Build-To-Shelve Prototyping: Undercutting Doctrinal Development
Abstract
The lag between the fielding of systems and the development of conflict-winning employment tactics and doctrine is a historical fact we dare not neglect. Yet, DOD acquisition strategy appears to be on the path to do just that. Foregoing the expense of producing weapon systems--an understandable expedient in the budget crunch--has been widely criticized because of its effects on the defense industrial base. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's new approach, called rollover plus," recognizes the need for operational testing. What's been missing from the debate about these alternatives is how any approach that severely limits the numbers of end items fielded also adversely impacts our ability to develop conflict-winning employment doctrine. The famous B- 17 Flying Fortress illustrates where too few prototypes, and shorter than expected strategic warning, led to refining doctrine in combat. Although the B-17 prototype flew in 1935, there were never enough B-17 prototypes to "train like you'll fight" simply because the B-17 wasn't fielded in quantity until war broke out. The 13 B-17 prototypes were not used to develop, let alone practice, the "box" formations that were critical to the notion of "self-defending" bomber formations. The B-17 history-- strategic warning, production based upon tested prototypes, and employment in combat-- is much like what policymakers envision for future weapon system production.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA424859
Entities
People
- Donald Vazquez
Organizations
- Air University