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THE BANALITY OF ISLAMIST POLITICS

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THE BANALITY OF ISLAMIST POLITICS

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ABSTRACT

Political Islam has emerged as an unambiguous threat to liberal and Western-leaning regimes throughout the world. Public discourse has focused on the Islamic nature of this challenge, emphasizing the cultural characteristics of the threat. In contrast, this thesis argues that Political Islam is essentially a political challenge. Further, states can and do dictate the political space available to Islamists. In order to illustrate this argument, Indonesia and Algeria serve as case studies. These two culturally, economically and ethnically diverse nations share a predominance of Muslim adherents. Each nation has struggled with Political Islam. Yet, the consequences of state policy have profoundly differed. Recent innovations in political science theory are employed to provide a uniform structure of comparison between the two case studies. The thesis concludes that states make a choice whether to play offense or defense against their political opposition. When states choose the offensive, using targeted, preemptive repression to subsume the political space, they are successful. When states choose the defensive, using indiscriminate, reactive repression to foreclose political space, they are failures. This thesis implies that states, far from being hapless victims of fervently religious movements, can exercise a broad array of policy options to compete with Political Islam.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE CONTEXT

As America's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) moves into its third year, our national foreign policy debate has struggled to find an insightful and broadly-applicable analytical framework. Such a framework is desperately needed. For, if we are to understand the origins of Islamism and contain Islamist Terrorism, we must first analyze Islamism's political context. Public discourse has rarely moved past the initial attempt to answer two simple questions. Who is attacking us and why were we attacked? The inadequate answer proffered was, "They [terrorists inspired by Islamic Fundamentalism] hate our freedoms..."¹ This sophomoric analytical framework, admittedly optimized for political effect and not intellectual content, ultimately leads to only two policy prescriptions: change whatever terrorists hate about the West or eliminate everyone who hates the West. The former, often labeled 'appeasement', is not considered to be a politically acceptable solution. The latter course is complicated by two factors. First, terrorist groups, not individual states, are assumed to be the proper target of the GWOT.² That is, policy makers have assumed that states are the hapless victims or incompetent hosts of Islamic terrorist groups. Second, these groups are identified by religious, not political labels (e.g. Islamic Fundamentalist, Muslim Radicals). These labels imply that violent Islamic Fundamentalist movements are the product of religious creeds or teachings. Such an implication can blind policy makers to the essentially political genesis of these organizations. This essay will suggest that these violent Islamist organizations are the political product of the failed states they are located within. That is, actors like Osama bin Laden exist and flourish because of the fabulously rich, corrupt and autocratic Saudi regime and the hospitality or ineptitude of Afghanistan's Taliban. Or, Hezbollah and Hamas have emerged from the bloody injustice and cynicism of the Israel/Palestine/Lebanon triangle. To date, US policy has reflected these

¹ George W. Bush, address to a joint session of Congress and the nation, September 20, 2001.

² Ibid.

deep interactions by calling for military force to be applied within states (Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines) in order to destroy the violent Islamist groups they (allegedly) host. Regimes have fallen but the force of Islamic Fundamentalism remains. As yet, a causal relationship between ending bad regimes and ending terrorism does not appear to exist. This should come as no surprise because flawed analysis produces flawed policy prescriptions. Our national policy debate demands better.

B. THE ARGUMENT

Fortunately, refinements in the social sciences can offer better. Recent efforts (Hafez 2003, Wickham 2002, Wiktorowicz 2003) have applied the analytical framework of social movement theory (SMT) to the contentious politics of Islamic Fundamentalists. Others (Migdal 1997, Nasr 2001, VanCreveld 1999) have explored such contentious politics from the state's perspective. These efforts have demonstrated the insightful applicability of state level analysis and SMT to a field of study marked historically by the condescending oversimplification of Orientalism. SMT attempts to answer not why but **how** Islamic social movements become rebellious. Using SMT, one can also help to determine how social movements **do not** become rebellious. In this context, the state level of analysis seeks to explain how regimes consolidate or diffuse power in the face of Islamist opposition. An understanding of how such Islamist movements do or do not become rebellious informs a state's efforts to counter the possibility of rebellion. If international rebellious social movements like Islamic Fundamentalism are analogous to domestic rebellious social movements, then insights generated from this line of enquiry should significantly inform our larger GWOT policy debate. That is, if SMT helps us to understand how a state can impact the rebelliousness of a domestic social movement, then we can infer strategies for how a global hegemony might impact an international terrorist movement. Though critical to the credibility of any eventual conclusions, this thesis will not attempt to test the validity of this assumption. Instead, this paper will simply acknowledge the assumption and focus on the analysis.

The underlying theme for this thesis is that the state determines the level of Islamization in Muslim societies. States are not shapeless puppets moved whimsically by the strings of Islamists or any other social actor. States, weak or strong, consciously decide on the role of Islam. The theoretical framework for this argument is derived from Vali Nasr's *Islamic Leviathan*. He states matter-of-factly that "the state has played a key role in embedding Islam in politics."³ For the purposes of this paper, we also explore the corollary of Nasr's thesis that the state has played a key role in **not** embedding Islam in politics. By investigating Indonesia and Algeria, it will be shown that states do, in fact, matter. These two states have both withstood pressure from the Islamists to make Islam the bedrock of their political system. Although often faced with appeasing Muslim interests, the Indonesian and Algerian states determined whether or not a legitimate and successful Islamic political movement gained the reigns of national power and whether or not rebellion erupted.

The assumption which Nasr disproves is the often widely accepted notion that "Islamization is the work of Islamist movements who have forced their ideology on ruling regimes and other hapless social actors."⁴ In Nasr's case studies, the Malaysian and Pakistani states achieved regime consolidation because they sought to use Islam to legitimize their rule. In Indonesia and Algeria, we will argue that the states have consolidated power (often at a horrific price) because they never allowed Islam to become politically dominant.

This is not to say that Islam is not a powerful force in Muslim societies. But it is to say that the Islamic faith alone is not enough for a majority-Muslim population to evolve into an Islamic state. Politics in Islamic societies often resemble politics in Christian societies. Conflicting societal institutions continually vie for influence. The state will accommodate these institutions based on their relative influence within society.

³ Nasr 2001: 4.

⁴ Ibid: 3.

The usefulness of this paper will be to provide a better understanding of the state/social actor relationship in Islamic societies. There is no cookie-cutter approach that can provide the definitive answer, but this paper suggests a generalized foundation upon which students of state governance can better explain the policies states follow. State level analysis hopes to explain four main questions: “Why do states Islamize? When are they likely to do so? Through what mechanisms and to what ends do they Islamize? And what is likely to be the consequence of this turn to Islam?”⁵ This paper will examine another available strategy for states with Muslim societies. Why *don’t* states Islamize? When are they *not* likely to do so? How are they able to deter Islamization? What will be the consequences of shunning Islamization? Indonesia and Algeria offer strong support that the state does matter in Islamic societies. The state has options in plotting its political course.

C. THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT

It is important to note that this paper readily accepts the notion that the state can and will be shaped by societal influence. But it will be shown that the emphasis must be placed on the state. The state always has a choice in setting its political course. Of course, if all citizens desire *shariah*, the state will have a difficult time maintaining its legitimacy without also moving in that direction. This paper acknowledges the fact that states do not operate in a closed system, immune from society. States use cultural leanings to their advantage. Culture is a tool of the state.⁶ Hegemony and legitimacy are necessities of a strong state, and outside of the monopoly of force, controlling the “cultural underpinnings of their socio-political outlook” takes priority.⁷

This paper hopes to debunk the argument that the role of religion is all-powerful in Muslim societies. By using Indonesia and Algeria as examples, an exception to the inevitability of Islamization in Muslim societies will be shown. The notion that Islamic society is somehow pre-destined to become part of an

⁵ Ibid: 4.

⁶ Ibid: 7.

⁷ Ibid: 8.

Islamic state is not true. The state's leadership has the most important influence on that decision.

In short, culture is obviously a key factor in influencing the state, but it is not the sole, determining factor. The state determines the direction of the state. Obviously, it would be foolish for the state to pursue a policy insulting to the majority of the population. But, the fact is, the leader of the state maintains that option, though he may soon find himself out of power. Sukarno's actions in shaping the Indonesian state provide an interesting example of trying to balance competing societal influences. The Algerian attempt at political reform provides an example of a failed attempt at striking such a balance. In each case, the Islamist position never gained the upper hand.

D. THE STATE

There is no shortage of literature on the importance and significance of the state. For the purposes of our argument, this paper will employ a broad definition of the state. In short, states "provide for education, defense, and health care, and account for economic development and social change."⁸ States make policies, collect revenue, and, in short, greatly impact any number of the citizens' lives.⁹ As a result of conducting these actions, the state defines itself and the extent of its political reach. The state sets the framework upon which society will function. Modern history has shown that the state is the most important factor in effecting social and political change.¹⁰ Those who control the levers of the state have an incredible tool at their disposal to dictate societal change. Leaders of the state have the option of even operating counter to society's desires.¹¹ State leaders are the most crucial element in society's evolution.

Such leaders have several options from which to choose. As the state pursues a particular policy, it is possible that legitimate change within society can occur. If the particular policy is a spectacular failure, it is possible that the state

⁸ Nasr 2001: 5.

⁹ Trimberger 1978.

¹⁰ Nordlinger 1987: 353-90.

¹¹ Geddes 1994: 1-2.

will no longer be legitimate. States need to have control over the means of force, but “they must also control their subjects ideologically.”¹² The ideological framing options available to the state are defined by the society’s culture.

A state’s policy will inevitably draw on images and symbols of its particular culture. States frame the culture and “its traditional icons, its metaphors, its heroes, its rituals and its narratives” to serve its political purposes.¹³ Whatever the state does, it must meet the approval of the masses for its legitimacy. With legitimacy gained, the state can begin “redrawing social boundaries to coincide with actual or desired political borders... (and) states have been at the core of reinvention of society.”¹⁴

In summary, the state and society are in constant flux. Wide-ranging boundaries of acceptable behavior exist within a particular society. From that range, the state can choose available options in its policy pursuit. Once policy is implemented, the state becomes the shaper of society and culture. If at any time the state gets too far off the mark or fails to re-shape the cultural boundaries, society will react and either replace the existing state or cause the state to re-define its policies. The state is in a constant dilemma of asserting power while at the same time providing the citizenry a sense of ownership within the state.

E. POLITICAL ISLAM

Religion has been the most powerful influence on culture. Islam, in particular, has a deeply political aspect to it. Combine the beliefs and politics of a religion and add in centuries-old repression at the hand of colonialists and it is easy to see why violent rebellion and theocracy are often associated with Islam. It is no wonder that a term like “Islamization” exists. Islamism will be defined as a desire for the state to have a “greater visibility of Islamic norms, values, and symbols in the public arena, and (an) anchoring of law and policy making in values.”¹⁵ Islamism has been given a fertile environment in which to grow

¹² Ibid: 7.

¹³ Ibid: 7.

¹⁴ Migdal 1997: 230.

¹⁵ Nasr 2001: 3.

because of the colonial repressions of the past. The Algerian Islamist leader Ali Belhadj explained it this way: “My father and brothers (in religion) may have *physically* expelled the oppressor France from Algeria, but my struggle, together with my brothers, using weapons of faith, is to banish France *intellectually* and *ideologically* and to be done with her supporters who drank her poisonous milk.”¹⁶

F. THE TOOL

Before we can begin an analysis of our case studies, we need an introduction to the framework for our examination. The evolution of Indonesian Islamism will be explored from the perspective of a state-level analysis as described above. The broad, narrative perspective is intended to reveal equally broad strategic insights. By contrast, Algerian Islamism will be explored using SMT. This narrow analytical perspective is intended to reveal detailed tactical insights. The Algerian case became rebellious; the Indonesian did not. The disparate perspectives are designed to highlight any common insights. That is, themes which emerge from such different analytical approaches are more robust than from similar case studies.

The chronology of the Algerian movement’s interaction with the state will be assessed through five variables: the framing of grievances, political access, timing of state repression, targeting of state repression and the emergence of hyper-violent, exclusive organizations. Rebellious social movements do not evolve in a vacuum. They are the product of political environments that dictate opportunities and boundaries for action. These ‘rules of the game’ provide the calculus for movement actors’ decisions regarding strategy and action.¹⁷ The first variable of this larger political environment is the manner in which a social movement elects to articulate, or ‘frame’, its grievances with the state. Framing can, at first glance, appear as little more than slogan coining or bumper-sticker production. However, politically effective framing ties simple or popular images to larger agendas. Framing is the act of seizing rhetorical ground and turning it

¹⁶Ibid: 13.

¹⁷ McAdam et al. 1996.

to a purpose. For example, colonial Americans rallied to the cry of “no taxation without representation”. This frame tied the popular resentment towards taxes to the Crown together with an implication that the colonial’s were not being treated as the equals to other British subjects. The resulting image provided a populist cover to those who simply were engaging in self-interested, bare-knuckle politics. More recently, Hamas has deftly claimed Palestine as a *waqf* or religious endowment. The result is not simply to tie Palestine to the notion of a God-given charity for the benefit of all Muslims. The deeper result is to politically restrict other Muslim’s ability to even discuss the possibility of a settlement which leaves portion of the *waqf* in non-Muslim hands. States and rebellious movements alike can and do seize the opportunity to frame their agendas.¹⁸ Such framing is necessary, but not sufficient for social movements to become rebellious.¹⁹

The second variable of a movement’s tendency to rebellion is the degree to which a social movement can access the political system. The ability of social movements to participate in the political organism of their state, directly impacts the movement’s decision to promote reform or revolution.²⁰ As the iconic Che Guevara warned, revolutionaries should avoid armed rebellion in states that maintain some electoral legitimacy because, “the populace will not turn in a revolutionary direction while electoral alternatives remain an option and retain appeal”.²¹ That is why, the more accessible the system, the more likely Islamists will embrace accommodative strategies instead of violence.

The third and fourth variables of the state’s political environment involve the character of state repression. Repression and access are intimately intertwined. As Social Science has noted, state repression “raises the contender’s cost of collective action.”²² Yet, repression has produced a variety of outcomes from provoking further rebellion to quelling rebellion. The best

¹⁸ Robinson 2003: 130.

¹⁹ Wiktutowicz 2003: 25.

²⁰ Hafez 2003: 27.

²¹ McClintock 1998: 5.

²² McAdam, et al 1997: 100.

discriminates for differentiating these two outcomes are the timing and targeting of state repression.²³

The timing of repression can be characterized in one of two ways: preemptive or reactive. Repression can be considered preemptive if it is applied before the prospective rebels have been able to organize themselves and mobilize followers. Preemptive repression increases the uncertainty and cost of organizing and acting. Prospective sympathizers are unsure of the size and commitment of the organization. "Recruitment is less risky when the recruiter can trust the recruit, and vice versa."²⁴ Preemptive repression deprives a movement of repeated opportunities for interaction with prospective recruits. Such repression discourages rebellion because it decreases a movement's ability to expand its organizational and material resources. By contrast, reactive repression increases a movement's established grievances and inspires a call for change through action. If such repression is severe enough to threaten a movement's very survival, the movement is motivated to act to preserve its accumulated resources. "Where no movement gains have been made due to preemptive repression, retreat, not rebellion, is the likely outcome."²⁵

Targeting refers to the breadth of actors that are impacted by the state's repression. The intent here is to discern whether the state focuses its efforts specifically on a movement's leadership and central membership or more broadly toward movement sympathizers and innocent suspects. Selective repression clearly demonstrates a state's intention to punish only "troublemakers" thereby encouraging sympathizers to keep their distance.²⁶ On the other hand, indiscriminate repression makes the cost of action uniform for "troublemakers", sympathizers and bystanders alike. Such repression antagonizes individuals into committing acts for which, they believe, punishment is inevitable. In the face of political exclusion these two variables are necessary and sufficient to explain

²³ Hafez 2003: 72.

²⁴ Della Porta 1988: 159.

²⁵ Hafez: 75.

²⁶ Ibid: 75.

rebellion.²⁷ That is, “armed insurgencies result from the violent suppression of the peaceful political activities of aggrieved people who have the capacity and opportunity to rebel”.²⁸

Finally, we must discriminate between armed rebellion against bona fide state targets and intentional anti-civilian violence. This distinction will help us separate the murky area between guerilla warrior and terrorist. Our ultimate aim is a better understanding of Islamist as terrorist. Therefore, we identify exclusive organizations as the fifth variable in the state’s relationship with Islamic Fundamentalism. An inclusive organization allows relatively unrestricted criteria for membership. By contrast, an exclusive organization sets rather demanding standards for membership. Such exclusive organizations are the result of protracted conflicts. This is due to three factors. First, state agents that infiltrate rebellious movements will tend to destroy them from within. Exclusive and loosely structured organizations deter and delay such infiltration. Second, direct set-backs dealt by the state (arrest, execution, exile) can eliminate a centralized movement where such actions are non-lethal to a decentralized organization. Finally, terrorist activities in a repressive system require a great deal of coordination and trust. The need to maintain secrecy is absolute. The significance of each point grows with the duration of the conflict.

G. THE ORGANIZATION

Chapter I sets the stage for our thesis. We have introduced two very different, yet complimentary theoretical approaches to the investigation of state/Islamist interaction. Chapter II will introduce the reader to the key political forces in modern Indonesia and Algeria. Following this introduction, Chapters III will embark on a rich, state level exploration of Indonesian political life. This exploration will remain attentive to the descriptive power of SMT. In contrast, Chapter IV will provide a parsimonious analysis of modern Algeria’s Islamic social movement while it incorporates the state’s experience with contentious Islamic politics. Finally, Chapter V will conclude the analysis, synthesize the

²⁷ Ibid: 72.

²⁸ Goodwin 2001: 37.

common lessons of these two analytical perspectives and suggest policy prescriptions for consideration.

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II. THE PLAYERS

A. INDONESIA

This chapter will introduce the major cultural and societal players and factors with which the state sought to exert control. During the covered time period – the end of the colonial era until the fall of Suharto – it is possible to narrow the key participants to a manageable scholarly discussion. Indonesia's two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, are the only two individuals who have had the ability to manipulate the official levers of the state. These levers can also be simplified into four main areas: the Islamists, the Communists, the Army, and the constitutions, or *Pancasila*. For the purposes of this paper, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) will represent the Islamists. The justification for this approach is to narrow the focus. NU was and is Indonesia's largest Muslim organization and has been the single most politically active Islamic group. NU provides an excellent example of how the state shapes Islamist political players.

