena, much of what he preached was either commonplace or nineteenth century specific. The exceptions are three. First was his advocacy of seeking battle. This obviously sets him apart from Sun Tzu and many others, and Clausewitz is quite specific about his expectations of decisive battle. He wrote,

. . . the importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory and in many cases is more important than the first. Strategy at this point draws near to tactics in order to receive the completed assignment from it; and its first exercise of authority is to demand that the victory should really be complete.¹³

Next, Clausewitz originated the concept of attacking what he called the enemy's center of gravity. The center of gravity comes from the characteristics of the belligerents and is "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."¹⁴ He offered several possibilities but decided that attacking the enemy's army was usually the best way to start a campaign, followed by seizing his capital and attacking his alliances. The concept, which the U.S. military adopted almost verbatim until the most recent doctrinal publications, has caused interminable debate both in the active force and the schoolhouses. Tactically the U.S. military has always identified and attacked vulnerabilities—now, some dead Prussian is telling us that strategically we should attack strengths (for whatever else one might believe, it is clear that a center of gravity is a strength not a weakness). We thus see attempts to mix the two concepts and essentially do both.

Clausewitz's final significant "how to" idea is the concept of the culminating point. "There are strategic attacks that have led directly to peace, but these are the minority. Most of them only lead up to the point where their remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace. Beyond that point, the scale turns and the reaction follows with a small force that is usually much stronger than that of the original attack. This is what we mean by the culminating point of the attack."¹⁵ Although Clausewitz only discusses culmination in terms of the attack (his later discussion of the culminating point of victory is a different concept), modern U.S. doctrine also identifies a culminating point for the defense—essentially a breaking point.

Jomini

Jomini also gave modern U.S. doctrine several terms. He is much more specific in his "how to" analysis than Clausewitz. Jomini believed war was a science, and consequently one could discover by careful study rules about how it should be conducted. He offered the results of his study. Jomini is often criticized for being geometric—although such a depiction overlooks some aspects of his work, it is not totally unfair. Jomini was specific about how to plan a campaign. First one selected the theater of war. Next, he determined the decisive points in the theater. Selection of bases and zones of operation followed. Then one designated the objective point. The line of operations was then the line from the base through the decisive points to the objective point. Thus, the great principle of war "which must be followed in all good combinations" was contained in four maxims:

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own.
2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces.
3. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of first importance to overthrow.
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper time and with energy.¹⁶

Delbrück

Attrition, exhaustion, and annihilation are standard strategic categories, although *Joint Pub 1-02* does not mention them. The late nineteenth century German military historian Hans Delbrück made the distinction between exhaustion and annihilation. Attrition is sometimes used synonymously with exhaustion, but they are actually different. Annihilation seeks political victory through the complete destruction (often in a single battle or short campaign) of the enemy armed forces. Attrition seeks victory through the gradual destruction (by a long campaign or series of campaigns) of the enemy's armed forces. Exhaustion seeks to erode the will and resources of the enemy nation/state rather than the armed forces. Recently, Russell Weigley has opined that, at least in his classic book, *The American Way of War*, he should have replaced attrition with erosion as a characterization of U.S. strategy. He believes the term is less confusing and actually better portrays certain aspects of American strategy. Erosion would be closer in meaning to exhaustion than attrition, except that—and this is only a tentative interpretation of Weigley's brief and incomplete explanation of the concept—it would aim more directly at the political or governmental will than at popular support or resources.¹⁷ It is not clear how the term erosion fits into the paradigm, but it would seem to be either a new category or a sub-set of exhaustion. Regardless, Professor Weigley's modification to the traditional categories of attrition, exhaustion, and annihilation is neither widely known nor accepted.

Hart

B. H. Liddell Hart had his own approach to strategy that has become famous as the indirect approach.

Strategy has not to overcome resistance, except from nature. *Its purpose is to diminish the possibility of resistance*, and it seeks to fulfill this purpose by exploiting the elements of *movement* and *surprise*. . . . Although strategy may aim more at exploiting movement than at exploiting surprise, or conversely, the two elements react on each other. Movement generates surprise, and surprise gives impetus to movement.¹⁸

Just as the military means is only one of the means of grand strategy—one of the instruments in the surgeon's case—so battle is only one of the means to the end of strategy. If the conditions are suitable, it is usually the quickest in effect, but if the conditions are unfavorable it is folly to use it. . . . His [a military strategist's] responsibility is to seek it [a military decision] under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the most profitable results. Hence *his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this*. In other words, dislocation is the aim of strategy.¹⁹

Dislocation is produced physically by forcing the enemy to change fronts or threatening his forces or lines of communication. It is also achieved psychologically in the enemy commander's mind as a result of the physical dislocation. "In studying the physical aspect, we must never lose sight of the psychological, and only when both are combined is the strategy truly an indirect approach, calculated to dislocate the opponent's balance." Although Hart would be appalled at being compared with Clausewitz, this statement is similar to the Prussian's comment, "Military activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated."²⁰

Hart and his indirect approach have won a wide following among strategists. However, the issue of direct versus indirect is actually a smoke screen. The indirect approach is a tactical concept elevated to the strategic level, and it loses some of its validity in the transition. Strategically, it is sometimes (if not often)

advantageous to take a direct approach. This is particularly true in cases when the contending parties have disproportionate power—that is, when one side possesses overwhelming force. In such cases, the stronger side invariably benefits from direct action. The concept of the indirect approach is also a downright silly notion when talking about simultaneous operations across the spectrum of conflict. Advocates will cry that I have missed the point. Hart seeks an indirect approach only because what he really wants is the mental dislocation it produces. I would counter that his real point was the avoidance of battle and winning without fighting. Surprise, which Hart acknowledges is how an indirect approach produces mental dislocation, is a tremendous advantage; however, designing strategies purely or even primarily to achieve surprise overlooks the rest of the equation—surprise to do what? Surprise for what purpose? If a strategist can accomplish his purpose in a direct manner, it might be more desirable than contending with the disadvantages inherent in achieving surprise. Nevertheless, the indirect approach is a recognized strategic tool that has tremendous utility if not elevated to a dogma.

Howard

Michael Howard postulated a strategic paradigm based on deterrence, compellence, and reassurance. Military power can deter other states from doing something, or it can compel them to do something. “Reassurance provides a general sense of security that is not specific to any particular threat or scenario.” Pax Britannia is the best example. The British navy provided world-wide security through its control of the seas. That security translated into general peace.²¹ Howard proposes these as the broad categories of the ways in which military force can be used. Although deterrence and compellence are widely accepted concepts, the addition of reassurance to create a general paradigm is not widely known or accepted.

Luttwack

Edward Luttwack talks about attrition and maneuver as the forms of strategy. For Luttwack, attrition is the application of superior firepower and material strength to eventually destroy the enemy’s entire force unless he surrenders or retreats. The enemy is nothing more than a target array to be serviced by industrial methods. The opposite of attrition warfare is relational maneuver—“action related to the specifics of the objective.” The goal of relational maneuver, instead of physically destroying the enemy as in attrition, is to incapacitate his systems. Those systems might be the enemy’s command and control or his fielded forces or even his doctrine or perhaps the spatial deployment of his force, as in the penetration of a linear position. In some cases it might entail the attack of actual technical systems—Luttwack uses deception of radar rather than its deception or jamming to illustrate the final category.²²

Instead of seeking out the enemy’s concentration of strength, since that is where the targets are to be found in bulk, the starting point of relational maneuver is the avoidance of the enemy’s strengths, followed by the application of some selective superiority against presumed enemy weaknesses, physical or psychological, technical or organizational.²³

Luttwack recognizes that neither attrition nor relational maneuver are ever employed alone—there is always some mix of the two even if one or the other is decidedly dominant. Relational maneuver is more difficult to execute than attrition, although it can produce better results more quickly. Conversely, relational maneuver can fail completely if the force applied is too weak to do the task, or it encounters unexpected resistance. Relational maneuver does not usually allow “free substitution of quantity for quality.” There is

always a basic quality floor beneath which one cannot safely pass. Only after that floor has been exceeded will quantity substitutions be possible.²⁴

Luttwak also says that strategy is paradoxical.

The large claim I advance here is that strategy does not merely entail this or that paradoxical proposition, contradictory and yet recognized as valid, but rather that *the entire realm of strategy is pervaded by a paradoxical logic of its own*, standing against the ordinary linear logic by which we live in all other spheres of life (except for warlike games, of course).

He believes paradoxical logic pervades the five levels (technical, tactical, operational, theater strategic, and grand strategic) and two dimensions (vertical across levels and horizontal in levels) of warfare.²⁵

At the most basic level, Luttwak demonstrates both the presence and the desirability of choices in war that defy peacetime logic. His base example is the choice of an approach road to an objective. The alternatives are a wide, straight, well-surfaced road and a narrow, winding, poorly-surfaced road. “Only in the conflictual realm of strategy would the choice arise at all, for it is only if combat is possible that the bad road can be good *precisely because it is bad* and may therefore be less strongly held or even left unguarded by the enemy.” Thus, commanders make choices contrary to normal logic because they produce valuable advantages—advantages arising directly from the nature of war. Like Clausewitz, Luttwak believes the competitive aspect of war, that it is always a competition between active opponents, is one of the defining aspects of war. “On the contrary, the paradoxical preference for inconvenient times and directions, preparations visibly and deliberately incomplete, approaches seemly too dangerous, for combat at night and in bad weather, is a common aspect of tactical ingenuity—and for a reason that derives from the essential nature of war.”²⁶ Commanders make paradoxical choices primarily to gain surprise and thus reduce the risk of combat.

To have the advantage of an enemy who cannot react because he is surprised and unready, or at least who cannot react promptly and in full force, all sorts of paradoxical choices may be justified. . . . Surprise can now be recognized for what it is: not merely one factor of advantage in warfare among many others, but rather the suspension, if only briefly, if only partially, of the entire predicament of strategy, even as the struggle continues. Without a reacting enemy, or rather according to the extent and degree that surprise is achieved, the conduct of war becomes mere administration.²⁷

Gaining surprise, therefore, becomes one of the key objectives of strategy. In fact, whole schools of strategy (Luttwak refers specifically to Hart’s indirect approach) have been founded on the principle of surprise. The problem is that paradoxical choices—those necessary to achieve surprise—are never free or even necessarily safe because every “paradoxical choice made for the sake of surprise must have its cost, manifest in some loss of strength that would otherwise be available.” The choice itself may make execution more difficult (it is harder to fight at night); secrecy can inhibit preparations and is almost never total; deception may contain relatively cost-free elements (like false information leaked to the enemy) but as it becomes more sophisticated, complex, and convincing, it soaks up resources (units conducting feints are not available at the main point of contact). At the extreme, one could expend so much force gaining surprise that insufficient combat power remained for the real fight.²⁸

Obviously the paradoxical course of “least expectation” must stop short of self-defeating extremes, but beyond that the decision is a matter of calculations neither safe nor precise. Although the loss of strength potentially available is certain, success in achieving surprise can only be hoped for; and although the cost can usually be tightly calculated, the benefit must remain a matter of speculation

until the deed is done.²⁹

All of this, of course, is complicated by friction, which Luttwack calls organizational risk. Also, acting paradoxically can become predictable. Thus, by 1982 in Lebanon the Israelis had established such a reputation for paradoxical action that they were unable to achieve surprise until they broke their established paradigm and conducted the obvious frontal attack down the Bekka Valley. Luttwack recognizes that some situations call for straightforward, logical solutions. “If the enemy is so weakened that his forces are best treated as a passive array of targets that might as well be inanimate, the normal linear logic of industrial production, with all the derived criteria of productive efficiency, is fully valid, and the paradoxical logic of strategy is irrelevant.”³⁰

While he has some interesting and valid points, especially in the details, Luttwack’s insistence on the paradoxical nature of war is too broad a generalization. There is much that is paradoxical in warfare; however, if war were completely paradoxical as Luttwack asserts (his exceptions are too trivial to be significant), war would not yield to study. In fact, much of warfare—including its paradox—is very logical. In a sense, Luttwack’s argument proves that proposition and refutes itself.

Van Creveld

Martin van Creveld’s *The Transformation of War* is, according at least to the cover, “The most radical reinterpretation of armed conflict since Clausewitz.” He represents a segment of modern scholars that believe Clausewitz no longer explains why how, or by whom wars are fought. To Van Creveld, war is no longer a rational political act conducted among states—if it ever was. He points out that warfare waged by non-state actors dominated conflict in 1991 rather than the organized, political, interstate warfare between great powers that the international community seemed to expect (and Clausewitz seemed to predict). War is no longer fought by the entities we always assumed fought wars. The combatants in modern wars no longer fight for the reasons we always believed. Finally, they do not fight in the manner we always accepted as standard.³¹

Modern war takes many forms—the Clausewitzian trinitarian form of war being one, but by no means the dominant one, of them. For Van Creveld, Clausewitz does not apply in any case that does not involve exclusively state-on-state warfare. Since he sees a resurgence of “Low-Intensity Conflict,” he believes war will be dominated by non-state actors. “We are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between trading blocks, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups.” Current fielded military forces are irrelevant to the tasks they will likely face. Should the states in question fail to recognize the changed reality, they will first become incapable of wielding appropriate force at all and eventually cease to exist as recognizable states.³²

The nature of the participants dictates the nature of the reasons they fight. Because the participants are not states, they will not be fighting for state-like reasons. This follows logically from Van Creveld’s assertion that politics applies only to states—not a more broadly defined interest in a more broadly defined community. Non-state actors fight wars for abstract concepts like justice or religion. Frequently, groups feel their existence is threatened and lash out violently in response. In any case, reasons are highly individualistic and do not yield easily to analysis—especially analysis based on the inappropriate model of the Clausewitzian universe.³³

Finally, Van Creveld believes that Clausewitz did not understand how wars are fought—at least his assertion that they would tend naturally toward totality is wrong. He cites international law and convention, among other factors, as major inhibitors on the drift to totality in state-on-state war. More significant is his critique of strategy. Like Luttwak, Van Creveld sees strategy as paradoxical. He believes pairs of paradoxes define strategy. If the object of war is to beat our opponent's force with our own, then we must design maneuvers to pit strength against weakness. Because war is competitive, our enemy is doing the same thing, and we must conceal or protect our weakness from the opponent's strength. Thus, the essence of strategy is “. . . the ability to feint, deceive, and mislead.” Eventually one can work so hard on concealing that he and his side may be deceived—where the distinction between feint and main effort is unclear. Van Creveld also discusses the paradox in time and space, using the same argument as Luttwak that the shortest distance between two points may not be the straight line. Other paradoxes include that between concentration and dispersion (concentration is necessary to apply power, but concentration increases the chance of discovery) and between effectiveness and efficiency (the more economical, streamlined, or efficient a military organization becomes, the more vulnerable it is).³⁴

Perhaps uniquely in the field of strategic theory, Martin van Creveld has provided a critique of his own thesis. In a chapter of a book published in 2003, Van Creveld finds, not surprisingly, that in balance his earlier work, written in 1988-89, holds up very well. The Gulf War was an aberration—the outcome of which was almost preordained. Otherwise, “. . . the main thesis of *The Transformation of War*, namely that major armed conflict between major powers is on the way out, seems to have been borne out during the ten years since the book's publication.” Conversely, non-trinitarian wars are on the rise and conventional forces do not seem able to bring them to satisfactory closure. “. . . [T]he prediction that history is witnessing a major shift from trinitarian to non-trinitarian war seems to have fulfilled itself and is still fulfilling itself on an almost daily basis.” He believes information warfare might be a wild card that could disrupt his predictions; however, on balance he sees information as advantageous to (or at least an equalizing factor for) non-state actors, and hence a confirmation of the trend toward non-trinitarianism. Thus, Van Creveld sticks with his criticism of Clausewitz and essentially every element of his original thesis.³⁵

Miscellaneous Alternatives

There are also whole categories we can only classify as miscellaneous, alternative, possibly-strategic concepts:

Sequential, Simultaneous, and Cumulative

This paradigm attempts to make distinctions between strategies based on whether the strategist is attacking objectives progressively, simultaneously, or in essentially random order. Thus, a typical sequential campaign would involve actions to gain control of the air, followed by efforts to defeat the enemy's fielded forces, and culminating in the attack or occupation of political objectives. A simultaneous campaign would include near-simultaneous attacks on each of those target sets. A cumulative strategy produces results not by any single action or sequence of actions but by the cumulative effect of numerous actions over time. A commerce raiding strategy is a classic example. The loss of a single ship is not especially significant; there is no need to sink ships in any order; while specific types of ships (like tankers) might be more valuable than others, the loss of any ship contributes directly to victory. The effectiveness of the strategy comes from cumulative losses over time.

Denial, Punishment, and Coercion

These are proposed replacements for attrition, exhaustion, and annihilation. They actually describe the ends of strategy (or perhaps a limited set of ways) rather than a complete strategic concept. Their utility is limited, and their acceptance as a group by the strategic community is minimal at best. Coercion, of course, is a recognized strategic concept on its own; it is just not commonly grouped with denial and punishment as paradigm.

Jones

Historian Archer Jones has a unique approach to strategy.

The object for military strategy used herein is the depletion of the military force of an adversary. The definition of political-military strategy, a companion term, is the use of military force to attain political or related objectives directly, rather than by depleting an adversary's military force. Of course, military strategy usually endeavored to implement political or comparable objectives but sought to attain them indirectly, by depleting the hostile military force sufficiently to gain an ascendancy adequate to attain the war's political goals.³⁶

Jones does not use attrition because of its association with a particular form of military strategy. Instead, he asserts that military force can achieve its objective of depleting the enemy through one of two methods. Combat strategies deplete the enemy by directly destroying his force in the field. Logistic strategies deprive the opponent of supplies, forces, weapons, recruits, or other resources. Either of these strategies can be executed in one of two ways. One can use "a transitory presence in hostile territory to make a destructive incursion," which Jones labels a raiding strategy, or one can conquer and permanently occupy significant segments of enemy territory, which he calls a persisting strategy. The two pairs—combat and logistics and raiding and persisting—define comprehensive strategy.³⁷

Jones then puts the factors into a matrix and uses them for all kinds of warfare—air, land, and sea. Air war, however, can really only be raiding because of the nature of the medium. This is a military only, ways only approach to strategy that works best as Jones applies it—in retrospect to analyze historical campaigns. The separation of a purely political strategy from military strategy based on whether or not the aim is depleting the enemy force is awkward to say the least. Jones has an interesting concept of "political attrition." This means that victory in battle raises morale and engenders optimism about winning in a reasonable time with acceptable casualties. Conversely, defeat in battle makes victory look less certain, further away in time, and attainable only at high cost. He does not think that political attrition necessarily works in reverse—that is, you cannot store up good will during good times to tide you over during the bad times. (Although presumably you would start the bad times at a higher overall level of morale.) Elsewhere, Jones compares popular will to win with the classic economic supply and demand theory of elastic and inelastic demand.³⁸ That is a much less satisfying explanation. While perhaps of little use to practical strategists, Archer Jones' concepts are creative and not completely without merit.

Decapitation

An attractive recent suggestion is a strategy of decapitation where one targets specifically and selectively the enemy leader or at least a fairly limited set of upper-echelon leaders. Saddam Hussein is a favorite object of this approach, although recent strategic treatises like the *Quadrennial Defense Review* that used regime change as an evaluative factor, hint at a widening acceptance of the concept. A primary

assumption, generally asserted without proof, is that the current leader (perhaps aided by a small group of accomplices) is the whole cause of the international dispute. A corollary assumption is that eliminating the current evil leadership will result in its replacement by a regime willing to grant the concessions demanded by the opposing state or coalition. There are several problems with this approach—most related to the validity of the assumptions. First, the assumption that the common people of a country are good and could not possibly support the policies of their evil ruler is (as a minimum) unproven in most cases and palpably false in many. Thus, decapitation will not solve the problem. Second, a potential follow-on regime can be either better than, about the same as, or worse than the current leadership. Hence, the odds of achieving one's policy objectives by decapitation are actually fairly poor. The old saw about contending with the devil one knows may be worn, but that does not make it any less worthwhile advice.

Boyd

U.S. Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd talks about the “OODA loop”—that is, the decision cycle of observation, orientation, decision, and action. The concept is derived from a fighter pilot in a dogfight. Like the pilot, a strategist wins by out-thinking and out-maneuvering his opponent; by the time the opponent decides what to do and initiates action, it is too late since you have already anticipated and countered his move or made a countermove that makes his action meaningless. One accomplishes this by possessing sufficient agility to be able, both mentally and physically, to act a step or more ahead of the enemy. Thus, the successful strategist always works inside his enemy's decision cycle.³⁹ This theory describes a way, and really is a new and unnecessarily complicated rephrasing of the ancient concept of the initiative. Initiative is not critical or essential, and alone it is not decisive. Robert E. Lee had tactical, operational, and even strategic initiative at Gettysburg and lost tactically, operationally, and strategically. However, initiative is a tremendous advantage—if Boyd's paradigm makes it more clear or obvious to the strategist, it has provided a service.

Warden

Another U.S. Air Force Colonel, John A. Warden III, translated his targeteering experience into a strategic theory, thus elevating the tactical process of allocating aircraft sorties to specific targets to a strategic theory. Warden views the enemy as a target array in five strategic rings; the innermost and most important is leadership. One can win by striking that inner ring so frequently and violently that the enemy is essentially paralyzed and never able to mount an effective defense. It is unnecessary to take on the outer and much more difficult target rings like the enemy's armed forces, although modern advances like stealth technology make simultaneous attack of the entire target array possible (instead of the traditional sequential attacks where one array had to be neutralized before proceeding to the next).⁴⁰ This is often considered an air power theory—and Warden uses it to push the decisiveness of air power—but the conceptual approach has broader application. Its major drawback as a general theory of strategy is that it works best (if not exclusively) when one side has or can quickly gain total dominance of its opponent's airspace.

Underdog Strategies

There are also a number of alternative strategies that seem to be intended specifically for, or at least be most appropriate for, weaker powers or underdogs.

Fabian

Fabian strategies and variants: Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus was a Roman general during the Second Punic War. He advocated avoiding open battle because he was convinced the Romans would lose, which they proceeded to do when they abandoned his strategy. Thus, Fabian strategy is a strategy in which one side intentionally avoids large-scale battle for fear of the outcome. Victory depends on wearing down (attriting) one's opponent over time—usually by an unrelenting campaign of skirmishes between detachments. Somewhat akin to a Fabian strategy is a strategy of survival. In that case, however, the weaker power does not necessarily avoid battle. Instead, one reacts to his opponent's moves rather than making an effort to seize the initiative. The object is to survive rather than to win in the classic sense—hopefully, sheer survival achieves (or perhaps comprises) one's political aim. This is a favorite alternative strategy of modern critics for the Confederate States of America. Scorched earth strategies are another variant of the basic Fabian strategy. The concept is to withdraw slowly before an enemy while devastating the countryside over which he must advance so he cannot subsist his force on your terrain. Attrition will eventually halt the attack—it will reach what Clausewitz called a culminating point—and the retreating side can safely assume the offensive. This is actually the addition of a tactical technique to the basic Fabian strategy and not a major new school of strategy.

There is a whole subset of doctrine under the general heading of strategies for the weak that advocates guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and/or terrorism.

Mao

Mao Zedong developed the most famous theory of insurgency warfare. His concepts, designed initially for the Chinese fight against the Japanese in World War II, have been expanded and adapted by himself and others to become a general theory of revolutionary warfare. Mao emphasizes the political nature of war and the reliance of the army on the civilian population, especially the Chinese peasant population. He advocated a protracted war against the Japanese; victory would come in time through attrition. He believed the Chinese should avoid large battles except in the rare instances when they had the advantage. Guerrillas should normally operate dispersed across the countryside and concentrate only to attack. Because the Chinese had a regular army contending with the Japanese, Mao had to pay particular attention to how guerrilla and regular operations complemented each other. He postulated a progressive campaign that would move slowly and deliberately from a stage when the Chinese were on the strategic defensive through a period of strategic stalemate to the final stage when Chinese forces assumed the strategic offensive. The ratio of forces and their tactical activities in each stage reflected the strategic realities of the environment. Thus, guerrilla forces and tactics dominated the phase of the strategic defensive. During the strategic stalemate, mobile and guerrilla warfare would complement each other, and guerrilla and regular forces would reach approximate equilibrium (largely by guerrilla forces combining and training into progressively larger regular units). Mobile warfare conducted by regular units would dominate the period of strategic offensive. Although guerrilla units would never completely disappear, the regular forces would achieve the final victory.⁴¹ Mao has had an enormous impact on the field of revolutionary warfare theory.

Guevara

Ernesto “Che” Guevara de la Serna based his theory of revolutionary warfare on the Cuban model. He offered a definition of strategy that highlighted his variation of the basic guerrilla theme. “In guerrilla terminology, strategy means the analysis of the objectives we wish to attain. First, determine how the enemy will operate, his manpower, mobility, popular support, weapons, and leadership. Then plan a strategy to best confront these factors, always keeping in mind that the final objective is to destroy the enemy army.” To Che, the major lessons of the Cuban Revolution were that guerrillas could defeat regular armies; that it was

unnecessary to wait for all the preconditions to be met before beginning the fight—the insurrection itself would produce them; and that the countryside was the arena for conflict in underdeveloped Latin America. Gradual progress through the Maoist stages of revolution was unnecessary—the guerrilla effort could not only establish the political preconditions of revolution but also win the war on its own. Parties, doctrine, theories, and even political causes are unimportant. The armed insurgency will eventually produce them all.⁴² That is incredibly naive and even dangerous as an insurgent strategic concept, but Che became very well-known pursuing it.

Terrorism

Although there is no outstanding single theorist of terrorism, it is not a new strategic concept. The theory behind terrorism is fairly straightforward. A weak, usually non-governmental actor uses random violence, often directed against civilian targets, to produce terror. The aim is to make life so uncertain and miserable that the state against which the terror is directed concedes whatever political, social, economic, environmental, or theological point the terrorist pursues. The technique has not proven particularly effective in changing important policies in even marginally effective states. It is, however, comparatively cheap, easy to conceptualize and execute, requires minimal training, is relatively safe since competent terrorist groups are extremely difficult to eradicate, and is demonstrably effective in gaining the terrorist publicity for himself and his cause.

Strategic Advice

There are also numerous advice books that give leaders and decisionmakers more or less specific advice about what to do or how to do it without necessarily offering a comprehensive strategic paradigm. Examples include Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Art of War*, *The Discourses*, and *The Prince*, written to influence sixteenth century Florentine leaders and Frederick the Great's *Instructions for His Generals*, the title of which explains its intent. Alternatively, there are collections of military advice culled from the writings of great soldiers like *The Military Maxims of Napoleon*. As historian David Chandler noted in his introduction to a recent reprint of that work, "The practical value of military maxims can be debatable. . . . Consequently the collecting of his [Napoleon's] *obiter dicta* into any kind of military rule-book for future generations to apply is a process fraught with perils and pitfalls." In a more modern vein, Michele A. Flournoy, ed., *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security*, is essentially an advice book that presents a specific strategic solution without developing an overarching strategic theory.⁴³ Advice books are often beneficial; however, their generally narrow focus and frequent bumper sticker quality limit that utility.

Deterrence

During the Cold War the nuclear weapons field developed its own set of specific strategies based on deterrence theory. Deterrence theory itself is a useful strategic concept. Conversely, concepts like mutual assured destruction, counterforce or countervalue targeting, launch on warning, and first strike versus retaliation are terms of nuclear art that will retain some relevance as long as major nations maintain large nuclear stockpiles, but they no longer dominate the strategic debate as they once did. According to the Department of Defense, deterrence is "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences."⁴⁴ It is altogether different from compellence where one is attempting to make another party do something. Theoretically, one party can deter another either by threat of punishment or by denial. Threat of punishment

implies performing an act will evoke a response so undesirable that the actor decides against acting. Deterrence by denial seeks to avert an action by convincing the actor that he cannot achieve his purpose. In either case deterrence theory assumes rational decisionmakers with similar value systems. To be deterred, one must be convinced that his adversary possesses both the capability to punish or deny and the will to use that capability. Demonstrating the effectiveness of deterrence is difficult, since it involves proving the absence of something resulted from a specific cause; however, politicians and strategists generally agree that nuclear deterrence worked during the Cold War. It is not as clear that conventional deterrence works, although that concept has numerous advocates and is deeply embedded in modern joint doctrine.

Seapower

Mahan

There are also schools of single service strategies devoted to sea power or airpower. In the sea power arena, the most famous strategic theorists are Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian S. Corbett. American naval officer Mahan wrote several books and articles around the turn of the twentieth century advocating sea power. Perhaps the most famous was *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*. Mahan developed a set of criteria that he believed facilitated sea power, but his major contribution was in the realm of the exercise of that capability through what he called command of the sea. To Mahan, oceans were highways of commerce. Navies existed to protect their nation's commerce and interrupt that of their enemy. The way to do both was to gain command of the sea.⁴⁵ His study of history convinced Mahan that the powerful maritime nations had dominated history, and specifically that England had parlayed its command of the sea into world dominance. At the grand strategic level Mahan believed that countries with the proper prerequisites should pursue sea power (and especially naval power) as the key to prosperity. For Mahan, the essence of naval strategy was to mass one's navy, seek out the enemy navy, and destroy it in a decisive naval battle. With the enemy's navy at the bottom of the ocean—that is, with command of the sea—your merchantmen were free to sail where they pleased while the enemy's merchantmen were either confined to port or subject to capture. Diversion of naval power to subsidiary tasks like commerce raiding (a favorite U.S. naval strategy in the early years of the republic) was a waste of resources. The key to Mahanian naval warfare was thus the concentrated fleet of major combatants that would fight for and hopefully win command of the sea. Ideally, that fleet would have global reach, which required secure bases for refueling conveniently located worldwide. Although Mahan's theories actively supported his political agenda of navalism and imperialism, they contained enough pure and original thought to survive both the author and his age.

Corbett

British author Julian S. Corbett had a different interpretation of naval warfare. A contemporary of Mahan, Corbett saw British success not so much as a result of dominance of the sea as from its ability to effectively wield what we call today all the elements of national power. Corbett differentiated between maritime power and strategy and naval power and strategy. Maritime strategy encompassed all the aspects of sea power—military, commercial, political, etc. Naval strategy dealt specifically with the actions and maneuvers of the fleet. Like Mahan, Corbett saw oceans as highways of commerce and understood their importance. However, he emphasized not the uniqueness of sea power but its relationship with other elements of power. For Corbett, the importance of navies was not their ability to gain command of the sea but their ability to effect events on land. He believed that navies rarely won wars on their own—they often made it possible for armies to do so. The navy's role was thus to protect the homeland while isolating and

facilitating the insertion of ground forces into the overseas objective area. Neither command of the sea nor decisive naval battle were necessarily required to accomplish either of those tasks. Although Corbett admitted that winning the decisive naval clash remained the supreme function of a fleet, he believed there were times when that was neither necessary nor desirable.⁴⁶ His theories most closely approximate current U.S. naval doctrine.

Jeune Ecolé

Another school of sea power popular on the continent in the early 1880s was that of *Jeune Ecolé*. Its primary advocate was Admiral Théophile Aube of the French Navy. Unlike the theories of either Mahan or Corbett, which were intended for major naval powers, the *Jeune Ecolé* is a classic small navy strategy. Advocates claimed that a nation did not have to command the sea to use it. In fact, modern technology made gaining command of the sea impossible. And one certainly did not have to have a large fleet of capital ships or win a big fleet battle. Rather than capital ships, one could rely on torpedo boats and cruisers (later versions would emphasize submarines). The naval strategist could either use those smaller vessels against the enemy's fleet in specific situations like countering an amphibious invasion or more commonly against his commerce (to deny him the value of commanding the sea). Either use could be decisive without the expense of building and maintaining a large fleet or the dangers inherent in a major naval battle.⁴⁷ The *Jeune Ecolé* was an asymmetric naval strategy. It had a brief spurt of popularity and faded. Its advocates probably chuckled knowingly during World Wars I and II as submarines executed their pet theory without the benefit of a name other than unrestricted submarine warfare.

Airpower

Douhet

The basis of classic airpower theory—although paternity is debatable—is *The Command of the Air* published first in 1921 by Italian general and author, Giulio Douhet. Reacting to the horrors he saw in the First World War, Douhet became an advocate of airpower. He believed that the airplane could restore decisiveness that ground combat seemed incapable of achieving. It could fly over the ground battlefield to directly attack the enemy's will. Because of technical problems with detection and interception, stopping an air raid would be impossible. Big bombers with a mix of high explosive, incendiary, and poison gas weapons could target enemy cities. Civilian populations, which were the key to modern warfare, would be unable to stand such bombardment and would soon force their governments to surrender. Although civilian casualties might be high, this would be a more humane method of warfare than prolonged ground combat.

There were a few strategic dicta beyond that. First, a prerequisite for success was command of the air—a theory closely related to command of the sea. Command of the air granted one side the ability to fly where and when it desired while the enemy was unable to fly. Next, because the airplane was an offensive weapon, one gained command of the air by strategic bombardment—ideally catching the enemy's air force on the ground. There was no need for anti-aircraft artillery or interceptors. In fact, resources devoted to air defense or any type of auxiliary aircraft (anything that was not a large bomber) were wasted.⁴⁸ Douhet captured the imagination of early airmen with his vision of decisiveness through command of the air. Generations of later airpower enthusiasts continue to seek to fulfill his prophecy. Nuclear weapons were supposed to have fixed the technological shortfalls that prevented airpower alone from winning World War II. That they were unusable made little difference. Precision guided munitions are the current mantra of the airpower enthusiast—they have finally made decisive air attack possible. There may actually be something to the

precision guided munitions claim; only time will tell. Douhet's assertion of the futility of air defense proved wrong when radar made locating aircraft possible and fighters became capable of catching and shooting down big bombers. Douhet still has a major influence on airpower doctrine and is the father of all modern airpower theory.

Other Airpower Theories

Douhet may have been the father of airpower theory, but others followed him quickly. Most of the later airpower theorists worked on one or both of two primary issues that Douhet had first surfaced: the most efficient way to organize airpower, a debate generally about an independent air force, or the proper mix of fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft. The debate about separate air forces was important but not a true strategic issue. Conversely, the issue of proper mix of aircraft got directly to the issue of the proper role of airpower. The early theorists presented a variety of views on the issue. William "Billy" Mitchell saw America's strategic problem as one of defense against sea-borne attack. A Douhet-like offensive air strategy was inappropriate. He also believed that aerial combat could provide effective defense against air attack. Thus he developed a strategy based on a mix of fighters and bombers. In terms of both the necessity of command of the air and the potential strategic decisiveness of airpower, Mitchell agreed completely with Douhet.⁴⁹

Another early airpower theorist was British Wing Commander John C. "Jack" Slessor. Slessor served a tour as an instructor at the Army Staff College at Camberley. His book, *Air Power and Armies*, is a collection of his lectures at the War College. Slessor was a believer in strategic bombing, but perhaps because of his audience, he also emphasized the relationship between airpower and ground operations. The first requirement was gaining command of the air. Next, airpower could interdict the enemy's lines of communication. Using airpower in direct support of committed troops (the flying artillery/close air support concept) was ineffective. Slessor did believe that both aspects of the air campaign could occur simultaneously—one did not need complete air superiority to begin interdiction. From the standpoint of the ground commander, supporting airpower was most effective in facilitating a breakthrough, in the pursuit, and in the defense.⁵⁰

Slessor's advocacy of interdiction was not, however, the only way one might approach the air-ground support issue. German Chief of Air Staff during the interwar years Helmut Wilberg was a pioneer in direct air-ground support. He wrote some of and edited and approved all of Germany's immediate post-war studies on air force operations. Those studies concluded that strategic bombardment did not work, but that close air support did. Thus, it is not surprising that unlike either the British or the Americans, the Germans developed a tactical air force oriented on close support of ground forces. The opportunity for Germany to develop a strategic air force or doctrine occurred during the tenure of Walter Weaver as Chief of Air Staff between 1934 and 1936. Weaver was a bomber advocate of the Douhetian ilk. However, when he died in an airplane crash in 1936, the Luftwaffe canceled Weaver's pet four-engine bomber development program and slipped comfortably back into its ground support doctrine.

Conclusion

Which of these approaches to strategy is the best? What is the approved solution? The answer is simple—there is no best solution. All the above have utility for specific purposes but are lacking as generalizations on strategy. They tend to be: 1) war-oriented rather than general (i.e., military strategy rather

than strategy in general); 2) too narrowly focused even within the wartime realm (that is, they address military-specific strategies rather than more general grand strategies and in some cases represent single service approaches); and 3) even in the military arena, are too focused on one aspect of a multidimensional problem (i.e., they attempt to skip the basic ends-ways-means relationship and go straight to the solution). They are generally concerned with the how while ignoring the what or why. The exception is nuclear strategy that always aimed at deterrence and clearly linked ways with means to achieve that end and the broad concepts like attrition, exhaustion, and annihilation. So, why present all these strategic concepts if they do not work? Remember that although none of the paradigms works as a generalization, each has merit in specific circumstances. The strategist needs to be familiar with each so he can select the best approach or combination of approaches for the situation he faces. In that respect, strategy is much like carpentry. Both are skills intended for solving problems. The carpenter uses a saw to cut, a hammer to drive, sandpaper to smooth, and myriad other tools depending on the need—there is a tool for every job. Similarly, the strategist needs to have a wide assortment of tools in his kitbag and be able to select the proper one for the task at hand. There is an old saying that if the only tool one has is a hammer, all problems look like a nail. That is as bad a solution in strategy as it is in carpentry.

Notes - Chapter 7

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CHAPTER 8

NATIONAL POWER

David Jablonsky

*I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.*¹

Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes personifies the realist approach to international relations in a world of anarchy and self-help, in which individual man and men aggregated into states seek to maintain or to increase power. In the modern era, this approach is reflected quintessentially by Hans Morgenthau, who presents national power not only as an end in the Hobbesian sense that “power is always the immediate aim,” but as a means to that end.² The study of strategy also deals with power primarily from the national security perspective, an acknowledgment that the nation-state is still the most important actor in the international arena.

Most scholars focus on power as a means, the strength or capacity that provides the “ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one’s own objectives.”³ At the national level, this influence is based on relations between nation-state A and another actor (B), with A seeking to influence B to act in A’s interest by doing x, by continuing to do x, or by not doing x. Some governments or statesmen may seek influence for its own sake. But for most, influence, like money, is instrumental, to be used primarily for achieving or defending other goals, which could include prestige, territory, raw material, or alliances. To achieve these ends, state A can use various techniques of influencing, ranging from persuasion or the offering of rewards to threats or the actual use of force.⁴

From this standpoint, the use of a nation’s power in national security strategy is a simple relational exercise. But in dealing with the concept of national power, as Clausewitz remarked of war, “everything . . . is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”⁵ To begin with, there are subtle characteristics of power that render its use in the national strategic formulation process more art than science. Moreover, relationships among the elements of national power as well as the context in which they are to be used to further a nation’s interests are seldom clear-cut propositions. All this means that in the end, national power defies any attempts at rigorous, scientific assessment. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why this is so and, more important, why, all the complexity notwithstanding, the concept of national power remains a key building block for understanding and developing national security strategy.

The Context of National Power

National power is contextual in that it can be evaluated only in terms of all the power elements and only in relation to another player or players and the situation in which power is being exercised. A nation may

appear powerful because it possesses many military assets, but the assets may be inadequate against those of a potential enemy or inappropriate to the nature of the conflict. The question should always be: power over whom, and with respect to what?⁶

Multidimensional Interrelationship

National power is historically linked with military capacity, a natural relationship since war in the international arena is the *ultima ratio* of power. Nevertheless, one element of power alone cannot determine national power. For instance, there is the huge size of Brazil, the large population of Pakistan, the industrial makeup of Belgium, and the first-class army of Switzerland. Yet none of these states is a first-rank power. Morgenthau calls the mistaken attempt to define national power in terms of one element of that power the “Fallacy of the Single Factor.” Another aspect of this fallacy is the failure to distinguish between potential and actual power. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the term “power” has taken on the meaning of both the capacity to do something and the actual exercise of the capacity. And yet a nation’s ability to convert potential power into operational power is based on many considerations, not the least of which is the political and psychological interrelationship of such factors as government effectiveness and national unity.⁷

In this context, the elements of national power, no matter how defined, can be separated only artificially. Together, they constitute the resources for the attainment of national objectives and goals. And while those goals may be judged as moral, immoral, or amoral, the elements of power are simply means to national strategic ends and, as such, are morally neutral. It is possible, in other words, to reject the cynic’s belief that God is on the side of the largest number of battalions, as well as the assumption that the side with the smallest number always fights for the right.⁸

Relations and Dynamics

National power is relative, not absolute. Simply put, a nation does not have abstract power in and of itself, but only power in relation to another actor or actors in the international arena. To say that the United States is the most powerful nation on earth is to compare American power with that of all nations as they currently exist. Nevertheless, leaders of a nation at the peak of its power can come to believe that such power has an absolute quality that can be lost only through stupidity or neglect. In reality the superior power of a nation is derived not only from its own qualities, but from that of other actors compared with its own. Many observers in the late 1930s, for example, perceived France as more than a match for Nazi Germany, since the French military of that era was superior in quality and quantity of troops and weaponry to the victorious French forces of 1919. But the French military power of 1919 was supreme only in the context of a defeated and disarmed Germany; that supremacy was not intrinsic to the French nation in the manner of its geographic location and natural resources. Thus, while the French military of 1939 was superior to that of 1919, a comparison of 1939 French military power to that of Germany in the same year would have shown a vastly different picture for many reasons, not the least of which was the German adoption of the military doctrine of blitzkrieg.⁹

Closely allied to all this is the fact that national power is dynamic, not permanent. No particular power factor or relationship is immune to change. In this century, in particular, rapid changes in military technologies have accelerated this dynamism. America’s explosion of a nuclear device instantly transformed its power position, the nature of warfare, and the very conduct of international relations. A war or revolution can have an equally sudden effect on power. The two world wars devastated Europe, caused the rise of the flank powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and set the developing world on a road to decolonization that in less than 50 years dismantled a system that had been in existence for over three

centuries. Economic growth can also quickly change a nation's power position, as was the case with Japan and Germany after World War II. In addition, the discovery of new resources, or their depletion, can alter the balance of power. Certainly the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) control over a diminishing supply of oil, coupled with its effectiveness as a cartel, caused a dramatic shift in power relations after 1973.¹⁰

Such shifts are not always so immediately discernible. Power, as Hobbes long ago pointed out, is what people believe it is until it is exercised. Reputation for power, in other words, confers power on a nation-state regardless of whether that power is real or not. At the same time, there are examples throughout history of nations that continued to trade on past reputations, only to see them shattered by a single event. For France, the battles of Sedan produced just such effects in 1870 and again in 1940.¹¹

This subjective characteristic of power also plays a key role in deterrence, the exercise of negative power as state A influences actor B *not* to do x. The influence is effectively exercised because B perceives that A not only has the capability to prevent B from doing x, but the willingness to use that capability as well. In other words, national credibility must be a concomitant of national capability for deterrence to work. When the combination doesn't occur, as Britain and France discovered when Hitler discounted their guarantee of Poland in the summer of 1939, the result can be war. "*The men of Munich will not take the risk*," the Nazi leader explained to his commanders on 14 August 1939.¹²

Situational

Some elements of national power or combinations of power cannot be applied to certain situations involving certain actors. The United States in 1979-80, for instance, was powerless to rescue American citizens held hostage in Teheran, and American nuclear power during the Cold War had little value in causing nonaligned countries to modify their policies; nor did it deter North Korea or North Vietnam in their attempts to unify their countries.

The Vietnam War also illustrates another contextual aspect of national power, that of cost-risk-benefit analysis, in which power can be exercised but the costs and risks are perceived to be disproportionate to the benefit achieved. Power, in other words, must be relevant in the existing circumstances for the particular situation. This explains why, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States was not able to persuade its European allies to allow American planes to use NATO bases for refueling and maintenance. The overall economic and military strength of the United States as well as the political bonds of alliance solidarity proved less influential on European decisionmakers than the possible economic loss of their access to oil. This type of American power was equally irrelevant in late 1994 when Britain and France, with troops involved in peace operations on the ground in Bosnia, turned down a U.S. plan for NATO air strikes to support Muslims in the besieged town of Bihac.¹³

This aspect of the contextual nature of national power introduces even more complications when the diversity of actors in the international arena is taken into account. In an increasingly multicentric world, nation-states will increasingly deal with transnational actors in the exercise of national power. The European Union is just one example of international government organizations in which the confluence of political and economic trends has created a supra-national regional unit that transcends in many ways both the legal-territorial aspects of the state and the psychological unity of the nation. This type of challenge is abetted by international nongovernmental actors ranging from multinational corporations focused on self-interested profit and national liberation movements seeking to establish new governments within existing states, to organizations such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace, seeking to mobilize international public

opinion in order to bring pressure on national governments to alter particular policies.¹⁴

Some of these actors respond more willingly to one aspect of national power than to another. Multinational corporations, for example, will generally react to economic factors more rapidly than the United Nations or a national liberation movement. Conversely, negotiations and appeals to human morality may prove to be more powerful at the United Nations than in the corporate boardroom or in the field. And the allegiance of an uneducated people in a newly independent country may help create a powerful national liberation movement, yet be meaningless for a multinational corporation or the United Nations. National power, then, is contextual not only in its application to other states, but to other global actors as well.¹⁵

The Elements of National Power

It is convenient to organize the study of national power by distinguishing between natural and social determinants of power. The natural determinants (geography, resources, and population) are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical environment. Social determinants (economic, political, military, psychological, and, more recently, informational) concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their environment. In practice, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between natural and social elements. For instance, resources are a natural factor, but the degree to which they are used is socially determined. Population factors, in particular, cut across the dividing line between both categories. The number of people of working age in the population affects the degree of industrialization of a nation, but the process of industrialization, in turn, can greatly alter the composition of the population.¹⁶

Natural Determinants of Power

Geography

Geographical factors, whether they are location and climate or size and topography, influence a nation's outlook and capacity. Location, in particular, is closely tied to the foreign policy of a state. Vulnerable nations, like Poland caught geographically between Russia and Germany, have even had to deal with the loss of national existence. Conversely, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan have been protected by large bodies of water throughout their histories. Each, in turn, used the combination of a large navy and overseas trade to become a great power. With its oceanic moats, the United States was able to follow George Washington's advice to avoid entangling alliances and expand peacefully for almost a century, free of external interference. In addition, that expansion came about primarily without conquest, through the purchase of huge land tracts from European powers that found the location of the territories too remote to defend easily.

The connection between foreign policy and location is, in fact, so fundamental that it gave rise in this century to geopolitics as a field of study. At its most extreme, geopolitics can succumb to Morgenthau's "Fallacy of the Single Factor" or be distorted as it was at the hands of Karl Haushofer and his disciples into a kind of political metaphysics with a call for adequate national living space (*Lebensraum*) that was put into ideological service for Nazi Germany. At its best, geopolitics has many insights to offer. Consider, for instance, the connection between the British and American development of democracy and civil rights and the relatively secure strategic locations of both countries, as opposed to the authoritarian regimes of Germany and Russia, direct neighbors for much of history, lying exposed on the North European plain. Or

consider the continuing Russian drive for warm-water ports and the continuing value of choke points, as was demonstrated when Egypt's closure of the Straits of Tiran in May 1967 led to war. The persistence of this field of study was reflected in the Cold War by Raymond Aaron, who described the forward deployment of U.S. troops as analogous in geographical terms to earlier British policy:

In relation to the Eurasian land mass, the American continent occupied a position comparable to that of the British Isles in relation to Europe: the United States was continuing the tradition of the insular state by attempting to bar the dominant continental state's expansion in central Germany and in Korea.¹⁷

Location is also closely tied to climate, which in turn has a significant effect on national power. The poorest and weakest states in modern times have all been located outside the temperate climate zones in either the tropics or in the frigid zone. Even Russia has chronic agricultural problems because all but a small part of that country lies north of the latitude of the U.S.-Canadian border. Russia is also a good example of how geographical factors such as size and topography can have advantages and disadvantages for a nation. The Soviet Union, with its 11 time zones, was able to use its vast size during World War II to repeat the historical Russian military method of trading space for time when invaded. At the same time, that immense size certainly played a role in the complex ethnic and political centrifugal forces that eventually pulled apart the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In a similar manner, the predominantly north-south Russian rivers are great natural resources that would have been economically and politically more valuable had they run in an east-west direction. In the future, technology may mitigate some of these factors in the same way that intercontinental missiles affected the importance of insular locations. But here, as in other areas, there are many geographical obstacles to the acquisition of power that are costly or impossible to overcome.¹⁸

Population

Demographics in the form of size, trends, and structure are an important aspect of national power. A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an automatic guarantee of strength. Thus, there is Canada, more powerful than the more populous but less industrialized Mexico. And Japan, with a small population marked by widespread technical skills, has been able to exercise national power far in excess of China, for all its masses. At the same time, trends in population growth and decline can have significant effects on national power. The Prussian unification of the German-speaking peoples in 1870, for example, instantly created a great power with a population that grew by 27 million between then and 1940, even as that of France reflected the shift in European power, increasing by only four million in the same period. In another example, the historical increase in American power was partly due to the arrival of more than 100 million immigrants between 1824 and 1924. During the same century, Canada and Australia, comparable in territory and developmental level but with populations less than a tenth of America's, remained secondary powers. That such trends could have more complex causes dealing with other elements of power was illustrated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had a large and growing population during most of that period, but also remained a secondary power because it was divided ethnically, weak politically, and at an extremely low level in terms of industrial development.¹⁹

In the future, global trends also will affect the structure and balance of national populations, particularly those of the poorest countries. In 1830, the global population reached one billion for the first time; it required 100 years to double. It took only 45 more years (1975) for the population to double again to four billion. In the next 21 years the population increased almost two billion, reflecting a growth rate of about 90 million a year. For the next several decades, 90 percent of this growth will occur in the lesser-developed

countries, many already burdened by extreme overpopulation for which there is no remedy in the form of economic infrastructure, skills, and capital.²⁰

Population structure and balance are also significant for developed nations. Important here is the percentage of the population in the most productive cohort, generally considered to be somewhere between the ages of 18 and 45, that can best meet the needs of the nation's military and industry as well as create the following generation. Comparing the numbers in this group to those in the younger cohort also provides a more accurate picture of population trends and the interaction of demographics with all power elements. Israel, for example, has to deal with its relatively small population and that its military siphons off a significant segment of the civilian workforce in the middle cohort. One consequence is government emphasis on education across all age groups. Another is the government's military focus on sophisticated weaponry, mobility, air power, and the preemptive strike in order to avoid drawn-out land warfare that could be costly in manpower. Finally, a comparison of the middle population group to the older will provide a picture of trends that can have significant consequences for a nation's power. For example, any nation with an increasing cohort of retired people coupled with generous social welfare benefits will eventually have to face hard choices between guns and butter on the one hand, and possible limits to its national power as well as to its investment and economic growth potential on the other. These choices already face the United States as the "baby boomer" generation approaches retirement age against the backdrop of a staggering explosion in social entitlements.²¹

Natural Resources

Large amounts of natural resources are essential for a modern nation to wage war, to operate an industrial base, and to reward other international actors through trade and aid, either in modern industrial products or in the raw materials themselves. But these resources, whether they be arable land and water or coal and oil, are unevenly distributed around the world and are becoming increasingly scarce. Moreover, as in the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the physical possession of natural resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a nation can also develop those resources and maintain political control over their disposition. In their raw state, for example, minerals and energy sources are generally useless. Thus, the Mesabi iron deposits had no value to the Indian tribes near Lake Superior, and Arabian oil a century ago was a matter of indifference to the nomads who roamed above it. Conversely, those nations with great industrial organizations and manufacturing infrastructures have traditionally been able to convert the potential power of natural resources into actual national power.

Very few nations, however, are self-sufficient. A country like the United States has a rich store of natural resources, and yet may be dependent on imports because of its voracious consumption. Japan, on the other hand, has few natural resources; it is dependent on imports for 100 percent of its petroleum, bauxite, wool, and cotton; 95 percent of its wheat; 90 percent of its copper; and 70 percent of its timber and grain.²² Nations have traditionally made up for such difficulties in several ways. One time-honored method is to conquer the resources, a principal motivation for the Japanese expansion that led to World War II and the Iraqi invasion that led to the Gulf War. A second method is to develop resources in another country by means of concessions, political manipulation, and even a judicious use of force—all used earlier to considerable effect by the United States in Latin America. In an age of increasing interdependence, this type of economic penetration has long since lost its neocolonial identity, particularly since both of America's principal World War II adversaries now regularly exercise such penetration in the United States.

The third and most common method for obtaining natural resources is to buy them. In recent years, however, the combination of rapid industrial growth and decline of resources has changed the global

economy into a seller's market, while providing considerable economic leverage to nations in control of vital commodities. OPEC's control of oil, for example, provided its members influence all out of proportion to their economic and military power. A similar transformation may occur in the future with those nations that are major food producers as the so-called "Green Revolution" faces the prospect of more depleted lands and encroaching deserts. Finally, there is the short supply of strategic and often esoteric minerals so necessary for high technology and modern weapons. One consequence of this diminishment of raw materials has been the emergence of the sea bed, with its oil and manganese reserves, as a new venue of international competition, in which those nations with long coastlines and extensive territorial waters have the advantage. Such shortages are a reminder of how closely connected is the acquisition of natural resources to all the elements of power, particularly for a truly dependent nation like Japan, which can neither feed its people nor fuel its high-technology economy without access to overseas markets. Absent its alliance with the United States as a means to ensure its access to such resources as Persian Gulf oil, Japan would be forced to expand its "self-defense" military force, perhaps even becoming a declared nuclear power.²³

Social Determinants of Power

Economic

Economic capacity and development are key links to both natural and social determinants of power. In terms of natural resources, as we have seen, a nation may be well-endowed but lack the ability to convert those resources into military hardware, high-technology exports, and other manifestations of power. Ultimately, however, economic development in a nation flows from the social determinants of power, whether they be political modernization and widespread formal education, or geographic and social mobility and the ready acceptance of innovation. All this, of course, is worked out against the backdrop of balanced military investment. An excess of military spending can erode the underlying basis for a nation's power if it occurs at the expense of a larger economy and reduces the national ability to invest in future economic growth. For developing countries already short of economic investment capital, military spending represents a serious allocation of resources. But even advanced countries, especially since the end of the Cold War, have to make some choices between guns and butter. Because a nation's political stability as well as the legitimacy of its government are increasingly linked to domestic economic performance, excessive military spending, as the former Soviet Union discovered, can be dangerous for large and small countries alike.

Strong domestic economies also produce non-military national power in the international arena. Leading industrial nations have available all the techniques for exercising power, including rewards or punishment by means of foreign trade, foreign aid, and investment and loans, as well as the mere consequences their domestic policies can have on the global economy. This type of power can be weakened, however, if a nation suffers from high inflation, a large foreign debt, or chronic balance-of-payment deficits. In short, the strength of a nation's economy has a direct effect on the variety, resiliency, and credibility of its international economic options. The size of the U.S. budget and trade deficits, for example, means that the Federal Reserve must maintain interest rates high enough for deficit financing, which limits its ability to stimulate the economy with lower rates. And American foreign aid is becoming less influential as an economic instrument of power as budgets decline. On the other hand, U.S. trade policy has become increasingly important to the U.S. economy, with American exports, as an example, expected to create 16 million jobs by the year 2000.²⁴ That such economic considerations are closely interrelated to other elements of power is demonstrated by the perennial question of whether most-favored-nation status, which is nothing more than normal access to U.S. markets, should be made conditional on progress in human rights by

countries such as China.

Finally, increasing interdependence has caused major changes in the economic element of national power. National economies have become more dependent on international trade and on financial markets that have become truly global in scope. This in turn makes it more difficult for a nation to raise short-term interest rates or to coordinate monetary policy with other international actors. In a similar manner, the ability of nations to use exchange rates to further their national interests has declined as governments deal more and more with international capital flows that dwarf the resources available to any nation to defend its currency. From a security perspective, this type of economic interpenetration is reflected in the mutual vulnerability of national economies. Moreover, a nation's economic policy is now influenced by myriad international governmental organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), while multinational corporations stand ready to manipulate the domestic politics of nation-states to further their transnational interests.²⁵

Military

Military strength is historically the gauge for national power. Defeat in war has normally signaled the decline, if not the end, of a nation's power, while military victory has usually heralded the ascent of a new power. But military power is more than just the aggregation of personnel, equipment, and weaponry. Leadership, morale, and discipline also remain vital factors of military power. Despite rough quantitative parity between the Iraqi military and the allied coalition, the dismal Iraqi performance in the Gulf War demonstrated the enduring relevance of those intangibles. That performance also showed how political interference or the gradual infection of a nation or its military by incompetence, waste, and corruption can weaken a nation's armed forces. By contrast, there is the example of the U.S. military working over the years in tandem with political authorities to move from the hollow force of the immediate post-Vietnam period to the joint military machine of Operation DESERT STORM.²⁶

The Gulf War also highlights how important power projection and sustainability are in the modern era for military effectiveness. For a global power like the United States, the focus on these factors produced not only the unique air and sea lift capability that provided transportation for a half-million troops to the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, but incredible resupply feats in an environment in which a single division during the 100-hour ground offensive consumed 2.4 million gallons of fuel, brought forward in 475 5,000-gallon tankers.²⁷ Allied to these factors, of course, are readiness considerations ranging from training and maneuver opportunities to the availability of fuel and repair parts. In a similar manner, a nation's potential for rapid mobilization may also play a key role. Israel, for example, has a permanent force of only 164,000 highly trained and ready soldiers. But that force can be augmented within 24 hours by almost three times that many combat-ready troops. And Sweden has the capability to mobilize a force almost overnight that can equal many European standing armies.²⁸

The quality of arms technology also has become a vital military factor for all nations in a period marked by rapid and important scientific breakthroughs. Timely inventions ranging from the crossbow to the airplane have often been decisive when accompanied by appropriate changes in military organization and doctrine. When these two components lag technological change, however, as they did in the American Civil War and World War I, the results can be horrific diminishment and waste of military power. In addition, new technologies in the hands of rogue states or non-state actors such as terrorist groups will continue to be an important consideration for nations in the exercise of military power. Weapons of mass destruction are

and will probably continue to be of primary concern in this regard. But even relatively cheap, recently developed conventional weapons in the appropriate situation can be decisive, as was illustrated by the American-built, shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that enabled the Afghan *mujahedeen* guerrillas to neutralize Soviet air power. Finally, technological advances are a useful reminder once again that military power, like all elements of national power, is contextual. Technology is not an automatic panacea for producing quick victories and low casualties, particularly absent clear political direction and coherent strategy. There comes a time, as Britain's thin red line discovered under the weight of the Zulu offensive at Isandhewana, when quantity has a quality all its own.²⁹

Political

This element of power addresses key questions, many of which are related to the psychological element: What is the form of government, what is the attitude of the population toward it, how strong do the people want it to be, and how strong and efficient is it? These questions cannot be answered with simple statistics, yet they may be paramount in any assessment of national power. If a government is inadequate and cannot bring the nation's potential power to bear on an issue, that power might as well not exist. Nor can an analysis turn on the type of government a state claims to have, for even the constitution of a state may be misleading. The 1936 Soviet Constitution, for example, was a democratic-sounding organic law that had little in common with the actual operation of the Soviet regime. And the German Weimar Constitution, a model of democratic devices, did not prevent Hitler from reaching power and from creating his own "constitutional law" as he proceeded.

