The Tao of Special Forces: An Analysis of Counterinsurgency Doctrine
Abstract
The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN doctrine or to adhere to the effective methods outlined by count doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and government in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, requiring a counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the counterguerilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Existing COIN doctrine is inadequate, as it lacks an overall governing strategy, which must include engaging of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, going well beyond just counterforce operations against the guerrillas. But the entire hierarchy of COIN doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under support and stability operations, as do counterguerillas operations in a doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes insurgency and foreign internal defense doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development IDAD programs). The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and commanding these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA424849
Entities
People
- Adrian A. Donahoe
- D. T. Reed Jr.
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School