Strategic Paralysis: An Airpower Theory for the Present
Abstract
"All wars are costly in lives and treasure!" Through the ages, this fundamental truth has driven military strategists to search for a quick and inexpensive victory in battle. But, the limits of technology allowed for only so which innovation on land and sea. Then, just as the horrors of war reached their zenith in the trenches of WWI, the airplane promised to take the battle directly to the enemy's most vital targets. Victory, some reasoned, would now go quickly, easily, and with less expense to those wh could command and the air. But early Airpower results were not all that impressive. Airplanes never achieved the unambiguous, inexpensive or decisive victory its advocates envisioned. Ever since, military men have sought a better understanding of Airpower and how best to use this unique weapon to defeat an enemy. Until recently Airpower technology, employment and doctrine were not up to the task. Most military theorists are in agreement about the final objective sought in any military conflict. The end, usually and ultimately, requires a change in the enemy government's behavior. What is not so clear is how this change is achieved, and more specifically the role airpower plays. This paper suggests an independent strategy for the application of Airpower and discusses the conditions necessary for its success: Strategic Paralysis.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA425593
Entities
People
- Jason B. Barlow
Organizations
- Air University