What is clear is that the actual forms of government, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, play a role in the application of national power. An authoritarian system, for instance, restricts in varying degrees individual freedom and initiative, but permits formulation of a highly organized state strategy. Democratic systems, by comparison, require policy formation by consensus-building and persuasion in an open, pluralistic society. Consequently, it is extremely difficult for democracies to develop and implement a long-range state strategy or to change policy direction as abruptly as, for example, Nazi Germany and the USSR did in the ideological volte-face marked by the August 1939 non-aggression treaty. In addition, the level of political development within a state is also important. This development involves both the capability, and more particularly the efficiency and effectiveness, of a national government in using its human and material resources in pursuit of national interests. Thus, administrative and management skills are crucial if a nation is to realize its full power potential.

A government also takes the shape and operates the way it does for very complex reasons, many of which reflect the experience of a people and their attitude toward, and expectations of, what the government is to do and how strong, as a consequence, it should be. For example, a fear of too much state power caused the Founding Fathers deliberately to make the U.S. Government inefficient (in the sense of a quick, smooth operation) by means of "checks and balances." In a similar manner, the French fear of a "man on horseback" in the wake of their second experience with Bonapartism caused a curtailment of executive powers that resulted in the weakness of the French governments after the Franco-Prussian War. Under both the Third and Fourth French Republics, as a result, the French strengthened the legislative branch to a degree that made strong executive leadership almost impossible. The French preferred to suffer the executive weakness rather than run the risks entailed in a strong government. Consequently, while the United States had 14 administrations between 1875 and 1940, and the British 20, France had 102. After World War II, the Fourth French Republic averaged two regimes a year.³⁰

Psychological

The psychological element of power consists of national will and morale, national character, and degree of national integration. It is this most ephemeral of the social power determinants that has repeatedly caused nations with superior economic and military power to be defeated or have their policies frustrated by less capable actors. Thus there was Mao's defeat of Chiang Kai-shek when Chiang at least initially possessed most of China's wealth and military capability, the ability of Gandhi to drive the British from India, and that of Khomeini to undermine the Shah. And it is almost a cliché that any measurement of U.S. economic and military power vis-à-vis that of the North Vietnam-Vietcong combination during the late 1960s would have led to the conclusion that U.S. superiority in these two categories would result in an American victory. Harry Summers recounts a story, in this regard, that was circulating during the final days of the U.S. retreat from Vietnam:

When the Nixon Administration took over in 1969 all the data on North Vietnam and on the United States was fed into a Pentagon computer—population, gross national product, manufacturing capability, number of tanks, ships, and aircraft, size of the armed forces, and the like.

The computer was then asked, "*When will we win?*"

It took only a moment to give the answer: "*You won in 1964!*"³¹

National will and morale are defined as the degree of determination that any actor manifests in the pursuit of its internal or external objectives. For a given international actor, however, will and morale need not be identical at all levels of society. During 1916 and early 1917, the Russian nobility continued to plan for new offensive action even as Russian troops were abandoning their weapons and their battlefield positions. National character has an equally complex relation to national power inasmuch as that character favors or proscribes certain policies and strategies. Americans, for example, like to justify their actions. Thus, the United States did not enter World War I until Wilsonian idealism had to confront the loss of American ships and American lives. The elevation of "moralism" in the conduct of foreign policy, in turn, diminishes the ability of the United States to initiate a truly preemptive action. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the choice of a blockade over an air strike was based in part on the argument that from the standpoint of both morality and tradition, the United States could not perpetrate a "Pearl Harbor in reverse."³² In all such cases, as with will and morale, it is extremely difficult to identify the constituent parts of and sources behind national character. Historical experiences and traditional values undoubtedly are important, as are such factors as geographic location and environment. Russian mistrust of the external world, for instance, is historically verifiable as part of the national character, whether it is because of the centuries of Tartar rule, three invasions from Western Europe in little more than a century, or something else. And Russian stoicism is a character trait, whether the cause is Russian Orthodox Christianity, communism, or the long Russian winters.³³

Finally, there is the degree of integration, which refers simply to the sense of belonging and identification of a nation's people. In many ways, this contributes to both national will and morale as well as character. In most cases there is a direct correlation between the degree of perceived integration and the extent of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity, all of which contribute to a sense of belonging, manifested in a sense of citizenship. On the other hand, despite examples to the contrary (Belgium, Canada, and the states of the former Yugoslavia), a lack of integration need not necessarily cause a lack of identity. Swiss unity has continued across the centuries despite low degrees of integration in ethnicity, language, and religion.³⁴

Informational.

The communications revolution, which began over a century ago with the advent of global transmission of information, has taken on new momentum in recent decades with the development of fax machines, television satellites, and computer linkages. As the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated in the fall of 1989, a new fact of life in the international arena is that it is no longer possible for any nation-state to deny its citizens knowledge of what is taking place elsewhere. Ideas, in other words, move more freely around the world than at any other time in the past. This has had particularly fortunate results for the United States. Even as some other aspects of power have gone into relative decline, America's influence as a source of ideas and as a shaper of culture has increased. This "soft power," in Joseph Nye's words, has been a major factor in formulating the U.S. national security strategic objective of "enlargement."³⁵ So in one sense, information has contributed to the concept of the world as a global village.

This combination of enhanced communication and dissemination of information, however, is a two-edged sword that cuts across all the social determinants of power in national strategy. In the economic realm, for instance, global interdependence has been enhanced by information-communication improvements. On the other hand, near instantaneous downturns of major economies are always a possibility with the immediate transmission of adverse economic news concerning any nation-state or transnational economic actor. Politically, instantaneous and pervasive communication can enhance the ability of governmental elites to lead the people in a democracy or to act as a national consoler in times of tragedy, such as the *Challenger* explosion or the Oklahoma City bombing. At the same time, these developments can also aid the demagogues, the great simplifiers always waiting in the wings to stir fundamental discontents and the dark side of nationalism. In terms of psychological power, Winston Churchill demonstrated repeatedly that the pervasive distribution of targeted information can have momentous effects on intangibles such as national will. Conversely, however, this type of ubiquity has the pernicious potential of altering in a matter of years basic values and cultural beliefs that take generations to create.

Nowhere is the effect of developments in communications and access to information more far-reaching than on warfare. In the purely military realm, information dominance can create operational synergies by allowing those systems that provide battlespace awareness, enhance command and control, and create precision force to be integrated into the so-called "system of systems." One result of all this is to compress the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, previously considered as separate and distinct loci of command and functional responsibilities. The commander will be faced in the future with the much more complex job of recognizing those events occurring simultaneously at all three levels and integrating them into the calculation that results from the traditional consideration at the operational level of which tactical battles and engagements to join and which to avoid. Equally important, shorter time for decisions—occasioned by both the compressed continuum of war and electronically gathered information—means less time to discover ambiguities or to analyze those ambiguities that are already apparent.

At the higher level of cyberwar, the two-edged potential of communications and information is even more evident. In the future, nations will wage offensive information warfare on another state's computer systems, targeting assets ranging from telecommunications and power to safety and banking. Such an onslaught could undermine the more advanced aspects of an adversary's economy, interrupt its mobilization of military power, and by affecting the integrity of highly visible services to the population, create almost immediate pressure on government at all levels. As activities rely increasingly on information systems rather than manual processes and procedures, information infrastructures of the most developed nations, such as the United States, become progressively more vulnerable to state and non-state actors. Even as there

are advances in information security technologies, hacker tools are becoming more sophisticated and easier to obtain and use. One analyst concludes in this regard that, for the United States, “the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor cannot be dismissed out of hand.”³⁶

Evaluation

Evaluation of national power is difficult. The basic problem, as we have seen, is that all elements of power are interrelated. Where people live will influence what they possess; how many they are will influence how much they possess; what their historical experience has been will affect how they look at life; how they look at life will influence how they organize and govern themselves; and all these elements weighed in relation to the problem of national security will influence the nature, size, and effectiveness of the armed forces. As a consequence, not only must each separate element be analyzed, but the effects of those elements on one another must be considered. These complexities are compounded because national power is both dynamic and relative. Nation-states and other international actors change each day in potential and realized power, although the rate of change may vary from one actor to another. And because these changes go on continually, an estimate of a state’s national power vis-à-vis the power of another actor is obsolescent even as the estimate is made. The greater the rate of change in the actors being compared, the greater the obsolescence of the estimate.

In other words, like all strategic endeavors, more art than science is involved in the evaluation of where one nation-state stands in relation to the power of other regional and global actors. This has not deterred one former government official from creating a formula to develop a rough estimate of “perceived” national power—focused primarily on a state’s capacity to wage war.³⁷

$P_p = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$ in which:

P_p = Perceived power

C = Critical mass: population and territory

E = Economic capability

M = Military capability

S = Strategic purpose

W = Will to pursue national strategy

Regardless of its prospective contribution in calculating a P_p value, this formula has some important lessons. The more tangible elements (C , E , M) that can be objectively quantified also involve varying degrees of subjective qualifications: territory that is vast but covered with mountain ranges and has few navigable rivers; a population that is large but unskilled and uneducated; or cases in which, despite qualitative military superiority in technology and weapons on one side, the opponent is able to prevail through superior intangibles ranging from leadership to morale. Most important, by demonstrating that national power is a product—not a sum—of its components, the formula is a reminder of how important the relational and contextual aspects are. The United States discovered in Vietnam that no matter how large the sum of the more tangible economic and military capabilities in relation to an adversary, their utility is

determined by the intangibles of strategic purpose (S) and national will (W). Zero times any number, no matter how large, is still zero.

These considerations are particularly important in evaluating what some might consider to be irrational acts by states that use force to alter the status quo. In fact, these states may simply differ from others in the perception of low risks where others perceive high ones, rather than in the willingness to take risks. There is growing evidence that the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait falls into this category. In another era, many of Hitler's "Saturday surprises" in the 1930s were considered reckless by those who would eventually have to redress their consequences. These incidents came about, however, not because the Nazi leader willingly tolerated a high probability of conflict, but because he was certain that the other side would back down. When the German military opposed such policies as the Rhineland coup and the *Anschluss* with Austria on the basis that they were too dangerous, Hitler did not argue that the risks were worth the prizes, but that instead, taking the social determinants of power in Germany and the other countries into consideration, the risks were negligible. In terms of the concept of gain and risk assessment displayed in Figure 1, Hitler's analysis of potential opposition came to rest at the MAXIMIN approach of Quadrant 2, not that of MAXIMAX in Quadrant 1.³⁸

		Risk	
		High (MAX)	Low (MIN)
Gain	High (MAX)	1 (MAXIMAX)	2 (MAXIMIN)
	Low (MIN)	3 (MINIMAX)	4 (MINIMIN)

Figure 1. Gain and Risk Assessment.

In the Rhineland episode of 7 March 1936, for example, the military correlation of forces was quantifiably against Germany, as Hitler was well aware. "We had no army worth mentioning," he reflected later; "at that time it would not even have had the fighting strength to maintain itself against the Poles."³⁹ But unlike his military advisors, who were focused firmly on French military capabilities, the Nazi leader considered other elements of power, particularly the lack of political integration and coherency in the French Popular Front government and the connection to the psychological component of French national will. As a result, he concluded that France had no intention of responding militarily to the German military incursion. On 9 March, the Wehrmacht commander received warning of impending French military countermoves and asked to withdraw troops from major cities in the Rhineland. Hitler, however, was still taking an essentially MAXIMIN (Quadrant 2) approach and correctly discounted the possibility of intervention by a French government vacillating between two incorrect positions: MAXIMAX (Quadrant 1) and MINIMAX (Quadrant 3).⁴⁰

Thinking In the Box

A great deal of lip service has been paid of late to the need for students of strategy to "think outside the box." The "box" in this case presumably contains the traditional approaches to those issues that affect America's national security. It is natural, of course, in a time of great change to search for a "Philosopher's Stone," or to look for the sword that can, in one clean stroke, preclude the tedious unraveling of the Gordian

knot of post-Cold War strategy. And perhaps this will all be possible in an extra-box environment of the future. But such explorations cannot and should not be made until the student of national security has learned to think inside the box, and that begins with an understanding of concepts like national power.

The concept of national power helps to provide an initial organizational focus as students deal with the deceptively simple thought process that links strategic ends, ways, and means. National elements of power, however they are described, provide the conceptual foundation for this process at the national strategic level. An understanding of the characteristics and the interrelationships of these elements allows the student to expand the process to comprehend how derivative instruments of power can be combined most effectively as policy options to achieve national strategic objectives. This is a key step in strategic maturation that will play an increasingly larger role in the future for military and civilian professionals concerned with national security strategy.

Military planners already deal with Flexible Deterrent Options, in which military instruments of power are matched with instruments derived from other elements of power. Military options in response to a challenge could include an increase in specific reconnaissance activities, the exercise of certain prepositioned equipment, or the deployment of small units. Politically, this could mean consultation by executive branch elites with congressional leaders or initiation of a specific diplomatic demarche. At the same time, economic options might include, alone or in combination, the enactment of trade sanctions, the freezing of assets, and the restriction of corporate transactions. In all this, the effectiveness of small discrete response options depends on how well the instruments of power are wielded together. And that will depend to a great deal on how well military strategists and their civilian counterparts understand the elements of national power from which those instruments are derived.⁴¹

The focus on these elements of national power as means to national strategic ends also serves as an organizational link to the overall strategic formulation process. That process begins by demonstrating how national strategic objectives are derived from national interests, which in turn owe their articulation and degree of intensity to national values. This linkage is also a useful reminder that power, the “means” in the strategic equation, ultimately takes its meaning from the values it serves. Absent the legitimation provided by this connection to national values, national power may come to be perceived as a resource or means that invites suspicion and challenge; at worst it could be associated with tyranny and aggrandizement. Without the bond of popular support and the justification that comes from an overarching purpose, national power can be quick to erode and ephemeral as a source of national security.

What takes place within the box in dealing with concepts like national power is an educational process, a not inconsiderable achievement in an era mesmerized by techno-chic innovations which tend to confuse training with that process and data collection with knowledge.

In the final analysis, the study of national power is a valuable educational objective because it is so difficult. Aspiring national security strategists must grapple with concepts that overlap, that are subjective in many cases, that are relative and situational, and that defy scientific measurement. All this teaches flexible thinking—the *sine qua non* for a strategist. In short, it is this very complexity that causes students to mature intellectually, to understand that within the box there is no such thing as a free strategic lunch. Equally important, students learn that they cannot escape these limitations by moving outside the box, a lesson that many futurists need to absorb.

Notes - Chapter 8

1 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 86.

2 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 25. Although Morgenthau sees the concept of national interest defined in terms of power, much of this discussion is under a sub-heading that treats political power “As Means to the Nation’s Ends.” Ibid.

3 John Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 1996), p. 128. See also Theodore A. Coulombis and James H. Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982), p. 64. Many scholars use this broad interpretation of influence in their definition of power: “the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one’s own ends.” A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 104, and “the ability of an actor to influence the outcomes of international events to its own satisfaction.” Walter S. Jones, *The Logic of International Relations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 245. For arguments against mixing power and influence, see Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976), p. 29; Daniel S. Papp, *Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 308; and Michael P. Sullivan, *Power in Contemporary Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 98.

4 K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp. 142, 152-153. On patterns of influence, see *ibid.*, pp. 154-156. On similar methods or techniques of exercising power, see Organski, pp. 112-115. Realists, in general, treat power as the “currency of politics.” Just as economists focus on the definition and variety of currency types, students of international relations define and distinguish the types of power. See, for example, Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

5 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 119.

6 On the context of power, see Spanier and Wendzel, pp. 144-145; Papp, pp. 309-311; and Gordon C. Schloming, *Power and Principle in International Affairs* (New York: Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, 1991), p. 528.

7 Morgenthau, p. 153; Spanier and Wendzel, pp. 128, 131; and Organski, p. 102. In English and German (*Macht*), for example, “power” indicates both capacity and the exercise of that capacity. In French, however, there are two words: *puissance*, indicating potential or capacity; and *pouvoir*, indicating the act or the exercise of power. Dennis H. Wrong, *Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pp. 9-10. Frederick Hartmann deals with the distinction between potential and real in his definition of national power as “the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests.” Emphasis in original. Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1978), p. 43.

8 Organski, pp. 101-102.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 121; Morgenthau, pp. 149-151; Spanier and Wendzel, p. 128; and Eugene J. Kolb, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), pp. 50-52.

10 Organski, p. 110; Kolb, pp. 50-52; Morgenthau, pp. 151-153; and Schloming, p. 527. For the declinist approach to the dynamic nature of national power, see Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); Mancur Olsen, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Great Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

11 Organski, pp. 108-109; Spanier, p. 128; and Hobbes, p. 106.

12 Emphasis in original. Franz Halder, *The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of Colonel General Franz Halder*, Arnold Lissance, ed. (Boulder, CO, and Dunn Loring, VA: Westview Press and T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1976), pp. I, 8. After the Munich Conference, Mussolini appraised the British leaders as “the tired sons of a long line of rich men.” Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. I, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 341. On the concept of negative power

as used in this context, see Holsti, p. 144, and Dahl, p. 43. On a different view of negative as well as positive power, see Organski, pp. 118-119. See also Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

13 Papp, p. 311; Spanier and Wendzel, pp. 144-145; Kolb, pp. 49-50.

14 Sullivan, pp. 21-24; and Papp, p. 12.

15 Barry O'Neill, "Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40 (June 1996), pp. 219-237; and Papp, p. 311.

16 For the distinction between natural and social determinants of power, see Organski, chaps. 7, 8. Morgenthau, p. 106, breaks the elements down into "those which are relatively stable and those which are subject to constant change." See also Couloumbis and Wolfe, pp. 65, 73-78, who break national power into two categories: tangible (population, territory, natural resources, industrial capacity, agricultural capacity, military strength and mobility) and intangible (leadership and personality, bureaucratic-organizational efficiency, type of government, societal cohesiveness, reputation, foreign support and diplomacy, accidents).

17 Raymond Aron, *Peace and War* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 1. See also Derwent Whittlesey, "Haushofer: The Geopoliticians," *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Edward Mead Earle, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 388-414; Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Runlands, and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977); Hartmann, pp. 49-52; Morgenthau, pp. 106-108, 153; Spanier and Wendzel, p. 132; Hughes, p. 91; and Organski, pp. 126-138, who believes that geography's effect on national power has been exaggerated.

18 Schloming, p. 530. Hartmann, p. 49, believes climate is the most important geographical factor. Life magazine listed the air conditioner as one of the most important inventions in world history because it would enable tropical areas to begin industrialization. The shape of a nation is also important, as witness Israel's difficulty in returning to its pre-1967 configuration of long frontiers and very little depth. Spanier and Wendzel, p. 132. See also Isaiah Berlin, *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas* (New York: Viking Press, 1980), p. 258, who attributes the aggressive nationalism of such leaders as Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin to their geographical origins on the borderlands of the empires they will later rule.

19 Schloming, p. 531, and Julian L. Simon, *Population Matters: People, Resources, Environment, and Immigration* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990).

20 Nafis Sadik, "World Population Continues to Rise," *The Brown and Benchmark Reader in International Relations, 1992*, Jeffrey Elliott, ed. (Dubuque, Ia.: Wm. C. Brown, 1992), pp. 291-296. See also Spanier and Wendzel, pp. 135-136; Hartmann, pp. 46-49; Schloming, p. 531; Organski, pp. 153-154, and George D. Moffett, *Global Population Growth: 21st Century Challenges* (Ithaca, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 1994).

21 Hartmann, p. 47; Schloming, p. 532; and Peter G. Peterson, "Will America Grow Up Before It Grows Old?" *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1996, pp. 55-92.

22 Spanier and Wendzel, p. 139. See also Schloming, p. 531; and Organski, pp. 138-141.

23 On problems with the most basic of all resources, see Miriam R. Lowi, *Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Organski, p. 142; Schloming, pp. 533-534; and Morgenthau, pp. 109-112.

24 National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 96* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 49. See also Organski, p. 169. Hartmann, pp. 52-56, includes natural resources in the economic element of power.

25 Strategic Assessment 96, p. 51; and Schloming, p. 158.

26 For questions concerning the jointness of Operation DESERT STORM, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994). Stalin's great purges of the 1930s are an extreme example of political interference. In addition to the roughly 800,000 party members who were killed, about half of the army officer corps, some 35,000 in all, were eliminated despite the weakness it imposed on the USSR in a time of growing foreign danger. Gordon A. Craig, *Europe Since 1815* (New York: Dryden Press, 1974), p. 383.

27 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1993), p. 12-21. See also Spanier and Wendzel, p. 143.

28 Switzerland is another prime example with the capability of mobilizing in excess of a half million troops in less than two days. Schloming, p. 543.

29 In the subsequent battle of Rourke's Drift, of course, technology plus an inspired combination of all the intangibles ranging from leadership to unit cohesion produced a British victory in which 11 Victoria Crosses were earned. On revolutions in military affairs, see the Strategic Studies Institute monographs from the fifth annual U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, April 1994. See also Schloming, p. 540.

30 Papp, p. 316; Hartmann, pp. 59-60; and Morgenthau, pp. 133-135.

31 Emphasis in original. Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1983), p. 11. See also Papp, p. 378.

32 Graham T. Allison, *Essence of a Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missiles Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 123-124. See also Papp, pp. 382-384, and Morgenthau, pp. 122-134.

33 On the Russian national character, see Morgenthau, pp. 125-127, and Papp, p. 383. On the American character, see Spanier and Wendzel, pp. 186-192.

34 Papp, pp. 386-387.

35 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990) and "Understanding U.S. Strength," *Foreign Policy*, No. 72 (Fall 1988), 105-129.

36 Strategic Assessment 96, p. 197. See also *ibid.*, pp. 195-916, and chap. 15; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75 (March-April 1996); and Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddle, and Peter A. Wilson, *Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). A recent Defense Science Board report on information warfare repeated this warning. Thomas E. Ricks, "Information Warfare Defense is Urged: Pentagon Panel Warns of 'Electronic Pearl Harbor,'" *The Wall Street Journal*, 6 January 1997, p. B2.

37 Ray S. Cline, *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. 13. See also Papp, pp. 308-309; Hartmann, p. 67; and Coulombis and Wolfe, pp. 66-67. For another approach to quantifying and ranking the actual and projected capabilities of states, see Karl Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 21-39.

38 Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 52.

39 Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, Richard and Clara Winston, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 72. General von Blomberg pointed out after the war that if the French had resisted, the Germans would "have to have beat a hasty retreat." And General Keitel confided that "he wouldn't have been a bit surprised" if three battalions of French troops had flicked the German forces right off the map. G. M. Gilbert, *The Psychology of Dictatorship* (New York: Ronald Press, 1950), p. 211.

40 This did not mean that Hitler was not nervous. “The 48 hours after the march,” he stated, “were the most nerve-wracking in my life.” Allan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 345. For additional measures Hitler took to make the operation as unprovocative as possible, see John Thomas Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crises* (Ames: Iowa University Press, 1977), p. 101.

41 For the flexible deterrent options, see *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1993* (AFCC Pub 1) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 6-11 to 6-16. For some reason, JCS currently defines national security strategy in terms of instruments of power (diplomatic, economic, military, and information) as the means “to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.” JCS Pub 1-02, pp. 254-55. The same publication, however, defines elements of national power as “the means that are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives” (ibid., p. 130). The use of power elements as the “means” in the definition of national strategy (ibid., p. 255) is in keeping with the Goldwater-Nichols terminology concerning power and strategy. Professor Michael Morin, USAWC, 21 November 1996. See also note 4.

CHAPTER 9

MANAGING STRATEGIC RISK

James F. Holcomb

In a tactical situation one is able to see at least half the problem with the naked eye, whereas in strategy everything has to be guessed at and presumed.¹

Carl von Clausewitz

The hierarchical chart of the Army War College Strategy Formulation Model at Appendix I shows a final block labeled “Risk Assessment.” The implication of the diagram is that risk assessment is peculiar to the development of military strategy. Indeed, it figures prominently in that process, but not uniquely so. Policy and strategy properly arrived at, demand a continuous and thorough assessment and reassessment of risk throughout the total process.

Strategists and strategic theorists throughout history have grappled with the concept of risk and methodologies for its assessment. The motivation to eliminate uncertainty in policy and strategy development as well as execution is natural, if at times chimerical. There will always be uncertainty. It often will be unmeasurable. The very nature of war and conflict and the increasingly complex strategic environment ensures that this is so. Where then does this leave the aspiring student of strategy? Is risk assessment simply the “comfort level that senior planners experience as they assess key variables?”² It is this and more. The concept of risk assessment is worth examining in more detail to put some substance to the form.

Defining Risk

Defining risk is a relatively simple task. John Collins, in his primer on grand strategy, reduces it to its essentials: “Discrepancies between ends, which we have identified as interests and objectives, and means-available resources-create risks, which can rarely be quantified.”³ At its core, risk arises when ends and means are not in consonance. This is known as an “ends-means mismatch.” Collins is on solid ground with this definition, the legacy of which springs from Clausewitz and his discussion of “the political object of war and the effort to be made.”⁴ B. H. Liddell-Hart also focused on this basic truth: “Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and coordination of the end and the means . . . An excess may be as harmful as a deficiency.”⁵ Strategic risk then is the probability of failure in achieving a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The concept is simple to articulate and easy to understand. But, as in war, the simplest things in strategy are the most difficult.

The first difficulty is in understanding what Clausewitz and others meant by “means” in the ends-means equation. Current use of the term generally accepts that means constitute resources, that is, personnel, treasure, equipment, political will, time, and so on. Clausewitz also intended a larger meaning that includes

concepts or courses of action to achieve particular objectives; these coupled with resources constitute the means or “effort to be made.”⁶ It has become increasingly useful to separate these two components of Clausewitz’ “means” for consideration in strategy formulation without confusing Clausewitz’ original intent. Consequently, risk can be represented by a mismatch in ends and ways or means.

Art Lykke makes the case for this approach, developing a model comprising three variables: ends (objectives), ways (concepts, options or courses of action for achieving them) and means (resources). Using a simple metaphor of a three legged stool, he points out that if the ends, ways and means (the legs of the stool) are not of equal length then we are left with a stool (and a strategy) that is out of balance. Continuing the analogy, he defines this angle of imbalance as risk. The greater the mismatch between ends, ways and/or means, the greater the risk of achieving ones objectives.⁷ This is a subtle but important addition to the simple ends-means equation. One can correctly and accurately identify the objective to be achieved and provide adequate resources to achieve it. However, if the “way” of achieving it is not in balance, then there is an inherent risk of failure to achieve the strategic objective. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis the objective of the Kennedy administration was fairly straightforward: Get the missiles out of Cuba. The means available were adequate and deliverable. However, there were several different ways to achieve the objective. Graham Allison identifies six major categories of possible response: Do nothing, apply diplomatic pressure, secretly approach Castro, conduct an invasion, conduct air strikes, or blockade.⁸ One can also see this in the continuing debate over the strategy for Kosovo and the use solely of airpower to achieve particular political objectives. In the Lykke model of the stool, the balance varies depending on which option is chosen. The degree of lopsidedness or imbalance defines risk. Choosing the right policy option (or way) to achieve the strategic objective is therefore a critical consideration even assuming a clear objective and adequate means. That is, an adequately resourced “way” that is inappropriate to the “end” would still create risk of failure to achieve the strategic objective.

Thus, the definition of risk is the degree to which strategic objectives, concepts and resources are in or out of balance. Since strategy is a dynamic process, one must understand that all three elements are variable and subject to change over time. The formulation of effective strategy for any endeavor is a constant quest to ensure balance among the variables. The definition applies to all aspects of strategy development whether dealing with national security (grand) strategy, defense, military or theater strategies, business strategy or even personal strategies.

Why is Strategic Risk Assessment Difficult?

The subtitle is borrowed from David Jablonsky’s piece, “Why is Strategy Difficult?”⁹ The very nature of war and conflict presupposes a relationship between thinking adversaries. This, in turn, ensures that a degree of ambiguity, uncertainty, and, yes, risk will exist in any developed strategy. Indeed, Clausewitz devotes the central theme of *On War* to this very premise; that is what distinguishes his work from his predecessors and ensures its continued relevance to the present day. Clausewitz was not the only one to recognize the subjective nature of war, but he was the first to mark that characteristic as preeminent. Throughout his work, there are allusions to “chance,” “luck,” “guesswork,” “uncertainty,” “probabilities,” and so on. The search for hard truths is a frustrating one. This in itself is a lesson. The analogies and metaphors the Prussian philosopher provides to help understand the nature of war are not based on chess, but reflect “a duel on a larger scale,” “a pair of wrestlers,” “commerce,” a “collision of living forces” or a “game of chance.” Formulating strategy presupposes “an animate object that *reacts*,” and moreover, reacts unpredictably. This equates to Andre Beufre’s definition of strategy as the “art of the dialectic of two

opposing wills using force to solve their dispute.”¹⁰ Just as one actor identifies objectives, develops concepts, and allocates resources, so does the potential or actual adversary. The variables in the strategic equation have now doubled, further complicating the task. Moreover, ambiguity and uncertainty *increase* as one climbs up the strategic ladder as moral factors gain primacy over material ones.¹¹ The problem is that these moral factors can only be guessed at. Clausewitz explicitly refers to this transition from certainty to uncertainty in strategic analysis:

At this point, then, intellectual activity leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then becomes an art in the broadest meaning of the term—the faculty of using judgment to detect the most important and decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations.¹²

The strategist now faces a prospect “that Newton himself would quail before the algebraic problems it could pose.”¹³ Risk assessment is difficult because strategy is difficult; strategy is difficult because war is the most complex of human undertakings and filled with unknowns. Liddell-Hart concludes in this regard: “This complicates calculation, because no man can exactly calculate the capacity of human genius and stupidity, nor the incapacity of will.”¹⁴ It is the inherent nature of war itself that sets the student adrift in a strategic sea of uncertainty.

Genius and Uncertainty

Despite this uncertainty, there is comfort in the knowledge that others have navigated these waters before. The challenge is to somehow structure or frame the strategic problem to minimize the unknown or more importantly, to account for it. The effective strategist strives for the “closest approximation of the truth” knowing that full knowledge is an impossibility.¹⁵

Clausewitz identifies two preeminent qualities in a successful strategist that bear consideration:

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead (emphasis in the original).¹⁶

These are the elements that define what Clausewitz terms “genius.” The aspiring strategist should not be misled or discouraged by the use of the term, however. Clausewitz does not refer to the result of good genetics, but to the development of a mind through study and experience. He is clear on this point as he continues his discussion: “It is the *average result* that indicates the presence of military genius.”¹⁷ In other words, “genius” as Clausewitz describes it is not solely the unique gift of a Napoleon or Gustavus or Hannibal. It is an achievable skill, and the “inner light” can be taught and learned.

Von Moltke the Elder took up the same theme several generations later:

What is necessary is to discover the situation, such as it is, in spite of its being surrounded by the fog of the unknown; then to *appreciate soundly* what is seen, to *guess* what is not seen, to *take a decision quickly, finally to act with vigour*, without hesitation.¹⁸

The message is that an education in strategic subjects, followed by continuous historical study to maintain mental suppleness, combined with vicarious experience through exercise, and actual experience, all contribute to acquiring the skills necessary for finding the “closest approximation of the truth.” Strategic

ability is rarely born, more often learned, but eminently achievable.

Acknowledging the theoretical uncertainties inherent in war, conflict, and policy and strategy development is an important, if unsatisfying, step in understanding risk assessment. It allows a better framing of the strategic puzzle. It is simply a matter of knowing what is not known in order to make better use of what is known and, as von Moltke suggests, to guess what is not seen. Guessing well is an inherent part of the art of Grand Strategy.

The Ends, Ways, Means Conundrum in Risk Assessment

The essence of the challenge of strategy in general and risk assessment in particular is the core problem of relating ends to ways and means. Compounding this basic conundrum is the fact that most often the ends will be abstract while the ways and means will be relatively well-defined.¹⁹ In addition, the real test of the master of strategic art is to translate obtuse, politically couched objectives into specific actions. This is likely to become more of a challenge as the nature, scope, and direction of potential threats multiply. Articulating the political objective in the event of a Major Theater War is relatively easy; however, achieving significant clarity in political objectives in multiplying crises around the world, especially where vital U.S. interests are not at stake, will become increasingly problematic. One analyst notes in a critique of the U.S. foreign policy process:

Any ambiguity in the ends-means relationship, any loss in the value roots of policy, or any failure to maintain a firm commitment to the achievement of the national purpose cannot help but deprive a foreign policy of essential meaning and effectiveness.²⁰

A second related potential pitfall facing the grand strategist is the “tail wagging the dog” phenomenon. In the absence of clear political objectives or policy guidance, the means can, in fact, “deflect the direction of ends.”²¹ What gets done becomes what one has the capability of doing. The ways and means can develop a momentum of their own and the result is strategy by default, usually at the risk of desired political outcomes. The von Schlieffen Plan and America’s experience in Vietnam are two stark historic examples of this effect.

This problem has been ascribed to the “triumph of technique” in American foreign policy. One critic specifically targets the militarization of foreign affairs during the Cold War and an emphasis on quantitative assessments based solely on capabilities.²² In such cases, Clausewitz’ “ephemeral factors” are discounted, and “consideration of political subtleties tends to be shunted aside.”²³ Ferdinand Foch, writing in 1903, complained of the same phenomenon but went further: “while the moral factors were depressed as *causes* [of war], they were also suppressed as *effects*.” The unintended result is that strategy can become a function solely of material factors.²⁴ The dramatic changes of the last decade and the growing complexities and dimensions of current and future world problems make simplistic, capabilities-based approaches dangerous at their worst, or potentially ineffective at best. Getting ends, ways and means right has always been hard; it is becoming harder.

Determining Risk

The simple definition of risk as an imbalance in ends, ways, and/or means is straightforward but clearly incomplete. How does one measure the *degree* of risk in any particular strategic endeavor? This is the heart of the dilemma.

Neuchterlein and National Interests

Risk assessment is inherent to the entire strategy formulation process. Donald Neuchterlein addresses risk in his discussion on identifying national interests and their intensities, a fundamental prerequisite to policy and strategy development. He posits sixteen criteria for assessing a particular issue as a vital interest.²⁵ These are divided into value and cost/risk factors* :

<u>Value Factors</u>	<u>Cost/Risk Factors</u>
Proximity of the danger	Economic costs of hostilities
Nature of the threat	Estimated casualties
Economic stake	Risk of protracted conflict
Sentimental attachment	Risk of enlarged conflict
Type of government and human rights	Cost of defeat or stalemate
Effect on the balance of power	Cost of public opposition
National prestige at stake	Risk of UN opposition
Support of allies	Risk of congressional opposition
* Note there is no direct correlation between values and cost/risk factors; they are randomly listed.	

Figure 1. Value and Cost/Risk Factors

Neuchterlein advocates using a simple valuation process by rating each factor high, medium, or low, or even assigning numerical scores to the factors. Likewise, for a particular issue, some factors may be more important than others and can be appropriately weighted or prioritized. The factor scores are then totaled. If the value totals of a particular issue are high compared to a low or medium cost/risk valuation, then the issue probably constitutes a vital interest. Neuchterlein does not claim a scientific basis for his methodology, only that “[i]t provides for systematic analysis of specific foreign policy issues; it should therefore lead to better judgments about levels of interest for the United States and its antagonists and, one would hope, to wiser policies than would otherwise be the case.”²⁶ Thus, it provides a simple tool that assists in the discrimination of interests in relative terms. Having determined “vitalness,” the policymaker/strategist is in a better position to articulate a balanced set of ends, ways, and means in the strategy formulation process by accounting for degrees of risk up front.

Calculated Risk

The noted naval theorist, Admiral J. C. Wylie, took a more rigorous approach to the problem in a tongue-in-cheek article published in 1953 entitled “The Calculation of Risk.”²⁷ The impetus for the short article apparently arose from the 1953 budget hearings in which the Army representative answered difficult questions with the rejoinder, “Mr. Congressman, that is a calculated risk.” Of course no one knew what a

calculated risk was or how to calculate it, so Wylie decided to try.²⁸ Although intended facetiously, Wylie's little paper does merit consideration in its own right. Using a series of variables and equations, he describes various strategic characteristics.²⁹

P = Profit if successful

C_n = Cost if not attempted

C_f = Cost of attempt that fails

C_s = Cost of attempt that succeeds

S = Probability of success

Wylie defines risk as P/C_f , or the potential profit divided by the cost of a failed attempt. As long as this is greater than 1, the enterprise (or strategy) is "encouraged"; likewise, if less than 1, "discouraged." These machinations result in general determining equations:

If $P \times S < C_f(1-S)$, then "no go"

If $P \times S > C_f(1-S)$, then "go"

These equations describe what is already known instinctively: If the payoff times the probability of success is greater than the cost of failure times the probability of failure, the result is a winning strategy. Risk is further defined by an equation:

$$C_f/C_s < S/(1-S)$$

That is, the cost of a failed attempt over the cost of a successful attempt must be less than the probability of success divided by the probability of failure.

Having had his fun with the reader, Wylie further stipulates that "To insure success in its use, there is only one condition that must be met: the factors involved must never be expressed in arithmetic quantities. That would blunt the fine edge of judgment and obscure the true balance of intangibles." Wylie clearly subscribes to the Clausewitzian notions of uncertainty and unpredictability in war, and he makes this clear in his important and short book, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. In it he further admonishes the reader to plan for a complete spectrum of strategies in order to have a "reserve" of strategies for the inevitable changes that will occur. He also warns that "the player who plans for only one strategy runs a great risk simply because his opponent soon detects the single strategy—and counters it . . . planning for certitude is the greatest of all military mistakes . . ."³⁰ Wylie's reserve of strategies is essentially conceptual hedging for uncertainty with its inherent risk. This, to borrow from operational art, is planning for strategic branches and sequels or for potential developments requiring adjustments in ends, ways, or means as a particular strategy is implemented.

Although Wylie's formulations were intended to ridicule early whiz kids, he actually produced a relatively sophisticated approach to a difficult concept. For example, an examination of a recent study prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency to address risk assessment and management of threats to security, uses an identical formulation.³¹ Defining risk as the potential of damage or loss to an asset, the study assesses the level of risk as the impact of loss or damage to the asset and the likelihood (probability)

that a specific vulnerability could be exploited by a particular threat.³² The formulation is defensive in nature since it is addressing security protection issues. Nevertheless, it equates exactly to Wylie's **Cf (1-S)**, that is, the **Cost of Failure times the Probability of Failure**. Strategy and risk assessment are indeed eternal.³³

Risk Management

The process of risk assessment is dynamic in nature over time and circumstance. That is, the variables are in constant flux. Risk assessment is simply the constant effort to identify and correct imbalances among the key variables. The first ability of the strategist is to recognize when variables change. The second is to adjust the remaining variables to account for the "delta" or, as it has been defined, the risk. This is known as risk management. In simplest terms, the strategist has several clear options:³⁴

Modify Ends. When the price to achieve a particular objective is too high or the ability to affect a "center of gravity" is limited, it may become necessary to reduce the overall objective to more realistic terms. Examples include the decision to forego a cross-channel attack in 1942 in favor of North Africa, or accepting a lesser objective than the unification of the Korean peninsula after the Chinese intervention.

Modify Means. An increase or reallocation of resources may affect the ability to implement a strategy and achieve the objective. This is, however, not simply a quantitative solution. A definition of resources includes unpredictable and changeable elements as well. For example, public support of a particular policy/strategy is a key consideration in a democracy and must be accounted for even if difficult to measure. Vietnam is a classic example of not adequately modifying means by calling up the reserves and generating sufficient public support for the effort.

Modify Ways. Assuming that the objective is sound and resources are adequate, there will likely be multiple ways to achieve the desired end-state. Use of the various elements of power (political, military, economic, informational) in differing combinations with varying emphasis may enhance the ability to achieve the same overall objective. The recent Kosovo experience serves as a good case of modifying ways: The deployment of Task Force Hawk and increasing information about planning for possible ground options coupled with retargeting the air operation are thought to have contributed to Milosevic's decision to withdraw forces.

Reassess the Risk. Over time some of the going-in assumptions may be proven invalid. Additional information may become available or gaps in knowledge filled. The strategist needs to recognize the potential strategic effect of more or less information, recognizing that the 100 percent solution will always be elusive due to the "ephemeral factors." It is important to reemphasize that this process is dynamic and "at once abstract and rational, [and] must be capable of synthesizing both psychological and material data."³⁵ Indeed, one man's risk is another man's certitude and therefore grist for the continuously grinding strategic mill.

Five Patterns of Strategy for Risk Assessment and Management

Andre Beaufre addresses the "ends-means" conundrum in his classic book, *Introduction to Strategy*. His intent is to provide a series of models, what he calls patterns of strategy, to assist in the process of strategic thinking.³⁶ The models are intended to show how various and fundamentally differing strategies can spring

from the dynamic relationship between ends, ways and means. These five patterns are macro-descriptors and it is clear to see that countless variations are possible.

Ends Moderate, Means Large. This is described as a strategy of “direct threat”; nuclear deterrence strategy is given as example of this pattern.

Ends Moderate, Means Limited. Consisting of a pattern of “indirect pressure,” this pattern is useful when freedom of action is limited. It emphasizes political, diplomatic, and economic elements of power at the expense of direct military action. It models the basis of Soviet strategy, that is, avoiding direct military confrontation with the United States.

Ends Important, Ways Limited (Low Freedom of Action), Means Limited. This pattern constitutes a combination of “direct threat” and “indirect pressure” applied in successive actions and reflects the strategy of indirect approach as described by Liddell-Hart. It is most appropriate to nations strong defensively but with limited resources.

Ends Important, Ways Unlimited (High Freedom of Action), Means Inadequate. This reflects a strategy of protracted war but at a low level of military intensity. It is the theoretical basis for Mao Tse-Tung’s theory of protracted struggle.

Ends Important, Means Unlimited. This traditional pattern is characterized by “violent conflict aiming at military victory.” Beufre describes it as the classic strategy of the Napoleonic era with Clausewitz as its principle theorist.

With these five patterns of strategy as a basis, Collins addresses risk specifically with seven examples of how to balance the strategic equation.³⁷

- Eliminate waste [modifying ways and/or means]
- Compress objectives [modifying ends]
- Adjust strategy [modifying ways]
- Augment assets [modifying means]
- Reduce ends and increase means [modifying ends and means]
- Bluff [adversary misinterprets your ends, ways, means]
- Give up on the objective [the ultimate modification of ends]

Intended as examples, achieving strategic balance, and hence strategic effectiveness, may require application of one, more, or other creative elements to induce change in the strategic equation.

Readiness And Risk

There does exist detailed and rigorously institutionalized processes for measuring risk within the U.S. defense establishment. The roots of these processes spring from the era of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the introduction of systems analysis to defense planning. In general, these methodologies

represent an attempt to institutionally account for the unknown and help to “guess well.” For example, the Joint Net Assessment (JNA) is the informal process that “provides a strategic level risk assessment and provides the basis for developing risk associated with alternative force structures and strategies.”³⁸ The JNA draws on multiple sources of information and contributes to other strategic assessments and potentially to changes in the National Military Strategy (NMS). Normally a net assessment is developed every 4 years but dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment can result in more frequent assessments. One of the sources of information feeding the JNA process is the regularized readiness reporting system. Therefore, bureaucratically and institutionally, at least in the Department of Defense (DoD), strategic risk is related closely to readiness. That is the system. But as recent events in Kosovo have demonstrated, the reality of risk assessment can have as much to do with art as with science.

The Chairman’s Readiness System

The Chairman’s Readiness System is the process by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses the military’s readiness to fulfill the requirements of the NMS. The vehicle for assessing and reporting readiness across the armed forces is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR).³⁹

The Chairman’s overall strategic assessment draws on three sources of information: The individual services unit readiness reports, the Unified Combatant Commanders (CINCs) joint readiness assessments and the Combat Support Agencies reports on their ability to support the CINCs. A full JMRR takes place quarterly with an assessment of capabilities and risk currently and out to 12 months in the future.

The assessments are scenario driven and derive from the current NMS. The scenarios normally start with a real-world operation currently underway and include a Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) or one or two Major Theater Wars (MTW) “in two distant theaters in overlapping timeframes.”⁴⁰ CINCs are then required to address potential deficiencies in their ability to execute the scenario-based mission requirements. Deficiencies are identified and categorized. Fixes are suggested, or they are forwarded for consideration and solution by other working bodies. Unresolved deficiencies are aggregated and considered collectively. These are then termed “key risk elements.” Further aggregation may intensify into “overall strategic concerns”; these are potential risks to implementation of the National Military Strategy itself and constitute an overall strategic risk assessment.⁴¹

The system is largely score-based, that is, commanders at all levels are charged with assessing their own readiness and that of their subordinates and assigning a value to it. Scores are aggregated as assessments are forwarded upward. The process would appear at first glance to be relatively sound based as it is on seemingly quantitative assessments. However, the “granularity” of assessment becomes less clear as the reports are progressively aggregated. In fact, there are substantial opportunities for commanders to inject subjective assessments into the process.⁴² It is here, as Clausewitz says, that “intellectual activity leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then becomes an art in the broadest meaning of the term.”⁴³ Differing perceptions of readiness in turn drive differing perceptions of the degree of ultimate risk for the armed forces to implement the NMS, and by extension, elements of the NSS. This is the basis of the readiness debate within the services, the Joint Staff, DoD, and Congress today.⁴⁴

Although the system would appear to guess well on the surface, there is growing concern that an ends-ways-means mismatch exists. Culturally, commanders are naturally reluctant to report their commands unready to execute their missions. Likewise, senior commanders are adverse to less than capable readiness assessments from their subordinates. Further clouding the process is the political scrutiny under which it

takes place. The measure of risk may depend on how one interprets the current strategic mandate: “The United States [must be] able to deter and defeat large-scale cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames. In short, we must be able to fight and win two major theater wars nearly simultaneously.”⁴⁵ The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs assesses the risk factors for fighting and winning the first MTW as “moderate,” but the second as “high.”⁴⁶ What does this mean in real terms, especially with the occasional SSC thrown in for good measure? One’s point of view depends on where one sits. “Moderate” risk to DoD may be acceptable to the Senate Armed Services Committee, but as it is derived from an aggregated assessment, it may be considered downright dangerous by CENTCOM or TRANSCOM.

The Case of Kosovo and Two MTW’s

The conflict in Kosovo provides a fitting vehicle for examining in more real terms the nature of risk in strategy formulation and implementation. It is not the intent to examine the strategy for the conflict itself, although this has proven to be a rich field of discussion and debate, especially with regard to matching political ends to military objectives, courses of action, and resources. More interesting is the impact the conflict had on the ability to execute, if need be, declared elements of NSS and NMS and the risk thereby incurred as a result of the commitment to the Kosovo operation.

As established, the NMS (as well as the National Security and Defense Strategies) posit as a fundamental element the ability to “deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames.” Moreover, this obtains in an environment in which the United States is globally engaged and indeed, conducting “multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations” at the same time.

The NSS addresses the possibility that, in the event of one or two MTWs, of withdrawing from ongoing contingency operations. In doing so, the NSS acknowledges accepting a “degree of risk” since such a course is necessary to “reduce the greater risk incurred if we failed to respond adequately to major theater wars.” What happens when an SSC takes on the characteristics, at least in part, of an MTW?

As outlined earlier, the JMRR is the Chairman’s snapshot of the U.S. Armed Forces ability to execute the NMS. The two JMRRs crafted during and immediately following the Kosovo conflict highlighted some of the risk entailed in the two-MTW component of the NMS.

The JMRR covering the April to June 1999 timeframe posited as a scenario an expanding Kosovo operation lasting until September, with a simultaneous outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula.⁴⁷ It assessed the risk of not prevailing in the Korean MTW as “moderate,” and the risk of successfully responding to a second, unstated MTW as “high.” Moderate risk under the given scenario was defined in terms of time and potential casualties:

This does not mean that U.S. forces would not prevail in either contingency [Kosovo and Korea], but rather, that potentially longer timelines required to initiate the counter-offensive increase the potential for higher casualties to forces in the interim and during the warfight.

As might be expected, the Air Force was particularly affected due to its significant commitment to Kosovo. In fact, the Air Force level of effort in Kosovo constituted an MTW in its own right.⁴⁸ The strategic concerns listed included mobility shortfalls, logistics/sustainment shortfalls, and C4 and ISR deficiencies.

Since strategic concerns are “an aggregation of key risk elements that impact [on] readiness to execute the National Military Strategy,” the JMRR, in effect, provides an overall and general articulation of risk.⁴⁹

The overall strategic effect of this risk was well-articulated in the Kosovo After Action Report to Congress:

Without question, a situation in which the United States would have to prosecute two major theater wars nearly simultaneously would be extraordinarily demanding—well beyond that required for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991. It would involve our complete commitment as a nation and would entail all elements of our total force Consistent with our defense strategy, U.S. forces could not have continued the intense campaign in Kosovo and, at the same time, conducted two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.⁵⁰

In fact, in the course of operations in Kosovo, higher levels of risk were reassessed, and some measures were taken to bring the strategic variables into better balance. One assumption notes that the forces in and around Southwest Asia, coupled with elements enforcing the no-fly zone, constituted an effective deterrent to Saddam. The air-bridge supporting the Kosovo operation was also considered to be a positive asset if operations had to be redirected to the Gulf. However, in Northeast Asia some units were repositioned and others put on a “tighter string” for a quicker response in the event of crisis. The objective was to “maintain a very visible defense capability to discourage leaders in Baghdad and Pyongyang. . . .”⁵¹ In other words, some adjustments in ways and means were undertaken to reduce potential strategic risk in undertaking the Kosovo operation.

If all this language leaves readers slightly dissatisfied with the ability of the defense establishment to measure and articulate risk, then they are in good company. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also acknowledge a shortcoming in this particular strategic skill. The Kosovo experience brought home the potential impact that SSCs could have on the execution of NMS, especially the two-MTW capability.

Risk analysis is important in judging force readiness where commitments are made to support important and necessary operations but do not involve our vital interests. Some smaller scale contingencies may be in this category.⁵²

In fact, the statement of the Secretary and Chairman before Congress acknowledged that “managing these risks is a highly complicated endeavor that would benefit from a more structured and dynamic set of tools for assessing our ability to conduct major wars when we respond to contingencies.”⁵³ The search for “the closest approximation of the truth,” like strategy, is eternal.

Conclusion

Assessing and managing strategic risk is an inherently inexact process. It encompasses a combination of inputs, both material and moral, that defy empirical resolution. Weighing these inputs, identifying possible outcomes, and planning for uncertainty should be done with the clear understanding that a complete solution is impossible to achieve but always striven for. Once a strategy is developed, the most important strategic skill and the true mark of strategic “genius” is accounting for potential change and recognizing actual change in a timely enough manner to adjust the strategic variables and thereby ensure a valid strategic

equation oriented firmly on achieving the political objectives at hand. This is increasingly difficult to do in a dynamically changing strategic environment with myriad threats, challenges, actors, and unclear potential effects. This is why the development and execution of strategy is primarily an art, and why the requirement for developing masters of that art is so essential. In the end, though, the essential elements of strategic risk are unchanged through the ages and consist in the proper balancing of ends, ways, and means to achieve the desired strategic outcome. Understanding that fundamental relationship and “guessing well” through study, exercise, and experience will ensure that assessing and managing strategic risk rises above simply “the comfort level of strategic planners.” A gastrointestinal assessment is not good enough. It never was.

Notes - Chapter 9

1 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 178-179.

2 Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning,” in *Strategy and Force Planning*, The Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995), p. 20.

3 John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 5.

4 Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 81, 92, 585.

5 B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Meridian, 1991), pp. 322-323. Liddell Hart sounds here very much like Clausewitz. See Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 177: “A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources, doing neither too much nor too little.”

6 See Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 92-95, for a discussion of “ways.”

7 Arthur F. Lykke, “Defining Military Strategy,” *Military Review*, Vol. 69, No. 5 (May 1989), pp. 2-8.

8 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 111-120.

9 David Jablonsky, *Why is Strategy Difficult?* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 1992).

10 Andre Beufre, *An Introduction to Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 20.

11 Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 178, 586.

12 Ibid., p. 585.

13 Ibid., pp. 112, 586. Attributed to Napoleon, it is interesting that Clausewitz uses it in support of two different discussions; one on Military Genius, and the other on the Scale of the Objective and the Effort To Be Made.

14 Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 323.

15 Ibid.

16 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 102.

17 Ibid., p. 103.

18 Von Moltke is quoted here in Ferdinand Foch, *The Principles of War* (New York: Holt, 1920), p. 17.

19 Roger S. Whitcomb, *The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 71.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., p. 72.

23 Ibid. See also M. Thomas Davis, "Size Military to Strategy, Not Vice Versa," *Government Executive*, Vol. 31, No. 12 (December 1999): pp. 81-82.

24 Foch, *The Principles of War*, p. 3.

25 Donald E. Neuchterlein, *America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), pp. 18-28.

* Note that there is no direct correlation between value and cost/risk factors; they are randomly listed.

26 Ibid., p. 28.

27 J. C. Wylie, "The Calculation of Risk," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (July 1953): p. 725.

28 See introduction by John B. Hattendorf in J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. xxvii.

29 I have modified the variables for greater ease of understanding.

30 Wylie, *Military Strategy*, pp. 71-72.

31 Center for CIA Security, *Analytical Risk Management* (December 1998).

32 Ibid., p. 29.

33 A reference to Chapter 13, "Strategy Eternal," in Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

34 Bartlett, Holman, and Somes, "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," *Strategy and Force Planning*, p. 19.

35 Beufre, *Introduction to Strategy*, p. 29.

36 Ibid., pp. 26-29.

37 Collins, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 6-7.

38 CJSCI 3100.01A, *Joint Strategic Planning System* (1 September 1999), p. E-5.

39 CJCSI 3401.01B (1 July 1999), *Chairman's Readiness System*.

- 40 William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), p. 19.
- 41 *The Chairman's Readiness System*, Enclosure E; see also Michael A. Pearson, ed., *How the Army Runs* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1 April 1999), pp. 8-6 to 8-10.
- 42 Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, "Measuring Readiness," *Armed Forces Journal International* (January 1999), p. 16.
- 43 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 585.
- 44 David Abel, "Two War Strategy is 'Unrealistic,' Senator Says," *Defense Week*, 6 December 1999, p. 1.
- 45 Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, "Joint Statement of William S. Cohen and General Henry H. Shelton," *Hearing on Kosovo After-Action Review*, 14 October 1999.
- 46 Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Posture Statement before the 106th Congress Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate*, 8 February 2000, p. 5.
- 47 JMRR information from Elaine M. Grossman, "U.S. Forces May Have Faced High Risk If Major War Erupted Last Spring," *Inside the Pentagon*, 21 October 1999, p. 1; and Elaine M. Grossman, "U.S. Forces Still Faced High Readiness Risk After Kosovo Air War," *Inside the Pentagon*, 6 January 2000, p. 1. See also Elaine M. Grossman, "DOD Finds Readiness Risks in 'One-And-A-Half' Overlapping Wars," *Inside the Pentagon*, 25 May 2000, p. 2.
- 48 William S. Cohen and Henry H. Shelton, *Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, 31 January 2000, p. 121.
- 49 The subsequent JMRR (July-September 1999) had an even more dire assessment. The scenario assumed all real-world ongoing commitments with an outbreak of war in Southwest Asia. The JMRR assessed "moderate to high risk factors for conducting this scenario." See Grossman, "US Forces Still Faced High Risk After Kosovo Air War."
- 50 Cohen and Shelton, *Report to Congress*, p. 12.
- 51 "Joint Statement . . .," *Hearing on Kosovo After-Action Review*, p. 7.
- 52 Cohen and Shelton, *Report to Congress*, p. 121
- 53 "Joint Statement . . .," *Hearing on Kosovo After-Action Review*, p. 8.

CHAPTER 10

WHY A WINNING STRATEGY MATTERS: THE IMPACT OF LOSING IN VIETNAM AND AFGHANISTAN

Douglas A. Borer

Poets, novelists, and playwrights are all likely to observe, “in war there are no winners, only losers.” Even if true, such philosophical musings are a luxury not shared by strategists. Because war is the most horrible trauma that humans choose to inflict on each other, the difference between winning and losing does matter. The outcome of war efforts eventually determines survival and prosperity of all state actors in the international system, and the road to victory or road to defeat starts with strategy. Occasionally, bad strategic planning may result in victory if an overwhelmingly powerful state is pitted against a materially overmatched opponent (e.g., Russia v. Finland circa 1939-40); however, history has proven that such imbalances of aggregate power do not always guarantee victory. Indeed, while mired in the fog of war, the very weak can overcome the very strong in the most unlikely of places. Nowhere is the truth of this claim better illustrated than during the U.S. war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan. This chapter is, however, not devoted to a critical analysis of superpower strategic policy in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Rather, I seek to extend Clausewitz’s most famous maxim “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” by investigating the impact of war *loss* on the asymmetrically more powerful actor. Therefore, the statement “war loss will undermine the stability of domestic politics and at times threaten national survival” expresses the major theme of inquiry in this chapter.

