



The Role of United States Air Power in Peacekeeping

by

BROOKS L. BASH, Major, USAF

THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES,
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF
GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1992-93.

Air University Press
401 Chennault Circle
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6428

June 1994

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JUN 1994		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Role of United States Air Power in Peacekeeping				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air University Press Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6615				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 51	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.

Contents

<i>Chapter</i>		<i>Page</i>
	DISCLAIMER	ii
	ABSTRACT	v
	ABOUT THE AUTHOR	vii
1	INTRODUCTION	1
	Notes	2
2	DISCUSSION OF PEACEKEEPING	5
	Peacekeeping Defined	6
	The Use of Force for Self-defense	6
	The Principles of Consent and Impartiality	7
	Principle of Effective Military Support	8
	Additional Principles	8
	Peacekeeping and International Conflict Control	8
	Peacekeeping in the 21st Century	10
	Notes	12
3	AIR POWER AND PEACEKEEPING	15
	Operational Analysis	17
	Command and Control	17
	Communications	19
	Intelligence	21
	Mobility	24
	Force Protection	26
	Putting It Together—Military Effectiveness	27
	Notes	28
4	RECOMMENDATIONS	31
	Notes	34
5	CONCLUSION	37
	Notes	38
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	39

Illustrations

Table

1	Stages of Conflict and Techniques Available	9
---	---	---

Abstract

In the aftermath of the cold war, the world is witnessing a dramatic increase in regional conflict and associated United Nations peacekeeping operations. Recognizing this trend and the fact that peacekeeping can serve US national security interests, US policymakers have earmarked military peacekeeping involvement, the employment of air power will be a natural consideration. Unfortunately, there is little practical or doctrinal guidance outlining the benefits and limitations of air power within the peacekeeping paradigm. To remedy this situation, this study first provides a general discussion of peacekeeping and constructs a comprehensive framework to categorize and analyze the role of air power in peacekeeping. Next, several recommendations are presented concerning command and control, doctrine, and organizational issues. In the end, this study concludes that the role of air power in peacekeeping is primarily auxiliary. Nevertheless, among the potential US contributions to UN peacekeeping, air power may be the best medium as it offers capabilities different from those currently available to UN forces. Moreover, the use of air power, as opposed to ground peacekeeping forces, will reduce the risk to American lives. Finally, the expanded use of air power in UN peacekeeping presents an opportunity to demonstrate US leadership and resolve while avoiding the perception of dominating the show.

About the Author

Maj (Lieutenant Colonel select) Brooks L. Bash (BS, USAF Academy; MS, Central Michigan University; MA, Naval War College) is an Air Force senior pilot with nearly 5,000 hours of experience in the C-141. A recent graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he is assigned to Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois. An honor graduate of the Naval Command and Staff College, his previous assignments include Prime Nuclear Airlift Force program manager at Travis AFB, California; Air Staff Training (ASTRA) officer at The Pentagon; C-141 Standardization and Evaluation pilot at McGuire AFB, New Jersey.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The United States is ready to do its part to strengthen world peace by strengthening international peacekeeping. For decades the American military has served as a stabilizing presence around the globe. And I want to draw on our extensive experience in winning wars and keeping the peace to support U. N. peacekeeping.

—President George Bush
Address to the UN General Assembly
21 September 1992

A repercussion of the collapse of Communism is a dramatic increase in regional conflicts and associated United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.¹ Since the beginning of 1992 new peacekeeping missions were created in the Balkans, Cambodia, Somalia and Mozambique. Indeed, during the past four years more peacekeeping operations were created than in the previous 43-year history of the United Nations.² During the zero-sum game of the cold war, the superpowers were reluctant to provide direct support of peacekeeping operations as their respective efforts would automatically arouse suspicion and mistrust of nonaligned powers.³ In fact, during the first 45 years of the UN there were 279 vetoes in the Security Council, yet there have been none in the past three years.⁴

Recognizing this postcold war opportunity and the prospect that peacekeeping can serve US national security interests, President Bush ordered greater peacekeeping efforts: “I have directed the United States Secretary of Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping.”⁵ Unfortunately, the United States has little operational experience in peacekeeping, and a current dilemma is to determine the role of US military forces in general and specifically air power. The air power debate concerning the Bosnia quagmire has brought recent attention to air power, but there are several fundamental changes in the peacekeeping environment that also suggest the need for an in-depth evaluation of the potential role of air power. The first change is the increasing availability of superpower technology to the UN due to end of the cold war. Technologically advanced air assets were previously unavailable by the inhibitions associated with superpower involvement, and the call for air power is a delayed integration of technology within the peacekeeping paradigm. As the means of waging war over the past four decades increased, the technological aids for peacekeeping remained noticeably static.⁶ Therefore, as combatants or aggressors gain technological military capability, there will be a need for commensurate advances in peacekeeping technology.

A second fundamental change involves the very nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions today have broadly expanded roles and objectives,

thus increasing the need for a stronger and more versatile force. Peacekeeping is marked by diversity, not only in terms of cost and scale, but also in terms of specific tasks. Recent operations have ranged from 50 observers in Afghanistan to over 20,000 personnel in the Balkans, while tasks vary from providing a transitional government in Cambodia to monitoring human rights violations in El Salvador.⁷ This changing scope, scale, and number of peacekeeping operations naturally invites exploration into new activities, including the potential of air power.

Finally, the recent explosion of peacekeeping efforts brings to the forefront reoccurring operational problems which inhibit the efficiency of peacekeeping forces. Perennial difficulties in information gathering, communications and rapid deployment are exacerbated as a result of the foregoing changes. Consequently, financial concerns are forcing peacekeepers to achieve efficiencies through the integration of high-technology equipment.

Clearly the new world order has generated a need to explore the increased use of air power in the peacekeeping context. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of research and information concerning the role of air power. To remedy this weakness, this study constructs a comprehensive framework that categorizes the functions of air power and then applies them in the peacekeeping context.⁸ This effort will focus on the application of air power specifically within the peacekeeping context and will not attempt to reconcile the political and theoretical debate concerning the role of peacekeeping in international relations.⁹ In addition, the proposals within this study in no way purport that UN peacekeeping is a panacea for all international instability—peacekeeping is only a part of the larger international conflict control process. Furthermore, the application of air power is plainly of secondary importance to the combined efforts of numerous nonmilitary agencies working towards the goal of peaceful containment and ultimate settlement of a conflict. The main point is that peacekeeping is a technique in international relations which will be increasingly adopted by the United States and the use of air power will be a primary consideration.

Notes

1. There is no international agreement on the spelling of "peacekeeping." The preponderance of literature, to include the International Peace Academy and the US Government, do not use a hyphen while United Nations publications generally use a hyphen as in "peace-keeping."

2. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 28; John R. Bolton, "U.N. Peacekeeping Efforts to Promote Security and Stability," *The DISAM Journal*, Summer 1992, 50.

3. Raymond J. Barrett, "U.N. Peacekeeping and U.S. National Security," *Air University Review* 24, no. 10 (March–April 1973): 34.

4. Boutros-Ghali, 7.

5. President George Bush, "Address by the President of the United States of America to the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *USUN Press Release 84-(92)*, 21 September 1992.

6. Michael and Tracey Krepon, "Open Skies and UN Peace-keeping," *Survival*, May–June 1990, 251.

7. J. S. Bremner and J. M. Snell, "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, August 1992, 8; John Mackinlay, "Powerful Peace-keepers," *Survival*, 243.

8. The term *air power* is used in the broadest sense to include all air- and space-borne assets available from *all* military services.

9. This work will primarily use United Nations peacekeeping examples, but it is clear that the US can engage in peacekeeping operations outside UN auspices.

Chapter 2

Discussion of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it.

—Anonymous United Nations Peacekeeping Soldier

Although the majority of peacekeeping operations occur under UN auspices, peacekeeping was not created by the UN Charter. Consequently, the development of peacekeeping was evolutionary and the term has come to mean many things, especially as applied in the non-UN context. In fact, one peacekeeping expert proclaims: “Non-UN peacekeeping has come to mean whatever those applying it have wished it to mean.”¹ Even so, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recently stated: “Peace-keeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations.” In fact, peacekeeping was the brainchild of Prime Minister Lester Pearson of Canada and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and developed over the decades by Sir Brian Urquhart, a lifelong United Nations official.²

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United Nations Charter was drafted to lay a foundation for greater international peace and security. Unfortunately, the realities of the emerging cold war paralyzed the United Nations. The charter’s dream “to maintain international peace and security” was not achievable through the prescribed mechanisms.³ Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for peaceful resolution of conflict through “negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement . . . or other peaceful means;”⁴ however, these mechanisms were inadequate to deal with the realities of cold war politics. The only alternative for the UN was to turn to the enforcement provisions of chapter VII which empower the Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”⁵ Again, cold war politics ensured a divided Security Council, and the result of any proposed chapter VII action was usually a veto. Hamstrung, without unanimity among the members of the Security Council, the UN began to improvise and peacekeeping became an alternative to direct cold war confrontations. Former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld fittingly referred to peacekeeping as chapter VI 1/2 of the UN Charter.⁶ The rudimentary beginnings of UN peacekeeping consisted of a simple observer mission in Jerusalem after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 with the first use of military peacekeeping forces during the Suez crisis of 1956. In subsequent years, the role of peacekeeping continued to expand to include such diverse activities as the monitoring of elections in Namibia or

Haiti; providing humanitarian assistance in Cyprus and most recently in Somalia; and the disarmament of insurgents in Nicaragua and Cambodia.⁷ Peacekeeping has evolved into a permanent process within the UN.

Peacekeeping Defined

In simplest terms, peacekeeping is primarily a diplomatic tool used to stimulate the peaceful resolution of conflict and is not an end in itself. Since the existence of peacekeeping was not foreseen in the UN Charter, there is no internationally accepted definition of peacekeeping. Consequently, this study will use a synthesis of the International Peace Academy and historical United Nations outlooks:

Peacekeeping is an international technique used in conjunction with diplomacy for the purpose of conflict management. Peacekeeping operations employ voluntary military and diplomatic personnel from one or more countries to either create the conditions for conflict resolution or to prevent further hostilities through the supervision of an interim or final settlement of conflict. Peacekeeping forces are *impartial* and exist only with the *consent* of all disputing parties; therefore, peacekeeping forces do not interfere with the internal affairs of the host countries or use coercion to enforce agreements—the use of force is limited to self-defense.⁸

The above peacekeeping definition embodies a number of principles or foundations which set peacekeeping apart from other international methods of conflict control or resolution. These principles are

1. use of force for self-defense,
2. impartiality,
3. consent,
4. effective military support,
5. balance of forces,
6. clear and achievable mandate, and
7. centralized command.

