

***A PROTOTYPE JFACC:
GENERAL GEORGE C. KENNEY***

***BY
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Abstract

With the down-sizing of our current military force structure, military and civilian leaders are searching for ways to ensure unity of effort during military operations. For air operations, the USAF claims that a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is the best concept to ensure this unity of effort. One man they frequently cite as the prototypical JFACC is General George C. Kenney in his role as General MacArthur's air commander in the Southwest Pacific during World War II. Most of these discussions centers around Kenney's initial actions in 1942 and 1943.

This paper discusses Kenney's role as a prototype JFACC after June 1944, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganized the Southwest Pacific Area of Operations (SWPA) and assigned to Kenney air forces from the US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as air forces from Australia and New Zealand. Many accounts of the Battles for Leyte and Luzon center around ground and naval forces, giving the impression that "the Air Force also flew." In fact, Kenney's Far East Air Force (FEAF) was flying combat missions that were instrumental to these campaigns in the Philippines.

By examining certain planning, execution, and doctrinal criteria, this paper seeks to determine whether unity of effort *was* achieved in the SWPA. Then it aims to measure General Kenney against responsibilities of the JFACC as outlined in the Air Force's *JFACC Primer*. If unity of effort was achieved and General Kenney fulfilled the responsibilities, then there may be some lessons for today's JFACC.

About the Author

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Preface

On the eve of 1945, General Douglas MacArthur commanded one of the largest allied military forces yet formed. He was poised in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) for the operation to retake Luzon in the Philippines. The force included the Allied Naval Forces commanded by Vice Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, the Sixth US Army commanded by Lt General Walter Krueger, the Eighth US Army commanded by Lt General Robert L. Eichelberger, and the Allied Air Forces commanded by Lt General George C.




Figure 1. Source: General Kenney Reports, 492.

Kenney. Since August 1942, these commanders had operated together to reclaim territory that the Japanese had seized earlier in the war. The island hopping operations from Australia, along New Guinea to Hollandia, and on to Morotai, brought the force together in the Philippines. These senior commanders worked together to overcome the great distances in the Pacific and shortages of men and equipment. The joint operations of the earlier months of the war exercised command relationships that depended heavily on personalities. Of special interest are the command relationships between General Kenney and the other senior commanders, for he controlled the Allied air forces in the SWPA. This command included air forces not only from the US Army Far East Air Forces (FEAF), but from the Marines and Navy as well.

Fifty years later, United States civilian and military leaders are searching for ways to ensure unity of effort in modern joint warfare. The Air Force position is that the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Concept is the best way to ensure unity of effort while conducting joint air operations.¹ Admiral James A. Winnefeld, USN (Ret.)

and Doctor Dana J. Johnson in their book *Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991* conclude that "unity of effort does not always require unity of command; control may be sufficient."² Among their case studies, they have included from World War II the Battle of Midway and the Solomons Campaign. There may be some additional lessons to learn from another joint air operation in the war against Japan: the Philippine Campaign. By the time MacArthur's forces reached the Philippines, Kenney had the chance to sharpen his skills as a prototype JFACC, commanding and coordinating air forces from all three components; Army, Navy, and Marine.

Much of the present joint literature and guidance emphasizes unity of effort.³ Unity of effort is a good measure to determine if service efforts functionally contribute to the overall theater strategy. But unity of effort may require more than just unity of command. Unity of command can be described as formal command channels designed to assign forces from different services to a single commander. This may be insufficient to determine if a functional component commander (like the JFACC) is effective. The component commander, while using forces from each of the services to contribute to joint theater air operations, must continue to accomplish traditional command tasks such as maximizing friendly capabilities, exploiting enemy weaknesses, and ensuring plans from the different service elements support the strategy.

Since the Air Force cites General Kenney as one of the best JFACC examples history offers, the purpose of this paper is to determine if there is "contemporary relevance to the relationship between MacArthur and Kenney?"⁴ The questions I will seek to answer are: first, was unity of effort achieved; and second, are there lessons today's JFACC can learn from the relationship?

In order to do this, I will first review the present literature and regulations pertaining to joint air operations. I will outline the Air Force position that the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept is the best way to execute those operations. Then I will conduct a case study of General George C. Kenney's joint air operations planned and executed in the Philippine campaign in 1944-1945.

The case study will first include a review of the grand strategy, because in my opinion, the decision to take the Philippines represented a convergence of the split strategy in the Pacific. Next I will look at the operational objectives and the doctrine that may have influenced those objectives. Although ensuring the objectives support the strategy does not guarantee unity of effort, objectives that do not support strategy may be wasted effort. Then I will examine the command relationships to see if Kenney had unity of command, or as Winnefeld and Johnson have said, control of the air assets in theater.

After examining the command relationships, I will determine if Kenney's SWPA Air Forces maximized friendly capabilities while accounting for enemy capabilities. These are tasks that any commander, not just the JFACC, must account for in his planning. And finally, I will examine that planning to see if, in the absence of a true "joint" planning staff, air operations from the different services supported the same objectives and contributed to overall unity of effort.

In my conclusions I aim to quickly summarize the operations and answer:

1 - Was unity of effort achieved in the Philippine Campaign?

2 - Was General Kenney a prototype JFACC, and if so, are there lessons from which today's JFACC can benefit?

¹Hq USAF/XOXD, *JFACC Primer*, (Washington, DC.: Pentagon, Feb. 1994).

²James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, *Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 171.

³Winnefeld and Johnson and *JFACC Primer*; also see UNAAF and Joint Pubs.

⁴Question from Congressman Newt Gingrich to Lt Col Pat A. Pentland of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

PART I

UNITY OF EFFORT

Headquarters USAF recently published the second edition of the *JFACC Primer*, which reflects the Air Force position on "how to best organize, plan, and execute joint air operations."⁵ Like the regulations from which the Primer gains its authority, this pamphlet emphasizes unity of effort.