At the outset of their respective interventions, both superpowers determined that sending their troops to war served the vital interests of the nation. Likewise, nearly a decade later the decisions to withdraw were also seen to be in the vital national interests of both countries. Clearly, in both cases what constituted the national interest had changed over time. Although it is clear that a mixture of international and domestic factors were involved during the initiation of hostilities, there is little doubt that the international considerations manifested in the Cold War ideological struggle for global power were primarily responsible for influencing President Johnson (1965) and General Secretary Brezhnev (1979), the two key decisionmakers in these wars. However, while the decisions to disengage from these conflicts were also driven by an amalgam of domestic and international factors, the emphasis had clearly switched, with domestic considerations playing the dominant role in the minds of President Nixon (1973) and General Secretary Gorbachev (1989). As the late great Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Thomas “Tip” O’Neill (D-MA) was fond of saying, “all politics is local.”¹ The “local politics” at the national level in the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) illuminate a number of similarities and differences in how losing strategies impact domestic politics in countries with very dissimilar governing structures.

The Impact of Vietnam on the United States

In American history no other event, with the exception of the Civil War, has had a greater impact on the domestic tranquility of the United States as the Vietnam War. The United States survived its Vietnam experience as it had the Civil War—battered, changed, bloodied, but intact. The withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973 and the unification of Vietnam under a communist government in 1975 did not produce the dire consequences predicted by those who argued for intervention. The Asian communist dominos did fall in Cambodia and Laos; however, the original American belief in a monolithic international communist movement shed its last vestiges of credibility when Vietnam invaded its communist neighbor, Cambodia, in 1978 to oust the genocidal regime of Pol Pot; an act that, in turn, caused communist China to invade Vietnam briefly in 1979 to reassert Chinese regional hegemony. But the dominos stopped falling in Indochina, and communism did not spread as predicted to Japan, which lay at the root of the original U.S. justification for projecting containment into Vietnam. Thus, one of the most significant impacts of the Vietnam War was the stark clarity with which the original domino theory was rebutted as the other Asian “dominos”—Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan—all remained standing. George Herring provides a poignant critique of containment and the domino theory:

By wrongly attributing the Vietnamese conflict to external sources, the United States drastically misjudged its internal dynamics. By intervening in what was essentially a local struggle, it placed itself at the mercy of local forces, a weak client and a determined adversary. It elevated into a major international conflict what might have remained a localized struggle. By raising the stakes into a test of its own credibility, it perilously narrowed its options. A policy so flawed in its premises cannot help but fail, and, in this case, the results were disastrous.²

At home, the impact of war loss, in material, psychological, political, and cultural terms was tremendous. Before its end, U.S. involvement in Vietnam had inspired some of the most violent protests in the nation’s history, and the final U.S. withdrawal and swift unification of Vietnam under the communists also had a profound impact on the United States. In April 1975, Americans watched in stunned disbelief as the last helicopter lifted off from the roof of the U.S. embassy in the final hours before Saigon’s fall. The first televised war ended with scenes of chaos as thousand of Vietnamese tried to flee the invading communist forces. For the families of over 58,000 dead American service personnel, there was no satisfactory answer to the question of what they had died for. To some U.S. citizens, the American military had failed the country, either for acts that violated morality, human rights, and justice, or for the simple dereliction of duty in failing to strongly protest political decisions which were strategically culpable.³ For many others, images of the My Lai massacre, in which American soldiers had slaughtered over 500 unarmed Vietnamese civilians, drove home the vision that the true enemy was “us.” Others adopted a “stab in the back” analysis that blamed the government for not allowing the army to win the war, and “tying the military’s hands,” a common response by the losing side at war’s end throughout history. Others blamed the protesters—“the hippie-freak/pinko/commie/fags”—for undermining the system and for being “un-American.” The simplistic slogan “America—love it or leave it” was hurled like an epitaph on those who protested the war. Others blamed the press for distorting the images of the war, arguing that the horror of Vietnam was no different from that any other war, and that the atrocities committed by America’s enemies had been lost in the sensationalism of live coverage showing only the death and destruction caused by U.S. forces. Still, many others reacted with a combination of denial, confusion, and amnesia. Immediately after the war, there was little debate outside the halls of academia as to who “lost” Vietnam. In the political realm, the latest Cold War rendition of “losing China” to communism could not easily be used again for political purposes, as both major U.S. political parties had been deeply involved in the war’s beginning and its outcome. Even the leading members of American media were reluctant to raise the issue, having become sensitized to the accusation of undercutting public support.⁴ Only one year after America’s “child” was lost

in Asia, Vietnam was scarcely mentioned in the 1976 presidential campaign.⁵

The economic impact of the war, although less spectacular than the emotional trauma, was possibly equally damaging to American society. A study by Anthony Campagna estimates that the direct total cost of the Vietnam War on the U.S. economy was \$515 billion. If indirect costs (such as war-caused recessions and long-term inflation, the deterioration of trade conditions, etc.) are included, the cost of the Vietnam War exceeds \$900 billion. In his analysis of the costs, Campagna notes:

It takes little imagination to wonder what sums like these could have accomplished if used for other purposes. Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" plan for domestic renewal was sacrificed, urban problems were allowed to fester and grow, mass transportation was discarded, schools were ignored, and so on. There is little point in belaboring the issue or listing the social ills—the butter that was sacrificed for the guns. Whether or not these problems would have been addressed in the absence of the war is problematic anyway, and little is gained in speculation. It is sufficient to point to the enormous waste of resources in the pursuit of unspecified goals and thereby hope to avoid its repetition.

He then reaffirms the critique with an assessment of the war's positive value.

The enormity of the folly is evident when one looks at the benefits of the war. That no one, except perhaps for defense contractors, seems to have benefited appears distressing in view of the costs involved . . . costs may be easier to measure than benefits, but more gains should be readily identifiable. Only the military sector appears to show temporary gains, either for contractors or in promotions for officers who reported for battle. The rest of society was badly divided with little in economic gains to smooth over the dissension.

Campagna concludes, "Considering the total costs minus the total benefits leaves only one conclusion—it was not a worthwhile endeavor. Looking at costs and benefits are one way to pass judgment, but whether considered from an economic, legal, moral, or military view, the same conclusion emerges—the war cannot be justified."⁶

The American economy was also damaged by Vietnam on the international level. Beginning during the Johnson administration, worldwide confidence in the dollar began to erode because of growing deficits both in balance-of-trade figures and in federal budget outlays. In his 1984 analysis of the evolution of the U.S. role in the global debt crisis, economist John Makin states:

The decade that had forged ahead on hope for the future had reached its extravagant goal, to put a man on the moon, with no great amount of thought given to just why it was being done and how it was going to pay for itself. All of this, along with Vietnam, began to take its toll. Inflation reached 6.1 percent in 1969—its highest level since World War II. Americans were beginning to feel the weight of Vietnam on their spirits and their pocketbook . . . wage increases were starting to fall behind inflation. The federal government's \$3.2 billion surplus that year was the last Americans have seen to date. By the mid-1970s, Vietnam, social programs, and the politicians' imperative to postpone as much of their cost as possible to an inevitably more prosperous future brought in the first \$50 billion deficit since World War II.⁷

The federal budget deficit was tied to Johnson's guns-and-butter policies, with the war directly blamed for the outflow of dollars. The global economy of that time, still tied to the gold standard, became increasingly volatile and unstable. The United States was increasingly unable to exchange gold for dollars

with investors; thus the price of gold rose, and the value of the dollar fell. The United States, still committed to the Bretton Woods monetary regime, was also committed to sustaining the dollar's parity against other international currencies. Investors responded by selling dollars en masse to foreign central banks, creating a run on the dollar. Because of massive intervention by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank in 1968, the dollar's slide was temporarily halted. However, the decline in the postwar U.S. economic hegemony had begun. It accelerated during the Nixon "shocks" of 1971, a trend that continued throughout the 1980s when the United States moved from being the world's largest creditor nation to being its largest debtor. It cannot be said that the Vietnam War itself was more than a small part of this overall trend, and a detailed analysis of the impact of Vietnam on global U.S. economic hegemony is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, according to political economist David Calleo, "the Vietnam War undoubtedly cost the country's economy a great deal. Enormous defense budgets throughout the postwar era may well have distorted and weakened American economic growth. Steady overseas investment may well have slowed the modernization of domestic industry."⁸ While America was "investing" in the Vietnam War, Japan, Germany, and others were investing in their domestic economic infrastructure.

One positive result of American defense spending in Vietnam was on other U.S. allies, especially those in East Asia. In the late 1950s and 1960s, industrialists based in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were given privileged access to the U.S. market as part of economic development strategies to undermine communism's appeal. Major contracts for war materials and spending by soldiers on leave helped to stimulate the local economies in the region. The meteoric economic rise of the East Asian "Tigers," widely hailed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was part of a wider matrix of U.S. policies in Asia during the Cold War, of which Vietnam was the most visible location. The United States tolerated tightly protected markets in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan while pressuring other countries to pursue open or free trade, a practice that began to unravel only in the late 1980s as the Cold War wound down. In Vietnam the anticommunist crusade was fought with dollars, guns, and soldiers; in the rest of Asia, dollars were the primary instrument of U.S. influence, much to the benefit of East Asian economies.⁹

The economics of war loss are often of secondary importance to the more significant shocks to a society's political culture. Like the impact of World War II on Japan's culture, Vietnam has had a lasting impact on American society. In the case of Japan, a polity once distinguished by its glorification of the individual warrior and the *samurai* code is now fundamentally pacifist, with a deep-seated suspicion of the military and its role in Japanese society. In the case of the United States, a polity historically distinguished by the glorification of the ideals of democratic governance is now fundamentally suspicious of and cynical about both governing institutions and politicians. In the years since Vietnam War, general public distrust in government has grown, even as Americans are increasingly more willing to discuss the war. Academic texts as well as anecdotal accounts by American veterans are continually added to a growing body of literature. The trauma and drama of Vietnam are replayed (and often history is rewritten) in television shows, documentaries, and major movie productions.¹⁰ Vietnam veterans, who were initially perceived as drug-crazed, gun-toting, hair-trigger maniacs, have been in great part socially rehabilitated in movies and television shows, with much of the rest of American society feeling a collective sense of guilt and shame for having treated veterans so poorly on their return from Vietnam.

The war also continues to have a tangible impact on the lives of its combatants. In the 1980s evidence emerged that many veterans (both U.S. and its allies) were dying from various cancers that are linked to Agent Orange, the chemical defoliant that had been used indiscriminately to destroy the jungle vegetation that had served so effectively as a cover for the Vietnamese combatants. In the 1990s the long-festered issues of prisoners of war (POWs) and soldiers missing in action (MIA) again became prominent. During

the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, new and as yet unsubstantiated evidence and allegations emerged that Americans had been left behind in Vietnam and Laos. The candidacy of Arkansas Governor William Clinton was questioned on the grounds of “character,” with some seeking political advantage by questioning Clinton’s patriotism for his opposition to the war as a college student. Other contentious issues continue to resurface, including the plight of Vietnamese “boat people,” refugees, and unpaid war reparations. Even the U.S. Army has begun to come to terms with Vietnam. In March 1998 two American soldiers, Lawrence Colburn and Hugh Thompson, received medals for heroism under enemy fire in a moving ceremony at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC, a site that continues to affect profoundly virtually everyone who visits it. The bestowing of medals on these soldiers was a monumental act, as it acknowledged their heroism for risking their own lives to protect Vietnamese civilians from rampaging American troops during the My Lai massacre in March 1968.¹¹

In the realm of foreign affairs, the impact of Vietnam remains the most clearly tangible component of American politics. After the Vietnam War, the doctrine of communist containment remained the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy; however, the use of military force came under great scrutiny, with comparisons to Vietnam being raised thereafter whenever military intervention has been contemplated. In relations with its allies, the U.S. global position was perhaps shaken, but it was not structurally altered in the immediate wake of the Vietnam War. The Western European alliance structure remained intact, and new organs of international cooperation (most notably the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]) were born. On a strategic level, both the Soviet Union and China were eager to maintain the status quo or to proceed with arms control negotiations and confidence-building measures. In the age of nuclear interdependence, it was clear to all sides that the vital national interests of the members of the nuclear club could not be directly assailed. The American defeat in Vietnam was actually followed by improved relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR—and the fall of Vietnam did not inspire an entirely new wave of communist aggression or communist-inspired rebellion. In the late 1970s socialist forces did gain ground in some countries. However, in countries where communists gained power (Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan) U.S. national interests were not threatened, and eventually the support of these new allies became major economic burdens for their Soviet patrons, adding to the eventual communist collapse.

In a more direct challenge to U.S. national interests, in Latin America and the Caribbean various communist insurgencies also made tangible gains. However, the Vietnam War had clearly shattered the anticommunist consensus that had existed under U.S. containment doctrine since the late 1940s. Even before the fall of Saigon, public opinion polls had indicated that only one-third of Americans felt that the United States should intervene militarily to protect any of its allies, with only the defense of Canada being endorsed by a majority.¹² During the second half of the Carter administration American anger was rekindled in the humiliation of the Iranian seizure of the U.S. embassy; however, Carter refused to use military force in an attempt to challenge the outcome of the Iranian Islamic revolution. His ill-fated hostage rescue mission, that ended with the death of a number of special operations troops, was a mission which had no immediate strategic impact at that time, other than perhaps to seal Carter’s loss in the next election. However, despite its failure, “Desert I” led to the further expansion of U.S. special operations capabilities that would play increasingly important roles in future conflicts, culminating in their critical strategic role in overthrowing the Afghan Taliban regime in 2002.

American nationalism and a renewed emphasis on military force reemerged somewhat with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Like many cold warriors of the 1950s, Reagan embraced a relatively simplistic view of world affairs—the source of all evil was communism, primarily communism centered in Moscow and spread by the Soviets and their proxies. During his tenure in office, Reagan ordered U.S. troops to

intervene globally on a number of occasions, the most successful operation taking place on the small Caribbean island of Grenada in October 1983. Reagan ordered 1,900 U.S. troops (supported by 300 troops from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States) to liberate the island from a pro-Cuban communist faction that had seized control. The U.S. troops quickly overwhelmed the Marxist forces and restored a representative government to the island. The Reagan administration bragged that it had reversed the “Vietnam syndrome” by showing that Washington would use military force when necessary to block communist expansionism in the Western hemisphere. However, many other countries condemned the U.S. act as an illegal act of aggression, including Reagan’s closest ally, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.¹³

Grenada clearly marked the reemergence of military intervention as a tool of U.S. foreign policy after approximately a decade of post-Vietnam inhibition. However, Grenada was an operation of limited scope, with a mission against a tiny number of lightly armed forces located in a small, isolated, and easily controlled geographic space—a qualitatively different matter from an operation the size and scope of Vietnam. A more comparably valid scenario presented itself in Nicaragua, a country that had witnessed the overthrow by leftist forces of the pro-U.S. Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979. For the next decade, the shadow of Vietnam openly influenced the domestic political debate on what U.S. response was appropriate in Nicaragua, a country located in a region the United States had long considered as its exclusive sphere of influence. Turning back Marxism in Nicaragua became a personal obsession for Reagan; however, the strong fear that U.S. policy might be headed toward a Vietnam-style military intervention was prevalent among members of the U.S. Congress, who sharply curtailed the president’s ability to act in Nicaragua. Congressional limits were imposed on spending by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the support of the Nicaraguan “Contras,” a group consisting mainly of ex-National Guard troops from the Somoza dictatorship. When in 1982 members of Congress raised questions about the scope and purpose of U.S. covert operations, CIA director William Casey falsely assured them that neither the Reagan administration nor the Contras sought to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. With the memories of the Gulf of Tonkin deception echoing in the background, Congress revealed its lack of trust in the executive branch by passing a series of laws that steadily undercut funding for the Contras. In April 1984, when it was revealed that the CIA had illegally mined Nicaraguan ports and harbors, Congress acted to bar the CIA or any other U.S. intelligence agencies from aiding the Contras.¹⁴

Reagan, like his Republican predecessor, Richard Nixon, in Vietnam, would not be deterred by legal constraints. Members of his national security staff, including the NSC director Robert McFarland and his deputy and successor, Admiral John Poindexter, supervised an effort organized by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North to bypass the congressional restrictions. In part of a highly controversial and illegal strategy, North’s plan called for covertly selling arms to Iran in an attempt to free U.S. hostages in Lebanon who had been seized by pro-Iranian militants. The profits from the illegal arms sales would then be funneled to the Contras. After a U.S. transport plane was downed in Nicaragua in October 1986, the Iran-Contra scandal erupted, nearly bringing the Reagan presidency to an end. Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shultz, warned the president that his order to circumvent Congress by soliciting foreign funds for the Contras might constitute an impeachable offense, to which Reagan responded that if the story ever got out “we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House.”¹⁵ Reagan would publicly deny his knowledge of the transfer of funds from the Iranian operation to the Contras, a denial contested by Colonel North, who claimed that the president had full knowledge of North’s activities. During the Iran-Contra congressional hearings, it was revealed that North had conducted extensive planning for a U.S. military invasion of Nicaragua, which appears to be modeled on U.S. policies in Vietnam under the Eisenhower administration. North’s plans included the creation of a new Nicaraguan government made up of pro-U.S. leaders who

would declare their sovereign independence from the leftist Sandinista regime. The United States could then recognize the new government as legitimate, thereby justifying the invasion of U.S. forces to protect an allied state. Being a veteran of the Vietnam era, North knew that an explosion of antigovernment protest in the United States would erupt after any invasion. Thus his contingency plans included a declaration of marshal law in order to prevent any repeat of the domestic upheavals that had plagued the country in the late 1960s.¹⁶

Although President Reagan avoided impeachment in the Iran-Contra scandal and his various aides' direct criminal activities were mostly absolved on the basis of legal technicalities and grants of congressional immunity, for many observers the entire Nicaraguan scenario in the 1980s was a replay of the U.S. approach to Vietnam. Rather than focusing on the political history of Nicaragua and the local conditions that led to the overthrow of the Somoza regime by a populist uprising that included both communists and noncommunist forces, Reagan blamed Latin America's problems on the evil influence of the Kremlin. As in Vietnam, in Nicaragua the Reagan administration seemed unable to comprehend that nationalism could be championed by those who also professed a pro-socialist political ideology, and that the majority of Nicaraguans viewed the Sandinista regime as their legitimate government. As in Vietnam, it was falsely believed that a military solution could be found to what fundamentally was a question of political legitimacy, with the U.S.-created "contras" being viewed as illegitimate in the domestic polity of Nicaragua. As in Vietnam, in order to achieve the administration's policy goals in Nicaragua, both Congress and the American people were lied to repeatedly, and the White House pursued illegal acts. However, unlike in Vietnam, congressional oversight and influence of U.S. foreign policy were much greater, primarily through the aggressive control of funding measures. It is also clear that Colonel North's views on Nicaragua did not represent those of the majority of the U.S. military establishment, which, like Congress, was hesitant to become embroiled in what was clearly a domestic political upheaval with numerous parallels to Vietnam. The military did not want to again be blamed for losing a war, and, with the perspective gained from Vietnam, it seemed unlikely that a U.S. war in Nicaragua could be won without great cost. It was clear that an invasion of Nicaragua would require the U.S. military to reengineer fundamentally the politics of a revolutionary state that was strongly unified by the drama and sacrifice of a recently won popular struggle against a highly unpopular dictatorship. The potential quagmire in Nicaragua in the early 1980s was analogous to that in Vietnam in the mid-1950s, and the majority of the U.S. military understood this, despite the simplistic illusions of their commander in chief.

Most Americans supported President Bush's decision to send troops to Panama in December 1989, though criticism abroad was widespread. Bush's intervention had deep roots in the tangled history of U.S.-Panamanian relations. In May 1989 Manuel Noriega, the head of the armed forces who had been indicted in the United States on drug trafficking charges, annulled Panama's presidential elections. Despite the irony that Noriega had long been on the CIA's payroll, the Bush administration, embarrassed by this affront to democracy in a long-time U.S. vassal state, urged Panamanians to overthrow Noriega. In mid-December 1989 the Noriega-controlled National Assembly declared war on the United States and sanctioned the continued harassment of U.S. service personnel and their dependents, who were stationed in Panama as part of long-standing agreements. Bush responded with what can only be described as overwhelming force, including over 25,000 troops and the most advanced weapon systems in the U.S. arsenal. Within days, organized resistance was destroyed, and Noriega soon surrendered to U.S. troops. Bush's objectives were achieved: to protect the lives of U.S. citizens and the security of the Panama Canal, to take Noriega into custody, and to reestablish the elected government of Panama. The forces used in the operation were withdrawn less than two months after the operation.¹⁷ Most important, however, is that many Panamanians also strongly supported the U.S. action. Before the invasion, Noriega had attempted to foment support for

his regime by accusing the United States of “Yankee imperialism.” Although the mass of citizens were not willing to confront the Panamanian military forces as urged by Bush, nor were they willing to support Noriega’s desire for an anti-American nationalist uprising. The dreaded Vietnam-like quagmire did not develop, showing clearly that local conditions in Panama were unlike those in Indochina.

The problematic issues of post-Vietnam U.S. military intervention were again raised during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The Bush administration’s public relations campaign to gain both congressional and public support was largely built around the strategy of explaining why Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the proposed American response comprised a set of circumstances entirely different from those that led to defeat in Vietnam. Bush’s major task was to overcome opponents who argued that “Iraq was Arabic for Vietnam,” envisioning another unpopular, unwinnable war, this time in the desert. During these debates, the average American was exposed to a series of useful and informative comparisons. Vietnam was largely a civil disorder between domestic Vietnamese factions struggling to control the national government. Kuwait was the victim of a conventional invasion by an outside aggressive force bent on territorial expansion. In Vietnam, the United States had attempted to create a legitimate government; in Kuwait, the United States would restore a legitimate government. In Vietnam, the military had been constrained by political considerations that limited its ability to win the war. In Kuwait, the military would not be constrained, with maximum force being employed as rapidly as possible. According to Bush, the war in the Persian Gulf would “not be another Vietnam,” and he and his military advisers, many of whom had fought in Vietnam, would pursue the war and achieve victory on the basis of the lessons of the Vietnam defeat. In retrospect, it would appear that they kept their word. On the eve of certain victory, Bush refused to widen the war and destroy the Iraqi regime outright, instead acting within the existing framework of the international agreements that provided a legal mandate only for the liberation of Kuwait. In a euphoric victory statement, President Bush claimed, “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!”¹⁸

The president was only partially correct. The Gulf War had shown citizens of the United States that their military was capable of victory, and it had convinced decisionmakers that the government could rally popular support for the use of force abroad. However, the Gulf War’s success also clarified the vast differences between the types of struggles involved in Vietnam and the Gulf. Vietnam was not forgotten; the victory in the Gulf War reminded Americans of just how different the war in Vietnam was, a fact confirmed by the president’s own behavior. Bush’s refusal to try to solve the “Saddam problem” was not only contingent upon the international agreements that authorized the transition from Operation DESERT SHIELD (to protect Saudi Arabia) to Operation DESERT STORM, which liberated Kuwait by force. Rather, George Bush’s decision to limit the operation was also a recognition of the political and military quagmire that might have ensued if the United States had continued the invasion of Iraq with the intent of installing a new government. Who would that government consist of? How would it remain in power? Would the Iraqi people rebel against foreign occupation? Would U.S. troops be forced to prop up the new government indefinitely? What would happen to U.S. credibility in the Middle East and elsewhere? Would the American people support an extended operation that had no clear resolution, massive costs, and continual casualties? These and other questions clearly echoed Vietnam’s lasting influence on policymaking in the Bush White House.

In the years since the Gulf War, the United States has been willing to send forces into various operations, each of which has been closely scrutinized through the Vietnam lens. In the post-Cold War era, the argument over ideology has largely disappeared; however, the arguments over the utility and limits of military force remain highly salient. Perhaps the two best examples are the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. Bush was supported by the American public in his decision to send U.S. forces to Somalia in 1992,

with the goal of averting a humanitarian disaster. Domestic turmoil by warring Somali factions had paralyzed the food distribution system and threatened the lives of hundreds of thousands of Somalis with starvation. The initial mission to feed the population was remarkably successful. However, by the autumn of 1993 the U.S. mission had incrementally changed, with U.S. troops becoming embroiled in the domestic dispute. When eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed, the shade of Vietnam immediately reemerged in the domestic debate. Critics from both liberal and conservative poles of the political spectrum cited the lesson of Vietnam that the United States could not be the world's "policeman" in the "new world order" envisioned by President Bush. President Clinton agreed, ordering the withdrawal of American forces and making it clear that the "Vietnam syndrome" remained alive and well in the hearts and minds of both citizens and policymakers.¹⁹

In short, the "lessons" of Vietnam have been applied to each use of force in American foreign policy since 1973. However, it should be noted that Vietnam was a unique historical experience that may have only limited utility in determining the proper course of action in any subsequent scenario. Furthermore, there is little agreement on just what exactly the lessons of Vietnam are. The 1990 Gulf War's success rekindled the notion that massive uses of force can be the means to achieve moral, legal, and practical interests that serve both the United States and the international community. However, because the nature of the conflict in the Vietnam War was so fundamentally different from that of the Gulf War, the liberation of Kuwait has confirmed the notion that old-style forms of cross-border aggression between sovereign states are much easier to deal with using counterforce methods than are domestic civil disputes.

Thus Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia each provide a different amalgam of lessons as a result of its comparison with Vietnam. Americans have shown their willingness to support intervention in a domestic civil dispute when they perceive U.S. national interests to be at stake. However, the determination of national interest, always a problematic endeavor among the nation's foreign policy elite, will remain a matter of rancorous public discourse in the post-Vietnam era. In the cases of Grenada and Panama, Presidents Reagan and Bush did not seek public support; they acted unilaterally, correctly gambling that if rapid victory could be achieved with minimal costs, the American people would deferentially accept fait-accomplis justifications of U.S. national security interests. With the war won and their sons and daughters coming home alive and well rather than dead and wounded, most Americans were willing to overlook the complex moral, legal, and ethical issues that both of these interventions raised in the international community. However, the American public and Congress would not deferentially accept justifications for the use of force when given the opportunity to express themselves. Any proposed or ongoing intervention must pass some loosely defined "Vietnam test" before approval is given, and such approval is generally highly qualified. Clearly, Americans are willing to support intervention when they perceive a significant moral rationale, either to avert a massive humanitarian crisis or to prevent the gross violation of human rights. However, as Somalia shows, such support can rapidly be withdrawn when American casualties are incurred and there is no clear and compelling national interest at stake that justifies further sacrifice of American lives. As shown in Panama, Haiti, and Kuwait, Americans are willing to support intervention when they perceive that either internal or external forces have wrongly overthrown a legitimate government. However, Somalia clearly lacked such a government, and in the Balkans the new governments are understood to be the frangible creations of a peace imposed by the outside world, a peace that could rapidly unravel into a new quagmire of ethnic violence, from which American troops would most likely be rapidly withdrawn. In their deep-seated anxiety about Bosnia, Americans remember the most fundamental the lesson of Vietnam: no matter how much military force is brought to bear, governing legitimacy cannot be created for people by outside powers; they must create it themselves.

Public discord, dissent, and debate over the utility of military force in U.S. foreign policy remained the norm until 11 September 2001, when the long-held illusion of America as an impenetrable fortress imploded. Even though some voices still urged caution and conciliation, as the realities of American vulnerability to physical attack began to penetrate deeply into the collective psyche of the American populace, the ghosts of Vietnam were replaced by the haunting specter terrorists armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. In response, President George W. Bush ordered an immediate military assault in Afghanistan, the primary geographic base of operations for Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist organization. Bin Laden's close ties with the Afghan Taliban regime and its refusal to extradite him to the United States created common-cause among most of the world's governments, which voiced support individually and in multilateral forums such as the United Nations for a U.S.-led counter strike. The rapid success of American military operations in this far-flung and inhospitable land put to rest any doubts of the global-reach of American military power. However, having conducted what a majority of both American and global citizens considered a just and legitimate war of retaliation against an enemy regime, the second Bush administration launched a new war against Iraq in 2003.

The American-led war in Iraq, dubbed Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, generated a great deal of domestic and international discord over the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, and again the ghosts of Vietnam have reemerged. After a stunningly swift and overwhelming military campaign that lasted a little over two weeks, Saddam Hussein's government was ousted from power by a force comprised almost entirely of American and British troops. Expected by Pentagon planners to be received as liberators by a Saddam-hating Iraqi populace, the allied forces quickly became embroiled in fighting a classic low-intensity insurgency made up of Saddam-loyalists and anti-U.S. Islamic extremists from neighboring countries. At the time of writing, the exact nature of these combatants and their ability to rally support from the Iraqi populace remains uncertain; however, if judged by the increasing lethality and regularity of their attacks during the first six-months after Saddam's fall, it is clear that the United States will be faced by a nation-building task on a scale and complexity not seen since its dramatic and tragic failure in Vietnam. As such, the ghosts of Vietnam, once thought buried a decade earlier by a previous president named Bush have risen to haunt the second President Bush.

The Impact of Afghanistan on the Soviet Union

The end of the Afghan War coincided with the end of the Soviet Union itself. However, it was not a coincidence, even though it certainly was a surprise. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the USSR was perceived by many statesmen and scholars to have increased its relative power and influence vis-à-vis the United States. Even though Eisenhower's apocalyptic domino effect did not materialize in Asia in the wake of the communist victory in Vietnam, the Soviet Union was able to achieve nuclear parity, and it maintained a modest numerical advantage in conventional weapons. In addition, the states conquered in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II remained chastened, and military and political ties with leftist or "socialist-oriented" states were strengthened in Africa, Asia, and Central America. However, it is clear now that by the mid-1980s, severe economic problems were developing in the Soviet Union—problems that coincided with a renewed challenge from Washington—and that cracks in the system were widening. The United States under Reagan had renewed the arms race for techno-military superiority. Protected by a well-armed NATO, a vibrant and wealthy European Community stood in stark contrast to the comparative poverty of the Eastern bloc, and many Third World revolutionary regimes began to buckle under the heavy burdens of internal corruption, civil war, and Western political pressure. In the late 1980s these cracks had become full-blown fissures that in 1989 destroyed the Warsaw Pact, and then in 1991 shattered the very existence of the

USSR as a unified state.

What role did Afghanistan play in the downfall of the Soviet Union? Like the debate over the impact of Vietnam on the United States, this is a question that is not easily or simply answered. Most scholars agree that the war in Afghanistan certainly played some role in the Soviet collapse; however, the degree of its importance remains a topic hotly debated. A well-received book by Mark Galeotti concludes with the following emphatic assertion:

[T]o suggest that the defeat in Afghanistan doomed the USSR is patently unfounded, even if we accept the popular perception that the Soviet Union was defeated rather than the more clinical verdict that it failed to win much of a success. The events of 1991 were rooted, after all, in economic decay and the associated loss of legitimacy for a state which had long since abandoned ideology in favour of legitimization by managerial success. From a personal point of view, having spent years studying it, it would be satisfying to be able to identify the war as a pivotal event in late Soviet history: the cause of *perestroika*, the last gasp of Sovietised Russian imperialism, the final nail in the USSR's coffin. Yet, of course, it was none of these things. It was part and parcel of the catastrophes, blunders, tensions, and crises which brought the Soviet system down, from Chernobyl to food queues, the Tbilisi massacre to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Perhaps, at most, it added a particularly sanguine red hue and some dramatic imagery to the collage.²⁰

Galeotti's conclusion is representative of many mainstream Soviet and Russian area studies specialists: Afghanistan played only a minor part in the collapse of communism. Despite some empathy with his conclusion, I believe Galeotti goes too far in undervaluing the importance of Afghanistan. While I do not believe that Afghanistan was the only important factor in the myriad of elements that combined to bring down the communist regime, I do think that its role influencing events cannot be degraded to the level of insignificance that he expresses. In making my case for the importance of the Afghan experience, I will turn to a discussion of political legitimacy and the important role that Afghanistan had in undermining the Soviet state's own of legitimacy within the context of Gorbachev's reform policies. I believe that the departure from Afghan soil by the last Soviet combat soldier on 15 February 1989 represented a significant and crucial event in the rapid ideological, foreign, and domestic policy reforms undertaken by President Gorbachev. Further, concurrent with the repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the withdrawal from Afghanistan marks the first significant example of Gorbachev's reforms in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet withdrawal was important internationally because it bolstered the existing forces for reform in the Soviet bloc. In essence, I argue that Afghanistan was the first "domino" in the systematic collapse of the pro-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe, and in the fall of the supreme domino itself—the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan: Communism's First Domino

Like the American withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan was firmly rooted in domestic factors. However, unlike the Vietnam War, the primary pressure for a change in policy did not emanate from the domestic population. Rather, the decision to leave Afghanistan was made at the highest level of Soviet politics—within the leadership cadre of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's change in policy on Afghanistan was embodied by his sweeping ideological programs of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness). The revolution from above began with the intent to strengthen the Soviet Union through what was perceived as imperative internal reform measures. However, the Cold War presented Gorbachev with a difficult predicament. His plans for domestic revitalization were seen as being indefensible to conservative criticism from within the Communist Party while the Soviet Union was

confronted by powerful enemies in a hostile international environment. Therefore Gorbachev launched his reform agenda first in the realm of foreign policy with the belief that when international peace and cooperation were obtained, the regime could turn to rebuilding socialism at home. From Gorbachev's perspective, withdrawing from Afghanistan was the logical first step toward revitalizing détente with the USSR's global competitors, the United States and China, which had become significantly more confrontational after the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Thus, the withdrawal from Afghanistan was perceived as part of a larger strategic plan to achieve domestic political and economic goals.

Although the direct economic impact of Afghanistan is difficult to judge, the war was clearly one of the most significant components of the multiple foreign policy expenditures draining Soviet coffers. Beginning with Khrushchev, one of the major tools of Soviet foreign policy had been to provide economic incentives to reinforce friendly regimes and, it was hoped, to buy nonaligned ones. Like American containment policies, Soviet foreign policy under the guise of Brezhnevian "internationalism" required massive outlays, usually in the form of exceedingly cheap weapons systems, overcompensation for exports from "fraternal" countries, low-interest or no-interest loans, and outright charity. However, the indirect costs were significant as well, as noted shortly after the intervention in a first critical report by Oleg Bogomolov, the director the Institute for Economics of the World Socialist System, a leading government think tank: "Our policy has evidently gone beyond the brink of confrontation tolerance in the 'Third World' as a result of the move to send forces into Afghanistan. The benefits of the action proved insignificant compared to the damage caused to our interests. . . . Détente has been blockaded. . . . Economic and technological pressure against the Soviet Union has sharply grown. . . . The Soviet Union has now got to shoulder a new burden of economic aid to Afghanistan."²¹ Although Bogomolov and others (including Evgennii Primakov, who would be Russia's foreign minister under Yeltsin) were ignored at the time, their influence emerged when Gorbachev came to power. In his critique of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Gorbachev fully acknowledged the fact that Soviet national interests had been damaged. He stated "the foreign policy that served the utopian aim of spreading communist ideas around the world, had led us into the dead end of the Cold War, inflicting on the people an intolerable burden of military expenditure and dragged us into adventures like the one in Afghanistan."²² The war itself cost the Soviet Union approximately 5 billion rubles a year, with a total direct cost of approximately 60 billion rubles. During the *glasnost* era, one of the major public criticisms of Gorbachev's foreign policy was in regard to continued Soviet economic support for Afghanistan after withdrawal of the last troops in 1989. Many wondered why the state was spending money abroad when the average Soviet citizen was living so poorly at home. Like Americans, the Soviet masses clearly overestimated the burden of foreign aid as a percentage of overall government expenditures.²³ Nonetheless, in terms of political importance, absolute truth is often irrelevant. If Americans or Russians believe that their government is spending too much on foreign aid, the government must either act to change that perception, or pay the price in terms of the erosion of popular support.

In contemplating the withdrawal from Afghanistan, General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze were faced with credibility quandaries analogous to those that had plagued Nixon and Henry Kissinger in Vietnam. In both wars each country's guiding ideology had provided the rationale and justification for intervention, but that same ideology became a great liability during the withdrawal process. Just as the U.S. containment doctrine had morally and philosophically committed the United States to any conflict in which communists were involved, Soviet foreign policy as driven by the Brezhnev Doctrine had raised the stakes in the Soviet response during any crisis in the socialist camp. Having drawn the Cold War battle lines around its clients, the USSR required these states to conduct their domestic and foreign policies within the confined space of Soviet consent. If any state failed to correct what Moscow deemed unacceptable behavior, military intervention became a probable solution. Although some ideological

variation was tolerated in the Eastern bloc, Soviet prestige and international credibility demanded that decisive military action be taken if Moscow's policies were openly defied. From the Kremlin's perspective, any loss of prestige risked the spread of dissent in the Eastern bloc. If one state were to defy Moscow, they all might follow suit. Just as the United States feared the fall of dominos in Asia if a noncommunist South Vietnam was not preserved, the Kremlin feared the fall of dominos in Eastern Europe if any regimes under Moscow's control were allowed to act as independent sovereign nations.

In the early 1980s, Poland's communist leaders were confronted with a serious dilemma. Soviet intolerance of the increasing popularity of the independent Polish labor union, Solidarity, clearly showed the limits of their own power and independence. If the Polish authorities did not take action to repress Solidarity, the Soviets would most likely react as they had in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1981 the threat of a Soviet invasion was very tangible. Before the declaration of martial law in Poland, Soviet theorist Oleg Bykov plainly restated the Brezhnev Doctrine in warning Poland that "no one should have any doubts about the common determination of the fraternal countries to protect the socialist gains of the Polish people from infringement by counter-revolution, internal or external."²⁴ His warning was substantiated by a significant buildup and mobilization of Soviet forces on the border. As a result, the Polish military authorities heeded this omen and imposed martial law.

However, by the late 1980s the demands for ideological and political loyalty had changed dramatically. Gorbachev had determined that the Soviet economy was collapsing under the dual pressures of overextended foreign commitments and inefficient internal organization. New policies on Afghanistan would begin the process of changing the nature of Soviet foreign commitments, and these changes would affect Poland. Shortly before the revolt against communism in the winter of 1989, the state-controlled Eastern European press agencies had provided routine coverage of the negotiations that led to the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, and the press had reported on the Soviet troop withdrawal from that country. According to a brief survey of the Czechoslovakian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian, and East German press conducted by Australian political analyst Robert Miller, Poland's news agencies provided the most complete and detailed coverage of events.

Trybuna Luda, for example, carried an only slightly abridged version of Aleksandr Prokhanov's article in *Literaturnaia gazeta* featuring the argument that the Afghan adventure had been a grievous mistake, which would have "painful after-effects" on the USSR, its culture, internal politics, social conditions and the life of a significant part of a whole generation of Soviet citizens. In reporting the meeting between Gorbachev and Najibullah in Tashkent on 7 April, *Trybuna Luda*, like other Eastern European papers, noted . . . "the problems of Afghanistan and their solutions are Afghanistan's own business and no one else's," to be solved by that country as an "independent, non-aligned, neutral state."²⁵

Perhaps the most significant coverage occurred in the Polish weekly, *Polityka*, which acknowledged the "electrifying effect" of the news of the Soviet withdrawal, citing the "many open questions" on the past, present, and future of Afghanistan.²⁶ Clearly, the authors of these articles were raising in the minds of Polish citizens suggestive questions that, with little imagination, could be extended to Poland's own relationship with the USSR and the role that military force had played in coercing Polish fealty toward Moscow since World War II. As Miller notes, "the implications of this formulation for the autonomous forces in Eastern Europe were obvious, but no one seemed inclined to mention them."²⁷ However, even after making this perceptive statement on the possible implications of the Soviet withdrawal, Miller concludes that "it was clear that different rules applied to Soviet allies in the second world, namely, the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization."²⁸ Clearly, with the benefit of hindsight his initial analysis of the potential impact of

these news stories was correct; yet, like the majority of Western scholars at that time, Miller's cautious conclusion on Gorbachev's willingness to extend the Afghan model to Eastern Europe was in error.

Despite variations in the degree of coverage and in accuracy in the Eastern press, it is clear that the knowledge of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from an occupied country was not withheld from the masses of Eastern Europe. It is true that the impact of these press reports is hard to ascertain, and it cannot be said with certainty that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had a direct causal impact in spurring on the Eastern European revolutions. Yet it is impossible to ignore the fact that the revolutionary wave that exploded throughout Eastern Europe emerged only after reports that Soviet troops had actually pulled out of Afghanistan.

Further empirical evidence exists that more substantially connects these two events. Writing from prison, Adam Michnik, one of Poland's leading political dissident writers, declared in 1982, "They have no program; they have no principles; they have no respect; they have only guns and tanks."²⁹ However, Michnik was also one of the first to recognize the potential changes that Gorbachev's reform policies had initiated. In 1987 and 1988 Michnik and others in the Polish opposition began to assert increasingly that there was a growing disparity between the pace of reform in the Soviet Union and that in Poland.³⁰ Once Gorbachev's reform policies began to be accepted as genuine, the Polish military government became the first in Eastern Europe to test seriously the limits of *perestroika* and *glasnost* as they applied to Soviet foreign policy and the Brezhnev Doctrine. During the last month of the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, Solidarity was declared a legal trade union by General Wojciech Jaruzelski's government, and six months later, in June 1989, Solidarity candidates stunned the Eastern bloc by capturing 99 of 100 open seats in Poland's first partially free parliamentary elections.³¹ When the results of the election were allowed to stand both by the Polish military and, more important, by the Soviet Union, the rules of power politics had explicitly changed in Eastern Europe. In Afghanistan, the Soviets had first abandoned one of their allied communist regimes. By not forcing the Polish military to crack down on internal dissent as it had on all previous occasions since World War II, the Soviets had clearly revoked the Brezhnev doctrine in Eastern Europe.

The more direct connection between the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Eastern European revolution is made by Czech President Vaclav Havel in the preface of a book in which he states: "Many journalists and scholars will look for the correlation of that chain of spectacular transformations that changed as if at one blow, the fates of tens of millions of individuals and hitherto firm bipolar picture of the modern world. I believe this book will be one of the first important impulses in that direction."³² One of the contributing authors to the book clearly states that Havel's "one blow" was first struck in Afghanistan. Andrei Piontkowsky, an active participant in the "Democratic Russia" movement and adviser to the liberal Inter-Regional Group in the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, wrote:

The experience in Afghanistan was crucial in stimulating this rethinking. Afghanistan showed the limitations of military power very clearly and convincingly. Even the most hard-line generals and political and military analysts in the Kremlin understood this message. So it would be fair, if a little surprising to Europeans, to say that it was not so much thinkers in the corridors of the Kremlin as the Mujahadin in the hills of Afghanistan who were the real liberators of Eastern Europe.³³

Perestroika and *glasnost*, the new Soviet policies that made these changes possible, would have been made morally bankrupt if any military action had been taken in Eastern Europe. In December 1988, during the final months of the Afghan withdrawal, Gorbachev announced in a speech at the United Nations that the USSR would unilaterally withdraw some of its military forces from Eastern Europe, without insisting on a

quid pro quo from Washington and NATO. It was a particularly candid expression of Moscow's sincere intent to retreat from the globalist/imperialist posture that had characterized its foreign policy in Eastern Europe since World War II. In a speech in Italy in September 1989, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennediy Gerisomov said that the USSR has "replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine, which exists no longer and perhaps never existed, with the Frank Sinatra Doctrine from the title of one of his famous songs, 'I did it my way'."³⁴ Thus Gorbachev's new policies, which had been received with much skepticism in the West in 1987, had become institutionalized in Soviet foreign policy by 1989. The Brezhnev Doctrine, which had justified the deaths of thousands in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, was officially laid to rest with a light-hearted quip from Gerisomov.

There is no question that the multiple political, social, and economic forces that fueled the democratic movements in Eastern Europe had been slowly multiplying since the beginning of the Cold War. Nor is there a debate that parts of Eastern Europe had been sovereign between the two world wars, and the dissident movements that led the 1989 revolution had continued to operate underground even in the most oppressive periods of Soviet-backed totalitarian rule. Gorbachev's abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine contained a critically important political message: the Soviet Union would no longer defend its allied regimes against populist uprisings by their own peoples. As noted in the case of Poland, it was a message not lost on either government officials or their domestic opponents, and throughout the rest of Eastern Europe, domestic grassroots opposition to the Stalinist-modeled one-party statist regimes coalesced quickly among the general population. In Hungary and Poland the less rigid communist regimes reached out to the rapidly germinating democratic elements, and within a year were peacefully replaced in power by the democratic forces. In Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania the communist regimes resisted change more forcefully, with the Romanian democratic revolution being marked by significant bloodshed. However, the result was the same—the communist governments were all overthrown, in large part because of their inability to disassociate themselves from their past connection with the Soviet Union. In the case of Afghanistan, the regime of Najibullah had little choice but to fight on. The somewhat surprising 3-year survival of Najibullah's government was assisted by the historic fissure in Afghan politics, which quickly invoked infighting among the tribal-based groups after Soviet forces were withdrawn in 1989. However, as different as they may appear to be at first glance, the countries of Eastern Europe and Afghanistan shared the common fate of having been invaded and occupied by Soviet troops when their internal political situations threatened perceived Soviet national interests. Because of this shared trauma, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was a signifier of hope. Actions in Afghanistan were the first concrete sign to the rest of the "socialist commonwealth" that Moscow was willing to match the rhetoric of *perestroika* with action. Even though Eastern Europe's predisposition for revolution existed long before the late 1980s, the actual expression of any people's revolution occurred only after Gorbachev's removal of troops from Afghanistan and the subsequent affirmations by Gorbachev that the Red Army would not again be used to support the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Afghanistan was the first place where this revolution in foreign policy took place. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was a harbinger of the fall of the communist "dominos" in Eastern Europe. In 1992 this sequential reality was confirmed by *perestroika*'s foremost patron in foreign policy. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze makes the final connection by declaring, "*The decision to leave Afghanistan was the first and most difficult step. . . . Everything else flowed from that.*"³⁵

End of Force—End of Union

From the founding of the Soviet state in 1917, the declared enemies of socialism were either

imprisoned, forced into exile, or shot. State violence was used extensively in order to maintain complete political control over Soviet society. When the Soviet Union expanded its sphere of influence after the Second World War, military and secret police forces were the primary tool used to maintain Soviet dominance in the outer empire. The need to use force, fear, and terror to Sovietize most of Eastern Europe demonstrated the primary weakness of the Soviet system, and once force had been used to keep its titular “allies” in line, the USSR became largely dependent on force to remain in control. At its core, military force was the key ingredient in holding both the outer empire and the internal union together. Ironically, Gorbachev’s grand strategy for breaking this dependence on force led to the destruction of the entire system. The last communist “domino” to fall in the wave of democratic political reform that swept the Eastern Block in the dramatic period of 1989-1991 was the Soviet Union itself.

By 1988 the Soviet public had become much more attuned to the problems of Afghanistan. On the domestic level, Gorbachev was faced with growing public dissatisfaction with the war as the human costs became increasingly tangible over the years. Like the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet military’s inability to win the Afghan War decisively brought home the negative aspects of the war: battlefield deaths, POWs and MIAs, wounded veterans, mentally and physically ill veterans, and veterans with drug addiction. Veterans of the Afghan War, all conscripts, rotated home at periodic intervals, which permitted the travails, frustrations, self-doubts, and horror stories of the common soldier to be shared by the entire population. The problems exposed in the wartime army soon became a microcosm for the internal weakness of the society as a whole. According to one study:

The messages of doubt were military, political, ethnic, and social. In the end they were corrosive and destructive. One needs only review the recently released casualty figures to underscore the persuasiveness of the problem. Soviet dead and missing in Afghanistan amounted to almost 15,000 troops, a modest percent of the 642,000 Soviets who served during the 10-year war. Far more telling were the 469,685 other casualties, fully 73 percent of the overall force, who were wounded or incapacitated by serious illness. Some 415,932 troops fell victim to disease, of which 115,308 suffered from infectious hepatitis and 31,080 from typhoid fever. Beyond the sheer magnitude of these numbers is what the figures say about Soviet military hygiene and the conditions surrounding troop life. These numbers are unheard of in modern armies and modern medicine and their social impact among the returnees and the Soviet population was staggering.³⁶

Because of Gorbachev’s policy of *glasnost*, press reports on the Afghan War were also being printed that did not simply promote a glossy official line, thus increasing public awareness and dissatisfaction with the war. During the Brezhnev years, there had been no war at all—Soviet soldiers were simply helping the Afghans, who welcomed them with open arms. Under Andropov and Chernenko some fighting was reported; however, most reports simply glorified the prowess of the Soviet fighting machine. Under Gorbachev the extent of coverage widened rapidly, with stories of veterans’ experiences being used to enhance the reform process, undermine conservative critics inside the Communist Party, and outflank the ossified bureaucracy. At the 27th Party Congress in February 1988, Gorbachev had called the war a “bleeding wound,” a statement that inspired members of the Soviet press to steadily test the limits of *glasnost*. Politically Gorbachev wanted the war to be linked to the failed foreign and domestic policies of the Brezhnev era. Any opposition to the Afghan withdrawal was therefore linked to support of the previous regime. Gorbachev perceived that the battle to restructure Soviet society at home could only be helped by ending the war in Afghanistan and by unmasking its dark side by freeing censorship in television, movies, music, art, and literature. On all levels, in various forms and degrees, reports on the horrors and heroism of Afghanistan extensively penetrated the cultural space of Soviet society.³⁷ The political sphere was penetrated directly as well. After a remarkable series of heated debates between dissident Andrei Sakharov

and various conservative members of the legislature, the Supreme Soviet declared in December 1989 that the Afghan War had been an immoral act in violation of international human rights standards and illegal under international law. No similar declaration of guilt has ever been adopted by the U.S. Government regarding Vietnam. In 1990 the Soviets continued to confess old sins, apologizing for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and going so far as to declare the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact illegal, thus opening a Pandora's box of territorial legal questions and fanning the long-smoldering embers of Baltic independence into open flame.

In an interview on the granting of independence to the Baltic states, Alexander Karpjenko, a Soviet veteran wounded in Afghanistan, cites the importance of Afghanistan in the destruction of the Soviet empire. "Afghanistan was a crucial link in the chain. Our failure in Afghanistan and Gorbachev's decision to introduce *glasnost* raised questions about the proper role of the Soviet army. Russian mothers began insisting that their sons be brought home."³⁸ Once Gorbachev broke the ideological constructs of the "socialist commonwealth" and denounced the use of force to maintain Soviet influence, there was little else to hold the empire together. Internally, the empire crumbled because violent force was no longer seen as a legitimate and effective tool of state power. Military force was used to keep the Baltic States in line from 1988 to 1991. However, when Soviet soldiers refused in late August 1991 to obey the coup leadership's orders to crack down in Moscow, the independence movement was destined to succeed. By removing Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Gorbachev had set in motion a tide of social forces that eventually destroyed the Soviet Union as a unified state.

In April 1992 the last Soviet-installed leader of Afghanistan, President Najibullah, surrendered power. Oddly, Afghanistan, where the end of Soviet hegemony was initiated, was the last Soviet-backed regime to fall, surviving longer than its patron. In commenting on Najibullah's departure, Robert B. Oakley, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan (1988-91), summarized Afghanistan's importance: "The unraveling of the Cold War began there. When the Soviet people asked why their leaders were wasting lives and treasure in a remote, backward country in a time they were facing massive domestic problems, it was the beginning of the end for the whole Soviet experiment."³⁹ Oakley's view was echoed by Afghanistan's first post-communist president, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi. During the ceremony that officially transferred power from Najibullah's regime to the Islamic rebels, Mujaddidi claimed credit on behalf of the Afghans for the Soviet Union's demise. "No one believed that our resort to arms would destroy a superpower and destroy communism. But we believe God is the only superpower."⁴⁰ Mujaddidi's words are revealing, if somewhat exaggerated. The Afghans' resort to arms was one of many factors that led to the destruction of a superpower. However, Soviet communism was finally destroyed after its leaders renounced the use of force by arms to maintain power and, once fear of arrest or execution had dissipated, the citizenry rebelled.

In addition to the linkage between the breaking of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Afghanistan and the revolution in Eastern Europe, the Soviet/Afghan experience has more direct generative linkage to the final days of the Soviet state. As widely narrated in newspaper and television reports from the makeshift blockades in the streets of Moscow, the vast majority of anti-coup forces were young men between the ages of 20 and 40, most of whom had military experience under the Soviet system of universal conscription. Veterans of the Afghan War were present in large numbers and were largely responsible for guarding the Russian Republic parliamentary building during the critical hours of the aborted coup in Moscow. Artyom Borovik, a Soviet journalist and author of *The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan*, helped to man the barricades while reporting for the American television network CBS's highly acclaimed *60 Minutes* program. After numerous interviews, he reported that Afghan War veterans were committed to the internal reforms started by Gorbachev and would die before allowing a

return of the old leadership that had sent them to Afghanistan.⁴¹ Clearly, many Afghan War veterans in Moscow were willing to lie down in front of tanks to protect the reform process symbolized by Boris Yeltsin and the Russian parliament building. After having personally experienced the failure of Brezhnev's socialist internationalism in Afghanistan, opposing the coup was of paramount importance to these veterans. Two of the three men killed on the night of 20 August 1991, Dmitri Komar and Iliya Krichevsky, were Afghan War veterans.⁴²

On the other side of the barricades, the legacy of Afghanistan was also at work. Soviet generals who had served in Afghanistan were involved in carrying out the coup, and many of their soldiers were veterans of the Afghan War. However, in the final test of loyalties, three of the last commanders in Afghanistan, Aleksandar Rutskoi, Pavel Grachev, and Boris Gromov, joined with Yeltsin's forces. Both Grachev and Gromov had been involved in coup plans to storm the Russian parliament building, but, during the second day of the coup, Grachev and Gromov refused to give orders for the attack when it became apparent that a massive loss of life would result. Gromov took a series of steps that effectively sabotaged the coup by informing his fellow Afghan War veterans inside the building that an attack was being planned. Grachev was responsible for urging the Russian leadership to summon as many supporters as possible because "the attacking forces will not dare open fire on the people."⁴³ Rutskoi, who had been shot down by a Stinger missile on one of his 428 combat missions in Afghanistan, had become on his return from service a leading champion of parliamentary democracy and a major figure during the August coup.

Elite Soviet KGB troops of the celebrated Alpha group also refused to participate. Many Alpha members were Afghan War veterans and had been responsible for the death of Amin during the storming of the presidential palace in Kabul in December 1979. Anatoly Savelev, one such member, stated, "Everyone is free to act as his conscience determines. But I personally will not take part in a storming of the White House." His words were echoed by General Grachev, who informed Yeltsin, "I am a Russian and will never allow the army to spill the blood of my own people." Yeltsin was informed also that Grachev was so committed to stopping the coup that he had arranged plans to bomb the Kremlin if coup leaders attempted to storm the building. Yeltsin rewarded Grachev's loyalty by appointing him minister of defense in his new government; Rutskoi became Yeltsin's vice president; and Gromov, the "Lion of Afghanistan," remained a deputy commander of ground forces after the coup, even though he had run for president against Yeltsin in 1991 and at one time was seen as one of Yeltsin's many rivals.⁴⁴ Thus, on many levels; international, cultural, and individual, Afghanistan proved to be a critical turning point in Russian history.

Conclusions

Perhaps the most important lesson that can be derived from this comparison has to do with our understanding of political legitimacy in the domestic polities of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both superpowers ended their interventions because of domestic pressures, although in the United States it was pressure from the masses and in the USSR it was pressure from within the government. In the United States, President Johnson was driven from politics because of his inability both to win the war and to fulfill his strategic vision of a Great Society for all Americans. Although the Tet offensive in 1968 was a military disaster for communist forces located south of the 17th parallel—a defeat from which they never fully recovered—it was the turning point in the war's legitimacy crisis in the United States, where the ruling political elite were willing to continue the war, but the population increasingly was not. Americans had been given numerous promises and assurances that their sons and daughters would be home soon, that the war was being won, that South Vietnam was a bastion of democracy, and that the United States had always

pursued the war in accordance with the laws and ideals of American society. Thus, the very fact that the communist's Tet offensive could happen at all came as a great shock to Americans. The trauma of Tet began to peel away the multiple layers of naive trust that Americans held in their government—or, perhaps more accurately, Tet ultimately revealed the façade of Cold War illusions that the government had fabricated around an overly trusting public.

Ironically, Tet also undermined the legitimacy of the communist forces in the South, which were rendered militarily destitute by their near destruction by the U.S. and GVN forces. From 1956 to 1968 the war was fought in the South by members of the local population supported by those in the North. However, from 1969 to 1975, primarily soldiers from the North who infiltrated South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail fought the war in South Vietnam. As for the American commitment to fight on behalf of Vietnam, the war was essentially over after Tet, in no small part because of its influence on the 1968 election in the United States and President Johnson's decision to end his otherwise brilliant political career. Nixon was elected in large part because of his promise to end the war in Vietnam while keeping America's international credibility and honor intact.

Although Nixon fulfilled this promise, he too was driven from office. Why? In the politics of the United States, the ends do not always justify the means—especially if the means violate the sources of legitimacy in American politics. Due process, the separation of powers, and constitutional legality are the fundamental sources of political legitimacy in the American political system. Nixon eventually ended the war in Vietnam, but in doing so he violated the lawful boundaries of the office of the American presidency.

Both Nixon and Johnson were ruined in part because they violated the accepted norms of American politics. Both presidents were caught in half-truths, deception, and outright lies regarding various aspects of the war. This behavior was unacceptable, especially in the context of a war that would cost 58,000 American lives, over a million Vietnamese lives, and uncounted billions of dollars in national treasure. Further, once the process began, Americans wanted to know what other forms of duplicity had been perpetuated upon them. Deception regarding the war, including its origins in Vietnamese history; U.S. original support for Ho Chi Minh during the Second World War; Eisenhower's abrogation of the democratic elections promised in the Geneva accords of 1954; and Kennedy's involvement in the coup d'état that killed President Diem were some of the major dishonorable acts dredged up for U.S. citizens to consider. They did not (and do not) enjoy the flavor of this slice of American history.