The first three principles of “the use of force for self-defense,” “consent,” and “impartiality” are considered prerequisites for a peacekeeping operation. The principle of “effective military support” will be the crux of the next chapter’s analysis of the role of air power in peacekeeping. The final three principles, if followed, will enhance the prospects for a successful operation.

The Use of Force for Self-defense

The first and the most defining peacekeeping principle specifically limits the use of force to self-defense. Historically, peacekeeping evolved due to the deliberate effort to avoid enforcement as outlined in chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, due to the changing international environment, there is increasing pressure to relax this principle. Indeed, the UN itself is blurring the distinction between self-defense and enforcement. For example, the Security Council authorized peacekeepers in Bosnia to use force to stop any interference with their mission. Commenting on this situation, David Scheffer, an

international lawyer, claims the UN is using this action “as a pretext to avoid the kind of [enforcement] force necessary” as outlined in chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁹ Furthermore, Donald Snow correctly criticizes this trend: “The danger is in thinking peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace-enforcement situations; that somehow these situations represent a linear extension of one another.”¹⁰ This principle represents a symbolic barrier, which, if broken, will at the very least cause significant operational problems; and at worst, could allow application of military force to theoretically become unlimited. Therefore, the consequences of blending peacekeeping and peace enforcement can be significant.

The first consequence is the increased difficulty of the international peacekeeping agency to control the actions of the individual national forces. Although not a peacekeeping operation, the activities of the United States in postwar Iraq are representative of this. In January 1993, the US unilaterally destroyed a suspected Iraqi nuclear production facility without UN approval. The UN was impotent in the face of this action and had international criticism as the only recourse. A second consequence of using force is that the peacekeeping operation may become identified with the policy of the nation leading the effort rather than the international community as a whole. Again, US postwar actions in Iraq are illustrative—where the US attempted to enforce UN resolutions by destroying Iraqi air defense radars. Although compliance was achieved, the action generated sympathy among the Arab nations and further identified UN action with US policy.¹¹

Political considerations aside, there are also practical limitations to using force in a peacekeeping operation.¹² First, the use of force in peacekeeping operations is associated with past failure. The UN intervention in the Congo in 1961 and the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon are examples of the negative effects of using firepower to enforce the authority of an interpositional force.¹³ Both operations resulted in significant UN casualties and left behind a situation which was worse than before intervention. Secondly, the UN does not have the planning capability, experience, or infrastructure to command and administer military force in a proactive manner. Consequently, home governments will increase their involvement to decrease the risk to their troops. Finally, UN forces are often inferior in strength and armament to the parties in dispute. Therefore, the line between self-defense and proactive military action may become very fine.

The Principles of Consent and Impartiality

Also paramount to the concept of peacekeeping are the principles of “consent” and “impartiality.” First, consent is a measure to avoid the suggestion of enforcement as defined in chapter VII of the UN Charter. Clearly, the premeditated use of force would not garner the consent of the parties in dispute and the operation could not be established. Unfortunately, the principle of consent is not always cut and dry. In cases of cease-fire or transfers of power,

it may be impossible to gain consent of all parties, either because they cannot be consulted, or do not want to be consulted.¹⁴ In Lebanon, it was impossible to identify all the parties involved, much less receive their consent.¹⁵ Another example is the ongoing Cambodia peacekeeping effort where the Khmer Rouge have actually withdrawn their consent to the operation, yet the peacekeepers remain. Furthermore, consent is inextricably dependent on the impartiality of the peacekeeping force. Once peacekeepers appear to favor a particular party, the other parties will likely withdraw consent.

Principle of Effective Military Support

The principle of “effective military support” is the *sine qua non* of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping necessarily relies on military forces, as their readiness, training and equipment are readily compatible with the varied peacekeeping operations. Effective military support is achieved through the proper application of military equipment and personnel.¹⁶ It is in support of this principle that the role of air power resides.

Additional Principles

The final three principles are the result of lessons learned and adherence to them will improve the chances for success. A “clear and achievable mandate” provides the guiding light for consensus in the face of international instabilities; while, a “balance of forces” ensures diverse representation for approval and recognition by the world community. Finally, the principle of “centralized control” is simply a statement of necessity for any military operation.

In summary, the key peacekeeping foundations of impartiality, consent, and limitation of force are interrelated and inseparable. Strict adherence to these foundations enables peacekeeping to remain an effective tool of the conflict resolution process. Once force is introduced, one must recognize that the fundamental purpose has shifted within the conflict control spectrum and another tool may be more appropriate. One can argue that the distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement may be nothing more than semantics and perceptions. However, perceptions are important and the fact that the line between the two is not absolute does not imply that it is of little significance. On the contrary, the saliency of that distinction continues to be necessary for peacekeeping operations to obtain consent from the relevant parties and remain a viable tool for the international community.¹⁷

Peacekeeping and International Conflict Control

As implied in the previous discussion, peacekeeping is distinct in application, yet interrelated to the techniques of preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and peace building. Peacekeeping is emphatically a

part of the international conflict resolution process and cannot be undertaken without consideration for the complete process as depicted in table 1.

Table 1

Stages of Conflict and Techniques Available¹⁸

<i>Conflict Stages</i>	<i>Techniques</i>
Pre-War	Preventive Diplomacy
Wartime	Peacemaking
	Peace Enforcement
Post-War	Peacekeeping
	Peace Building

First, the concept of **preventative diplomacy** encompasses purely diplomatic actions taken in anticipation of, or during a dispute between parties *before* armed conflict has occurred. A natural outcome of this diplomatic action may be the introduction of peacekeeping forces to facilitate peaceful negotiation between the parties. Preventive diplomacy is governed under the auspices of chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Peacemaking is the next step in conflict resolution and occurs *after* the failure of preventive diplomacy and armed conflict has begun. Peacemaking is diplomatic action to bring the hostile parties to permanent resolution or temporary cessation of hostilities through peaceful means. Peacemaking efforts may be concurrent with a peacekeeping operation. The primary difference between peacemaking and peacekeeping is that peacekeeping attempts to provide the atmosphere in which the peacemakers can negotiate and arbitrate for peace. Peacemaking is clearly more difficult.

After the failure of peacemaking efforts, **peace enforcement** attempts to coerce the disputing parties into agreement. Peace enforcement differs from peacekeeping primarily through the use of force and the lack of consent among the disputing parties. This technique clearly indicates an escalation of the conflict resolution process; within the UN context, peace enforcement is governed under the auspices of chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Finally, if peacekeeping or peace enforcement is successful, the conflict resolution process can turn to postconflict **peace building**. This term describes the efforts of the international community to resolve underlying problems and raises the chances for a stable and long-lasting peace. Peacekeeping operations may continue for an indefinite period while peacebuilding efforts are under way. An example of this situation is the UN peacekeeping force established in Pakistan in 1949, which continues to this day.

In summary, peacekeeping is a complicated mechanism most notably recognized through the nonuse of force. Although past peacekeeping efforts have used coercive force, these situations are not the ideal and must be recognized as departing from the peacekeeping paradigm into another method of conflict resolution.

Peacekeeping in the 21st Century

United States participation in peacekeeping is at a crossroads. The end of the cold war enables and also demands the direct involvement of the US and other Security Council members. In addition, there are several international and domestic trends further modifying the character of peacekeeping and require greater US participation—in the form of air power.

The first international trend is the proliferation of technology and weapons among the less-developed nations of the world. As weapons and technology become cheaper and easier to obtain, peacekeepers will find their job more difficult. The ability of peacekeepers to effectively monitor accords will decrease as disputing parties increase their tempo of operations through improved mobility and communications. Peacekeepers will, in turn, be exposed to greater risks due to the increased range, accuracy, and lethality of today's weapons; eventually resulting in an erosion of operational effectiveness. Accordingly, peacekeepers will need advanced military equipment, including air power, to help offset the negative consequences of this trend.

The next international trend is the increased responsiveness and mutual cooperation of the international community towards conflict resolution and peacekeeping. More and more, the international community is using economic and political pressure to coerce disputing parties to begin peace negotiations and accept peacekeeping forces. The consequences of this trend are threefold.

First, as the number of peacekeeping activities increase, the range of operational tasks also increases, thus putting a premium on flexibility and enhancing the potential for air power. From simple observation missions to complicated disarmament operations involving over 20,000 peacekeepers, the tasks of peacekeeping are becoming greatly diversified. The following list represents a sample of past or ongoing peacekeeping operations.

1. Supervision of disputed territories, withdrawals and disengagements, POW exchanges, and elections (Cambodia, 1992)
2. Maintenance of postconflict security/stability through armistice observation or cease-fire supervision (Mozambique, 1993)
3. Restoration of peace (Angola, 1991; Congo, 1960) through internal pacification or supervision of demilitarization and demobilization
4. Maintenance of law and order (Somalia, 1992)
5. Protecting delivery of humanitarian assistance (Bosnia, 1992)
6. Guarantee right of passage (Suez, 1956)
7. Interposition of a buffer force either internally (Cyprus, 1964) or at an international border (Golan Heights, 1974)¹⁹

A second consequence of increased international cooperation is the origination of peacekeeping accords earlier in the conflict resolution process. As a result, the duration of peacekeeping operations may be longer while the disputing parties work out their differences. Peacekeeping will need to be increasingly efficient in future operations or the already spiraling cost will become unbearable.

A third consequence of increased international interest is a demand for greater responsiveness. One recent criticism of the UN is the failure to respond quickly due to a lack of effective coordination between the numerous participating members. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali commented: "One of the lessons learned during the recent headlong expansion of UN peacekeeping is the need to accelerate the deployment of new operations."²⁰ Consequently, the Security Council recently requested UN members to express their willingness for short-notice response of peacekeeping missions.²¹ This increased emphasis on responsiveness will ultimately place a greater dependence on air mobility assets, a function traditionally shouldered by the United States.