Unity of effort through centralized control of theater air assets is the most effective way to employ air power. The current Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept provides a Joint Force Commander (JFC) the means to exploit the capabilities of air power in a theater air campaign.⁶

The Air Force supports its position with a number of historical examples. These examples show that unity of effort led to success, and divergent efforts squandered valuable resources. In the Vietnam War, lack of a unified air campaign plan and service parochialism "produced waste and futility." Poor unity in the Korean war produced an air effort characteristic of poor air-ground coordination. On the contrary, in the Southwest Pacific during World War II, it appears that General Kenney's operations demonstrated how a coordinated air effort contributed to the success of the overall theater campaign. Finally, during Desert Storm, General Schwartzkopf designated General Horner as the JFACC to ensure unity of effort. The results of Operation DESERT STORM are well documented and unity of effort seems to have been achieved though unity of command was not.⁷

The JFACC Primer next describes where the JFACC gets his authority. Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, "sets forth principles and doctrines to govern the joint activities and performance of the armed forces of the United States."⁸ These principles include Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Control (TACON), support and coordinating authority, and provisions for a Joint Force Commander (JFC) and functional or service component commanders. OPCON is when a direct line of operational command exists between a commander and the forces he employs. However, component commanders will most likely exercise TACON over complementary forces during specific operations, rather than OPCON.⁹ TACON, like OPCON, gives the commander the authority to assign missions and tasks, but not the authority to reorganize forces. "The support command relationship gives the [supported] commander authority

to exercise general direction of the support effort, [while] [c]oordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders."¹⁰

The UNAAF goes into great detail to describe the different types of JFCs. For smaller contingencies the JFC may be a Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander. For larger operations that span one or more theaters, a unified Commander in Chief (CinC) will be the JFC. Regardless of the size of the operation, the JFC designates the component commanders (the JFACC) and applicable lines of authority (OPCON or TACON).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, outlines command relationships required for joint operations. In an operation where a JTF Commander is designated, he may assign either service component commanders, Air Force, Navy, Army, or functional component commanders, air, land, sea. The functional component might include forces from the different services with the same function. For example, the air component includes air forces from the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and sometimes Army. If the JFC designates functional components, for joint air operations the component commander is also referred to as the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).¹¹ The JFACC, like the other component commanders, has specific responsibilities as outlined by the JFC. The JFC will also outline the working relationship among the respective component commands. He will "establish a supporting and/or supported relationship between components to facilitate operations."¹² The bottom line in the working relationship among the functional components is that the JFC determines who supports whom for each operation. This is the written doctrine, but in order for it to be successfully implemented, the service component commanders must have good working relationships with each other.

For any specific operation, like retaking the Philippines for example, the JFACC will have air forces at his disposal from each of the service components. In order for the operation to satisfy the intent of Joint Pub 3-0 (cited above), Navy and Marine air forces assigned to the Navy and Marine service components must be at the disposal of the JFACC. That is, the JFACC has TACON over the forces required for the operation as designated by the JFC.¹³ In the Philippine campaign, MacArthur as the JFC assigned specific Marine and Navy aircraft units to Kenney (what we today call the JFACC). All these relationships are a complex way of saying that MacArthur assigned Kenney an air task and specific air assets to accomplish them. Kenney coordinated with the service components to make sure their aircraft accomplished the missions he outlined for them.

Neither MacArthur nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945 spelled out provisions for TACON, OPCON, support or coordination authority. These relationships were the result of a good working effort between the component commanders. Today, although strong

working relationships remain a prerequisite to success, joint publications aid the JFC in determining command relationships, and in JFACC selection.

Joint Pub 3-01.2, *Joint Operations for Theater Counter Air Operations*, has guidance for the JFACC concerning the special capabilities each service can bring to the joint air operation. Naval air operations, it says, are characteristically different from land-based air operations because of "the large distances involved in maritime antiair (or counterair) operations, . . . the communication difficulties inherent . . . in the maritime environment, . . . and the multidimensional threat to naval forces."¹⁴ The JFACC must be able to integrate Navy air assets while accounting for these characteristics. The multidimensional threat, no doubt, includes the enemy submarine threat that Air Force officers seldom deal with. The effect on the conduct of a joint air operation will be sorties allocated to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) that might otherwise contribute to a counterair operation. Also, poor interoperability between maritime and Air Force aircraft and associated equipment often causes communication problems. The Air Force JFACC, aware of these communication problems, should also be well versed in dealing with problems caused by great operating distances.

Although Marine aircraft are part of the maritime force as a whole, Joint Pub 3-04 cites JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV and gives specific guidance covering allocation of Marine sorties.

The primary mission of the MAGTAF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] air combat element is the support of the MAGTAF ground element. . . . Sorties in *excess* of MAGTAF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force Commander for tasking through the air component commander for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. (*italics added*)¹⁵

This issue, the allocation of excess sorties, is vague in JCS Pub 3-01.2. The JFACC Primer attempts to add guidance to an already sensitive subject.

Sorties provided for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance are not "excess" sorties and will be covered in the ATO [air task order] as directed by the JFACC. These sorties provide a distinct contribution to the overall joint force effort. The JFC must exercise integrated control of air defense, long range reconnaissance, and interdiction aspects of the joint operation or theater campaign. Excess sorties are in addition to these sorties.¹⁶

The bottom line concerning Marine sorties is that the JFACC must work closely with the MAGTAF commander to determine how many sorties are not otherwise needed for MAGTAF ground support, and recommend apportionment to the JFC.

JCS Pub 3-04, *Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air) [JMO(AIR)]*, discusses yet another facet of joint air operations. It primarily voices the Navy's concern for indiscriminately assigning naval air assets to a commander other than a naval officer. It specifically warns against delegating OPCON to "other than the at-sea naval commander." Since the primary mission of JMO(AIR) is to "degrade, destroy, or neutralize enemy warfighting capabilities in the maritime environment," assigning these JMO(AIR) sorties otherwise would degrade the effectiveness at sea.¹⁷ Though the Navy does not want to surrender OPCON of its air assets, it should recognize that sorties will not be diverted from essential maritime missions to support other air operations. Likewise, the JFACC, through close coordination with the naval component commander, will ensure primary maritime missions are not slighted. If there are land-based aircraft available to enhance the maritime missions, the JFACC should task these appropriately. Again, the JFC has final word on weight of effort and sortie apportionment, and this decision will be made primarily from JFACC recommendations.