Nevertheless, despite being shaken to its core, the American constitutional system remained intact and mostly legitimate in the view of the American people. American democracy, like all modern democratic regimes, has a number of self-correcting mechanisms, primarily in the form of elections, but also in the form of laws for the removal of figures from high office. Hence when the rational-legal authority of the modern state is violated, the state itself—the “system”—has the ability to survive by addressing its shortcomings through legislation. The system may in fact have flaws, but individuals are usually seen as the cause for failures of the system. Individuals are replaced during elections, and the system is tinkered with, but the basic constitutional structure remains the same. The greatest damage of strategic failure in Vietnam was to the attitudes of Americans toward their government, themselves, and their place in the world. However, perhaps even here a silver lining can be discerned. In the wake of Vietnam, Americans once again became willing to question their leaders. Only after Vietnam had destroyed the self-righteous illusions and myths that Americans had constructed around themselves after World War II did Americans remember that blind trust in their leaders was a potential recipe for disaster. Vietnam was a searing experience for the nation, but at some level, perhaps, the United States emerged improved from the experience. For a time, the hubris of

superpower was humbled, and I suspect that until the last generation of Americans who lived through the Vietnam War passes into history, the United States will not again be involved in a war in which its citizens fail to keep close tabs on what their government is doing, both in rhetoric and in reality.

There were no Tets for the Soviets in Afghanistan; there was no similar battlefield crisis to foment a legitimacy crisis in Soviet society comparable with the Tet offensive's impact on the United States. The Mujahideen, unlike the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Vietnam, never attempted to overthrow the Soviet forces in a single, coordinated, country-wide military assault and popular uprising. In all likelihood, such a unified effort was impossible in Afghanistan, simply because it would have required the cooperation and coordination of too great a number of disparate political groups that, although unified in the struggle to oust the Soviet army, were not unified under a single umbrella of Afghan nationalism to the extent seen in Vietnam. In political terms, however, the Soviet Union perhaps did experience something of its own Tet offensive in the form of the crisis of legitimacy caused by Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, which were first rendered into tangible policy acts in Afghanistan. Like Nixon, Gorbachev pulled out of Afghanistan to achieve objectives that he perceived as crucial to the national interests of the Soviet Union. Like the Tet offensive, the message to the Soviet people was delivered primarily through decreasing controls on the press, which became the vehicle for promoting change. Still, the fate of the Soviet Union stands in sharp contrast to the final fallout of Vietnam on American society. In making his reforms, Gorbachev employed a public relations strategy that, instead of strengthening the Union, ultimately destroyed it entirely. Why?

During the Soviet era, the authority of the state was *officially* portrayed in rational-legal terms, and the regime had all the accoutrements of rational-legal authority that characterize modern states: a written constitution, an elective legislative body, an executive bureaucracy, and regular elections. Viewed collectively, the various drafts of the Soviet constitution all *officially* guaranteed the Soviet citizens an extensive complement of civil, political, and economic rights, often exceeding those of Western democracies. Likewise, elections and voting took place on the national, regional, and local levels. However, in reality, all aspects of Soviet politics—from the construction of the organs of the state, to relations among the fifteen republics, to the rights and obligations of the average citizen—were contingent on the monopoly on power held by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although political parties are often considered to be a characteristic of modern, rational-legal politics, in the Soviet case power and legitimacy in the Communist Party was characterized by a peculiar amalgam of charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal sources of authority. For example, charismatic elements were seen in the “cult of personality” that sprung up around each successive Soviet leader. The longer any individual leader served in the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party, the more that person began to accrue the absolute power of the Czar, as the office and the person merged. Continuity with traditional sources of legitimacy was best expressed by the use of military force and police terror to maintain the state. Rational-legal elements of legitimacy existed in form, but lacked true substance in comparison to the other sources. Despite Gorbachev's reforms, the rule of law never was able to free itself from the rule of the Party during the Soviet era.

In a broader historical context, then, we can perhaps best understand the Soviet Union as a transition regime between what political sociologists describe as premodern and modern states. In the Czarist order, power, authority, and legitimacy were deeply embedded in traditional and charismatic elements, and these remained vibrant in the Soviet era. In essence both Czars and commissars justified their monopoly of absolute power on a very narrow set of criteria. At the foundation of the Czarist order lay tradition, orthodox mysticism, the divine right of aristocratic rule, and coercive military power as the final arbiter of rule. At the foundation of the Soviet regime lay a superior ideology, the principal role of the Party to propagate and to

guarantee the survival of that ideology, and coercive military power as the final arbiter of rule. As such, both regimes based their ruling legitimacy on claims of superiority, the guardianship of truth, basic infallibility, and fear. When challenged by internal dissent, both Czarist and Soviet regimes remained in power through the extensive use of military force, state violence, and terror. As discussed above, during both the Czarist and the Soviet era, war loss challenged the basic legitimacy of the state and resulted in structural reforms. The claim of superiority and infallibility could only be maintained in time of military success. In defeat, the state was seen as unreliable and possibly inferior to its worldly opponents. Only in times of war loss, when a regime had fallen into a condition of proven fallibility, did political change ever take place in Russia.

The crucial importance of repressive means of control for the survival of these regimes is perhaps best illustrated in its absence. The end of the Soviet empire would not have occurred in the period of 1989-91 without Gorbachev's rejection of the use of force as enshrined in his *glasnost* and *perestroika* policies. In an ideal sense, these policies were a strategic attempt to reform the Soviet Union by abandoning traditional authority asserted from within the Communist Party by institutionalizing a more genuine form of rational-legal authority and the rule of law. In true rational-legal authority, democracy can be authentic only if people can choose their political leaders. Elections can be genuine only if they are free from manipulation by the state. Due process can be certain only if the rules apply to everyone equally. However, despite Gorbachev's desire to reform the Communist Party, the ruling regime could not be separated from the instruments of power upon which it relied. The "ways" of control essentially defined the legitimacy of the Soviet system. Once Gorbachev had renounced the use of force to maintain Communist Party dictatorship, there was very little left to make the government legitimate in the minds of the population. End of force resulted in end of empire and end of union.⁴⁵ Although he clearly did not intend for the Soviet Union to collapse, in a transcendent sense Gorbachev succeeded in creating a more modern rational-legal democracy in Russia. In the wake of Vietnam, Americans learned again to beware of unsupervised power. In the wake of Afghanistan, Russians and others living in much of the territorial space of the old Soviet empire have been provided with a similar opportunity as part of the ongoing evolution of politics in the newly democratized states.

Throughout history war has always been the ultimate test of a state's ruling legitimacy, and the superpowers' experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan reaffirm this age-old truth. Vietnam is the only war that the United States ever completely lost, and Afghanistan is the only war that the Soviet Union ever completely lost. The strategic formulation choices in both cases ended in great stress and discord in one country, and outright disaster (from a regime-survival point of view) in another. From a comparative perspective, it is clear that Afghanistan's impact on the ultimate fate of the Soviet Union was much greater than Vietnam's impact on the United States. The United States survived Vietnam, and the Soviet Union did not survive Afghanistan. Therefore, despite multiple layers of analogy, in comprehensive terms Afghanistan was not the Soviet Vietnam; and mercifully, Vietnam was not the American Afghanistan.

Notes - Chapter 10

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PART III

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

CHAPTER 11

ECONOMICS: AMERICAN ELEMENT OF POWER OR SOURCE OF VULNERABILITY?

Clayton K. S. Chun

The early Romans worshipped Janus, one of their many panoply of gods. Janus, the god of beginnings, was frequently depicted as two-faced. One face looked at new beginnings, while the other looked to the past. In many respects, the economic element of national power is like Janus. Economics has two faces: one as a dominant element of power and the other as a source of potential susceptibility to the nation. Economic activity provides a potent source of power that includes the ability to produce goods and services, influence, a tool to weaken a possible foe, and an objective to protect in terms of a national asset. The United States is blessed with a rare combination of labor, capital, raw materials, and geography that has allowed it to become the leading global economic power. Conversely, economics is also a source of vulnerability or weakness for a nation. The nation can exist without international trade; however, the standard of living for its citizens and its wealth would certainly suffer. This nation's economy is inextricably linked to countries large and small throughout the world. We purchase many finished goods and raw materials from around the world. Similarly, we get capital from foreign nations, businesses, and individuals to help finance governmental and commercial ventures. Real and perceived disturbances in the global economy can certainly affect actions that reach this country's shores.

Economics, for many people, is a complex subject. The topic can entail highly mathematical models or arcane issues that, on the surface, do not seem to have much relevance to national security. However, the world does revolve around economics. Economics is simply the study of the use of constrained resources. One of national leadership's main concerns involves the acquisition of additional resources or trying to maximize the use of the nation's resources. In this respect, the United States tries to expand its ability, within these constrained resources, to make goods and services and extend its access around the world to get more. These objectives naturally come into conflict from a host of domestic and international sources. On the domestic side, members of Congress and the President might disagree about how much we will spend on military or healthcare programs. More interesting are international issues. A nation's ability to get strategic raw materials necessary for its economic security is vulnerable to potential rivals that may refuse access to those materials.

This chapter explores economics as an element of national power. The most potent and flexible ability of the United States to influence events worldwide may not be military, but economic. Increasingly, national leadership may find exercising military power difficult to accomplish. A basic understanding of the scope of the nation's economic power will help the reader think about how the country can use it along with other elements of power—political, military, and informational. The chapter addresses what makes an economy strong and how the nation can use its economic power to achieve its national interests. Although the it

focuses on the United States, much, if not all, of this discussion is applicable to other countries. This examination can help the reader evaluate the economic capabilities and limitations of nation-states.

What Makes an Economy Strong?

The United States is fortunate that its economy is, at present, the preeminent one in the world. The nation's businesses and her people can draw on a host of resources that they can convert to capabilities expressed in to an effective military or other element of power. What does a nation require to do so? One can certainly use the United States as an example to analyze. No matter what the size or strength of national economies, they have certain common characteristics that allow them to flex their economic power. No matter what problems a nation has, most have some ability to use their resources to conduct economic activities.

Every nation in the world has some type of national resource that it can parlay into economic power. For some, it might involve a natural resource like oil or some other type of raw material. However, not all countries have the luxury of self-sustaining supplies of raw materials. Instead, a nation might have the benefit of other types of national resources that can compensate for basic raw materials. Three types of resources might allow a nation's industry to provide value-added activities that transform the worth of raw minerals or components into a product or service that allows that state to extract economic gain and allow it the wherewithal to provide national security. Human, capital, and technological resources are some of the most visible means that nations can use to strengthen their economies and where they might be vulnerable.

Human resources involve the skill and abilities of labor and management. A highly educated and motivated labor force can increase the capabilities of an economy through improved productivity or flexibility to change scope or direction of activities. Additionally, management of firms that provide leadership, innovation, and acceptance of risk, coupled with a labor force, can introduce new or better products. Nations such as Singapore have compensated for the lack of geography and raw materials to become a regional economic power in Southeast Asia. Singapore's economy depends of its biggest resource, people, to provide value to the nation's production of finished goods from consumer to high-tech products, like electronics, that depends on skilled labor.

Increasingly, capital resources have become very important assets that allow a nation to control the investment or production of goods and services. Capital can take the form of physical plant or financial assets. Physical plants, the traditional image of industrial might, allows a nation to transform raw materials into goods. Financial resources allow for the construction of new or modifications of existing physical plants in the country. More frequently, countries rely on financial resources to acquire means of production by building or purchasing productive capacity or other activities outside of their borders. Such investment in the form of foreign-owned businesses is often welcomed by countries with other resources, but little capital or technical knowledge.

Nations can also replace or substitute products through technological advancement. A nation's ability to provide resources to research, develop, and further educate their people can lead to new applications of science and knowledge to solve problems—in other words, technology. Technological advances can replace existing weapon and support systems to enhance or expand warfighting capability. Acquiring technology through a nation's own human resources or with capital resources can allow the nation to make great leaps in economic progress. The People's Republic of China attracted billions of dollars in foreign direct

investment through favorable business terms, e.g., cheap labor or taxes, and aggressively seeking critical knowledge through activities like sending graduate students to nations that possess desired technology. Foreign business ventures allow technology transfer through design, production techniques, and management skills.

A nation's government has a significant impact on the performance on an economy. Government policies to improve business and labor activities can motivate market activities that may lead to innovation or the motivation to compete. These actions can allow the nation's population to develop the state's economic power. Similarly, the government can fund activities to improve common public infrastructure that provides a foundation for growth to include roads, utilities, and other basic services to operate an economy. Governments can also send a message to their people on how they will treat business activities. Will the government operate publicly owned enterprises that compete unfairly with private business? Does the government punish business with onerous taxes or uncompetitive labor laws? These and other activities can challenge the economic future of a nation. Indeed, government plays a large role in the domestic economy, but it also affects international events. National governments might agree to international standards of the World Trade Organization, support regional alliances, or encourage the free flow of goods, services, and capital that may affect economic relations with other states.

Not all nations possess all of the aforementioned resources. They use a combination of these resources to convert those assets they have or can acquire into a capability. Even though the United States dominates over all individual nations economically, it is not self-sufficient today for all raw materials, goods, services, and capital. The nation must import many components to sustain its economy. The subsequent trading relationships have forced greater reliance on and interest in events around the world that can create pressures on other resources and the economy itself. Nations that have historically had little impact because of trade relations or possessed raw materials of limited value in the past are now capable of influencing American foreign policy actions. These nations have either a direct linkage to or indirectly affect America's economy. For example, the United States has attempted to seek oil sources from other than Persian Gulf nations. Some of the largest sources of available oil imports are from Venezuela and Nigeria. This reliance on Venezuelan and Nigerian oil gives those nations a heretofore unknown influence on U.S. foreign policy. Failure to consider them or problems within their region can produce hefty economic penalties to the nation and the global economy. Although the amounts are smaller than Saudi Arabia or some other oil producers, oil prices can spike up throughout the world that directly "taxes" production costs due to higher prices at the gas pump and for many products. However, the effect does not stop there. Higher world oil prices also threaten the economic health of many small nations. This, in turn, affects their ability to produce exported goods and services and can seriously reduce their ability to buy imported American goods.

Economics as an Element of Power

National power is a very topical issue today. Countries that desire to achieve certain goals or objectives can do so in many ways in this complex world. Although most people equate national power with military power, many situations in international politics are not appropriate for the sole use of military means to solve a problem. Often, a combination of other elements, with or without the military, might accomplish the objective faster and with better results. Perhaps one way to think about national power is the capacity to create capabilities that a nation can use to undertake actions to achieve its national interests. In this light, a strong economy provides the means to allow national leaders the ways to attain desired ends. The economy does this through a number of measures by providing the goods and services necessary to carry out selected

actions.

A nation could either produce those goods and services themselves through domestic production, or acquire them through international sources. The United States has been able to mobilize its economy to fight wars and to provide resources to her allies. Certainly, the United States was able to significantly aid in the defeat the Axis powers in World War II through its role as the “arsenal of democracy.” American-made aircraft, tanks, small arms, clothing, and food helped arm and feed the armed forces and liberated peoples around the world. American business and labor leaders were able to transition the economy from a depression-era subsistence production level to a fully mobilized economy that made military and, albeit limited, civilian goods and services available. Times have changed. Today, with the globalization of the economy, the United States and other nations must progressively go beyond their shores to get products. Trade access and the financial wherewithal allows the country to get those goods that are not available in the United States either because they are not manufactured here or the domestic economy does not produce enough of the item for our nation’s use. The nation could purchase them from a foreign source or finance the building of productive capacity as a foreign subsidy.

National leadership can take several approaches to addressing potential security concerns. In most cases, a government concentrates on three approaches for security policy. Economics is a vital element as a part of these security discussions. A government can use an instrument or combination of instruments of power to persuade, coerce, or defeat an adversary.¹ A nation could try to persuade or use influence to change what a power might believe or value. Similarly, a country might want to change certain of its adversary’s behaviors. A state could then use coercion to force modifications of selected behaviors. Finally, the nation’s government might try to eliminate another power’s ability to take certain actions or capabilities through defeating them in some endeavor. Economics can be used in all three cases independently or along with political, military, and informational elements of power.

A government can persuade or influence another state that perhaps what they value or believe is fundamentally flawed.² The United States could illustrate the benefits or costs of taking a particular position. Instead of maintaining closed markets or limiting the production of products or raw materials, better economic gains or prosperity would result by allowing more open trade. One might use examples of nations that allowed increased privatization of state-owned enterprises or eliminated high import tariffs that led to increased standards of living.

Economic success and gain are easily seen. Improved standards of living manifested in material and financial wealth, mortality rates, education, and other measurable means are very powerful as evidence of economic growth. In our hemisphere, many nations in Central and South America have seen the success in many areas of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Not only has it improved industry and increased jobs across borders, but it has helped improve intergovernmental relations in many respects. Central American nations might also see political benefits through improved cooperation between themselves by using a similar agreement as a device for better relations.³ Mexico and Canada have seen increased investment in their countries by U.S. businesses that have directly advanced their country economically. Other nations could easily see the potential benefits from economic integration.

Coercion takes on a more ominous image than persuasion. Instead of trying to voluntarily change behavior from within, coercion attempts to force changes in measured behavior. A nation can take two routes to coerce another: deter or compel.⁴ Deterrence involves getting an opponent to realize that if it takes a certain action, then any result from that action will become more costly to it than any potential gains. For

example, a nation might use the threat of force to dissuade another from taking a contemplated action. Nations could also deter other nations by getting them to join an alliance or agreement to force them to accept certain standards of behavior and reject others. Similarly, a nation could compel other states to take certain actions. Nations can use threats or more positive means to force adversaries to take a particular avenue to solve a problem.

A government can use economic means to deter or compel another to take certain actions. The United States could use her economy to deny essential goods or services from a potential adversary. The nation can simply refuse to sell certain items to that country, outbid rivals for the sale of the items so that the targeted country cannot purchase the items, deny them the ability to sell good and services that would reduce their ability to buy certain resources, or get other countries to act against the state in question. A strong economy has a great say among producers and consumers around the world. In some respects, even if the nation is concerned about buying a product from another country, the United States could moderate the seller's behavior. Suppose the seller of a raw material decides to export that product to an American adversary. We could use our purchasing power to buy or use the threat to buy all of the surplus; pressure the seller not to allow the sale of the product to the adversary by threatening to buy the product from someone else; or withhold sales of a product to the selling nation. Certainly, the options are numerous, given the strength of the economy compared to a weak economy that lays that country open to many vulnerabilities.

A nation can also use its economy to try to defeat another power. The nation can use its economic power in attempts to destroy a target's capability to take certain actions or destroy its ability to project power. Although physical defeat of the enemy is more often associated with military operations, economic means are also viable to support the elimination of a nation's ability to take certain actions. These economic measures could allow only one course of action open to the adversary, one chosen by the power that destroyed the economy.

Perhaps a nation could target a particular segment of an opponent's economy for destruction that would render it vulnerable to other actions. Let's suppose that a nation relies primarily on manufacturing for domestic and international sales. Further, this manufacturing capability is tied to steel production. A nation or combination of nations can try to limit a raw material used in its steel production; out-produce the target and sell the raw material at a low price; convince others to boycott the adversary's products; or find some other way to choke off vital manufacturing capability to permanently destroy the capability to make steel. As mentioned earlier, this nation lent vital economic aid to allied countries during World War II. Some might argue that it was American economic power that out-produced the Axis powers' economies in terms of armaments to defeat them. The United States, as the world's largest and most diverse economy, has many options it can take in using its ability to influence, coerce, and defeat a foe with economic means.

Indeed, economic power has become a very powerful tool to enhance the capabilities of a nation and limit those of an adversary. However, as nations become more intertwined through globalization, they become more vulnerable to disruptions in their economies, manmade or natural, due to reliance on foreign sources of raw materials, components, finished products, or key services. This is especially true for complex, highly integrated economies like the United States. For example, U.S. dependence on energy sources indicates a strong need for imported oil. In 1973, the nation imported 6,256 thousand barrels per day. Ten years later, the amount of oil purchased from foreign sources fell to 5,051 thousand barrels due to much increased emphasis on energy efficiency. Unfortunately, declining domestic supplies, economic demands, and worldwide lower energy prices forced the demand for more imported oil. By 2001, imports had more than doubled to 11,619 thousand barrels. Dependence on volatile imports from Persian Gulf states

rose from 8.8 percent of all imports in 1983 to 23.5 percent in 2001.⁵ The nation is a net importer of oil. In 2001, American business, government, and citizens used about 19,633 thousands of barrels of oil per day, the largest consumer of oil in the world.⁶

Consequently, the nation has become more sensitive to external events that might affect the future supply of oil. Any reduction in oil production, regardless of its intended destination, affects the nation's economy in several ways. First, if there is a reduction in oil production, prices rise worldwide since buyers bid up prices to meet their demand. This disrupts resource flows and production. Second, poorer nations that cannot afford oil might face internal political strife as their standard of living declines. Third, uncertainty and turmoil about the future threatens long-term investment and consumer confidence due to fears that the nation's economy might slow. This will affect its ability to produce goods and services in the coming years. Fourth, declining oil stocks can affect key trading partners and allies' economies that also rely on access to oil. If those nations do not have viable economies, then they might not produce the goods we need, nor are they capable of buying our exports.

An oil crisis or shortage of some other product, e.g., imported computer microchips, that was caused by a manmade or natural disaster can create a series of political and economic conditions that can severely affect the health of a nation. A reduction in oil supplies creates all types of possible government responses, which may become a cause to use other elements of power to assure that oil flows freely in the world market. One could use, for example, the political element to encourage other states to increase production. Conversely, we could use informational means to persuade oil consumers not to panic and cause additional disruptions in the market. Finally, the country could use military means to create a secure supply line for oil producers to consumers.

Conclusion

Economic interdependence has, on one hand allowed competitive forces to lower prices and increase availability of many goods and services. Economic security, improving domestic employment and wealth, has been aided with international trade. Free trade has helped sharpen the government's ability to achieve national objectives. The promise of access to American and other markets tariff free can help motivate other countries to cooperate with the United States. The increased accesses to markets have also allowed American business to sell products from computers to agricultural items that result in jobs. However, with the enhanced economic relationships have come critics that charge that more international integration has led to the loss of vital industries that have left the country to seek lower cost production elsewhere. This aspect of trade has created less jobs, a hemorrhage of technology, strengthening potential regional rivals, and left the nation more vulnerable to economic disruptions. Manmade or natural disruptions in supply of imported assets may slow the ability to sustain combat operations or alter a decisionmaker's options to involve the country in operations for fear of adverse economic consequences. One of the challenges facing the nation's leaders will continue to revolve around economics as a way to strengthen America's security, while balancing the risk of future involvement in economic relationships that may constrain, rather than enhance U.S. national security.

Economic power has helped shape American foreign policy for decades. This element of power is very flexible. If used wisely in conjunction with the political, military, and informational elements, it is hard to beat. Whether a nation has a large or small military, its leadership does understand economics. Economics is a great tool to create conditions for further action or force a nation to change behavior. As the world further embraces globalization, economics as an element of power will only gain greater influence in the United

States and around the world.

Notes - Chapter 11

1 David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, V. *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 9.

2 Ibid., 8.

3 “How to Trade Up,” *Economist*, February 15, 2003, 36.

4 Johnson , 8.

5 Energy Information Administration, *Annual Energy Review 2001* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2002), Table 5.4, Petroleum Imports by Country of Origin, 1960-2001, 133.

6 British Petroleum, *BP Statistical Review of World Energy* (London: British Petroleum, June 2002), 9. This country used about 25.5 percent of all oil consumed in 2001. The United States uses more oil per day than Europe. The next largest consumer of oil is Japan at 5,427 thousand barrels per day.

CHAPTER 12

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: RETHINKING ENGAGEMENT

Douglas A. Borer

February 2003 marked the 12th anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait by the United States and its global allies and their near-total victory over the military forces of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Operation DESERT STORM. However, much to the surprise of members of the first Bush administration, academic scholars, military analysts, media pundits, foreign policy experts, and the average layman, Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq and continued to successfully defy the international community. Regardless of the military success of the U.S. war with Iraq prosecuted by the second Bush administration in 2003, Saddam's longevity should, in itself, serve as a significant warning to policymakers that something may be amiss in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. In this chapter I reexamine the fundamental intellectual and strategic assumptions of what is known as "engagement," the foreign policy doctrine that guided U.S. behavior toward Iraq in the decade preceding Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Despite the wholesale failure of U.S. strategy toward Iraq before 1990, the fundamental assumptions that guided U.S. engagement policies have remained largely unexamined. This failure to acknowledge historic mistakes raises the disturbing possibility that similar failures of engagement may occur in Washington's strategic relationships with other problematic international actors and rogue states.

Engagement in Practice: U.S. Relations with Iraq, 1982-1990

Engagement serves as a core policy doctrine of U.S. national security strategy in the twenty-first century.¹ In practice, implementing engagement relies heavily on the manipulation of the economic elements of national power, primarily in the areas of trade and finance, to influence the behavior of other states. Engagement uses economic interdependence, or mutual dependence, to create ties that, in theory, should bind states together. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggest that economic interdependence should be understood in terms of the power to influence, or the effects on each state of their trade linkages. Indeed, as many scholars have indicated, states have long recognized the truth that power generally flows from asymmetrical (or imbalanced) interdependence.² In keeping with this tradition, Keohane and Nye stress that when planning an effective diplomatic strategy, "It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues."³ At its core, economic statecraft is founded on the principle of asymmetrical power.

In 1979 political turmoil in the Middle East forever changed the regional strategic landscape. In January

of that year a groundswell of Islamist protesters drove the Shah of Iran from the Persian throne; in December, the Soviet Union launched its ruinous war in Afghanistan; and in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. Thus, the Middle East stage was radically changed as the Reagan administration entered the White House. In the minds of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy team, U.S. national interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf now faced two significant new threats: communist expansionism by direct military means from the Soviet Union and the spread of anti-U.S. Islamic fundamentalism from Iran. With these two factors in mind, Iraq's sponsorship of international terrorism was seen as a lesser of evils, and therefore Baghdad was perceived as a potential partner that could serve U.S. strategic interests in the region.

In terms of strategic formulation, the ends (or goals) were clear: block both Soviet expansion and the further expansion of radical Islam into the Gulf region. The way in which these goals could be achieved was identified as the transformation of Iraq into a pro-U.S. country vis-à-vis a policy of engagement. The means to be deployed would be a combination of three elements of national power: 1) limited military support, 2) increased diplomatic and political intercourse, and 3) heavy economic incentives; with the latter being the key element. What was the risk assessment of such a strategy? There was little chance that U.S.-Iraq relations could be made any worse than they were at the time, thus, it seemed that almost any strategy that could increase U.S. influence in with Baghdad was worth a try. If the strategy worked, the United States would achieve its regional political goals and possibly even score a broader battle in the Cold War by weaning a Soviet client state away from Moscow. The only possible negative outcome was a domestic political backlash by those who would accuse the administration of negotiating with a terrorist-sponsoring state. However, there were no well-organized anti-Saddam groups of Iraqis in the United States that could pressure Congress (unlike the powerful Cuban-American community) to block White House overtures. Due to the huge leverage Washington held over Tel Aviv by its yearly military and financial aid packages, any potential pressure that the Israeli lobby might decide to mount was considered manageable. Finally, it must be remembered that these events transpired during one of its most strained periods of the Cold War. Virtually all opposition to a change in policy toward Iraq could be bent on the traditional wheel of geopolitical Cold War national security interests. In short, the risk assessment suggested a high potential gain, with a minimal potential loss; as a result, engagement was given the green light.

In March 1982, the U.S. Government officially began engaging Saddam Hussein by removing Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The official reason was to recognize Iraq's improved record,⁴ a claim that a Defense Department official later rebutted in stating, "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism. . . . The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."⁵ Thus Iraq, no longer on the list of terrorist states subject to highly binding export restrictions on weapon purchases and technology exports, became eligible for U.S. Government-financed credits designed to promote the export of U.S. goods. It was presumed that after Iraq began to benefit from and become reliant on U.S. economic linkages, the United States would be able to induce Iraq to behave more in accordance with international norms. Engagement of Saddam's regime was anchored on the assumption that trade interdependence would be asymmetrical in favor of the United States, and that, in turn, the United States would be able to shape Iraq's behavior, using trade as a tool of influence. In November 1984, after Reagan's reelection, Washington resumed full diplomatic ties with Baghdad.

The contextual setting of the time strongly suggested that such a strategy had an excellent chance of success. As a result of war-related disruptions in shipping through the Persian Gulf, Iraq's oil revenues had shrunk from \$22 billion in 1980 to approximately \$9.5 billion in 1982. Iraq was dependent on imports for 75 percent of its food supply, and it was deep in debt.⁶ Thus, it comes as no surprise that three of the main areas of trade that Reagan administration officials focused on for engagement with Iraq were in the realms of oil,

agriculture, and finance. By 1984 the U.S. Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) had extended to Iraq \$513 million in credits to purchase U.S. farm products. In 1985 the U.S. Export-Import Bank extended more than \$684 million in short- and long-term credits to Iraq for the construction of a strategic oil pipeline through Jordan that would have the capacity for a million barrels per day. In terms of military assistance, the United States still officially maintained a stance of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. However, the United States sold to Iraq a wide variety of "dual-use" items. For instance, Iraq purchased more than 100 helicopters from manufacturers in the United States, which in export documents were designated for civilian and recreational purposes. Upon arrival in Iraq, they immediately were diverted to the front with Iran, with no ensuing protest from Washington. The Reagan administration also gave the "nod and wink" to the illegal transfer of U.S. weapons from third countries, including sales of Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank missiles, helicopters, small arms, mortars, and munitions from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. However, of greater military value was the intelligence data supplied to Iraq from U.S. satellite photography. In 1984 President Reagan signed a national security directive authorizing intelligence-sharing with Iraq, a move analysts would later describe as having saved the Iraqis from being overrun in several key battles.⁷

U.S. engagement incentives continued to grow throughout the remainder of Reagan's term in office. Under the first Bush administration, however, the use of the economic tools of statecraft moved to a higher level. His transition team argued, "Trade is the best key to political influence."⁸ By 1989, Iraq had become the single biggest market for U.S. rice exporters, with sales running to \$180 million. Sales of wheat, flour, livestock feed, cotton, and other commodities amounted to more than \$345 million in additional income for U.S. farmers and agribusinesses. In 1990 the U.S. Department of Agriculture proposed allocating \$1 billion in new credits to Iraq, bringing the total to more than \$2 billion.⁹ These selected examples only begin to portray the variety of ways in which the United States attempted to engage Iraq with economic incentives.

Considering what we now know about Iraq in the years that have passed since the Gulf War, it is only pointed rhetoric to ask if the policy was a success. However, even before the Gulf War, it was apparent to many observers that engagement of Iraq was not working. Despite Saddam's official opening of Kurdistan to foreign reporters, atrocities against the Kurds continued unabated in 1989 and 1990. Amnesty International documented the kidnapping and torture of more than 300 Kurdish children as human hostages in an attempt to intimidate Kurdish separatists in the north of Iraq,¹⁰ and the U.S. Government's own human rights report clearly stated that even *perceived* political and military opposition to the Iraqi government was routinely dealt with through the torture and execution of suspected Kurds.¹¹ Some of the most disturbing warning signs of Saddam's continued predatory profile come from the review of Iraq's supposedly clandestine program to develop weapons of mass destruction. As early as March 1985 Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle urged that the United States impose a "non-nuclear assurance" clause as a written condition for exporting advanced computers. Perle, who was known as one of the administration's most hard-line hawks in his anti-Soviet views, was not convinced that economic statecraft (in the form of technology transfers) should be used in the attempt to wean Iraq away from Moscow. However, those who were certain that such transfers were necessary to convince the Iraqis of Washington's friendship overruled Perle and others in the administration.¹²

From 1985 to 1990, U.S. controls on exports of specialized, high-technology dual-use products were steadily weakened despite repeated protests from high-ranking officials in the Energy and Defense Departments.¹³ However, in retrospect it is clear that until the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. foreign policy agencies that had embraced the economic tools of statecraft (primarily State and Commerce) were able to continually override those agencies focused on national security (Defense and the Central

Intelligence Agency [CIA]). Correspondingly, the Iraqi record on terrorism remained largely unchanged. In 1982 Iraq was tied to the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to London, the hit man being a colonel in the Iraqi intelligence services. After expelling the well-known Palestinian terrorist, Abu Nidal, under pressure from the U.S. Congress, Saddam proceeded to patch up relations with Yasir Arafat, who thanked the Iraqi leader for his “donations” of weapons to reequip the Palestine Liberation Organization after it had been driven out of Beirut by Israeli forces. In October 1985 the Iraqi government assisted the escape of the terrorists responsible for the murder of wheelchair-bound U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer on the cruise ship, *Achille Lauro*, and Baghdad refused to revoke the diplomatic passport held by Abu Abbas, the lead terrorist in the high-profile attack. In 1985 two Iraqi-based terrorists were captured in Rome in transit to planned attacks on American targets. Despite official public denials from the U.S. executive branch, it was acknowledged in a then-classified Reagan administration document that Iraq continued to support terrorism.¹⁴

Probably the most damning evidence of engagement’s ineffectiveness in altering Iraq’s behavior comes from a review of that country’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and Iraqi civilians. In 1983 the first of four reports of the use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces was received in Washington, and in 1984 a report issued by the United Nations provided the first public documentation of Iraq’s violation of international law on the use of such weapons.¹⁵ The Reagan administration responded to these chemical weapon attacks by filing paper protests with the Iraqi government, sponsoring a resolution in the UN general assembly, and tightening some export controls on chemical supplies and technology.¹⁶ At the same time, however, the United States continued to provide Iraq with intelligence data on Iranian troop movements and formations, ignoring the fact that such data was being used to optimize the deployment and use of chemical attacks against the Iranians.

It is obvious that from a moral, ethical, or legal perspective, the U.S. position in these policies is an impoverished one. However, in the amoral, *realpolitik* world of international diplomacy, where strategic concerns often take precedence over moral and ethical principles, one might choose to argue that the U.S. position was not necessarily an illogical one. But does such an amoral realist’s analysis actually hold true under closer scrutiny in terms of its strategic logic? The key question is this: When George Bush took over from Ronald Reagan, what had happened to the original strategic rationale for engaging Iraq?

In 1988 immediately after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam, using U.S.-built helicopters, unleashed brutal gas attacks on the Kurds. Approximately 30 villages were gassed with chemical agents that included mustard gas and nerve toxins. Normally the United States would lead the outraged international response to any such act. (One can only imagine the response at the time if the Sandinista government in Nicaragua had gassed the U.S.-supported Contras.) In fact, the Reagan administration did sponsor a resolution in the United Nations condemning the use of chemical weapons, and it tightened some export controls; however, the great majority of all dual-use export licenses were approved by the Reagan administration.¹⁷ While the record clearly shows that the United States refused to pursue a highly confrontational approach (in the form of economic sanctions), there is little evidence that Washington made any serious attempt to alter Saddam’s behavior by using any form of leverage that the burgeoning asymmetrical economic ties had created during six years of engagement.

This inaction on the part of the United States is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, economic sanctions had been imposed on Libya simply based on intelligence data showing that the country was developing a chemical weapons program. In contrast, Iraq had not only developed the most extensive chemical weapons program in the Third World, but it had actually used the weapons repeatedly. Yet no

sanctions were forthcoming. As noted at the time by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter, Saddam's actions constituted a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," which according to existing law required sanctions.¹⁸ Second, and perhaps more to the point, the geopolitical strategic situation in the region, which drove the original overture to Iraq, had changed by the summer of 1988. The Cold War was at its lowest ebb in years as Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* revolution accelerated. This revolution in Soviet behavior was validated that year by the announcement that Soviet troops would begin withdrawing from Afghanistan. In August 1988 Iraq's war with Iran came to an end, with stalemate along the original border being the end result. Thus, both core strategic U.S. goals had been fulfilled: fundamentalism had been geostrategically blocked from spreading from Iran into the oil-rich Gulf states, and the Soviet military threat was in rapid retreat from the region. If the "ends" or goals of U.S. strategy had been accomplished—why, then, did the Bush administration continue the policy of engagement, vis-à-vis positive incentives, rather than turning to more coercive threats by threatening to cut off Iraq's sole remaining lifeline?

In terms of the logic of engagement, the potential for U.S. leverage over Iraq was quite salient at the time. In 1988 Iraq was mired in debt and in desperate need of foreign capital for reconstruction after 8 years of destructive war with Iran. If the rationale of asymmetrical interdependence that lay at the foundation of U.S. engagement policies was correct, Iraq should have been malleable under any new economic stresses imposed by the United States. Indeed, the war with Iran had cost the country nearly half a trillion dollars in direct and indirect costs.¹⁹ Iraq was behind in its loan payments, with an overall foreign debt of more than \$80 billion. Its major economic lifeblood, oil, was a commodity in high supply and lower demand on world markets. In 1980, before the war, Iraq had made \$22 billion a year in oil revenues; in 1988, the figure was \$11 billion before adjusting for inflation.²⁰

The question is, when Saddam used poison gas to lay waste to Kurdish Iraqi citizens, why did the United States put so little pressure on Iraq to change its behavior? This lack of action seems inexplicable when the original policy of building economic ties to gain political leverage over Iraq seemed so ripe for success. If the tools of economic statecraft had been deployed with the goal of making Iraq open to U.S. influence, then those tools could be given meaning and substance only if the United States was willing to put coercive pressure on Iraq when behavioral reciprocity failed to emerge. In retrospect, the preponderance of evidence even at the time made it quite clear that Iraqi behavior had not fundamentally changed. Yet, despite Iraq's ongoing pariah-like behavior, the United States was unwilling to invoke the power of the trade linkages it had intentionally created. Why?

Bridging the Gap in Theory and Practice: Inverse Engagement

The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive incentives, by one state to alter the elements of another state's behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement.²¹ However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative difference exists between the two: "Engagement is more than appeasement," he says:

It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target's behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a

status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more.²²

Schweller's account provides the basic parameters of how engagement should work in theory, but what can theory tell us about how engagement works in practice? When the "carrots" fail to produce change, can theory help to explain why an established power fails to use the "sticks" mentioned by Schweller? In this case, how can theory help us explain the first Bush administration's ongoing practice of granting non-coercive, positive trade incentives to Iraq in the face of overwhelming evidence, before its invasion of Kuwait, showing that Iraq had not changed its pre-engagement behavioral profile and was continuing to act as a rogue state? In other words, why did the United States not use its significant power over Iraq?

To bridge this gap between theory and practice, I turn again to Keohane and Nye's classic work, *Power and Interdependence*:

Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). . . . When we say that asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power, we are thinking of power as control over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes. A less dependent actor in a relationship often has a significant political resource, because changes in the relationship (which the actor may be able to initiate or threaten) will be less costly to that actor than to its partners. This advantage does not guarantee, however, that the political resources provided by favorable asymmetries in interdependence will lead to similar patterns of control over outcomes.²³

Clearly, our study of U.S.-Iraq relations is illustrative of a case when a less dependent actor (the United States) is not guaranteed control over outcomes. Why? In order to understand the dynamics of power in an interdependent relationship, Keohane and Nye distinguish two useful concepts: sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity interdependence, "involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework—how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects? It is measured not merely by the volume of flows across borders but also by the costly effects of changes in transactions on societies or governments." The authors characterize vulnerability interdependence as the cost to, and the capabilities of, a state to offset or change any unwanted impacts caused by the actions of its foreign partner.²⁴ For instance, two countries may be equally sensitive to change in an economic variable, but one might be less vulnerable than the other because it has a wider variety of alternatives available to it. To illustrate both concepts, Keohane and Nye use the following pertinent example:

In petroleum, for instance, what matters is not only the proportion of one's needs that is imported, but the alternatives to imported energy and the costs of pursuing those alternatives. Two countries, each importing 35 percent of their petroleum needs, may seem equally sensitive to price rises; but if one could shift to domestic sources at moderate cost [e.g., the United States], and the other had no alternative [e.g., Japan], the second state would be more vulnerable than the first. The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.²⁵

How does this distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability help us understand the relationship between interdependence and power? According, again, to Keohane and Nye:

Clearly, it indicates that sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability

interdependence in providing power resources to actors. If one actor can reduce its costs by altering its policy, either domestically or internationally, the sensitivity patterns will not be a good guide to power resources.²⁶

As shown during the oil shocks of the 1970s, and again most recently in 2000, the U.S. policymaking sphere is highly sensitive to changes in the world price of oil.²⁷ Because of its own domestic oil production, the United States is less vulnerable than a country like Japan in terms of absolute dependence on foreign sources, but price sensitivity for such products as gasoline and heating oil is similar in the United States and Japan, a sensitivity that invokes policy changes by decisionmakers in the White House. Thus, if Iraq somehow had the power to dictate world oil prices, then the United States would be both sensitive to price increases for petroleum products²⁸ and vulnerable because of a lack of alternative suppliers, although less vulnerable than countries that rely more heavily than the United States on imported oil. On the flip side, because of its heavy reliance on exported oil as its primary source of state revenue, Iraq's policymaking sphere was also highly attuned to changes in the world crude oil price. If too many producers were pumping too much oil, the global price would drop, and Iraq would suffer.

In terms of vulnerability, by 1990 Iraq's exposure to variations in the global oil market was clearly much higher than that of the United States. The oil shocks of the 1970s driven by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were followed by efforts by numerous suppliers to increase global production, which resulted in overproduction by the late 1980s. OPEC unity progressively deteriorated as its members blatantly violated production quotas, resulting in an oil glut and low prices that lasted until the beginning of the Gulf War (and resumed thereafter to continue through the 1990s). As a result, by 1990, U.S. vulnerability to any single oil supplier had greatly lessened. With the supply outpacing demand, the United States could acquire oil from a broader assortment of sources than had been contributing to the world market a decade earlier (for example, new sources included the United Kingdom's North Sea operations and new domestic production in Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico), and existing suppliers had all increased production. As an importer, the United States remained vulnerable to the overall supply of oil, but only if major exporters cooperated in cutting production and raising prices. Lacking such cooperation by OPEC and other major exporters, in 1990 the United States was not vulnerable to the actions of any single source-point supplier like Iraq.²⁹ However, Iraq, which added to the global oversupply problem by pumping as much oil as possible to finance its war debt, could not easily find an alternative customer to replace the level of consumption represented by the United States.³⁰ Within the U.S.-Iraq trading relationship, the United States might have had incurred some minimal short-term financial costs for replacing its Iraqi oil with oil from other suppliers. But, in comparative economic terms, the costs borne by Iraq would have been significantly higher if Washington had decided to play its economic cards—that is, its asymmetric power within the bilateral interdependency. All other things being equal, in terms of bilateral economic pain and influence, Iraq should have had a lower threshold than the United States, because in 1990 Iraq's weakened economy was much more vulnerable than the U.S. economy to existing conditions in the global oil market.

A similar situation existed in the two other pillars of the bilateral economic relationship, the intertwined areas of agriculture and finance. In an economy that relied on imports to supply 65 to 70 percent of its agricultural commodities, food and the financial ability to pay for it were two critical economic sectors with a high degree of vulnerability for Iraq. By the late 1980s, Iraq had become increasingly dependent on U.S. Government-backed loans that were used to buy agricultural goods produced in the United States. According to data from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, by 1988 Iraq had serious credit problems. Primarily because of Iraq's payment arrears, which totaled over \$100 million to Italy, \$90 million to France, \$65 million to the United Kingdom, \$36 million to West Germany, and additional large amounts to Japan, the

governments of the industrialized countries were unwilling to extend further loans to Baghdad.³¹ Likewise, Iraq had mostly exhausted the huge lines of credit and outright grants of cash that had been extended by its oil-rich but by then cash-strapped Arab neighbors. These Arab countries held approximately half of Iraq's \$80 billion in foreign debt. Thus, as noted earlier, the \$1 billion in agricultural credits approved in 1990 under the CCC program was exceedingly important to Iraq because it had few options.³² Thus, having no alternative funding sources if U.S. credits dried up, Iraq was exceedingly vulnerable to any U.S. fiscal actions. In short, in terms of U.S.-Iraq interdependence, Iraq was asymmetrically dependent on the United States for its economic well-being and was of negligible importance to the overall economic well-being of the United States.

If Iraq was highly vulnerable to U.S. power over the core economic areas of oil, food, and finance yet Saddam remained a bad actor, why did the United States not act to assert its economic leverage despite the change in the strategic picture after 1988? Ignorance of Saddam's ongoing behavior by decisionmakers in Washington was certainly not the case. As hinted at previously, the Reagan/Bush policies of uninterrupted economic engagement with Saddam did not proceed without serious internal dissent within the U.S. Government. Inside the administration, the strongest opposition came from the Department of Defense, which (as noted in the earlier Richard Perle example) had argued for years against the shipment of dual-use technologies that could be used in the development of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Dissenting voices were also heard from those within the State Department responsible for monitoring human rights violations. Additional internal resistance was put forward at the sub-Cabinet level and by analysts in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the CIA, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve. On the whole, however, within the upper echelons of the executive branch, any direct challenges to the overall engagement mandate were eventually overridden by Cabinet-level secretaries wielding their most effective lever: the national security directives signed by both President Reagan and President Bush.³³

A more serious challenge to U.S. policies of engagement with Iraq came from Congress. Under the framework of the Constitution, the executive branch holds the greatest sway in overall matters of foreign policy. Because of its control over the nation's taxation and spending authority, however, Congress can influence any U.S. foreign policy that utilizes financial instruments. Although Congress did not act to condemn Iraq for the gassing of Iranian soldiers on four verified occasions in the mid-1980s,³⁴ Saddam's gassing of Kurdish civilians in 1988 from American-made helicopters did foment a significant congressional reaction, primarily from the Senate.

In early September the Senate unanimously passed the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988. In its original form, the legislation called for the following changes in U.S. policy toward Iraq:

- An embargo on all dual-use technology exports.
- The elimination of all CCC and Export-Import Bank credits.
- An embargo on all U.S. imports of Iraqi oil.
- A requirement that all loans to Iraq under consideration in international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.) be opposed by the United States.³⁵

Liberal and conservative senators alike lent their outspoken support to this assertive legislation. Liberal Democrat Claiborne Pell declared, "Iraq's conduct is a crime against humanity. . . . It must be met with the strongest possible response." His conservative Republican counterpart, Senator Jesse Helms, concurred,

stating that the Senate legislation “will help demonstrate to the Iraqi regime just how serious our country views its campaign against the Kurds. In addition, it will help assure that U.S. tax dollars do not subsidize the Iraqis.”³⁶ As members of the Senate saw it, the time had come for exercising whatever leverage the United States held in its relationship with Iraq. However, despite the unanimous support of the Senate, over the course of the next few months, the sanctions bill was systematically watered down, and it eventually died under the heavy influence of both the administration and opponents within the House of Representatives.

The power to influence is a two-way relationship. The key question in this case is “Who is influencing whom?” On the surface, the answer appears simple. By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States had become Iraq’s most important international trading partner. Thus the American plan hatched by the Reagan White House for building economic ties had, in fact, worked. However, as noted by Keohane and Nye, “sensitivity interdependence can be social or political as well as economic.”³⁷ While the United States consciously pursued its own diplomatic strategy to engage Baghdad with economic tools of statecraft, Iraq was simultaneously organizing its own political muscle in Washington on the basis of a strategy of *inverse engagement* that targeted the power of interest-group politics within the U.S. political system.

To achieve its own national interest goals, Iraq pressured American businesses and organizations with vested interests in trade to lobby key members of the House. For instance, at the urging of Iraq, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce strongly encouraged Representative Dante Fascell (Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee) to step away from an emotional response to the Iraqi poison gas attacks and to think in terms of the economic cost to Americans if sanctions were imposed.³⁸ Other pro-Iraq business groups also put pressure on members of the House. One important lobbying group, created in 1985 at the urging of the Iraqi government, was the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum. This group was one of Iraq’s major tools of influence inside the U.S. business community, and subsequently it held significant influence inside the American government. At the forum’s founding, Iraq Ambassador to the United States Nizar Hamdoun publicly urged corporate executives to join the group, promising that its members would receive preferential treatment in any competitive ventures involving Iraqi government contracts. In addition to a wide assortment of medium-sized and small American businesses, the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum included Fortune 500 companies (AT&T, Bechtel, Caterpillar, and GM), major defense contractors (Bell Helicopter-Textron, Boeing, Lockheed, and United Technologies), and some of the world’s largest U.S.-based oil companies (Amoco, Exxon, Mobil, Occidental, Texaco).³⁹ In aggregate, the membership of the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum represented a significant cross-section of the commanding heights of corporate America.

Implemented through the manipulation of powerful American domestic special interests, Iraq’s strategy of inverse engagement is perhaps best illustrated in its oil pricing policies. In its effort to engage Iraq, the United States had gone from importing no Iraqi oil before lifting sanctions in 1982, to importing 126 million barrels in 1988. However, what is most interesting in this exchange is that, despite historically low global oil prices, American oil companies received a \$1 per barrel discount on purchases of Iraqi oil, a benefit not shared by non-U.S. companies. Thus, by 1988 Iraq’s inverse engagement policy resulted in discount pricing that increased normal American oil company profits on 126 million barrels of oil per year.⁴⁰ These companies could have purchased non-Iraqi oil from alternative suppliers; however, they would do so without the \$126 million financial “carrot” offered by Saddam’s inverse engagement strategy. Thus, despite its severe financial crisis, the Iraqi government was willing to purchase what it perceived as an extra \$126 million worth of power and influence with American oil company executives, who in turn would be asked to use their substantial clout inside the Washington beltway.

Was inverse engagement a good policy choice by Iraq? When sanctions for gassing the Kurds were being debated within the U.S. Government, Iraq threatened to turn to other countries in the world market, warning that it would stop payment on over \$1 billion in outstanding debt if the United States imposed sanctions. Leading members of the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum and other special interests in Washington then pressured members of the House to kill the sanctions bill. As *New York Times* reporter Elaine Sciolino reported,

“The special interests got into the act,” [Senator] Pell said in a speech on October 21, 1988. Agriculture interests objected to the suspension of taxpayer subsidies for agricultural exports to Iraq; the oil industry protested the oil boycott—although alternative supplies are readily available. Even a chemical company called to inquire how its products might be impacted.⁴¹

To borrow Harold Lasswell’s statement, the Iraqis clearly understood the intricacies of “who gets what, when, and how”⁴² in American politics. In order to achieve its foreign policy goals, Iraq demanded that its major trade partners in the private sector pressure key members of Congress as well as the White House to block any proposals for economic sanctions or to act in other ways that harmed Iraq. In terms of economic statecraft, Iraq’s inverse engagement was a brilliant tactical approach that used Washington’s own erroneously perceived strengths to Iraq’s advantage. By specifically targeting congressional political sensitivity to any matters related to trade, domestic employment, and the profit margins of politically active groups, the Iraqis were able to effectively neutralize America’s power to exploit the asymmetric economic interdependence that had been created through the policy of engagement. Indeed, as noted above, “Trade is the best key to political influence”; in this case, however, the sentence should read: “Trade is the best key to political influence in the United States, not necessarily in other countries.”

Conclusion

It would be a bold and erroneous assertion to claim that a single variable—domestic special interests—fully explains the complexities of U.S. foreign policy in the case of Iraq in the 1980s. However, it does seem clear that the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability lend credence to the relative weight of this analytical approach, although not precisely in the manner that Keohane and Nye prescribed. In retrospect, it is clear that America’s engagement policies, both past and present, are built on the basic theoretical assumption that economic sensitivity and vulnerability in the target state will ensue from any asymmetrical trade linkages that favor the United States. This assumption may be theoretically true in purely economic terms, but it is less relevant (if not erroneous) in terms of practical statecraft, the arena where economics and politics are inextricably linked. In the real-world politics of U.S.-Iraq relations, the political spheres in the United States were highly sensitive to Iraq’s counterstrategy of inverse engagement, despite the asymmetrical nature of interdependent U.S.-Iraq economic ties. Here, too, it is clear that international relations theory needs some rethinking. First, it is clear that the more dependent actor (Iraq) held more power to influence policy than the less dependent actor (the United States). Second, Keohane and Nye’s assertion that “sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors”⁴³ is challenged by the evidence on the ground in this particular case. American sensitivity to Iraqi-inspired economic threats was greater than Iraq’s vulnerability to overall U.S. economic power. As the British military historian Charles Callwell wrote early in the twentieth century, “Theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way.”⁴⁴

Therein lies a key conceptual problem of engagement. In thinking about how engagement would work in Iraq, U.S. policymakers failed to fully comprehend the internal dynamics of both sides of the system, both in terms of the Iraqi regime and in terms of the U.S. regime. As a result, perhaps the most important

lesson of this chapter is the failure of U.S. foreign policy practitioners to grasp the domestic consequences of their actions at home. In other words, when engaging a foreign power during the critical risk assessment phase, the question should be asked: What impact will policy changes have inside the United States? Iraq did, of course, respond to U.S. engagement initiatives, but not in the way policymakers in the United States hoped it would. Instead of responding as predicted in Washington, the Iraqis designed their own inverse engagement policies to obtain some measure of control over American policy. In the United States, politicians rule on the democratic principle of popular sovereignty; in day-to-day practice, however, American policymaking in both domestic and foreign affairs is heavily influenced by interest-group politics that have little to do with voting by the masses.⁴⁵ Domestic special interest groups in the form of oil companies, agribusinesses, labor unions, and industrial conglomerates existed long before the United States embarked on its new policies with Iraq in 1982. However, before the Reagan administration decided to engage Iraq, no significant pro-Iraq special interests existed in the United States, because there were no vested interests in Iraq. Professional umbrella political organizations such as the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum emerged only after engagement of Iraq began in the early 1980s. To use a battlefield metaphor, Iraq's inverse engagement policy was a well-executed flanking maneuver that took advantage of the shifting diplomatic terrain created by the United States.

In thinking broadly about trade politics in general, this domestic-level oversight may not be a critical consideration in relations between democracies, but when an autocracy is involved, all bets are off. Indeed, as this case study suggests, when an economically powerful yet politically sensitive democracy (the United States) is pitted against an economically vulnerable yet politically resilient autocracy (Iraq), the autocracy may achieve undue levels of influence if it is clever enough to follow the Iraqi model and employ an inverse engagement strategy. Thus, if one wished to identify an Achilles' heel of engagement, the answer is not found beyond America's borders but within the nation's constitutional structures and governing order. In rethinking engagement, a keener understanding of, and greater respect for, any given opponent's ends, ways, and means for influencing the U.S. process must be considered seriously by American decisionmakers.

Notes - Chapter 12

An earlier version of this paper appears under the title "Inverse Engagement: Lessons from US-Iraq Relations, 1982-1990," published in *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly* (Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer 2003), pp. 51-65.

1 William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington: The White House, October 1998). Document appears in appendix of Michael E. Brown, *et al.*, eds., *America's Strategic Choices* (rev. ed.; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).

2 For instance, see Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945). Thucydides asserts that war between Sparta and Athens was the result of an imbalance of power resulting from Athens' increasing success as an Aegean trading center. Fear of increased Athenian military power that derived from its impressive growth in trade drove Sparta to launch a preemptive strike against its rival.

3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (3d. ed.; New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 2000), pp. 10-11.

4 See letter from Reagan's chief of Congressional Relations, Kenneth Duberstein, to members of Congress in "Congress and Iraq: A Chronology," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 27 April 1992, p. 1,070. Cited in Bruce Jentleson, *With Friends Like These: Reagan-Bush and Saddam, 1982-1990* (New York: Norton Press, 1994), p. 33.

5 Guy Gugliotta, *et al.*, interview with Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel Koch, "At War, Iraq Courted U.S. into Economic Embrace," *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1990, p. A34.

6 Jentleson, p. 42.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 101.

9 Memorandum to file, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gale McKenzie, "Briefing of USDA-OIG by NDGA re: Criminal Investigation of BNL-Atlanta," 16 June 1992, cited in Jentleson, p. 132.

10 Jentleson, p. 45.

11 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of 1985* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).

12 Perle and his deputy, Stephen Bryen, were overruled by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger after their views were rejected by Secretary of State George Schultz. See Jentleson, p. 51.

13 Kenneth Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 202.

14 U.S. Department of State Memorandum, "Iraq's Retreat from International Terrorism," cited in Jentleson, pp. 53-55. Abbas was captured by U.S. forces on the outskirts of Baghdad, 15 April 2003.

15 *Ibid.*

16 U.S. Department of State Memorandum, "Curbing Proliferation of Chemical Weapons," 10 June 1985, cited in Jentleson, p. 76.

17 See Jentleson, pp. 68-93.

18 See Jentleson, p. 92.

19 Elaine Sciolino, *The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), p. 105.

20 Jentleson, p. 81.

21 See Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993), pp. 61-70. George is careful to clarify that he is using the term in its classic definition as a conflict resolution strategy, and not in the pejorative sense that is usually equated to appeasement of Hitler in the late 1930s.

22 Randall L. Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 14-15.

23 Keohane and Nye, p. 11.

24 Ibid., pp. 12-15.

25 Ibid., p. 15.

26 Ibid.

27 This sensitivity in the policy realm was revealed most recently in September-October 2000 with the Clinton administration's decision to tap 30 million barrels of oil from the strategic petroleum reserve when crude oil prices topped \$30 per barrel.

28 This sensitivity was illustrated shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, when oil prices spiked above \$40 per barrel. Prices rose dramatically on fear of a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter. Sensitivity and vulnerability in the policy sphere in Washington were manifest in the decision to go to war with Iraq to prevent its control of the world's most concentrated oil resources.

29 Iraq's OPEC quota of 2.73 million barrels per day was not enough to even service the interest payments on its debt when the average price of oil hovered around \$16 per barrel. See Christine Moss Helms, "Arab Perspectives on the Gulf Crisis," in *The Persian Gulf Crisis: Power in the Post-Cold War World*, Robert F. Helms and Robert H. Dorff, eds. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), p. 75.

30 For instance, in 1988 the United States purchased \$1.6 billion of Iraq's \$11 billion in sales, or 15 percent of total Iraqi exports. See Jentleson, pp. 81-82.

31 Export-Import Bank, *Country Report: Iraq*, 24 April 1989, appendices 1-2, cited in Jentleson, p. 81.

32 In documents relating to the scandal involving the foreign bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, the Iraq desk officer from the U.S. Treasury Department indicated that only U.S. and UK export financing sources were available to Iraq. See Jentleson, p. 129.