1. Ahmad Sukarno

Sukarno was, arguably, the most important figure in the history of the Indonesian state. He can be credited with inventing a state that is intact even today. Although his tenure was defined by a state constantly facing turmoil, even after his demise, his original vision for the Indonesian state remained unscathed. As the "Father of Indonesia," Sukarno is credited with inventing *Pancasila*, the state philosophy that even his successor, Suharto, found necessary to leave intact. Sukarno faced many difficult challenges to his authority and eventually fell to Suharto, but the Pancasila state survived.

The first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, was born in 1901 in Surabaya to a Javanese school teacher father and Balinese mother. He began school under his father's tutelage and then moved on to receive elementary and secondary education under the Dutch system. During this time, he boarded at the house of Umar Said Cokroaminoto, the leader of the large Islamic nationalist movement *Sarikat Islam*. It was through him that Sukarno had his first widespread exposure to many of the time's nationalist leaders. Following his completion of secondary

school, Sukarno chose to remain in Indonesia to further pursue his studies and enrolled at the Bandung Technical College. It was here that he began to form his nationalist ideology, illustrated in his published article, "Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism." He understood the need to form a national ideology that could unite the several differing views among Indonesian society. In 1927 he formed the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). The party's foundation was "multiethnic nationalism, not religion or ethno-nationalism."²⁹ Sukarno was not anti-Islam, but he embraced a belief, influenced by the reforms in Turkey, that Islam should not be part of the state, and that only by separating the two could the Muslim world advance from its current stagnation.³⁰ For Indonesia to compete against the West it needed to modernize, and this, he believed, was only possible in a secular state.

The failure of both the Sarikat Islam and Communist movements during the 1920's left PNI as leader of nationalist sentiment. Sukarno presented a message of secular nationalism that became extremely popular, as evidenced by the huge crowds he drew during his speeches. The reason for the crowds had as much to do with his message as with his notable public speaking ability. His success in achieving a following led to the Dutch incarcerating him from 1929 until 1931. After release from jail, Sukarno agreed to refrain from political activity, but the Dutch in 1933 exiled him anyway. The Dutch, in effect, granted Sukarno martyrdom status and placed Sukarno in prime position as a symbol of the Indonesian struggle for independence.

Hoping to quell social unrest, the Japanese in 1942 allowed Sukarno to return. Sukarno became a participant in the Japanese government and gained access to such organizational tools as the media. Sukarno's messages over the radio further increased his popularity. As the Japanese sensed their eventual defeat in World War II, they allowed Sukarno to call a meeting of the major societal institutions in 1945 to form a plan for eventual independent Indonesian nationhood. During this meeting the Indonesian *Pancasila* philosophy was born,

²⁹ Hefner 2000: 38.

³⁰ Ibid: 39.

which provided a unifying message for Indonesians. Sukarno was seen as the one who could turn this message into reality. In 1945, he further enamored himself with the public with his agreement to limit his presidential power by agreeing to a parliamentary system. Although this move lessened presidential power, it gave Sukarno the ability to act independently and better represent himself as a “symbol of unity” against the Dutch and better serve as mediator between the conflicting interests of the blossoming nation.³¹ On 17 August 1945, two days after the official surrender of the Japanese in World War II, he took the first step toward a sovereign Indonesia and declared independence. After a four-year conflict/negotiation with the Dutch, Indonesia officially achieved nationhood in 1949.

Sukarno understood the political climate as well as anyone. He was the single most powerful political figure and was the only one who could at least superficially unify Indonesians. With his reformist philosophy, Sukarno, “in a remarkable display of political agility,” was able to lead Indonesia to independence and hold its presidency until Suharto officially replaced him in 1968.³² And even after his departure, the Indonesian *Pancasila* state survived. The basic premise of Pancasila is still the foundation upon which today’s emerging Indonesian democracy bases its reforms. The diversity of Indonesian society required a flexible constitution and Sukarno gave it one.

2. Suharto

If Sukarno was the inventor of the Indonesian state, then Suharto was the consolidator of the Indonesian state. Suharto was a repressive dictator, at least viewed through Western, pluralistic eyes. He was heavy-handed at times, rigged the political system to remain in power, and was not hesitant to use military might against his own citizens. But through his tenure he achieved what Sukarno could not- he consolidated the Indonesian state. He took the Sukarno invention of *Pancasila* and aggressively pursued state policies of unity and modernization. He made up for his lack of faith in democracy with an ability to instill nationalistic

³¹ Embree 1988: 21-22.

³² Emmerson 1999: 19.

pride. Although he was unable to overcome the financial crisis of 1997, he was responsible for stabilizing a state that is still around today. His insistence on the *Pancasila* philosophy ensured that it remained the foundation of the state. Even today, democratic reforms are conducted under the Pancasila framework.

The second president of Indonesia, Suharto, was born in 1921 to the son of a minor village official in central Java. Early in his life he had chosen the path of the military. In 1940 he received military training under the Dutch and became a battalion commander under the Japanese Self Defense Corps. As Indonesia moved toward its struggle against the Dutch and eventual independence, Suharto in 1945 entered the Indonesian revolutionary army. It was through his fight against the Dutch that Suharto began to feel slighted as leader of the revolution. Many members of the armed forces felt it was them, not the Dutch-educated elite like Sukarno, who were the real leaders of the revolution.

Suharto, though, did not let his distaste for the elite prohibit his career from moving forward. He moved up through the ranks, serving as Military Commander of Central Java in 1956. By 1960 he had achieved the rank of Brigadier General. In 1962 he became a Major General and served as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for East Indonesia Inter Regional Command, where he again fought the Dutch during their last-ditch effort to hold onto West Irian. In 1963, he became Commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), a position he held during the 1965 "coup."³³

The botched "coup" of 1965 can also be viewed as a successful "coup" for Suharto because, in the end, it was he who came out on top. He was able to effectively consolidate the armed forces under his control and overcome Sukarno's vast influence. By 1968 he had become the official president of Indonesia and held that post until his overthrow in 1998. But even in his absence, the Indonesian state still adheres to same philosophy as Suharto: *Pancasila*. Obviously, the undergoing democratic reforms require a different interpretation of *Pancasila*, but the basic tenants remain unchanged.

³³ Dolling 1991: 291.

3. The Islamists – *Nahdlatul Ulama*

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has a membership of forty million and is the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, a nation with the world's largest Muslim population. Its influence is not often discussed, but it is a shining example of a fundamentalist Islamic organization embracing democratic, pluralistic values. NU has not necessarily always been consistent with these values, but its evolution provides an interesting case study of a civil institution operating within civil society. Although still labeled as a "traditionalist" organization, NU's focus has shifted from one pursuing the Islamization of Indonesian society to one pursuing the democratization of Indonesian society. NU offers a unique insight into the inner workings of Muslim organizations. Too many references are generically applied to Muslim groups that muddy the complexities of their members and the adaptability they have in adapting to a changing world. NU is living proof that Islam is not inherently incapable of embracing plurality.

NU rebukes stereotypical labels. For instance, how can NU concurrently both embrace "traditional" and "progressive" philosophies? Islamic traditionalists are expected to act in a particular manner. Abdurrahman Wahid explained:

Traditionalists are widely supposed to be rather backward in orientation and ossified in their understanding of Islamic society and thought.....(their) upholding of Islamic law leads them to reject modernity....(they) have a fatalistic understanding of submission to God's will and a disregard for the exercise of free-will and independent thinking....(they forsake) the present world in the hope of gaining eternal happiness in heaven....they are a wholly passive community unable to cope with the dynamic challenges of modernisation...³⁴

It is the above misrepresentation of the complexity of fundamentalist Islamic thought that prevents a proper understanding of Islamization movements in general. NU provides an excellent example regarding the adaptability of Islam in the political and social arenas

NU has evolved a great deal throughout its history. The stereotypical "traditionalist" label does not help to explain how NU came to embrace women's

³⁴ Barton 1996: xiii.

rights or how NU adapted to modern issues such as family planning, birth control, and banking. The traditionalist label also does not help to explain how NU came to embrace *Pancasila* and not Islam as the foundation for the Indonesian state.³⁵ NU has continually adapted during its history; it has evolved from a belief in Islamism to a belief in plurality for all people, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. By examining the NU/state interactions, one finds a case where Islamic fundamentalism and democracy go hand-in-hand. This paper will explore the NU evolution; the organization has, in general, operated in three eras: one as a socio-religious organization, one as an official political party, and again one as a socio-religious organization.³⁶ Through the exploration of these eras, the traditionalist NU will be shown to be much more than its generic label suggests.

In broad terms Indonesian Muslims are predominantly Sunni and can be separated into two groups: the syncretic *abangan* and the more orthodox *santri* Muslims. In general, *santri* Muslims include Islam as part of the political discussion whereas *abangan* Muslims often choose the more secular political parties.³⁷ *Abangan* Muslims turned away from an orthodox view of Islam and turned “to socialism, secular nationalism, and Marxism to make sense of their new world.”³⁸ Within the *santri* group, “modernist” and “traditionalist” Muslims exist and display different theological tendencies. Although impossible to exactly categorize each group, a few distinct differences are noticeable. First, a “modernist” tends to believe more in self-determination, whereas a “traditionalist” tends to believe more in God’s will. Second, a “modernist” turns to a more literal interpretation of the Koran and the Hadiths for questions of faith. A “traditionalist” leans more toward a scholarly interpretation that includes an historical context.³⁹ An example of a “modernist” group is Indonesia’s second-largest Muslim organization, *Muhammadiyah*. *Nahdlatul Ulama* falls into the “traditionalist”

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Barton 1996: ix.

³⁷ Funston 2001: 83.

³⁸ Hefner 2000: 15.

³⁹ Jackson 1980: 81.

category. Ironically, NU in its desire to remain true to its traditional values has pursued a politically progressive strategy.⁴⁰

NU was formally founded on January 31, 1926 by a group of prominent *ulama* (Muslim authorities) intent on giving an “organizational voice to the interests of traditional Islam.”⁴¹ Its primary function was to care for its *umat* (community). Initially, the *ulama* leaders focused their efforts on education and social welfare through Islamic boarding schools, called *pesantren*, and assistance to Muslim peasants and farmers. NU found a substantial following. Membership rose from forty thousand in 1933 to one hundred thousand in 1938.⁴² In its expanding effort to care for the Muslim community, NU began to use the political arena to enhance its efforts to care for the *umat*. Beginning in the late 1930’s, NU campaigned against colonial policies seen as contrary to Islamic life and supported the formation of GAPI, the Indonesian Political Organization, which was calling for the establishment of an Indonesian parliament in 1939. The Japanese actively sought to use Islamic groups to assist in maintaining social calm. They created the Department of Religious Affairs, staffed by members primarily from the Muslim community, and allowed for the formation of an Islamic political unity, *Masyumi*. NU featured prominently in both of these ventures.⁴³

Decades prior to Indonesian independence, Islamic groups sought to unite Indonesians around religion. *Sarikat Islam* was a movement begun in 1912 to speak for the voice of the Muslim people, and especially for Muslim merchants against its Chinese competitors.⁴⁴ This movement, though, failed as its members were split ideologically between Muslim politics, secular nationalism, and Marxism. Indonesia was a diverse and complex society. People identified themselves as Muslims, but also as fathers, peasants, educated elite or any

⁴⁰ Lapidus 2002: 665.

⁴¹ Barton 1996: xix.

⁴² Ibid: xix.

⁴³ Hefner 2000: 41.

⁴⁴ Ibid: 38.

other number of groups. A Muslim bureaucrat living in Jakarta did not hold the same ideology as a peasant farmer living in rural Java. One brand of Islam for all Indonesians proved difficult to formulate. NU represented this complexity of this Indonesian society. The traditionalist NU continually debated the philosophical direction upon which it should embark. By 1984, the fundamentalist Islamic group had officially declared an interesting position; NU wholeheartedly embraced the state philosophy of *Pancasila*. The fundamentalist NU was to become one of the most important catalysts for democratic reform in Indonesia.

4. The Communists

PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), which became the voice of Indonesian Communism, was founded in 1914 by Dutchman H.J.F.M. Sneevliet, and, ironically, was an offshoot of *Sarikat Islam*, one of the original Islamic movements seeking to unify the Muslim voice.⁴⁵ Although PKI sought ties with Moscow and Lenin believed in supporting Asian nationalist revolutionary movements, the Comintern disagreed and passed a resolution opposing any pan-Muslim or pan-Asian revolutions. The decision brought the idea of religion and Communism to the forefront in Indonesia, and by 1923, PKI had officially declared that it was “neutral” with regard to religion, a fact not lost on Islamist groups like NU.⁴⁶

The first substantial Communist movement was destroyed by colonialists during the failed rebellion of 1926-27, but the Communist cause did not disappear. It is interesting to note where the PKI gained its support. After all, Indonesia is upwards of 90% Muslim. PKI appealed to the *abangan* Muslims in a way that can be viewed as mutual compromise. The *abangan* Muslims sought a partner in its struggle against “the inroads of both activist Islam and urban-sponsored ‘modernization’.” The PKI, on the other hand needed to increase its following from the traditional disadvantaged, the “urban workers and lowly state functionaries, estate laborers, squatters on estate lands, and the young people in

⁴⁵ Scalapino 1969: 274-305.

⁴⁶ Dahm 1971: 55-56.

the more detraditionalized villages.”⁴⁷ The two ideologically different institutions became partners out of convenience and necessity.

Early PKI was unsuccessful due to overly “dogmatic” ties Moscow. A strictly anti-religious form of Communism just would not be successful in Muslim Indonesia. The PKI became a force because it was “fervently patriotic, sympathetic to religion, peaceful in pursuit of its goals, painstakingly solicitous of the small problems consciously felt by its supporters, moderate in demands and self-effacing in the friendliness shown toward most other Indonesian political forces.”⁴⁸ Much of this success can be attributed to its new leader, Aidit, who seemed to be offering a little bit for everyone except those at the other end of the ideological extreme, such as the army and the radical Islamists.

5. The Army

The army as an institution is much harder to define ideologically. Some were Islamists and some were Communists, but on the whole, those in the army were a right-leaning group who opposed Sukarno, especially as he moved toward the left. The Indonesian armed forces, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, changed its name to TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia in 1999), began as part of the colonial forces. With the rapid surrender of the Japanese in 1945, the ABRI seized the opportunity to lead Indonesia to independence. For the most part, the army did not have much in common with the educated elite like Sukarno. Harold Crouch explained:

The government leaders, who had joined the nationalist movement during the 1920’s and 1930’s, were derived mainly from the urban, Dutch-educated elite, whereas the senior officers of the army were rarely more than thirty years old and usually came from the small towns of Java, where they had been steeped in traditional culture, obtained only secondary schooling, and learned little Dutch.⁴⁹

The army’s ideology can more easily be defined by what it was not. The majority of the army was not part of the elite, or the Communists, or the Islamists.

⁴⁷ Lewis 1974: 105-6.

⁴⁸ Taylor 1976: 84-86.

⁴⁹ Crouch 1988: 26.

The army was a nationalist organization determined to have a hand in political affairs. As the fight for independence began, there was a deep split. It was the uneducated masses who fought the Dutch, while the educated elite, like Sukarno, appeared to appease the Dutch through negotiations. It was a bitter divide that had tremendous impact on future society.

The army had demonstrated a history of direct involvement within society, a fact that left it well-positioned for political and societal influence. The army was a social force to be reckoned with. With at least some semblance of a bureaucratic structure in place and with its at least partial control of its own monopoly of force, the Indonesian military was in prime position to influence Indonesian politics. The military felt just as entitled to determine Indonesia's future as the civilian leadership. To the military this meant no compromise with the returning Dutch. This aggressive stance required more forces than the 35000 Japanese-trained nucleus, and so recruitment became necessary.⁵⁰ As the military's numbers increased, centralized control became more and more difficult. Often, this recruitment might be to enlist an entire regional, radical youth organization. These organizations would fight for the national army, but they still had local loyalties as well.⁵¹ This regional, paramilitary ancestry and its effects are still felt today in Indonesia. As the only group with at least partial control of the country's means of violence and a desire to involve itself politically, the military early on set itself up for its future dual function, *dwifungsi*, role.

6. Pancasila

Pancasila was Sukarno's philosophical revolutionary foundation and was introduced during a Japanese-sponsored conference of various Indonesian societal groups in March 1945. It was intended to provide the ideological legitimacy required for Indonesia to eventually achieve sovereignty and remains the basis for the Indonesian state today. The term *Pancasila* literally means "five pillars." These five pillars were a belief in the following: nationalism, humanitarianism, representative government, social justice, and the belief in one

⁵⁰ Kingsbury 1998: 29.

⁵¹ Crouch 1988: 26-27.

God. The last pillar was the most socially divisive. There existed a strong push among the Muslim community for an Islamic state and a great fear of repression by the non-Muslim minority if an Islamic state became a reality. Originally, the principle was stated simply as “belief in God.” Unsatisfactory to many Muslim leaders, the constitution committee agreed to change the principle to “belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law,” known to this day as the Jakarta Charter.⁵² Not surprisingly, the non-Muslims and secularists disagreed with this choice and the added Islamic emphasis. Sukarno and his second-in-command, Mohammad Hatta, needed to find a compromise. *Nahdlatul Ulama* gave them one. NU suggested that a compromise between the two versions was to state the first principle as “belief in a singular God.”⁵³ Though far from perfect for either group, it was a workable agreement, and it gave the emerging nation at least a loose framework with which to proceed.