Joint Pub 3-56.1 (Draft), *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*, is an effort to collate the guidance into one source document. Again, unity of effort is foremost. Its purpose is "To set forth doctrine and fundamental principles for the command and control of joint air operations to ensure *unity of effort* (italics added) when conducting joint force air operations for the benefit of the joint force as a whole." The doctrine recommends that the JFACC be a component commander with the "preponderance of air assets." In the case where most of the operations are maritime, the JFACC should be "afloat."¹⁸ Conversely, a JFACC "ashore" might be more appropriate "because of enhanced logistic, communication, and facility capabilities ashore." Whether or not this joint pub is accepted in its present form is immaterial. What is important is it recognizes flexibility as airpower's most important attribute and attempts to exploit this through unity of effort. Unity of effort is foremost in all the publications I reviewed. I will determine if unity of effort was indeed achieved in the SWPA by using Winnefeld and Johnson's criteria outlined below.

1. Evidence of unity of command or, in the absence of such unity, the command arrangements used to broker various interests.
2. The quality of joint attack and defense planning in exploiting the special capabilities of each service.

3. The quality of joint operations and execution decisions, their timeliness, their utilization of available information, and their flexibility in the face of uncertainty and adversity.
4. The degree of readiness and tactical compatibility among forces from the different services in meeting mission requirements (as applied to doctrine, equipment, training, and organization).¹⁹

Once I determine whether or not unity of effort was achieved in the Philippine air operations, I will measure General Kenney's effectiveness as a prototype JFACC against the following responsibilities which I have summarized from Joint Pub 3-0 and the *JFACC Primer*.

1. Did he satisfy responsibilities as assigned by MacArthur such as planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of air assets?
2. Did he support the maneuver effort in accordance with MacArthur's overall Strategic concept?
3. Did he "provide general direction for passive defenses, deception efforts, and the protection of air defense assets?"
4. Did he "capitalize on the capabilities . . . of all participating forces?"²⁰

The next part of this paper is a case study of MacArthur's and Kenney's Philippine campaign during 1944-1945. The chapters address the areas I outlined in the preface, specifically: Grand Strategy; Operational Objectives and Supporting Doctrine; Command Organization; Friendly and Enemy Capabilities; and Planning for Combat.

⁵*JFACC Primer*, introduction.

⁶*JFACC Primer*, 1.

⁷*JFACC Primer*, 2-7.

⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces, UNAAF*, (Washington DC.: Pentagon, 1986), 1.

⁹*UNAAF*.

¹⁰*JFACC Primer*, 10.

¹¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC.: Pentagon, 9 Sept. 1993), page GL-9. "The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. . . The [JFACC]'s responsibilities will be assigned by the [JFC] (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the [JFC]'s apportionment decision). Using the [JFC]'s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other service component commanders, the [JFACC] will recommend to the [JFC] apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas."

¹²Joint Pub 3-0, p. II-18.

¹³In DESERT STORM, the Navy and Marines quickly realized that if they wanted to participate in the air campaign they had to be tasked by General Chuck Horner's staff. Though he did not have statutory TACON over the forces, he did have control of the sorties they flew.

¹⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-01.2, *Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations* (Washington DC.: Pentagon, 1 April 1986), pp. I-1, 2.

¹⁵Cited in Joint Pub 3-01.2, p. III-4., also *JFACC Primer*, 12.

¹⁶*JFACC Primer*, 12-13.

¹⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-04, *Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air)* (Washington DC.: Pentagon, 1 May 1988 (Test Pub)), I-2,3, III-1, 6.

¹⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-56.1 (Draft), *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations* (Washington DC.: Pentagon, 1 July 1993) p. iii. JCS Pub 3-04 is more specific in this case and recommends a Naval Officer.

¹⁹Winnefeld and Johnson, 2.

²⁰*JFACC Primer*, 14-19. Many of these are responsibilities of any commander, not only the JFACC, but, the whole JFACC concept is to ensure unity of effort through the use of a single air commander. Therefore, it is possible that by investigating the unity of effort questions, I will also discover that Kenney was in fact a model JFACC. Also, although many of the terms such as apportionment and allocation were not used in relation to the air effort during the Pacific war, I should be able to determine if Kenney was a model JFACC through his command and control efforts.

Part II Chapter 1

GRAND STRATEGY

Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill traveled to Washington to meet with President Roosevelt in the ARCADIA conference. The agenda was:


(1) a redeclaration of the fundamental bases of joint strategy; (2) the interpretation of this strategy into terms of immediate military measures; (3) the allocation of joint forces in harmony with the accepted strategy; (4) the formulation of a continuing program to raise and equip the forces called for in that strategy; and (5) the establishment of joint machinery for directing the war effort.²¹

After the conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) would meet continuously rather than at specified intervals. Although the CCS was an advisory body that reported to the President and Prime Minister for decisions, they essentially directed the war effort. Their responsibilities were "the formulation and execution of policies and plans concerning: (1) the strategic conduct of the war; (2) a broad program of production conceived in terms of that strategy; (3) allocation of raw materials and weapons; and (4) assignment of shipping for personnel and materiel."²²

European war strategy changed little during the conference. Troop deployments were slowed with the realization that when they arrived in theater, they would not immediately go to combat. Aircraft movement to Europe still reflected the Army Air Force (AAF) strategic bombing preference and AAF planners continued to support AWPD-1, the strategic bombing plan against Germany.²³

Initial Allied strategy in the Pacific was defensive in nature as the Allied CCS maintained a "Europe First" grand strategy for materiel and manpower. After the initial Japanese attacks at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, the "Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] directed General MacArthur to hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for a future offensive and check the Japanese southward advance . . ."²⁴ The enemy soon

overran MacArthur in the Philippines and he moved his headquarters to Brisbane, Australia. In order to slow and disrupt further enemy efforts, the JCS directed MacArthur to conduct operations against Japanese shipping, especially raw material transported from enemy controlled areas.