33 Most important in this regard were Secretary of State George P. Schultz under Reagan and Secretary of State James A. Baker III under Bush.

34 March 1984, April 1985, February-March 1986, April-May 1987. See Anthony Cordesman, "Creating Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Armed Forces Journal*, January/February 1989, p. 56.

35 Jentleson, p. 77.

36 *Congressional Record*, 9 September 1988, pp. S12136-37.

37 Keohane and Nye, p. 12.

38 Letter from William T. Archey, Vice President, International Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante B. Fascell, 15 September 1988, cited in Jentleson, p. 85.

39 Jentleson, p. 84.

40 U.S. Department of Energy, "Petroleum Supply Annual," Energy Information Administration, Office of Oil and Gas, 1981-1990; "Discount Prices on Imports of Iraqi Oil, 1988-1990," document provided by U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Sub-committee on Energy and Power; cited in Jentleson, p. 81.

41 Sciolino, p. 171. See also Douglas Waller, "Glass House," *The New Republic*, 5 November 1990, pp. 13-14.

42 Harold Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: P. Smith, 1950).

43 Keohane and Nye, p. 15.

44 Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers*, reprint of the 1906 edition (London: Greenhill, 1990), p. 270; cited in Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 4.

45 For the classic critical expression of this analysis, see Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* (2d ed.; New York: W. W. Norton, 1979).

CHAPTER 13

DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

Reed J. Fendrick

A diplomat is an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country.

Apocryphal

The patriotic art of lying for one's country.

Ambrose Bierce¹

The media and intellectual elites, the State Department (as an institution), and the Foreign Service (as a culture) clearly favor the process, politeness, and accommodation position..

Newt Gingrich²

Ordinary Americans have often been uncomfortable about the art and practice of diplomacy. Frequently, they associate diplomacy and American diplomats either with elitist, pseudo-aristocratic bowing and scraping before supercilious foreigners whose aim is to impinge on our sovereignty and partake of our largesse; or as naïve country bumpkins whose gullibility allows them to forsake key American goals and objectives; or as ruthless, cynical practitioners of Bismarckian realpolitik whose aims and practices fall far short of our Founders' noble aspirations, or as liberal, one-worldists whose collective ideology is far from the American mainstream and who seek to undermine the political aims of elected Administrations. These stereotypes go back to our country's origins and have been reinforced by such traumatic events as Wilson's perceived failure at Versailles, the Yalta Conference near the end of World War II, Henry Kissinger's role as architect of the opening to China, and the failure to obtain a UN Security Council resolution endorsing the use of force in Iraq.

Is any of this true? True or not, does it matter? What is diplomacy supposed to do? Does the U.S. wield diplomacy effectively? Can democracy and diplomacy function harmoniously? How does diplomacy fit in with the protection and furtherance of national security?

First, diplomacy is one instrument among many that a government utilizes in its pursuit of the national interest. Among others are: military power, actual or potential; economic power; intelligence-gathering and operations; cultural and information or "soft power"; relative degrees of national unity; and probably others. Diplomacy never functions in isolation from the other instruments of power but may at times be emphasized

as the situation warrants. In its simplest, most original form diplomacy is the official means by which one state formally relates to other states. Although ambassadors have existed since antiquity representing one sovereign to another, the earliest diplomats often functioned more as de facto hostages to ensure peace or compliance with some agreement than in the modern understanding of an ambassador's role. Since nation-states were more or less legitimized by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, a whole series of codes and protocols have been established to create a framework for the practice of diplomacy. These include such seeming anomalies (and irritants to common citizens) as diplomatic immunity; creation of embassies; establishing and breaking diplomatic relations; sending and receiving diplomatic notes, demarches, non-papers and other forms of communication; holding international conferences and many other means of interstate communication and relations.

Diplomats are agents of the State. In theory, they act on instruction. Until the advent of modern communications, their instructions necessarily had to be general and they required a nearly innate understanding of the national interest of the country they represented. Both because of the non-democratic nature of nearly all States before the American and French Revolutions, and due to the need for confidentiality to protect state secrets and national security, diplomatic exchanges and even treaties or agreements were often undertaken in secret or with quiet discretion. When Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points called for "open covenants openly arrived at" (a reference to Allied agreements for post-World War I division of spoils from the Central Powers that appeared to make a mockery of claims the War was meant to make the "world safe for democracy"), he was publicly challenging the entire edifice of traditional diplomacy that had, however, begun to be modified with the rise of the mass media and popular participation in the nineteenth century. Increasingly, mounting scrutiny from democratic media and academics and ever-increasing intrusive clandestine intelligence-gathering make formal secret agreements less and less palatable.

One prism through which to view diplomacy is to think of it as an element on the spectrum of national security devices. In the "normal" course of events, most nations, while competing for influence, markets, relative perceived power and other markers of strength, most of the time relate to one another the way competitors do in seeking market-share—not as gangs fighting over turf. In other words, the assumption is that peaceful approaches, use of agreements and treaties, and normal intercourse will prevail. In this scenario, diplomacy provides the lubricant for acceptable relations, seeks to remove irritants, and strives for mutual understanding. However, even in the relations between traditionally peaceful entities, in the semi-Hobbesian universe of contemporary international relations, diplomacy holds in its quiver, the potential threat of force. In the cases where rivalry becomes equated with threats to vital national interests (a determination that is difficult to objectively define but that governments make drawing on their specific cultural, historical, and political traditions and bringing to bear whatever institutions or individuals wield predominant influence on this subject), diplomacy becomes an adjunct to overt or masked displays or use of armed force. In this situation, diplomacy becomes the main instrument to build coalitions, influence publics and elites in other countries of the justice of the cause, and works closely with the military establishment to make available critical spaces in non-national territory for the possible deployment of armed force (i.e., aircraft overflight rights, port visits, shipment of men and materiel). Finally, if armed conflict does erupt, diplomacy continues during that period (albeit with a lower emphasis) focusing on post-war planning, cost and burden-sharing, and international organization endorsement (or at least non-condemnation) of the military actions.

Diplomacy fundamentally consists of a constant assessment of other countries' power potential, perceived vital interests, relationship with other states, in an attempt to maximize one's own country's

freedom of action with the ultimate purpose of assuring the achievement of the nation's vital interests, the core of which is survival. Diplomacy traditionally and currently utilizes a variety of practices or maneuvers to obtain the protection or furtherance of the national goals or interests. Essentially all these practices are elements of diplomatic strategy that seek advantage for the state short of war (although war always remains the ultimate recourse). From the realist perspective, all strategies, while perhaps amoral in themselves, have as the ultimate goal the moral aim of the survival of the state and its core values. Thus, leaders must take account of the particular circumstance of the place in the international order of their state to determine what would be an effective strategy and tactics or maneuvers to enable its success. Thus, from the British and French perspective in 1938, the decision to appease Germany over the Sudetenland may have been a misperception of the relative power of each state but was not, *a priori*, an invalid tactic. The constant politically-charged accusation of "Munich" or "Yalta" in quite different circumstances is meaningless. Sometimes appeasement is good or unavoidable. In the case of Nazi Germany, in hindsight, it was a bad tactic because Hitler could not be appeased, and the Allies simply postponed the inevitable clash to a moment when they yielded military advantage to Hitler. *Détente* (especially the series of arms control human rights agreements) as practiced by Nixon and Kissinger was an effort to reach accommodation with the Soviet Union at a time when it appeared a balance of power in nuclear weapons had been struck and neither side could expect to gain a decisive advantage. The effort by President George H. W. Bush to create a coalition in the First Gulf War was not so much to increase U.S. military advantage over Iraq as it was to demonstrate—especially in the Arab and Islamic worlds—the broad support to repel Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. In the recent Gulf War, the relative absence of a significant coalition was largely a function of the administration's desire to not be constrained in tactics, operations (targeting), and strategy in the way it believed NATO operations in Kosovo had been hampered.

Diplomatic Instruments

The main instrument of diplomacy is negotiation, whether in a formal or informal setting. In a sense all diplomacy is a constant adjustment of relations among states pursued simultaneously through multiple, overlapping dialogues: bilateral, multilateral (e.g., United Nations); special conferences and other venues. The goal is usually, but not always, to reach an agreement that could range from those containing significant enforcement mechanisms for implementation (e.g., the Non-Proliferation Treaty) to hortatory proclamations such as the Kellogg-Briand pact that purported to outlaw war. One of the special advantages diplomats as a profession may have is that they should possess significant knowledge of the personalities and national cultural styles of their interlocutors. Since much diplomatic maneuvering by states consist of bluffs and feints as well as subtle signals either of accommodation or willingness to risk war, a capable diplomacy can discern and characterize the meaning of a given action. Misinterpretation, ignorance, lack of knowledge, or arrogance can lead to unforeseeable consequences (e.g., ignoring India's warning during the Korean War that China would intervene if U.S. forces approached the Yalu River).

Diplomatic relations among countries have long followed a common set of practices. The necessity to maintain contact as a means to facilitate dialogue between states leads to diplomatic recognition that can be of the state but not the government (e.g., North Korea by the United States); or of the government as well. Normally, such recognition is not a moral stamp of approval but a reflection that a regime controls the preponderance of national territory, and that it is in the interest of the other country to have formal channels of communication. Breaking relations can be a prelude to war; more often it is a mark of extreme disapproval. But if the regime survives, non-recognition can be a cause of great inconvenience since

maintaining a dialogue usually involves talking either through third parties or in multilateral institutions. There are also anomalous situations such as is currently the case with Cuba where the United States maintains a large Interests Section under the technical protection of the Swiss embassy in order to pursue business with the Castro regime without compromising its disapproval. Sometimes a decision is made to withdraw the ambassador, temporarily or for longer periods, to deliver a significant rebuke for some policy or action of the host government. The downside to such an action is that dialogue between the states may become more rigid and are certainly conducted at a lower level of authority. In normal practice, the ambassador heads an embassy that is usually divided into numerous sections each specializing in a particular subject area. The number of persons granted diplomatic status, which under the Vienna Convention imparts immunity to certain host government laws, is negotiated between the two states.

An American embassy is normally organized in the following manner: at the apex is the Ambassador, appointed by the President as his personal representative and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. He may be a career Foreign Service Officer from the Department of State or he may be chosen from other agencies or the private sector. His/her alter ego is the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) who serves under the Ambassador to assure the timely, efficient, and correct carrying out of instructions and to assure good management practices in the embassy (i.e., avoidance of waste, fraud, and mismanagement). There are usually several functional State Department Sections (i.e., Political, Economic, Consular, and Administrative) that handle the reporting, management, and protection of U.S. citizens and issuance of visas to foreign nationals. Many Embassies also maintain a Defense Attaché Office with representatives from one or more of the armed services; a Defense Cooperation Office that manages foreign military sales and transfers; often a Foreign Commercial Service that promotes U.S. exports; a Foreign Agricultural Service that does the same for agricultural commodities; a Legal Attaché (normally FBI) that liaises with host country police authorities; Drug Enforcement Agency that does the same on narcotics issues; and a representative from Customs, possibly the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Depending on the country, many other Federal agencies may be represented. Similarly, the receiving country may have similar sections in its embassy in Washington.

How, in the real, contemporary world, does modern American diplomacy work? With or without the publication of the National Security Strategy, which is an explicit annual overview of an Administration's top priorities often together with a general roadmap on how to achieve the objectives, the Department of State, usually in conjunction and coordination with the other foreign affairs agencies under the auspices of the National Security Council, will send telegraphic (or sometimes e-mail or telephone) instructions to an embassy in a given country or international organization. It might be a request for information on a matter that has risen to the attention of at least the Country Director in a regional or functional bureau of the Department of State (perhaps due to media attention, pressure from a lobbyist, or a request from a member of Congress). Or the department could instruct the Ambassador to raise with the host country a matter of concern such as the arrest of an American citizen, a report of human rights abuse by a military unit, allegations of unfair commercial practice harmful to an American firm, sale of military weapons, a request for port visit of a U.S. warship, surveillance of a suspected terrorist or many other possible items. In what becomes a continuous conversation, the appropriate section in the embassy (Political, Economic, Consular, Defense Attaché, Commercial Service, or others) would be tasked to take the necessary action. Sometimes the embassy itself reports on a matter and offers a recommendation. In rare cases where immediate action is vital, the embassy might report what it did and implicitly request endorsement of the action. Often, in parallel fashion, especially on important issues, the Department would convoke the Ambassador or an appropriate official from the relevant embassy in Washington or its Mission to the United Nations to make similar points. Because embassies and foreign ministries are organized on highly hierarchical principles, it is

often possible to adjust the tone and content of the message to a particular rank, thus making clear the relative importance of the message. Depending on response, the message's content, deliverer, and recipient can be ratcheted up or down accordingly.

Diplomatic Roles

What are the principal roles of a diplomat? First, he is an agent of his government ordered to carry out instructions from authorized superiors. In the American case, there is often a vigorous internal debate throughout the foreign affairs agencies of the government on a given policy, as well as on the tactics of its proposed execution, a dialogue in which both Department of State and embassies continuously engage. However, once a decision is made, the action is carried out. Whatever an individual diplomat's private feelings on a given issue may be, he is duty-bound to carry out the instructions. If his conscience does not so allow, he may request a transfer to another assignment or region or offer to resign. In effect, the diplomat in this role functions as a lawyer with the U.S. Government as his client. Just as a lawyer's ethical responsibility is to make the most vigorous possible advocacy for his client regardless of his personal opinions of the client's innocence, so is a diplomat in public or in conversation with foreign interlocutors expected to make the best possible presentation on behalf of his government.

The diplomat is also an information-gatherer and analyst. Although not expected to compete in real-time with the media organizations such as CNN or the *New York Times* on basic facts, due to his presumed experience and familiarity with a country, its culture, institutions, and key personalities, the diplomat should be able to bring added value by analyzing and putting in context what to harried Washington senior leaders can seem like isolated, meaningless events. So, for the diplomat to be well-informed, he ideally should speak, read, and understand the local language, extract from the mass media key nuggets of important information, develop a string of well-informed contacts covering a wide spectrum, and attend major events such as political party congresses. As a message-drafter, the diplomatic drafter needs to be succinct, clear, pungent enough to both hold busy readers' attention and to answer the "so-what" question. The analysis needs to be substantiated by fact and interpretation, each clearly labeled as such. While never writing with the intent to provoke, when necessary, the drafter may have to call attention respectfully but clearly to actual or potential situations that may be unpleasant or resented by policymakers. At the same time, national leaders must be careful not to shoot the messenger even if they disagree with the analysis or recommendations. Sometimes, this requires courage from the drafter and restraint from the recipient. It is always the policymakers' prerogative to choose other courses. But retaliation against unwanted advice or analysis can lead to self-censorship and ultimate harm to the national interest through failure to realistically assess events.

In Washington, the middle-level diplomat is not as concerned with interpreting events in a foreign country as he is with assisting in defining his agency's position on a given issue (usually a whole host of them) while interacting with other elements of the foreign affairs agencies in order to glean their positions to better support their own agency's position.

A diplomat is also a negotiator. Depending on the issue, a diplomat may have more or less freedom to adjust from basic instructions, tactics, and goals. In order for a negotiation to succeed, which may not always be desirable or the preferred outcome, the astute diplomat will have a good general understanding of his counterpart's baseline requirement, some sense of the national cultural manner of negotiating, and a willingness to bargain—but not to bargain away essential or vital objectives. This propensity for

negotiation, also an inherent part of a lawyer's toolkit, is what sometimes infuriates ideological or idealistic individuals since they believe it immoral to negotiate with either blatantly evil states or leaders or they believe it puts the United States in a position of appearing to make compromises on what can be construed as vital interests. Unless there is no longer a need to negotiate at all because of acknowledged overwhelming power of one country, or because diplomacy has yielded to open war, such compromises are an inherent property of having to deal with a Hobbesian world of sovereign states. Even criminal prosecutors make plea-bargains with criminals to achieve a balance of justice, resource use, and likelihood of conviction on the most serious charges.

In a slightly different key, a diplomat facilitates and maintains dialogue with his counterparts, hopefully with a view to arriving at complementary assessments of threats, benefits, and actions to take to maximize their respective national interests. If the dialogue goes far enough, it can lead to commitments usually expressed in the form of treaties or agreements. They can range from reciprocal reduction of tariffs to willingness to go to war on behalf of another country.

Diplomats also act as spokesman and sounding board for the country. A good diplomat will be effective in public and private gatherings at furthering his country's interests and refuting criticism of it by couching his advocacy in a manner best suited to the culture where he is stationed. Because of the ubiquity of media outlets, a good diplomat learns how to access the host country media, key decisionmakers, and most relevant institutions (parliament, military, chambers of commerce, labor union federations, etc.), and gets his point across over the blare of "white noise" emanating in the modern media.

At the more senior level, diplomats serve as counselors to national leaders, few of whom are regional or global experts. While diplomats rarely have the final say in the most solemn decision a nation can make—the decision to go to war—they can serve to make clear the potential costs as well as benefits of such acts and the likely prospects of coalitions in favor (or opposed) to their country. While certainly not pacifists, diplomats are temperamentally and professionally inclined to seek non-violent solutions partly because that is what they do, and partly because they frequently can foresee second and third order consequences that can lead to a worse situation than the status quo ante bellum. It is at this juncture that politicians and the media sometimes confuse reporting and analysis that may be at odd with national leadership goals with disloyalty. It is not a desire for the status quo, let alone a preference for dealing with dictators, that may drive diplomats as some have charged. Rather it is a realization that in the absence of comprehensive universally-acknowledged supremacy, negotiation with other regimes, no matter how unpalatable, may be necessary. The obvious classic quote is that of Winston Churchill who, despite being before and after World War II an adamant anti-Communist, said on Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, "If Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons."³

Conclusion

To sum up, diplomacy is a mechanism—one among many—used in furtherance of the national interest and in protection of the national security. While styles of diplomacy may differ by national cultures, personal idiosyncrasies, and historical memories, they all have a common purpose. As long as there are states and they hold differing assessments of their national interests, there will be diplomacy. While technology is making certain traditional means of conducting diplomacy obsolete, the core functions of diplomacy will remain. In the past airplane and telegraph made clipper ships and quill pen instructions redundant. New information technology is already making reporting far more focused on analysis than

simple newsgathering that is done better by CNN, and e-mail and cell-phone are replacing cabled instructions. Such advances occasionally produce serious suggestions to eliminate some or many embassies, but only because of a perceived more efficient manner of performing their functions. Diplomacy is still a vital element of national power.

Notes - Chapter 13

1 Ambrose Bierce, *The Devil's Dictionary*, available at www.alcyone.com/max/lit/devils/d.html, accessed 7 August 2003.

2 Newt Gingrich, "Rogue State Department," *Foreign Policy* (July-August 2003) available at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/story.php?storyID=13742&PHPSESSID=7580b0d87d9d1e0995f9bc68f9beab56d accessed 7 August 2003.

3 Winston Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 370.

CHAPTER 14

MILITARY POWER AND THE USE OF FORCE

John F. Troxell¹

Force without wisdom falls of its own weight.

Horace

International politics is a struggle for power. Power, in the international arena, is used to protect a nation's interests by influencing potential competitors or partners. The most important instrument of power available to a nation-state is military power. "In international politics in particular," according to Hans Morgenthau, "armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation."² The other elements of power are certainly important and can contribute to the furtherance of national interests; however, as long as states continue to exist in a condition of anarchy, military power will continue to play a crucial role in international politics. As Kenneth Waltz aptly put it, "In politics force is said to be the ultima ratio. In international politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one."³

The current world situation once again focuses the international community's attention on the role of military power, due in part to the absolute and relative dominance of the world's sole superpower, the United States. According to recent figures, U.S. defense expenditures account for 39 percent of the world's total spending on defense. The United States spends more than eight times the combined defense budgets of China and Russia, and more than 25 times the combined defense spending of the remaining six "rogue nations" (Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea). These comparisons do not reflect the defense contributions of the closest U.S. allies, nor do they include the impact of the Pentagon's fiscal 2005 budget request of \$400 billion, a cumulative increase of 24 percent over the past three years.⁴ The resultant gap in military capabilities is huge, and may even be greater than that reflected in a comparison of defense budgets, due to the technological lead and the high quality professional armed forces of the United States. Recent conventional operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq only confirm this dominance.

As important as military power is to the functioning of the international system, it is a very expensive and dangerous tool of statecraft—one, as Robert Art recently pointed out, that should not be exercised without a great deal of wisdom:

Using military power correctly does not ensure that a state will protect all of its interests, but using it incorrectly would put a great burden on these other instruments and could make it impossible for a state to achieve its goals. Decisions about whether and how to use military power may therefore be the most fateful a state makes.⁵

Art's caution is clearly evident in the emerging security environment of the twenty-first century. Despite

undisputed U.S. military supremacy, the United States and its allies sense a greater vulnerability to their basic freedoms and way of life than at any time since the height of the nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union. Military supremacy has yet to find an answer to the combined threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism. Failed states and rogue states continue to present security concerns and the resultant demand for military forces to contain conflicts and rebuild nations. The United States faces two strategic challenges—one of ends and the other of means. The most prominent declinist of the last decade, Paul Kennedy, argued that great powers succumb to “imperial overstretch” because their global interests and obligations outpace their ability to defend them all simultaneously. James Fallows recently echoed this concern in claiming that “America is over-extended” because the United States has so many troops tied down in so many places that we can no longer respond to emerging crises. Beyond the concern with over-ambitious ends, Fallows also claims that the United States is in danger of actually breaking the military instrument of power through overuse and thus returning to the days of the post-Vietnam “Hollow Army.”⁶

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of military power in the international arena in an effort to address challenges highlighted above associated with its use. There are two major parts to this discussion. The first concerns the political purposes of military power, and the second concerns the actual use of military force. The use of force discussion will include a brief consideration of employment options (the Range of Military Operations), a presentation of various guidelines for the use of force, and a look at the issue of legitimacy.

Political Purposes of Military Power

Despite all of the changes that have occurred in world politics since the end of the Cold War, there is in many respects an underlying continuity with earlier eras. The recent conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and mass-casualty terrorism are evidence that the use of military power as an instrument of political purpose remains as relevant today as in the past. Clausewitz’ famous dictum continues to ring true, “that war [the application of military power] should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy,” and that “war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” While still serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell analyzed the military successes that the United States had experienced through most of the 1990s. The principal reason for these achievements, he concluded, “is that in every instance we have matched the use of military force to our political objectives.”⁷

From a modern day American perspective, the U.S. Constitution establishes the political context in which military power is applied and the framework for civilian authority over the Armed Forces. The capstone publication for the U.S. Armed Forces, Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, which addresses the employment of the U.S. military as an instrument of national power, is very explicit on this point: “Under the Constitution’s framework, American military power operates for and under conditions determined by the people through their elected representatives. This political context establishes the objectives and the limits of legitimate military action in peace, crisis, and conflict in the United States and abroad.”⁸

Military power can be matched to several different categories of broadly defined political objectives. The traditional categories that were developed and articulated during the Cold War, in the context of the U.S./USSR nuclear rivalry, included deterrence, compellence, and defense.⁹ Since the threat of large-scale nuclear war between competing nation-states has largely receded, it seems more appropriate to focus on the

political purposes behind the use of conventional forces. In this context the categories can be modified, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Components of Security Policy.¹⁰

Defeat.

Military power can be used in its purest sense to physically defeat an adversary. Joint Pub 1 clearly articulates this objective as the fundamental purpose of military power—to fight and win the nation’s wars. Although recognizing other, potential non-combat objectives, JP 1 argues that “success in combat in defense of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, societal values, and national interests is the essential goal and measure of the profession of arms in American society.”¹¹ Thomas Schelling, in the classic *Arms and Influence*, used the phrase brute force, and referred to a country’s ability, assuming it had enough military power, to forcibly seize, disarm or disable, or repel, deny, and defend against an opponent.¹² Schelling’s discussion clearly recognizes both offensive and defensive uses of force. Robert Art, on the other hand, focuses on the defensive use of force as the deployment of military power to either ward off an attack or to minimize damage if actually attacked. Despite this focus, Art also argues that a state can use its forces to strike first if it believes that an attack is imminent or inevitable. This leads to the distinction between a preemptive attack — in response to an imminent threat, and a preventive attack — in response to an inevitable attack. A preventive attack can be undertaken if a state believes that others will attack it when the balance of forces shift in their favor, or perhaps after key military capabilities are developed. In the case of either preemptive or preventive actions, Art concludes that “it is better to strike first than to be struck first,” and supports the maxim that “the best defense is a good offense.” The defeat aspect of military force seeks to eliminate the adversary’s ability or opportunity to do anything other than what is demanded of it.¹³

Coercion.

Because of the high cost and uncertainty associated with combat operations, a nation's primary strategic objective is usually an attempt to cause an adversary to accede to one's demands short of war or actual combat operations. As such, most states attempt to achieve their goals through coercion. Successful coercion is not warfighting, but is the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back up that threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would. Coercion relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decisionmaking.¹⁴ As opposed to brute force, coercion is the "threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply."¹⁵ From this perspective, it is withheld violence that can influence an adversary's choice. It is this perception of withheld consequences that causes a nation to acquiesce to a coercer's demands. Those consequences can take the broad form of anticipated punishment in response to an action, or anticipated denial or failure of an opponent's chosen course of action. Punitive coercion seeks to influence an opponent through fear, and coercion by denial through hopelessness. Finally, just as it is important to recognize the dynamic nature of the strategy formulation process, strategists should also view coercion as a dynamic, two (or more) player contest. Each side acts, not only based on anticipation of the other side's moves, but also based on other changes in the security environment. The adversary can react to alter the perceived costs and benefits and certainly has a vote in assessing the credibility of the coercer's threat.¹⁶ Coercion has two subcategories: deterrence and compellence.

Deterrence.

Deterrence, in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent *not to initiate* a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks. Deterrence can be based on punishment, which involves a threat to destroy what the adversary values, or on denial, which requires convincing an opponent that he will not achieve his goals on the battlefield. In either case, the adversary is assumed to be willing and able to engage in well-informed cost-benefit calculations and respond rationally on the basis of those calculations. An irrational (or ill-informed) opponent that will accept destruction or disproportionate loss may not be deterrable.¹⁷ Deterrence theory became almost synonymous with strategy during the Cold War as both superpowers sought to ensure their survival through mutual threats of massive nuclear retaliation.¹⁸ Nevertheless, there are certain important distinctions concerning the term:¹⁹

- General (strategic) or immediate (tactical) deterrence (the former refers to a diffuse deterrent effect deriving from one's capabilities and reputation; the latter to efforts to discourage specific behavior in times of crises). An example of tactical deterrence was the evidently successful threat conveyed to Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War to dissuade Iraq from using WMD against coalition forces. An unsuccessful example was the U.S.-United Arab Emirates (UAE) tanker exercise that failed to dissuade Iraq from invading Kuwait.
- Extended and central deterrence (the former alludes to endeavors to extend deterrent coverage over friends and allies; the latter to the deterrence of attack upon one's homeland). Examples continue to abound concerning extended deterrence—one particularly difficult issue concerns the U.S. security guarantees extended to Taiwan.

There are two challenges to the future deterrent posture of U.S. forces. The first is the ongoing issue of trying to evaluate the effectiveness of a deterrent policy. The willingness of a legislative body to allocate resources to various elements of military power is normally contingent on recognition of beneficial results. Henry Kissinger aptly describes the problem:

Since deterrence can only be tested negatively, by events that do not take place, and since it is never

possible to demonstrate why something has not occurred, it became especially difficult to assess whether existing policy was the best possible policy or a just barely effective one. Perhaps deterrence was unnecessary because it was impossible to prove whether the adversary ever intended to attack in the first place.²⁰

The second challenge deals with the changing nature of the threat. During the Cold War deterrence was based on a known enemy operating from a known location and under the assumed direction of a rational leader. The emergence of rogue states and transnational terrorist networks that could gain access to WMD has created what Colin Gray defines as the current crisis of deterrence. These new actors do not necessarily share the long-standing and highly developed theory of deterrence that emerged from the Cold War, and the cost-benefit calculus that underpins deterrence may be clouded by cultural differences and varying attitudes towards risk. In fact, as Gray observes, “. . . some of the more implacable of our contemporary adversaries appear to be undeterrable. Not only are their motivations apparently unreachable by the standard kind of menaces, but they lack fixed physical assets for us to threaten.”²¹ The current U.S. *National Security Strategy* is in full accord with these views: “Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.”²²

Compellence.

Compellence is the use of military power to change an adversary's behavior. It attempts to reverse an action that has already occurred or to otherwise overturn the status quo. Examples include evicting an aggressor from territory it has just conquered or convincing a proliferating state to abandon its nuclear weapons program. According to Thomas Schelling, who initially coined the term, “Compellence . . . usually involves initiating action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds.”²³ Physical force is often employed to harm another state until the later abides by the coercer's demands. It is important to recognize the difference between compellence and deterrence. The distinction, according to Robert Art, “is one between the active and passive use of force. The success of a deterrent threat is measured by its not having been used. The success of a compellent action is measured by how closely and quickly the adversary conforms to one's stipulated wishes.”²⁴

Compellence may be easier to demonstrate than deterrence, because of the observable change in behavior; but it tends to be harder to achieve. It is usually easier to make a potential aggressor decide not to attack in the first place than to cause the same aggressor to call off the attack once it is underway. A state that is deterred from taking a particular action can always claim that it never intended to act in such a way, and thus publicly ignore the deterrent threat. However, if a state succumbs to compellent actions, it is much harder to change behavior without an associated loss of prestige and possible national humiliation. Consequently, compellent threats should be accompanied by a complementary set of concessions or face-saving measures to make it politically acceptable for a state to comply. Success can also be driven by the perceived or actual imbalance of interests at stake. As the American experience in Vietnam demonstrated, compellence tends to fail when the issue is of vital importance to the adversary but possibly only represents an important or peripheral interest to the coercing state.²⁵




Figure 2. Evaluations of Compellent Threats.²⁶

In the post-Cold War era, three broad conditions have emerged that facilitate the effective use of military threats. These relationships are expressed in Figure 2. Together, the credibility of the threat and the degree of difficulty of the demands shape the targeted leader's evaluation of the likely cost of complying or of not complying with U.S. demands. If the threat is perceived to be wholly incredible, the anticipated cost of noncompliance will be low. The balance between the cost of compliance and the cost of defiance represents the potency of the threat. In the post-Cold War period, despite overwhelming U.S. military supremacy, it has been extremely difficult for the United States to achieve its objectives without actually conducting sustained military operations. A principal reason for this difficulty is the existence of a generation of political leaders throughout the world whose basic perception of U.S. military power and political will is one of weakness. They enter any situation with a fundamental belief that the United States can be defeated or driven away.²⁷

Echoing Colin Gray's crisis of deterrence, perhaps there is a similar crisis of compellence. According to Blechman and Wittes:

American presidents have been reluctant to step as close to the plate as had been required to achieve U.S. objectives in many post-cold war conflicts. They have made threats only reluctantly and usually have not made as clear or potent a threat as was called for by the situation. They have understood the need to act in the situation but have been unwilling or perceived themselves as being unable to lead the American people into the potential sacrifice necessary to secure the proper goal. As a result, they have attempted to satisfy, taking some action but not the most effective possible action to challenge the foreign leader threatening U.S. interests. They have sought to curtail the extent and potential cost of the confrontation by avoiding the most serious type of threat and therefore the most costly type of war if the threat were challenged.²⁸

This conclusion was written prior to the tragic events of 9/11 and the subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Time will tell if Americans will sustain their support for two very challenging and increasingly costly nation-building projects.

Reassurance

Finally, there are two other political objectives listed on Figure 1. The first of these is reassurance, a

term that began as a key element of U.S. nuclear strategy. In particular, reassurance was closely associated with the notion of extended deterrence in that its objective was to extend security guarantees to friends and allies. As a consequence, reassurance played a crucial role in the Cold War if for no other reason than the concept helped to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states like Germany and Japan. In a similar manner, the current U.S. defense policy includes, as its first objective, the goal of assuring friends and allies. This assurance is gained through the forward presence of U.S. forces and ensures allies and friends that the United States will honor its security commitments and continue to be a reliable security partner. In addition to the stationing of large numbers of U.S. military personnel overseas, the political objective of reassurance/assurance is achieved through numerous security cooperation activities and agreements. Security cooperation serves U.S. national interests by advancing U.S. values and beliefs, promoting regional stability, and improving cooperation among allies, partners and friends.²⁹ From this perspective, security is this country's most influential public-sector export. "We are the only nation on earth," one analyst observes, "capable of exporting security in a sustained fashion, and we have a very good track record of doing it."³⁰ A primary consequence of a more secure environment is the promotion of global economic growth. With this focus on both security and economic interests, the ultimate purpose of U.S. military engagement, according to some analysts, is to maintain international order, thereby allowing the American people to continue to reap the benefits of globalization.³¹

Dissuasion

The final political objective is dissuasion, sometimes presented as the ultimate purpose of both defense and deterrence, that is, persuading others not to take actions harmful to oneself. The notion here, however, is more in keeping with that of the *National Security Strategy*, which describes building U.S. military forces strong enough "to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling the power of the United States."³² The *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) elaborates on this objective: "Well-targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions. The United States can exert such influence through the conduct of research and development, test, and demonstration programs. It can do so by maintaining or enhancing advantages in key areas of military capability."³³ The goal is clearly to maintain, if not grow, the tremendous capability gap that U.S. military forces enjoy over virtually all other militaries. The origin of this objective dates back to the formerly discredited draft 1992 Defense Planning Guidance. When initially leaked to the press, this document included a call to preserve American global military supremacy, to discourage others from challenging our leadership, and to maintain a military dominance capable of "detering potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."³⁴ More recently, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld has been equally explicit: "Just as the existence of the U.S. Navy dissuades others from investing in competing navies—because it would cost them a fortune and would not provide them a margin of military advantage—we must develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from competing."³⁵

The concept, however, need not be so rough-edged, dissuasion can also apply to countries that are not full-fledged adversaries, but those with which the United States has a mixed relationship—mutual suspicions and common incentives to avoid violence. The term goes to the heart of the new geo-strategic era. "In short, dissuasion aims at urging potential geopolitical rivals not to become real rivals by making clear that any sustained malevolent conduct will be checkmated by the United States. It involves military pressure applied with a velvet glove, not crude threats of war and destruction."³⁶ The key relationship for U.S. dissuasion is that with China in terms of preventing the People's Republic from developing assertive

and menacing geo-political policies. Colin Gray is much more sanguine about this policy’s prospects, noting “we should expect state-centric enemies to attempt to organize to resist the American hegemony, and in particular to work hard in search of strategic means and methods that might negate much of our dissuasive strength.”³⁷

In all this, it is important to recognize that military power alone is not sufficient to conduct a successful foreign policy. Military power must be properly integrated with the other elements of statecraft—political, economic, diplomatic, and information. Even for the greatest of nations, as Joseph Nye argues, military power is always in short supply and consequently must be rationed among competing goals: “The paradox of American power is that world politics is changing in a way that makes it impossible for the strongest world power since Rome to achieve some of its most crucial international goals alone.”³⁸

Range of Military Operations

The broad political purposes for the use of military power clearly encompass many different employment options for military force, which have been grouped under employment categories in what the Joint Staff calls the “Range of Military Operations (ROMO)” (Figure 3). These distinctions are designed to assist strategists in understanding the characteristics of each one.³⁹

War refers to large-scale, sustained combat operations necessary to achieve national objectives or protect national interests. These operations could include preventive attacks or preemptive operations. Preemptive actions are associated with imminent threats, and the identification of these threats places a premium on intelligence and warning.

On the other hand, force is only used as a combat mode in one of two broad categories concerned with military operations other than war (MOOTW), that of deterring war and resolving conflict. These operations include punitive attacks or raids and strikes, in which military force is designed to inflict pain and cost, normally in retaliation for some behavior, but not necessarily designed to reverse the adversaries actions. Punitive attacks also require evidence of who was responsible for the offending action. Interdiction involves the discrete use of direct force to prevent the transshipment of goods or resources. These operations can be associated with sanctions enforcement.

Under this same category are peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. Peace enforcement operations are also referred to as Chapter VII operations referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which addresses enforcement actions “with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” A closely related category is peace-making, which assumes that one of the protagonists

Range of Military Operations			
Military Operations		General US Goals	Representative Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockade
	NONCOMBAT <i>Military Operations Other Than War</i>	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement/ Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Strikes/Raids/Show of Force Counterterrorism/Peacekeeping Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Antiterrorism/Disaster relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Domestic Support Counterdrug / NEO

Source: Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, September 10, 2001, I-2

Figure 3. Range of Military Operations.

opposes the status quo. These operations take place in a non-consensual environment. Peacekeeping is often referred to as a Chapter VI operation under the UN Charter, which addresses pacific settlement of disputes.” Peacekeepers are impartial and relatively passive, called upon to monitor or verify troop withdrawals, separation of forces, or provide security during elections. These operations take place in a consensual environment.

Promoting peace and support to civil authorities; which do not involve the use or threat of force, represent the other end of the MOOTW spectrum. Nevertheless, nation-assistance or nation-building is still an extremely intrusive form of intervention designed to bring about political leadership and/or institutions different from those that presently exist. Disaster relief or humanitarian assistance involves the deployment of forces to save lives without necessarily altering the political context. These generally occur in a consensual environment, although occasionally military forces will take part in an imposed humanitarian intervention which may be carried out in a hostile environment.

In any event, all of these different classifications of military operations can be viewed as fulfilling one of the three principal political purposes: deterrent, compellent or defensive. For example, the political goal of humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations is to save lives; this is defense of parties under attack. The political goal of nation-assistance is to construct a viable government; this can be viewed as compelling armed groups or other elements of the society to obey the new central government. As a final example, the political goal of any collective security arrangement is to prevent aggression; which is deterrence.⁴⁰

There is one important type of military operation that is not explicitly cited in the “Range of Military Operations” chart—covert action. These actions are a specialty of the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) community, which is currently enjoying an unprecedented prominence within the U.S. military. Covert action is defined by U.S. law as activity meant “to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged.”⁴¹ According to the Special Operations Command posture statement, “SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct covert, clandestine, or discreet counterterrorism missions in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.”⁴² The current definition of covert operations was adopted as part of the effort to fill gaps in oversight that led to the Iran-Contra scandal. According to the law, covert actions must first be authorized by a written presidential finding, and the House and Senate intelligence committees must be notified before the operation has begun.⁴³

In the past, SOF missions were viewed as “traditional military activities” in support of ongoing or anticipated military campaigns and were thus not subject to the covert action oversights just mentioned. However, in the ongoing, and broadly defined campaign against global terrorism—a campaign in which the Special Operations Command directly plans and executes its own missions—there is some concern that this type of use of force will be completely removed from congressional oversight. On the one hand, the U.S. Government should be able to use every tool available in the fight against terrorism. However, such broad-brush authority, combined with an increasing propensity to use SOF in covert operations in support of an aggressive preemption strategy, may lead to abuse and risks to U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁴

One final point concerning the current nature of military operations is the increasingly cluttered battlefield from the standpoint of other coalition partners, interagency elements, and even non-governmental organizations. The Joint Staff describes the nature of these operations as *unified action*. The concept of unified action highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and multinational

power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.⁴⁵

Guidelines for the Use of Force

War cannot be divorced from political life; whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.

Clausewitz

If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops.

Sun Tzu

Madeleine Albright asked me in frustration, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" I thought I would have an aneurysm.

Colin Powell

Whom shall I send, and who will go for us? Here I am. Send me.

Isaiah⁴⁶

These quotations emphasize the importance of linking political objectives to the use of military force. One of the best ways to ensure this is to use military force only in support of the national interest and when success is assured. The difficulty with such a straightforward prescription is reconciling the various degrees of interests, to include valid concerns about furthering important national and international values. In addition, the resort to war or conflict always unleashes the forces of chance and friction, creating in one analyst's description, "a fearful lottery."⁴⁷ Creating the conditions for success, let alone guaranteeing success is much easier said than done. Decisions concerning the use of force are the most important that any nation can make. Given that the post-Cold War experience supports the necessity of resorting to force and the threats of force, but also emphasizes the risks of doing so, national security decisionmakers are left with a critical issue in the theory and practice of foreign policy: under what conditions and how can military force and threats of force be used effectively to accomplish different types of policy objectives. In the final analysis, political leaders should come up with convincing answers to these questions before sending soldiers in harms way.⁴⁸

Debates in the United States about appropriate guidelines for the use of force normally revolve around the Weinberger Doctrine—which is habitually viewed as an outgrowth of the lessons from the Vietnam War.⁴⁹ However, the origins of the current debate actually go back to the Korean War. Two schools of strategic thought developed from an assessment of that limited and inconclusive war. The first was the never-again or all-or-nothing school, which advocated that either the United States should do everything necessary to win a decisive military victory or it should not intervene at all.⁵⁰ At the other extreme was the limited-war school. Proponents of this view held that the United States could expect to become involved in regional conflicts demanding intervention in support of less than vital interests. Colin Powell, although normally associated with the all-or-nothing school, has argued that all wars are limited; either by territory on which they are fought, the means used, or the objectives for which they are fought.⁵¹

Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger articulated his six criteria for the use of force in response to two major issues—the lessons of the Vietnam War and an ongoing policy debate in the Reagan

administration about the appropriate response to terrorism. Both issues are clearly relevant as the debate on the use of force enters the twenty-first century. Lessons from Vietnam included the recognition that military victory does not always result in political victory and that sustaining public and political support throughout a prolonged war can be difficult. Both of these issues continue to resonate in the debate about U.S. operations in Iraq. Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy, for instance, recently charged that “Iraq has developed into a quagmire,” and has become George Bush’s Vietnam.⁵²

Concerning terrorism, when the Weinberger doctrine was unveiled in 1984, the national security elites were in a heated debate about this issue, particularly as it related to the failure of U.S. policy in Lebanon. Weinberger was reluctant to commit troops to such an indeterminate and chaotic situation. Secretary of State George Shultz, on the other hand, argued that the Weinberger doctrine counseled inaction bordering on paralysis, and that “diplomacy could work these problems most effectively when force—or the threat of force—was a credible part of the equation.” The *Wall Street Journal* referred to “Mr. Shultz’s sensible anti-terrorist policy of ‘active-prevention, preemption, and retaliation’.”⁵³ Shultz was on the losing end of this debate in the 1980’s, but 20 years later his approach seems to have carried the day, at least in the Bush administration. Figure 4 shows the Weinberger doctrine and several more recent versions of guidelines for the use of force.⁵⁴

When to use force is the first critical question. The linkage of such use in support of vital national interests harkens back to the Napoleonic notion of fighting wars for grand purposes. Samuel Huntington defined national interest as a public good of concern to all or most Americans and a vital national interest as one that Americans are willing to expend blood and treasure to protect. The *National Security Strategy* defined vital interests as those directly connected to the survival of the nation. There are two problems with this very straightforward proposition. The first is the difficulty in determining what those interests are. The domestic consensus that supported U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War has been shattered, resulting in a lack of agreement on the nature and importance of U.S. national interests.⁵⁵ The recent focus on commercial and ethnic interests exacerbates the lack of widespread agreement on national interests. The institutions and capabilities created to serve a grand national purpose in the Cold War, according to Huntington, “are now being suborned and redirected to serve narrow subnational, transnational, and even nonnational purposes.”⁵⁶ Conversely, the attacks of 9/11 have undoubtedly contributed to a recognition of grand purposes and vital national interests, at least as associated with war on terrorism.

Guidelines for the Use of Force				
Two questions: 1. When to use force? 2. How to use force?				
W H E N	Weinberger Doctrine (November 28, 1984)	Powell (Fall, 1992)	Berry (Clinton NSS) (April 1995 / NSS '99)	Joint Pub 1 (Nov 2000)
	• No fixed set of rules • Relevant questions: 1. Vital interests at stake 2. Overwhelming force 3. Humanitarian interests	• No fixed set of rules • Relevant questions: 1. Vital interests 2. Important interests 3. Humanitarian interests	• Political interests • Ethical considerations • Overwhelming force • Multilateral consensus • Clear mission • Public support	• Adhere to societal values • No binding rules • Advances national interest • Clear mission • International support • Public support
H O W	Unambiguous military objective	Will the force be successful? • Costs & risks • Decisive means (overwhelming force)	• Clear mission • Public support	• Decisive means • End state and exit strategy • Termination conditions • Path to success • Milestones • Alternatives if military unsuccessful • NGOs and IGO's ready
	3. Clearly defined political and military objectives 5. Public support 6. Last resort	End state consequences (exit strategy)	• Decisive means • End state and exit strategy • Termination conditions • Path to success • Milestones • Alternatives if military unsuccessful • NGOs and IGO's ready	1. Necessary? 2. Doable? 3. Is it worth it?

Figure 4. Guidelines for the Use of Force.

The second concern is that states often use force in support of secondary and even tertiary interests. They do this either to protect vital interests or to support important national values. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry supported the selective use of force and thus distinguished between three categories of interests—vital, important, and humanitarian. He argued that different uses of limited force, and not necessarily applied in an overwhelming manner, were appropriate to protect these interests in the pursuit of limited objectives.⁵⁷ Perry's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John Shalikashvili, also desired more flexibility in the use of force. He reportedly claimed that he did not have the right to put a sign on his door saying, "I'm sorry—we only do the big ones." The United States has clearly continued to use force in support of non-vital interests or important national values. And wars waged in the name of values invariably turn out to be more controversial than wars waged for interests.⁵⁸

Weinberger borrows heavily from Clausewitz for his third, and relatively uncontroversial, criterion, the importance of having clearly established objectives. According to Clausewitz, "No one starts a war . . . without first being clear in his own mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."⁵⁹ This criterion is common across all of the sets of guidelines. Recognizing the need for clear objectives, however, does not necessarily remove all debate on the issue. The objectives chosen, just as the articulation of the national interests at stake, may not reflect broad agreement.

There are two other points worth considering on this criterion. First, once a war begins, chance, friction, and uncertainty take effect, and original political objectives and force requirements, as Michael Handel has observed, can change.

Weinberger's assumptions are more correct for military interventions/operations that can be carried out swiftly and decisively, . . . than they are for prolonged interventions and wars. The problem, of course, is that it is often very difficult to tell in advance which interventions will be short and decisive, and which will be costly and long.⁶⁰

The second point is that it is always difficult to determine in advance if a certain compellent or deterrent action will have the desired effect or result in an unanticipated counter-reaction by an adversary. As Richard Haass so aptly puts it, "It is as simple—and as basic—as the difference between winning a battle and winning a war. It only takes one party to initiate hostilities, but it takes everyone involved to bring hostilities to an end."⁶¹

The next two criteria: public support and last resort, are also common across all of the sets of guidelines. The need to maintain public and political support is common sense but not completely without debate, and certainly not without potentially great difficulty in execution. In the original argument over the Weinberger doctrine, Secretary Shultz took issue with the need for public support prior to initiating action. In his view, the duties of leadership could require action before mobilization of public support.

My view is that democratically elected and accountable individuals have been placed in positions where they can and must make decisions to defend our national security. The risk and burden of leadership is that those decisions will receive, or not receive, the support of the people on their merits. The democratic process will deal with leaders who fail to measure up to the standards imposed by the American people . . .⁶²

There is a great deal of historical validity to the "rally-around-the-flag" and "support-the-troops" effect. That approach can be particularly effective for short and decisive campaigns. In prolonged wars, however, the difficulty does not lie so much in obtaining initial public and political support as it does in sustaining it

for the duration.⁶³ Leaders must lead and mobilize public support. That can most easily be done by appeals to moral values or national interests. In any event,

the inertia of the governed can not be disentangled from the indifference of the government. American leaders have both a circular and a deliberate relationship to public opinion. It is circular because their constituencies are rarely if ever aroused by foreign crises, even genocidal ones, in the absence of political leadership, and yet at the same time U.S. officials continually cite the absence of public support as grounds for inaction.⁶⁴

Last resort is an important component of the just war theory of *jus ad bellum*, or just resort in going to war. Americans traditionally have been very reluctant to resort to force unless they have been directly attacked. There is always a strong desire to give diplomacy a chance or obtain sufficient results through the application of economic sanctions or other pressures. Time is also needed to mobilize domestic and international support. However, it may not always be wise to delay military action. Once again, George Shultz challenged this point, “The idea that force should be used ‘only as a last resort’ means that, by the time of use, force is the only resort and likely a much more costly one than if used earlier.”⁶⁵ General Wesley Clark, in his examination of the Kosovo campaign, concluded that the key lesson must be that “nations and alliances should move early to deal with crises while they are still ambiguous and can be dealt with more easily, for delay raises both the costs and the risks. Early action is the objective to which statesmen and military leaders should aspire.” All of this has direct relevance for the threat of catastrophic terrorism. Countering undeterrable terrorist organizations armed with weapons of mass destruction places the other instruments of statecraft at a huge disadvantage. “To consider force as a last resort is appropriate when trying to settle interstate conflict,” according to Ivo Daalder, “but when it comes to . . . preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or defeating terrorism waiting too long to employ force can both enhance the cost and reduce the effectiveness of its use.”⁶⁶

The last two items on Weinberger’s list concern how force should be used. The first of these addresses the importance of committing sufficient forces to accomplish the objectives. The goal is to avoid a long, drawn-out gradual employment of force that may not accomplish the objectives in a swift and decisive manner. This is the essence of the Vietnam syndrome. The U.S. military wants to avoid a half-hearted approach that results in higher casualties, a prolonged war, and a decision to quit before the mission is accomplished. One significant deterrent to U.S. action in Bosnia was the estimated steep cost of intervening in terms of troops required. For instance, the Joint Staff estimated in 1992 that it would take 50,000 U.S. ground troops to secure the Sarajevo airport for humanitarian relief operations. The airlift was eventually conducted under the watchful care of only 1,000 Canadian and French forces.⁶⁷

On the other hand, it is normally better to go into a hostile environment with too much rather than too little force. General Powell used the phrase decisive force and indicated that decisive means and results are always preferred, and that if force is used “we should not be equivocal: we should win and win decisively.”⁶⁸ Decisive means eventually evolved into overwhelming force, and related concepts, such as shock and awe. Joint Pub 1, notes that “when combat is possible, the force employed must be both overwhelming and decisive.”⁶⁹ The controversy about U.S. endstrength in Iraq, in both the initial combat phase and the subsequent stabilization and reconstruction phase, will only contribute to renewed military reluctance to undertake operations with less than overwhelming or decisive force. General Clark has argued in this regard that Operation IRAQI FREEDOM took “unnecessary risk because it skimped on the forces made available to the commanders” during the combat phase, and he claimed the existence of excessive risk during the post-combat phase. “The result was a U.S. force at the operation’s end that was incapable of

providing security, stopping the looting and sabotage, or establishing a credible presence throughout the country.”⁷⁰ The all-or-nothing versus limited objective (limited war) debate continues.

Michael Handel refers to the final item, the need for continuous reassessment, as the escape clause. Circumstances may change, or the enemy may respond in an unexpected manner, all necessitating a reassessment of objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and forces (means). That criteria also implies that if the costs become too high or if the objectives do not justify a greater commitment of resources, it may be prudent to terminate the conflict.⁷¹

Figure 4 clearly shows that several of the Weinberger guidelines have evolved and been modified over the years. One of the most important and far-reaching evolutions is the expansion of applicable interests categories and the recognition that limited options for the use of force may be appropriate in the pursuit of less than vital interests. Another is the inclusion of the concern about multilateral or international support. That guideline was added in the Clinton administration’s national security strategies and reflected a growing interest in ensuring multilateral responses to security issues. Multilateralism obviously included deliberations and support from NATO, but also recognized an enhanced role for the United Nations. America’s alliances were one of the keystones of Clinton’s selective engagement strategy, and the administration saw the UN as an important actor in the new world order. Having partners when it comes to using force also contributes to gaining and sustaining public support. As Charles Krauthammer argued at the close of the Gulf War, “Americans insist on the multilateral pretense. A large segment of American opinion doubts the legitimacy of unilateral American action, but accepts action taken under the rubric of the ‘world community’.” He went on to say that the ultimate problem with “multilateralism is that if you take it seriously you gratuitously forfeit American freedom of action.”⁷²

Finally, in terms of the evolution of the Weinberger guidelines, there is the inclusion of end state and exit strategy concerns. The desire to establish an exit strategy is principally associated with interventions that do not involve vital interests. If vital interests are at stake, national security experts generally assume that politicians will apply overwhelming force, unilaterally if necessary, until the conflict is resolved. For interventions in support of important or humanitarian issues, there is much more of a premium placed on quickly reaching an agreed upon end-state, getting U.S. forces out, and reconstituting them for the next “big one.” As indicated on Figure 4, the Joint Staff has expanded this criteria to include specific termination conditions, paths to success, and milestones along those paths. Rumsfeld’s guidelines, however, seem to challenge this point by specifically cautioning against arbitrary deadlines. He is supported in this view by Richard Haass who argues that it is important to “avoid a specific end point or certain date for ending the commitment regardless of local developments. Artificial boundaries on a U.S. intervention run the risk of emboldening adversaries, who need only to wait until the deadline has passed, and unnerving allies.”⁷³ End states can also be very ambiguous and constrained, since they rarely include unconditional surrender, regime change or destruction of the warmaking capability of the other side.⁷⁴

Michael Handel’s analysis of the Weinberger doctrine concluded that it represented a utilitarian, realistic yardstick not much concerned with moral and ethical questions, although it does in fact provide useful insights for moral and ethical decisions about the use of force.⁷⁵ The proliferation of intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War world, and the growing threat posed by non-state actors, will continue to place pressure on decisionmakers to decide when and how to use force. Figure 5 represents a score card of sorts to portray a subjective assessment of the application of the Weinberger doctrine to recent U.S. military operations.

Weinberger Doctrine from Vietnam to Iraq

Criterion	Vietnam	Grenada	Lebanon	Panama	Persian Gulf War	Somalia	Haiti (1994)	Bosnia	Kosovo	Iraq (2003)
1. Vital interests at stake	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
2. Commitment to victory	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES – for regime change NO – nation bldg	NO	NO	YES – for regime change ? – nation bldg
3. Clearly defined pol/mil objectives	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES then NO	NO	?	YES – short term ?- long term	YES
4. Continuous reassessment	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
5. Public support (mobilized by the gov't)	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES (at first)	YES	YES (?)	YES	YES
6. Last resort	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES/ NO
Success or Failure	FAILURE	SUCCESS	FAILURE	SUCCESS	SUCCESS	FAILURE	FAILURE	?	?	?

Figure 5. Weinburger Doctrine from Vietnam to Iraq.⁷⁶

Legitimacy

One of the main tenets of the Weinberger doctrine was the need to garner public and congressional support—“some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.”⁷⁷ Public support represents the will of the people, and as Harry Summers concluded, the failure to invoke that national will was one of the principal strategic failures of the Vietnam War, producing a strategic vulnerability that the North Vietnamese were able to exploit.⁷⁸ Public support and national will are both a reflection of the legitimacy with which the use of force is viewed. Legitimacy is fostered and sustained through many channels, including the steadfast application of Weinberger doctrine-like guidelines, Congressional resolutions and legislation, Presidential leadership, and actions of the international community. Legitimacy is thus grounded in both domestic processes and international or multilateral organizations and processes.

The President and the Congress

Constitutional provisions represent the foundation of legitimacy in the United States. Under the constitution, the president and Congress share the war powers. The president is commander in chief (Article II, Section 2), but Congress has the power to declare war and raise and support the armed forces (Article I, Section 8). Congress, however, has only declared war on five occasions, the last being World War II. Despite having considerable constitutional authority over decisions about the use of force, Congress has largely deferred to the president as commander in chief, in general recognition that this role makes him responsible for leading the armed forces and gives him the power to repel attacks against the United States. Consequently, the executive branch has executed most military interventions.⁷⁹

In an effort to regain some control over decisions on the use of force, and as a backlash to the Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR) over President Nixon's veto in 1973. The purpose of the WPR was to ensure that Congress and the President share in making decisions about the use of force. Compliance becomes an issue when the president introduces forces abroad in situations that might be construed as hostilities or imminent hostilities. The law included a broad set of triggers for executive consultations and explanations of the rationale for, and the scope and duration of military operations. If Congress does not grant authorization in a certain period, the law does not permit the action to continue. Presidents have never acknowledged the constitutionality of the WPR; however, they have made modest efforts to comply with its reporting requirements, submitting 104 reports to Congress concerning troop deployments abroad.⁸⁰ Some deployments were not reported because of the brevity of the operation or the perceived lack of hostilities or imminent hostilities. Most of the reports submitted to Congress are done "consistent" with the WPR, and not in "compliance" with the WPR.