The *Pancasila* debate exemplified the complexities of Indonesian culture. Although the five pillars were often criticized as too vague for an ideological foundation, *Pancasila* through the years remained as a constitutional foundation. *Pancasila* came to represent the epitome of compromise for conflicting ideological institutions. *Pancasila*, in fact, eventually became one of the few concepts within Indonesian society that was beyond reproach. Suharto had much to do with the *Pancasila* emphasis, but the fact was that the concept was pliable enough to appeal to any group. The constitution remained flexible for both secular dictators like Suharto and Islamist groups like NU. Both found much to be selfishly exploited within the philosophy of the five pillars. *Pancasila* is the common thread of the Indonesian state. Sukarno invented it, and Suharto strengthened it. And today, democratic reform is based upon it. Figure one provides further explanation of the *Pancasila* concept.

⁵² Hefner 2000: 42.

⁵³ Ibid.

THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PANCASILA

1. One and Only God

- This principle of Pancasila reaffirms the Indonesian people's belief that God does exist. It also implies that the Indonesian people believe in life after death. It emphasizes that the pursuit of sacred values will lead the people to a better life in the hereafter.
- The principle is embodied in article 29, Section I of the 1945 Constitution and reads: "The state shall be based on the belief in the One and Only God".

2. Just and Civilized Humanity

- This principle requires that human beings be treated with due regard to their dignity as God's creatures. It emphasizes that the Indonesian people do not tolerate physical or spiritual oppression of human beings by their own people or by any other nation.

3. The Unity of Indonesia

- This principle embodies the concept of nationalism, of love for one's nation and motherland. It envisages the need to always foster national unity and integrity. Pancasila nationalism demands that Indonesians avoid feelings of superiority on ethnical grounds, for reasons of ancestry and color of the skin. In 1928 Indonesian youth pledged to have one country, one nation and one language, while the Indonesian coat of arms enshrines the symbol of "Honea Tunggal Ika" which means "unity in diversity".

4. Democracy Guided by the Inner Wisdom in the Unanimity Arising Out of Deliberations Amongst Representatives

- Pancasila democracy calls for decision-making through deliberations, or musyawarah, to reach a consensus, or mufakat. It is democracy that lives up to the principles of Pancasila. This implies that democratic right must always be exercised with a deep sense of responsibility to God Almighty according to one's own conviction and religious belief, with respect for humanitarian values of man's dignity and integrity, and with a view to preserving and strengthening national unity and the pursuit of social justice.
- Thus, Pancasila Democracy means democracy based on the people's sovereignty which is inspired by and integrated with other principles of Pancasila. This means that the use of democratic rights should always be in line with responsibility towards God Almighty according to the respective faith; uphold human values in line with human dignity; guarantee and strengthen national unity; and be aimed at realizing social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

5. Social Justice for the Whole of the People of Indonesia

- This principle calls for the equitable spread of welfare to the entire population, not in a static but in a dynamic and progressive way. This means that all the country's natural resources and the national potentials should be utilized for the greatest possible good and happiness of the people.
- Social justice implies protection of the weak. But protection should not deny them work. On the contrary, they should work according to their abilities and fields of activity. Protection should prevent willful treatment by the strong and ensure the rule of justice.
- These are the sacred values of Pancasila which, as a cultural principle, should always be respected by every Indonesian because it is now the ideology of the state and the life philosophy of the Indonesian people.

Figure 1. PANCASILA (From the Indonesian Embassy, Ottawa, Canada)

B. ALGERIA

In 1947, after more than one hundred years of foreign rule, the native Algerian and Berber population sensed the grip of French colonialism loosening. The Algerian Organic Statute of that year established the first elected assembly in Algeria's history. Soon, with the success of Nasser's nationalist revolution in Egypt and French withdrawal from Indo-China, Tunisia and Morocco, this first taste of national autonomy had blossomed into a popular independence movement, the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN). Indicative of its times, this first Algerian Rebellion eschewed religious or ethnic frames in favor of socialist and nationalist rhetoric. After six years, 500,000 casualties and the demise of a French Republic, the Algerian nationalists had their independence.

Algeria's first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, took his regime on a brief, autocratic digression to the cult of personality. In 1965, his tenure was cut short by a bloodless military coup. The coup leader and long-time FLN stalwart, Houari Boumedienne, commanded the most significant elements of the Algerian armed forces. As Boumedienne proceeded to consolidate his regime, Algeria finally began to reap the benefit of its vast natural resources. Gradually, the army supplanted the FLN as the nation's dominant political force. Boumedienne gathered his closest civilian associates and the chief military commanders in a Council of the Revolution. Collegial rule was in and factionalism was out. Nonetheless, with Boumedienne holding the offices of prime minister, president and minister of defense, Algeria remained decidedly autocratic.

The FLN, though ardently nationalist, represented a larger coalition of anti-colonial interests. Chief amongst these was the *al Qiyam* Society. This transnational Islamic organization reflected the Janus-like perspectives of its chief modern-day spokesmen: Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj.⁵⁴

Despite a thin veil of Islam (including a constitutional reference to Islam as the state religion), Boumedienne embraced a program of socialist state building.

⁵⁴ Esposito, 177.

The emigrating settlers left behind vast landholdings that the state swiftly nationalized. This policy soon extended to industry with a focus on developing the nation's petroleum sector. By 1971, Boumedienne managed to nationalize the formerly French-controlled oil fields. This critical achievement coincided with a redistribution of state land to peasant collective farms. While national petro-wealth grew, farm productivity did not. In addition, Boumedienne attempted to engage the power of nationalism by promoting Arabic culture and language. This well-intentioned attempt to eradicate the vestiges of French colonialism produced the unintended consequence of alienating the large native Berber population.⁵⁵ The Berbers had grown accustomed to the uniform subjugation of Berber and Arab culture to the Francophone colonial culture. The official state promotion of Arabic promised to deny the Berbers the full rewards of independence.

By 1976, despite these challenges, Algeria appeared to have struck out on a successful path to national consolidation. Soaring oil prices filled the national coffers. A national charter and constitution were adopted and Boumedienne was legally elected president. Even Boumedienne's sudden death due to illness passed quietly as the army selected Chadli Bendjedid to be Algeria's next president. After a brief period of consolidation, Bendjedid moved to put his personal stamp on national rule. As part of his policy to ease some of Boumedienne's strict political controls, Bendjedid pardoned former president Ben Bella and released him from house arrest. Bendjedid also moved to liberalize the national economy. These reforms extended to privatizing the unsuccessful peasant cooperative farms. By 1984, Bendjedid had been reelected in an unopposed national ballot.

Algeria's period of measured national consolidation was drawing to a close. Soaring oil prices had engendered a national population explosion. The youth, in particular, flocked to the cities to benefit from the oil-driven *rentier* social contract: free education, free health care, government jobs. As oil prices plummeted in the mid-1980s the state's capacity to maintain this social contract

⁵⁵ Roberts, 68.

evaporated. By late 1988, young protestors were clashing with police and soldiers throughout the country. Bendjedid followed a program of severe repression with political and economic reforms. He was reelected to a third term in December of 1988. Falsely buoyed by this hollow mandate, Bendjedid revised the constitution in February 1989 in order to lay the groundwork for a July legalization of multiparty national elections. One of the first parties to organize under the new system was an Islamist coalition, the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS).

Early in 1990, the FIS handily outpolled the FLN in provincial and municipal elections. The broad public response prompted the Bendjedid regime to suspend the June 1991 parliamentary elections and arrest the FIS's leadership – Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj. When elections resumed in January of 1992, the first round of balloting indicated another overwhelming FIS victory. Famously fearing “one man, one vote, one time”, the civilian and military elites behind Bendjedid convinced him to resign. In the ensuing confusion, elections were cancelled, parliament suspended and a national High Council of State (HCS) was established with formerly exiled FLN war hero, Mohammed Boudiaf at its head. As popular unrest cascaded into violence. The HCS outlawed the FIS and unleashed the state's security apparatus. By July of 1992, Boudiaf had been assassinated and the HCS appointed one of its own, Ali Kafi, to the presidency. Although unable to participate politically, the FIS swiftly formed an armed wing, the *Armee Islamique du Salut* (AIS). Conventional clashes with government troops continued through 1993 when the extremist *Groupe Islamique Arme* (GIA) emerged as the force behind a campaign of assassinations and bombings. In a single generation, Algeria had slipped from the optimistic exuberance of independence to the despairing horror of civil war. The party of nationalism, social justice and hope found itself in a mortal struggle with violent Fundamentalists.

1. FLN

The *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) formed in March of 1954 as the result of a conference of opponents to French rule (the Revolutionary Committee

for Unity and Action). By October of 1954, the FLN was sponsoring coordinated guerilla attacks on symbols of colonial rule: military posts, police stations, public offices and communications centers. By 1956, the FLN had expanded its campaign to all of Algeria's cities, the Algerian borders with Tunisian and Morocco, as well as continental France. After independence in 1962, the FLN became the only legal political party in the autocratic, socialist state. The party maintained this privileged position until 1989 when Chadli Bendjedid legalized political opposition. In 1990, Islamists won early rounds of national elections. By 1991, the army had formally seized power, nullifying the elections and putting an end to the FLN's 37 year dominance of Algerian political life.

2. ALN

Formed in 1954, The *Armée de Liberation Nationale* (ALN) served as the conventional armed wing of the FLN. Though radical armed elements of the ALN engaged in an intentional campaign of guerilla warfare and terrorism, the bulk of the ALN spent the duration of the War of Independence drilling just across the border in Tunisia. This large conventional force served to tie up a sizable percentage of French troops in border security missions. As a further consequence, the FLN developed into two factions: those who fought within Algeria and those that threatened from without. By the time the French withdrew in 1962, the Insiders were exhausted while the Outsiders were fresh. As a result, the Outside element of the FLN held sway in the post-independence political maneuvering.

3. Ahmed Ben Bella

Ben Bella formed the FLN in 1954. Imprisoned by the French from 1956-1962, he served as a symbolic leader for the Algerian independence movement. Released in '62 as part of the peace agreement with France, Ben Bella returned to a hero's welcome in Algiers. He ran unopposed in the first post-independence national elections. After his inauguration, Ben Bella focused on reestablishing domestic order and agrarian reforms. However, his increasingly autocratic rule led to a split within the FLN. Ben Bella was deposed in June of 1965 through a bloodless coup. He spent the next fifteen years in house arrest followed by a

decade in exile. Based in Paris, Ben Bella devoted his time organizing an opposition movement against the very institution he helped create, the FLN.

4. Houri Boumedienne

Boumedienne joined the guerilla opposition to French rule in 1954, eventually commanding the military district around Oran. By 1960, as the FLN chief of staff, he concentrated his efforts on raising the ALN regular forces in Morocco and Tunisia. When a peace treaty was signed in 1962, Boumedienne commanded the only element of FLN power not devastated by the conflict with France. His support proved vital in elevating Ben Bella to the presidency and secured for himself the positions of defense minister and vice president. Increasingly concerned by Ben Bella's autocratic leadership, Boumedienne led a coup in June of 1965 installing himself as president. After a period of weak and indecisive collegial rule, Boumedienne asserted personal control over Algeria in 1967 by foiling another coup attempt. By the early 1970s, he had instituted a socialist state with nationalized industries. The explosion of petro-wealth in the mid to late 70s engendered an associated population explosion and growth of popular expectations for Algeria's economic and social development. Houri Boumedienne died suddenly in 1978.

5. FIS

The *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) formed in 1989 as the result of Bendjedid's legalization of political opposition. Actually an umbrella organization for a host of pre-existing Islamic civic organizations, the FIS embraced two roles. The first role was as a political party working within the larger and recently opened political process. The second role was as a populist movement that led marches, rallies and strikes to both air its constituents' grievances and to demonstrate the power of that constituency. At times, FIS mobilized as many as three quarters of a million Algerians in silent protest. Algeria's largest opposition party took on an overtly Islamic frame for four reasons: the failure of socialism, the disgrace of Arab nationalism, the resurgence of Berber and Arab ethnic identity, and the failure of FLN moderates to reform the state. The FIS coalition

handily defeated the FLN slate of candidates during the 1990 and 1991 local and regional elections.

6. GIA

The *Groupe Islamique Arme* (GIA) formed gradually in the early 1990's as a loose association of violent urban youth groups and veterans of the Arab/Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. This volatile combination advocated an especially bloody and uncompromising form of holy war or *jihad* against the Algerian state. The GIA insisted upon a program of *Quran*, *Sunna* and *Salafiya* tradition; nothing more and nothing less. This meant a rejection of democracy, negotiation and secular rule of any kind. More significantly, the GIA program required Muslims of other traditions to renounce their earlier beliefs and adhere to the *Salafiya* tradition as a prerequisite to membership. Increasingly, these militants defined "us" and "them" in very narrow terms.⁵⁶ Eventually, the GIA added other Islamists (including civilians) to their list of *Takfir*. By 1994 this exclusive terrorist organization had begun a dedicated campaign of brutal anti-civilian violence. GIA exported their campaign to France in 1995.⁵⁷

7. Chadli Bendjedid

Bendjedid was an early standout for the ALN, eventually commanding the 13th Battalion along the Tunisian border. After initially supporting Ben Bella's ascendance to the premiership, Bendjedid supported the Boumedienne led coup which deposed Ben Bella in 1965. Bendjedid devoted most of the 60s and 70s to solidifying his control over the Oran military command. He served as Minister of Defense late in the Boumedienne administration. The death, by illness, of Boumedienne in December of 1978 set off a power struggle within the FLN. Proposed as a compromise between two other candidates, Bendjedid was inaugurated in February of 1979. As president, he focused on agricultural and economic reform, privatizing many state-owned industries. Reelected in non-competitive elections in 1984 and 1988, Bendjedid attempted to quell popular unrest by introducing a number of democratic reforms in 1989. These reforms

⁵⁶ Ibid: 48.

⁵⁷ Kepel, 255.

were resoundingly rejected by the electorate when the Islamic FIS won early rounds of national elections in 1991. Bendjedid's position further deteriorated when the army stepped in to nullify the 1991 elections. Military leaders eased Bendjedid out of office in January of 1992.

8. Mohamed Boudiaf

A longtime opponent to FLN rule, Boudiaf was sent into exile in 1964. After the ouster of Bendjedid, Boudiaf was brought back to act as the civilian face of the Algerian military leadership. Though sworn in as president in January of 1992, he served only five months before being assassinated in June 1992.

9. Abdelaziz Bouteflika

An early firebrand of the FLN and rising star in the late 70s, Bouteflika's political career appeared to meet an early demise with corruption charges and exile in 1980. During a brief visit to his homeland in 1994, Bouteflika declined an offer from the ruling military junta to take over as unelected head of state. However, in the subsequent 1999 elections, he was widely viewed as the army's candidate. He pledged to negotiate with the FIS and bring an end to Algeria's bloody civil war. Bouteflika was reelected in 2004.

10. Abbasi Madani

Madani was a political activist in the early 1950s and was arrested 17 days after Algeria's war for independence broke out in 1954. He was released in 1962 and called for democratic elections and pluralism.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, he found that his preference for Islamic Fundamentalism was out of favor in the new government. By 1966, Madani was in such ill favor with the FLN that he quit formal politics and chose an academic career. He eventually became a professor at Algiers University and later earned his doctorate in Britain. In 1982, Madani became a political figure once again when he intervened at the expense of established Islamist groups at the university in a controversy over the replacement of French by Arabic. Consequently, he was jailed for four years. In October 1988, Madani led a disciplined rank of Islamists to march despite army gun-fire. The army was called to reestablish law and order in Algiers after it was

⁵⁸ Esposito. 177.

taken over by the mob. Within a year, Algeria became the first North African country to legalize an Islamic party.⁵⁹

11. Ali Belhaj

Madani's alter-ego, Ali Belhaj, acted equally as loyal Lieutenant and advocate for the more provocative philosophies of Qutb and Mawdudi. Born in Tunisia, Belhaj was a war orphan who received only an Arab-Islamic religious education. His more dogmatic approach included the call for the immediate embrace of *Sharia* and denunciation of the West. Belhaj found himself imprisoned from 1982 to 1987 as a result of his more confrontational Islamist style. However, this only increased his popularity amongst Algeria's youth.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Stora, 263.

⁶⁰ Esposito. 177.

III. INDONESIA

A. INTRODUCTION

Up until 1998 only two men had manipulated the levers of the Indonesian state. Sukarno and Suharto each understood the major political forces which they faced- the Islamists, the army, and the Communists. Each man differed in his political leanings- Sukarno to the left and Suharto to the right- but each actively sought to shape society. The common policy thread for both men was the interpretation of *Pancasila*. Indonesia's "five pillars" remained constant through both presidents' tenure, and, in fact, remains constant even today. *Pancasila* provided a means to govern and provided the flexibility for each man to choose his methods of rule. Sukarno invented *Pancasila* in the hope of uniting Indonesia and solidifying his power; Suharto built upon this philosophy and, as a result, further strengthened the Indonesian state.

But just as Pancasila provided options for the rulers, it also provided options for the societal players. It was this flexibility that provided a framework for the Islamist NU to evolve into a champion for democracy. *Pancasila* allowed for NU to have an option to gain a political voice in a legal and peaceful manner. Through an historical narrative, this chapter hopes to shed light on how the actions of state leaders can cause significant societal change; sometimes these actions lead to horrific violence; sometimes these actions can lead to peaceful reform. The final goal of this paper is to demonstrate the potential states have in shaping fundamentalist Islamic groups to becoming proponents for democratic and peaceful societies, but the historical narrative will also provide the forum to demonstrate that even in Muslim societies, the role of religion is just one of many factors a state must take into consideration.

B. INITIAL CONSOLIDATION

We the people of Indonesia hereby declare Indonesia's independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible time.⁶¹

President Sukarno, 17 August 1945

The above quotation illustrates that Indonesians looked to Sukarno to give the new state direction. He was the single most powerful figure in Indonesian politics and, therefore, the one most capable of directing policy. He did not, however, inherit an enviable societal situation. Outside of the obvious geographical limitations of uniting an archipelago covering some 17,000 islands, Sukarno faced a culture that had many different views on what the nature of the Indonesian state should be. Would Sukarno choose to use Islam as a means for the “transfer of power and other matters?” Where would Communism fit in with the new nation? Could the army be contained? Could the *Pancasila*-based constitution hold the key to unite Indonesians around a single cause? Sukarno's quotation foreshadowed the uncertain and chaotic times that Indonesia would soon encounter and the difficult socio-political decisions Sukarno would face as leader of the state. What direction would Sukarno drive the state? This section will present Sukarno as the decision-maker of the Indonesian state. His ideological legitimacy was founded upon the *Pancasila* constitution. And with this legitimacy, he sought to create a state faced with three major societal influences - the army, the Communists, and the Islamists.