One final international trend is the weakening concept of national sovereignty, which may allow the increased use of intrusive air power technology. The recent repression of sovereignty is summed up well by the UN Secretary-General: "The centuries old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory."²² Indeed, according to Donald Snow, the Westphalian principle of state sovereignty was directly assaulted by three recent UN actions: Operation Provide Comfort on behalf of the Kurds in 1991; Operation Restore Hope in Somalia; and the UN actions in Bosnia. Furthermore, Snow observed: "Implicitly each operation promotes the contrary position that individuals and groups within nation-states have international rights in some cases such as when atrocities are committed against them) supersede the sovereign right to govern and assert an international right to intervene in such instances."²³ Consequently, as the absolute right of sovereignty becomes less sacrosanct, the arguments against intrusive technology lose force.²⁴

In addition to these international trends, recent domestic trends also elevate the call for air power in peacekeeping operations. First, the ongoing military drawdown will increase the reliance on existing equipment and organizations designed for conventional military operations. Therefore, if and when the US increases direct peacekeeping participation, equipment and organizations will most likely not be designed and procured specifically for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping contributions will necessarily rely on versatile assets, such as air power, that are readily compatible with the military peacekeeping functions.

A second domestic trend—risk aversion—will have direct implications for the use of, and will ultimately limit, ground forces in peacekeeping. Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole recently expressed the congressional outlook about the increased sensitivity for the safety of ground troops if used in Bosnia: "Insofar as you can detect, a common thread in Congress, is a concern about involving US ground troops; no one seems to want that."²⁵ Consequently, no US government is likely to undertake peacekeeping operations that promise more than a handful of casualties, especially those not concerned with vital interests. The US will thus be faced with an international environment demanding increased peacekeeping participation and a domestic environment cautioning against casualties. To resolve this apparent dilemma, policymakers are likely to first consider lower risk air power options.

A final domestic trend is a direct legacy of the successful performance of air power in the Persian Gulf War—precision, efficiency, and intensity. While peacekeeping does not necessarily anticipate the use of force, policymakers will nevertheless favor air power as a hedge against escalation into peace enforcement.

In summary, policymakers have clearly indicated the US will increase participation in peacekeeping operations. A comparison of land, naval, and air assets to the implications of the aforementioned trends suggest air assets may have a comparative advantage. Naval surface assets have a limited role in peacekeeping, and the current trends do not suggest a significant increase.²⁶ Although land resources are an obvious peacekeeping choice, they offer few unique capabilities beyond existing UN peacekeeping resources. Air power, on the other hand, has both the flexibility and unique capabilities to offer something new to peacekeeping and minimize the negative consequences of the changing nature of peacekeeping. All of this put together indicates that air power may be the logical first choice to fulfill increased US peacekeeping commitments.

Notes

1. Indarjit Rikhye, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," in *Peacekeeping Appraisals and Proposals*, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 6.
2. Paul Lewis, "A Short History of the United Nations Peacekeeping," *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, Autumn 1992, 7.
3. Henry W. Degenhardt, *Treaties and Alliances of the World* (London: The Eastern Press, 1986), 15.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 16.
6. Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse'," *Survival*, May–June 1990, 196.
7. Bruce Russett and James Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, 164.
8. The International Peace Academy is a nonpolitical, nonprofit, educational institute located at the United Nations and is regarded to be a leading academic authority on peacekeeping activities.
9. Lucia Mouat, "UN Struggles to Keep Politics Out of Relief," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 7 January 1993, 3.
10. Donald M. Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993), 19.
11. Russett, 167.
12. John Mackinlay, "Powerful Peace-keepers," *Survival*, May–June 1990, 241.
13. Ibid., 242.
14. Gustav Hagglund, "Peace-keeping in a Modern War Zone," *Survival*, May–June 1990, 233.
15. John Mackinlay and Jaret Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992, 120.
16. J. D. Murray, "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping: Problems and Recommendations," in *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 181.
17. Johan Jorgen Holst, "Enhancing Peace-keeping Operations," *Survival*, May–June 1990, 269.

18. Snow, 20; Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 11.
19. JCS Pub 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," Proposed Final Pub, November 1992, IV-1; James C. Wise, "How Not to Fight: Putting Together a US Army Force for UN Peacekeeping Operation," *Military Review*, December 1977, 23; Michael S. Serrill, "Under Fire," *Time*, 18 January 1993.
20. Boutros-Ghali, 92.
21. Frank J. Prial, "UN Seeks Signal On Troop Notice," *New York Times International*, 30 October 1992, sec. A11.
22. Boutros-Ghali, 99.
23. Snow, 3.
24. J. S. Bremner and J. M. Snell, "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, August 1992, 8.
25. John M. Goshko, "Christopher Defines US Role in Negotiations on Bosnia Peace," *Washington Post*, 12 February 1993, 32.
26. An International Peace Academy publication by Robert Stevens Staley II addresses the potential for naval peacekeeping operations, *The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).

Chapter 3

Air Power and Peacekeeping

The expenses required to prevent a war are much lighter than those that will, if not prevented, be absolutely necessary to maintain it.

—Benjamin Franklin

The role of air power in peacekeeping is auxiliary and its use should ultimately improve the chances for success. Specifically, air power must support both the general peacekeeping principles and the specific objectives of an operation.

A review of the peacekeeping principles reveals that the strategic contributions of air power fall under the principles of “international approval and support” and “effective military support.” First, the contributions of US air power for international recognition can be significant. As the sole remaining superpower, US willingness to use valuable air power assets reflects an important commitment both financially and materially to UN operations.¹ In the past, the US only provided political and financial support, yet the evolving international environment now expects direct personnel and material contributions. Consequently, the lack of direct US involvement will be a signal that the particular operation is not important or does not have a good chance for success. Therefore, in many circumstances, US air power commitments may foster greater international confidence and reassure contributing countries that their commitment of resources is prudent.

In addition to showing commitment, air power also can provide added credibility to peacekeeping in the eyes of the disputing parties. Improved effectiveness in observation and reporting can reduce mistrust among the disputing parties and foster the confidence building necessary for the long-term resolution of differences. An example of this potential was seen in the Sinai where the US provided modern surveillance and communications equipment to the peacekeepers, thus enhancing the confidence of Egypt and Israel during the disengagement and cease-fire.² In sum, the commitment of air power can act as a political statement signaling a higher level of US commitment to the world community, add credibility to UN peacekeeping, and have the added benefit of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

Despite these strategic benefits, there may also be attendant adverse consequences of using air power, which must be considered in the context of the

specific peacekeeping situation. These consequences include philosophical concerns, economic restrictions, and unpredictable utility.

First, traditional peacekeepers argue that air power and high technology have little utility for dealing with problems rooted in ethnicity, philosophy, and politics. However, the use of air power does not suggest that it can replace the personal interaction required of the ground peacekeeping force. Air assets used in peacekeeping are simply a tool to enhance the efforts of the peace builders to achieve a long-term resolution of hostilities. Furthermore, this argument is closely related to the issue of national sovereignty discussed earlier. Suffice it to say that this is a major concern and may inhibit the use of air power if the disputing parties reject intrusive technology. Nevertheless, this issue will be resolved prior to a given operation and will therefore not directly inhibit its chances for success.

Secondly, there is a significant concern for the negative perceptions of disputing parties when faced with the destructive potential represented by US air forces. Ultimately, this problem is not specific to air assets but rather a part of the larger philosophical argument concerning the use of force. Indeed, negative perceptions among disputing parties may be justified if the UN continues to close the gap between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Granted, air power may amplify these negative perceptions and, as such, the use of air power must be sensitive to the fundamental peacekeeping principles. Therefore, the UN must make specific efforts to reassure the disputing parties.

Next, there is a justifiable concern for the financial implications of air power operations. Due to the increasing size and number of operations, the UN peacekeeping budget has mushroomed from \$421 million in 1991 to over \$2.7 billion in 1992.³ Accordingly, UN officials are extremely cost conscious. In fact, the cost problem is so acute the UN recently criticized Canadian peacekeepers as a “high cost” contributor, due to their insistence on deploying properly equipped units.⁴ One answer, however, was recently proposed by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. He stated that high-value assets, if provided by the great powers, will have to be provided free of cost. Consequently, the burden of cost will be a domestic political concern rather than a burden on the already strapped UN coffers. From a US perspective, these costs will have to be weighed against the potential contributions of air power towards the success of peacekeeping and the conflict control process in general.

Finally, a fundamental issue is the question of air power’s operational utility. Policymakers must have a sense of the potential utility before deciding on a given political course of action. Unfortunately, the benefits of air power will not be constant due to numerous variables such as the scope and length of the operation, geography and weather. The combination of these variables and others within the unique peacekeeping paradigm make it extremely difficult to isolate the specific benefits of air power. Consequently, a general assessment of air power capabilities is required to provide policymakers with a sense of its operational utility—the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to this task.

Operational Analysis

The suggestion of using air power in peacekeeping may well prompt images of highly sophisticated airborne sensing equipment to record every ground movement, aircraft that whisk peacekeepers to trouble spots, satellites peering over the shoulders of troops, and sophisticated communications instantaneously reporting violations of accords. While these capabilities may be possible with increased US involvement, there are also associated limitations of air power in the peacekeeping context. This operational analysis will provide a framework to analyze the impact of air power on peacekeeping operations.

To begin, peacekeeping forces are necessarily made up of military assets and, as such, are the keystone to a successful operation. It is the military forces that perform the peacekeeping tasks in support of the political peacemaking or peace-building objectives. Consequently, any degradation of military performance due to difficulties or problems will have a direct effect on the successful outcome of any given operation. To examine the role of the military and specifically air forces, we may consider their services in a functional context. The functional categories of command and control, communications, intelligence, mobility, and force protection are common to all peacekeeping tasks and provide a framework to examine the strengths and weaknesses of air power. The relative predominance of each functional category will fluctuate according to the specific peacekeeping operation but are representative of the spectrum of potential requirements. These functional duties combined with unique air power characteristics bring to peacekeeping a set of tools to potentially overcome habitual difficulties. In fact, the air power characteristics of responsiveness, flexibility, mobility, and range may apply particularly well to the numerous situations often faced by peacekeepers within these functions.

Command and Control

Effective command and control is vital to peacekeeping, and centralization is a fundamental command principle. While air power may indirectly contribute to command and control through improved communications (to be discussed later), the concern in this study is the task of integrating high-value US air assets into the UN command and control structure. The satisfactory resolution of this problem will dictate whether US air power can feasibly be included in peacekeeping operations.

From a US perspective, the greatest obstacle to committing air assets is the command and control of these assets. Historically, the UN demands operational control of military forces under a UN commander. However, the US is reluctant to relinquish the command of military assets, especially high-value air forces. This position is summed up in the Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report*: "The United States will not delegate to anyone outside our government the authority to commit U.S. forces."⁵ The force of this position is due to

historical tradition and a hesitancy to relinquish control of US forces in risky situations. However, the underlying reasoning for this position may not be insurmountable when applied to the peacekeeping context.