While the Allies were busy disrupting enemy lines of communication, the JCS directed Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific to establish and defend our own lines of communication. If the Allies were to conduct a war effort against the Japanese, they had to secure the air and sea routes to supply forces in the Pacific. The JCS also charged Nimitz with the defense of the United States and her territories in the Pacific. These operations were to precede an eventual offensive after Allied operations in Europe showed promise of success.²⁵

Operations in the Pacific showed the first counter offensive action in the summer of 1942. Allied forces checked the Japanese advance and General George C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff agreed with MacArthur that the US should take advantage of the situation. MacArthur wanted to concentrate forces in the Southwest Pacific and drive toward the north. Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and CinC US Fleet, proposed a two pronged drive. MacArthur was against such division of effort, but the JCS issued a directive on July 2, 1942, which was a compromise of the two plans. MacArthur would share effort with Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, commander of the South Pacific Area, and proceed with operations in the Solomon Islands, Rabaul, and New Guinea.²⁶

Allied forces were in the midst of accomplishing these tasks when the Americans and British met at Casablanca on January 14, 1943. The American position at the conference emphasized the urgency in the Pacific, but the British dominated discussions and kept the Germany first posture in worldwide strategy. The CCS decided to begin preparations for attacks in southern Europe from Africa to take pressure off the Russians, and to begin planning for a cross channel invasion. "Operations in the Pacific [were] to be continued to include the capture of Rabaul and Eastern New Guinea while plans [were] to be prepared to extend the operations to the Marshall Islands and the capture of Truk . . ."²⁷ In effect, the Casablanca conference merely reiterated JCS Pacific strategy outlined on July 2.

In May 1943, the CCS and the heads of state met in Washington for the TRIDENT conference. Like Casablanca and ARCADIA before, TRIDENT was to reexamine and further define the grand strategy for the war. The CCS maintained the Germany first stance, but there was new emphasis on the China Burma India (CBI) theater. In the opening discussions, President Roosevelt mentioned increasing efforts against Japanese shipping, but did not otherwise comment on increased Pacific operations. Admiral King did however, outline a plan to the CCS for the defeat of Japan. He proposed a thrust

through the Central Pacific to the heart of the Philippines with no mention of the Southern flank. The CCS initially endorsed this plan, however, after examining several alternatives, they chose:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
- (2) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
- (3) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- (4) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.
- (5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.²⁸

Once again the CCS were indecisive concerning the strategy in the Pacific. As they concluded the TRIDENT conference, they agreed to address the Pacific in more specific terms later that summer. In August, they met for the QUADRANT conference in Quebec and their agenda was primarily Pacific: "operations in the Pacific Theater during 1943-1944; long-term strategy for the defeat of Japan; and what was to be done in China-Burma-India." Admiral King presented a paper to the CCS and again recommended a Central Pacific drive. When it appeared that the committee would endorse the plan, General Marshall informed MacArthur, and as he expected, MacArthur opposed the plan because there were provisions for him to support the plan with his own battle tested troops. MacArthur subsequently sent a message to the JCS emphasizing the futility and danger of attacking the well-defended islands in the Central Pacific and proposed a continuation of his CARTWHEEL operation in the south. The CCS reached another compromise and finally outlined specific objectives for operations in the Pacific through December 1944. In the Central Pacific, Admiral Nimitz would take the Gilberts and the Marshalls, and continue to Truk and Palau. In the south, MacArthur would proceed through New Guinea. The two plans would support each other and converge in the Philippines.²⁹

MacArthur's execution of these plans went well throughout 1943 and early 1944. During this time MacArthur and King dueled over from where the final thrust to the Philippines would come. MacArthur wanted the emphasis to be in the SWPA and Admiral King supported the Central Pacific. MacArthur was represented by Lt General Richard K. Sutherland at the conferences who stressed that the SWPA plan (RENO III) was the best use of joint Army, Navy and Marine forces, and the Central Pacific plan was incomplete because it did not include any provisions for land-based air. The JCS maintained a dual thrust strategy to the Philippines.³⁰

From the beginning, MacArthur declared that no single service, Army, Army Air Force, or Navy would be capable of defeating the Japanese single handed. Likewise, the Royal Australian Air Force was busy defending Australia and would contribute little to the joint or combined effort. He rightly lobbied to the JCS for increases in men and equipment, a struggle that would continue for the duration of the war.

The (JCS) chose Leyte for MacArthur's return to give the Allies primary logistics and air bases from which to launch attacks into Luzon, and eventually, Japan. The Philippines were also along an important Japanese supply line, and the recapture of this archipelago would sever that line, compounding enemy military supply and raw material problems. The JCS identified a target date of November 15, 1944, for MacArthur's landing in the Philippines. The initial operation was to be a two-part effort. First, landings in Sarangani Bay in Southern Mindanao would give General Kenney airbases from which to cover the main effort. MacArthur's forces were to seize the Leyte area shortly thereafter "in order to take full advantage of the surprise tactics."³¹

The Philippine operations would reflect the general strategic plan in the Pacific.

Objectives were seized for one or more of four purposes: To provide forward airfields so that shore-based aircraft might maintain and project forward United States control of the air; to furnish advanced bases for the fleet; to secure land areas for the staging of troops in succeeding advances;

and in the case of the Marianas, to provide bases for long-range air attacks on the Japanese home islands.³²

The Commanders in the Pacific still could not agree on the ultimate direction this strategy should take to defeat Japan. In the spring of 1944 operations in the Pacific were going well, and the JCS recommended bypassing several objectives to shorten the road to Japan. Admiral King was eager to bypass the Philippines in order to go directly through Formosa and on to Japan. MacArthur objected to this proposition for many reasons. He claimed that if we left the Americans and Filipinos in Japanese prisons, enemy propaganda "that we had abandoned the Filipinos and would not shed American blood to free them" would have a great psychological effect. In July General Marshall invited MacArthur to Pearl Harbor to discuss strategy with Nimitz and Leahy. This was the only time in the war that MacArthur left the area of operations. He was surprised to discover that President Roosevelt was at Pearl Harbor to discuss Pacific strategy. The conference concluded with Nimitz and MacArthur in agreement that the Central Philippines would be the immediate objective.³³

Subsequent events in the Pacific led the Joint Chiefs to move the operation in the Philippines to an earlier date. In September, Admiral Halsey's carrier aviation struck targets in the Morotai and Leyte areas and preliminary damage assessment indicated enemy air had more or less been eliminated. Also, a Japanese prisoner revealed in an interrogation that there were few enemy troops on Leyte. Admirals Halsey and Nimitz agreed that MacArthur's operation to take Leyte should be moved up and the intermediate operations canceled. The Combined Chiefs of Staff concurred. They sent a directive to MacArthur to execute the Leyte operation on October 20. MacArthur was en route to Morotai to observe operations and under radio silence. General Sutherland answered the directive after conferring with General Kenney and the other theater commanders. MacArthur would return to the Philippines on October 20, 1944.³⁴

Because Halsey's carrier aviation crippled enemy aircraft in Leyte, the initial landings in October went relatively unopposed. The campaign for Leyte and the subsequent operation for Luzon saw General Kenney command joint air forces from the Army Air Force, the Navy and the Marines.