Despite this record on reporting, a longer-term issue concerns the degree to which Congress is actually participating in the decisions to employ force. The WPR requires the president to consult with Congress prior to introducing U.S. forces into hostilities and to continue consultations as long as the armed forces remain. The conclusion of one Congressional Research study is that there has been very little executive consultation with Congress, "when consultation is defined to mean seeking advice prior to a decision to introduce troops."⁸¹ It is certainly in the country's best interest to garner congressional support, and thus the two branches of government need to work out useful political processes that debate, inform, and support the country's engagement in conflict. From this perspective, a major purpose behind the WPR was not necessarily to constrain the president, but to force Congress to meet its obligations to share in decisions on the use of force, "compelling members to face within a predictable period and under specified procedures the fundamental question regarding military action by the United States: Does the Congress endorse or oppose the commitment of American blood and treasure to a particular mission?"⁸² The question is appropriate for Congress. As confirmed by Secretary Weinberger, U.S. military personnel want to know that it has the backing of the public—a commitment affirmed through a constitutional political process.⁸³

The WPR played an important role in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, President Bush notified Congress that he had deployed forces to the region. Although he had not consulted with Congress before acting, both houses later adopted resolutions supporting the deployment. Throughout the fall of 1990 there was intense debate within Congress concerning the use of force. Urged by congressional leaders, President Bush later asked for a resolution supporting the use of all necessary means to implement the UN decrees on Iraq. On January 12, 1991, both houses, by narrow margins, approved a joint resolution authorizing the use of force pursuant to UN Resolution 678, which had been passed on November 29, 1990.⁸⁴

In the crisis in Bosnia, on the other hand, the United States participated without congressional authorization in humanitarian airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring and sanctions, and aerial enforcement of no-fly zones and safe havens. In late 1995, after President Clinton committed over 20,000 combat troops as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force, Congress considered several bills and resolutions authorizing this deployment, but failed to reach a consensus. In 1999, President Clinton ordered U.S. military forces to participate in the NATO-led military operation in Kosovo, without specific authorization from the Congress, a state of affairs that one analyst has termed "virtual consent," in which the public is consulted but the formal institutions of democracy are bypassed: "The decay of institutional checks and balances on the war-making power of the executive has received almost no attention in the debate over the Kosovo conflict. This suggests that citizens no longer even care whether their elected politicians exercise their constitutional

responsibilities. We have allowed ourselves to accept virtual consent in the most important political matter of all: war and peace.”⁸⁵

The catastrophic events of 9/11 initially created a united sense of purpose between the executive and Congress. Only three days after the terrorist attacks, Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.” Three weeks later, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” President Bush reported to Congress the use of force against Afghanistan.⁸⁶ In a similar manner, Congress passed the Joint Resolution, “Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq,” in October 2002. This resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces of the United States “as he determines to be necessary and appropriate,” to defend the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq. The President, in turn, dutifully reported to the Congress on March 21, 2003, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” and pursuant to his authority as Commander-in-Chief, that he had “directed U.S. Armed Forces operating with other coalition forces, to commence operations on March 19, 2003, against Iraq.”⁸⁷

The political storm gathering around the 9/11 Commission and the ongoing struggle in Iraq will constitute a severe test of the nation’s willingness to support a prolonged and deadly conflict. The legitimacy of these actions will largely be dependent on the President’s ability to mobilize public opinion, and the willingness of Congress to continue to provide support. According to Alton Frye, “unless there is continuing consultation in good faith between Congress and the Executive, the unity that marks the beginning of the campaign against terrorism could degenerate into the profound disunity that scarred American politics thirty years ago.”⁸⁸ But the harsh reality is that Congress rallies around victory and piles on in defeat. Success matters more than procedure in the politics of making war.⁸⁹

The United Nations

The founding of the United Nations substantially narrowed the legitimacy of the use of force by individual nation-states. The UN Charter indicates in its Preamble that the UN is established “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” and its substantive provisions obligate the member states to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means” (Article 2(3)) and to “refrain . . . from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .” (Article 2(4)). In place of the traditional right of states to resort to force, the charter creates a system of collective security in which the Security Council is authorized to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace” and to “decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain international peace and security” (Article 39).⁹⁰

The UN security apparatus created in 1945 was a hybrid, combining a universal quality with a great power concert. The system did not work well during the Cold War because the UN was kept on the sidelines by U.S.-Soviet bipolar rivalry. With few exceptions, UN involvement in use of force decisions began in the 1990s. The evolving nature of global threats, however, has caused a reexamination of the collective security apparatus. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan helped set the stage for this process: “The United Nations Charter declares that ‘armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.’ But what is the common interest? Who shall define it? Who shall defend it? Under whose authority?”⁹¹

Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of self-defense: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Some authorities interpret Article 51 to permit anticipatory self-

defense in response to an imminent attack. Such an interpretation allows action, either unilaterally or collectively in self-defense, or preemptively based on an interpretation of imminent threat. The threat of catastrophic terrorism argues for a requirement to establish intelligible and transparent criteria of imminent threat that could provide for legitimate unilateral, coalition of the willing, or hopefully UN Security Council action.⁹² Even Kofi Annan has suggested that UN members should consider developing “criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of threats—for instance, terrorists groups armed with weapons of mass destruction.”⁹³ Article 106 of the charter can be interpreted to allow coalitions of states to take action to maintain international peace and security pending UN Security Council action. This article was originally added to accommodate regional alliances such as the RIO Pact and NATO. By modifying certain aspects of the charter, to include article 106, a better understanding may be developed for the legitimate requirements for multilateral response to threats outside the confines of the Security Council.

Based on the use of force in the last decade, some analysts have argued that the UN Security Council must be reformed: enlarged to become more representative, and restructured to replace the veto system. One rationale for the elimination of the veto power of the permanent five is based on the need for legitimacy:

All modern military operations need international legitimacy if they are going to succeed. Consequently, the great powers, especially America, face a difficult choice: they can either maintain the veto, and embark on unsanctioned military adventures with their partners only to see these fail because of lack of international approval; or they can surrender veto power in return for the increased likelihood of securing majority approval for the use of military power.⁹⁴

As this argument relates to the debate in the UN about Iraq, France, or any other country on the Security Council, should be in a position to adopt and support a particular view, but it should not be in a position to block pursuit of a vital interest and put at risk the entire UN enterprise. “What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you?” asks Charles Krauthammer,” Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national—and international security?”⁹⁵ Thomas Friedman answered the question, “The French and others know that . . . their refusal to present Saddam with a threat only guarantees U.S. unilateralism and undermines the very UN structure that is the best vehicle for their managing of U.S. power.”⁹⁶

This debate also touches on the concept of multilateralism. Americans define multilateralism as a policy that actively seeks to gain the support of allies. As such, Security Council authorization is a means to an end—gaining more allies—not an end in itself. The Europeans, on the other hand, view multilateralism much more narrowly as a legitimate sanction from a duly constituted international body—the Security Council. Despite the fact that the United States enjoyed the support of dozens of nations for the war in Iraq, and is supported by 33 troop-contributing coalition partners as I write, many critics continue to charge that the United States is acting unilaterally. The current debate “over multilateralism and legitimacy is thus not only about the principles of law, or even about the supreme authority of the UN; it is also about the transatlantic struggle for influence. It is Europe’s response to the unipolar predicament.”⁹⁷ In any event, it is clear that any new arrangements to exercise collective security need to be developed and given legitimacy by the international community.

Conclusion

War between nation-states endures because human interests, values, and commitments are often irreconcilable. In addition, because of the existence of a much more insidious kind of violence—

catastrophic terrorism—military power remains the ultimate defender of common human values, and the ultimate arbiter of human disagreements:

The efficacy of force endures. For in anarchy, force and politics are connected. By itself, military power guarantees neither survival nor prosperity. But it is almost always the essential ingredient for both. Because resort to force is the ultimate card of all states, the seriousness of a state's intentions is conveyed fundamentally by its having a credible military posture. Without it, a state's diplomacy generally lacks effectiveness.⁹⁸

Strategists must be able to answer the classic charge from Clausewitz, “No one starts a war . . . without first being clear in his own mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” The political objectives for the use of force must be continually reassessed in light of the changing nature of warfare and the proliferation of non-traditional threats. Likewise, remembering the caution raised by President George H. W. Bush that there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for the use of force, the prudent strategist needs to keep in mind relevant questions and issues he should evaluate in each particular circumstance that might require military force. Finally, democracies have the unique challenge of dealing with the elusive and malleable concept of legitimacy. “Discovering where legitimacy lies at any given moment in history,” according to Robert Kagan, “is an art, not a science reducible to the reading of international legal documents.”⁹⁹ Still there are immutable principles such as that of Horace who cautioned that “force without wisdom falls of its own weight.” Today, more than ever, the key question concerning the use of force is not whether it is lawful, but whether it is wise.¹⁰⁰

Notes - Chapter 14

1 The author would like to acknowledge the grateful assistance of Dr. Charles Krupnick and Dr. David Jablonsky in reviewing and making valuable suggestions for this chapter.

2 Han J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) 29.

3 Anarchy refers to the absence of government, but should not be confused with chaos. International politics exhibits a great deal of order, regularity, and cooperation, but also includes much coercion, unpredictability, and bloodshed. Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 4. Kenneth Waltz is quoted in Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, ed., *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 5th ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 5-6.

4 *The Military Balance: 2003-2004* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003). Also refer to Anup Shah, “High Military Expenditures in Some Places,” <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp>, accessed March 23, 2004.

5 Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” 4.

6 Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 515. Kennedy posits two challenges for the longevity of every major power: “whether, in the military/strategical realm, it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation's perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments; and whether, it can preserve the technological and economic bases of power.” 514 His basic declinist argument is that if a “nation overextends itself geographically and strategically” and chooses “to devote a large proportion of its total income to ‘protection,’ leaving less for ‘productive investment,’ it is likely to find its economic output slowing down, with dire implications for its long-term capacity to

maintain both its citizens' consumption demands and its international position." 539 The United States was able to harness the economic vitality of the information age and thus avoid the predictions of decline at the end of the 20th century. Perhaps it will not be as fortunate in this new century. James Fallows, "The Hollow Army," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 2004.

7 John Baylis and James J. Wirtz, "Introduction," in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin Gray, eds. *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 12; Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88, 605. As famous as this dictum is, it is not fully accepted without some debate. Colin Gray goes into some depth on this issue in his book, *Modern Strategy*. He goes so far as to say, "Although Clausewitz was more wise than foolish in this dictum, the wisdom in the formula is hostage to the folly." He concludes his initial review of this topic by stating that "the idea of force as an agent of political purpose is generally persuasive," but should be viewed as the product of not only political purpose, but also of an ongoing political process. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 30, and Chapter 2, "Strategy, Politics, Ethics," 48-74; Colin L. Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter, 1992/93, 39. General Powell contrasted the success of military operations in the 90's with the failed mission to Lebanon in 1983. Concerning Lebanon, he stated that we, "inserted those proud warriors into the middle of a five-faction civil war complete with terrorists, hostage-takers, and a dozen spies in every camp." Perhaps the successes of the 90's resulted from simpler problems or an avoidance of the very complex, a prescription that the West may not be able to follow in the new century.

8 Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: The Joint staff, 14 November 2000), I-4.

9 Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?," *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), 3-35.

10 Figure is a modified version from David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, V, *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 9. Several noted analysts are more inclined to classify compellence as the sole coercive component (Art and Colin Gray). Gray, in *Maintaining Effective Deterrence* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic studies Institute, August 2003), refers to compellence as coercion or coercive diplomacy. (13) But he later recognizes that deterrence is "executed as a coercive strategy intended to control unfriendly behavior." (17) Thomas Schelling, who coined the term compellence, also concluded that, "'Coercion' . . . includes 'deterrent' as well as 'compellent' intentions." *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 71.

11 JP 1, III-1.

12 Schelling, 1-2.

13 Art, "To What Ends Military Power," 5-6. Richard Haass includes preventive attacks and punitive attacks, along with deterrence and compellence as the principle uses of military power. See Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 50-56. For another interesting discussion of preventive war and preemption as strategic choices, refer to Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), 141-149.

14 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), 6

15 Schelling, 3.

16 Johnson, 15-17; Byman and Waxman, 8-9.

17 John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14; Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazar, *American National Security* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 38. A fundamental debate concerning U.S. grand strategy involves the continued deterrability of U.S. opponents. Failed and rogue states may not be viewed as rational, particularly from a western perspective. Nevertheless, as David Jablonsky argues, even crazy states can be deterred: ". . . a state may behave rationally in an instrumental sense of effectively achieving its ends or goals which

in themselves may be ‘crazy’.” He emphasizes that there must be at least a modicum of instrumental rationality on the part of a nation to be deterred. David Jablonsky, *Strategic Rationality is not Enough: Hitler and the Concept of Crazy States* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991). Unfortunately, the current list of opponents includes highly lethal non-state organizations, such as the al Qaeda terrorist network. As Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins argue, this class of terrorist, driven by extremely strong, messianic, religious views, lacks instrumental rationality, and therefore cannot be deterred and must be eradicated. Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002).

18 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 608. There is a vast literature on the evolution of nuclear strategy during the Cold War. One source for a systematic and comprehensive treatment of the major themes of nuclear strategy is Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). Despite using the word ‘evolution’ in the title, he claims that it is somewhat misleading. In the introduction he mentions the cyclical character of the debates and states that “much of what is offered today as a profound and new insight was said yesterday; and usually in a more concise and literate manner.” The utility of military power during the Cold War, particularly concerning great power competition, was constrained by the logic of nuclear deterrence. As Bernard Brodie declared, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.” Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (Harcourt Brace, 1946), 76.

19 Gray, 13. See also Johnson, *et. al.*, 10-12; Haass, 50-51; Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 14-15 and 328-329. Bobbitt makes the argument that extended deterrence has driven U.S. nuclear strategy, not central deterrence. Concerning a more contemporary issue—missile defense—Bobbitt reiterates the ongoing importance of extended deterrence: “Extended deterrence is the single most effective instrument the United States has to prevent major-state proliferation because it permits these states to develop their economies without diverting vast resources to the nuclear arms competition, and yet remain relatively safe from nuclear attack.” Although the United States has vastly reduced and restructured its nuclear force posture, nuclear deterrence retains its relevancy even after the end of the Cold War.

20 Kissinger, 608.

21 Gray, vii. See also William T. Johnsen, *The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and their Implications* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies institute, April 17, 1997), 7; and Bobbitt, 12. Colin Gray points out that the current concern is not about irrational leaders—those leaders that cannot connect means purposefully with ends. “The problem is not the irrational adversary, instead it is the perfectly rational foe who seeks purposefully, and rationally, to achieve goals that appear wholly unreasonable to us.” He goes on to argue that he believes Al Qaeda is deterrable. “Al Qaeda has many would-be martyrs in its ranks, but the organization is most careful of the lives of its key officers, and it functions strategically. It can be deterred by the fact and expectation of strategic failure.” vii, viii, and 21-22. He also recommends several practical measures to enhance the role of deterrence under the current circumstances and recognizes the synergy achieved through combining elements of both deterrent and defensive (preventive-preemptive) postures. “A little prevention-preemption would do wonders for the subsequent effectiveness of deterrence in the minds of those whose motives were primarily worldly and pragmatic.” *Ibid.*, v, 29. Gray’s bottom line is that deterrence, though diminished in significance, remains absolutely essential as an element of U.S. grand strategy.

22 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 15. Also see John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 69-70.

23 Byman and Waxman, 6; See also, Art, *Grand Strategy*, 5; Schelling, 72.

24 Art, “To What Ends Military Power?,” 8. See also, Schelling, 69-91. Byman and Waxman argue that it is often difficult to distinguish compellence and deterrence. “Classifying cases as compellence as opposed to deterrence is always speculative to some degree, given the inherent opacity of enemy intentions. And, ultimately, general deterrence and compellence are codependent, as success or failure in coercion affects the coercing power’s general reputation to some degree and thus its overall ability to deter.” 7.

25 Art, 8-10; and Haass, 53-54.

26 A slightly modified version of a chart found in, Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 114, No. 1, Spring 1999, 7.

27 Ibid., 5-11. This point was explicitly expressed by Mohamed Farad Aideed to Ambassador Oakley concerning the disastrous U.S. involvement in Somalia: "We have studied Vietnam and Lebanon and know how to get rid of Americans, by killing them so public opinion will put an end to things."

28 Ibid., 27.

29 Bobbitt, 14; *The Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: The Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), 11. For a good discussion of the benefits of forward presence, see Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, 139-145; Johnsen., 11.

30 Thomas P.M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map," *Esquire*, March 2003, 228.

31 Andrew Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 128. Bacevich argues that the United States has been pursuing a grand strategy of "openness" since the days of Woodrow Wilson. This strategy seeks economic expansion and aims to foster an open and integrated international order, thereby perpetuating the undisputed primacy of the world's sole remaining super power.

32 National Security Strategy, 2002, 30.

33 QDR, 2001, 12.

34 Barton Gellman, "Keeping the U.S. First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower," *The Washington Post*, March 11, 1992, 1. The principal author of the document was then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz. When the draft DPG was leaked it was roundly criticized and, consequently, dramatically toned down in the final version. It seems that the Secretary meant what he said 10 years ago, in that it is now an accepted tenet of the U.S. defense strategy.

35 Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3, May/June 2002, 27. He goes on to cite several specific examples: deployment of effective missile defenses to dissuade ballistic missile programs; hardening U.S. space systems to dissuade the development of killer satellites; new earth-penetrating weapons that would make deep-underground facilities obsolete as hiding places for terrorists or WMD capabilities.

36 Richard Kugler, "Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept," *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU, No. 196, December 2002, 1-2.

37 Gray, "Maintaining Effective Deterrence," 14.

38 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 4, July/August 2003, 72.

39 This list is taken from JP 1, III-14-III-15 and Haass, 51-65.

40 Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, 5-6.

41 Jennifer D. Kibbe, "The Rise of the Shadow Warriors," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2, March/April 2004, 104. Covert actions are distinct from clandestine missions. The term "clandestine" refers to the secrecy of the operation itself, "covert" refers to the secrecy of its sponsor.

42 United States Special Operations Command, *Posture Statement 2003-2004*, 36.

43 Kibbe, 105. The definition and oversight requirements were contained in the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991.

44 Donald Rumsfeld, *2003 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2003), 2. This report highlights the historic change in the charter of the SOCCOM, from supporting missions of the other regional combatant commanders, to planning and executing its own missions in the global war on terrorism. Kibbe, 109.

45 Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, September 10, 2001, II-3-II-4.

46 Clausewitz, *On War*, 605; Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 142; Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), 561; *Isaiah* 6:8.

47 Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Picador USA, 2000), 179.

48 The discussion in this section is related to the discussion on just war theory, as presented in Chapter 3 of this volume, “Ethical Issues in War: An Overview,” by Martin L. Cook. This section will focus on political and military considerations, as opposed to the international legal framework associated with just war theory. However, it should be clear that many of the issues overlap.

49 Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 10-11.

50 Edward Luttwak refers to this as “Napoleonic” warfare—wars fought for grand purposes, implying the decisive employment of large forces. Edward N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare: The Obsolescence of Total War,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, May/June 1995, 113-114.

51 Alexander L. George, “The Role of Force in Diplomacy: Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy,” talk at CSIS Security Strategy Symposium, June 25, 1998; Available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/article.html>. Accessed, March 2, 2004; Colin Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/93, 36. Also see, Les Aspin, “The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces in the Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World,” from an address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC, September 21, 1992; excerpted in Haass, 183-190.

52 Handel, 10; Evan Thomas, “The Vietnam Question,” *Newsweek*, April 19, 2004.

53 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 650.

54 The Weinberger doctrine was first presented in a speech before the National Press Club, 28 November 1984. It’s rendition for the figure is from Handel, 310-311. The criteria are numbered in accordance with the sequence in which they were originally presented. However, that sequence is broken on the chart to help categorize criteria as either addressing the “when” or “how” of using force. Colin Powell’s list is taken from Aspen (as excerpted in Haass), 184-185. The best first person account is from Powell’s *Foreign Affairs* article which was previously cited. Secretary William Perry’s list is from “The Ethical Use of Military Force,” the Forrestal Lecture, Foreign Affairs Conference, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, April 18, 1995. These points were largely incorporated in all subsequent National Security Strategies issued by the Clinton administration. Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 November 2000, contains a list of considerations for the use of military force, IV-2. The final set, from Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, is taken from his remarks before the Fortune Magazine Global Forum, November 11, 2002.

55 Samuel Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 5, September/October 1997, 35. Huntington goes on to state that “national interests usually combine security and material concerns, on the one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other.” *A National Security Strategy for A Global Age* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2000), 4; George, 3.

56 Huntington, 37.

57 Handel, 312; Bobbitt, 298. Perry was initially responding to the ongoing debate about committing U.S. forces to help solve the crisis in Bosnia. The National Security Advisor for Bush (41), Brent Scowcroft, clearly reflected the opposite view that helped keep U.S. forces out of Bosnia for years. “We could never satisfy ourselves that the amount of involvement we thought it would

take was justified in terms of U.S. interests involved . . . We were heavily national interest oriented . . . If it [war] stayed in Bosnia, it might be horrible, but it did not affect us.” Quoted in Samantha Power, *“A Problem From Hell” : America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: New Republic Book, 2002), 288.

58 David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 390-391; Ignatieff, 72.

59 Clausewitz, 579.

60 Handel, 316.

61 Haass, 74.

62 Shultz, 650.

63 Handel, 318.

64 Power, 509. Public support can be very fickle, based on the latest news from the battlefield, and is particularly problematic in prolonged and costly military operations. Handel, 319.

65 Haass, 88-89; Shultz, 650.

66 Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 423; Ivo H. Daalder, “The Use of Force in a Changing World—U.S. and European Perspectives,” The Brookings Institution, November 25, 2002, 12.

67 Handel, 314; Power, 283. Another example cited is the claim, once again in 1992, by Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, to Congress, that 400,000 troops would be needed to enforce a cease-fire. Scowcroft conceded that the military’s analysis was probably inflated.

68 Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” 40.

69 Joint Pub 1, IV-2.

70 Wesley K. Clark, *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 86-87. Clark went on to conclude, that the “ensuing disorder vitiated some of the boost in U.S. credibility won on the battlefield, and it opened the door for deeper and more organized resistance during the following weeks.”

71 Handel, 317.

72 Quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), 252.

73 Haass, 76-77.

74 Ignatieff, 208. As an example of an ambiguous end state, he cites the military technical agreement that concluded the conflict between NATO and Serbia. It specified the terms and timing of Serbian withdrawal and the entry of NATO troops, but left entirely undefined the juridical status of the territory over which the war was fought.

75 Handel, 324.

76 This chart has been modified from one that appears in Handel, 326. Handel’s chart did not include Haiti (1994), and Iraq (2003). Handel had also included a column for Central America, which has been omitted. As mentioned in the body of the chapter, these ratings should be viewed as subject to open debate and discussion. In fact a useful exercise would be to determine

your own ratings for particular interventions. As one example of the subjectiveness of these ratings, concerning Kosovo, Handel concluded that the public supported the operation. Ignatieff, on the other hand, stated that “the public did not sign up to 78 days’ worth of bombing, and had they been asked, most would have said no.” 183.

77 Handel, 311.

78 Summers, *On Strategy*, 43.

79 Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, *Congress and Its Members*, 9th edition (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 2004), 439.

80 Richard F. Grimmett, “War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,” *Issue Brief for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, updated March 24, 2003, CRS; Robert B. Zoellick, “Congress and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, 33; Grimmett. Of the 104 reports, Ford submitted 4, Carter 1, Reagan 14, George H.W. Bush 7, Clinton 60 and George W. Bush 18; CRS-11.

81 Ibid., CRS-13.

82 Alton Frye, “Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism,” testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, April 17, 2002.

83 Zoellick, 34.

84 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 446. For a superb discussion of the intricacies of gaining both domestic and international support for the use of force refer to pages 355-449. Concerning this debate, Brent Scowcroft had this to say: “We were confident that the Constitution was on our side when it came to the president’s discretion to use force if necessary: If we sought congressional involvement, it would not be authority we were after, but support.” 398 And President Bush added; “...even had Congress not passed the resolutions I would have acted and ordered our troops into combat. I know it would have caused an outcry, but it was the right thing to do. I was comfortable in my own mind that I had the constitutional authority.” 446.

85 Grimmett, CRS-3—CRS-4; Ignatieff, 180-181.

86 Davidson and Oleszek, 440.

87 “Congressional Joint resolution to Authorize Use of Force Against Iraq,” *Washington Post*, October 11, 2002, A12; Grimmett, CRS-12.

88 Frye, Congressional testimony.

89 John Lindsay, cited in Zoellick, 34.

90 David M. Ackerman, “International Law and the Preemptive Use of force Against Iraq,” *CRS Report for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, updated march 17, 2003, CRS-3.

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CHAPTER 15

INFORMATION: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT

Frank L. Jones

Information and the various technologies that disseminate it to people throughout the world are critical to modern life even though some people take it for granted while others resist its impact with Hutterite vigor. The very nature of our personal lives including the means of social interaction as well as the conduct of commerce and government have been changed dramatically by the use of computers and telecommunications equipment. The technological revolution that we have witnessed since the 1970s forced us to coin the term “Information Age” to provide the context for the influence that the computer and the silicon chip have had on our daily activities. The means by which we communicate today are decidedly different from the methods used even a decade ago and the technological advances that are likely to be developed in the next several decades cannot be readily understood or appreciated except by a few visionaries. Nonetheless, we now readily grasp that the methods used to communicate are in constant transformation.

The repercussions of this spectacular and perhaps radical change in technology are numerous. Nonetheless, for the national security professional it has strategic implications. States now must not only deal with other states, but with a variety of sub-national and non-state actors. Diplomacy in a wired world is far different in its conduct than it was even a few decades ago. This is because of the capacity of the global media to transmit information and images throughout the world with astonishing speed but also because the nature of communication today is transnational, domestic audiences cannot be isolated from foreign ones. We live in an increasingly connected world. The other two elements of power, military and economic, have been changed substantially by the wired world as well.

U.S. military doctrine addresses the concept of “information dominance,” which is defined as “the degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary.”¹ Military theorists argue that information dominance is essential to military operational success and relies on a sophisticated understanding of what information is required as well as a capacity to manage the use and dissemination of that knowledge to the right place, at the right time, and for the desired purpose.²

Economists talk about information production and use as a modern measurable inventory of assets, a medium of exchange and the target for growth.³ In other words, knowledge and information are understood as commodities that can be moved thousands of miles in fractions of seconds. Yet, despite this recognition of information as an integral facet of contemporary society and its inclusion as an element of national power by many scholars and strategic thinkers, this element’s unique role is often misunderstood.

Since the 1990s, many political scientists and international relations scholars have identified and advocated information as a fourth element of power. Bartlett, Holman, and Some have argued that the dynamic security environment that we confront today and in the future will alter the relative utility of the other three elements—economic, diplomatic, and military. They suggest that strategists must increasingly consider additional forms of influence, including the growing use of information media to shape the battle space.

Defining Information as an Instrument of Power

Nonetheless, a common understanding of information as an instrument of power is necessary before proceeding. Information as an element of power has taken on a new meaning in the past decade with the introduction of such concepts as information operations (IO) and information warfare (IW). Unfortunately, both of these terms have disputed and convoluted meanings that encompass numerous aspects of warfare ranging from computer network attack to psychological operations. Consequently, our understanding of information as an element of power is often confused or so ambiguous as to be meaningless to the strategist. We need a more refined definition.

In his seminal article, “Soft Power,” Joseph Nye argues that the notion of power is changing in world politics. He contends that displays of power do not reside in resources but in the ability to change the behavior of states, to control the political environment. Military power and economic power have their limitations because of unintended consequences and the costs associated with using these instruments as well as the diffusion of certain equalizers such as technology. Power is being transferred from the “capital rich” to the “information-rich” and that power in world politics has now another dimension, what Nye calls “co-optive power” or “soft power” whereby “one country gets other countries to do what it wants” rather than using force to order other countries to act in a certain manner. He continues by stating that soft power is designed to shape beliefs and preferences of other countries based on the attractiveness of culture and ideology. To succeed in this endeavor, a state must have the ability to communicate its messages to other countries.⁴

Information, as an element of soft power, is a strategic instrument within the context of grand strategy. As an instrument, it relies on the “understanding and use of graphic, intellectual, or sensory imagery, drawing on historical, cultural, linguistic, religious, ethical, and other issues of substance and belief which affect people as individuals or groups within the strategic environment.”⁵ Thus information as an element of power should be understood as a psychological dimension of warfare, not to be confused with psychological operations which is a component of the information element of power. Therefore, for the U.S. Government, the informational element of power is its ability to employ its information capabilities to influence the attitudes and behaviors of foreign elites and publics. Unfortunately, the informational element is often viewed as a component of the diplomatic or political elements of power, but to view information solely as a subordinate tool is myopic since information is an instrument in its own right. The increasing reach of regional and global communication systems has made it an autonomous tool of statecraft.

It is important to differentiate information as an element of power from the diplomatic and military elements. Regarding the former, the diplomatic element tends to focus primarily on state-to-state communication through the auspices of foreign ministries and other governmental institutions.

The military use of information has largely been placed under the umbrella term “information

operations.” As mentioned earlier, the functions that constitute IO have been a subject of debate for several years. The definition in Army Field Manual 3-0, June 2001, will suffice for our purposes: “Actions taken to affect adversaries’ and influence others’ decisionmaking process, information and information systems while protecting one’s own. . . .”⁶ Consequently, this definition could include such practices as computer network operations (attack and defense), deception, and psychological operations. For most people, however, information operations are synonymous with computers. This meaning is inconsistent with the objective of influencing foreign audiences. It confuses the technology that is used with the intention. Instead, there must be some basic principles to define information as an element of power. William Kiehl, a U.S. public diplomacy expert, offers a useful term—influence and perception management. Influence and perception management may be defined as “the use of the tools of influence and perception management in peace or in war to influence positively the perceptions, attitudes and actions of publics to advance the interests of a nation.”⁷ Kiehl makes no distinction between foreign and domestic audiences. Such a distinction must be noted because of U.S. law. The Smith-Mundt Act, which was enacted in 1948, prohibits the domestic dissemination of any “information about the United States, its people, and its policies” prepared for foreign dissemination.⁸ In essence, the Congress was concerned about U.S. Government agencies propagandizing the American public. Therefore, in the U.S. context, the emphasis is on influencing foreign publics although many practitioners argue that this distinction is no longer realistic, given the transnational nature of information dissemination by the global media.⁹

Regardless, Kiehl’s term is more apt as it speaks to the outcomes that a strategist wants to effect in utilizing information as an instrument of power, that is, influencing the behaviors and actions of allies, friends, neutrals, and enemies in order to attain national security objectives while at the same time recognizing that to influence publics one must make use of various tools. The U.S. Government uses four tools for influence and perception management. They are public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and psychological operations.

The Four Components of the Informational Element

The ability to influence the attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences historically has been a government’s ability to further its national strategic goals through an integrated, synchronized interagency process using the aforementioned tools as its channels.

Public diplomacy is one of the earliest tools that the founders of this nation used in attempting to influence foreign publics. One can argue that the Declaration of Independence is not only a statement of the aspirations of some American colonists to break from England and create a new philosophy of democratic governance, but it is also a well-crafted propaganda document directed at the English and European publics to justify their actions against the monarch and Parliament.

There is no generally accepted definition of public diplomacy. In fact, its meanings have changed over the years and with various presidential administrations. Nonetheless, it is generally understood to be the careful engagement primarily of targeted sectors of foreign publics (individuals and groups) in order to promote U.S. national interests through understanding, information, and influence.

Public diplomacy activities are carried out by the Department of State and consist of two elements. The first are information activities. These activities include publications and electronic media, overseas information resource centers, speakers, and specialists who meet with foreign publics and governments in

various venues, and various video and teleconference programs. The other aspect of public diplomacy is educational and cultural exchanges such as academic exchanges, the Fulbright program, and international visitors programs, to name a few.

Public affairs is the second component. It is the provision of information to the public, press, and other institutions regarding the goals, policies and activities of the U.S. Government. It seeks to foster an understanding of these goals through a dialogue with individual citizens, groups, and institutions, as well as the domestic and international media. Nonetheless, the focus of public affairs is to inform the U.S. domestic audience.

The primary departmental offices concerned with public affairs as it related to the conduct of national security policy are the Department of State's office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

The third component, international broadcasting, is conducted under the auspices of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which became the independent, autonomous entity responsible for all U.S. Government and government sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting in October 1999. This was the result of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (Public Law 105-277), the single most important legislation affecting U.S. international broadcasting since the early 1950s.

The Board consists of nine members, eight private citizens and the Secretary of State (the director of the U.S. Information Agency represented the U.S. Government on the board until that agency was abolished in 1999). Congress intended the composition of the BBG to protect the integrity of the journalists working in international broadcasting and to maintain their ability to operate under the Voice of America Charter.

The Voice of America Charter, which was drafted in 1960 and later signed into law in July 1976 by President Gerald Ford, provides the principles that guide U.S. Governmental international broadcasting. The Charter indicates that the long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly to the peoples of the world and by gaining the attention and respect of these listeners. Therefore, three principles pertain to achieve this end:

- VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.
- VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought.
- VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies.

The U.S. Government's international broadcasting programs are transmitted directly to a mass audience rather than through an embassy. These programs are disseminated on a daily basis by the individual BBG international broadcasters: the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio and TV Marti, and WORLDNET Television, with the assistance of the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), which provides administrative and other support for the broadcasters.

The final component of the informational element of power is international military information (IMI),

better known as overt psychological operations. Psychological operations are defined as operations to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior that are favorable to U.S. foreign policy or military objectives in selected foreign audiences through planned operations to convey selected information in order to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately behavior and to accomplish this end through truthful means.¹⁰ Historically, psychological operations have been conducted at the operational and tactical level by designated psychological operations units and less at the strategic level since the modes of information dissemination at that level belong to the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Experts typically view IMI as having two facets. The first is information communicated to foreign audiences through the execution of the regional combatant commander's Theater Security Cooperation Plan using such measures as forward deployments, military-to-military contacts, unit visits, exercises, and conferences. IMI also includes overt peacetime psychological operations programs (OP-3), which was established in the early 1980s. OP-3 are annual programs that regional commanders have coordinated with the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions to support and provide for the conduct of overt psychological operations in support of U.S. regional objectives.

Using the Power of Information—The U.S. Historical Experience

As indicated earlier, influence and perception management has been understood as an important aspect of American foreign policy since the founders declared their independence from Great Britain. However, it was not an institutionalized or a highly developed tool until the American experience in World War I, with the creation of the Committee on Public Information in 1917. It was at this time that the U.S. Government first comprehended and valued the importance of communicating with foreign publics and opinionmakers to promote its foreign policy goals, dismiss rumors, and counteract disinformation and propaganda. Over the succeeding decades, it has created a number of organizations, usually of limited duration, and utilized a variety of media to communicate with foreign audiences. Media have ranged from the technologically simple such as printed materials, to the more sophisticated such as radio broadcasts, film, television, Internet websites, and direct satellite broadcasting. The purpose for establishing these organizations and using these media is to inform and influence foreign audiences, whether friendly or not, to understand and accept and support, or at least tolerate, U.S. activities and policies. Yet, the U.S. Government's overall investment in these media has been minimal, and its attention to the importance of this instrument has been sporadic at best.

Nonetheless, beginning with the Cold War, some Presidents have understood the value of an information campaign directed at foreign audiences. For example, in 1951, President Harry Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to provide for more effective planning, coordination, and conduct of psychological operations within the structure of approved reporting directly to the National Security Council.¹¹

This belief in the use of information as an instrument of power was not necessarily shared by the administrations that followed. In some instances, the use of this instrument became too narrowly focused because a national-level strategic vision was lacking or was beleaguered by bureaucratic resistance and poor operational coordination among the responsible agencies. Scholars and practitioners have maintained that these problems manifested themselves during the Vietnam War and festered through the 1970s and into the 1980s as a foreign policy consensus in the United States unraveled. It can be argued as well that within the Department of Defense starting in the late 1950s, psychological operations, then called psychological

warfare, became an element of the Army's special warfare mission and therefore lost its strategic focus, becoming instead a device for use in counterinsurgency. Regardless of these reasons, what does seem clear is that the post-Vietnam war era signaled the beginning of a long period of decline and ultimately degeneration, until President Ronald Reagan's election.¹²

President Reagan, the "Great Communicator," appreciated and used information as a fundamental part of his administration's national security strategy to destroy the Soviet Union. National Security Decision Directives 45, 77, and 130, which were signed in 1982, 1983, and 1984, respectively, emphasized the importance of public diplomacy, particularly, international radio broadcasting and psychological operations. Public diplomacy programs were acknowledged as a strategic means of implementing U.S. national security policy and not merely supplementary to diplomacy.¹³ Carl Builder concluded in his book, *The Icarus Syndrome*, that the barriers of the Cold War were "breached not by military forces, diplomacy, alliances, or economic power, but by information spewing out of television sets, telephones, audio and video tapes, computers, and facsimile machines, into the minds of the individuals."¹⁴

President William Clinton recognized the importance of strategic information dissemination and signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, International Public Information, in 1999. The objective of this directive was to use international public information activities to improve the ability of the U.S. Government to prevent and mitigate crises and to promote understanding and support for U.S. foreign policy initiatives around the globe. PDD-68, however, was not directed against a particular adversary in order to defeat that opponent. Instead, it was developed in response to primarily the horrors of Rwanda and the use of "Hate Radio" by Hutu extremists to incite violence against Tutsis and moderate Hutus, but also because of the U.S. peacekeeping experience in Haiti and Bosnia. Although the directive had its flaws, the absence of senior official support for timely implementation of its provisions, insufficient staff, and no funding specifically targeted for its purposes ensured that it remained a half-measure. Yet, like its predecessor directives, with a change in administration, what little progress had been made in underscoring the importance of influence and perception management was lost since there was no organizational structure in place to ensure continuity.

Diplomats, members of Congress, and others recognized this situation in the aftermath of September 11. Shortly after those tragic events, members of Congress, practitioners, and scholars wrote opinion pieces decrying the U.S. Government's inability to communicate its message to foreign audiences. Congressional committees held hearings dedicated to understanding the U.S. Government's public diplomacy role in the war on terrorism. The Department of State enlisted the Advertising Council to assist in the creation of public service announcements to be used overseas. This measure only highlighted that the U.S. Government had no strategic information policy or plan that had been forged in the interagency process and that would synchronize the efforts of the Departments of State and Defense as well as other agencies that can contribute to this effort. Instead, the administration was reacting to events as many of its predecessors had done, and when it did act, it did not always tailor its message to foreign audiences accurately. Eventually, the Bush administration recognized that it needed to implement several actions in the "War on Terrorism" to include reestablishing media and information capabilities that had been eliminated because of limited resources and implementing a formal interagency coordination process at the senior level.¹⁵ President Bush also established by executive order an Office of Global Communications in the White House to advise the President and other U.S. Government leaders on how to achieve the most effective means for the U.S. Government to ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform international audiences.¹⁶

It is too early to determine if such measures will be long lasting. Historically, the U.S. Government's awareness of information as a critical element of power has been uneven, always receiving more attention during crises. Nonetheless, the events of September 11, as well as the "War on Terrorism," have sensitized strategic leaders to the importance of not only having a more effective apparatus for disseminating the U.S. Government's message but the creation of specialized programs primarily aimed at communicating with the Arab and the wider Muslim community. Yet, even these efforts are not panaceas, as there are limitations due to the complexities involved to how successful the U.S. Government can be in influencing foreign audiences.

Controlling the Information Environment

Control of the information environment at the strategic level has always been a critical requirement for U.S. political leaders. Every act of government has a psychological effect on the nation's foreign relations whether it is a trade delegation visit, a diplomatic summit or a military training exercise conducted with allies and friends. Numerous administrations have attempted to consolidate strategic information capabilities and develop an information strategy, but the task is difficult for a number of reasons ranging from the mundane—such as competing bureaucratic demands and interests and the availability of resources—to the more complicated elements of time, image, and ideas. These three elements, according to Professor Barry Fulton, underscore that a government's ability to influence the attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences is difficult and limited.

There is a decided belief that if an information campaign is well designed and directed toward the correct audience, it will change attitudes and behavior. As Fulton points out, time past is often forgotten, that is, any message will be filtered through culture, history, and experience, and these variables have a tendency to distort the message. Further, he argues that governments tend to concern themselves with today's message or with short-term goals while changing attitudes and behaviors takes years to accomplish. Thus few government leaders are in office long enough to sustain a information campaign over an extended period, and few want to dedicate resources to address problems that may be decades away.¹⁷

The second element is image, that is, we act on the pictures that we perceive and retain, not on the complex reality of which these pictures are a part. In other words, how people perceive images is individualistic and it is difficult to predict how broadcasted images will be received, what reality they may represent.¹⁸ As Carnes Lord has pointed out, success in psychological warfare is more than the conflict of ideas, ideologies, and opinions. It is also about cultural and political symbols, about perceptions and emotions. The informational content of television pictures is low or nonexistent, and they are often "torn out of any intelligible context" so as to arouse emotions that hinder rational discussion.¹⁹

Lastly, ideas are more than the messages. Ideas are best nurtured in dialogue—listening is as important as speaking. Fulton refers to the work of two RAND Corporation researchers, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who suggest that there are three realms of information. The first is cyberspace—the global network of electronic connectivity, primarily the internet plus electronic information held by corporations and governments. The second is the infosphere, which consists of cyberspace and broadcast, print, and other media, as well as command, control and communication systems of the military. The third is noosphere, the realm of knowledge and wisdom. If one focuses on cyberspace and the infosphere, then the tendency is to concentrate our attention on the media and the message. Fulton argues that the contemporary strategist must go beyond these two dimensions and become comfortable in the more abstract noosphere where he must

learn to think in terms of ideas and values.²⁰

Conclusion

Clearly, the times warrant a greater recognition of the distinctiveness and importance of information as an element of national power given the technological advances in communications that have occurred over the past three decades. These advances have furnished new tools of communication, influenced not only the structures and processes of public and private sector organizations, but also given rise to a multitude of non-state actors that now wield power in international affairs, and transformed political and economic relationships domestically and globally. In short, information is now understood to be an essential instrument of power and influence that when used strategically can be effective in achieving national interests.

Senior leaders and strategists who do not comprehend that information is a strategic element surrender the advantage to those who do. As General Wesley Clark underscores in his book, *Waging Modern War*, the efforts of NATO and the U.S. Government to tell their story during Kosovo and to counter the Serb media campaign were inadequate. He declares that the importance of attending to media coverage was not lost on the military and political leaders in the West.²¹ The validity of his pronouncement is subject to debate. His experience is not. Strategic leaders must understand the value that the components of the informational element of power can bring to the strategic art. Using information effectively is more than networks and hardware. Instead, the synchronized and timely dissemination of a relevant message consistent with the audience's values is critical to achieving national security objectives.

Notes - Chapter 15

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PART IV

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING

CHAPTER 16

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING

Marybeth P. Ulrich

National security strategy is the product of dual environments—the international strategic environment and the domestic political environment. The international strategic environment is the source both of threats to U.S. interests and of opportunities to exploit to achieve U.S. interests. The domestic political environment consists of American democratic institutions, with their inherent powers and processes, as well as other key features of the domestic political context such as the media, interest groups, and public opinion. In the formulation and implementation of foreign and security policy, strategists and citizens concur that much is at stake. President John F. Kennedy noted, “The big difference [between domestic and foreign policy] is that between a bill being defeated, and the country [being] wiped out.”¹

Strategists must take on the task of understanding these two environments in order to assume their roles in the national security policymaking environment. This chapter will focus broadly on the domestic political context of national security policymaking. While the focus is on the President as the single most important actor in the national security policymaking process, other significant actors and entities will be surveyed whose powers overlap the executive’s. Although the federal government’s powers are distributed across judicial, executive, and legislative branches, this chapter focuses on the struggle for power in national security policymaking between Congress and the Executive, and the role of effective presidential leadership in this process.

Constitutional Foundations

The framers of the Constitution envisioned a national security process that would be dependent on a system of shared and separate powers across the democratic institutions that they created. The legislative and executive branches were envisioned as two coequal institutions, each vested with the authority to balance the other with neither branch dominant over or subordinate to the other.² Embedded in these constitutional foundations are the formal sources of power of the Presidency and Congress, the two key democratic institutions that work together to formulate and carry out national security policy.

Some scholars argue that the Framers’ intent to give the Congress a leading role in government is evident in the fact that Article I of the Constitution grants many explicit powers to the Congress in comparison to the ambiguity of the President’s powers outlined in Article II. Indeed, a survey of the historical record reveals that over time, presidents have successfully exploited this ambiguity to increase the

power of the Presidency vis-à-vis the Congress. A brief review of the constitutional basis of each institution's powers will be useful to strategists seeking to understand the evolution of these powers in the life of the American republic.

The framers envisioned the Congress as the main preserve of governmental powers. The powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8, touch on the entire scope of governmental authority. Chief among these is the power to tax and spend. This power of the purse, checked by the President's veto power, is the defining characteristic of the framers' intent to create an energetic central government with a vigorous legislature.³ The framers concluded the powers enumerated in Article 8 with the elastic clause, the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."⁴

The first sentence of Article II clearly designates the President as the Chief Administrator of the government, but the Constitution offers few specifics about how this executive responsibility should be carried out. The President's role as Chief Executive stems from language in Section 2 that requires the heads of each executive department to report to the President. In the Washington administration, the federal government consisted of only three cabinet departments (State, Treasury, and War) and a few hundred people.⁵ Of course, the vast bureaucracy of the United States has grown exponentially since then and is now comprised of 15 executive departments and 136 federal agencies and commissions,⁶ backed up by a work force of 1.7 million federal civil service employees.⁷ As the federal government has grown, the power of the President has also expanded as the statutory and constitutional responsibility for the policies, programs, and expenditure of funds is asserted across the executive branch.

Authority to administer the federal bureaucracy, however, does not necessarily translate into its control. All presidents are faced with the challenge of making the bureaucracy responsive to their leadership. Two key tools to shape the executive branch's outputs into a more coherent administration vision are the use of the appointment authority and the White House Staff. Article II, Section 2 gives the President the power to appoint the department and agency heads within the federal government.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the schedule C personnel classification for appointed policymaking positions throughout the executive branch. This represented a shift from party-based patronage that rewarded the party faithful with everything from predominantly uncontroversial government jobs in the field to key policy posts in Washington.⁸ Schedule C personnel play critical behind-the-scenes roles, such as setting the schedules and agendas of cabinet members, guiding political strategy, and giving legal opinions and policy advice. These appointees are lower in rank than noncareer Senior Executive Service (SES) officials, who fall just below presidential appointees and who must be confirmed by the Senate. At latest count, SES and Schedule C employees numbered 1,935 in the George W. Bush administration. In all, President Bush has 3,000 political appointees serving in his administration. Although political appointees account for less than two-tenths of one percent of the total civil service, their presence results in significant influence throughout the policymaking process.⁹ In the modern presidency, presidents have offered these positions to ideologically compatible people who will work to ensure that their department or agency's policies are in sync with the president's vision.

The Senate's confirmation role is its check on the President's appointment power. While the vast majority of the President's nominations are confirmed, the potential to subject nominees to intense congressional scrutiny and to ultimately reject candidates gives the Senate great influence in the appointment process and, tangentially, in the overall policy process. While the executive sits at the top of the federal bureaucracy, the design of the various departments and agencies are specified in congressional

statutes that detail their structure and duties. Though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, Congress' oversight role has evolved into a tremendous check on the executive. Congress keeps a careful eye on the administration of its laws to ensure that they are properly interpreted and executed.¹⁰

Another management tool of relatively recent creation is the Executive Office of the President (EOP), better known as the White House Staff. President Franklin Roosevelt established this "mini-bureaucracy within the bureaucracy" with Congress' consent in 1939 as an attempt to centralize control over the executive branch and to provide unity and direction to the federal government.¹¹ The EOP includes both the professional staff working in such places as the National Security Council and the Council of Economic Advisers as well as the president's most trusted advisers in the White House Office.¹² The two tools are closely related as presidential appointments have increasingly become subject to intense vetting in the EOP.

In national security affairs and the conduct of foreign policy that might result in the use of armed force, the President draws on the authority vested in him as Commander-in-Chief. However, the framers were in agreement that significant war-related powers must also reside in the Congress. Indeed, as Figure 1 indicates, Article I, Section 8 lays out extensive and explicit war-related powers granted to the Congress. The Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights both reflect the Framers' distrust of standing armies unaccountable to a legislature. The design of American democratic institutions separating the power to declare war from the power to command or direct military forces in wartime was meant to ensure that the President was unable to make war alone. It is important to note that rather than giving the President the power to declare war with the "advice and consent of the Senate" as they had done with the treaty power, the Framers deliberately elected to give Congress the sole authority to declare war.¹³ The historical record shows that in practice Congress has not been the initiator of all significant military actions and that there has been a struggle for power between the two branches over war powers.

This brief survey of constitutional powers relevant to the conduct of national security policymaking highlights the Framers' intent for policymaking and implementation to be a shared process across the legislative and executive branches. The Framers' design of shared and separate powers resulted in a policymaking framework that requires both cooperation and coordination to achieve anything of real significance in national security affairs.

Institutional Competencies

The Framers' final product reflected an understanding that the institutions they created had distinct and complementary institutional competencies. While Congress was granted important powers ensuring it a significant role in the conduct of national security policy, its institutional design also meant that it would almost never move quickly on such matters. The requirement for legislation to clear both the House and the Senate after potentially lengthy deliberations in each body subject to the influences of public opinion and the media, favored Congress's role as the branch of government that considered diverse viewpoints, deliberated between them, and remained accountable to the public.

The executive branch, on the other hand, was designed to move with speed and dispatch, with an appropriate amount of secrecy in order to conduct foreign and security policy day to day in peacetime, and to act decisively in crisis situations. Congress' design, meanwhile, affords it significant oversight checks as well as policy influence in the power of the purse. The Framers' deliberate consideration of institutional competencies when deciding which powers should be shared, which should be held alone, and in which

branch the power should be put is evident in the Framers' debate on the distribution of war powers at the constitutional convention. Early deliberations argued that Congress should be given the power to "make war." However, it was eventually agreed that this should be changed to "declare war" to clarify and ensure that the actual conduct of war remained an executive function and that the institutional competencies of the Presidency were maximized during wartime.

<i>Formal Powers of the President Relevant to National Security Policymaking As Stated in the Constitution</i>	<i>Formal Powers of the Congress Relevant to National Security Policymaking As Stated in the Constitution</i>
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."¹⁴ Article II, Section 1. "... he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed..." Article II, Section 3.	"The Congress shall have Power to... make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, all other Powers vested by this Constitution..." Article I, Section 8.
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President... If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it... If after such reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent... to the other House... and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become Law." Article I, Section 7.	"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the debts..." Article I, Section 8. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law..." Article I, Section 9.
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." Article II, Section 2.	"The Congress shall have Power to... provide for the common defense and general Welfare of the United States, ... declare War, ... to raise and support Armies..., To provide and maintain a Navy; To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States..." Article I, Section 8.
"... he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices..." Article II, Section 2.	
"He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law." Article II, Section 2.	"He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law." Article II, Section 2.

Figure 1. Key National Security Powers as Enumerated in the Constitution.

Presidential Power and Persuasion

Formal powers contribute to and limit the influence wielded by the President and Congress in any specific policymaking scenario. Informal powers of each branch, on the other hand, if astutely employed, can significantly enhance the influence of either institution. The struggle for influence is characterized neither by all-out competition nor by perfect consensus. Congress can be both a potential adversary and key partner in the formulation and conduct of national security policy. Conversely, the President and his team cannot sustain any national security policy course without the support of Congress and the American people. Dominating the political agenda requires that the President build popular support, work effectively with Congress, control the vast federal bureaucracy, and know when and where to invest political capital. Presidential leadership and the administration's articulation of a vision underpinning its foreign policy, in general, and its national security policy in particular is key to success as well.

The President and Congress are at once so independent and so intertwined that neither can be said to govern save as both do. And even when they come together they face other claimants to a share in governing: the courts, the states, the press, the private interests, all protected by our Constitution, and the foreign governments that help to shape our policy.¹⁵

Although the President is the single actor in the American political system granted the greatest range of formal powers, the ability to make his will prevail among the competing wills of actors also vested with significant powers depends on skillful presidential leadership. President Truman once remarked that presidential power really just boils down to the power to persuade.¹⁶ Renowned presidential scholar Richard Neustadt in his classic text, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, equates presidential power with influence and seeks to explain its sources and the contexts where presidential power is more or less dominant.

Scholars differentiate between situations where the President can essentially command and those in which he must rely on his powers of persuasion. If the issue involves presidential authority that is not shared with a competing entity, then the desired result may be achieved without resistance. Examples include the relief of a military commander, the use of an executive order to advance unpopular policy, and the deployment of military forces to protect American interests.

Truman's relief of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 is probably the most well-known dismissal of a military commander in the modern presidency. Truman was careful to consult the Joint Chiefs in the matter and implemented the order in a successive delegation of authority from him through the appropriate military authorities. Truman and the Chiefs viewed MacArthur's public interventions in the face of strict orders not to publicly comment on administration policy as the open defiance of the Commander in Chief and consequently justified his dismissal as essential to maintaining civilian control of the military. There was no question in the MacArthur affair, with regard to the assertion of formal constitutional powers, that the President had the authority to dismiss a commander in the field. However, congressional critics of Truman's Korean Policy and MacArthur's Republican supporters used the opportunity to conduct a full-fledged congressional investigation of the government's foreign and military policies against a domestic backdrop that featured a grand tickertape parade in the general's honor, MacArthur's address to a Joint Session of Congress, and an adoring public passionately opposed to the ouster of an American icon.¹⁷ Truman's actions consequently were offset by the exertion of informal powers inherent in the Congress, the press, and the

people whose inputs account for and shape the ultimate political impact of the President's actions.

The issuance of an executive order is another strategic tool that presidents can use to achieve desired policy outcomes and to assert presidential authority. Eisenhower's use of federal troops to enforce the orders of a Federal Court to desegregate Little Rock schools in 1957 illustrates a president's prerogative to assert his constitutional power over the state militias, a power that is not shared with another constitutional entity. The president's decision to federalize the Arkansas National Guard troops originally called into action by Governor Orval Faubus to halt the integration of Central High School was clear, unambiguous, and highly public. The president's assertion of power featured a "sense of legitimate obligation, legitimately imposed"¹⁸ As in the MacArthur case, to have not exerted the authority would have resulted in its erosion and the prevalence of less legitimate sources of power in the American political system.

Executive orders have mainly been used in three areas: to combat various forms of discrimination against citizens, to increase White House control over the executive branch, and to maintain secrets.¹⁹ When Congress perceives that executive orders are taken to bypass Congress on controversial issues, they may elicit great political controversy and be a source of conflict between the two branches.

Even the prospect of an executive order being issued can erupt in major political controversy as was the case with President Clinton's proposal to lift the ban on gays serving in the military. There was no question that the president had the legitimate authority to issue such an order as Truman had done to integrate the armed forces in 1948, but the political backlash was so strong in 1993 that Clinton abandoned the idea in order to salvage his domestic agenda before Congress.²⁰

While the president's formal powers are significant, presidential leadership is more often dependent on the president's power to persuade others that what he wants of them is also compatible with the pursuit of their own interests. The successful launching of the Marshall Plan is an example of a president with minimal political capital achieving a critical foreign policy goal through the effective use of the informal powers of his office. Truman faced the uphill battle of convincing a Republican and traditionally isolationist Congress, and a Treasury department focused on controlling spending, that massive European aid deserved their support. The domestic political context in 1947 was further characterized by animosity over Truman's veto of the Republican leadership's key legislative initiatives and the assumption that the president would be easily defeated in the upcoming 1948 election.

Truman had a key advocate in the figure of General George C. Marshall pushing for the plan that bore his name from State and the support of the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg. All the resources of the administration were unleashed to back the plan and special care was taken to meet the terms Vandenberg insisted on to maintain his support, which included frequent personal meetings with the President and Marshall and extensive liaisons between Congress and the agencies involved with implementing the plan. Truman even deferred to Vandenberg's choice of a Republican to head the new agency created to administer the program. These "bargains" subsequently resulted in key players lending their prestige and influence to make the proposed European Recovery Program a reality.²¹

The few cases discussed here highlight the linkages between presidential power and effective presidential leadership. The American political system's institutional design, with its unique blend of shared and separate powers, means that key actors often have divided loyalties, a result of serving multiple masters in government. Even players within the executive branch are also responsible to Congress and have

allegiance as well to their staffs and departments to represent their bureaucratic interests. Fulfilling the president's policies, in addition, necessarily involves interagency cooperation and overcoming the disparate bureaucratic interests of each. presidential power is as much a function of personal politics as it is of formal authority or position.²²

Presidential Leadership and the Role of Congress

Most texts examining the extent of the presidential-congressional partnership in national security policymaking cite the constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin's musing that the Constitution "is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."²³ What does the historical record suggest about the President's capacity to dominate national security policy? Is the American political tradition that Congress defers to the Executive in foreign and security policy, weighing in with countervailing powers only by exception? Has Congress acted in recent decades in order to expand its influence over the executive?

An objective assessment of the congressional-executive struggle over the control of national security policies will reveal several findings. First, American history is replete with examples of serious Congressional quarrels with the President over the conduct of foreign policy. Second, periods of deference to the executive have been limited, and even then, included at least tacit approval of the basic parameters of U.S. foreign policy. Third, as a result of congressional reforms in the 1970s Congress gained an increased capacity to challenge presidential policies with the creation of the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the expansion of personal and committee staffs. These tools boosted the Congress' analytical ability and contributed to more enhanced oversight of foreign policy and a greater trend toward legislating specific aspects of foreign policy.²⁴ Finally, the congressional-executive relationship on use of force issues seeks a comfortable equilibrium. Periods of congressional acquiescence are often interrupted by perceived executive overreach that leads to the reassertion of congressional authority. Such was the context for the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973.

Beginning with George Washington, presidents have drawn on the institutional competencies of the executive and on their formal powers to play an active and assertive role in foreign affairs and national security issues. Most scholars would agree that the president has a clear advantage with respect to the substantive initiation of national security policy. However, even in the most extreme cases of executive unilateral action in national security affairs, such as Abraham Lincoln's and Franklin Roosevelt's assumption of emergency powers in wartime, presidents have felt compelled to note that their actions were subject to congressional ratification. Whether or not these initiatives are ultimately successful, however, depends on presidential leadership to navigate the policies through the zones of executive and legislative concurrent authority²⁵ and to ensure that public support for the policies are sufficient for their continued sustainment.

Three Political Contexts

Three possible political contexts have characterized congressional-presidential relations in the national security arena. First, *presidential power is maximized when the President acts pursuant to the express or implied authorization of Congress in a given area.* In such periods of concordance, presidential leadership is virtually unchallenged. Such cooperation may be attributed to agreement over the major policy decisions in play. Presidential power has also been at its height during times of national crisis and war. Lincoln largely got his way in the conduct of the Civil War. In the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson until 1919, and

Franklin Roosevelt after 1941, enjoyed an advantage over the control of foreign policy. The postwar era through the mid-1960s was another period of presidential dominance rooted in broad agreement over policy. Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson all governed during major wars or at the height of the Cold War, and each had relative control over national security and foreign policy.²⁶

However, each of these periods was followed by a backlash or resurgence of congressional power. Following the Civil War, powerful Congresses dominated the presidency in the late nineteenth century, and Congress handed Wilson the devastating political and personal defeat of rejecting the Treaty of Versailles with a reassertion of congressional power that resulted in the domination of foreign policy until World War II.²⁷ The War Powers Act of 1973 was the culmination of Congress' break with the president over the conduct of the Vietnam War and its reemergence in national security affairs.