First, the “tradition” argument recently lost its force. The US involvement in Somalia has set a precedent for future UN peacekeeping command relationships. The US currently has over 4,000 troops under the command of Turkish General Cevik Bir, representing the largest number of American troops ever serving under a foreign commander in a UN operation.⁶ Furthermore, the Russians have also broken with tradition and indicated their willingness to commit military forces under UN operational command.⁷

The second and more realistic impediment emanates from strategic and operational concerns for commitment of US forces in high-risk situations. First, this fear incorrectly assumes air power may be used without US approval. Ultimately, the US can control air power assets at the strategic level through the initial wording of the UN mandate and, if necessary, a veto in the Security Council.

Second, the operational command and control concerns emanate from the dual fear of air power misapplication and excessive exposure to risk. Indeed, the fear that air power may be used improperly correctly identifies a UN structural weakness. The United Nations does not have the capability or expertise to run a large air power operation, and the employment of air power would therefore be accomplished *ad hoc*. Maj Jay Meester, the chief of Air Section during the Congo peacekeeping operation, succinctly supports this fear:

Perhaps the most glaring problems are the misuse of tactical air power and the inability to effectively command and control it. Actually these factors are tied together. Group Commanders [non U.S.] are, by and large, minimally efficient. . . . Consequently, inordinate demands for air support are made with little appreciation of air capabilities. Control of air assets has been decentralized to allow independent action on the part of each ground commander.⁸

The US can, however, mitigate these concerns through the structure of air power participation. One organizational solution may be to create a UN “air component commander” headed by a US airman. This concept would be in line with the current peacekeeping tradition to divide national forces into sectors—the US sector would be the air. This command would retain substantial operating independence, yet would be subordinate to the needs of the overall UN force commander. In essence, this arrangement would be similar to the current command and control structure used for US fighter aircraft supporting the Bosnia no-fly zone.⁹ Although this operation is under NATO command, it is under the strict political control of the UN. Whereas the US maintains operational control through NATO, the ultimate strategic direction flows through the UN force commander and is approved by the Security Council.

Similarly, the “risk” concerns can be mitigated through the aforementioned command arrangement. However, there will always exist the prerogative of the UN force commander to override operational recommendations. Even so,

these fears may be without basis due to the fact that peacekeeping is not a combat operation. The risk associated with the use of air power in peacekeeping, as compared to its use in combat, is fundamentally different. Throughout history only a handful of peacekeeping aircraft have been intentionally destroyed.

In summary, strategic command and control of US air power will ultimately reside with the US by virtue of its position on the Security Council. Air power assets ought not to be committed to an unwanted action without US approval. Operationally, US concerns for effective air power application and avoidance of unnecessary risk are warranted, but can be solved by the integration of US expertise into the chain of command. The importance of this command and control problem must not be minimized, as its resolution is a prerequisite to achieving peacekeeping benefits in the following functional areas.

Communications

It is probably true to say that most peacekeeping operations will continue to use [communication] equipment about a generation behind those currently in use in the more modern and larger armies.

—*The Peacekeeper's Handbook*

Although the structure of command and control is important, the essence of its effectiveness is dependent on the function of communication. Timely and adequate signal communications at all levels of the operation is necessary to effectively plan, direct, and control the various peacekeeping activities. At the strategic level, secure and reliable communications provide the interface between operations and the UN Headquarters. While at the operational level, effective communications is a necessity, not only in routine daily operations, but for communications associated with the peace-building effort. Heretofore, sophisticated communications equipment in UN peacekeeping operations was either unavailable or prohibitively costly and the result was less efficient peacekeeping communication capabilities.

In the peacekeeping setting, communications are particularly difficult due to a trio of problems. First, peacekeepers are often hampered by interoperability problems due to different national equipment, procedures and languages. Although one may argue the integration of air power may contribute to this problem, these difficulties will be pervasive regardless of the military approach the US ultimately employs in peacekeeping.

Secondly, the lack of permanent communications facilities often forces peacekeepers to rely on temporary and ad hoc arrangements. The current peacekeeping effort in Bosnia is illustrative as peacekeepers rely on unreliable high-frequency radio communications.¹⁰ This problem is best summed up by a Canadian peacekeeper: "I was involved in setting up communications for several peacekeeping operations, and every time was completely different. We

were never sure what would work until we hit the ground, and we were usually wrong the first time. If someone was to ask me to pick a system to use for area surveillance in all these operations, I don't think it exists."¹¹

Finally, communications are often hampered due to intentional degradation of communication capabilities. Information is critical to the disputing parties and these parties routinely try to gain an advantage through bugging and interference of communications.¹² Lt Gen Gustav Hagglund relates his experience as force commander of UNIFIL in Lebanon: "The Norwegian battalion noticed that when it captured infiltrators and reported in Norwegian to the battalion headquarters, South Lebanon Army or Israel Defense Forces patrols appeared on the scene of capture within minutes."¹³ In addition, UN communications are often purposely cut off to preclude the interference of the UN in planned confrontations. Communications efficiency is critical for rapid response, and the effectiveness of UN intervention rests primarily upon the speed and accuracy of the initial reports.¹⁴

Although the problem of interoperability may be intractable, the communication problems of security, speed, range and flexibility can all be improved with air force assets. Air assets cannot, nor should, replace land communications, but they can reduce the aforementioned problems through the use of satellites and occasionally airborne platforms. There is, however, a trade-off between the potential benefits of using air power and the disadvantages of increased costs and complexity—leading to a natural reluctance to embrace air capabilities. The *Peacekeeper's Handbook* aptly sums up this reluctance: "... contingents hitherto used in peacekeeping operations have come from small countries which neither need, nor can afford, the very sophisticated systems used by larger powers. Simple procedures and easily understood methodology will make for greater reliability."¹⁵ In other words, peacekeeping communications are hindered not necessarily by the lack of equipment but due to accommodating the realities of a multinational force. Therefore, the increasing availability of satellite communications to small countries makes satellite communication a viable consideration for the future.

Satellite communication characteristics such as capacity, flexibility, range, reliability, robustness, and resistance to jamming are all useful to peacekeeping forces to help offset the increasing technical sophistication of disputing parties. The multinational effort in the Persian Gulf in 1990–1991 relied extensively on satellite communication despite the modern communication system available in Saudi Arabia. In fact, over 90 percent of the communications into and out of the area of operations were carried over satellite systems, and thousands of inexpensive and reliable satellite communications receivers were used at the unit level.¹⁶ Of note, only a small percentage of these communications traveled over commercial satellite systems readily available to the UN. Consequently, US participation is essential for greater UN satellite access. United States defense systems such as Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM), Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and the Air Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM) can all be adapted for peacekeeping use.¹⁷

In addition to satellites, US airborne communication platforms may be useful on an ad hoc basis. Permanent or land-line communications can be augmented during the critical initial deployment of UN forces with temporary airborne support. Likewise, in times of crisis, airborne communications can replace civil communications which are susceptible to deterioration and unreliability at precisely the time they are needed the most.¹⁸

In sum, air power enhanced communication can provide benefits to peacekeeping at all levels of command. At the strategic level, enhanced satellite communications will provide the UN force commander with reliable and secure communications for impartial negotiations and efficient access to UN Headquarters. At the operational level, both satellite and airborne communications can enhance effectiveness through greater ground unit connectivity and reliability.

Intelligence

Reliable reporting is a cornerstone of all peace-keeping. Good observation devices are essential.

—Lt Gen Gustav Hagglund
Two-time UN force commander

The functional category of intelligence or “military information,” as referred to in the UN context, is essential to verify compliance with the terms of a peacekeeping agreement.¹⁹ The primary source of peacekeeping intelligence will always be the peacekeeper on the ground; however, these forces have limitations particularly in observation capabilities. Rarely do peacekeepers have access to satellite observation, airborne radars, or remotely piloted vehicles. General Hagglund states: “The only way for a peacekeeping force to gain access to this kind of information [high-technology] is for a great power to make it available.”²⁰ Indeed, the willingness of the US to help in this regard was confirmed by President Bush: “We will also broaden American support for monitoring, verification, reconnaissance and other requirements of UN peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations.”²¹ Therefore, increased US participation within the function of intelligence is a distinct possibility. Even though the US has significant national technical means (NTM) for intelligence, the difficulty will be to determine exactly “what” kind of intelligence the UN needs and “how” to make it available.

Perhaps the best way to determine the “what” of intelligence needs is to focus on solving common peacekeeping-intelligence problems. First, peacekeepers cannot be everywhere at all times, especially when the disputing parties do not necessarily want them to be knowledgeable of their activities. The incorporation of night- and all-weather imaging sensors will increase the time in which peacekeeping forces can operate effectively within a given territory. This potential was used in 1975, when an early warning intelligence system was employed in the Sinai. The peacekeeping force used aerial sur-

veillance and satellite reconnaissance to create a system to monitor compliance with cease-fire accords.²²

A second common intelligence problem is the inability to timely detect potential violations or impending violence. Airborne and satellite observation and signals interception capabilities may direct peacekeepers to potential problems and increase manpower efficiency. For example, both the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Operation in the Congo (UNOC) experienced several incidents, including direct attacks on peacekeeping troops, which were avoidable if timely information had been available.²³ Air intelligence provides the force commander with an additional tool to help determine the military aims of the disputing parties.

A third problem area is the inability of peacekeepers to hold disputing parties accountable for violations of agreements. Minor violations will lead to larger retributions; therefore, unless the disputing parties are effectively deterred from violations, the peacekeeping operation may escalate uncontrollably. For example, during one nine-week period in the UN Iran-Iraq Observer Group mission (UNIIOGM), peacekeepers recorded 1,072 cease-fire violations—the UN was unable to hold the disputing parties accountable.²⁴ Accordingly, better observation techniques may improve deterrence of violations by the threat of releasing incriminating information.

There are a number of air and space intelligence systems which can help solve the above mentioned problem areas. Possible sensors for aerial surveillance include synthetic aperture radar, thermal infrared line scanners, and electro-optical sensors.²⁵ In addition, space platforms can support the spectrum of peacekeeping intelligence needs through signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) to identify and assess troop disposition and movements. Multispectral imagery enables detection of troop movement and the Defense Satellite Program (DSP) can provide information on hostile activities through infrared sensing.²⁶ Most importantly, satellite intelligence collection can be especially timely if combined with satellite communication.