Many critics of the Muslim world would assume that given the situation Sukarno faced, Islamization of the state would undoubtedly be the course of governance. In a nation that is ninety percent Muslim and contains the world's largest Muslim population, Islamists would surely drive Indonesia to becoming an Islamic state. Islamization of Indonesian politics, though, has not occurred. From its colonial times and during the reign of its two presidents, Sukarno and

⁶¹ Jeffrey 1981: 113.

Suharto, Indonesia has maintained a relatively secular state. Sukarno inherited this secular tradition and built upon it. The state has withstood the pressure of several Islamic groups to Islamize. Although unsuccessful in achieving societal stability, Sukarno chose a path for the Indonesian state counter to Islamist desires and sought to form a state more resembling Turkey than, say, Pakistan. Indonesia, much like Turkey, set out to define itself through modernization and nationalism and not religion. Sukarno was not helpless at the hands of Islamists. Sukarno could have used the Islamist card more prominently, but he did not. He faced the difficult situation enacting state policy that would balance Communism, the army and the Islamists. Each group had an ideal for what the state should resemble and Sukarno embarked on an experiment to forge a new nation. He based his leadership on the legitimizing concept of *Pancasila*. To better understand Sukarno's situation, this paper must first briefly examine the Indonesian state's inherited colonial influences.

1. The Inherited State

a. The Dutch

The Dutch provided Indonesians with the basic tools to form a nation, but failed to provide a unifying ideology. Sukarno eventually filled the ideological void with *Pancasila*, but it was the Dutch who initially forged the beginnings of a modern state. They introduced the modern world to Indonesians. Modern state necessities like bureaucracy and education were introduced by the Dutch. The Dutch, much like the rest of the European colonial powers, came to Asia seeking wealth, prestige and empire growth. The Dutch began as merely traders, but by 1619, they had invaded Indonesia and founded Batavia (present-day Jakarta). As the Dutch expanded their control over much of the Indonesian archipelago to counter the ongoing British expansion, they required increased efficiency and manpower. A modernization push ensued, requiring a more involved and educated local populace.⁶² A by-product of this expansion was the emergence of an educated class that acquired the tools of Western knowledge

⁶² Palmier 1962: 2.

and developed the ideas for future indigenous revolts.⁶³ The more educated the populace became, the more aware they became of their unfair treatment at the hands of the Dutch. The Dutch as leaders of the state were enacting policy that would eventually influence the demise of the colonial state.

In addition to the nationalist movement that the Dutch helped to instill, several other areas of society also began to take shape during their rule. The beginnings of corruption can be traced back to the Dutch way of doing business. The Dutch East India Company only paid its officials minor salaries with the expectation that they would seek out their own business in compensation. The Dutch gave the Indonesians an example of profiting outside of central control, a practice seen even today, both within the military and business communities.⁶⁴ In a way, this influence can be seen in the landmark Sukarno decision to allow the Indonesian military to independently run nationalized Dutch companies. Instead of the state taking control of funding the military, Sukarno left it in the hands of the military. This idea of a self-funded military is even today a major issue as Indonesia moves toward democratic reform. Society did not invent corruption and military privatization of business; the state had made policy decisions that allowed for these occurrences.

Another societal player, the Indonesian army also emerged under the Dutch. The army was to become the single most influential player in Indonesian politics. The Dutch provided the initial capability to stage a revolution when they formed the Indonesian military. The Dutch, feeling vulnerable to attack in Europe as a result of World War I, did not have the available manpower to spare to its colonies and saw the need to form local armies. They began to train Indonesians. It was this small nucleus of trained military professionals, combined with irregular troops, who fought the Dutch on the way to Indonesian independence.⁶⁵ The military was the most well-organized and powerful institution during colonial times. The Dutch state may have felt the need to form

⁶³ Tarling 1999: 149.

⁶⁴ Crouch 1988: 293.

⁶⁵ Wild 1988: 72-74.

a military, but the fact remains that it was a conscious decision. Inventing an Indonesian military greatly changed the shape of Indonesian society.

Corruption, combined with the example of elite rule, also gave rise to another future societal influence. The Communist movement, much like in the rest of the world, was emerging in Indonesia during the latter period of colonial rule, despite the efforts at repression by the Dutch. The Dutch began a pattern of violence against Communist that would eventually culminate with the 1965 massacre. In the 1920's the Dutch government in West Java supported Islamic youth gangs' terrorizing of Communist groups. Not only was this planting the seed of Muslim/Communist conflict, but it also began to instill among the populace the perception that government was weak. The Islamic leader Haji Agus Salim stated that the government "was playing with fire encouraging violence and placing its opponents beyond the protection of the law; in the end, such a course could only sabotage all respect for authority."⁶⁶ The state demonstrated its weakness and its implicit approval that social violence to maintain power was acceptable.

The volatile legacy the Dutch bequeathed to Indonesia was a spirited nationalism without a foundation upon which to build a nation. The Dutch invented the modern state framework and its associated institutions, but they lacked an ideology that would give them legitimacy. Sukarno was able to build on the Dutch state and hoped that the *Pancasila* philosophy would allow for a unifying of Indonesians and a legitimization of his authority, but the task was to be a difficult one. The Dutch state left Sukarno with the unenviable situation of forming a policy that could shape Communist, Islamist, and army sensibilities around his vision of the Indonesian state.

b. The Japanese

Although Japanese presence in Indonesia was much shorter than the Dutch stay, the Easterners also greatly influenced society through their actions as state leaders. In fact, even prior to actually assuming the reigns of power, the Japanese were influencing Indonesians. Four decades prior to

⁶⁶ Colombijn 2003: 47.

invading Indonesia, Japan had already influenced local nationalism with its victory in the Russo/Japanese War. Indonesians, although lacking any close ties to Japan, witnessed for the first time that Asians could defeat non-Asians. This fact was not lost on Indonesians with the arrival of the Japanese to Indonesia - Japan was a symbol of what was possible. Japan demonstrated that the Westerners could be defeated, and, therefore, Indonesians felt at least some sort of tie to their Asian rulers. The humiliating ten-day defeat of the Dutch and the contempt with which the Japanese treated their prisoners-of-war forever tarnished the Dutch aura of superiority. The strong Japanese state forever changed the Indonesian cultural view of inferiority to Westerners.

Japan encouraged the formation of anti-Western organizations and sought to breed a spirit of Asian unity. They streamlined government and education and eliminated the Dutch dual system of colonial rule. Education and government jobs became available to more people. Also, the colonialists exposed more of the nation to the Japanese obsession with modernization.⁶⁷ Japanese governance and modernization often included the local populace and gave Indonesians a taste of at least partial independence. The Japanese state moved Indonesians a step closer to having the ability to achieve independence.

During their occupation, the Japanese actively sought to use Islamic groups to maintain social calm. They created the Department of Religious Affairs, staffed almost exclusively by Muslims, and allowed for Indonesia's first official Islamic political party, *Masyumi*, which included Indonesia's two largest Islamic groups, *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*.⁶⁸ The Japanese state allowed for Islamization to occur, feeling that this would help to legitimize the state. The colonial state set the tone for future state/*Nahdlatul Ulama* interaction. The Japanese were the first to give a political voice to Islamists; it was a voice the Islamists were reluctant to give up.

⁶⁷ Wild 1988: 75-80.

⁶⁸ Hefner 2000: 41.

The Japanese treatment of the local populace was extremely brutal at times.⁶⁹ The behavior of the Japanese simply solidified the locals' belief that independence was the only alternative. Colonialism, whether European or Asian, was now unacceptable to Indonesians. With the defeat of Japan in World War II, the stage was set for the "era of revolution."⁷⁰ The power vacuum the defeated Japanese left was a prime opportunity for the Indonesian nationalist movement to actually achieve success. By 1949, Indonesia had gained its independence, and Sukarno moved forward to define a state inherited from the colonialists and to shape a populace that was ideologically divided.

2. Independence

As Indonesia tested the waters of sovereignty, its politics were quite explosive. Sukarno faced the daunting challenge of enacting a state policy that would appease the numerous ideological societal divides. As previously mentioned, Sukarno was generally accepted as the rightful leader of the new state. In effect, he had been given the reigns of power, backed with the *Pancasila* constitution, to shape the state as he saw fit. The views on how best to proceed covered a vastly different ideological spectrum. Public opinion, in general, fit into three categories. On the one hand, there were the Marxists, calling for radical change in all of Indonesia, including rejecting the global economy and throwing out all foreign business. A second ideology can be described as "developmentalist." This idea believed in building on the colonial state that was already in place. It focused on improving the existing infrastructure, education, and investment. The colonial bureaucracy would simply be replaced by an Indonesian one. A final movement centered on Muslim nationalism, calling for an Islamic state. This movement promoted the idea that Islam would hold Indonesia together and signal that it was truly independent.⁷¹ Sukarno attempted to form a policy to mesh all these differing viewpoints into a workable state.

⁶⁹ Christie 1998: 82-110.

⁷⁰ Ibid: 116-118.

⁷¹ Emmerson 1999: 21-25.

a. *The State and the Army*

The army came to represent the most substantial threat to Sukarno's authority and legitimacy. The army had never been happy with Sukarno and his cooperation with the Japanese and Dutch. This tension often strained the legitimacy of the Sukarno state. Early and often in Sukarno's presidency, the army sought to counter state decisions legally, politically, and, eventually, violently. Sukarno had the ability to make independent policy decisions, but the army represented the most influential segment of all the societal players. As a result, Sukarno often chose policies meant to appease the army. These decisions increasingly empowered the military and lessened Sukarno's hold on power.

Initially, though, Sukarno sought to challenge the army. In 1952 segments of the army attempted to have parliament peacefully dissolved, known as the "Seventeenth of October Affair." The crux of the affair came down to a divide within the armed forces between the technocrats and the irregulars. The politics of the national military were controlled by former Dutch-trained technocrats, and led by the young army chief-of-staff, General Nasution. The disenfranchised group was the less-educated, less-trained irregular army forces who had helped in the struggle against the Dutch, and mostly had its power base at the local, rural level. General Nasution sought to solidify his control of the army by decreasing the size of the irregular army. Parliament, though, sided with the irregulars, possibly due to its fear of a consolidated control of the army under one man. Nasution and the technocrats, displeased with this civilian intrusion on military matters, staged demonstrations and called for a new parliament.⁷² Though unsuccessful, the situation demonstrated two future problematic themes. Firstly, the army was to be a formidable political force. There was no doubt in its desire to affect policy and manipulate the levers of the state. Secondly, the "Seventeenth of October Affair" demonstrated that the acting state still did have its legitimacy and short of an outright violent coup, the parliament's decisions were the law of the land. Sukarno as the leader of the state could have backed

⁷² Crouch 1988: 28-31.

down to Nasution, but he did not. It is an example of the state having options and not simply deferring helplessly to societal forces.

Eventually, though, Sukarno's legitimacy as the driver of the state began to weaken, even as early as 1955. Sukarno was unable to form any sort of political consensus, and this fact made governance difficult. His weakness had the effect of unifying the army.⁷³ He had not demonstrated to the army that he had the substantial support needed to rule. In 1955, the army began a move toward actually controlling the levers of the state by refusing the Indonesian Cabinet's appointment of a new chief of staff and signaling that decisions in the Sukarno state were not necessarily law. This caused a lack of confidence and eventual crumbling of the Cabinet.⁷⁴ This is the first real sign that perhaps two states were emerging- one controlled by Sukarno and one controlled by the army.

b. The State and the Communists

Sukarno faced another substantial societal influence in the Communists. The Communists lacked sufficient violent force to protect itself, and, as a result, Sukarno had another policy option available to him that was not an option in dealing with the army. Sometimes the president felt that the best solution was violent preemptive repression. The Madiun Rebellion of 1948 marked the beginning of army/Communist conflict that eventually culminated in the tragedy of 1965. As the Sukarno/Hatta government came to power, PKI feared that its local Communist-led armed militias were to be disbanded. Feeling cornered, PKI revolted and Sukarno reacted with force by calling in the regular national army. It was the first notable conflict between the army and the Communists. Several prominent PKI leaders were killed, causing a severe blow to PKI in their pursuit of government control, but it by no means ended the Communist movement.⁷⁵ At this point in Sukarno's presidency, he chose to side with the army to legitimize his authority.

⁷³ Ibid, 31.

⁷⁴ Kingsbury 1998: 41.

⁷⁵ Kingsbury 1998: 37-38.

The failed rebellion and the violent reaction by the Sukarno state caused PKI to shift tactics. PKI's new accommodation strategy, coupled with the army's growing influence, led Sukarno to increasingly side with the Communists. The remarkable organizational recovery of the Communists following the Madiun Rebellion provided Sukarno with a tool to stymie army power. The Communists were gaining strength and provided the president with a potential ally and counterweight to the military. Realizing its disadvantage against the army, PKI gradually and quietly embarked upon a campaign of "agitation, organization and mobilization of the masses."⁷⁶ PKI became an organizational success story, expanding its membership between 1952 and 1962 from 7910 to over 2 million. PKI was poised for great success, but it never got the chance because of Sukarno's decision to declare martial law, a decision that greatly increased the army's legitimacy as state policy makers. Sukarno's martial law policy signaled a drastic change in state power. The army now had a footing in dictating state policy. This fact eventually led to the downfall of both Sukarno and PKI.

c. *The State and the Islamists*

The Muslims presented a different challenge for the Indonesian state. They were a sort of wildcard because they did not present the coherent threat to the state that the Communists and the army did. The Islamic community was not united politically with the exception of desiring Islam to have influence in governance. This fact allowed for other competing groups to gain their favor. In fact, the bitterness between *Masyumi* and NU-supporting *santri* Muslims and PNI-supporting *abangan* Muslims was quite heated.⁷⁷ Religious ideological differences aside, the two Muslim groups also represented different geographic regions in the island nation, making unity even more difficult. These differences not only made Muslim unity difficult, but it also made using the Islamic card more difficult for the state. Sukarno could not easily be seen as a voice for all Muslims because Muslims themselves did not have one voice.

⁷⁶ Brackman 1969: 29.

⁷⁷ Kingsbury 1998: 41.

As Indonesia moved toward independence, the Islamists, nevertheless, still enjoyed significant cultural and political influence. Sukarno faced a difficult situation in meshing Indonesia's conflicting ideals during the actual formulation of *Pancasila* in 1945. Sukarno faced a dilemma in forming the constitution: bow to *santri* Muslim leaders for an Islamic state or bow to non-Muslims and secularists leaving Islam out of the state. For *santri* Muslims, vagueness in the role of God in Indonesia proved unpalatable. Originally, the first principle was stated simply as "belief in God." This phrasing was unsatisfactory to many Muslim leaders, and the constitution committee agreed to change the principle to "belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law," known to this day as the Jakarta Charter.⁷⁸ Not surprisingly, the non-Muslims and secularists, as well as Sukarno, disagreed with this choice and the added Islamic emphasis. Sukarno and his second-in-command, Mohammad Hatta, needed to find a compromise. *Nahdlatul Ulama* gave them one. NU suggested that a compromise between the two versions was to state the first principle as "belief in a singular God."⁷⁹ Though far from perfect for either group, it was a workable agreement, and it gave the emerging nation at least a loose framework with which to proceed. Sukarno clearly demonstrated an aversion to the Islamization of the political process and was successful lessening the role of Islam.

Darul Islam represented an example of the Islamist political voice. It was a movement pushing for an Islamic state and particularly active in Aceh, West Java, and South Sulawesi. In 1948 the movement's leaders even declared a new state, Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State), and declared the current republic illegitimate. The movement continued into the 1960's and through its evolution, *Darul Islam* increasingly focused its attention on PKI and its growing influence in government.^{80 81} The movement never realistically

⁷⁸ Ibid: 42.

⁷⁹ Ibid: 42.

⁸⁰ Kingsbury 1998: 40-41.

⁸¹ Funston 2001: 76.

threatened the cohesion of the Indonesian state, however, demonstrating that Sukarno's relatively secular policy was working and acceptable to the vast majority of the Muslim community. The movement, though, does provide another glimpse into Indonesian society being far from homogenous in its beliefs and the difficulties state leaders face in enacting effective policy. Islamic tensions did exist, but the Islamists could not compel the state was bow to its pressures.

NU continued to participate peacefully in Sukarno's relatively secular state. Until 1952, NU was part of a conglomeration of Islamic interests that formed the Muslim political party *Masyumi*. In 1952, NU departed *Masyumi* in an effort to pursue its more clearly defined traditionalist policies. NU was increasingly at odds with the modernist *Muhammadiyah*. If *santri* Muslims could have put up a more united front, the 1955 elections might have turned out differently. *Masyumi*, NU and other smaller Islamic parties accounted for over 40 percent of the vote.⁸² It was interesting to note that Indonesia had a Muslim population upwards of 90 percent. A very large number of Muslims, mostly of the *abangan* type, supported the nationalists and the Communists. NU witnessed both the positive and negative in defining itself as a political party. NU enjoyed substantial support, yet that support was not substantial enough to achieve political consensus.