²¹Wesley Frank Craven, and James Lea Cate, eds. *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol I, Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 238. During the conference the senior commanders chose the term "combined" instead of "joint" to describe operations that included forces from more than one nation. "Joint" would refer to operations of one nation that included forces from more than one service.

²²Craven and Cate, Vol I, 254.

²³Craven and Cate, Vol I, 238, 246.

²⁴USSBS, *Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command*, Vol. 65 (Washington, D.C.: Military Analysis Division, 1947), 6.

²⁵USSBS, Vol. 65, 6.

²⁶USSBS, Vol. 65, 10.

²⁷Report by Sir Alan Brooke to chiefs of state on results of Casablanca conference. Cited in Grace Person Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 289.

²⁸Hayes, 408-9.

²⁹Hayes, 413-33.

³⁰Hayes, 508-68. During the final months of 1943 and the first months of 1944, the CCS met for SEXTANT in Cairo, and EUREKA in Tehran. They made no major changes to the agreements from QUADRANT but began to transfer major forces from the South Pacific Area to MacArthur's SWPA, much to Admiral King's dismay.

³¹M. Hanlon Cannon, *United States Army in World War II, Vol. V: Leyte: The Return to the Philippines* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1954), 1-3.

³²USSBS, Vol 71a, *Air Campaign of the Pacific War*, 7.

³³Cannon, 4-6.

³⁴Cannon, 7-9, also George C. Kenney, General, USAF (Ret.), *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War* (New York, Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1949).

Part II Chapter 2
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES and
SUPPORTING DOCTRINE

US and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives are the basis for combatant command strategies. Combatant commanders design strategic concepts and develop plans to accomplish these objectives within their geographic or functional areas.

-- Planning Joint Operations
Joint Pub 3-0, Chapter III³⁵

By 1944, US and Allied Pacific strategy formally included the Philippines as an objective. For MacArthur, however, this was the "main objective . . . from the time of his departure from Corregidor in March 1942 until his dramatic return to Leyte two and one half years later."³⁶ For MacArthur, and the Army in particular, objectives meant seizing land bases from which to advance toward the Japanese home islands. For the Air Force, objectives were neutralizing enemy ground, sea and air forces through bombardment and strafing so they could cover the army in the advance. The Navy would share the Air Force roles with its carrier aviation, transport troops and supplies, and use naval gunnery to bombard the enemy on the shore.

Post war evaluations of objectives yield different descriptions. In *The History of the Army Air Forces in World War Two*, Craven and Cate feel the Army was in theater to support the Air Force: "the assaults were never to gain the land masses or to capture populous cities, but only to establish airfields (and fleet anchorages and bases) from which the next forward spring might be launched."³⁷

Although the sequence of events of taking land mass and establishing an airfield for extended coverage might appear as if the Army was supporting the Air Force, this parochial view contrasts directly with MacArthur's well known strategic objective of "retaking the Philippines."


The *USSBS* report shows less service bias and includes the goal to "stage forward troops."³⁸ General Krueger echoes this view of the objectives in his description of each individual operation. In sum, his is a joint view and reflects the complementary nature of the three services.

Island objectives were seized to establish air bases for fighters and bombers. These new areas would support forward staging to the next objective. Naval forces would transport and supply the troops while

establishing forward naval bases. And the *final objective* was to invade the Philippines. (emphasis added)³⁹

Since he first arrived in theater, Kenney understood his objectives as the airman and told MacArthur that he first needed to establish air superiority. He said, "There was no use talking about playing across the street until we got the [enemy] out of our front lawn." Once air superiority was established, he could forward base bombers to "do more damage." This was prior to the actual landing in the objective area. He understood that his mission objectives to support the landing were to establish air control and suppress enemy forces that could fire upon the Allies' own troops. On a number of occasions, Kenney pointed out that his personal objective for amphibious operations was to have the Army and Marines go ashore "with their rifles on their backs."⁴⁰

The original plan for the Philippines resembled the offensive drive in the SWPA thus far. Forward jumps would be made only as far as fighter cover could reach. Bases in New Guinea would support a drive to Morotai and Halmahera. The next move would be on to Mindanao in the southern Philippines. The Leyte invasion would occur next on December 20, followed by Mindoro and Luzon in January. This schedule would allow Kenney to "maintain cover over the amphibious assault en route, during unloading, and on the way back."⁴¹



The Morotai invasion went as planned and Kenney based fighters and bombers there to support the next operation. Admiral Halsey, in the meantime, had been advancing to the Palaus, and with the intelligence information suggesting an enemy weakness at Leyte, Mindanao would be left for a later mop-up operation. General Kenney opposed the Leyte operation because the bulk of the landings would be out of range of his fighter cover, leaving him in a subordinate support role. Admiral Kinkaid's carriers would get the immediate air support role for the invasion and Kenney would move forward when air bases could be established in Leyte. He voiced his concern to MacArthur that Kinkaid's "baby carriers" didn't have the endurance to support extended operations, but the decision was made and MacArthur's orders for the operation stated:

The Commander Allied Air Forces, while continuing present missions, will:

(1) Support the operation by:

- (a) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography as required.
- (b) Neutralizing, in coordination with carrier and land based aircraft of the third fleet, hostile naval and air forces within range in the Philippine Archipelago, intensifying the neutralization in the western Visayas and Mindanao areas from D-9 to cover the movement of naval forces, the landing and subsequent operations.
- (c) Providing protection of convoys and naval forces and direct support of the landing and subsequent operations within capabilities and as required by Commander Allied Naval Forces.
- (d) Assuming the mission of direct support of the operations in the Leyte-Samar area at the earliest practicable date after establishment of fighters and light bombers in the Leyte area, as arranged with the Commander Allied Naval Forces.⁴²

The most significant provision regarding Kenney's role as a JFACC was the establishment of forward bases in Leyte, and later in Mindoro. According to MacArthur's staff, "The primary purpose of the seizure of Mindoro was to establish airfields from which land-based aircraft could bomb selected targets on Luzon and at the same time protect the assault and resupply shipping en route to Lingayen Gulf."⁴³ Five days after the Leyte invasion (A-Day plus 5)⁴⁴ Sixth Army would have airdrome facilities for one group each of P-38s and RAAF P-40s, and a night fighter squadron. By A-Day plus 60, Kenney would command a composite air force which included: Fifth and Thirteenth Air Force fighters, bombers, and strafers; Navy VPB and Marine VMF squadrons; and MAG-12.⁴⁵

With these resources under his control, General Kenney would be able to accomplish his support objectives, but he was still out of range of the northern Luzon targets. Cooperating with Admiral Kinkaid to cover these northern objectives, he delegated the remaining missions to FEAF. These missions assumed the pattern characteristic to FEAF's previous operations. They "included striking southern Luzon before the assault, . . . [help] the CVE's protect the assault convoys, . . . stop any Japanese attempts to move troops, . . . [bomb] Japanese air bases and other installations in the southern Philippines, . . . and finally, making reconnaissance and photographic missions." General Whitehead's Fifth Air Force accomplished most of these missions, and Thirteenth Air Force and the RAAF would help out as conditions permitted. The land-based Navy aircraft would do the photo reconnaissance, and the Marine fighters and bombers assigned to Whitehead would hit targets on Luzon. "Palau-based bombers of the Seventh Air Force, under

Nimitz' control, were also to hit targets on Luzon at times and places determined by Kenney."⁴⁶

By the time Kenney commanded these combined air forces in the Pacific, he had employed a tactical air support doctrine that spelled out air superiority as the first objective. This was followed by interdiction and ground support. Surprisingly, this was not unlike the doctrine that evolved in the Mediterranean and was applied in OVERLORD. Despite different circumstances, similar doctrines evolved in different theaters of operation.

THE EVOLUTION OF AIR DOCTRINE

Aerospace Doctrine is, simply defined, what we hold true about aerospace power and the best way to do the job in the Air Force. It is based on experience, our own and that of others.

- AFM 1-1, 1992, p. viii.

Early in 1942 Headquarters Army Air Forces rushed to publish formal doctrine to guide Air Force actions in the war. Interestingly enough, the director of military requirements, whose duty it was to publish the doctrine, was only an advisory position and held no formal authority. This characteristic of doctrine, that it is advisory in nature and should not be applied devoid of judgment, has survived to the present. Fortunately, the advisory nature of these early days was the only thing that survived, since decentralization on Arnold's staff had resulted in volumes of conflicting and impotent guidance.⁴⁷

Reorganization in March 1942 streamlined staff work and resulted in the first semblance of published doctrine. Col David M. Schlatter, chief of the Ground Support Division, dissected reports from the Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers of 1941, and published War Department Field Manual 31-35, *Aviation in Support of Ground Forces*, on 9 April 1942. Kenney no doubt was aware of the manual and familiar with its provisions.⁴⁸ He himself had been teaching the same ideas ten years earlier.

Army officers disliked the manual because it vested centralized control in an air support command. The Army preferred to have air assigned directly to the units that it would support. With this arrangement, the ground commander had final authority over targeting priorities. The targets thus became those that posed the greatest threat to the ground operations. The airmen and Army disagreed on these basic arrangements and consequently, they viewed the regulation as being temporary and subject to change.⁴⁹

In October 1942 the Army Air Forces established the School of Applied Tactics to replace the defunct Air Corps Tactical School, which had been prematurely closed as a result of reorganization. Within the school was the Army Air Forces board who had the charter to "determine major questions of policy and doctrine for all activities of the school and such other matters as may be assigned to it by competent authority."⁵⁰

After the Casablanca conference, General Arnold, satisfied with the operational expansion of the Air Force, emphasized that the Air Force still had no formal doctrine. Determined to educate every young airman in basic doctrine and employment policies:

Arnold charged Brigadier General Byron E. Gates, chief of AAF management control, to direct the preparation and publication of a volume that would "present . . . a comprehensive picture of the objectives of Air Forces in Theaters of Operations and of the organization available to obtain those objectives."⁵¹

The Air Force in Theaters of Operations: Organization and Functions, 1 June 1943, was the most complete doctrinal volume thus far. It conformed to organizational doctrine established in FM 31-35 and included a "pamphlet [that] described an operational air force as comprising the traditional, air defense, air bombardment, air support, and air service commands."⁵² To Arnold's disappointment, there is little evidence to suggest that the publication ever reached its intended audience. George Kenney in the Southwest Pacific certainly did not benefit from it.

Kenney had probably formed his own ideas of Air Force doctrine while he was an instructor in the ACTS. Years later, while Kenney was commanding in the Pacific, British General Bernard Montgomery published his notes from observations of the Allied North Africa Campaign. The pamphlet, which cited flexibility as the greatest asset of airpower, and emphasized unity of command, became the basis for FM 100-20, *Command and Employment of Airpower*, 21 July 1943. Enamored with doctrine that preached centralized control of airpower, Arnold issued a copy of the manual to every Air Corps officer and wrote a letter to every air commander. Undoubtedly, Kenney received one of these manuals and letters, but practical experience had already led him to form his own tactical air doctrine in the Southwest Pacific, and he was applying that doctrine to support MacArthur's operations.⁵³

³⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3: *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 9 September 1993, III-1.

³⁶Douglas MacArthur, General, USA, *The Reports of General MacArthur: The campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*. Prepared by his General Staff (Washington: US Government, 1966), 166.