Generally, there is little disagreement on “what” intelligence capabilities can provide peacekeeping—the larger obstacle concerns the “how” part of the problem. This intelligence dissemination problem can be divided into two areas: sensitivity to excessive information collection and management of classified information.

First, the sovereignty issue will fully manifest itself with increased air surveillance. Herein lies the basis for the UN characterization of intelligence as “military information,” as the term *intelligence* connotes both overt and covert intelligence.²⁷ In fact, peacekeeping operations in the Sinai, Cyprus, and most recently in Namibia were specifically denied high-technology information gathering.²⁸ Consequently, disputing parties must be convinced that air intelligence collections will be overt and with the knowledge of all disputing parties.

Nevertheless, there is mounting evidence that peacekeepers may be allowed greater freedom in the area of surveillance as nations become more

familiar with satellites. First, as previously discussed, the rigidity of sovereignty is beginning to erode. Secondly, the perception that satellite imagery is an intrusion is changing due to increasing use and access. The initial precedent for satellite imagery was set almost two decades ago when the US provided Syria and Israel satellite photography every two weeks during the UN Disengagement Observer Force.²⁹ Third, proliferation of obtrusive technology among developing nations may serve to desensitize the parties as they gain increasing access to satellite capabilities. Satellite images are now available in the open market from countries such as France, Germany, Japan, and most recently Russia.³⁰ In addition, over 100 developing nations are involved in some aspect of space research, and up to 18 are expected to complete satellite receiving stations by the turn of the century.³¹ A Canadian peacekeeping study concludes intelligence assets would foster greater confidence among the disputing parties through verification that all signatories to a treaty are actually complying with its terms.³²

The first difficulty of increased intelligence access is developing an acceptable system to manage the dissemination and interpretation of intelligence. Opponents argue increased intelligence capabilities will result in greater infrastructure requirements and information management difficulties. In fact, intelligence-processing requirements will exacerbate UN resource management problems. Intelligence management requires interaction, collation, and fusion of multiple sources of intelligence to pinpoint the type, extent, and location of force activity. In addition, the work load on the functional aspects of communication and mobility will also multiply. Although intelligence growth will cause infrastructure expansion, this problem is not insurmountable.

The second difficulty is the challenge of managing intelligence information, especially that derived from national technical means. Intelligence capabilities are traditionally shrouded by considerable security measures. Although the use of commercial imagery from US LANDSAT or the French SPOT systems would circumvent this problem, these systems have limited utility for peacekeeping. In 1990, LANDSAT users waited an average of 16 days for images, and these commercial systems possess no signals interception capabilities.³³

These previous two dissemination problems may be solved by establishing an international intelligence organization. There are several proposals for international organizations specifically designed to promote international security through the use of satellite intelligence. The International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) is one such proposal which may be adapted to satisfy US security concerns.³⁴ The ISMA concept includes construction of a image-processing and interpretation center, ground processing stations, and organic satellites. Unfortunately, these international intelligence concepts belong to the distant future. Consequently, near-term UN satellite intelligence must utilize existing US intelligence infrastructure.

In this vein, most US intelligence assets can be used for UN purposes in a parasitic manner without great expense or degradation of capability. In other

words, the US intelligence community need not specifically launch or move satellites to support UN activities, but can adapt currently available products. Unfortunately, a negative consequence is a concern for the principle of impartiality since processing could not be truly international. Considering the proliferation of satellite technology, the problem may not be overriding—by the end of the century, over 24 countries will be operating 48 unclassified remote sensing satellites.³⁵

In summary, intelligence or “information gathering” represents one of the greatest potentials for the application of air power in peacekeeping. Both airborne and satellite assets can provide information which will contribute to the success of peacekeeping through better observation. Factional groups may find it more difficult to anonymously disrupt agreements and operations, while the primary disputing parties will be deterred from violating agreements. This deterrent effect is summed up by one observer.

Nations that know what their enemies are doing are less likely to increase world tensions through actions. And nations that know their enemies are observing them are far less likely to threaten international peace through rash behavior. Governments are also more likely to propose and sign treaties if they believe they can verify their enemies' compliance with treaty terms.³⁶

Mobility

Historically, the role of air power in peacekeeping concentrated on transportation and logistical support. Intertheater airlift support for UN peacekeeping is well established and needs little justification in this study. However, the lack of strategic airlift is a continuing concern and has had negative consequences in the past. For example, the airlift logistics system in the Congo operation was unable to fully support peacekeeping operations and the first UN Emergency Force between Egypt and Israel experienced two years of emergency rations.³⁷ Indeed, the current demand for greater timeliness increases the UN reliance on strategic airlift. The UN recently proposed moving up to 30,000 US, European, and Russian troops to Bosnia within 72 hours of a peace agreement.³⁸ The absolute necessity of US strategic airlift will continue for the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, tactical airlift support for UN logistics and transportation has long been overlooked. Since peacekeepers rely almost exclusively on external support mechanisms, tactical mobility is essential for supply of food, billeting, equipment, maintenance, and medical treatment.³⁹ As such, freedom of movement is essential, yet may be one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome for several reasons.

For one thing, modern combat zones are saturated with mines. The UN protection force in Bosnia face this situation, as militias mine essential roads nightly.⁴⁰ In addition, disputing parties often challenge freedom of movement in order to gain an advantage *vis-à-vis* their adversary. This situation is a daily occurrence in Bosnia where closed roads, vehicle checks and harassing fire serves to manipulate the peacekeepers and degrade their effectiveness.⁴¹

In fact, a recent relief convoy in the former Yugoslavia passed 90 roadblocks over a distance of only 250 miles.⁴²

In addition, geopolitical and geographic obstacles can provide insurmountable mobility obstacles to peacekeepers. Again the situation in Bosnia is illustrative, where the fate of thousands in isolated Sarajevo rests primarily on airlifted supplies.⁴³ The US is currently air-dropping up to 78 tons of cargo daily to regions unable to receive supplies via ground convoy.⁴⁴ Harry Summers recently recanted: "The airdrops were ridiculed when they first began and many—myself included—doubted their practical value . . . but we were wrong. . . . the relief airlift was not a symbolic display. Thousands in the region are alive today because of the dedication of US and allied airlifters."⁴⁵

In addition to daily mobility needs, efficient mobility is also critical for effective deterrence of hostilities. Rapid show of force is generally considered to be an effective deterrent to the resumption of hostilities in peacekeeping.⁴⁶ Several experienced Canadian peacekeepers claim that a high state of readiness was a significant factor in avoiding escalation of conflict and decreasing the potential for loss of life.⁴⁷ Often peacekeeping forces are placed in a position to gain quick local superiority by concentrating troops in hopes of persuading the violating party to back off. The situation in Somalia in 1993 illustrates this point. The US Marines established a "quick reaction force" using helicopters for the specific purpose of controlling hostilities before they escalate.⁴⁸ The following general rule applies to peacekeeping: "maximum show of force ensures best minimum use of weapons."⁴⁹

While both US fixed-wing and helicopter assets can enhance peacekeeping mobility, there are also some disadvantages in terms of resources and cost. Efficient airlift will require an expanded ground infrastructure for planning, loading and servicing aircraft. In addition, the expense associated with integrating increased tactical airlift may not be affordable to the UN.

Further mobility improvements can be provided by US satellite capabilities in the form of weather, mapping, and navigation assistance. The US Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) can provide peacekeepers access to weather information. Multi-Spectral Imagery (MSI) capabilities can help identify suitable drop zones, helicopter landing zones, existing roads or airfields and surface conditions affecting ground mobility.⁵⁰ The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Navy Navigation Satellite System can be used for improved peacekeeping.⁵¹ As seen in the Persian Gulf War, GPS receivers were readily available and could provide peacekeepers with enhanced navigation and improved verification of territorial agreements.

One final use of mobility assets is for peacekeeping psychological operations (PSYOP). The use of air assets for PSYOP can be useful as a public information resource. Psychological operations can be used to counter disinformation programs by factions of the disputing parties or to announce the terms of a cease-fire. Air resources can be employed as information delivery platforms for radio and television broadcasting, loudspeakers, and printed literature. Using PSYOP in conjunction with greater mobility of UN officials may lend credibility to the peacekeeping effort.

In summary, improved strategic mobility can increase the timeliness of UN initial deployments to minimize escalation of conflict. Additionally, tactical airlift provides the means of rapidly transporting security forces and supplies to forward areas by physically extending the reach of observers and negotiators. In support of humanitarian relief, tactical airlift can provide direct assistance through food and medicine deliveries or transportation of personnel for public services management, sanitation and hygiene, and medical support. Finally, satellite weather and mapping capabilities can be used to assist both ground and air mobility.

Force Protection

A final function of all military forces is self-protection. In April 1983, 241 American peacekeepers were killed by a suicide car bomb in Lebanon; between October 1992 and mid-January 1993 in Bosnia, the United Nations recorded 54 attacks on its personnel, including shelling of convoys.⁵² All in all, over 600 UN peacekeepers have been killed due to hostile actions or operational accidents, while another 200 were lost due to "other causes."⁵³ Force protection is a growing concern as evidenced by a statement from Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: "An innovative measure will be required to deal with the dangers facing United Nations personnel."⁵⁴ Air power may well be that innovative measure.

The safety of peacekeeping forces relies on a perception among the disputing parties that they will be held accountable for compromising the safety of UN forces. Through a combination of air-enhanced mobility, communications, and intelligence, peacekeepers may be made safer by either avoiding trouble or deterring threatening actions.

Airborne assets can detect large munitions expenditures or unannounced movements of forces. This capability, coupled with enhanced communication capabilities, can improve notification of outlying outposts of an impending threat. The potential of this capability was recognized by Canadian peacekeepers in UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989. The after-action report specifically blames the failure to receive prompt information on troop movements as "potentially disastrous" and recommended national intelligence sources be used for the purpose of self-defense in all future operations.⁵⁵

The previously discussed capability to quickly move reserve forces may not only calm hostilities but also provide an added measure of force protection. This capability may have averted tragedy in 1961 when 44 isolated UN personnel were attacked and ruthlessly massacred.⁵⁶ As a last resort, air power may provide direct intervention with supporting fire in self-defense or evacuation of UN personnel out of a deteriorating situation.