Sukarno, possibly due to the relative lack of Islamic unity, never felt a need to unite Indonesia around an Islamic identity. The Sukarno state, due to the fragmentation of Islamic society, did not need to Islamize the government. Although Islamization was an available tool Sukarno could have used, it never became the defining cultural characteristic of Indonesian society.

d. Society Too Divided

Sukarno as the driver of the state may have been in an impossible situation. Too many cultural institutions had too much influence. His strategy could be simply defined as allying with PKI, appeasing the army, and ignoring the Islamists. A demonstration of the difficulty Sukarno must have had in plotting Indonesia's political course, one need only to examine the 1955 elections. In

⁸² Hefner 2000: 43.

spite of the numerous societal differences, Indonesia did, in fact, conduct successful free elections in 1955 (not until 1998 would another free election occur), but as Indonesia was to demonstrate, free elections are no guarantor of stable governance. Sukarno did not have the social consensus to rule effectively. Sixteen parties held at least one seat in parliament, and there were still deep-seated societal differences. The Communist movement was indeed substantial. PKI, growing rapidly in strength, won 16.4 percent of the vote. The other major political parties, the Nationalist Party, the modernist Muslim Masyumi and the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama, won 22.3, 20.9 and 18.4 percent, respectively.⁸³ Obviously, there was no clear consensus being formed, and a second round of voting failed to solve the issue. Almost immediately after the 1955 elections, Sukarno was already contemplating the need for a “Guided Democracy.”⁸⁴

With Sukarno dealing with *Darul Islam*, PRRI and *Permesta* rebellions, PKI situated itself as a friend of the president. The timing was perfect for Sukarno as well. He was facing stiff challenges from the army and the Islamists. In 1959 Aidit described the PKI philosophy: “the PKI uses Marxism-Leninism as a constant guide in determining the character of its policy; it also bases its decisions on the existing balance in social forces. The PKI is obliged to continuously calculate the balance in the unstable social forces in Indonesia.”⁸⁵ Sukarno had apparently found the least-threatening ally in PKI. It was a party that appeared to have no obvious desires to drastically change the state or the ruler of the state and provided the best means to counter the increasingly threatening army.

Sukarno’s left-leaning stance brought the president and the army into closer conflict. The well-organized PKI was obviously a threat to army influence. Also, Sukarno’s allying with Communism pushed the Islamists away from the president and closer to the army. The closer Sukarno allied with PKI,

⁸³ Ibid: 43.

⁸⁴ Kingbury 1998: 41.

⁸⁵ Crouch 1988: 286.

the closer NU allied with the army. As communism grew and Sukarno increasingly accommodated its movement, NU was cornered into allying with the army. The Indonesian state, in a way, had shunned Islam. The state had offended Islamic sensibilities by siding with an atheist ideal like communism. Sukarno's policies continued to shape society.

C. THE FALL OF SUKARNO

The optimism of the 1955 free elections soon gave way to the bleak picture that two states were emerging. The players had not changed. Sukarno still controlled state policy that would directly affect the army, the Communists, and the Islamists. It was the army with its access to force and its own bureaucracy that soon came to resemble its own state. Sukarno policy also had the effect of legitimizing the army and their self-autonomous ways. Ten years of social unrest eventually erupted in the tragic events of 1965. Sukarno failed to enact the proper state policies that would have prevented the army from becoming effectively self-autonomous. The most severe was allowing the army's nationalization of Dutch property, but he also made other strategic errors. Although Sukarno did not inherit a thriving economy, his economic policy failed to improve the situation. He attempted to use nationalism to solidify his power, and this led to taking hard stance against any perceived Western influence. He led Indonesia into economic ruins with a nationalist policy of high public ownership and high tariffs, effectively isolating Indonesia from the global economy. At the same time, he was spending excessively on the military both to appease the army and to pursue an ill-conceived Indonesian pride campaign of trying to pick a fight with Malaysia. The resultant effects were 1000 percent inflation and a poverty level of over 60 percent.⁸⁶ Sukarno's state decisions directly led to a failed economy and an emerging army capable of pulling the levers of the state.

1. Sukarno Losing Control

The army's ability in 1955 to refuse the appointment of a new army chief of staff was a prime example of the decreasing legitimacy of the Sukarno state. Two states were emerging: the army's and Sukarno's. Sukarno, having won no

⁸⁶ Funston 2001: 84.

clear support in the 1955 parliamentary elections, continued his balancing act between the military, the Communists, and the Muslims. During the fight for independence from the Dutch, the military had been organized territorially, allowing regional commands to receive supplies and support from local villages. With Jakarta unable to effectively fund the military, leading officers in those territories began to set up their own businesses.

If there was one decision that solidified the military's place in Indonesian society, it was the nationalization of Dutch property in 1957.⁸⁷ Demonstrating its political influence, the army essentially took control of the newly nationalized properties. Although the Indonesian economy was already in shambles, in large part due to an un-manageable post-colonial debt, it was the military, not society, which benefited from the nationalization. The military solidified its position by having a privately-funded organization, isolating itself further from civilian control. In effect, the military was becoming its own state.

Following the nationalization of Dutch property, the Indonesian state faced its most significant challenge to the republic with the PRRI-Permesta rebellion. When all Dutch property was nationalized, Sumatra and Sulawesi were physically isolated due to the lack of transportation. Also, the worsening economic situation was most severe outside of Java. Power and governance was centered in Java, and the outlying regions sought greater independence. On 10 February 1958, rebels in West Sumatra proclaimed the new Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia- PRRI). Although Sukarno had effectively put Indonesia in a state of martial law in 1957, he was still reluctant to use the military to suppress Indonesian citizens. The military, though, increasingly at odds with the left-leaning Sukarno and gaining prestige, acted out on its own to crush the rebellion. Within two months the army had crushed the rebellion and further solidified its power in Indonesia.⁸⁸ The republic had been saved, but it was the army who had

⁸⁷ Kingsbury 1998:42.

⁸⁸ Kingbury 2003: 50-51.

made the decision, not Sukarno. It was now even less clear who represented the state: the army or Sukarno?

2. Sukarno's Last Stand

Realizing the combination of challenges the military and a failing economy presented, Sukarno in 1959 attempted to consolidate his power by overturning the agreements reached in the 1955 elections and returned Indonesia to its 1945 constitution, a constitution providing much more power to the executive, but still a constitution and based on *Pancasila*. Sukarno instigated a new program known as "Guided Democracy." The army agreed to the program because it was given increased influence and gained control of several important industries through nationalization of Dutch property.⁸⁹ Also included in Sukarno's plan was the formation of NASAKOM, which rid Indonesia of political parties by combining the nationalist, religious, and Communist parties in one large organization. In theory, the group was supposed to be an attempt at compromise to get past the bitter divisions that Indonesian politics faced. It was supposed to be a display of unity. NASAKOM actually represented one of the last times that Sukarno attempted appeasement of the military. The nationalists, primarily backed by the military, received much of Sukarno's attention. The Communists in the early stages and the Muslim groups were left without much real political power.⁹⁰

Sukarno and his NASAKOM policy at least initially garnered support from the Islamists. *Nahdlatul Ulama* initially chose to support Sukarno and work within the political system to gain influence. Sukarno rewarded NU with inclusion in NASAKOM, but this act still left NU without any real influence. NASAKOM provided him a means to more effectively control NU's political actions without allowing it any real power.⁹¹ In essence, NU's influence was limited to influencing social issues through its running of the Department of Religion. Although Sukarno intended to isolate NU politically, NASAKOM had the unintended consequence pushing the Muslim organization to seek ties with the

⁸⁹ Lapidus 2002: 670.

⁹⁰ Hefner 2000: 42.

⁹¹ Ibid.

army in the hopes of gaining more political leverage.⁹² NU came to view the Sukarno policy as detrimental to its cause.

“Guided Democracy” and its associated NASAKOM failed in the desired result of unifying Indonesians around a common goal. The differences were still unresolved and too complex. NU did not want NASAKOM and neither did the army. The army had, in fact, formed its own political party, GOLKAR, in 1964.⁹³ At the same time, PKI was at the height of its popularity. Sukarno was forced to finally choose sides. Perhaps, Sukarno realized that maintaining his authority while appeasing the military, specifically the army, was impossible. By 1965, Sukarno had clearly moved to the Communist side and sought to diminish army power.

At about the same time, the left-leaning air force sought to counter army influence by creating a “fifth” armed force, a move not opposed by Sukarno. The man behind this idea was the air force commander, Omar Dhani who sought to arm the workers and peasants and destroy the army’s monopoly on armed power. Very few of the armed forces officer corps favored the PKI, but in the air force the supporters represented the majority. The air force’s first chief of staff, Air Marshall Surjadi Surjadarma and Omar Dhani’s predecessor had begun the service’s PKI leanings.⁹⁴ The effect of the “fifth” force proposal combine with the land reform policy had two disastrous and unintended consequences. Land reform had the effect of bringing the Communists into sometimes violent conflict with Muslims, who accounted for a substantial percentage of the middle class and land-owning elite. And Dhani’s plan was completely unacceptable to the army and highlighted the growing left/right tensions within the military.

This is not to say that Sukarno’s eventual demise was inevitable. He still had substantial support within the military and sought political maneuverings to increase his control over the military. The army was no doubt entrenched in the

⁹² Ibid: 89.

⁹³ Emmerson 1999: 45.

⁹⁴ Crouch 1988: 83-84.

state by 1965, primarily as a result of privatization and martial law.⁹⁵ But the army as a whole was not united and the air force, navy, and police checked army power. Sukarno, in fact, remained respected within several elements of the army. These factors and the belief that much of the military would be amenable to a left-leaning Indonesian state provided Sukarno with the rationale to pursue his policy.

Sukarno knew that influential elements within the army would not allow for increasing PKI influence. Leading the anti-communist segment of the army was its chief, the devout Muslim, General Nasution. Sukarno wanted an army chief more amenable, so he offered Nasution the post of director for defense and security, a post that would have given him power over all 4 services (army, navy, air force, and police). Nasution agreed, but General Dhani of the air force protested. In a move possibly orchestrated by Sukarno himself, a new agreement was reached that the four services would be directly under the control of the president. Sukarno, although his influence was lessening, continued to make political decisions that would have an impact on the eventual makeup of the state. He had offended the right-wing army with his checking of Nasution's power and had offended Islamists by naming a less-fundamental replacement.

This volatile situation in Indonesia triggered a series of confusing, tragic events. Sukarno was rumored to be ill, the Muslims saw Sukarno granting PKI more power, and the military was worried about divisions among its own ranks.⁹⁶ Confidence in Sukarno's government was at an all-time low. These tensions finally reached the breaking point with the still confusing "Thirtieth of September Movement."

3. Sukarno's State Crumbles

The events of 1965 signaled an end to Sukarno's rule. Supposedly, a commander in Sukarno's palace guard, Lieutenant Colonel Untung had uncovered a treacherous "council of General's," including the Defence Minister General Nasution and Commander of the Army Yani, intent on overthrowing the

⁹⁵ Ibid: 34.

⁹⁶ Hefner 2000: 60.

president. A statement released by Untung's "Thirtieth of September Movement" described the council as "a subversive movement sponsored by the CIA (consisting of) power-mad generals and officers who have neglected the lot of their men and who above the accumulated sufferings of their men have lived in luxury, led a gay life, insulted our women and wasted government funds."⁹⁷ Untung's movement kidnapped six officers, including Nasution, and killed three of them, including Yani. The left-leaning air force General Dhani supported the movement as a "purge within the army," no doubt pleased with the removal of the anti-Communists, Nasution and Yani. But he and the PKI gravely miscalculated that Untung's apparent foiling of the council would be enough to swing army leadership to the left.⁹⁸

Several in Untung's group believed that Major General Suharto, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) would be sympathetic to their cause.⁹⁹ Quite the contrary, Suharto, in noting that the most senior army general was missing, assumed control of the entire army, condemned the rebels, and began spinning the story as a PKI plot to assume power. On 1 October Suharto's forces captured Halim air force base and found Sukarno, Dhani, the head of PKI, and "Thirtieth of September Movement" leaders fleeing the scene, an occurrence that lent legitimacy to the PKI coup conspiracy.¹⁰⁰ That evening Suharto announced over the radio that he had united the army and was "now able to control the situation both at the center and in the regions."¹⁰¹ In effect, Indonesia had a new president, though it would not become official until March 1968.

Was it the PKI behind the mysterious "Thirtieth of September Movement"? Army reformists? Sukarno? Or perhaps Suharto himself? The fact that the "Thirtieth of September" events directly led to Suharto becoming president has

⁹⁷ Ibid: 61.

⁹⁸ Ibid: 61.

⁹⁹ Ibid: 61.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid: 62.

¹⁰¹ Crouch 1988: 99.

fueled much speculation, and little has changed since the initial recollections of 1965. In any event, Sukarno was effectively finished as legitimate ruler of the Indonesian state. He had made several policy decisions that eventually provided Suharto with the opportunity to grab power. Suharto successfully rallied the army behind him, effectively turned Suharto into a figurehead president, and severely damaged Communist credibility all over the span of a few days. Sukarno's poor decisions and miscalculations had gradually led Indonesia into a two-state system. Regardless of who was behind the "coup," Sukarno and his overt siding with PKI sealed his fate. He drew the battle lines between his state and the army state. Suharto was able to rally the army behind him and move Indonesia into a new state era known the New Order. Sukarno's state policies had opened the door for Suharto to assume reigns of power. The former KOSTRAD commander began a methodical re-shaping of state policy that would lead to thirty years of New Order rule.

4. Summary of the Sukarno State

Sukarno inherited a colonial state that was neither geographically nor ideologically united. He did, however, initially possess the legitimacy to rule. The vast majority of the Indonesian populace accepted his right to rule. With this backing, he formulated *Pancasila*, a constitutional framework that still exists today, and embarked on a political path attempting to unify three major societal players: the army, the Communists, and the Islamists. He often pursued conflicting policies that would either appease or disgruntle these groups. In the end, Sukarno's state failed but the Indonesian state did not. The *Pancasila* state was still very much alive, but it was soon to have a different man pulling the reigns. Suharto was to attempt to solidify his power around the *Pancasila* state and was able to do so much more effectively because he only had one remaining legitimate challenge to his authority - the Islamists.

D. SUHARTO'S RE-CONSOLIDATION

So far, this paper has examined the Sukarno state and its dealings with three major societal groups: the army, the Communists, and the Islamists. As Suharto asserted his authority in consolidating his legitimacy, the former general

effectively only had one remaining dissenter to his idea of the state. The Islamists, and primarily NU, had hoped to benefit from its alliance with Suharto but soon found that Suharto had no intentions of Islamizing politics. He continued to use *Pancasila* as a state foundation and manipulated the political environment making it impossible to criticize his state. Following the destruction of PKI and the dominance of the army's GOLKAR party, NU was overmatched in seeking political gain. But rather than becoming violently anti-state, NU came to embrace the state philosophy of *Pancasila* and focus its criticism on Suharto's interpretation the *Pancasila* state.

The few days between September and October of 1965 during the botched "coup" combined with the already present economic and social problems spawned a much larger social unrest that culminated with the tragic Communist massacre. Although the massacre was not directly a military campaign, Suharto and his allies were the instigators. NU's participation is a violent example of the state manipulating cultural forces. Suharto and the army set it up to look like the "spontaneous fury of ordinary citizens," while in fact, it was the military that organized hundreds of thousands of vigilantes, including many NU members, and led to the slaughter of 500,000 men, women and children.¹⁰² The volatile mix of Sukarno's attempt to maintain power, increasing tensions between the military and the Communists, and the disillusionment in the Muslim community came to a tragic end in 1965. Sukarno's attempt at consolidating power and defining the state ended in bloodshed and a chance for another leader to lead Indonesia. A student member of *Nahdlatul Ulama* explained the time period in the following manner:

We have found that wealthy farmers and religious leaders participated in the massacres, not out of religious conviction but because they had been told that they would lose their land to the Communists. Our research has also shown that people who were good Muslims allowed themselves to be used by those who would inflame us to strike at their enemies for reasons having nothing to

¹⁰² Hefner 2000: xii, 64.

do with Islam. Those involved in the killings acted contrary to Islamic law and social justice.¹⁰³

Indonesia by the 1960's was a nation in the midst of tremendous instability. The economy was in shambles, the Communist movement, in step with the rest of Southeast Asia, was in full swing, and Muslims felt slighted by the political picture. Suharto through a series of maneuvers, including the destruction of PKI, managed to legitimize his authority over the state much more effectively than Suharto had. NU, both because of its participation in the massacre and in its disillusionment with the resultant lack of political gain, became the sole, worthy opponent to Suharto's idea of the Indonesian state. Obviously NU had shown its capability of violence during the massacre, but facing Suharto repression, the Islamic organization began a completely different path, one of peaceful resolution and inclusion.

1. Sukarno to Suharto

Suharto's fate as president was by no means settled following the "Thirtieth of September" movement. Much doubt existed as to who would eventually control the state. Even in the army, Suharto had his dissenters. Sukarno still had supporters such as Yani, who feared Suharto as president would bring in his own people and purge Yani and others like him. The non-army services were also, in general, much more supportive of Sukarno. These supporters felt Sukarno was the only chance to challenge the army. Also, there was a sense of Javanist loyalty prevalent and Sukarno still maintained prestige as the "Father of Indonesia."¹⁰⁴

Sukarno, though, faced one major disadvantage. Sukarno no longer had his ally and army counterweight, the PKI. PKI had been Sukarno's primary tool in countering army influence and now PKI was effectively finished as an organization. Suharto had more control of the other remaining tools, the army and the Islamists. Sukarno was essentially on his own against the army and the Islamists, with only *Pancasila* to support his presidency. It was the adherence to

¹⁰³ Ibid: xv.

¹⁰⁴ Crouch 1988: 159.

Pancasila that perhaps kept Sukarno around as long as he did. Suharto, though, also used *Pancasila* as a legitimizing force for his presidency.

Many in the army were dismayed by Sukarno ignoring the army in its desire to be better represented within the Cabinet. Others, including possible Sukarno supporters, felt that increased army representation was better than Subandrio-and -Saleh-like representation.¹⁰⁵ Sukarno's struggle to remain in power may have been futile, but the fact remains that he was still making conscious policy decisions in the hopes of shaping a favorable political climate.

Suharto also began to manipulate the levers of the state. Suharto understood he could not be seen as attempting an outright overthrow of Sukarno. Harold Crouch wrote that "Suharto needed a way to reject the cabinet without taking action that would force members of the armed forces to choose between Sukarno and Suharto."¹⁰⁶ The president, represented by Sukarno, was still viable within the state. Suharto chose a strategy in concert with the radical anti-Communist officer element to disrupt society, forcing Sukarno to rely more heavily on the army for stability. The radical officers covertly encouraged student demonstrations. Suharto then presented himself as a moderating force, as one who could regain social order. He offered suggestions to Sukarno like removing certain members from his cabinet to appease the radicals and restore order.¹⁰⁷ Suharto, although he controlled the largest access to military force, still needed to operate within the acceptable state framework. The acceptable state framework was still based upon the original *Pancasila* concept.