³⁷Wesley Frank Craven, and James Lea Cate, eds. *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), xviii.

³⁸USSBS, Vol 71a, *Air Campaign of the Pacific War* (Washington, D.C.: Military Analysis Division, 1947), 7.

³⁹Walter Krueger, General, USA (Ret), *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II* (Washington DC: Combat Forces Press, 1953), 23, 61, 83, 106, 118.

⁴⁰George C. Kenney, General USAF, (Ret), *The MacArthur I Know* p. 52, also *Kenney Reports*, 44.

⁴¹Kenney, *Reports*, 397, 420. The schedule for the advance prior to the decision to move the Leyte invasion up to October 20 was:

Morotai	15 Sep	Mindoro	15 Jan
Talud	15 Oct	Aparri, Luzon	31 Jan
Mindanao	15 Nov	Lingayen, Luzon	20 Feb
Leyte	20 Dec	Source: <i>Kenney Reports</i> , 420	

⁴²Operations Order Cited in *Reports of General MacArthur*, 188.

⁴³MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 251.

⁴⁴Since "D-Day" was associated with the Normandy invasion, SWPA commonly used "A-Day" to signify the Leyte Operation.

⁴⁵Robert Sherrod, *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II* (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1962), 288, also Captain Robert F. Futrell, "History of the Far East Air Force," unpublished report at USAF/HRA, pp. 121, 132. *Kenney Reports*, 519-20. A VP squadron is a Navy scouting squadron, VMF is a Marine Fighter Squadron, and a MAG is a Marine Air Group (see Sherrod, xxiii-xxvi).

⁴⁶Robert Ross Smith, *United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, Vol 11. Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1963), 34-6.

⁴⁷Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1960* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1989), 132-4.

⁴⁸Futrell, *Ideas*.

⁴⁹Futrell, *Ideas*.

⁵⁰Cited in Futrell, *Ideas*, 134.

⁵¹Cited in Futrell, *Ideas*, 136.

⁵²Cited in Futrell, *Ideas*, 136.

⁵³The path from Montgomery's notes to the finished FM 100-20 was a complicated coordination process including Generals Lawrence Kuter, Carl A. Spaatz, Hap Arnold, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. See Futrell, *Ideas*, 137-8.

Part II Chapter 3

COMMAND ORGANIZATION

That every problem which faced us was successfully solved is a tribute to the Army-Navy-Air Forces team and the ability and cooperative spirit displayed by its members.

- General Walter S. Krueger
Commander, Sixth US Army⁵⁴

Command in the Pacific didn't start out as unified as MacArthur's command organization for the Philippine Campaign. Despite overtures from senior military commanders, the JCS carved out several command areas in the Pacific. (See figure 4 below)




Figure 4. Source: Morton, 1962, foldout.

Admiral Chester Nimitz, Pacific Fleet Commander, also commanded the Pacific Ocean Areas, which included the North, Central, and South Pacific Areas. Admiral Ghormley, subordinate to Nimitz, and General MacArthur, shared the southern region in the South Pacific (SOPAC) and Southwest Pacific (SWPA) Areas respectively. The northern area was insignificant in the war toward the Philippines. Consequently, final command authority for the conduct of operations in the Pacific was vested in the JCS because they would have to ensure unity of effort between the separate theaters.⁵⁵

This divided command structure was a compromise of each service's position that *it* should command the Pacific Theater. General Arnold, the Chief of the Army Air Force, recommended a unified command because he was concerned the Navy would not use Army aircraft effectively. Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations, understandably recommended a unified command under the Navy. A lesser-known position was voiced by General Wedemeyer who supported a single command headed by an airman because in his opinion, the Air Force would "exercise the strongest influence in the Pacific." General Marshall as the Army Chief of Staff naturally supported MacArthur to command the whole Pacific Area of operations.⁵⁶

The first obstacle Kenney faced when he arrived in theater was organizational restraints. After observing operations for a number of weeks, he fired generals, colonels, and unneeded staff officers in the 5th Air Force. In effect, "he scrapped what he considered to be a chaotic organization and set up clear lines of authority."⁵⁷ After he fired the old staff, Kenney had to set up his own organization. He chose for his next in command, Brigadier General Ennis C. Whitehead. With Kenney organizing and designing the strategy and Whitehead backing him up with sound operations, the team would prove an invaluable asset to MacArthur.

The original command organization in the SWPA Air Force was a directorate system, with the directors in charge of such things as logistics and support. Kenney, however, envisioned the island hopping operations and organized accordingly. He and

Whitehead changed the system to one that functioned to meet the needs of specific operations. Each group took responsibility for its own logistics and support now that the directorates were gone. "Traditional" group and squadron organizations were formed under Fifth Bomber Command with Brigadier General Kenneth Walker and Fifth Fighter Command with Brigadier General Paul B. Wurthsmith.⁵⁸

Still, a major command problem existed with the great distances involved between headquarters in Brisbane and forward operations. To solve the problem, Kenney formed the advanced echelon Fifth Air Force under Whitehead at Port Moresby. This "Advon" would serve well in future operations by coordinating operations orders between Kenney at headquarters and forward operations. Also, when headquarters moved forward, like the later move to Hollandia, the Advon would likewise leap forward.