The use of air power assets, as opposed to alternative military assets, may help alleviate the growing US domestic demand to reduce the risk to US military personnel. In this respect, the benefits of providing air power are

twofold. First, although air force personnel are not completely safe, they are relatively safer than the ground forces who are continuously exposed to random bullets, shelling and mines. Second, great powers are prime targets for hostage-taking in an attempt to influence policy. In reality, air commitments are significantly less manpower-intensive than army or marine contingents. Accordingly, air support personnel can easily be located in a specific area which is easier to protect than ground forces spread across a peacekeeping zone among the disputing parties.

Nevertheless, the risk to US personnel can never be completely eliminated by the use of air power. For example, in 1973 a Canadian peacekeeping flight was shot down by Syrian anti-aircraft fire and all nine peacekeepers aboard were killed.⁵⁷ One should not forget Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and seven UN staff members who were killed in an aircraft accident during the Congo peacekeeping effort in 1961.

These instances and the fear of future occurrences provide the strongest general arguments against the use of air power. This argument is best summed up by Lt Gen Philippe Morillon, the current UN force commander in the former Yugoslavia, commenting on the US proposal to provide airdrop relief in Bosnia: "In the current climate of paranoia, everybody will shoot at everything in the air."⁵⁸ The general rightfully based his observation on extreme factional instability and the presence of significant anti-aircraft capabilities. However, events are proving his concerns to be unfounded. Through May 1993, United States C-130 cargo aircraft have accomplished numerous missions without mishap, and their success has prompted Germany and France to join in the humanitarian airlift mission.⁵⁹

Putting It Together— Military Effectiveness

From a macro viewpoint, military forces ultimately serve in the peacekeeping context to help preserve a fragile peace and discourage further conflict. Air power can serve to enhance both effectiveness and efficiency as peacekeepers perform their many tasks. Although measures of effectiveness are extremely difficult to define in the peacekeeping context, there is little doubt that benefits and advantages can be accrued from air capabilities. The synthesis of air-enhanced communications, intelligence, mobility, and force protection will greatly assist peacekeeping tasks, which include armistice observation, preservation of law and order, guaranteeing right of passage, interposition of buffer forces, show of force, and supervision of disputed territories, withdrawals, POW exchange, cease-fire, and elections.⁶⁰ The humanitarian airlift operation in Bosnia provides us an example of the potential of fusing various air power assets.⁶¹ This airdrop operation used space-based GPS assets to improve the accuracy of airdrops; airborne command and control assets (E-2Cs and AWACS) to coordinate fighter escort and identification of threats; and finally, intelligence satellites to provide digital-imaging reconnaissance to verify landing location of airdrops and future drop zones.

In addition to these potential operational benefits, the primary advantage of air power may be to improve overall efficiency, thus leading to greater deterrence against breaking a fragile peace. First, the air component's ability to closely monitor the situation through electronic means or by moving personnel over a wider range of outposts will serve to discourage the disputing parties and factions from attempting to disrupt the peacekeeping process. Second, the air component's ability to quickly provide a show of force may help to diffuse potential hostilities. Third, the ability to provide intelligence sharing may lead to improved trust and confidence among the disputing parties. Fourth, the use of air assets for psychological operations may improve conflict deterrence. Through the use of media capabilities, leaflets, or even loudspeakers, the UN forces can directly communicate with the population or factional groups about the status of agreements or to inform them of the UN presence. Finally, the presence of US air assets may provide a tacit deterrence through the recognizable ability to quickly change a peacekeeping operation into a peace enforcement operation. Although peacekeeping avoids the use of force, concurrent diplomatic peacemaking can make clear the implications of not adhering to the peacekeeping accords. Heretofore, the UN was unable to carry out peace enforcement under chapter VII of the UN Charter, but today's disputing parties understand this can happen much more easily and quickly.

In summary, the improved effectiveness of military forces through the use of US air power may provide the basis for greater success in future peacekeeping operations. At the same time, we must recognize that air power is not a peacekeeping panacea and may at times have a negative influence.

Notes

1. Barton Gellman and Ann Devroy, "US May Offer Troops For Bosnia," *Washington Post*, 10 February 1993, 1.
2. William M. Stokes, "Technology and the Future of Peacekeeping," in *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 8.
3. Paul Lewis, "A Short History of the United Nations Peacekeeping," *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, Autumn 1992, 33.
4. Col A. S. Henry et al., "Peacekeeping," *Final Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/90* (Ottawa, Canada: Program Evaluation Division, 30 June 1992), 184.
5. Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, January 1993, 22.
6. Stanley Meisler, "US, UN Apparently Agree on Somali Command Pact," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 February 1993, 2; Rick Maze, "UN Takes Command of Somalia," *Air Force Times*, 5 April 1993, 8.
7. John Q. Blodgett, "The Future Of UN Peacekeeping," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1991, 212.
8. Maj Jay J. Meester, "Debriefing of Maj Jay J. Meester, chief Air Section, Comish the Republic of the Congo" (Headquarters USAF: Special Warfare Division, 8 January 1965), 1.
9. Nicholas Doughty, "NATO Planes to Guard No-fly Zone," *Washington Times*, 2 April 1993, 7.
10. John F. Burns, "Aid Convoy in Bosnia Is Blocked by Serbs for 3d Day," *New York Times International*, 17 February 1993, A2.

11. S. B. Fleming, *Organizational and Military Impacts of High-Tech Surveillance and Detection Systems For UN Peacekeeping*. ORAE Project Report No. PR535 (Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defence Canada, December 1992), 13.
12. Gustav Hagglund, "Peace-keeping in a Modern War Zone," *Survival*, May–June 1990, 235.
13. Ibid., 235.
14. *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 207.
15. Ibid., 209.
16. Gen Donald J. Kutyna, "The State Of Space," *Defense Issues* 6, no. 14 (1991): 4.
17. Maj Steve Malutich and Maj Bruce Thieman, "Space Systems for Military Use," *ACSC Volume 10: Space Operations*, 1991, 78.
18. *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, 209.
19. Hagglund, 235.
20. Ibid.
21. President George Bush, "Address by the President of the United States of America to the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *USUN Press Release 84-(92)*, 21 September 1992, 4–5.
22. Flemming, 5.
23. J. D. Murray, "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping: Problems and Recommendations," in *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 179.
24. *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, 332.
25. Michael and Tracey Krepon, "Open Skies and UN Peace-keeping," *Survival*, May–June 1990, 255.
26. Malutich, 33.
27. Michael N. Harbottle, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," *Military Review*, September 1969, 49; *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, 59.
28. Henry, 241.
29. Hagglund, 235.
30. Louis J. Levy and Susan B. Chodakewitz, "The Commercialization of Satellite Imagery," *Space Policy*, August 1990, 211.
31. Leonard S. Spector, "Not-so-open Skies," *Space Policy*, February 1990, 14.
32. Henry, 24.
33. Spector, 12.
34. Thomas E. Cremins, "Security in the Space Age," *Space Policy*, February 1990, 37.
35. Ibid., 41.
36. Levy, 213.
37. Murray, 188.
38. Doyle McManus, "Clinton Aides Divided on Use of GIs in Bosnia," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 March 1993, 2.
39. *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, 158.
40. Robert Marquand, "For UN Peacekeepers in Croatia, Isolation is Tough Challenge," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 14 December 1992, 6.
41. Hagglund, 234.
42. Lucia Mouat, "UN Struggles to Keep Politics Out of Relief," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 7 January 1993, 3.
43. Hagglund, 234.
44. Michael R. Gordon, "US Is Increasing Airdrops to Bosnian Town," *New York Times International*, 20 March 1993, 2.
45. Harry S. Summers, "A Date to Remember: Actions, Decisions Pull World to Bosnia," *Air Force Times*, 19 April 1993, 40.
46. Flemming, 11.
47. Ibid.
48. Rick Maze, "UN Takes Command of Somalia," *Air Force Times*, 5 April 1993, 8.
49. Hagglund, 239.
50. Malutich, 30.

51. Ibid., 24.
52. Burns, 1; *The Blue Helmets* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1990), 234; Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), 359.
53. *The Blue Helmets*, 419–450.
54. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 39.
55. Henry, 116.
56. *The Blue Helmets*, 234.
57. Ibid., 109.
58. Burns, A6.
59. Mark Kinkade, "German Crews Practicing Airdrops for Bosnian Relief," *European Stars and Stripes*, 18 March 1993, 2.
60. Johan Jorgen Holst, "Enhancing Peace-keeping Operations," *Survival*, May–June 1990, 265.
61. Craig Covault, "Military Air Operations Grow Over Balkan Crisis," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 19 April 1993, 61.

Chapter 4

Recommendations

Not only politics, but peace-keeping too, is the art of the possible.

—Lt Gen Gustav Hagglund
UN Force Commander, UNDOF and UNIFIL

Any recommendation for the use of air power in peacekeeping must focus on the “art of the possible.” These recommendations assume the relative importance of peacekeeping to the US military will not become greater than an ancillary role. The US, as the sole remaining superpower, will not significantly organize, train, or equip forces based on peacekeeping participation—for it is always feasible to adapt conventionally trained forces for peacekeeping, but the reverse is not true. Furthermore, the international climate requires a variety of military forces to promote lasting peace and security—peacekeeping is only a part of the peace process.

Nevertheless, the presidential mandate is clear: “The need for enhanced peacekeeping capabilities has never been greater . . . and we will work with the United Nations to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping operations.”¹ Consequently, the US will increasingly commit military forces to peacekeeping and US air power assets will be a consideration. The following recommendations should be considered prior to adaptation of US air power assets to peacekeeping.

First, the United States should adopt a definition of peacekeeping which clearly delineates the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This definitional difference should be based on the fundamental principle of “the use of force for self-defense.” The proposed joint definition for peacekeeping does not highlight this basic principle: “Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense actions) that are undertaken by outside forces with consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive peace settlement.”² Furthermore, the proposed *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* (JCS Pub 3-07.3) states peacekeeping is “distinct from enforcement powers,” yet it paradoxically states: “Regional peacekeeping is not directed at enforcing anything *beyond* the negotiated cease-fire/armistice.” (italics added)³ Given the enormous firepower capabilities of air assets, the temptation to slide into peace enforcement and unwanted long-term troop commit-

ments will be all too easy once the firebreak of using force is bridged. The *New York Times* columnist Lawrence Friedman recently argued: "If halting starvation or upholding human rights are now legitimate criteria for American intervention abroad, as compelling as protecting traditional strategic interests, where does President-elect [sic] Clinton draw the new red line?"⁴ One method to draw a line is to participate only in UN peacekeeping operations which require a Security Council vote to alter the mandate from peacekeeping to one allowing enforcement under chapter VII of the UN Charter. American policymakers will thus be presented with a clear decision point to transition from a peaceful supporting role of air assets to the hostile coercive use of air power. In sum, the most obvious benefit of a restrictive peacekeeping definition applied in the UN setting is a positive decision for escalation, rather than a slide down the slippery road of gradualism as experienced in previous conflicts.