Second, *presidential independence is possible if Congress is indifferent or acquiesces in a particular policy area.* In this political context Congress falls short of playing the role of constructive partner to critique, build support for, and improve on the president's foreign and security policy. Many factors contribute to such a scenario. There is a tendency in Congress to view foreign and security policy through domestic political lenses or from the perspective of special interests, which may both be barriers to judging foreign policy initiatives on the basis of the national interest. Presidential independence may also be possible simply because Congress is not paying attention to the administration's policies. Domestic issues often dominate the congressional agenda in peacetime. Furthermore, Congress may neglect its responsibilities in foreign affairs by devoting too little time to rigorous programmatic oversight.²⁸ In both the concordant and acquiescent political contexts, the president's leadership is not essential. However, in the third context to be considered, presidential leadership is critical.

Presidential power in security and foreign policy is at its lowest ebb when the administration's desired action is incompatible with the expressed or implied will of the Congress. An analysis of congressional-presidential relations in the Vietnam War illustrates a dramatic conversion of Congress' perception of its role in checking presidential war making powers. Its 1964 passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution essentially ceded to President Johnson the "blank check" he sought to deal with the crisis in Southeast Asia. The near unanimous backing in Congress (there were only two dissenting votes in the Senate) gave the president authority to take all "necessary measures" to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and "to prevent further aggression." Johnson's interpretation of his Commander-in-Chief powers, which President Richard Nixon took to even greater heights as his successor, was an open-ended doctrine permitting the president to order armed forces into combat whenever the president determined that the security of the United States was threatened.²⁹

As the administrations' prosecution of the war continued, Congress retreated from its role of presidential cheerleader and gradually began to reassert its authority. Congressmen increasingly traveled to Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s to take stock of the war, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held televised hearings in 1966, and by the early 1970s Congress changed its rules for considering defense appropriations bills so that individual amendments attempting to limit or influence the policy could be considered without rejecting the entire defense appropriations package.³⁰ Continuation of presidential dominance in the face of a growing majority's disagreement with the Vietnam policy in particular, and even broader consensus that the Nixon administration had overreached with the assertion that the executive had unlimited discretionary authority as Commander-in-Chief to send American troops into action around the world, led to the passage of the War Powers Act.

The act established procedures in three main areas: presidential consultation with Congress, presidential reports to Congress, and congressional termination of military action. Congress' intent was to assert its authority via procedural constraints limiting the ability of the president to commit U.S. forces abroad. The act calls for the president to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before introducing U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, declares that the president must report to Congress within 48 hours when such forces are introduced, and mandates that the use of forces be terminated within sixty to ninety days unless Congress authorizes that they remain.³¹

The continuous shifting between the political contexts discussed above is indicative in the ambiguous role the War Powers Act has played since its passage. President Nixon rejected it out of hand with his veto of the measure in 1973. Congress shot back with its overwhelming override,³² asserting its intent to expand its influence in national security policymaking with measures beyond the blunt instrument of withholding funds. In practice, Congress has not consistently asserted the authority granted in the act. Presidents, meanwhile, have been careful not to acknowledge the law's constitutionality, while avoiding direct confrontations with Congress over its provisions. Depending on lawmakers' overall view of the president's proposed intervention, they may sit on the sidelines or strive to be consulted. Presidents continue to insist on flexibility and may seek Congress's explicit authorization for an impending action, but without admitting that such action is being taken in order to remain in compliance with the Act. There is, however, an acceptance, if grudgingly, that the War Powers Act stands as a reminder of the ultimate need to get at least congressional acquiescence, and, ideally, congressional approval for the commitment of troops.³³ Since the introduction of the War Powers Act into congressional-presidential relations all three political contexts, enthusiastic concord, indifferent acquiescence, and expressed disagreement with the president's foreign and security policy continue to occur.

Presidential Leadership as the Key to Successful National Security Policymaking

The executive branch's institutional competencies make the president the most important actor in foreign and security policy. The president, alone, has command of the bully pulpit to give him an unrivaled voice in policy debates. The president is also the actor in the American political system best positioned to consider the national interest. Since World War II, control over foreign and security policy has increasingly been centralized in the executive. The government's expertise for formulating and implementing foreign and security policy is largely resident in the Department of State and the Department of Defense, with the National Security Council also assuming an increasing amount of authority and influence—all three components of the executive branch. Yet effective leadership is not a given. The chapter will now survey some of the recommendations that scholars and national security policy practitioners have offered the president and his staff on how to best wield the power of the presidency. Finally, we will look at a recent and still evolving case, George W. Bush's leadership in the Iraq War.

Perhaps the broadest and most common sense recommendation comes from presidential scholar Paul Quirk, who contributes the concept of "strategic competence." Quirk argues that presidents must have a well-designed strategy for achieving the competencies they need to lead effectively. In this view, the key competencies to be mastered are policy substance, policy process, and policy promotion. An adequate level of policy expertise will result from years of attentive engagement in the major national issues. The development of direct in-depth personal competence in policy areas is necessarily selective, but a base knowledge of the key issues is essential to the president's recognition of the elements of responsible debate and to responsible decisionmaking.³⁴ Anything less than this, Quirk argues is minimalist and may impede

intelligent decisionmaking,

A minimalist president . . . will not fully appreciate his own limitations. By consistently neglecting the complexities of careful policy arguments, one never comes to understand the importance of thorough analysis. In politics and government, at least, people generally do not place a high value on discourse that is much more sophisticated than their own habitual mode of thought.³⁵

To lead effectively, presidents must also be competent in the processes of policymaking. The president sits atop a system of complex organizational and group decisionmaking processes and must ensure that the administration has put in place reliable decisionmaking processes. The major threats to effective national security policymaking processes are intelligence failures, groupthink, and other malfunctions of the advisory process,³⁶ and failing to effectively coordinate within the interagency process and beyond the executive branch as appropriate.³⁷ Finally, building coalitions with congressional leaders and key interest groups, and using the bully pulpit to take the case to the public are essential ingredients for effective policy promotion once policy decisions have been made.

Lee Hamilton offers his advice for effective presidential leadership in foreign and national security policy from his perspective as the former chairman and long time ranking Democrat on the House Committee on International Relations. Presidents must make foreign policy a priority and set forth a day-to-day course that is driven by an overall strategic vision. Hamilton argues that the foreign and security policy arena is uniquely dependent on the president's attention and leadership. Too often an issue receives intense attention and scrutiny for a short time, but then the administration fails to remain sufficiently focused or to expend the requisite resources to achieve success. The president is uniquely positioned to forge the personal relations with foreign heads of state that are critical to alliance building and to articulate U.S. policies and the associated national interests with clarity to the American people.³⁸

In a system of shared and separate powers in national security policymaking, successful policy will rarely be the result of strong-arming the Congress or the American people through the overplaying of formal powers. The Supreme Court has never intervened to check the president's power while a war is in progress; however, although such tactics may be legal they may not be wise.³⁹ Presidential leadership in national security policymaking effectively blends presidential authority with a consideration of the institutional competencies that the rival branch brings to the development and execution of strategy.

As the most accessible and representative branch of government, Congress can help mediate between the American people and the foreign policy elite. Through the hearings process, Congress can also help to educate the public on complex foreign and security policies. Testifying before the appropriate committees also forces the administration's top officials to articulate and defend their policies.

Debates over particularly contentious and weighty matters of national security policy, such as whether or not to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, can engage the public and strengthen the policy process through the inclusion of such measured deliberations. Passing legislation in support of the administration's policies can also help to strengthen the president's hand before international bodies, adversaries, and allies. In the case of the Gulf War, congressional leaders insisted on being consulted and on debating the issue before authorizing the use of military force. President George H. W. Bush, however, feared that weak support or a split vote would be worse than no vote at all and might actually weaken his hand in the face of Iraqi aggression. President Bush maintained throughout the period of congressional consultation that, regardless of the outcome in Congress, he still had the constitutional right to commit U.S. forces to battle. In the end, Congress passed the resolution with a clear victory in the House,

250-183, and a squeaker in the Senate, 52-47.⁴⁰ Effective presidential leadership in foreign and security policy recognizes Congress' constitutional role in the process and seeks ways to ensure that sustained consultation is a characteristic of the executive strategy for interacting with Congress.

Assessing Presidential Leadership in the War in Iraq

The chapter concludes with a brief application of some of the themes discussed to President George W. Bush's leadership in the prosecution of the war in Iraq and its still unfolding aftermath. The open-ended resolution Congress passed in October 2002 granted the president broad authority to use any means he determined necessary and appropriate—including military force—to respond to any security threat posed by Iraq.⁴¹ Critics contended that in contrast to the 1991 appeal of President Bush's father to authorize force on the eve of conflict when key conditions related to its prosecution were well-known, "The president is asking Congress to delegate its constitutional power to declare war before he has decided we need to go to war, but he has not adequately explained what this war will look like."⁴² Others argued President Bush's request was constitutionally inappropriate because it was seeking a conditional grant of power, leaving in the president's hands the decision to change the nation into a state of war. These critics contend that a nonbinding resolution declaring support for the president's efforts to make Iraq comply with UN resolutions and Congress' intention to authorize the use of force if peaceful means fail may have been more appropriate. Such a two-step approach would have left Congress in the loop up until the point when the president was ready to begin military action.⁴³

Although some Republicans had concerns about endorsing the new doctrine of preemption, they deferred to the president. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, many Democrats felt pressure to "get this question of Iraq behind us" so they could return to other issues that they thought would be successful for them in the elections. At the height of the House debate, less than 40 members could be found on the floor. On the Senate side no more than 10 senators could be found. The resolution passed 296 to 133 in the House and in the Senate 77 to 23.⁴⁴

Observers noted that the debate over the Iraq war was a pale shadow of the Senate's more vigorous role in the past. Congressional scholar Norman Ornstein commenting on the Senate's role in foreign policy, "the Senate is struggling to find an appropriate role to play. I think you'd be hard-pressed to suggest the Senate is a great debating body—on anything."⁴⁵ The concordant-acquiescent political context that has characterized congressional-presidential relations since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks may be leading to executive overreach in ways that could weaken the overall prospects for the sustainment and ultimate success of the president's strategy in Iraq.

The political environment in the run-up to the War in Iraq was conducive to the executive "going it alone" vis-à-vis Congress. Although the Congress put up little resistance over the open-ended resolution to use force in Iraq, this support occurred within a climate of some angst on the Hill over the administration's attitude toward the role of Congress in defense policy. Congressmen of both parties complained that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld "tells lawmakers little and demands immense discretion."⁴⁶ Complaints were also numerous accusing the administration of thwarting Congress' investigative authority. Some lawmakers were frustrated that their attempts to get more information about the administration's impending war plans and strategy came up empty. Administration officials were unable to answer with any specificity questions related to the cost of the war or of the reconstruction effort to follow before lawmakers cast their votes.

Some members of Congress demanded to hear the administration's plans for the postwar occupation, but were denied such consultations based on the argument that it would not be proper to plan for the aftermath of a conflict that the president had not yet decided to fight. The "ends" that the president advanced shifted among competing candidates, eventually settling on the need to disarm Saddam Hussein and dismantle the imminent threat that the administration argued his weapons posed.

Furthermore, presidential scholars, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., point out that the doctrine of preemptive military strikes adds a "new wrinkle to the Imperial Presidency," because the trigger for the use of force is classified intelligence.⁴⁷ Richard Durbin, a member of the Senate intelligence committee, complained that an insufficient body of the intelligence available to the committee was declassified in the run-up to the vote on Iraq hindering the ability of his colleagues to make an informed vote.

The choice to maximize the powers of the presidency, while marginalizing the participation of the Congress may have put the strategy at risk. Congress shares responsibility for the policy due to its decision to support the open-ended resolution. However, the emphasis on regime change through invasion without laying out all aspects of a comprehensive strategy complete with clear strategic ends, a thorough explanation of the ways or courses of action the administration would pursue to achieve the ends, and a good faith estimate of the means or cost to the American people in terms of lives and treasure made it more likely that the administration would be on the defensive when the strategy ran into difficulty.

Indeed, in September 2003, when the Bush administration finally delivered the first major bill for the war to Congress in the form of a request for \$87 billion dollars to fund Iraqi reconstruction and the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the remainder of the fiscal year, Congress pushed back mightily. Pent up frustration over the lack of collaboration with the legislative branch was evident. Senator Diane Feinstein remarked, "We want to be good Americans. We want a bipartisan foreign policy. We know the time is tough. We want to be with you. But there's a feeling that you know it all. The administration knows it all. And nobody else knows anything. And, therefore, we're here just to say, 'Yes, sir. How high do we jump?' And at some point we refuse to jump."⁴⁸ More direct was Senator Robert Byrd's comment to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, "Congress is not an ATM. We have to be able to explain this huge, enormous bill to the American people."⁴⁹

The administration sustained another wave of attacks in January 2004 when its Chief Weapons Inspector in Iraq, David Kay, concluded that there were no large stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq before the war. "Based on what I've seen is that we are very unlikely to find stockpiles, large stockpiles of weapons. I don't think they exist." "It turns out we were all wrong."⁵⁰ Democrats charged this was further proof the war was based on false premises. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle took issue with the certainty of the language that administration officials used with regard to the prewar intelligence and some questioned whether administration officials misled them.

Members of Congress complained that the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, gave his personal assurance in closed-door hearings that WMD stocks would be found in Iraq. "He was telling the senior people in the administration . . . that the weapons were absolutely there, that they were certain the stuff was there."⁵¹ Ohio Senator Mike DeWine, a Republican on the Intelligence Committee, told the Columbus *Dispatch*, that he was not sure he would vote to authorize war with Iraq if he had to do it all over again.⁵² Meanwhile, on the campaign trail, Democratic presidential candidates took aim at the administration. "We were misled not only in the intelligence but misled in the way that the president took us to war," the Democratic front-runner, Sen. John F. Kerry (MA.), said when asked about Kay's

conclusions.”⁵³

The administration’s critics fault the lack of consensus building and deride its unwillingness to collaborate with either international allies or its domestic partners in the national security policymaking process. Supporters of the administration laud the resurgence of presidential power and maintain that the administration’s approach is merely a corrective action necessary to reverse the erosion of presidential prerogatives in recent decades. According to this view, the administration’s approach is to be admired as a model in presidential leadership,

To achieve all this, Bush staged one of the most impressive exercises of presidential power in modern times. He used all the tools at hand: the bully pulpit, TV, personal persuasion in the Oval Office, and the skillful deployment of top officials in his administration. And, not to be underestimated, there was sheer presidential bullheadedness. When a president takes a firm and defensible position and doesn’t flinch, he normally prevails . . . One telling result of Bush’s full-throttle use of his presidency was a far greater percentage of Democratic support for his congressional war resolution than the elder President Bush won in 1991 after Iraq had invaded Kuwait.⁵⁴

Is President Bush’s leadership vis-à-vis Iraq firm, resolute leadership appropriate to the national security challenges inherent in fighting the security threats facing the United States in the twenty-first century or imperial presidential overreach, that if continued, will ultimately lead to a failed strategy for fighting the War on Terrorism? The historical record indicates that policy is strengthened when each branch understands its proper role, powers, and limitations in foreign policy. An analysis of the case of the war in Iraq suggests that both branches have fallen short of this ideal.

Conclusion

Students of the national security policymaking process must understand the interplay of formal and informal powers that both the president and the Congress bring to the process. Budding strategists must also immerse themselves in the various dimensions of the domestic political process in order to become familiar with the constraints and opportunities inherent in American politics affecting the actions of key players in the system.

Effective presidential leadership in national security policymaking, like effective strategy, depends on understanding one’s power, its limits, and the recognition that other actors’ actions also shape the policy battlefield. Successful national security policy exploits the institutional competencies that the framers’ designed into the American political system. Coordinated efforts that link the president’s national security policy initiatives with Congress’ unique capacity to vet the policy, educate the public, and ultimately lend its support are more likely to lead to successful strategy.

Presidents must also consciously develop strategies for gaining the competencies they need in policy substance, policy processes, and policy promotion. In the exercise of power, effective presidents blend their powers of persuasion with their inherent authority as chief executive. They understand that presidential decisionmaking is dependent on staffs that serve them well and interagency processes capable of prioritizing and properly vetting issues for decision. Successful policy implementation, furthermore, is reliant on efficient bureaucratic processes and the keen oversight of lawmakers, the media, and the American people.

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CHAPTER 17

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Gabriel Marcella¹

Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.²

Chas W. Freeman, Jr.

The United States is a fully equipped, globally deployed, interagency superpower. It is the indispensable anchor of international order and the increasingly globalized economic system. Nothing quite like it has ever existed. Indeed such great powers as Rome, Byzantium, China, Spain, England, and France achieved extraordinary sophistication, enormous institutional and cultural influence, and longevity, but they never achieved the full articulation of America's global reach.

Today the United States forward deploys some 250 diplomatic missions in the form of embassies, consulates, and membership in specialized organizations. It possesses a unified military command system that covers all regions of the world, the homeland, and even outer space. It is the leader of an interlocking set of alliances and agreements that promotes peace, open trade, the principles of democracy, human rights, and protection of the environment. American capital, technology, and culture influence the globe. American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional. All the instruments of national power are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness, remains. Presidents and their national security staffs strive to achieve coherence, with varying levels of success through use of the "interagency process."

The interagency decisionmaking process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity. Given ever expanding responsibilities and the competition for resources, it is imperative that national security professionals master it in order to work effectively within it. The complex challenges to national security in the twenty-first century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within the government. It is also imperative that changes be made to make the system and the process more effective.

The United States first faced the challenge of strategic integration within an embryonic interagency process during World War II. Mobilizing the nation, the government, and the armed forces for war and winning the peace highlighted the importance of resources and budgets, of integrating diplomacy with military power, gathering and analyzing enormous quantities of intelligence, conducting joint and combined

military operations, and managing coalition strategies and balancing competing regional priorities, for example, the European versus the Pacific theater in national strategy. From the war and the onset of the Cold War emerged a number of institutional and policy innovations. Among them: the structure of the modern Department of State, Department of Defense (DoD) (from the old War and Navy Departments), a centralized intelligence system, the Marshall Plan, the unified military command system, the Air Force, the predecessor of the U.S. Agency for International Development (Point Four), NATO and other alliances, military assistance pacts, military advisory groups, and the U.S. Information Agency.

There is probably no period in American history like the late 1940s and early 1950s that is formative of the kind of national and institutional learning that John P. Lovell calls “purposeful adaptation.” He defines it as “the need to develop and pursue foreign policy goals that are sensitive to national needs and aspirations and to the realities of a changing world environment.”³ The evolution of the interagency process parallels America’s purposeful adaptation to changing global realities of the last five decades. But it is not an orderly evolution because of serious structural and cultural impediments, such as discontinuities from one administration to another and poor institutional memory.⁴ Prominent historical markers along this path included such documents as National Security Council (NSC) 68, the intellectual framework for the containment strategy against the Soviet Union. Though not a policy document, the Weinberger Doctrine articulated criteria for the use of military power that dramatically influenced the shape of American strategy in the 1980s and 1990s.

There are countless examples of how American statesmen codify in writing the patterns of “purposeful adaptation.” The tragic events of September 11, 2001, had such an impact on American national security that the George W. Bush administration created a Department for Homeland Security. It also published a series of strategy documents on counterterrorism, homeland security, military strategy, and infrastructure security. Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS) dramatically redefined the philosophical underpinnings of the U.S. role in the world. Because the attacks of September 11 represented an assault on international order and exposed the vulnerabilities of the United States to asymmetric warfare by non-state actors, the NSS of September 17, 2002 spoke of the need to redefine the Westphalian concept of sovereignty.⁵

When the United States reluctantly inherited global responsibilities in 1945, American statesmen faced three challenges: forging a system of collective security, promoting decolonization, and building a stable international financial order. These and four decades of intense threat from the other superpower had a decisive impact on shaping the interagency process. With the end of bipolar ideological and geopolitical conflict, the foreign policy and defense agenda is captured by free trade, democratization, sub-national ethnic and religious conflict, failing states, humanitarian contingencies, ecological deterioration, terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of the technology of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The dawn of the twenty first century calls for a relook at the adequacy of the interagency system.

The National Security Council: Coordination vs. Policymaking

To bring strategic coherence, consensus, and decisiveness to the burgeoning global responsibilities of the emerging superpower, the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council. Its functions:

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of

domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

. . . other functions the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the nation's security . . .

. . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States . . .

. . . consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security . . .

The statutory members are the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. By statute the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors. Other advisors, including additional cabinet members, may be invited. The Council need not convene formally to function. Indeed, by late 1999 the Clinton NSC had met only once: March 2, 1993. There are alternatives to formal meetings, such as the ABC luncheons of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Sandy Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or the Deputies breakfasts and lunches. The "NSC system" of policy coordination and integration operates 24 hours a day. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs directs the staff. The emergence of the modern" operational presidency,"⁶ brought to the NSC greater authority over the development and implementation of policy, thus creating a new power center that competes for jurisdiction with the Departments of State and Defense.

The NSC staff, known as the Executive Secretariat, has varied in size and function. In 1999 the staff comprised about 208 (of which 101 were policy personnel and 107 administrative and support personnel) professionals covering regional and functional responsibilities. Under the George W. Bush administration, the NSC staff was cut to nearly half. Staffers are detailed from the diplomatic corps, the intelligence community, the civil service, the military services (12 military officers were in policy positions in September 1999), academia, and the private sector. The staffing procedures are personalized to the president's style and comfort level. The structure of the staff, its internal and external functioning, and the degree of control of policy by the president varies. Carter and Clinton were very centralized, Reagan and George Bush, senior, less so. As examples, the first two Presidential Decision Directives of the Clinton administration, dated January 20, 1993, set forth the structure and function of the NSC staff and groups that reported to it, as depicted in Figure 1 below:

National Security Council System




Figure 1. National Security Council System.

The day-to-day policy coordination and integration was done by the NSC Staff, divided into the following functional and geographic directorates:

National Security Council Staff




Figure 2. The National Security Council Staff.

The Principals Committee members were the cabinet level representatives who comprised the senior forum for national security issues. The Deputies Committee included deputy secretary level officials who monitored the work of the interagency process, did crisis management, and when necessary, pushed unresolved issues to the principals for resolution. Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) were the heart and soul of the process. They are *ad hoc*, standing, regional, or functional. They functioned at a number of levels, met regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, framed policy responses, and built consensus across the government for unified action. The fluid nature of the process meant that IWGs did not always have to come to decisions. The system preferred that issues be decided at the lowest level possible. If issues were not resolved there, they were elevated to the next level and when appropriate, to the Deputies Committee. Who chaired the different IWGS and committees varied between the NSC director and senior State Department officials.

Dramatic changes came with the election of George W. Bush. Comfortable with a corporate style executive leadership and surrounding himself with very experienced national security statesmen like Secretary of State Colin Powell (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Advisor to the President, and White House Fellow), Vice President Richard Cheney (former Congressman, Secretary of

Defense, and White House Chief of Staff), and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (former Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to NATO, and Congressman), President George W. Bush centralized policy authority by establishing new structures and procedures.

Beginning the new nomenclature for presidential directives, National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD1), dated February 13, 2001, established six regional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs) and eleven PCCs to handle functional responsibilities. The plethora of existing IWGs was abolished by NSPD1. The activities of IWGs were transferred to the new PCCs. The PCCs were the most important structural changes made by the Bush administration. According to NSPD1, they were the “Day-to-day *fora* for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the president.” The centralization of authority over national security matters reached levels not seen for many years. However, it remained to be seen whether the system would work effectively. In Spring 2003, a senior national security careerist who was intimately involved with policymaking referred to interagency relations as “the worst in twenty years.” An experienced foreign policy hand commented: “The inter-agency system is broken” and averred that instead of centralization of authority, there is fragmentation.⁷ Explanations for this state of affairs varied. It included the intrusion of group think dynamics among senior neo-conservative decisionmakers, the role of strong personalities, the bypassing of the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, as well as the deliberate isolation of the Department of State.⁸

Another important interagency reorganization made by the Bush administration was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and a unified military command, the Northern Command. The creation of DHS implies the transfer of responsibilities, people, and resources from existing agencies and departments to a new entity. DHS will have over 170,000 employees and an anticipated budget of 40 billion dollars. It constitutes the largest reorganization of the U.S. Government since the creation of the Defense Department. DHS will combine 22 agencies “specializing in various disciplines,” such as: law enforcement, border security, immigration, biological research, computer security, transportation security, disaster mitigation, and port security.⁹ Though it is a national security department it will not be involved in power projection, a crucial difference with the Defense Department. Yet, it will use many skills and resources that reside across the agencies: military, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and logistics. Homeland security also involves the concept of federalism, whereby some 87,000 state and local jurisdictions share power with federal institutions.

Policy is often made in different and subtle ways. Anthony Lake, writing in *Somoza Falling: The Nicaraguan Dilemma, A Portrait of Washington At Work*, discusses how the answer to an important letter can help set policy. Hence the importance of interagency coordination and the importance of being the one (bureau, office, agency) that drafts it. “. . . policy flows as much from work on specific items—like the letter from Perez [to Carter]—as it does from the large, formal interagency ‘policy reviews’ that result in presidential pronouncements.”¹⁰ Each action is precedent for future actions. Speeches, press conferences, VIP visits, and presidential travels are important. Lake elaborates: “Policy is made on the fly; it emerges from the pattern of specific decisions. Its wisdom is decided by whether you have some vision of what you want, a conceptual thread as you go along.”¹¹

The NSC staff does the daily and long-term coordination and integration of foreign policy and national security matters across the vast government. Specifically, it:

- Provides information and policy advice to the President

- Manages the policy coordination process
- Monitors implementation of presidential policy decisions
- Manages crises
- Articulates the President's policies
- Undertakes long term strategic planning
- Conducts liaison with Congress and foreign governments
- Coordinates summit meetings and national security related trips

There is a natural tension between the policy coordination function of the NSC and policymaking. Jimmy Carter's Director of Latin American Affairs at the NSC, Robert Pastor, argues that:

. . . tension between NSC and State derives in part from the former's control of the agenda and the latter's control of implementation. State Department officials tend to be anxious about the NSC usurping policy, and the NSC tends to be concerned that State either might not implement the President's decisions or might do so in a way that would make decisions State disapproved of appear ineffective and wrong.¹²

The NSC staff is ideally a coordinating body but it oscillates between the poles, taking policy control over some issues while allowing the State or Defense to be the lead agency on most national security and foreign policy issues. On some key issues, such as the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99, the NSC staff may take over policy control from State. Similarly, policy towards Cuba and Haiti in 1993-95 was handled directly out of the White House because of the deeply-rooted domestic dimension of those issues. In virtually all cases, however, major policy must be cleared through the NSC staff and the National Security Advisor. This process of clearing makes the NSC staff a key element in the policymaking process. In general, this clearance process involves a review by the appropriate NSC staff director to assure that the new policy initiative is consistent with the president's overall policy in that functional or regional area, that it has been coordinated with all appropriate departments and agencies, and that all obvious political risks associated with the new initiative have been identified and assessed. This process makes all the relevant departments stakeholders in the final policy statement. The Oliver North Iran-Contra caper created an autonomous operational entity within the NSC staff. But this was an aberration that does not invalidate the general rule. The salient point is that proximity to the president gives the NSC staff significant policy clout in the interagency process. Such clout must be used sparingly lest it cause resentment and resistance or overlook the policy wisdom and skills available elsewhere in the executive departments.

Toward a Theory of the Interagency Process: How Does the President Mobilize the Government?

The interagency is not a place. It is a process involving human beings and complex organizations with different cultures, different outlooks on what's good for the national interest and the best policy to pursue—all driven by the compulsion to defend and expand turf. The process is political (therefore conflictual) because at stake is power, personal, institutional, or party. The "power game" involves the push and pull of negotiation, the guarding of policy prerogatives, of hammering out compromises, and the normal human and

institutional propensity to resist change.¹³ Regardless of the style of the president and the structures developed for the management of national security policy, the interagency process performs the same basic functions: identifies policy issues and questions, formulates options, raises issues to the appropriate level for decisions, makes decisions where appropriate, and oversees the implementation of decisions throughout the executive departments.

It is helpful to view policy at five interrelated levels: conceptualization, articulation, budgeting, implementation, and post-implementation analysis and feedback. Conceptualization involves the intellectual task of policy development, such as a presidential directive. Articulation is the public declaration of policy that the president or subordinates make. It is critical in a democracy in order to engage public support. Budgeting involves testimony and the give and take before Congress and its various committees to justify policy goals and to request funding. Implementation is the programmed application of resources in the field in order to achieve the policy objectives. Post-implementation analysis and feedback is a continuous effort to assess the effectiveness of policy and to make appropriate adjustments. It is conducted by all the agencies in the field. The General Accounting Office of the Congress makes extensive evaluations of the effectiveness of policy implementation. Congressional hearings and visits in the field by congressional delegations and staffers also make evaluations that help refine policy.

The ideal system (see Figure 3) would have perfect goal setting, complete and accurate intelligence, comprehensive analysis and selection of the best options, clear articulation of policy and its rationale, effective execution, thorough and continuous assessment of the effects, and perfect learning from experience and the ability to recall relevant experience and information.




Figure 3. Ideal Foreign Policy Process.¹⁴

Such perfection is impossible. The reality is:

TASK	CONSTRAINTS

Goal Setting	National interests are subject to competing claims; goals established through political struggle
Intelligence	Always incomplete, susceptible to overload, delays and distortions caused by biases and ambiguity in interpretation
Option Formulation	Limited search for options, comparisons made in general terms according to predispositions rather than cost-benefit analysis

Figure 4. Policy in Practice.

Plans, Programs, and Decisions	Choices made in accordance with prevailing mind sets, influenced by groupthink and political compromise
Declaratory Policy	Multiple voices, contradictions and confusion, self-serving concern for personal image and feeding the appetite of the media
Execution	Breakdowns in communication, fuzzy lines of authority, organizational parochialism, bureaucratic politics, delays
Monitoring and Appraisal	Gaps, vague standards, rigidities in adaptation, feedback failures
Memory Storage and Recall	Spotty and unreliable, selective learning and application of lessons ¹⁵

Figure 4. Policy in Practice (Concluded).

Effective policy requires control, resources, and a system of accountability. The most compelling challenge for the executive is to retain policy control. Since presidents don't have the time and expertise to oversee policymaking in detail (though Jimmy Carter tried), they delegate responsibility. But "nobody is in charge" is an often-heard refrain of the interagency process. By delegating responsibility, control becomes more diffused and the policy effort diluted. Moreover, the quest for resources brings in another stakeholder. Congress has the constitutional responsibility to scrutinize policy initiatives and vote monies for foreign affairs and national defense. By then, a literal Pandora's box of players and expectations are opened. The numerous congressional committees and their staffs have enormous impact on national security and foreign policy.

The president begins to mobilize his government immediately upon election. A transition team works closely with the outgoing administration for the purpose of continuity. He begins nominating his cabinet, which must then be confirmed by the Senate. Some 6,000 presidential level appointees will fill the subcabinet positions, staff the White House and the NSC, take up ambassadorships (serving ambassadors

traditionally submit their resignation when the occupant of the White House changes), as well as second, third, and fourth level positions in the executive departments. The purpose of these nominations is to gain control and establish accountability to the president and his agenda. In his first administration, President William Clinton faced serious difficulties because he never finished staffing his government.

Thus there is a high turnover and the injection of new talent, at times inexperienced and equipped with new predispositions about national security, at the top echelons of American government every time the part that controls the White House changes. Continuity of government resides in the non-partisan professionals (neutral competence) of the federal civil service, the diplomatic service, the military, and the intelligence community. The transition to a new administration is a period of great anticipation about the direction of policy. Consequently, the entire interagency produces transition papers to assist and inform the newcomers, and to also protect the institutional interests of the various departments from unfriendly encroachment.

The first months of a new administration are a period of learning. Newly appointed people must familiarize themselves with the structure and process of policymaking. This necessity invariably leads to a trial-and-error atmosphere. In anticipation of the passing of the mantle, think tanks and the foreign policy and defense communities prepare for the transition by writing papers recommending the rationale for policy. These will inform the new administration about the central commitments of U.S. policy and provide opportunities for departments and agencies to define institutional turf and stake a claim to resources. The administration itself will also mandate policy reviews that eventually produce new guidance for policy.

Making speeches and declaring policy and doctrines is another way. The State of the Union message is one of the preeminent sources of presidential activism that engages the interagency. The congressionally mandated National Security Strategy (NSS) document, which bears the president's signature and is supposed to be produced annually, is eagerly awaited, though not with equal intensity across departments, as an indicator of an administration's direction in national security and foreign policy.

The NSS is eagerly awaited for another reason; it is the best example of "purposeful adaptation" by the American government to changing global realities and responsibilities. It expresses strategic vision, what the United States stands for in the world, its priorities, and a sensing of how the instruments of national power, the diplomatic, economic, and military will be arrayed. Since it is truly an interagency product, the NSS also serves to discipline the interagency system to understand the president's agenda and priorities and develops a common language that gives coherence to policy. It is also more than a strategic document. It is political because it is designed to enhance presidential authority in order to mobilize the nation. Finally, the NSS tends to document rather than drive policy initiatives. This is especially true in election years.

The first NSS in 1987 focused on the Soviet threat. The Bush administration expanded it by including more regional strategies, economic policy, arms control, and transnational issues and the environment. The Clinton document of 1994 proposed "engagement and enlargement," promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and security through strength. The 1995 version added criteria on when and how military forces would be used. By 1997, the integrating concepts of "shape," "prepare," and "respond" for the national military strategy came into prominence. To the core objectives of enhancing security, promoting prosperity and democracy were added fighting terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, along with managing the international financial crisis. Homeland defense against the threat of mass casualty attacks and regional strategies completed the agenda.

Another instrument is the presidential national security directives process. Other administrations have

titled these documents differently, such as Bush's National Security Decision Directive. The two Clinton administrations produced 73 PDDs by mid 1999 (Bush 79 National Security Directives, Reagan 325 National Security Decision Memoranda, Carter 63 Presidential Directives, Nixon-Ford 348 National Security Decision Memoranda Reagan 325, and Kennedy-Johnson 372 National Security Action Memoranda) By mid-2003, the Bush administration produced nearly 20 NSPDs. Each administration will try to put its own stamp on national security and foreign policy, though there is great continuity with previous administrations. Whereas Reagan emphasized restoring the preeminence of American military power and rolling back the "evil empire," Clinton focused on strengthening the American economy, open trade, democratization, conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, fighting drug trafficking and consumption, counterterrorism and non-proliferation. September 11, 2001, imposed a national defense priority on the George W. Bush administration. With it came the concept of preventive war. The NSS was followed by the *National Strategy to Combat Terrorism* and its complement, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. The events of 9/11 had, therefore, dramatic consequences on foreign policy and military strategy priorities.

Presidential national security directives are macro level documents, often classified, that take much deliberate planning to develop. They result from intensive interaction among the agencies. The process begins with a presidential directive to review policy, which tasks the relevant agencies to develop a new policy based on broad guidance. For example, Clinton's PDD 14 for counternarcotics emphasized greater balance between supply and demand strategies. Because of the many constraints placed on the use of economic and military assistance to fight the "war on drugs" and to help Colombia, PDD 14 evolved into the Colombia specific PDD 73. This, in turn was superseded in the Bush administration by NSPD 18, which, thanks to September 11 and the terrorism in Colombia, went further and provided support for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities in Colombia. The evolution of these policy documents over nearly ten years nurtured the growth of significant institutional memory and smarts in the interagency with respect to the Colombian conflict.

The learning went both ways, because Colombian officials had to adapt to the Washington policy process. Because of the global reach of American power and influence, such adaptation is becoming more common. Clinton's celebrated PDD 25 set down an elaborate set of guidelines for U.S. involvement in peace operations. It became so effective as a planning device that the United Nations adopted it for planning its own peace operations, an excellent example of the international transfer of American purposeful adaptation. Other nations also used the terminology and organizing principles for their strategic and operational planning in multilateral peacekeeping.

Another instructive example is the Latin American policy PDD 21. Effective on December 27, 1993, it emphasized democracy promotion and free trade. It was addressed to more than twenty departments and agencies: Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Trade Representative, Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, Assistant to the President for National Economic Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

The point of listing departments and agencies is to identify the interagency stakeholders in regional

policy, though the size of the stake will vary greatly among them according to the particular issue. The stakeholders are related *by functional interdependence*; they have different resources, personnel, and expertise that must be integrated for policy to be effective. It is an iron rule of the interagency that *no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone*. For example, the DoD needs the diplomatic process that the Department of State masters in order to deploy forces abroad, build coalitions, negotiate solutions to conflict, conduct non-combatant evacuations (NEO) of American citizens caught in difficult circumstances abroad, and administer security assistance. The Department of State in turn depends on the logistical capabilities of the DoD to deploy personnel and materials abroad during crises, conduct coercive diplomacy, support military-to-military contacts, and give substance to alliances and defense relationships. The Office of National Drug Control Policy, a new cabinet position, must rely on a range of agencies to reduce the supply abroad and consumption of drugs at home. Finally, all require intelligence input to make sound decisions.

These patterns of functional interdependence, whereby departments stayed within their jurisdictions, began to fray in the George W. Bush administration. Press reports in the spring of 2003 focused on the Bush “policy team at war with itself.”¹⁶ Accordingly, there was a “tectonic shift” of decisionmaking power from the Department of State to Defense because of the strong personalities and neo-conservative ideology of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and subordinates, principally Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Such a shift would be unnatural and would likely correct itself in the future. But the prospect of the DoD dominating foreign policy raised concerns about the effectiveness of policy and the standing of the United States in the world. The inattention to functional interdependence was a contributing factor to the ineffectiveness of postwar reconstruction planning for Iraq in 2003.¹⁷ In October of 2003 President Bush attempted to improve the Iraq reconstruction effort by placing his National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, in charge. The correction allegedly upset Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Earlier in the year the president had (via NSPD 24) given authority over the Iraq reconstruction to the Defense Department.¹⁸

The problems associated with post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq led to an upsurge of exhortations on how to improve the system for the future. For example, the House of Representatives and the Senate proposed the “Winning the Peace Act of 2003,” which would create within the Department of State a permanent office to provide support to the new position of Director of Reconstruction. A comprehensive study published in November 2003 by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson of the National Defense University advocated major focus on transforming military institutions to perform “stabilization and reconstruction” operations. It also recommended harnessing interagency capabilities via the creation of a rapidly deployable National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group to meet the need of a national level group to plan and coordinate post-conflict operations.¹⁹

Ideally in response to the promulgation of a presidential directive all agencies will energize their staffs and develop the elements that shape the policy programs. But this takes time and seldom creates optimum results, in part because of competing priorities on policymakers, limited time, constrained resources, and congressional input. For example, with respect to Latin American policy, the Haiti crisis of 1992-94 and congressional passage of the North America Free Trade Act would consume most of the kinetic energy of the Clinton administration’s NSC staff and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State during 1993-94. The Central American crisis of the 1980s crowded out the broader agenda for Latin American policy. The culture of the various executive departments will modify how directives are interpreted. For example, for the military oriented Defense Department, a directive is an order to be carried out. For State, a directive may be interpreted as the general direction a policy should take.

In theory, once the policy elements are put together, they are costed out and submitted to Congress for approval and funding, without which policy is merely words of hopeful expectations. The reality, however, is that a presidential directive is not a permanent guide to the actions of agencies. Rarely is it fully implemented. It can be overtaken by new priorities, new administrations, and by the departure of senior officials who had the stakes, the personal relationships, know how, and institutional memory to make it work. A senior NSC staffer, Navy Captain Joseph Bouchard, Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control, remarked in 1999 that one could not be sure about whether a directive from a previous administration is still in force because for security reasons no consolidated list of these documents is maintained. Moreover, directives and other presidential documents are removed to the presidential library and the archives when a new president takes over. A senior Defense Department official stated that directives are rarely referred to after they are final, are usually overtaken by events soon after publication, and are rarely updated. In this respect the interagency evaluation of PDD 56's effectiveness, published in May 1997, was instructive: "PDD 56 no longer has senior level ownership. The Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the NSC officials who initiated the document have moved on to new positions."²⁰ The loss of institutional memory is not necessarily fatal. The permanent government retains much of the wisdom for the continuity of policy. That wisdom is always available to an administration.

PDD 56: Ephemeral or Purposeful Adaptation?

It is useful to examine PDD 56 as an example of an interagency product and as a tool intended to influence the very process itself. Directives normally deal with the external world of foreign policy and national security. PDD 56 is radically different, for it goes beyond that and attempts to generate a cultural revolution in the way the U.S. Government prepares and organizes to deal with these issues. PDD 56, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, is perhaps the mother of all modern Directives. It is a superb example of codifying lessons of "purposeful adaptation" after fitful efforts by American civilian and military officials in the aftermath of problematic interventions in Panama (1989-90), Somalia (1992-94), and Haiti (1994-95).²¹ The intent was to institutionalize interagency coordination mechanisms and planning tools to achieve U.S. Government unity of effort in complex contingency operations and in post-conflict reconstruction. It tried to institutionalize five mechanisms and planning tools:

- An Executive Committee chaired by the Deputies Committee (Assistant Secretaries)
- An integrated, interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan
- Interagency Rehearsal
- Interagency After-Action Review
- Training.

The philosophy behind the document was that interagency planning could make or break an operation. Moreover, early involvement in planning could accelerate contributions from civilian agencies that are

normally culturally impeded from strategic and operational planning. An excellent *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* issued in August 1998, containing in easy digestible form much wisdom about how to do it right. PDD 56 was applied extensively and adapted to new contingencies, such as Eastern Slavonia (1995-98), Bosnia from 1995, Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict since 1998, and the Kosovo contingency of 1998-99. The March 1999 review commented: “PDD 56 is intended to be applied as an integrated package of complementary mechanisms and tools . . . since its issuance in 1997, PDD 56 has not been applied as intended. Three major issues must be addressed to improve the utility of PDD 56.” It recommended:

- Greater authority and leadership to promote PDD 56
- More flexible and less detailed political-military planning
- Dedicated training resources and greater outreach.

Imbedded in the three recommendations were the recurring problems of the interagency: the need for decisive authority (“nobody’s in charge”), contrasting approaches and institutional cultures (particularly diplomatic versus military) with respect to planning, and the lack of incentives across the government to create professionals expert in interagency work. PDD 56 is a noble effort to promote greater effectiveness. It may bear fruit if its philosophy of integrated planning and outreach to the interagency takes root. In late 1999 the PDD 56 planning requirement was embedded as an annex to contingency plans. Bush’s February 2001 NSPD1 tried to provide some life support to PDD56 by stating: “The oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/NSC-56 . . . will be performed by the appropriate . . . PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination for ongoing operations.” The failures in post-conflict planning and reconstruction for Iraq in 2003 underlined the importance of taking PDD-56 seriously. Fortunately, as mentioned above, there are enough people in government who retain the expertise and who can be tapped as necessary.

The Operational Level of the Interagency Process: Ambassador, Country Team and Combatant Commanders

To this point we have discussed the national strategic level of the interagency process, that is, what occurs in Washington. Actually, the interagency process spans three levels: the national strategic, the operational, and the tactical. In the field, policy is implemented by ambassadors and their country teams, often working with the regional combatant commanders (CCs) if the issue is principally security or political-military in nature. Ambassadors and combatant commanders are not only implementers, they frequently shape policy via their reporting to Washington through a continuous flow of cables, after action reports, proposals for new policy initiatives, as well as direct consultations in Washington with senior officials and members of Congress. They also comment on how to shape policy initiatives that originate from Washington.

There is a permanent conversation between the embassy and the respective regional bureau in Washington, which includes a broad distribution of the cable traffic to such agencies as the White House, the Defense Department, the regional combatant command, Department of Treasury, Commerce, the Joint Staff, the intelligence community, as well as other organizations, such as the Coast Guard, when there is a “need to know.” The “need to know” almost always includes other embassies in the region, or major embassies in other regions, and even at times, for example, the American Embassy to the Vatican.. The ambassador and combatant commander often conduct one on one meetings over the multiplicity of security

issues.

The embassy country team at the embassy is a miniature replica of the Washington interagency system. At the country team, the rubber proverbially meets the road of interagency implementation. Ambassadors and CCs rely on each other to promote policies that will enhance American interests in a country and region. CCs have large staffs and awesome resources compared to the small staffs and resources of ambassadors. Moreover their functions are different. The ambassador cultivates ties and is a conduit for bilateral communications through the art of diplomatic discourse. He or she promotes understanding of U.S. foreign policy, and promotes American culture and business, and is responsible for American citizens in that country. The ambassador is the personal emissary of the President, who signs the ambassador's formal letter of instruction.

The letter charges the ambassador "to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in (name of country), except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander . . ." There is enough ambiguity in the mandate to require both ambassador and CC to use common sense and, in a non-bureaucratic way, work out issues of command and control over U.S. military personnel in the country. In effect control is shared, the ambassador having policy control and the CC control over day-to-day military operations. Thus it is prudent that both work closely together to ensure that military operations meet the objectives of U.S. policy.

This is particularly the case in military operations other than war. Before and during non-combatant evacuations, peace operations, exercises, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, such cooperation will be imperative because of the different mixes of diplomacy, force, and preparation required. A successful U.S. policy effort requires a carefully calibrated combination of diplomatic and military pressure, with economic inducements added. The security assistance officer at the embassy (usually the commander of the military advisory group) can facilitate communication and bridge the policy and operational distance between the ambassador and the CC. So can State's Political Advisor to the CC, a senior ranking foreign service officer whose function is to provide the diplomatic and foreign policy perspective on military operations.²² The personal and professional relationship between the Foreign Policy Advisor (formerly called the Political Advisor) and the CC is the key to success.

The CC represents the coercive capacity of American power through a chain of command that goes to the president. He and his sizable staff the command operational tempo, deployments, readiness, exercises, and training of divisions, brigades, fleets, and air wings—resources, language, and culture that are the opposite of the art of diplomacy. Since all military activities have diplomatic impact, it is prudent that both work harmoniously to achieve common purpose. Ambassador and Commander interests intersect at the Military Advisory Group (also called Military Liaison Office, Office of Defense Coordination) level. The commander of the MAAG, which is an important arm of the country team since it provides training and military equipment to the host country, works for both the ambassador and the CC.

In the spectrum from peace, to crisis, and to war the ambassador will tend to dominate decisions at the lower end of the spectrum. As the environment transitions to war the Commander assumes greater authority and influence. Haiti 1994 is an excellent example of how the handoff from ambassador to CC takes place. The American ambassador in Port-au-Prince, William Swing, was in charge of U.S. policy until General Hugh Shelton and the U.S. military forces arrived in September of that year. Once the military phase was completed, policy control reverted to Swing, thus restoring the normal pattern of military subordination to civilian authority. In the gray area of military operations other than war or in what is called an "immature"

military theater, such as Latin America, disputes can arise between ambassadors and CCs about jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in the country. The most illustrative was in 1994 between the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, General Barry McCaffrey, and the U.S. Ambassadors to Bolivia, Charles R. Bowers, and Colombia, Morris D. Busby. The dispute had to be adjudicated in Washington by the Secretaries of State and Defense.²³ Elevating the dispute to such a level is something the system would rather not do. The fact is that ambassador and CC must work closely together to coordinate U.S. military activities. Another distinction: CCs have a regional perspective, strategies, and programs while ambassadors are focused on advancing the interests of the United States in one country.

The Continuing Challenges Within the Interagency Process

The tensions generated by cultural differences and jealousy over turf will always be part of the interagency process. The diplomatic and the military cultures dominate the national security system, though there are other cultures and even subcultures, within the dominant cultures. The former uses words to solve problems while the latter uses precise doses of force. Cultural differences are large but communicating across them is possible.²⁴ Figure 5 compares the cultures of military officers and diplomats.

Military Officers	Foreign Service Officers
Mission: prepare for and fight war	Mission: conduct diplomacy
Training a major activity, important for units and individuals	Training not a significant activity. Not important either for units or individuals
Extensive training for episodic, undesired events	Little formal training, learning by experience in doing desired activities (negotiating, reporting)
Uncomfortable with ambiguity	Can deal with ambiguity

Figure 5. Comparing Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers.

Plans and planning—both general and detailed—are important core activities	Plan in general terms to achieve objectives but value flexibility and innovation
Doctrine: important	Doctrine: not important
Focused on military element of foreign policy	Focused on all aspects of foreign policy
Focused on discrete events and activities with plans, objectives, courses of action, endstates	Focused on ongoing processes without expectation of an “endstate”
Infrequent real-world contact with opponents or partners in active war fighting	Day-to-day real-world contact with partners and opponents in active diplomacy
Officer corps commands significant numbers of NCOs and enlisted personnel	Officers supervise only other officers in core (political and economic) activities

NCOs and enlisted personnel perform many core functions (war fighting)	Only officers engage in core activity (diplomacy)
Leadership: career professional military officers (with the military services and in operations)	Leadership: a mix of politicians, academics, policy wonks, and career Foreign Service professionals at headquarters and in field
All aspects of peace operations, including civilian/diplomatic, becoming more important	All aspects of peace operations, including military, becoming more important
Writing and written word less important, physical actions more important	Writing and written word very important. Used extensively in conduct of diplomacy
Teamwork and management skills are rewarded, interpersonal skills important internally	Individual achievement and innovative ideas rewarded, inter-personal skills important externally
Understand “humma-humma” and “deconflict”	Understand “démarche” and non-paper”
Accustomed to large resources, manpower, equipment, and money	Focus meager resources on essential needs

Figure 5. Comparing Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers (Concluded).²⁵

The principal problem of interagency decisionmaking is lack of *decisive authority*; *there is no one in charge*. As long as personalities are involved who work well together and have leadership support in the NSC, interagency efforts will prosper, but such congruence is not predictable. The world situation does not wait for the proper alignment of the planets in Washington. There is too much diffusion of policy control. It is time to implement an NSC-centric national security system, with appropriate adjustments that align budget authority with policy responsibility. It would consolidate in the NSC the functions now performed by the Policy Planning Staff at State and the strategic planning done at Defense. Such reorganization recognizes the reality that the White House is where an integrated approach to national security planning must take place.

Asymmetries in resources are another impediment. The Department of State, which has the responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Its diplomats may have the best words in town, in terms of speaking and writing skills, and superb knowledge of foreign countries and foreign affairs, but it is a very small organization that has been getting smaller budget allocations from Congress. The corps of foreign service officers equates in number to about an Army brigade. The Department of State’s technology is primitive and officer professional development of the kind that the military does is not promoted. Moreover, unlike the military, State lacks a strong domestic constituency of support. The military has more money to conduct diplomacy than does State. Secretary of State Colin Powell began to improve the Department’s budget. But the inability to hire personnel, because of previous budgetary shortfalls, reduced hundreds of positions within the middle ranks of the diplomatic service.

The *resource barons*, those with people, money, technical expertise, and equipment reside in DoD and

the military services. Consequently, the military, especially the Army, is constantly being asked to provide resources out of hide for nation-building purposes, for example in Haiti and Panama. It is tempting to reach out to it because it is the only institution with an *expeditionary* capability, and fungible resources and expertise. It can get there quickly, show the flag, bring significant resources to bear, stabilize a situation, and create an environment secure enough for other agencies to operate. On a much smaller scale the Agency for International Development is a baron, because it has money and technical expertise to promote development and institution building. Other baronies exist, such as intelligence, Department of Justice, Commerce, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Finally, the personnel systems of the various agencies of the U.S. Government *do not promote professionalization and rewards in interagency jobs*. What is needed is a systematic effort to develop civilian and military cadres that are experts in interagency policy coordination, integration, and operations. Some of this takes place. Military officers are assigned to various departments. For example, until 2002, 35 officers from all military services worked in the regional and functional bureaus of the Department of State. Senior diplomats (some of ambassadorial rank) are also allocated to military and civilian agencies, such as Foreign Policy Advisors at the regional unified commands, the Special Operations Command, to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, various key positions in the Pentagon, and the war colleges. These programs must be expanded. Unfortunately, the opposite was occurring in 2003. In order to convert military personnel slots to warfighting positions, the DoD recalled most of its officers from the civilian agencies, to include the State Department, which in turn reduced to 30 the number of diplomats posted to military organizations. An important element for interagency integration and harmony was weakened.

Moreover, there ought to be incentives for national security professionalism, as there are for service and joint. For civilians, something akin to the Goldwater-Nichols Act for jointness in the military is needed to include the Department of State. Promotions should be based not only on performance at Foggy Bottom and in Embassies abroad, but on mandatory interagency tours as well. Similarly professional development incentives should apply to civil servants that work in the national security arena.

Admittedly, mandatory interagency tours would require significant changes in personnel systems and career tracking. The Report of the National Defense Panel of 1997, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the Twenty-first Century*, recommended creating “an interagency cadre of professionals, including civilian and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the national security structures.”²⁶ This would build on the jointness envisioned by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Report also recommended a national security curriculum for a mix of civilian, military, and foreign students. The Defense Leadership and Management Program of the DoD, a Master’s level initiative in national security studies for civilian personnel, is an important step in this direction. The Department of State, under Powell’s guidance, began to invest in educating its personnel in strategic planning. Also, more State Department personnel were allowed to participate in War College courses.

Implications for the Military Professional

There are critical implications for the military warrior. The nature of future warfare is likely to be more military operations other than war, requiring more mobile, flexible light forces. Future war will also require a more intellectual military officer, one who understands the imperative of having to work with the panoply of civilian agencies, non-government organizations, the national and international media, and with foreign armed forces. It is a commonplace of strategy that American forces will rarely fight alone again; they will do so in coalition. Thus, the strategic Clausewitzian trinity of the people, the armed forces, and the government now encompasses the global community. The implications are clear; the military officer will

have to develop greater diplomatic and negotiating skills, greater understanding of international affairs, capability in foreign languages, and more than a passing acquaintance with economics.

Moreover, the warrior will likely work with civilian counterparts across a spectrum of activities short of war. These include: strategic planning and budgeting, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, counter narcotics, counter terrorism, security assistance, environmental security, human rights, democratization, civil-military relations, arms control, intelligence, war planning and termination strategy, command and control of forces, continuity of government, post-conflict reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis management, overseas basing, alliances, non-combatant evacuations, and homeland defense.

Therefore, the future officer will also need greater appreciation of the institutional diversity and complexity of government, because of the need to advise a diversity of civilians on the utility of military power in complex contingencies that are neither peace nor war, as Americans are accustomed to think of them. He or she will have to work in tandem with civilian agencies and non-government organizations unaccustomed to command systems and deliberate planning, and who often do not understand the limits of military power.²⁷ Lastly, instruction on the interagency system and process should be mandatory for civilians and military alike. It must have a sound theoretical foundation in national security decisionmaking, strategic planning, and organizational behavior, expanded by sophisticated case studies of relevant historical experiences.

What attributes should the military officer bring? Above all, holistic thinking, the ability to think in terms of all the instruments of national power and respect for the functions and cultures of diverse departments and agencies. Communication skills are paramount. The effective interagency player writes and speaks well. He or she will be bilingual, able to function in military as well as civilian English. Bureaucratic jargon is the enemy of interagency communication. The military briefing, though an excellent vehicle for quickly transmitting a lot of information in formatted style, is not acceptable. One must be less conscious of rank because ranks will vary among the representative around a table. Some one of lower rank may be in charge of a meeting. A sense of humor, patience, endurance, and tolerance for ambiguity and indecisiveness will help. The ability to “stay in your box” and articulate the perspective of your department will be respected, though the temptation to poach on other domains will be there. The ability to anticipate issues, to consider the second and third order effects from the national level down to the country team and theater levels, will be invaluable. Finally, the interagency requires diplomatic and negotiating skills, the ability to network, and mastery of the nuances of bureaucratic politics and language.²⁸

The most evolved democracy in the world has the most cumbersome national security decisionmaking process. Inefficiency is the price the founding fathers imposed for democratic accountability. But some of the inefficiency is the result of American strategic culture, with its multiplicity of players, plentiful but diffused resources, and the propensity to segment peace and diplomacy from war and military power. Frederick the Great cautioned: “Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments.” So did John F. Kennedy: “Diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail.”²⁹ Major structural changes must be made in the interagency system in order to harness human talent and resources intelligently.

Democracy is defined as a process of mutual learning and adaptation. Accordingly all institutions of government learn, adapt, and make appropriate changes.. This is even more imperative for the national security agencies and personnel, where the stakes are high. The distempers in the interagency process evidenced in 2001-03 created new opportunities for learning and for adaptation. Fortunately, in time

American democracy will make those adaptations. The question will be at what price.

White House	Department of Transportation
National Security Council	Federal Aviation Administration
Office of the Special Trade Representative	
Office of National Drug Control Policy	Department of Energy
National Economic Council	Asst Secy for Defense Programs
Department of State	Department of Labor
U.S. Foreign Service	Dep Under Sec for Intl Affairs
Agency for International Development	
Overseas Private Investment Corporation	Department of Education
Department of Homeland Security	Department of Health & Human Services
Coast Guard	Social Security Administration
Immigration and Naturalization Service	Public Health Service
Border Patrol	Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
Department of Defense	Department of the Interior
Office of Secretary of Defense	Asst Sec for Territorial & Intl Affairs
Joint Chiefs of Staff	
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines	Office of National Drug Control Policy

Figure 6. U.S. Departments and Agencies Involved in Foreign Affairs.

Department of Treasury	Department of Agriculture
Internal Revenue Service	Foreign Agricultural Service
United States Customs Service	
Secret Service	Independent Agencies
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms	Central Intelligence Agency
	Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Commerce	Export Import Bank
Foreign Commercial Service	Federal Communications Commission
Travel and Tourism Administration	Federal Maritime Commission
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Agency	Federal Trade Commission
National Marine Fisheries Service	Natl Aeronautics & Space Administration
International Trade Administration	National Science Foundation
International Trade Commission	National Transportation Safety Board
	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Department of Justice	Peace Corps
Federal Bureau of Investigation	U.S. Postal Service
Drug Enforcement Administration	
U.S. Marshals Service	Congress
Foreign Claims Settlement Administration	General Accounting Office
U.S. National Central Bureau, International	Assorted committees
Criminal Police Organization	

Figure 6. U.S. Departments and Agencies Involved in Foreign Affairs (Concluded).