On March 11, 1966 Sukarno made another damaging decision. He angrily addressed his cabinet, ominously absent of Suharto, and re-affirmed his belief in Marxism. During the meeting troops without insignia (supposedly to hide their Suharto alliance) massed in front of the presidential palace. This fact eventually forced Sukarno to grant Suharto the authority "to take all measures considered necessary to guarantee security, calm, and the stability of the government and

¹⁰⁵ Ibid: 179-180

¹⁰⁶ Ibid: 180

¹⁰⁷ Ibid: 189.

the revolutions, and to guarantee the personal safety and authority of the President ... in the interests of the unity of the Republic of Indonesia.”¹⁰⁸ There are two key observations regarding this decision. Firstly, Sukarno based this decision on *Pancasila* and the moldable principle of “the unity Indonesia,” demonstrating the importance of state leaders basing their actions on the constitution. Secondly, Sukarno by granting Suharto “all measures considered necessary,” had greatly increased Suharto legal standing as the decision-maker of the state.

Sukarno, though, still would not dismiss his offensive against the army cabinet ministers, but now Suharto turned this strategy around to serve his purposes. Suharto used his new legitimacy to arrest certain ministers, but the ones he arrested were not loyal to him. The targets, Suharto explained, were against those “whose connection with the PKI/Gestapo there are sufficient indications, (second,) whose good faith in the president...is doubted, (and third,) those who have amorally and asocially lived in luxury over the sufferings of the people.”¹⁰⁹ Sukarno had granted Suharto authority to restore order, giving him the legitimacy to arrest, and now Sukarno was forced to acquiesce to Suharto, who was removing Sukarno supporters from the cabinet. Suharto operated brilliantly in that he never forced Sukarno into too much of a corner. He only asked for the removal of the modest number of fifteen ministers. Suharto was careful not to overstep his authority too early. In so doing, he gave Sukarno the hope that he could “outmaneuver” Suharto and his generals at a future date.¹¹⁰

Suharto, in the end, overcame Sukarno because he manipulated the state more effectively. Civil war had narrowly been avoided on several occasions, but both Sukarno and Suharto saw that their best chance in legitimate power lay within the current state system and MPRS (Indonesian parliament). Militant Sukarno supporters in East Java had pleaded with him to lead a resistance; Suharto shunned the militant elements of the army who called for an armed

¹⁰⁸ Ibid: 189

¹⁰⁹ Ibid: 195.

¹¹⁰ Ibid: 179-196.

uprising. The result was an eventual legal decision on succession of power. Parliament now had a more army-friendly make-up and as Old Order – New Order social unrest increased, the MPRS was forced to make a decision. On 8 March 1968, Sukarno was effectively removed from power. He remained on house arrest until his death in June 1970.

2. Suharto Alone

Alone, Suharto was able to much more effectively control the Indonesian state for three main reasons. First, he was able to consolidate the military and its monopoly of force much more effectively than Sukarno had. With this control went an ability to control information within society. Second, he enjoyed tremendous economic growth during his rule until the financial crisis of 1997. And, third, he aggressively demanded adherence to the *Pancasila* code, which both gave him the room to maneuver politically and to legitimize his authority. Suharto made state decisions that were perceived as good for the Indonesian state.

To control society the state needs to have good information and as Suharto consolidated his control over most of the military, he also had the means to do so. The territorial control of the armed forces allowed the army to be intimately involved in local society, and led to its dual function, *dwifungsi*, role in society. The dual role meant acting both as a traditional national defense armed force as well as a local, domestic police force. Acting as a local police force logically led to the establishment of the Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin) which focused on gathering intelligence on domestic matters.¹¹¹

Suharto felt that *Pancasila* was the sole answer to unify Indonesia. *Pancasila* allowed Suharto to portray his governmental apparatus as a “system with the forms of political competition and participation, (and) people would feel a sense of engagement with the developmental mission of the state.”¹¹² He felt the country needed to get past the severe ideological divides of the past. In his quest to maintain power, he above all else sought to promote stability. At the

¹¹¹ Ibid: 222-223.

¹¹² Emmerson 1999: 34.

heart of his political system was the military, which actively participated in Suharto's GOLKAR party. To appease Indonesians and appear supportive of democracy, Suharto allowed for other parties, but they were ineffective. Suharto allowed for three parties: Golkar; PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), which was a combination of Christian, socialist and nationalist parties; and PPP (United Development Party), which was a forced mixture of conflicting Muslim groups. PPP was an obvious attempt to blunt NU's influence by combining it with its rival *Muhammadiyah*. (the two groups demonstrated their differences previously with NU leaving *Masyumi*) Suharto had created a system where Golkar remained unchallenged due to the other parties' severe internal divisions.¹¹³ All members of the government were required to join Golkar, which made politicking by the other two parties difficult. PPP and PDI had no chance for political gain, and, as a result, Golkar would go on to "win" the next six elections.¹¹⁴

As much as Suharto pushed *Pancasila*, he also pushed his developmentalist strategy. This strategy was seen as immensely successful by the citizenry, at least until the economic collapse in 1997. Suharto had faced the same grim economic picture as Sukarno had, but Suharto succeeded in leading the economy out of the doldrums. Suharto took the 600 percent inflation in 1965 and turned the economy around.¹¹⁵ He developed infrastructure and encouraged foreign investment.

Pancasila during the first half of Suharto rule allowed him to remain fairly insulated from criticism. After all, he claimed that every decision was done for the good of the state. NU during this time went along with the president, and this actually had the effect of turning away some of its key support. Suharto and his strategy against Islamic groups can not be solely blamed for the weakening of their influence. Part of Islam's lessening role had to do with Muslim strategy. One direct result can be seen in the religious conversion numbers of the late 1960's. NU continued to take a hard line against former PKI members and

¹¹³ Bourcher 2003: 12.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. *Indonesian Politics and Society* Ibid, 12.

¹¹⁵ Ibid: 6.

forbade them from becoming NU members. NU also actively criticized the government for even releasing PKI prisoners. This aggressive stance proved offensive to many Indonesian Muslims. Christian groups took advantage through proselytizing and steadily increased membership. Islam lost substantial numbers to Christianity, including 3 percent of the Java population and 1.5 percent of the entire Indonesian population.¹¹⁶ Suharto understood, just as his predecessor had, that the radical Islamist position was far from becoming mainstream.

3. Radical NU Pushes Islamism

To better understand the state/NU relationship it would be helpful to expand on a few key points presented in the previous chapter and focus on the Islamist perspective with regard to state policy. Sukarno's policies by the 1960's had the effect of increasingly offending NU. Many in NU saw Sukarno as often pursuing anti-Islamic policies. A split developed between the old guard and the new. Senior NU leadership continued a policy of accommodation toward Sukarno policies. This strategy was seen as outdated and ineffective by an increasing number in the radical wing of NU. Groups such as the youth wing of NU, Ansor, and NU veteran's associations became increasingly active. The heart of the consternation with Sukarno's policies for NU and especially its radical element was the president's allegiance with the Communists.

Prior to the eruption of widespread violence in 1965, Sukarno policy had driven the radical factions of NU to lean toward violent political solutions. They were also at odds and operating autonomously from the senior leadership. The old-guard chairman of NU at the time, Wahab Chasbullah, still sought a policy of accommodation with Sukarno and PKI, but the land reform movement had increased organizational tensions, and the ideological split in NU began to overtly show itself. PKI and youth and veteran's sects of NU openly engaged in violence. By the time the chaotic "Thirtieth of September" events occurred, radical NU members had assisted in causing an unstable social environment that would make the Communist massacre possible.

¹¹⁶ Hefner 2000: 108.

The eventual failure of Sukarno's strategy with regard to the Islamists and NU was never a foregone conclusion. In fact, Sukarno received mixed signals from the organization. The elder, more moderate, leadership favored peaceful resolutions with Sukarno as president. The youth wing, on the other hand, wanted immediate and drastic change. For instance, there was much debate about the nature of the involvement by senior NU leadership in decisions leading to the massacre. Then NU Chairman Wahab apparently did not have much control, though he was often advised and sometimes asked for approval of operations.¹¹⁷ But there is ample evidence that at least substantial portions of NU were involved. NU's daily newspaper, *Duta Masyarakat*, backed an "annihilation" of PKI party members and any who participated in the "Thirtieth of September Movement."¹¹⁸

As the confusion and chaos in Indonesia reached its peak in 1965 and early 1966, NU as a cohesive organization found itself unsettled. Coordinated leadership decisions were lacking within NU. Young NU radicals were no doubt eager for aggressive tactics and the senior leadership appeared to remain quiet during these turbulent times. By the third of October NU's youth wing, *Ansor*, was calling for its members to assist the army in restoring order. A relative unknown, thirty-four year old fourth vice chairman of NU by the name of Subchan partnered with Catholic party leaders in calling for a ban on PKI (at least Muslims and Catholics can agree on something). By 4 October, Subchan released an official statement, prepared by young activists, condemning PKI. Subchan should not have had the authority to release such a statement, but the current environment favored the radical movement. Senior leaders did not even see the message until the following day. But senior leadership, faced with growing support for the radicals, felt obliged to sign off on the statement.¹¹⁹

Suharto and his fervent anti-Communist stance increasingly appealed to the Islamists. As Suharto moved into power, debate continued between the

¹¹⁷ Barton: 1996: 38.

¹¹⁸ Hefner 2000: 108.

¹¹⁹ Barton 1996: 47-48.

radicals and the moderates of NU over political strategy. But during the early stages following the “coup,” NU youth continued to drive organizational policy. Six months later they pressed for Sukarno’s official removal, in direct contradiction to several senior leaders. (Sukarno, by this time had little real authority) By 1968, the political climate in Indonesia forced even the NU senior leadership into relenting and supporting the removal of Sukarno. The future direction of Indonesia was clear.

4. Suharto Counters Islamism

It was not long before Suharto demonstrated, much like Sukarno, that seriously addressing the Islamist view would definitely not be a policy priority, and, in fact, not even necessary. NU greatly misread the Indonesian political situation. Part of the rationale in backing the army against Sukarno was the belief that General Nasution, a moderate pious Muslim, would emerge as the army leader. Whether coincidence or not, Nasution was one of the generals the “coup” plotters attempted to kidnap. Nasution was not in a position to assert his authority, and Suharto emerged as the general capable of uniting the army and seizing power. Suharto had actually previously in his career been relieved from command by Nasution. They were not close friends. This misjudgment by NU had lasting consequences. NU had hoped to ally with Nasution, a man it felt would be receptive to Islamic concerns, but instead found it had placed its fortunes with the “secular modernizer” Suharto.¹²⁰ Mostly out of political necessity, many in NU initially still chose to support Suharto.

NU did achieve some early political gains following the events of 1965. In effect, the army and NU were the only relevant political organizations remaining. *Masyumi* had not been a factor since its banishment from politics in 1960. Sukarno’s party, PNI, was discredited and severely weakened, and PKI had been effectively annihilated.¹²¹ The strategy by the radical NU element to support the army appeared to be succeeding, but its expectations for future gains were too

¹²⁰ Hefner 2000: 90.

¹²¹ Barton 1996: 42.

high. Initial progress had led NU “to expect more reward from Sukarno’s successor than it received.”¹²²

Suharto showed his desire to de-emphasize Islam early in his tenure. NU continued to support and accommodate Suharto. In 1968 NU even agreed to the controversial decision to reduce Islamic parliament seats from 48% to 28%. Suharto at this stage attempted to present an image of Islamic accommodation and had assured NU that the interests of Islam would still be met. He stated that “the *kiai* (religious leaders) are not the only ones to know what is *haram* (forbidden in Islam) and what is not.”¹²³ Suharto could not completely ignore NU, but he was politically masterful in consolidating his authority without needing to give in to Islamist desires. He gave just enough to appease, but not enough that his authority would be threatened.

By 1971, Suharto had solidified his hold on power and was able to become more aggressive in his pursuit of power. He began to use intimidation to gain electoral support.¹²⁴ As a result of intimidation tactics, even some *ulama* switched parties and joined GOLKAR. The government’s party steadily increased in size. Suharto specifically targeted NU as a political threat and removed NU from its seat as head of religious affairs. In 1971 GOLKAR crushed NU in the election by a margin of 62 percent to 18 percent.¹²⁵ These results and those of other Muslim parties represented a decline in Muslim party vote from 40 percent in the 1955 elections to 25 percent in 1971 elections.¹²⁶ Suharto was becoming so powerful that his way was fast becoming the only way in Indonesia.

Suharto still needed to at least superficially address Islamic concerns. Following the elections, Suharto continued a campaign of defusing Muslim tensions. The government catered to Muslims in the interest of social calm by siding with Islamic groups with regard to family law, interfaith competition, and

¹²² Ramage 1995: 30.

¹²³ Barton 1996: 50.

¹²⁴ Ibid: 55-56.

¹²⁵ Ibid: 62.

¹²⁶ Stoddard 1981: 162.

religious education. In 1973 the army amended the marriage law to make it more in line with orthodox Islamic practice. In 1979 the army did not recognize certain syncretic Javanist religions as legitimate creeds. It also banned an annual Christian festival of charity and prevented a hosting of world assembly of Christians.¹²⁷ Suharto and the army hoped these actions would show his government as supportive of Islam, but he was, of course, only granting superficial influence to Muslims. He still controlled all the real political power, and this fact continued to trouble NU.

Most of Suharto's political decisions stifled Muslim influence. NU soon found that Suharto was de-Islamizing Indonesian politics.¹²⁸ Both came to distrust one another. Suharto and his New Order regime worried "that Muslim groups (would) use their faith to break up the state (while) Muslim groups fear(ed) that the state (would) be used to break up their faith."¹²⁹ For Suharto, *Pancasila* was the state. Muslims, including NU, believed Suharto placed an overemphasis on *Pancasila*, and this policy was often viewed as offensive to Islam.

As Suharto became firmly entrenched in power and Islam as a political force became increasingly irrelevant, he forced NU to re-evaluate its strategy. NU was increasingly perceived as unable to look out for the best interests of the *umat*. NU leadership understood that "the more visible NU's compromises, the less so its conscience, and the more limited its appeal to Indonesian Muslims looking for a consistent religious opposition to join."¹³⁰ Suharto's forced detachment of Islam from the political arena indirectly benefited NU. NU no longer needed to concentrate on Jakarta and central politics. Suharto had made certain that NU's efforts were futile. NU went back to the countryside to concentrate on the *umat*. By returning to its origins, NU regained its legitimacy, both politically and religiously. NU regained touch with its membership.

¹²⁷Ibid: 165.

¹²⁸Barton 1996:

¹²⁹ Stoddard 1981: 160.

¹³⁰ Ibid: 163-164.

Ironically, Suharto, by attempting to de-legitimize all other parties save GOLKAR, gave the disenfranchised a reason to back NU. The less political NU appeared, the more appealing it became to the masses.

As early as the 1970's NU *ulama* such as Abdurrahman Wahid were forming a new, radical strategy that would be more effective in countering Suharto. Wahid favored a novel strategy that accepted the compatibility of Islam and *Pancasila*. It involved an acceptance that official politics was not in the best interest of NU members and that embracing *Pancasila* was the best course of action.¹³¹ He understood that "ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) uses *Pancasila* to define the political boundaries of permissible political behavior in Indonesia" and that it sees Islam as a threat to the unity of the state.¹³² But Wahid understood that *Pancasila* provided at least a chance for NU to have a political voice. Suharto had based his legitimacy on *Pancasila*. If NU could mesh Islam and *Pancasila*, it would have the means to compete with the New Order.

E. THE STRONG STATE

By the early 1970's, Suharto and his *Pancasila*-based state was firmly established. The state was strong and *Pancasila* was broadly accepted by Indonesians. Those seeking power needed to embrace Suharto's interpretation of the Indonesian state. Those seeking reform needed to find a strategy compatible with *Pancasila*. Although Suharto would still face challenges from the military for political power, Suharto increasingly viewed Muslim influence as his primary concern, both as a challenge to his authority and as a counterweight to military influence. Suharto and the army had effectively meshed into one unit and the government's official party, GOLKAR, was the only one with actual official political influence. Other political parties or challengers to Suharto were impossible in the current interpretation of the *Pancasila* state. For NU it needed to adopt a strategy that would work against these formidable challenges. Often times, those who feel their beliefs repressed react violently, and without the *Pancasila* ideology, violence may well have been the tactic of Islamists. But NU

¹³¹ Barton 1996: 71.

¹³² Ramage 1995: 123.

provided an interesting counter-tactic. NU believed that *Pancasila*, interpreted correctly, was not counter to Muslim beliefs. NU embarked upon a path that strengthened the state even further, but allowed it to begin to chip away at the power of the president and his interpretation of the state. The NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid explained as much in a 1992 interview:

So the idea was that in order to resist the government's interpretation of *Pancasila* as the all-embodying, all-dominating ideology, is by developing an alternative view of *Pancasila*. And that vision could only be developed outside of politics.¹³³

The Islamist NU embraced *Pancasila* and the current framework of the state wholeheartedly, but sought a new understanding that was more conducive to the organization's religious views. Suharto's monopoly on the official bureaucratic and political structure meant that pressure for reform needed to come from outside the system. NU's strategy had the effect of countering the very means that Suharto had been using to repress his foes. Suharto put *Pancasila* beyond reproach. This fact caused an organizational change in NU, but it also gave the group a platform to push for reform.

The same tools the dictatorial Suharto used to legitimize his state were the very ones that both pushed Muslims toward democracy and also eventually led to the president's downfall. NU succeeded because it became a proponent of the state, the basic framework of which had survived since the original *Pancasila* conference in 1945. Suharto's, like Sukarno's, authority had been built on *Pancasila*. These five pillars formed the basis of a philosophy that made criticism of the president possible. NU, though, was unique among Islamists in its embracing of *Pancasila* early on, but it soon became the most prominent group that had the greatest influence on Indonesian democratic reform.