Second, the United States should not form a permanent organization of air assets specifically dedicated to peacekeeping operations. The most useful air assets, such as mobility and satellites, are critical resources and the United States can not permanently divert these resources without a commensurate reduction in military capabilities. Furthermore, given the growing number, diversity and ad hoc nature of UN peacekeeping operations, a dedicated organization would probably be inefficient and wasteful.

Nonetheless, the US can effectively increase direct peacekeeping air power support on an ad hoc basis. The Canadian forces may serve as an example, as they do not specifically designate peacekeepers yet are highly regarded for their peacekeeping contributions. The Canadian policy follows.

Preparations for UN service on the part of Canadian military personnel must be varied, with an emphasis on mobility. While the training and equipping of such forces may be of a special nature, the best results can be accomplished through the establishment of regular military formations, which need not be earmarked exclusively for UN service and which can be used for other roles as required.⁵

Furthermore, a recent Canadian defense evaluation of this policy concluded that peacekeeping operations have no adverse impact on overall Canadian military readiness and, "In fact, there were indications that peacekeeping may be having a positive impact on operational readiness in that it has provided occasions when the CF [Canadian Forces] could implement and trial [sic] many of its standard operating procedures for personnel and material deployment."⁶ In sum, the benefits of short-notice peacekeeping deployments to unknown and austere locations may provide tremendous operational experience as the United States adjusts to a security environment typified by uncertainty.

Third, the United States should form a permanent peacekeeping planning group to prepare contingency plans for the integration of air assets. The UN currently does not have a permanent planning agency and the prospects for establishment are slim. The *Canadian Program Evaluation of Peacekeeping* sums up the basis for this observation: "The number and variety of opinions, perceptions and national agendas, in combination with the realities of international politics and the bureaucratic, hierarchal traditions of the UN, will

probably frustrate quick and significant improvements to UN operations and staff procedures, in the near term.”⁷ Consequently, a dedicated US planning staff is necessary to provide policy recommendations and to ensure the proper employment of high-value air power assets.

Fourth, the US should develop a space coordinating group to process satellite intelligence for UN operations and integrate this group with all intelligence sources. This group should not have the authority to direct US satellites but should allow the UN to become a receiver of existing satellite products. The group would fuse several sources of information and also sanitize the information to ensure security classifications are protected.

Fifth, the general knowledge and training for peacekeeping among service members must be increased. George Bush’s call for integration of peacekeeping training into service curriculum ought to be implemented. The Canadians, for example, attribute their peacekeeping success to training and education, without a reduction in general military training.⁸ The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has taken the first step towards specific training by recommending the US Atlantic Command, “Undertake principal responsibility for support to United Nations peacekeeping operations and training units for that purpose.”⁹

Sixth, the United States should not commit unique high-value air power assets such as AWACS, ABCCC, TR-1, RC-135, or JSTARS for other than temporary or crisis peacekeeping service. This policy will ensure peacekeeping operations do not limit policy options or provide a signal if they are unexpectedly removed for nonpeacekeeping operations.

Seventh, the United States should, as a precondition to commitment of air assets, establish a satisfactory UN command agreement. The establishment of an air commander position to be headed by a US airman who reports directly to the UN force commander and the Secretary-General is one possible solution. This arrangement will decrease the misuse of air assets through direct operational control, yet allow the UN force commander to maintain strategic direction.

Eighth, the United States should provide air assets to UN peacekeeping operations free of cost as suggested by the Secretary General *and* continue to maintain the traditional 30 percent share of overall UN contributions. Although air assets are costly, their use will nevertheless provide valuable operational training and experience, not to mention unquantifiable benefits derived from an invigorated UN peacekeeping process. The Clinton administration has recently recognized this need and earmarked \$300 million for peacekeeping operations for the fiscal 1994 defense budget—a figure Defense Secretary Les Aspin conceded might be “too modest.”¹⁰

A final recommendation centers on improving US peacekeeping doctrine. As mentioned, the forthcoming joint doctrine is an improvement, but it is only the first step towards development of service specific operational doctrine—namely Air Force peacekeeping doctrine. The Air Force should be proactive and address doctrine issues *before* commitment of forces. Air power specific doctrinal guidance will be instrumental during policy debate by iden-

tifying the practical limits and guidelines within which a sound air employment strategy can be formulated.

At this time there is no *official* US peacekeeping doctrine. Notwithstanding, the JCS is on the verge of approving Joint Pub 3.07, *Military Operations Other Than War*, which contains a specific chapter on peacekeeping doctrine. In addition, the JCS will soon publish Joint Pub 3-07.3. Heretofore, both JCS and Air Force peacekeeping doctrine fell under the rubric of low intensity conflict (LIC)—where official Air Force operational peacekeeping guidance still resides.

Peacekeeping requires special knowledge and capabilities and the debate on how best to organize and develop air forces to support peacekeeping has only just begun. The proposed joint doctrine provides little useful guidance by simply stating that air power contributions may include airlift; logistics; surveillance; reconnaissance; command, control, and communications; intelligence; aerial refueling; search and rescue; and medical evacuation.¹¹ In fact, the current Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, offers little assistance as it categorizes peacekeeping activities with insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and combating terrorism, and does not even define peacekeeping in its glossary.

Nonetheless, the basic precepts of AFM 1-1 can be applied to the peacekeeping problem to help develop an operational doctrine. Although specific methods and applications may vary according to the nature of the peacekeeping operation, aerospace operations should be founded on the basic tenets of aerospace power. These tenets, coupled with the principles of peacekeeping, will govern the operational application of aerospace power. For example, the inherent flexibility of aerospace power—derived from the advantages of responsiveness, mobility, and efficiency—can help peacekeeping forces achieve rapid concentration of effort from great distances while avoiding terrain difficulties and hostile factions. In addition, serious study of past and present peacekeeping operations may yield conclusions about the best use of air power in peacekeeping.

Notes

1. President George Bush, "Address by the President of the United States of America to the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *USUN Press Release 84-(92)*, 21 September 1992, 2, 5.

2. Lt Col Ann E. Story, chief, Stability Operations Division, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, telephone interview with author, 6 May 1993.

3. John F. Burns, "Aid Convoy in Bosnia Is Blocked by Serbs for 3d Day," *New York Times International*, 17 February 1993, A-3.

4. Donald M. Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute), February 1993, 15.

5. Col A. S. Henry et al., "Peacekeeping," *Final Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/90* (Ottawa, Canada: Program Evaluation Division, 30 June 1992), 134.

6. *Ibid.*, 138.

7. *Ibid.*, 45.

8. *Ibid.*, 251.

9. Gen Colin L. Powell, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles , Missions, and Functions of the Armed forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, February 1993), III-4.

10. Art Pine, "Defense Budget Lists Funds for Peacekeeping," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 March 1993, 5.

11. JCS Pub 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Peacekeeping Operations," revised final draft, August 1992.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

I believe peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are a given.

—General Colin L. Powell
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The resurgence of United Nations credibility, coupled with the United States' position as the world leader, makes future US peacekeeping a "given." The problem now facing policymakers is to determine how military forces can best participate. How often have we seen editorials calling for the use of air power to solve peacekeeping problems in Bosnia? These suggestions, with visions of Desert Storm efficiency, tend to ignore the consequences of turning a given peacekeeping operation into a peace enforcement operation, and they fundamentally misunderstand the true role of air power in peacekeeping. In contrast to these misperceptions, this analysis concludes air power is not a panacea for the underlying political problems associated with peacekeeping. Rather, the well-planned and imaginative use of air power in an auxiliary role may contribute to more effective and efficient peacekeeping.

Before making a conclusion that air power should be used in UN peacekeeping, we must first determine the objectives of increased US participation. If the objective is solely to provide leadership to the world community and preserve US reputation, then air power is an unnecessary and expensive option. However, if the objective is to contribute to crisis reduction and world stability, then air power may be the best vehicle for military participation.

Air power offers capabilities that are different from those already possessed by the UN—the UN does not necessarily need more ground equipment or personnel. The United Nations does need high-technology equipment capable of increasing the operational effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping forces. In this vein, the most promising areas of air power support for UN peacekeeping may be in the realm of US space and mobility assets.

In addition to providing unique capabilities to peacekeeping, air power may also reduce the risks associated with direct US peacekeeping involvement. First, air assets provide a greater margin of safety to US peacekeepers by reducing vulnerability—the memory of the Marine barracks tragedy will not be forgotten soon. Second, the use of air assets provides a clear and credible argument for the US to maintain operational command over military forces. The command and control of US air assets requires special expertise of which few, if any, countries can adequately provide. Third, US participation in a

support role may reduce the perception of US dominance in the minds of the disputing parties. As the US increases participation in UN peacekeeping, we must be mindful of assuming the very role the US is trying to avoid—that of a world policeman. Historically, the US tends to commit military forces in “full force” and the result, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security advisor, is “If the US intervenes largely on its own terms of both military personnel and resources to sustain an operation, it sets a precedent for itself which others will expect the US to follow elsewhere, thus ‘encouraging passivity and sophistry’ on the part of the world community.”¹ Air power can be used as a vehicle to show US political support, but would require other nations to participate as the role of air power is clearly auxiliary. This action would coincide with Mr Brzezinski’s recommendation that the US “ought to take the lead in indicating action, take the lead in saying we are willing to make a contribution, but that it is contingent on international approval and international cooperation.”² Air power thus provides the US with a natural break point of military support without giving the impression of dominating the show.

Notes

1. Gerald F. Seib, “US May Have to Be World’s Policeman or Grant a Larger Role to Other Nations,” *New York Times International*, 7 December 1992, A10.