Notes - Chapter 17

1 The development of this chapter has been enriched by the insights of practitioners and colleagues in the interagency. Special thanks goes to Anthony Williams, David Bennett, Frank Jones, Gary Maybarduk, Dennis Skocz, Erik Kjonnerod for helping to illuminate the labyrinthine ways of Washington. Joseph Cerami and Robin Dorff, chairmen of the Department of National Security and Strategy of the Army War College, provided the time and the support for research.

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3 John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation*, New York: Collier MacMillan, 1985, p. 7.

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11 Lake, p. 114.

12 Robert Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua*, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 81.

13 Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works*, New York: Random House, 1988.

14 John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation*, p. 26.

15 Adapted from John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy*, p. 32.

16 Warren P. Strobel and Jessica Guynn, "Bush Policy Team at War with Itself," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 4, 2003, p. A21. See also: Sonni Efron, "The War Within the War: Pentagon vs. State Deptember," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 11, 2003, p. A8. A former staffer in the Office of Secretary of Defense's Under Secretariat for Policy commented that the interagency problem was intensified by: "functional isolation of the professional corps of civil servants and professional military," "cross-agency cliques," and "groupthink." see Karen Kwiatkowski, "Flawed Decisionmaking: Cliques, Groupthink Dominate Work of Defense Department," *Charlotte Observer*, August 1, 2003 (Charlotte.com).

17 On this point, see: Jonathan Landay, Warren P. Strobel, "Plan B for Post-War Iraq Didn't Exist," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 13, 2003, p. A1.

18 On the problems of post-conflict planning, see: Thomas L. Friedman, "Bad Planning," *New York Times*, June 25, 2003 (<http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/06/25/nyt.friedman/index.html>). Seldom have the post-conflict planning requirements and the prospect of a military occupation been so clearly debated and identified before going to war. On the imperative for pre-planning, see the excellent piece by John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2002, pp. 85-96. See also: Karen Guttieri, "Post-Conflict Iraq: Prospects and Problems," Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict, National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, February 20, 2003. An excellent analysis is: George packer, "War After War: What Washington Doesn't See in Iraq," *New Yorker*, November 24, 2003, pp. 58-85.

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22 Excellent advice on how the ambassador and the regional unified commander should work together is found in: Ted Russell, "The Role of the Ambassador, the Country Team, and Their Relations with Regional Commanders," in U.S. Army War College, *Course Directive: Regional Appraisals*, AY 97, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997, pp. C1-C9. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of State and the Department of Defense covers the function of the Political Advisor. The MOU "recognizes the valuable role POLADs render to the Department of Defense and the Department of State in assessing the political implications of military planning and strategy and in serving as the principal source of counsel on international issues to their respective Commanders-in-Chief...the deep level of commitment and cooperation acknowledged by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in executing foreign and security policy established by the President." For how an embassy functions, see: Shawn Dorman, ed., *Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America*, Washington, DC: American Foreign Service Association, 2003.

23 For specifics, see the telegrams: 6 June 1994 from USCINCSOUTH, 8 June 1994 from Embassy La Paz, and 9 June 1994 from Embassy Bogota.

24 The classic study of the role of culture and turf in government is: James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, New York: Harper Collins, 1989. Pertinent are the excellent studies: George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1995, pp. 8-13; Douglas A. Hartwick, "The Culture at State, the Services, and Military Operations: Bridging the Communication Gap," Washington, DC: National War College, April 12, 1984; Rosemary Hansen and Rick Rife, "Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security," Palo Alto: Stanford University, May 1998. Other impediments to sound

decisionmaking are: groupthink, information overload, insufficient information, lack of time, faulty analogy, insufficient analysis of options, and the personal predispositions of the decisionmaker. The interaction of these factors are explored in the writings of Irving L. Janis, Alexander George, and Graham Allison.

25 Adapted from Robert Johnson, Foreign Service Officer, "Teaching Notes," Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College.

26 National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, Arlington, Virginia: 1997, p. 66.

27 There are indications that even the Department of State, the first among equals of the executive departments, is beginning to understand the value of strategic planning. See: Secretary's Office of Resources, Plans, and Policy, U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Strategic Plan*, Washington, DC, September 1997. Moreover, the U.S. Army and State established an ongoing tutorial to teach strategic planning to diplomats. At the same time, more State students will attend the Army War College course through distance learning. Excellent advice on how military culture should interact with the culture of non government organizations during humanitarian relief operations, peacekeeping, and stability operations is: Judith Stiehm, "The Challenge of Civil-Military Cooperation in Peacekeeping," *Airman-Scholar*, Vol. IV, No.1 (Winter 1998), pp. 26-35.

28 Military officers contemplating assignment to the Pentagon or civilians wishing to understand how to work with counterparts there should read the advice in: Perry Smith, *Assignment Pentagon: The Insider's Guide to the Potomac Puzzle Palace*, second edition, revised, Washington: Brassey's, 1992.

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CHAPTER 18

COGNITIVE FACTORS IN NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING

George E. Teague

Generally, national security professionals would probably agree that decisions concerning our national security are so important that they ought to be above personal and organizational self-interests and reflect an objective, unbiased approach to selecting actions that are truly in the best interest of the nation. However, for a variety of reasons, this is often not the case. A number of decisionmaking models have been developed and examined in order to gain insight into the national security decisionmaking process and to identify those factors that often keep this process from being as objective and unbiased as it perhaps should be. In their book, *Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow provide three such models for examining the U.S. national security decisionmaking process.¹ The first of these, the rational actor model, is essentially the ideal decisionmaking process—an unbiased, comprehensive examination of the relevant facts and all potential courses of action leading to an optimal choice designed to maximize value in terms of national interests. Two other models, organizational behavior and governmental politics, address some of the forces at work within our national security system—organizational self-interests, bureaucratic resistance, personal agendas of influential individuals, etc.—that often influence the decisionmaking process and lead to outcomes that would not have been predicted by the rational actor model. Even these models, however, do not fully account for why decisionmakers, at times, pursue courses of action that seem to disregard international and domestic political influences, appear inconsistent with national interests, or otherwise seem to deviate from the rational approach. Nor do they account for how decisionmakers sometimes make “good” decisions in the absence of sufficient time or information to adequately develop a rational approach to the issue.

In order to fully understand national security decisionmaking, then, a fourth model is required—one that takes into account factors that affect **individual** decisionmaking. Since decisions are ultimately made in the minds of individual decisionmakers, even when working as members of a group charged with making a group decision or recommendation (i.e., a jury or committee), it is almost inevitable that those decisions will be influenced to some extent by such things as personal beliefs, biases, values, desires, experiences, and memories. Further, anything that might affect an individual’s ability to function mentally, such as strong emotions, stress, fatigue, and illness, will likely also affect the decisions he or she makes. Finally, since many (most?) significant national security decisions are made under conditions of great uncertainty, how individuals compensate cognitively for the absence of important information will necessarily impact on the information they consider and the decisions they ultimately reach. It is therefore important that national security professionals understand how individuals make decisions and appreciate the influence of cognitive factors on the decisionmaking process.

This chapter will provide only a brief overview of some of the cognitive factors at work in the national

security decisionmaking process. Readers who wish to pursue this topic in greater detail will find a wealth of available material.

Cognition and Decisionmaking.

As indicated above, many factors may affect the extremely individual and internal process of making a decision. Some of these represent cognitive processes and tendencies common to most humans, while others are more idiosyncratic. At times these factors can enhance the decisionmaking process, but often they pose significant pitfalls. Failure to recognize these potential problems can lead to ineffective or flawed decisions.

Cognition.

The human mind generally prefers and seeks simplicity, consistency, and stability. The mind dislikes uncertainty and mental discomfort and will routinely attempt to eliminate these aspects from decisionmaking. These tendencies usually enable humans to efficiently sort, process, and make sense of the vast amount of sensory input received on a daily basis. However, when confronted with the complexities inherent in most decisionmaking situations, these same tendencies may lead one to ignore some information, “fill in the blanks” with other information from memory, and rely on unconscious mental shortcuts or routines known as heuristics (“rules of thumb”).² For example, although most people wish to believe that they mentally examine every alternative before choosing the “best” one, this is normally not so. The human mind tends to “satisfice,” that is, to seize upon the first solution that appears to solve the problem without looking past that solution to see if a better one can be found. Decisionmakers must consciously force themselves to identify and evaluate all possible solutions if the optimal solution, versus one that is only “good enough,” is desired. This is easier said than done, particularly when the stakes are high and the decision must be made under conditions of limited time and/or limited availability of relevant information. Such conditions increase the likelihood that decisionmakers will rely on assumptions and heuristics.

Although heuristics generally serve to facilitate mental functioning, researchers have identified a number of flaws in the way minds work when making decisions.³ Several of these are addressed below:

Anchoring. During decisionmaking, the mind tends to give disproportionate weight to the first information it receives. This information, such as first impressions or initial estimates, “anchors” subsequent thoughts and judgements. Since anchors can set the terms on which a decision is made, negotiators often try to exploit this tendency by submitting initial proposals that anchor negotiations in their favor (e.g., high-end offers).

Status Quo. Decisionmakers display a strong bias toward solutions that maintain or perpetuate the status quo. Breaking from the status quo requires taking increased action and responsibility and opens the possibility of criticism and regret. For example, the UN continued to impose economic sanctions against Iraq for years, despite evidence that the sanctions were being violated and having little effect on Hussein’s regime. The other options, lifting the sanctions altogether or using force to enforce them, were viewed as too risky for many members of the Security Council. Despite considerable criticism, President Bush broke from the status quo, and it remains to be seen whether or not he or his allies experience serious regret.

Sunk Cost. Decisionmakers tend to make choices that justify past choices, even when they no longer seem valid. People are generally unwilling to admit to mistakes, especially when the cost for doing so is high. Some might argue that President Johnson’s unwillingness to withdraw from, or change his method of

prosecuting the Vietnam War was due in large part to sunk cost—his political commitment and the potential cost for admitting that he was wrong were too high.

Confirming Evidence. Decisionmakers seek out information that supports their existing point of view while ignoring or dismissing contradictory information. This is compounded by two other tendencies: to subconsciously decide what we want to do before we figure out why we want to do it; and, to be more engaged by things we like than by things we dislike. Current debates over the accuracy and use of various intelligence reports on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs suggest that members of the Bush administration may have been affected by this bias towards confirming evidence to support a course of action they had already decided upon. At a more personal level, people often decide that they want a particular type of car, then seek information that supports their choice while ignoring or dismissing information that points out reasons not to buy the car (poor safety record, high insurance costs) or to buy a different model (higher fuel efficiency, lower cost).

Framing. The way a problem is framed can strongly influence the decision that is made. Framing can establish the status quo, introduce an anchor, highlight sunk costs, or lead one towards confirming evidence. Further, people tend to accept the frame as it is presented to them rather than restating the problem in their own terms. When framed in terms of potential gains, a given option is more likely to be chosen than when framed in terms of potential costs or losses. For example, surveys of public opinion concerning development of a missile defense system indicate that, when asked if having such a system to protect against missile attacks from rogue states is a good idea, most people respond favorably. However, when asked a similar question that highlights the cost in billions of dollars, the response is far less favorable. When debating whether to spend this much money on research and development of the system, opponents generally frame the problem in terms of the low likelihood of attack and of other programs where the money could be better spent, whereas proponents of the system highlight the costs associated with failure to prevent an attack (how much is your hometown worth?).

Overconfidence. Although most people are not very good at making estimates or forecasts, we tend to be overconfident about our accuracy when doing so, which can lead to poor judgement and bad decisions. This overconfidence can lead decisionmakers to limit the range of possibilities and miss opportunities or expose themselves or others to too much risk. Many critics of the postwar operations in Iraq accuse members of the Bush administration of being overconfident in their estimates of how many troops would be needed and how quickly they would be able to withdraw.

Overcautiousness (Prudence). When the stakes are high, we tend to adjust our estimates “just to be on the safe side.” This tendency sometimes leads to “worst-case analysis,” when efforts to cover every possible circumstance can add huge costs in terms of time and resources with minimal, if any, practical benefit. This is particularly evident in the development of weapon systems; engineers are routinely required to design weapons to operate under the worst possible circumstances, leading to huge costs increases despite the low likelihood of ever facing those circumstances.

Availability. Anything that distorts the ability to recall events in a balanced way will distort probability assessments. People tend to be overly influenced by dramatic events that leave strong impressions on their memories. As a result, we tend to exaggerate the probability of events that get disproportionate media attention or that we personally experience, such as plane crashes or the loss of a loved one to a particular disease. For example, if asked to estimate the percentage of sexual assault charges against U.S. servicemen in Okinawa relative to charges against Japanese men, it is likely that more people would assign a higher

probability to U.S. servicemen because of attention given to recent high-profile incidents.

Memory.

People acquire data through one or more of the five human senses, and the mind must interpret, evaluate, sort and store this data, as well as determine what is useful and what is not. Generally speaking the mind sorts data into broad categories (schemas) and encodes it for recall.⁴ Entire sets of data may then be retrieved when only limited bits of information are received. For example, if a person hears a growl coming from behind a fence, that piece of information could lead to the identification of the source of the growl as a dog. The mental picture associated with “dog” may be a generic one, or, if the growl is similar to one experienced in the person’s past, the mental picture may be of a specific type of dog. As more information becomes available the mental picture becomes more complete. If, a few seconds after hearing the growl, the observer noted an open gate, heard the sound of a chain breaking, and the growl were replaced by a fast-approaching, angry barking, a very complete mental picture could be obtained—and several possible courses of action suggested.

This ability to retrieve large amounts of information in response to selected information cues rests in large part on the use of stereotypes. There has been extensive research on this facet of human thought, leading to the general conclusions that stereotyping is “widely practiced as a means of simplifying the world and making perceptual and cognitive processes more efficient” and is “a pervasive human tendency.” Simply stated, stereotypes are used in most aspects of human thought because they offer an easy way of organizing, storing and recalling data. They serve as a tool for simplifying environmental stimuli.⁵ Unfortunately, stereotypes are often developed with inaccurate information and/or applied inappropriately due to insufficient information. Such stereotyping is often the basis of discrimination and faulty decisionmaking due to misinterpreting or underestimating the intentions and capabilities of others. Many would argue, for example, that the United States grossly underestimated both the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese in part because of a widely-held stereotype of Asians as inferior to Westerners. Further, the use of some stereotypic identifiers, such as “terrorist,” “fanatic,” “racist,” or “hero,” may often trigger strong emotional reactions from both the labeled individuals and those who interact with them.

Perceptions.

Perceptions (how individuals interpret and understand data presented to them) are among the most important influences in decisionmaking. The decisionmaker’s perceptions of other actors involved in the decision, the perceived consequences of the decision, and the apparent utility of historical parallels, can come to dominate the decisionmaking process. In extreme cases, perceptions can be so strong that the decisionmaker will ignore some facts, twist others, and interpret data as pointing to the presence of trends that do not exist in reality.⁶

Once formed, perceptions are difficult to discard.⁷ A famous example involves an experiment in which two different groups were shown an identical tape of a college lecture. The first group was told that the lecturer was warm, humorous, and highly respected. The lecturer was described to the second group as harsh, cold, and reserved. After watching the identical lecture, the groups were asked for their impressions. The first group gave the lecturer a very positive endorsement, while the second group was extremely negative in its response.

Analogies and perceptions are closely linked. As the noted behavioral political scientist Robert Jervis states: “Previous international events present the statesman with a range of imaginable situations and allow

him to detect patterns and causal links that help him understand his world.” It is human nature to look for patterns in an event, to seek similarities between what is happening now and what has happened before. Once apparent similarities are discovered, an analogy will inevitably be invoked. Examples of such analogies include “Saddam Hussein is just like Hitler,” or “Haiti is another Somalia waiting to happen.” The analogy may then suggest a course of action, e.g., “Appeasement is out, it leads to greater conflict,” or “The United States can never allow the United Nations to take operational command of U.S. forces.” This mental technique can be extremely useful if the analogy is accurate and its use leads to the quick adoption of a successful course of action. Unfortunately, analogies—especially those that are invoked with little or no thought—are rarely accurate, and solutions based on false analogies can be devastating.⁸

Values and Beliefs.

Personal values and beliefs tend to be forged over time and may reflect the cumulative values and beliefs of one’s parents, teachers, community, etc. They are powerful influences on decisionmaking and are directly tied to how individuals perceive situations, other people, and actions. People will tend to reject and distrust data or solutions that seem in conflict with their belief and value systems, while embracing those that do.⁹ Of course, the danger is that simply because information runs contrary to a belief, this does not make the information invalid, and vice-versa. For example, in 1941, many senior leaders in the United States believed the Japanese could not mount a surprise attack on the Hawaiian Islands. These leaders knew the Japanese possessed modern aircraft carriers and planes, and a Pearl Harbor scenario had been wargamed. However, these leaders believed that no one could sail a fleet in secrecy across the Pacific Ocean. They also believed that when the Japanese did start a war, they would limit their attacks to the Philippines, Guam, and other targets closer to Japan. These beliefs, although sincere, did not prevent the air raid on December 7, 1941. The leaders’ beliefs caused them to discard, ignore or dismiss multiple indications that the Japanese were quite capable of mounting such an attack.

A decisionmaker may also tend to believe that his or her personal value and belief systems are universal when they may not be. This can lead to “mirror imaging,” i.e., a decisionmaker expecting the “opponent” to react exactly as he/she would, or attributing motives to an opponent’s action based on why he/she may have done the same thing. Similar to the pitfalls of stereotyping, when a decisionmaker substitutes his or her own beliefs or values to compensate for a lack of information about—or understanding of—others involved in a national security issue, the likely result will be a poor decision.

Finally, decisionmakers may feel compelled to select a particular course of action based on their personal beliefs and values regardless of international or domestic political pressures. Sometimes our leaders simply believe that a particular action is the right or wrong thing to do and they act accordingly. President Bush, for example, appears to be firmly committed to development of a missile defense despite widespread international and domestic opposition and doubts about its efficacy.

Emotions, Fatigue and Stress.

The tendency of the mind to simplify and satisfice tends to be exaggerated when accompanied by strong emotions, fatigue, or stress. Emotions trigger chemical changes in the body that are generated in the same areas of the brain that handle reasoning and decisionmaking.¹⁰ As a result, strong emotions may physically interfere with normal cognitive processing of information during the decisionmaking process, despite one’s attempts to ignore or control them. In addition, emotions such as anger, embarrassment, and sadness may cause the decisionmaker to deliberately ignore the advice of others and make decisions for personal reasons

rather than out of concern for national interests. However, not all emotions are bad—for example, the presence of fear may cause the decisionmaker to more carefully consider the potential consequences of high-risk courses of action in situations where the stakes are high. The challenge facing a decisionmaker is to recognize emotional influences without being ruled by them.

The importance of proper physical condition in regards to decisionmaking should be readily apparent to anyone who has attempted some complex task after a long and tiring day. Fatigue decreases sensory awareness, limiting the ability to receive sensory data, and it inhibits cortical activity in the brain, limiting the ability to accurately interpret and then process the information. In other words, the senses do not collect information as well, and the mind is prone to misperception and inefficient processing of the information. People become more likely to misunderstand what they see or hear, to overlook or ignore important information, and to make faulty decisions as a result. Under these conditions, even something as simple as filling out a crossword puzzle may prove impossible. However, given a few hours rest, the same puzzle may be solved in minutes. Sleep deprivation induces extreme fatigue and exacerbates the cognitive limitations described above. Military leaders routinely deny themselves adequate rest during high-stress training and combat operations, often leading to impaired decisionmaking that results in catastrophic operational failure, fratricide and accidental deaths, blind obedience to irrational or illegal orders, and otherwise preventable noncombatant casualties.¹¹

Stress is also frequently encountered during the decisionmaking process and deserves special mention. Stress can lead to an increase of satisficing decisions and may strengthen the tendency to unquestioningly accept as accurate pre-existing perceptions, values, and beliefs. Stress can also lead to irritability, anger, and an unwillingness to listen to others. If a team, such as a committee of advisors, is involved with the decision, a high level of stress can rapidly cause dysfunctional and ineffective behavior, such as bickering and emotional outbursts. This is especially true if the team is inexperienced in dealing with stressful situations and becomes even worse if the members of the team are not used to working with each other.¹²

Personality and Motivation.

An individual's personality and personal motivation will also play a role in the decisionmaking process. Imagine the effect a cynical, autocratic and arrogant decisionmaker would exert on the decisionmaking process, compared to that exerted by an outgoing, affable and optimistic decisionmaker. The former could easily stifle opinion, instill fear and dislike, and perhaps convince others that the situation was hopeless. The latter's personality would very likely encourage subordinates to offer suggestions, feel comfortable in providing information, and keep belief in success alive. Some decisionmakers are brusque, while others are personable. No specific personality type is "wrong," but each affects decisions. Prudent decisionmakers will understand not only their own personalities, but also those of their closest advisors.

Motivation is also a factor in decisionmaking. A leader who wants a particular decision outcome will be less likely to turn over the process to subordinates. There will be less chance of stalling or delaying tactics. Conversely, a low level of motivation may mean that subordinates obtain an even greater degree of control over the decision or that the decision is continually put off—sometimes, as in Haiti, until it becomes a crisis. The perceived consequences of a decision may directly affect the decisionmaker's level of motivation and the extent to which he or she works for a particular decision. Concerns over such issues as popularity polls, reelection, impeachment, or one's legacy may cause decisionmakers to take actions that they otherwise might not have or that would not have been predicted by the rational actor model. Some might argue, for example, that concerns over possible impeachment compelled former President Kennedy to take aggressive action in the Cuban missile crisis.

Groupthink.

Groups of people sometimes appear to take on particular identities that arise through the complicity of the group's members and then behave in ways that can have a profound impact on decisionmaking. Behavioral expert Irving L. Janis developed a theory regarding this behavior and labeled it "Groupthink." Typically, as the group identity emerges members begin to modify their own behaviors in order to conform. Eventually, members may become reluctant to offer any opinions that may be seen as "anti-group." Those that do may find themselves being pressured to return to group norms and ostracized if they fail to do so.¹³ When this occurs, recommendations from the group may be based more on maintaining group harmony than in truly addressing the problem. Many believe that President Kennedy's advisors exhibited signs of groupthink in developing their recommendations that led to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.

Removing Barriers To Clear Thinking.

Having identified potential problems with cognition and decisionmaking, it is appropriate to examine potential methods to reduce or eliminate those problems. These methods include:

Seek Contradictory Views. Decisionmakers must guard against hearing only one point of view. When this occurs, unseen biases can intrude into the decisionmaking process. If one organization or individual assumes a disproportionate role in advising the decisionmaker, opposing views might not be heard or considered. Expanding the diversity of views makes the potential influence of biases less likely.¹⁴ The more varied the backgrounds and perspectives of those offering the leader advice, the less likely an important factor will go unnoticed.

Use Multiple Advisory Groups. Although assigning two groups to work separately on the same issue is redundant, this method may ensure that a wider spectrum of alternatives is examined prior to reaching a decision.¹⁵ During the Cold War, the U.S. military carried this process further than most other organizations. Not only were multiple independent groups assigned to large problems, but elite groups of specialists were also trained to look at issues from a Soviet perspective. This technique had the added benefit of reducing the danger of "mirror imaging," as long as the "red" players did not actually "think blue."

Assign a Devil's Advocate. This can be a highly effective technique, as was demonstrated during the Cuban Missile crisis when U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy filled the (unofficial) role of Devil's Advocate. Briefly stated, the role of the devil's advocate is to examine critically other proposals being put forward. This acts as a hedge against biases and groupthink. However, care must be taken in selecting the person to fill this role. This individual must be strong enough to take the mental stress of always being in the opposition and be respected enough by the leader to ensure that the advocate's opinion is not simply ignored. The latter happened during the administration of President Lyndon Johnson. Presidential advisor George Ball filled the devil's advocate role in discussions about Vietnam policy, but his opposing positions grew irritating to the president. Over time the other presidential advisors began to ignore Ball. This was doubly unfortunate because the group continued to believe that the devil's advocate was keeping them safe from groupthink biases.¹⁶

Identify Known/Unclear/Presumed. In their book, *Thinking in Time*, political science experts Richard Neustadt and Ernest May offer several methods to avoid the traps inherent in using history as a tool in

decisionmaking. One of these methods consists of formally writing down what is actually known, unknown, and presumed about the situation and the actors involved in it. This relatively simple exercise may point out potentially dangerous assumptions and blind spots. It can also be used to channel intelligence efforts and resources into activities with the largest potential payoffs.¹⁷

Identify Similarities/Differences. Neustadt and May also suggest treating analogies with great care. Recognizing the tremendous allure of an analogy (providing a blueprint for a solution) they strongly recommend that a list identifying the similarities and differences between the current and past situation be compiled. When this is done, it is not uncommon to find the similarities were only superficial or did not even exist at all.¹⁸

Conduct Placement. Neustadt and May offer a third safeguard known as “placement.” Placement is a method by which the stereotypical view of an opponent becomes more factual and sophisticated as important elements of personality and individual history are identified and placed in historical context. Although not in any way presented as a crystal ball or as a key to predicting exact behavior, placement does seem to offer a better chance of predicting an adversary’s moves and understanding how an opponent thinks.

Avoid Stress and Fatigue. The old folk remedy of sufficient rest being a cure for ailments still applies. Leaders must watch their staffs for signs of excessive fatigue and should schedule and manage meetings and work sessions to ensure that each member of the team can contribute at his/her maximum potential. At the same time, someone must watch the leader. Practicing decisionmaking, preferably under simulated crisis conditions, is a fairly effective method to prepare for, and minimize, the potential effects of stress in an actual crisis.¹⁹

Delay the Decision. Although not always possible, there may be real merit in postponing the execution of a decision until enough time has passed to allow reassessment. This technique reduces the chance that emotion might play too large a role in the decision.

Safeguard Against Groupthink. Janis discusses several safeguards in detail in his book *Groupthink*. These include encouraging the discussion of diverse opinions, accepting criticisms and attempting to shed organizational biases. Janis points to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the creation of the Marshall Plan as two instances where these techniques were extremely successful. A strong devil’s advocate was involved in decisionmaking during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the authors of the Marshall Plan solicited advice and input from an incredibly diverse group of experts. Janis also notes that, although the techniques sound easy, they may not be easy to implement. Senior leaders are often unprepared to hear their own judgments criticized, and many have difficulty remaining objective and impartial in this process. They are generally used to being right, they often have more experience than anyone around them, and they may perceive criticism as a personal attack.

Establish Reexamination Criteria. Despite the most conscientious intentions to remain “rational,” perceptions may gain control of the decisionmaker and his/her key advisors. It is therefore useful, at an early stage of the decisionmaking process, to identify specific criteria that will trigger a reexamination of some or all presumptions.²⁰ Examples could include the spotting of a new behavior or technology on the part of the opponent, or the lack of an expected reaction to certain actions. For example, the Egyptian acquisition of improved air defense systems and long-range missiles from the Soviet Union should have triggered a reexamination of the Israeli assumption that the Arab nations would not attack until the Egyptians had

rebuilt their air force to address their air superiority deficiency. Had such criteria been adopted, the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict might have run a very different course.

Conclusion.

The human dimension in decisionmaking is inescapable. It applies to all decisionmakers, irrespective of culture, education, or background. Everyone uses stereotypes to aid in memory retrieval, selects analogies to help in decisionmaking, and is affected, sometimes deeply, by personal beliefs, values, and emotions. In order to achieve a more complete understanding of the national security decisionmaking process, it is therefore important to consider the wide range of cognitive factors that may affect the individual decisionmaker. It is equally important to take steps to safeguard against the potentially detrimental effects of these cognitive factors when national security decisions are being made. In a general way, this reading has sought to indicate how this might be accomplished.

Notes - Chapter 18

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16 Allan R. Ricketts and Richard J. Norton, eds. *National Security Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994), 216; Jervis (1968), 416; Janis, 275.

17 Neustadt and May, 34-57.

18 Ibid.

19 TADMUS study.

20 Jervis (1968), 463; and Neustadt and May, 274.

CHAPTER 19

THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE MAKING OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY¹

Anthony R. Williams

The purpose of intelligence analysis is to elevate the quality of discussion in this town.

Sherman Kent

What is the appropriate role of intelligence² in the making of national security policy? Most members of the national security community bring to their roles a preconceived and mostly subconscious view on this issue, which view seems so obvious to its holders, that they rarely see reason to raise the question. Even within the U.S. Intelligence Community,³ where the subject is more frequently discussed, it is usually approached as part of an academic discussion, and only rarely as part of the planning and execution of normal support to the national security policy process.⁴ In effect, all the players in the process hold opinions on this issue, but those opinions function in the background, much as the operating software for a personal computer runs invisible to the user unless it malfunctions.

Generally speaking members of the national security community will fall loosely into one of two groups as regards their attitude toward the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy process. These can best be described as the “unconstrained support to policy” view and the “policy neutral” view. While few will hold either attitude without qualification, it is instructive to imagine these attitudes as opposite poles on a spectrum, along which national security players will tend to coalesce. This difference is more than of academic interest, because it dictates how the players use intelligence and the intelligence apparatus in the development, communication and execution of national security policy.

The 1947 National Security Act can be cited in support of the “unconstrained view,” in that it specifically charges the Directorate of Central Intelligence (DCI) (and by extension the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] as his executive agent) to act as the principle advisor to the President on intelligence matters relating to the national security.⁵ And most would agree that the *State of the Union Address* is very much a matter of national security. Furthermore, the 1947 Act also charges the DCI with the responsibility “for providing national intelligence—

- to the President;
- to the heads of the departments and agencies of the executive branch;
- to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and,
- where appropriate, to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof.”

But because the 1947 National Security Act leaves so many things undefined, it allows for the widest interpretation and in that context can be cited to buttress any position on this spectrum of attitudes. For example:

- What form or forms exactly is the DCI's advice and "national intelligence" to take? Does it include only formal reports, either verbally or in writing? Or does it include the review of Presidential and Secretarial speeches, statements, etc.? Does it include only passive review of those instruments or active involvement in their creation?
- Who is to initiate advice? Is it at the initiative of the DCI, or only at the invitation of the President, the National Security Advisor or other members of the National Security Council (NSC), executive departments, agencies, and military commands?
- Is there a difference between advice given by the principle advisor and "national intelligence?"

How one answers these questions determines where one falls with regard to the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy process.

Although most of these questions have never been formerly answered through Executive Order, legislation, or judicial interpretation, the government has managed to function more or less well over the past 60 years, as if it had answers to them in hand. These questions customarily are resolved on a dynamic basis through a variety of procedures established and modified by each presidential administration, by each Congress, and through the political process. Generally speaking, as each administration establishes its procedures for dealing with the overall issue of intelligence advice to the policymaking process, the players accept those procedures without challenge. Even in cases where both sides hold differing views as to the answer to one or more of the above questions, the players will frequently find a way to "peacefully coexist" on a given issue.⁶ Where they do clash, they customarily do so through the political process, which, regardless of specific outcome, always allows successors the opportunity to challenge again with potentially different outcomes.

The recent furor surrounding the *casus belli* for the Iraqi War provides us a case in point. Both the president's critics and supporters have addressed the veracity of the evidence presented by the president and Cabinet secretaries justifying the initiation of hostilities against Saddam's government in Iraq, and the appropriateness of the president's reference in the *State of the Union Address* to the British report on Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa.

In virtually every case, however, both supporters and critics have operated from a preconceived and unstated view of the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy process. For example, the *Statement* by the DCI accepting responsibility for the questionable "intelligence" included in President Bush's 2003 *State of the Union* speech, and a critical article by a former senior CIA officer titled "Intelligence Shouldn't Exist Just To Serve Policy," present starkly contrasting views on the role of intelligence in policymaking.⁷ Yet neither actually addresses that issue directly.

The DCI's *Statement* makes clear that he believes the responsibility of the DCI (and his executive arm, the CIA) goes beyond providing intelligence in a policy neutral format, and includes making sure to the extent possible that the president does not make a mistake in developing or communicating policy, whether the president is relying directly or indirectly on intelligence. A derivative of this position is that "intelligence" plays an important informational role in all aspects of policymaking, both formal and

informal. Thus, we arrive at the essence of the “unconstrained view of the role of intelligence in policymaking.”

The McGovern article, by its very title, makes the case that intelligence analysis should be policy neutral. While the author does not explicitly make that statement, and his polemical tone helps to obscure the bottom line in the piece, the clear implications of the article are that intelligence analysis should be neutral as regards policy. Note, for example, the parenthetical reference to the way the author believes intelligence assessments were done in his day, “without fear or favor.”⁸ It would appear, however, that McGovern also holds the view that “intelligence” should play an informational role in policymaking without regard to the formal or informal nature of that policymaking. Therefore, one could infer that McGovern is not concerned to constrain “when” intelligence is used, but only how it is used. That is important since “when” intelligence is used often determines “how” it is to be used.

By the terms of the “unconstrained” view, because the CIA and much of the Intelligence Community had serious reservations regarding the substance of the British reports on Iraq’s nuclear program, the DCI had a responsibility to make certain that the president was advised by the CIA to remove reference to those British reports from the *State of the Union Address*. And from the nature of the response to the DCI’s *Statement*, it is obvious that a wide range of policymakers, legislators, academics, and journalists agree that the DCI has this responsibility.⁹

Interestingly, both sides of the “unconstrained vs. policy neutral” debate also generally hold a wider definition of what constitutes the national security policy process than is commonly appreciated. Note, for example, that the “policy” document under discussion was a political speech by the president, albeit a very important speech. And in October 2002, the DCI intervened in another presidential speech of much less moment than the *State of the Union Address*, for which intervention he has been praised by critics and supporters alike.¹⁰ Clearly there seems to be widespread agreement throughout the national security community that any presidential statement (and by extension that of his closest advisors and cabinet members) is part of the policy process that the Intelligence Community is obligated to support. This view at its broadest holds that it is incumbent on the DCI to take strenuous measures to assure the veracity of all policy statements, both public and private, as they may deal with matters on which the Intelligence Community has some information.

One can conclude from White House statements noting that the CIA reviewed the president’s address,¹¹ that the current administration accepts the “unconstrained” view of intelligence support to policy. Furthermore, based on statements by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and efforts by members of the NSC and White House staffs to coordinate various parts of the president’s *State of the Union Address*, and presumably his October 2002 speech, it is clear that this administration views the DCI’s intelligence advisory role to include active involvement in both the development and communication of national security policy. Dr. Rice stated on 11 July 2003 that the wording used in President Bush’s speech had been reviewed and changed by the CIA, and that some “specifics about amount and place” had been changed, and that after the changes “the CIA cleared the speech in its entirety.”¹² According to press reporting, detailed discussions were held between a nuclear proliferation expert at the NSC and a proliferation expert at the CIA over the content of the speech relating to the putative Iraqi nuclear program.¹³

If we conclude that the DCI and “intelligence” are to play an active role in developing and communicating national security policy, at whose initiative are they to play this role? To wit, on 11 July Ms. Rice said that “if the CIA, the director of central intelligence (sic), had said, ‘Take this out of the speech,’ it

would have been gone, without question.”¹⁴ Furthermore, Senator Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stated “it was incumbent on the director of intelligence to correct the record and bring it to the immediate attention of the president.”¹⁵ And an unnamed Democratic member of the SSCI was quoted by the *Washington Post* as saying that DCI Tenet was repeatedly asked in closed hearings on 16 July why the CIA had “permitted” the unfounded Iraqi uranium allegation in the address.¹⁶ Clearly, there would seem to be wide agreement that the initiative lies, at least in part, with the DCI, and is not solely dependent on the initiative of the president or his cabinet members and advisors. This leads inevitably, however, to a significant blurring of the policy-support and policymaking roles. One is hard pressed to see how the DCI can exercise any real initiative in “correcting” or “amending” a presidential policy statement, and not himself become an active player in making policy.

As noted above, the countervailing view of the role of intelligence in the policy process, holds that to the extent possible, the DCI should ensure that the Intelligence Community strives to provide intelligence advice to the president and his advisors in a policy neutral format. While very few would argue that this goal can be attained 100 percent of the time, many see it as a necessary constraining force. The primary argument for this is that anything less undermines the credibility of the Intelligence Community, and particularly the Office of the DCI and the CIA. In general, there appears to be an acceptance of the fact that departmental intelligence agencies¹⁷ are intended to support policymakers within their respective departments or military services, and thus their product will be in many cases “policy supportive.” There is, however, a strong expectation on the part of many in the national security community that the national agencies should avoid even the appearance of policy bias in their products.

A good example of a policy neutral approach to intelligence can be found in the famous “missile gap” case in the run-up to the 1960 presidential election. Despite the fact that the Kennedy Campaign had used much of the material provided to the press by the Gaither Committee to substantiate its charge that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) held a commanding lead over the United States in the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, President Eisenhower refused to allow CIA intelligence on the subject to be released. It has been argued that this decision was a factor in the loss of the election by Richard Nixon, since the available national intelligence made clear that there was no missile gap, and there was not likely to be one for the foreseeable future. In this case, President Eisenhower chose not to allow intelligence to become embroiled publicly in the political process. One can argue the merits of Eisenhower’s decision, but it is taken by many analysts in CIA and the other national agencies as the proper way to handle national intelligence.

This view has a long tradition within the CIA,¹⁸ and it has often been criticized by members of the national security community as a bar to effective CIA intelligence support to policymakers. For example, as part of the continuing educational effort for analysts at CIA, the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis at the CIA University has published a series of occasional papers addressing among other subjects the proper relationship between the analyst and the policymaker. The author of these papers is at some pains to assure analysts that lowering the wall between intelligence analysis and the policymaking process will not damage intelligence credibility (if proper tradecraft is used) and will make intelligence more relevant to the policymaker.¹⁹

Criticisms of the “policy neutral” view have a long tradition among policymakers. Current Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was selected as a member of the so-called Team B, “which challenged the expertise, methods, and judgments of Intelligence Community analysts working on Soviet strategic military objectives (specifically, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-3-8 for 1977).”²⁰ The underlying

issue in this case was the perceived failure of the NIE to directly address the implications for Soviet intentions of the USSR's ongoing strategic buildup. The members of Team B started from a decidedly policy-supportive position, in that it was their contention that if the subject NIE had addressed the intentions issue "properly," then U.S. policymakers would have been encouraged to take a stronger stand vis-à-vis the USSR in our mutual relations. While serving as the Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Ambassador Wolfowitz was appointed to the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Throughout this period he continued to argue for a more "policy actionable" approach to national intelligence.²¹ According to press reports, Ambassador Wolfowitz, as Deputy Secretary of Defense in the current administration, has been associated with a large group of policymakers who have argued strenuously that the Intelligence Community, and specifically the CIA, has not produced intelligence on current policy issues that has been helpful in the development, articulation and execution of policy.²²

From the policy neutral perspective, the primary concern, as noted above, is that the close involvement of intelligence in the making, communication, and execution of specific national security policies will undermine the credibility of the intelligence itself, and the intelligence organizations involved. Often, critics attack the intelligence organization, such as the CIA, as "shilling" for a policymaker if the intelligence product is seen as too supportive, or is used openly in the political process.²³ In this case the intelligence agency itself, or the DCI, becomes sucked up in the maelstrom of political conflict over the policy under debate.²⁴ This position argues that such "policy-supportive" intelligence, to quote Senator John Kerry, D-MA, does ". . . nothing to make this country safer and will simply further erode the confidence of the American public and our allies around the world."²⁵

There is another hurdle over which the intelligence provider must leap in this process. That is the need to support the execution of policy. All intelligence is not meant simply to inform the "making of policy." Rather, once policy decisions are made and the Executive undertakes the implementation of those decisions, intelligence must be available to support that implementation at each step. Furthermore, intelligence is necessary as part of the policy execution feedback loop, so that the ongoing policy can be modulated toward ultimate success. This intelligence reporting and analysis, however, frequently becomes part of the political struggle over policies that do not have wide non-partisan support. Often, one side will see intelligence reporting that appears to cast a favorable light on the policy results as being slanted to favor the policy itself. And, of course, there is rarely a desire on the part of policymakers to receive intelligence that suggests that the policy execution cycle is not living up to the expectations of those who designed the policy in the first place.

The ultimate caution to the intelligence provider, and to the policymaker who uses that intelligence, may well be Aristotle's axiom, "moderation in all things." If the intelligence player or product is too supportive of policy, or appears to be too supportive, then both will be subject to criticism and a loss of credibility. If, on the other hand, intelligence is too "neutral" and too high a wall is kept between intelligence and policy, then the intelligence will be subject to criticism that it is not useful and ultimately a loss of relevance. Complicating this picture for the intelligence player is that critics will also often make the case that they want "objective" analysis, that can be used by all the participants in the policy debate.²⁶ When that is translated into reality, however, it most often means that the critic's side in the debate is not faring as well as the critic believes it should because the intelligence input favors the other side. Finally, as noted above, even the legislation creating the current intelligence structure does more to complicate than to answer the question as to the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy process.

In the end, there is probably no definitive answer to the question of the appropriate role of intelligence in the making of national security policy. Each administration must address that question for itself. As a starting point it would be useful for the key players in each administration to review their individual and institutional expectations of the Intelligence Community early on. And these players should continue to calibrate their expectations as the administration develops policies, engages in the political conflicts surrounding the implementation of those policies, and responds to the unexpected crises which are inevitable. A focused effort to remain aware of the synergistic nature of the policy-intelligence relationship on the part of policymakers would go a long way toward minimizing the potential damage to the U.S. Intelligence Community that can arise from the latter's efforts to support the policymaker at all phases of the policy process.

Notes - Chapter 19

1 The CIA Publications Review Board has reviewed the manuscript for this article to assist the author in eliminating classified information and poses no security objection to its publication. This review, however, should not be construed as an official release of information, confirmation of its accuracy, or an endorsement of the author's views.

2 I use the word "intelligence" here to describe two entities: (1) Intelligence in its generic sense of information that has been collected, processed, exploited, and analyzed, and which contains information from both clandestine and open sources; and (2) The U.S. intelligence apparatus which collects and converts the aforementioned information into intelligence product. Also, throughout this chapter I will use the term "national security community" in its most generic sense, to include not only elected, appointed, and career officials currently serving in the government, but also those legislators, press commentators, academics, and journalists who specialize in the study of national security policy. These latter individuals are often former government officers, and many will return to government upon the vagaries of the next round of elections. In addition, those journalists and academics who never serve in government still play a significant role in the formulation and execution of policy by virtue of their influence on public opinion.

3 The Intelligence Community is composed of four "national" intelligence agencies—CIA, NSA, NIMA & NRO—and 10 "departmental" agencies—DIA, State/INR, the military service intelligence agencies, Coast Guard intelligence, and the intelligence offices in the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Energy.

4 See for example, Jack Davis, "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process," *Kent Center Occasional Papers*, Vol. 1, No. 2, September 2002; and Jack Davis, "Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations," *Kent Center Occasional Papers*, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 2003.

5 The 1947 National Security Act, Secemder 101-105 [50 USC], as amended is the fundamental founding legislation for the modern U.S. Intelligence Community. See for example Sec 101 [50 USC 402] "Title I—Coordination for National Security: National Security Council." See also Sec 103 [50 USC 403-3] "Title I—Coordination for National Security: Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence."

6 For example, "During the prolonged tug-of-war between the branches of government over Iran-Contra, the Reagan White House held fast to its position that the Constitution permitted the President to defer covert action notification to the Congress indefinitely if he felt circumstances so warranted. Congress did not concur with this assertion but was in no position to do anything about it. In the end, the executive and legislative branches agreed to disagree on the matter." See Marvin, C. Ott, "Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 79.

7 See, “Statement By George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence,” 11 July 2003, http://www.odci/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr07112003.html; and Ray McGovern, “Intelligence Shouldn’t Exist Just To Serve Policy,” *Miami Herald*, 5 August 2003.

8 Ibid., McGovern, “It does not speak well for a director (sic) of Central Intelligence to shy away from serving up the intelligence communitys (sic) best estimate anyway (“without fear or favor,” the way we used to operate).”

9 See, for example, SSCI Chairman Senator Pat Roberts criticism of Tenet for “sloppy handling” of the questionable intelligence on Niger, cited in John Diamond, “CIA director Nudged Toward The Plank,” *USA Today*, 14 July 2003; or questions such as “why did CIA permit the allegation in the address” cited in Walter Pincus, “Tenet Says He Didn’t Know About Claim,” *Washington Post*, 17 July 2003.

10 Ibid., Diamond.

11 See, for example, Tom Raum, “Bush: CIA Approved State of Union Speech,” AP 07/11/03 22:58 EDT.

12 David Sanger and James Risen, “CIA Chief Takes Blame in Assertion on Iraqi Uranium,” *The New York Times*, 12 July 2003.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Raum, “Bush: CIA Approved State of Union Speech.”

16 Walter Pincus, “Tenet Says He Didn’t Know About Claims,” *The Washington Post*, 17 July 2003.

17 See footnote 3 above.

18 The “policy neutral mission” view is most closely associated with Sherman Kent, the first Deputy Director and Vice Chairman (and subsequently Director and Chairman) of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates and the Board of National Estimates, both created in 1950 by then DCI, General Walter B. Smith.

19 See for example, Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process,” and “Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations.”

20 See Jack Davis, “Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations,” *Studies In Intelligence*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 1996, pp. 36-37. Ironically, Ambassador Wolfowitz’s stated position on this issue was based on his concept that CIA intelligence was not objective because it did not offer alternative hypotheses to explain the observable facts, and therefore such CIA analysis was too policy supportive.

21 Ibid.

22 See, for example, Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan Landay, “Pentagon, CIA In Bitter Dispute On Iraq,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 28 October 2002; Seymour Hersh, “Selective Intelligence,” *The New Yorker*, 12 May 2003; and Julian Borger, “The Spies Who Pushed for War,” *The Guardian*, 17 July 2003. These are simply examples of numerous press reports on this issue over the past year.

23 See, for example, McGovern, *ibid.*; Richard Cohen, “Sword-Passing,” *Washington Post*, 24 July 2003, p. 21; and Jay Taylor, “When Intelligence Reports Become Political Tools . . .,” *Washington Post*, 29 June 2003, p. B02.

24 See the comment by former Senator Bob Kerry, who noted that the administration had decided “OK, we’ll make George Tenet walk the plank.”

25 Raum, “Bush: CIA Approved State of Union Speech.”

26 See footnote 23 above.

APPENDIX I

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY FORMULATION

General.

Strategy is an art, and a highly creative one at that. It is also somewhat scientific, in that it follows certain patterns which require a common understanding of terminology, adherence to certain principles, and disciplined, albeit creative, thought processes. Remember that these strategy formulation guidelines are not formulas. Strategy will be developed in keeping with the particular features of the time, place, and personalities involved. Nevertheless, these guidelines offer an approach to address the complexity of strategy, and are intended for strategists attempting to achieve the coherence, continuity, and consensus that policymakers seek in designing, developing, and executing national security and military strategies.




Figure 1. USAWC Strategy Formulation Model.

National Purpose.

This is the start point for the entire process. Enduring values and beliefs embodied in the national purpose represent the legal, philosophical, and moral basis for continuation of the American system. From the nation's purpose as well as an understanding of the nation's domestic and global needs, the United States derives its enduring core national interests in the grand strategic appraisal process. The strategist should return to these considerations in terms of risk assessment at every derivative level of strategic appraisal.

Grand Strategic Appraisal.

This appraisal reflects a macro process focused on the broadest aspects of the strategic ends-ways-means paradigm. The goal of the grand strategic appraisal is the development of a nation's grand strategy defined as the use of all U.S. national elements of power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of America's role in the world that will best achieve the nation's core objectives.

Grand Strategic Interests/Ends: There are three core U.S. national interests: physical security, defined as the protection against attack on the territory and people of the United States in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and institutions intact; promotion of values; and economic prosperity. The core interests are translated into the grand strategic objectives: preserve American security, bolster American economic prosperity, and promote American values. All administrations focus on these three objectives, but depending on a host of variables ranging from circumstances to personalities, presidents may choose to emphasize one objective over the others. For the incoming Carter administration, the initial emphasis was on human rights; for the Reagan administration, it was security; and for the Clinton administration, it was the economy. Security is once again the top priority, but in an increasingly globalized world populated by non-state actors with possible access to weapons of mass destruction, achieving physical security paradoxically may require an equal emphasis on promoting democratic values and generating global economic prosperity.

Grand Strategic Ways: At the grand strategic level, the ways are based on the national leadership's strategic vision of America's role in the world that U.S. leaders believe will best achieve U.S. core national objectives.

1. Throughout America's history, this vision has ranged from isolationism to global engagement based on American preponderance. In order to be effective, each new administration has to express a vision for the U.S. role in the world that doesn't outrun the experience of the American people, and thus lose the decisive authority or domestic consensus to implement the strategic vision. Is the vision, in other words, suitable and acceptable?

2. President Franklin Roosevelt, for example, had to act carefully prior to World War II as he moved the American grand strategic vision from isolationism to one of global engagement. And within five years after the end of that war, the perception of external threat allowed President Truman to gain support for the grand strategic vision of containment—focused on containing the Soviet Union on the Eurasian land mass.

Grand Strategic Means: The grand strategic means involves the consideration of America's national elements of power at the broadest level. Given the state of the international and domestic environment and the scope of the administration's grand strategic vision of the U.S. role in the world, a key consideration is the feasibility of employing sufficient U.S. national power to achieve the core objectives.

Risk Assessment: At any level of strategic appraisal, the combination of concepts and resources is normally not sufficient for full attainment of objectives. At the grand strategic level, the assessment of such risk can be extremely complex. Global engagement as a grand strategy, for example, helps the U.S. in terms of security, economic prosperity, and promotion of values. At the same time, the backlash against what are perceived as U.S. economic and cultural dominance of the process of globalism, as well as American military forward presence, has also unleashed threats to all three core objectives.

Grand Strategy.

Based on the grand strategic appraisal, the U.S. political leadership provides national policy in the form of broad guidance concerning America's global role in pursuit of the core national objectives. This policy constitutes the U.S. grand strategy and is the starting point for the national security strategic assessment. It comes in many iterative and cumulative forms ranging from formal national security directives, to pronouncements in presidential and cabinet-level speeches, to presidential replies to press queries or cabinet-level appearances on current affairs television shows.

National Security Strategic Appraisal.

General.

1. Inherent in this more detailed national security strategic appraisal, or in any derivative appraisals such as those at the national military strategic and regional strategic levels, is an appropriate degree of analysis designed to illuminate alternatives in the face of recognized uncertainties. A general outline for a strategic appraisal follows:

- a. Identify U.S. interests.
- b. Determine level of intensity for each interest.
- c. Evaluate the issues, trends, and challenges (threats and opportunities) in regard to interests.
- d. Determine objectives (ends).
- e. Consider alternative concepts (ways) that utilize available or needed resources (means) to achieve objectives.
- f. Conduct a risk assessment.
- g. Present policy recommendations.

2. The appraisal must be more than a listing of challenges. To be useful, an appraisal must analyze and explain which and in what ways U.S. interests are affected. The assessment should seek to identify opportunities and threats to U.S. interests. As a consequence, the strategic appraisal will not only be

influenced by current national policy, but will help identify recommendations to change existing policies. The appraisal should address some if not all of the following questions:

- a. What is the current U.S. policy or precedent?
- b. Who are the other critical actors?
- c. What are their interests and/or policies?
- d. With whom does the U.S. have convergence or divergence of interest/policy?
- e. What are the feasible options to employ the U.S. elements of power to achieve the policy options under consideration?

3. The strategy formulation guidelines delineated above apply equally to national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater military strategy. The strategist must be able to develop strategies employing all of the elements of power. Students at the USAWC will develop and practice these skills in Course 2, the Regional Strategic Appraisals, Elective Courses, and the Strategic Crisis Exercise. Remember, the formulation of national security strategy, as it does at any level of strategy, employs the strategic thought process based on the use of Ends, Ways, and Means.

National Interests. At the national security strategic level, the United States moves beyond the three core grand strategic interests to more specific national security interests derived from those core interests in accordance with national policy. These national security interests provide more detail to the nation's needs and aspirations, in terms of the relationship between the foreign and domestic aspects of national security, and are thus the start point for defining national security strategic objectives.

1. **Description:** As a rule of thumb, interests are stated as fundamental concerns of the nation, and written as desirable conditions without verbs, action modifiers, or intended actions. For example, U.S. national interests might be stated as:

- a. Access to raw materials—(Not “protect sources of raw materials”).
- b. Unrestricted passage through international waters — (Not “secure sea lines of communications”).

2. **Categories:** The Army War College groups national interests into three categories derived from the three core interests of the United States. Categories help to organize interests. Keep in mind the breakdown is normally artificial. Thus, while “Unrestricted access to Persian Gulf Oil” as a U.S. national interest has a primary category of “Economic Well-Being” for the United States and its allies, it also ties into the other two categories of national interests used by the USAWC. The three categories are:

- a. **SECURITY OF THE HOMELAND:** protection against attack on the territory and people of a nation-state in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and political systems intact.
- b. **ECONOMIC WELL-BEING:** attainment of the conditions in the world environment that ensure the economic well-being of the nation.
- c. **PROMOTION OF VALUES:** establishment of the legitimacy of or expansion of the fundamental values of the nation such as democracy and human rights.

3. **Intensity:** Determining the level of intensity helps to determine priority of interests, recognizing that without prioritization, there is the potential for unlimited derivative objectives and the consequent mismatch of those objectives (ends) with resources (means), which are always finite. The degree of intensity of an interest, in particular, should be determined *before* a detailed analysis of threats to those interests. It is important that interests not become a function of a particular threat. If a government begins with a threat assessment before a conceptualization of interest intensity, it may react to a threat with major commitments and resources devoid of any rational linkage to that intensity. Rational cost-benefit analysis should not be allowed to affect the intensity of interest. The three USAWC degrees of intensity are determined by answering the question: What happens if the interest is not realized?

- a. VITAL—if unfulfilled, will have immediate consequences for core national interests.
- b. IMPORTANT—if unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect core national interests.
- c. PERIPHERAL—if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect core national interests.

National Security Strategic Ends-Ways-Means:

1. U.S. National Security Strategic Objectives are derived from national policy concerning America's grand strategic role in the world and from a detailed consideration of U.S. national security interests by category and intensity against the backdrop at the national level of issues, trends, and challenges (threats and opportunities) that affect those interests. Based on these objectives, the national government considers alternative concepts and courses of action offered by executive branch departments for the use of the national elements of power.

2. Various agencies of the government contribute to the national security strategy with the president—assisted by the National Security Council (NSC) and Staff—as the final integrator. Since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the president's National Security Strategy document is the authoritative unclassified statement of our national strategy.

Risk Assessment: Strategies at any level normally lack resources sufficient for complete assurance of success. The U.S. National Security Strategy is no exception. As a result, a final and essential test is to assess the risk of less than full attainment of national security strategic objectives. Living with risk is part of the strategist's business in the modern world, and being able to articulate its character and extent is the first step in reducing its impact. Where the risk is determined to be unacceptable, the strategy must be revised by individually or in combination, reducing the objectives, changing the concepts, or increasing the resources.

National Military Strategy.

Of special interest to USAWC students is the development of national military strategy. This section applies the strategy formulation guidelines to this issue. Recall, that military strategy is meaningful only in the policy context outlined above.

Military Strategy: The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.

1. Military Strategy = Objectives + Strategic Concepts + Resources

2. <u>Generic</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Answers</u>
Ends	Objectives	What?
Ways	Concepts	How? (+Where & When)
Means	Resources	With What?

Military Objectives (Ends): The first crucial step, then, is translating applicable *national security objectives* and policy guidance into clear, concise, and achievable *military objectives*. Military objectives answer the question *what* is to be achieved by the military element of power. As a rule of thumb, military objectives should:

1. Be appropriate, explicit, finite, achievable, and, if necessitated by policy guidance, limited in scope. (Test this by asking yourself if, as a combatant commander, you would know exactly *what* you would be expected to accomplish by the national leadership.)
2. Directly secure one (or more) stated interest(s). An effective first step in articulating a military objective is to attach an appropriate verb to each previously identified interest. For example:
 - a. Interest: access to raw materials
Objective: secure access to raw materials
 - b. Interest: a region free of conflict
Objective: deter intra-regional conflict
 - c. Interest: survival of Country X
Objective: defend Country X
3. If no realizable military objective can be articulated to satisfy a given interest, a policy choice to use the military element of power should be questioned.

Military Strategic Concepts (Ways): Strategic concepts are broad courses of action or *ways* military power might be employed to achieve the stated objective. They answer the question of “*how?*” Here is where the originality, imagination, and creativity of the strategist come into play. As Clausewitz observed, there are many *ways* to achieve a given end; presumably many can be right, but real genius lies in finding the best. As a rule of thumb:

1. Each military objective must have one (or more) concept(s) detailing *how* means (resources) are to

relate to ends (objectives).

2. Stated strategic concepts represent the preferred options of the possible courses of action considered.
3. Strategic concepts also detail when, where, phasing, sequencing, roles, priorities, etc., as appropriate.

4. Examples:

a. *Interest*: Access to Middle-East Oil

b. *Objective*: Secure SLOCs to the Middle-East

c. *Strategic Concept*: U.S. naval forces and embarked land forces will maintain a periodic presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean in peacetime; be prepared to provide full-time presence in crisis; and be prepared to achieve naval superiority in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean in wartime.

Military Resources (Means): Finally, the strategy must have resources—i.e., military forces and means implied by the objectives and concepts are identified. Military resources are often stated as forces (divisions, wings, naval groups), but might include things such as time, effort, organization, people, etc. As a rule of thumb:

1. Military resources must be identified for each objective and concept articulated.
2. Supportability of forces should be addressed (in terms of strategic lift, sustainability, host nation support, reinforcements, etc.).
3. For example:
 - a. One Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) will deploy to X ocean on a quarterly basis . . .
 - b. A permanent Joint Task Force (JTF) will be established to Two CONU.S.-based Divisions, one Special Forces Group and two Tactical Fighter Wings, supported by . . . will be prepared to . . .
4. Identification of resource implications, while completing the strategy, should be the first step in testing its internal logic. You should now think backward through the process to ensure the forces envisioned are adequate to implement the concepts, that the concepts achieve stated objectives, that the military objectives correctly satisfy the policy objectives and protect the national interests identified, and so forth.

APPENDIX II

CONTRIBUTORS

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