1. NU De-Islamizes Politics

NU accepted the state, but not necessarily the state as defined by Suharto and his New Order. Suharto policy had led to frustration within NU. The organization had failed to achieve electoral success and believed that it had

¹³³ Barton 1996: 235

strayed from its original intent as a socio-religious organization. The political climate within the Indonesian state led NU to reevaluate its political strategy. By the mid 1970's NU began moving toward an organizational policy that would better support its members by "turning away from party-political activity and embracing the non-sectarian state philosophy of *Pancasila*."¹³⁴ It also was moving toward a policy that would provide it the best chance of success within the Suharto-defined state. At the 1979 NU Congress, the organization decided to accept *Pancasila* and leave official party politics. By 1983 NU scholars officially made the declaration that *Pancasila* was acceptable to Islam. They proclaimed that there was no need for an Islamic state.¹³⁵ In so doing, NU had re-defined the cultural makeup. The largest Islamist organization no longer called for the Islamization of politics.

Whereas in 1965 NU chose the violent path to counter a distasteful political situation, in 1984 NU demonstrated that it had learned from the failings of the past. Riots erupted in Tanjung Priok (North Jakarta) among Muslims upset with the ongoing perception that Suharto was using *Pancasila* to replace Islam both ideologically and spiritually. Depending on whose account one believes, anywhere from eighteen to hundreds were killed. NU's reaction to this Islamic violence provided an excellent example of the new NU strategy. Wahid stated that by acting violently against the government, the rioters had besmirched the *umat*. They had incorrectly demonstrated that "Islam and *Pancasila* as two opposing enemies, in which one must eliminate the other."¹³⁶ Wahid believed the two were compatible. Suharto, on the other hand, could not use the riots against NU.

Wahid believed that NU's political history only weakened NU as an organization. Involvement in politics took focus away from the primary goals of looking after the *umat* through its social, economic, and educational programs. Leaders increasingly were corrupted by politics and no longer had the best

¹³⁴ Ibid: 234

¹³⁵ Hefner 2000: 233.

¹³⁶ Ramage 1995: 37.

interest of the community at heart. The *umat* was losing faith in its leaders, which for a traditionalist organization and its emphasis on its leadership was quite troubling.¹³⁷

Suharto required all organizations to accept *Pancasila* as their ideological foundation. At the same time, he was heading off all competition with such tactics as forming PPP. NU felt its political influence increasingly lessened while at the same time its ideals were being compromised. Suharto had issued stern warning regarding the consequences of not embracing *Pancasila*, leaving no doubt that this was one element of the state that was beyond challenge.¹³⁸ NU gradually accepted the situation and developed a strategy. It would embrace the five principles of *Pancasila* to both protect the values of its organization and to criticize the New Order government. It would also leave official party politics. Although the initial impact was to drive more PPP members to join GOLKAR, NU was able to operate more successfully outside the restrictive bureaucratic structure.¹³⁹ NU's decision was a unique one, and one that must have surprised many experts on Islamic organizations.

2. Suharto Attempts a Re-Islamization of Politics

Suharto had been very careful in defining the state and manipulating the various social forces. His policy of aggressive pursuit of his definition of *Pancasila* was supposed to keep the Islamists at bay, and the strategy worked. But as a result of Suharto's policy, NU re-defined itself. NU was one of the key social players, and Suharto counted on the fact that Muslim organizations wanted more Islamization. Now its largest representative, NU, wanted less political Islamization and became a force for governmental reform, a fact that was a direct threat to Suharto's authority but in line with his policy. Suharto would soon turn toward a policy that actively encouraged Islamists.

During the latter part of the 1980's, Suharto's state policy strategy changed drastically. Partially due to his diminishing support among the armed

¹³⁷ Barton 1996: 205.

¹³⁸ Ramage 1995: 32.

¹³⁹ Ibid: 55-56.

forces, he began a policy of courting Islamists to improve his “Islamic credentials” and form support that could counter the military.¹⁴⁰ Not surprisingly, this policy shift also occurred shortly after NU’s decision to leave party politics. NU began a campaign pushing for democratic reform, a campaign that was much more threatening to a dictator like Suharto than Islamization. Islamization would give Suharto the means to quash democratic reform. Wahid explained that Suharto allying with Islamist activists would “reconfessionalise” politics and inevitably pit the army against the Islamists. The army would “clamp down” on the emerging Islamization and give the “armed forces an excuse to further restrict all forms of independent political activity, Islamic or otherwise.”¹⁴¹ In other words, Suharto was not embracing Islamization because he wanted more influence; instead, he was allowing Islamization to occur in order to combat his real threat to power: democratization. But democratic forces were already underway as a result of the *Pancasila* policy. NU began an active campaign to counter Suharto. Two examples provide insight into Suharto-state/NU interaction: NU’s mass rally, or *Rapat Akbar*, on 1 March 1992 and the Suharto association with ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslimin Indonesia* or Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), the government-approved Islamic organization founded in December 1990.

Wahid sought to demonstrate that NU and Islam stood for an inclusive form of democracy, not an exclusive one.¹⁴² By supporting *Pancasila* and leaving official party politics, NU was now free to use the strength of its 40 million-strong membership to influence politics as a legal, outside-the-system civil group. This policy was nowhere more evident than during the 1992 *Rapat Akbar*, a massive NU rally attended between 150,000 and 200,000 people. (Wahid argues that the number was closer to 500,000 and that many were prevented from attending by the armed forces)¹⁴³ The rally was an overt display of

¹⁴⁰ Barton 1996: 237-238.

¹⁴¹ Ibid: 241-242.

¹⁴² Hefner 2000: 236.

¹⁴³ Barton 1996: 235.

Pancasila support by NU and provided a forum to make several statements. Firstly, the rally demonstrated that NU was no longer a political organization and, therefore, it would be inappropriate for the group to endorse anyone, including Suharto, for president. Secondly, it was an attempt by NU to counter Suharto's ICMI strategy. Wahid wanted to show to the NU membership that NU's inclusive form of democracy still had massive support and that Suharto and ICMI did not represent the majority of Muslims. And thirdly, NU wanted to demonstrate that there was an option to the "rising tide of sectarianism and fundamentalism in Indonesia."¹⁴⁴

NU was betting that Indonesians felt much the same way Wahid did, and that Suharto's policy would lack the societal consensus to be accepted. Wahid hoped that the majority of Muslims believed the way he did that "if forced to make a choice between the democratization movement and the Islamic movement, 'my choice is clear, I will leave the Islamic movement.'"¹⁴⁵ Suharto, of course, was counting on most Muslims choosing Islamization over democracy.

Suharto's pursued his policy well into the 1990's and there was no guarantee that his Islamist strategy would not succeed. But through the efforts of groups such as NU and its pluralistic interpretation of a state, not to mention the economic chaos of 1997, the Suharto state eventually fell to an evolving democratic state in 1998. *Pancasila* survived, and it survived because Suharto had spent the majority of his rule ensuring its acceptance within society. As the Indonesian state moves into its first presidential general elections, there is a newfound emphasis on finding a workable democracy within the *Pancasila* system. *Pancasila* has obviously not been sufficient to ensure democracy, but it does provide an acceptable framework. Wahid said, "If you want to achieve political democracy you need more than *Pancasila*."¹⁴⁶ He argues that for this to happen "there must be a separation of the state and civil domains...basic freedoms of expression, association, and movement, (and) a separation of

¹⁴⁴ Ibid: 236.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid: 252.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid: 253.

powers within government.”¹⁴⁷ The skill with which the new leaders manipulate the levers of the state to make this happen will ultimately determine if the entrenched *Pancasila* state can evolve into a truly democratic state.

F. CONCLUSION

The Indonesian state has had one strong thread of continuity: *Pancasila*. Sukarno invented it and Suharto strengthened it. The concept has always been flexible, and this flexibility has allowed for un-democratic abuses to occur at the hands of both presidents. But *Pancasila* is also inherently an inclusive philosophy and one that can provide for a political voice for the masses. The *Pancasila* philosophy under Sukarno allowed for the massacre of 500000 Indonesian Communists to occur, but it also allowed for NU to pursue real democratic reform. The inclusive nature of *Pancasila* allowed for NU to evolve from an Islamist-promoting organization to a democratic-promoting organization.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid: 254.

IV. ALGERIA

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1947, after more than one hundred years of foreign rule, the native Algerian and Berber population sensed the grip of French colonialism loosening. The Algerian Organic Statute of that year established the first elected assembly in Algeria's history. Soon, with the success of Nasser's nationalist revolution in Egypt and French withdrawal from Indo-China, Tunisia and Morocco, this first taste of national autonomy had blossomed into a popular independence movement, the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN). Indicative of its times, this first Algerian Rebellion eschewed religious or ethnic frames in favor of socialist and nationalist rhetoric. After six years, 500,000 casualties and the demise of a French Republic, the Algerian nationalists had their independence.

Algeria's first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, took his regime on a brief, autocratic digression to the cult of personality. In 1965, his tenure was cut short by a bloodless military coup. The coup leader and long-time FLN stalwart, Houari Boumedienne, commanded the most significant elements of the Algerian armed forces. As Boumedienne proceeded to consolidate his regime, Algeria finally began to reap the benefit of its vast natural resources. Gradually, the army supplanted the FLN as the nation's dominant political force. Boumedienne gathered his closest civilian associates and the chief military commanders in a Council of the Revolution. Collegial rule was in and factionalism was out. Nonetheless, with Boumedienne holding the offices of prime minister, president and minister of defense, Algeria remained decidedly autocratic.

The FLN, though ardently nationalist, represented a larger coalition of anti-colonial interests. Chief amongst these was the *al Qiyam* Society. This transnational Islamic organization reflected the Janus-like perspectives of its chief modern day spokesmen: Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Stora 2001: 172.

Madani, an articulate devotee of Abduh and Iqbal, was a political activist in the early 1950s and was arrested 17 days after Algeria's war for independence broke out in 1954. He was released in 1962 and called for democratic elections and pluralism.¹⁴⁹ Nonetheless, he found that his preference for Islamic Fundamentalism was out of favor in the new government. By 1966, Madani was in such ill favor with the FLN that he quit formal politics and chose an academic career. He eventually became a professor at Algiers University and later earned his doctorate in Britain. In 1982, Madani became a political figure once again when he intervened at the expense of established Islamist groups at the university in a controversy over the replacement of French by Arabic. Consequently, he was jailed for four years. In October 1988, Madani led a disciplined rank of Islamists to march despite army gun-fire. The army was called to reestablish law and order in Algiers after it was taken over by the mob. Within a year, Algeria became the first North African country to legalize an Islamic party.¹⁵⁰

Madani's alter-ego, Ali Belhaj, acted equally as loyal Lieutenant and advocate for the more provocative philosophies of Qutb and Mawdudi. Born in Tunisia, Belhaj was a war orphan who received only an Arab-Islamic religious education. His more dogmatic approach included the call for the immediate embrace of *Sharia* and denunciation of the West. Belhaj found himself imprisoned from 1982 to 1987 as a result of his more confrontational Islamist style. However, this only increased his popularity amongst Algeria's youth.¹⁵¹

Despite a thin veil of Islam (including a constitutional reference to Islam as the state religion), Boumedienne embraced a program of socialist state building. The emigrating settlers left behind vast landholdings that the state swiftly nationalized. This policy soon extended to industry with a focus on developing the nation's petroleum sector. By 1971, Boumedienne managed to nationalize the formerly French-controlled oil fields. This critical achievement coincided with

¹⁴⁹ Esposito 1999: 178.

¹⁵⁰ Stora 2001: 198.

¹⁵¹ Esposito 1999: 177.

a redistribution of state land to peasant collective farms. While national petro-wealth grew, farm productivity did not. In addition, Boumedienne attempted to engage the power of nationalism by promoting Arabic culture and language. This well-intentioned attempt to eradicate the vestiges of French colonialism produced the unintended consequence of alienating the large native Berber population.¹⁵² The Berbers had grown accustomed to the uniform subjugation of Berber and Arab culture to the Francophone colonial culture. The official state promotion of Arabic promised to deny the Berbers the full rewards of independence.

By 1976, despite these challenges, Algeria appeared to have struck out on a successful path to national consolidation. Soaring oil prices filled the national coffers. A national charter and constitution were adopted and Boumedienne was legally elected president. Even Boumedienne's sudden death due to illness passed quietly as the army selected Chadli Bendjedid to be Algeria's next president. After a brief period of consolidation, Bendjedid moved to put his personal stamp on national rule. As part of his policy to ease some of Boumedienne's strict political controls, Bendjedid pardoned former president Ben Bella and released him from house arrest. Bendjedid also moved to liberalize the national economy. These reforms extended to privatizing the unsuccessful peasant cooperative farms. By 1984, Bendjedid had been reelected in an unopposed national ballot.

Algeria's period of measured national consolidation was drawing to a close. Soaring oil prices had engendered a national population explosion. The youth, in particular, flocked to the cities to benefit from the oil-driven *rentier* social contract: free education, free health care and government jobs. As oil prices plummeted in the mid-1980s the state's capacity to maintain this social contract evaporated. By late 1988, young protestors were clashing with police and soldiers throughout the country. Bendjedid followed a program of severe repression with political and economic reforms. He was reelected to a third term in December of 1988. Falsely buoyed by this hollow mandate, Bendjedid revised

¹⁵² Roberts 2003: 68.

the constitution in February 1989 in order to lay the groundwork for a July legalization of multiparty national elections. One of the first parties to organize under the new system was an Islamist coalition, the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS).

Early in 1990, the FIS handily outpolled the FLN in provincial and municipal elections. The broad public response prompted the Bendjedid regime to suspend the June 1991 parliamentary elections and arrest the FIS's leadership – Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj. When elections resumed in January of 1992, the first round of balloting indicated another overwhelming FIS victory. Famously fearing “one man, one vote, one time”, the civilian and military elites behind Bendjedid convinced him to resign. In the ensuing confusion, elections were cancelled, parliament suspended and a national High Council of State (HCS) was established with formerly exiled FLN war hero, Mohammed Boudiaf at its head. As popular unrest cascaded into violence. The HCS outlawed the FIS and unleashed the state's security apparatus. By July of 1992, Boudiaf had been assassinated and the HCS appointed one of its own, Ali Kafi, to the presidency. Although unable to participate politically, the FIS swiftly formed an armed wing, the *Armee Islamique du Salut* (AIS). Conventional clashes with government troops continued through 1993 when the extremist *Groupe Islamique Arme* (GIA) emerged as the force behind a campaign of assassinations and bombings. In a single generation, Algeria had slipped from the optimistic exuberance of independence to the despairing horror of civil war. The party of nationalism, social justice and hope found itself in a mortal struggle with violent Fundamentalists. How? Having reviewed the historical context, we will turn to an analysis of our five variables.

B. CIVIL WAR

This period of Algerian rebellion appeared to begin with a bloodless coup. In 1992, the Algerian military nullified national elections which broadly favored Islamists, instituted martial law, excused the president and outlawed all Islamist political parties. Access for Algeria's largest Islamist social movement, led by

FIS, had been foreclosed. Not surprisingly, the origins of this conflict could be traced back several years.

1. Access

The early stages of Algeria's Fundamentalist movement were marked by the exclusionary rule of a single, military-dominated party. The regimes tolerance of political opposition was testified to by its burgeoning population of political prisoners. However, these circumstances changed under the growing weight of demographic and economic strain.

Algeria's socialist economy took responsibility for housing, education, social services and most employment. As with many other *rentier* states, this largesse was supported by oil revenues. In Algeria's case, oil accounted for nearly 90 percent of her exports. Oil revenues collapsed in the mid 1980s and so did the Algerian economy. Austerity measures fell on the shoulders of the majority of the increasingly youthful and urban citizenry. In October of 1988, bread riots erupted in Algiers. The rioters were chiefly children and teens.¹⁵³ These riots swiftly spread throughout the country.

In response to the size and scope of unrest, President Bendjedid introduced a series of political and economic reforms. His intent was to dull the growing public resentment over the nation's stalled development.¹⁵⁴ These reforms were not subtle. A national referendum endorsed Bendjedid's plan to separate the FLN from "direct management at all levels of the state".¹⁵⁵ Further, opposition political parties were legalized at the same time that the FLN was denied the privilege of selecting candidates and managing elections. Public rallies were officially deregulated and the army withdrew from the FLN central committee. "In only nine months, from October 1988 to July 1989, the Algerian political system was fundamentally transformed from a single-party authoritarian state to a multiparty, pluralistic nation of laws."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Stora 2001: 195.

¹⁵⁴ Roberts 2003: 107.

¹⁵⁵ Hafez 2003: 35.

¹⁵⁶ Entelis 1992: 19.

Islamists seized this unprecedented opportunity. In March of 1989, a broad coalition of Fundamentalists formed the FIS. Those not willing to join formed their own party including *Harakat al-Mujtama al-Islami* (HAMAS) and *Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique* (MNI). The political discourse of these groups was lively and pluralistic.¹⁵⁷ However, Bendjedid's opening also engendered groups with much more radical orientations like the *Takfir wal Hijra* and the *Jamaat al-Sunna wa al-Sharia*. These groups existed in the political margins. Nonetheless, the opportunity to organize and mobilize was not lost on these groups, or on the watchful army.

2. Framing

While FIS emerged from a populist movement responsible for numerous strikes, rallies and demonstrations, it became a political party that was eager to work within the system. Taking advantage of the chief mobilizing structure to hand, the mosque, FIS espoused a combined message of moderation and radicalism. Abassi Madani represented the former position while Ali Belhaj espoused the latter. This 'good cop / bad cop' approach permitted FIS a broad array of framing choices.

Madani's moderate approach included public reassurance of FIS's benign intentions. In the party's 1989 platform, Madani claimed to pursue popular support through "persuasion not subjugation."¹⁵⁸ To do so, FIS intended to concentrate on the Islamic tradition of *al-shura* or consultation. Madani argued that "it is the people that rule and no government should exist without the will of the people; Islamists are not enemies of democracy." Further, he claimed that "*al-shura* permits multiple parties and opposition because the latter is necessary and existed during the time of the rightly guided caliphs."¹⁵⁹ By doing so, Madani adeptly bridged the gulf between democracy and theocracy. More specifically, by espousing the consistency of *al-shura* and democracy, Madani effectively highlighted the lack of legitimacy in Algeria's ruling party while bolstering FIS's

¹⁵⁷ Martinez 2000: 26.