2. Ibid.

Bibliography

Books

- The Blue Helmets*, United Nations Publication, 1990.
- Boudreau, Thomas E. *Sheathing the Sword: The UN Secretary-General and the Prevention of International Conflict*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
- Degenhardt, Henry W. *Treaties and Alliances of the World*. London: The Eastern Press, 1986.
- James, Alan. *Peacekeeping in International Politics*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1990.
- Jones, Peter. *Peacekeeping: An Annotated Bibliography*. Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1989.
- Kitson, Frank. *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*. London: Faber and Faber, 1991.
- Miall, Hugh. *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1992.
- Mackinlay, John. *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface*. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989.
- Murray, J.D. "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping: Problems and Recommendations." *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*. Edited by Henry Wiseman. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.
- Paschall, Rod. *LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional Warfare In The Next Century*. New York: Brassey's, 1990.
- _____. *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1984.
- Rikhye, Indarjit and Kjell Skjelsbaek, eds. *The United Nations and Peacekeeping*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1991.
- Stokes, William M. "Technology and the Future of Peacekeeping." *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*. Edited by Henry Wiseman. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.
- Weiss, Thomas G., ed. *Collective Security in a Changing World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993.
- Wiseman, Henry, ed. *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.
- Urquhart, Brian E. "Peacekeeping: A view from the Operational Center." *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*. Edited by Henry Wiseman. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.

Government Publications

- Air Command and Staff College. "Introduction to Peacekeeping." Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., November 1992.
- Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*. Vol. 1. March 1992.
- AFM 1-1. *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*. Vol. 2. March 1992.
- AFM 2-11. *Foreign Internal Defense Operations*. 1 January 1992.
- Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20/Field Manual 100-20. *Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict*. Departments of the Air Force and the Army, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1990.
- Ayers, Charles M. *Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. Langley AFB, Va.: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1989.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *An Agenda For Peace*. New York: United Nations, 1992.
- Cheney, Dick, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*. January 1993.
- Dean, David J. *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict*. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986.
- _____. *Low-Intensity Conflict And Modern Technology*. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986.
- Fleming, S.B. *Organizational and Military Impacts of High-Tech Surveillance and Detection Systems For UN Peacekeeping*. (ORAE Project Report No. PR535). Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defence Canada, December 1992.
- Fleming, S.B., et al. *Surveillance and Detection Systems For United Nations Peacekeeping*. (ORAE Project Report No. PR 611), Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defence Canada, December 1992.
- JCS Pub 1-02 (formerly JCS Pub 1). *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. 1 December 1989.
- JCS Pub 3-0 (Test Pub). *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations*. January 1990.
- JCS Pub 3-07 (Final Draft). "Doctrine for Joint Operations Other Than War." April 1993.
- JCS Pub 3-07.3 (Revised Final Draft). "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) For Peacekeeping Operations," August 1992.
- Malutich, Maj Steve, and Maj Bruce Thieman. "Space Systems for Military Use," *ACSC Vol. 10: Space Operations*, 1991.
- Mets, David R. *Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crises*. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986.
- Snow, Donald M. *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order*. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993.

US Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, *U.S. Low Intensity Conflicts 1899–1990*. 101st Cong., 2d Session. A study by the Congressional Research Service, 10 September 1990.

Speeches and Addresses

Bush, George. "Address by the President of the United States of America to the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly." *USUN Press Release 84-(92)*, 21 September 1992.

"Conditions in Somalia: Creating a Secure Environment." Delivered in an address to the nation, Washington, D.C., 4 December 1992.

Periodicals

Adolph, Maj Robert B. "Peacekeeping: Our Least Understood Mission." *Military Intelligence*, July–September 1992.

Barrett, Dr Raymond J. "U.N. Peacekeeping and U.S. National Security," *Air University Review*, March–April 1973.

Beaver, Paul. "The UN Secures a Foothold Towards Peace in Sarajevo." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 July 1992.

Belonogov, Aleksandr M. "Soviet Peace-keeping Proposals. " *Survival*, May–June 1990.

Blodgett, John Q. "The Future Of UN Peacekeeping." *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1991.

Bolton, John R. "U.N. Peacekeeping Efforts to Promote Security and Stability." Reprint of the statement of Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs to House Foreign Affairs Committee on 25 March 1992. *The DISAM Journal*, Summer 1992.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "Empowering The United Nations." *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/1993.

Bremner, J. S., and J. M. Snell "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, August 1992.

Burns, John F. "Aid Convoy in Bosnia Is Blocked by Serbs for 3d Day." *New York Times International*, 17 February 1993.

_____. "Most Relief Operations in Bosnia are Halted by UN Air Agency," *New York Times International*, 18 February 1993.

_____. "UN General Warns On Airdrop Plans." *New York Times International*, 23 February 1993.

_____. "Shelling Grounds Bosnia Evacuation." *New York Times International*, 25 March 1993.

Child, Lt Col John. "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System." *Military Review*. October 1980.

- Covault, Craig. "Military Air Operations Grow Over Balkan Crisis." *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 19 April 1993.
- Cremins, Thomas E. "Security in the Space Age." *Space Policy*, February 1990.
- Doughty, Nicholas. "NATO Planes to Guard No-fly Zone." *Washington Times*, 2 April 1993.
- Forsythe, David P. "United Nations Intervention in Conflict Situations Revisited: A Framework for Analysis," *International Organization*, Winter 1969.
- Gellman, Barton, and Ann Devroy. "US May Offer Troops For Bosnia." *Washington Post*, 10 February 1993.
- Gordon, Michael R. "US Is Increasing Airdrops to Bosnian Town." *New York Times International*, 20 March 1993.
- Goshko, John M. "Christopher Defines US Role in Negotiations on Bosnia Peace." *Washington Post*, 12 February 1993.
- Greenburg, Keith Elliot. "The Essential Art of Empathy." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, Autumn 1992.
- Hagglund, Gustav. "Peace-keeping in a Modern War Zone." *Survival*, May–June 1990.
- Harbottle, Michael N. "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking." *Military Review*, September 1969.
- Harleman, Christian. "Peace-Keeping and Disarmament in the Peace-Building Process." *Disarmament*, No. 3, 1992.
- Hobson, Sharon. "Jane's Interview with Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 19 September 1992.
- Holst, Johan Jorgen. "Enhancing Peace-keeping Operations." *Survival*, May–June 1990.
- Kinkade, Mark. "German crews practicing airdrops for Bosnian relief." *European Stars and Stripes*, 18 March 1993.
- _____. "C-130 mission to Bosnia aborted," *European Stars and Stripes*, 19 March 1993.
- Krepon, Michael, and Jeffrey P. Tracey. "Open Skies and UN Peace-keeping." *Survival*, May–June 1990.
- Kutyna, Gen Donald J. "The State Of Space." *Defense Issues* 6, no. 14, 1991.
- Lancaster, John. "US Airdrops Said to Be on Mark." *Washington Post*, 26 March 1993.
- Levy, Louis J., and Susan B. Chodakewitz. "The Commercialization of Satellite Imagery." *Space Policy*, August 1990.
- Lewis, Paul. "A Short History of the United Nations Peacekeeping." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, Autumn 1992.

- Lewis, Paul. "UN 's Top Official Sees No Need for War Room." *New York Times International*, 27 December 1992.
- MacKinlay, John. "Powerful Peace-keepers." *Survival*, May–June 1990.
- MacKinlay, John, and Jaert Chopra. "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992.
- MacFarquhar, Emily. "Even \$2 billion may not buy peace." *U.S. News & World Report*, 21 December 1992.
- Marquand, Robert. "For UN Peacekeepers in Croatia, Isolation is Tough Challenge." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 14 December 1992.
- Maze, Rick. "UN Takes Command of Somalia." *Air Force Times*, 5 April 1993.
- McManus, Doyle. "Clinton Aides Divided on Use of GIs in Bosnia." *Los Angeles Times*, 19 March 1993.
- Mecham, Michael. "USAF Fills New Role With U.N. Relief Flights." *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 23 November 1992.
- Meisler, Stanley. "Crisis In Katanga." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, Autumn 1992.
- Meisler, Stanley. "US, UN Apparentely Agree on Somali Command Pact." *Los Angeles Times*, 23 February 1993.
- Mouat, Lucia. "UN Struggles to Keep Politics Out of Relief." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 7 January 1993.
- Morrow, Lance. "An Interview: The Man In the Middle." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, Autumn 1992.
- Norton, Augustus R., and Thomas G. Weiss. "Superpowers and Peace-keepers." *Survival*, May/June 1990.
- Paschall, Rod. "The Impartial Buffer." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, Autumn 1992.
- Pine, Art. "Defense Budget Lists Funds for Peacekeeping." *Los Angeles Times*, 26 March 1993.
- Powell, Colin L. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead." *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/1993.
- Prial, Frank J. "UN Seeks Signal On Troop Notice." *New York Times International*, 30 October 1992.
- Richburg, Keith B. "US to Set Up Somali Police Unit." *Washington Post*, 29 January 1993.
- Russett, Bruce, and James Sutterlin. "The UN in a New World Order." *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992.
- Seib, Gerald F. "US May Have to Be World's Policeman or Grant a Larger Role to Other Nations." *New York Times International*, 7 December 1992.
- Spector, Leonard S. "Not-so-open Skies." *Space Policy*, February 1990.

Summers, Harry S. "A Date to Remember: Actions, Decisions Pull World to Bosnia." *Air Force Times*, 19 April 1993.

Urquhart, Brian. "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse'." *Survival*, May/June 1990.

Wise, James C. "How Not to Fight: Putting Together a US Army Force for UN Peacekeeping Operation." *Military Review*, December 1977.

Reports, Theses and Papers

Brinkley, Phillip L. *Tactical Requirements For Peacekeeping Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2 December 1985.

Fenton, Maj J. I. *Should Peacekeepers Use Force?* Toronto, Canada: Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, 1986.

Hamwood, J.S. *Graduated Response by Air Power: The Art of Political Dissuasion by Military Means*. Fairbairn, Australia: Air Power Studies Centre, October 1992.

Henry, Col A. S. et al. "Peacekeeping." *Final Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/90*. Ottawa, Canada: Program Evaluation Division, 30 June 1992.

_____. *Initial Think Piece on Military Support for "Peace Efforts."* Unpublished paper. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: CADRE, 25 January 1993.

Meester, Maj Jay J. "Debriefing of Maj Jay J. Meester, chief Air Section, Comish the Republic of the Congo." Prepared by Special Warfare Division, Headquarters USAF, 8 January 1965.

Mills, Maj Willard N. *U.S. Forces in the Peacekeeping Role: A New Profession*, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1987.

Powell, Gen Colin L. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, February 1993.

Staley, Robert Stephens II. *The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping*. Occasional Paper. New York: International Peace Academy, 1992.

Interviews

Story, Lt Col Ann E. Chief, Stability Operations Division, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. Telephone interview with author, 6 May 1993.