¹⁵⁸ Hafez 2003, 37.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 37.

claim to power. The 'good cop' established a frame of moderation and political legitimacy aimed at broadening the support for FIS as a legitimate, populist opposition.

By contrast, Belhaj embodied the Islamists contempt for secular, 'western', democratic states. He insisted that any victory achieved through electoral processes was a victory for Islam and not for democracy. Such hot-headed rhetoric managed to condemn autocracy and democracy without addressing the relationship between *al-shura* and theocracy. Belhaj contended that, "when we are in power there will be no more elections because God will be ruling."¹⁶⁰ This 'bad cop' routine, though likely reflective of Belhaj's sincere conviction, served a larger political purpose. Traditional, Islamist frames maintained the militant base of FIS power. This effect was demonstrated on three occasions.

First, FIS held a demonstration of approximately three quarters of a million Algerians on April 20th, 1990. This peaceful demonstration was designed to directly counter an FLN organized march in opposition to the politicization of Algeria's mosques. The FIS effort was so massive and disciplined that the FLN cancelled their event.

Second, FIS successfully organized a national protest against American intervention in the 1991 Gulf War. The Algerian regime, caught between pan-Arab loyalty and American diplomacy, remained publicly silent. As a result, FIS captured the popular imagination as a force for action, principle and dignity. Belhaj announced that "we do not want power... we leave the thrones to you. We want jihad, only jihad and to meet Allah."¹⁶¹

Third, FIS executed a general strike in June of 1991. This strike served as a response to a new election law which aimed to enhance FLN polling success. FIS focused on this action as a treasonous and undemocratic act. The deployment of army forces in the days preceding the strike enhanced the FIS's

¹⁶⁰ Wiktorowicz 2004: 46.

¹⁶¹ Hafez 2003: 38.

claims.¹⁶² On those occasions in which the strike failed to stop factory workers, shopkeepers or teachers from going to their employment, FIS activists distributed tracts on civil disobedience. In these cases, FIS asserted that political discourse had reached a stalemate. In the absence of a government accommodation, Algerians would have to resort to acts of civil disobedience. Not surprisingly, Madani and Belhaj were arrested for conspiring against the state and insurrection.

Such confrontational efforts were not the only aspects of FIS political framing. Each of these examples began as silent and disciplined events. They were planned, announced and executed legally. They also served to highlight the party's campaign for communal and departmental offices. After the successful round of balloting in June of 1990, Madani publicly guaranteed party and individual freedoms within FIS-controlled departments and communes. If Madani and Belhaj represented opposing wings of the FIS membership, then during this period Madani's moderates were in the ascendant.

During the June strikes, FIS ensured constant contact with the government. Prime Minister Hamrouche agreed to allow FIS to peacefully occupy town squares. Hamrouche's failure to defuse the confrontation precipitated his resignation. However, his successor, Ahmed Ghozali immediately resumed negotiations with FIS. The result of these negotiations included a promise of free parliamentary elections within six months and the amendment of the electoral law which had precipitated the strike. FIS called off the national strike.¹⁶³

FIS deftly focused its framing at two targets: populist mobilization and state ineptitude. A focus on *al-shurah* as consistent with – and perhaps culturally more authentic than – democracy attracted moderate Islamists and secular citizenry alike. An assertion and demonstrable track record of self-discipline and moderation contrasted with the state's failure to maintain law and order or honor

¹⁶² Mortimer 1996: 5-88

¹⁶³ Quandt 1998: 57.

their own constitution. Taken together, these successful acts of political framing set the FIS aside as a distinct, credible and effective opposition to FLN rule. The state ceded, intentionally or otherwise, political real estate to FIS.

3. Timing of Repression

The Algerian military followed up their coup with a drive to suppress Islamist opposition. This suppression campaign commenced after the Islamists had three years in which to mobilize and organize. This span of time was sufficient to allow the FIS to choreograph a landslide electoral victory. Algerian Islamists were the only ones in North Africa able to boast of such an achievement. So, they had much to lose when political repression returned in 1992: popular legitimacy, political organizational structures and municipal offices.

FIS, the populist movement, was very busy in 1989 consolidating its new-found legitimacy. Neighborhood committees were formed under FIS sponsorship to manage local mosques, schools, medical and relief aid, as well as manage local political organizing. In fact, FIS went so far as to establish an umbrella trade union for teachers, tourism, transportation, and communications workers. Each of these organizations drew from and supported Islamic leagues for University faculty, youth clubs and orphanages. In fact, FIS flowed like water into any crack or cavern left by the retreating capacity of the secular Algerian state: market and farm cooperatives, hospitals and clinics, and local media outlets. All of these institutions provided opportunities for like-minded Islamists to work together and represented a substantial investment in constituency building. As a result, FIS could and did draw on hundreds of thousands of supporters on short notice. These supporters translated into political clout as well as material assistance in times of need. Algeria's Islamists enjoyed numerous opportunities to measure the depth and breadth of their movement. Smaller Islamic groups throughout the large nation had an opportunity to shed their sense of isolation and take strength in a broader association. The rate of strikes increased year on year from 1989 to 1991. When repression returned, Islamists had the networks and activist structure to resist.

Bendjedid's muted response to the increase in civil disobedience precipitated his ouster by the military. Boudiaf, by contrast, was no impedance to military repression. In addition to outlawing the FIS, the military directly threatened the Islamists physical and material survival. By February of 1992, the army had started to fill five political prisons built in the Sahara. Thousands of Islamists rounded up since the coup kept company with the 500 FIS elected officials that were already detained. Government troops were stationed in those cities and townships that had voted for FIS on every Friday to prevent after-prayer disturbances. By October, the state had reinstituted special courts and sentencing for terrorist activities. In December, the state moved to bulldoze all unofficial mosques. As the new courts gathered momentum in 1993, they sentenced nearly 200 Islamists to death. Although 'due process' was suspended, Islamists were frequently killed during police searches and manhunts.¹⁶⁴

For three decades, Algeria's Islamists had grown accustomed to life in an authoritarian state. Popular unrest in the face of a long list of state failures led to an unprecedented level of political opening in 1989. The Islamists used their brief period of state tolerance for energetic organization and mobilization. By the time the military overtly seized the reigns of national power, the FIS was effective, confident and legitimate. FIS had much to lose. When state repression returned, it was a swift, reactive convulsion of self-preservation on the part of Algeria's established elites.

4. Targeting of Repression

After initial efforts failed to produce the desired effect, Algerian state repression grew increasingly indiscriminate, brutal and desperate. In the wake of the coup, Islamists were arrested whether they were violent activists or rank-and-file members. So many religiously observant Muslims were targeted by security forces that men stopped growing beards or wearing traditional garb.¹⁶⁵ By 1996, Algeria's 116 political prisons contained nearly 44,000 prisoners even though

¹⁶⁴ Martinez 2000:79

¹⁶⁵ Ibid: 80.

only half of this population was actually accused of terrorism.¹⁶⁶ Further, when the military regime dissolved all of the communal and departmental councils that the FIS had won, thousands of FIS sympathizers lost their civil service jobs. With nearly 70 per cent unemployment amongst the youth, job loss was serious punishment.

State repression was not limited to imprisonment and economic dislocation. In the rush to reassert state authority over political discourse, the state repressed violent outbursts and peaceful demonstrations alike. A national peace march scheduled by FIS for the 14th of February 1994 was canceled when the army deployed paratroopers along the planned pathway. Following Medani and Belhaj's trial for insurrection, their supporters were forbidden to protest the twelve year sentences.

In time, actual political activity was no longer a precursor to repression. Any contact with state security might prompt a violent response. As the police found themselves working in an increasingly hostile environment, they took to detaining youths at random and venting their frustration upon them. These youths might have their beards shaved or burned off. In some instances, young men were detained for days to endure beatings and humiliations.¹⁶⁷ After a downturn in charges between 1989 and 1991, Amnesty International reported that incidents of torture dramatically increased after 1992. By 1993, a de facto policy of collective punishment had been implemented that allowed the state to inflict reprisals upon entire villages.¹⁶⁸

The indiscriminate nature of state repression afforded few opportunities for effective Islamist response. However, the "perverse effects of that strategy began to appear from 1993: a number of FIS voters, who had adopted a wait and see attitude then, ... became, under the impact of repression, sympathizers of or participants in violence against the regime."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Hafez 2003: 80.

¹⁶⁷ Martinez 2000: 59.

¹⁶⁸ Stora 2001: 215-218.

¹⁶⁹ Martinez 2000: 81.

5. Outbreak of Violence

Soon this sympathy turned to participation for many Algerians. However, the state's security apparatus worked with marked efficiency. Sustained state repression caused the inclusive umbrella organization that was FIS into an increasingly decentralized, exclusive network.

FIS had grown into an effective political umbrella for Islamists for two reasons. First, FIS seized the initiative, forming the first Islamist party upon constitutional reform in 1989. This positioned FIS in the lead of the Islamist movement. Other Islamist parties, standing against the FIS in local elections, appeared to be splitting the Islamist movement at a time that clearly called for electoral unity. Second, FIS adopted an inclusive philosophy which invited moderate and uncommitted activists. There was room for sympathizers and supporters as well as activists. Only the highest level of membership required a contribution of time or money beyond voting.¹⁷⁰ In addition, FIS welcomed leadership from a broad array of Islamist perspectives. As exemplified by Madani and Belhaj, members with starkly different ideologies and agendas could find a lowest common denominator in the broader aims and political tactics of the organization.

This changed as indiscriminate government repression continued to increase the cost of identification – at any level – with Islamist political parties. Political and tactical divisions formed within the opposition. FIS activists began to defect from the moderate umbrella organization in favor of more radical organizations that rejected electoral participation generally and democracy specifically.¹⁷¹ In September of 1992, representatives of several armed factions of the Islamist movement met to unify their efforts behind a single leader. However, state security forces raided the meeting, killing or capturing several participants. Aside from breaking up the conference, this raid led to rumors of infiltration by state agents. Such rumors put an end to any talk of unification.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Wiktorowicz 2004: 45.

¹⁷¹ Martinez 2000.

¹⁷² Wiktorowicz 2004: 47.

By early 1993, the increasingly fragmented Islamist movement had been forced underground. From this deeply divided context emerged a more diffuse and exclusive movement, the Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA). Made up of a combination of urban youth and *jihadi* veterans of the Afghan War, the GIA adopted a program of *Quran*, *Sunna* and *Salafiya* tradition; nothing more and nothing less.¹⁷³ This meant a rejection of democracy, negotiation and secular rule of any kind. More significantly, the GIA program required Muslims of other traditions to renounce their earlier beliefs and adhere to the *Salafiya* tradition as a prerequisite to membership. Though initially loyal to the public image of FIS, the GIA eventually repudiated this moderate organization. Increasingly, these militants defined “us” and “them” in very narrow terms.¹⁷⁴ Eventually, the GIA added other Islamists (including civilians) to their list of *Takfir*. With the state on one side and the GIA on the other, Algeria’s remaining Islamist movements fell prey to random, brutal violence. Tens of thousands of innocent civilians were caught in this crossfire.

Ultimately, the logic of exclusive organization led GIA to turn against its own. By July of 1995, the GIA had undertaken an orgy of cell on cell fratricide. “Thus, as the insurgency developed, the armed movement became even more exclusive and decentralized.”¹⁷⁵ This process accelerated as militant splinters, like GIA, appeared to compete with the ferocity of their anti-system frames as ruthlessly as with their guns, knives and bombs. Rhetoric evolved from a focus on exclusivity to a justification for massacre. The concept of *Takfir* initially defined those who did not rise to earn membership in the GIA. Soon, the concept was used to identify those who could righteously be killed. This perverse ‘just war doctrine’ justified anti-civilian violence as a holy calling and sacred obligation.¹⁷⁶ By definition, anyone not engaged in this holy war was obstructing the holy war. One was either with the militants or against the militants. In either case, the blood flowed.

¹⁷³ Kepel 2003: 255,256.

¹⁷⁴ Wiktorowicz 2004: 48.

¹⁷⁵ Hafez 2003: 119.

¹⁷⁶ Kepel 2003: 260-262.

C. CONCLUSION

1. Analysis

After three decades of political exclusion and during a period of justifiable public unrest, the Algerian government opened the political system to a loyal opposition. At the first indication that this opposition might gain real political power, the state attempted to change the rules of the game. The ensuing riots crumbled the civilian façade of Algeria's autocratic regime. As the military formally claimed the levers of governance, they instituted a reactive and increasingly arbitrary repression of political opposition. In desperation, the army abrogated the constitutional boundaries of the state it was attempting to preserve. Imprisoning and killing relatively moderate Islamists led the surviving regime opponents to form ever more exclusive groups which precipitated ruthless anti-civilian violence. The Algerian state engendered, fostered and then attacked a contentious Islamist opposition; an opposition which constituted the majority of its own citizens. These discrete policy initiatives have come at the cost of the rule-of-law, civil society and hundreds of thousands of lives. A more expensive and less efficient national policy could hardly have been imagined; especially one which, in hindsight, was elective.

2. Epilogue

In January 1994, the HCS selected Liamine Zeroual as Algeria's next president and then promptly dissolved itself. Zeroual, another veteran of the War of Independence exercised wide powers to negotiate with the FIS and other insurgents. In search of a popular mandate, he called for early elections under the supervision of the Arab League and the UN. The 1995 general election witnessed a 75 percent voter participation and certification by observers. Zeroual's 61 percent of the popular vote did much to bolster domestic and international legitimacy. Multinationals returned to Algeria's petroleum industry as international lenders rescheduled the nation's foreign debt. Another new constitution, ratified in 1996, liberalized political participation and established a bicameral legislature. However, allegations of fraudulent parliamentary elections in 1997 sparked a renewed round of protests in Algiers. Zeroual stepped aside

in 1998, calling for early national elections. Amid allegations of fraud, six of seven candidates for the presidency withdrew. The remaining candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was widely perceived as the front man for the military establishment. Despite his unopposed victory, Bouteflika worked tirelessly towards national reconciliation. His Civil Concord initiative received wide endorsement in a national referendum. An offer of amnesty for militant Islamists encouraged many of them to lay down their arms. Eventually, the AIS voluntarily disbanded. The GIA, however, remained active. By 1999, the Islamist uprising within Algeria had claimed nearly 100,000 lives, mostly innocent civilians.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. THE ANALYSIS

America's recent experience with international terrorism has revealed a complex of misunderstanding and false assumption. If we are to wage war against global terrorism, we must understand our adversary. This adversary is, in part, a zealous, fundamentalist cadre of murderers. But, this is just the 'tip of the iceberg'. The larger movement of political Islam is the mass below the waterline. Our public policy discourse has failed to demonstrate an ability to analyze this movement in a useful way. This thesis has provided an example of what such analysis might look like.

Two dissimilar case studies have been exposed to substantially differing analytical approaches: one broad and strategic, the other narrow and tactical. Yet, dramatically similar insights have emerged from each analysis. These include: Islamism is a **political** ideology, states dictate the terms of national political discourse and rules matter.

1. Politics as Usual

Indonesian and Algerian Islamists responded to political calculations as any other constituency would. In each case, NU and FIS embraced the political opportunities available to them which held the greatest promise for achieving their political objectives. The rhetorical frames employed may have had a distinctly Islamic flavor, but the underlying demands were ecumenical. Calls for Islam or *al-shurah* were calls for a voice in the larger national debate. These movements were demanding that their governments be responsive to the needs of the governed. In turn, NU and FIS succeeded only to the extent that they addressed the demands of their own constituencies. Political participation tests these organizations in the same way it tests states. At the ballot box, responsiveness is rewarded while neglect is punished. When Islamist organizations move away from political participation, one can safely suspect a failure of access to the electoral process. The incentives of electoral politics transcend race or creed.

2. States Matter

The political landscape of a nation is most affected by the state itself. In each case study, the state dictated the form and substance of political debate. This can be done in several ways. States can seize or cede political real estate through issue framing or electoral access. They can change the cost/benefit structure of political participation. They can engage their constituencies proactively or reactively. Regardless of the tact, states have the power and responsibility to shape their political environment. Violent rebellion, Islamist or otherwise, emerges in an environment of the state's creation. Therefore, such rebellion is evidence of flawed policy making or policy execution. States are not innocent victims, they matter.

3. Respect the Rules

Just as states dictate their political environments, they dictate the rules of the political game. These rules, chiefly in the form of constitutions and laws, are powerful tools for setting boundaries. Perhaps more importantly, these rules serve to imbue political processes with legitimacy. Despite the many challenges attendant to managing the sprawling Indonesian state, the state consistently emphasized their respect for the Pancasila. As a result, the NU and others found that they could rely on this point of national consensus to preserve their constituents' interests. By contrast, the Algerian state repeatedly undermined the authority of the national constitution by manipulating or suspending it to serve their political convenience. Political opposition should not be expected to honor rules that the state itself disregards.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

These three insights emerge from an analysis of two Muslim states. However, they suggest strong analogies to our own foreign policy debate. First, since Islamists are politicians we should treat them as such. Providing a forum to air grievances does not obligate us to act or ameliorate such grievances. But, it can serve two other purposes: providing an acceptable outlet for political disagreements and informing U.S. policy development. A meeting between

American policy makers and spokesmen for Islamist movements – perhaps the Arab League – could advance this initiative.

Second, since states matter our state must maintain a constant political presence in the international community. The American tendency to intervene and then withdraw (e.g. Afghanistan in the 1980s, West Africa in the 1990s) shapes the political environment of these regions by our inaction. Since we will inevitably effect this change, we should do it on our own terms. Therefore, American foreign policy makers should institute a formal process for the development and maintenance of such policies. The Senate might insist on the diplomatic equivalent of an environmental impact statement from the Executive Branch. Such a requirement demands a thorough plan which incorporates an estimate of long-term regional and international consequences.

Third, since rules matter, America should redouble her effort to conduct foreign policy in concert with the values which underlie our own Constitution. National Security is not necessarily inconsistent with national values. The U.S. military withdrawal from the Philippines was attacked at the time on national security grounds. However, respecting the will of the Philippine people has led to the return of American military and commercial interests on Philippine terms and under more favorable economic conditions for America. To the extent that we honor our own rules, we increase the legitimacy of our own foreign policy initiatives.

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