In order to overcome organizational restraints and get the job done in the Pacific, the senior leaders who normally battled each other over the command issue were forced to cooperate and support each other in actual operations. This cooperation existed from the highest levels between MacArthur and Nimitz down to the units themselves. Because of the close proximity of the SWPA and the SOPAC, MacArthur and Halsey supported each other in the early campaigns. MacArthur supplied P-38s during the Battle for Guadalcanal and Halsey asked him to hit Japanese shipping at Buin-fasi to help with air control and to slow enemy resupply. Later on, Halsey took responsibility for the neutralization of Rabaul from MacArthur and Kenney to free the Southwest Pacific forces to move along New Guinea through Hollandia and Wewak. Also, MacArthur's Hollandia operation was supported by Nimitz's carrier aircraft. Finally, MacArthur and Halsey coordinated the carrier-based air support for the Leyte invasion because Kenney's aircraft didn't have the range.⁵⁹

This understanding between the theater commanders didn't exist between MacArthur and Arnold, who wanted to maintain control of the Air Force from Washington. Fortunately, Kenney's relationship with both generals enabled him to keep


disagreements over air assets to a minimum. Kenney had known Arnold for over twenty years and felt he could run the air show without meddling from Washington. Likewise, Kenney had MacArthur's full confidence and was able to plan the air war unimpeded by micro management. In his memoirs, Kenney quotes MacArthur's answer to a reporter who wanted to know why MacArthur didn't know exactly where the Air Force targets were: "Of course I know where they are falling . . . they are falling in the right place. Go ask George Kenney where that is."⁶⁰

Arrangements between theater commanders many times were initiated at the component level. When Kenney wanted help from Halsey's carriers, he coordinated through MacArthur. This cooperation paid off later in the war when naval assets were brought together under MacArthur's unified command.

As operations in the South Pacific gained momentum in early 1944, it became evident to the JCS that they had to redefine the command structure. Kenney, who had disagreed with the divided command since the beginning, presented a plan to MacArthur and subsequently to the JCS. His plan reflected the cooperation that the JCS had sanctioned between MacArthur and Halsey for the completion of the New Guinea operations. For New Guinea and the Solomons, SWPA and SOPAC were to coordinate their operations, with MacArthur retaining strategic control of the timing. Under the new command structure, MacArthur "regained not only the area he had previously controlled, but all the units located there."⁶¹

General MacArthur's command organization for the Philippine campaign extended from himself as Commander South West Pacific Area (SWPA) to the Allied Land Force, Naval Force, and Air Force, which was commanded by General Kenney. (See figure 5 below) The Allied Air Forces included, among others, the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), of which Kenney was the dual hatted commander, comprised of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. These were led by Major Generals Whitehead and Streett

respectively. Also in Kenney's joint air component were the First Marine Air Wing of the



previous Aircraft Northern Solomons command (AirNorSols) and Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet carrier aircraft. Major General R. J. Mitchell, USMC, commanded AirNorSols and Commodore T. S. Combs was Admiral Kinkaid's Air Commander. Finally, Kenney commanded the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), making the air component a *combined* rather than a *joint* command. This command structure evolved through the earlier years of the war and was finally implemented by the JCS on June 15, 1944.⁶²

Formal command channels are not enough for theater commanders to ensure unity of effort. The subordinate commanders cannot work in isolation, they must work with

each other. These working relationships are very personality dependent. Instrumental in the coordination between the components was General Richard K. Sutherland.

Sutherland worked directly for MacArthur as his Chief of Staff. In the beginning of the war, Sutherland attempted to isolate MacArthur from his subordinate commanders and act as a go-between. When Kenney arrived in theater in August of 1942, he asserted that *he* would work directly with MacArthur as the airman and he would not let Sutherland interfere. Although this relationship may appear to have been antagonistic, it was far from it. Kenney and Sutherland had met each other many years before as classmates in the Army War College. Kenney said that although Sutherland "rubbed people the wrong way," he was actually a very knowledgeable and capable General.⁶³

MacArthur endowed Sutherland with special trust. For example, in January 1944, Sutherland had represented MacArthur in the conference at Pearl Harbor where he and the component commanders presented their plan for the conduct of the war to the JCS. Along with Sutherland and Kenney were Admiral Kinkaid, Kinkaid's amphibious commander Admiral Dan Barbey, and General Krueger. Sutherland had previously coordinated the Allied position with MacArthur and his commanders at a conference in Brisbane. Sutherland was able to present a coordinated plan because these commanders had worked together before.⁶⁴ Finally, as we have already seen, the decision to invade Leyte instead of Mindanao is final proof of MacArthur's trust in Sutherland. Sutherland accepted the risky proposition and sent the JCS confirmation in MacArthur's name.⁶⁵

Sutherland didn't make the Leyte decision by himself. As always, he had the confidence of MacArthur's other commanders, and they had confidence in each other. General Krueger had coordinated operations with Generals Sutherland and Whitehead throughout the New Guinea and Philippine campaigns. He praised Fifth Air Force and Admiral Dan Barbey's Task Force 76 planning and execution of operations to take Los Negros and Manus Islands in March 1944. In his description of the planning conferences for subsequent operations, Krueger shows that all three services were adequately

represented by senior leaders. For example, while describing a planning conference for the invasion of Biak Island he says:

The conference was attended by Lieutenant General Kenney (CG, Allied Air Forces); Major General Whitehead (CG, Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force); Vice Admiral Kinkaid (Commander, Seventh Fleet); Rear Admiral Fechteler (Acting Commander VII Amphibious Force); Lieutenant General Sutherland (Chief of Staff, GHQ); and a number of staff officers of the three services. We reached an agreement on landing beaches and tentative target dates without difficulty and the result was communicated to GHQ.⁶⁶

An assertion that "all was well" between these service chiefs at these conferences should be suspect. This was just not so. What is true, however, is that MacArthur let the commanders voice their opinions and then he made the final decision on the operation. During the New Guinea campaign, the operation to take Saidor was the result of compromise between the three services at the component level. The Air Force wanted to accomplish its characteristic bombardment. The Navy task force commander wanted to maximize surprise and wanted to time the bombing with the assault. General Krueger wasn't too concerned with the timing or the bombardment as long as surprise was maximized. "So [Krueger] decided on an early landing although this necessarily eliminated a preliminary air bombardment. However, the Air Forces did later on effectively bombard and strafe the areas inland from the beach."⁶⁷

General Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth US Army, like the other commanders, calls the teamwork in the Pacific excellent. Teamwork doesn't mean you have to agree all the time. He said at one time or another he disagreed with the Air Force, or the Navy, and even at times, with his immediate superiors. "But in war -- ancient or modern -- there must be a certain amount of give and take." Eichelberger emphasized that this war had no preplanned solutions from years of wargaming like the war in Europe. Consequently, each service bringing its own expertise to the table was likely to depend on the other services to make up for its own shortfalls. The Navy started out the war "with one hand tied behind its back." The Air Force was in equally dire straits during the initial defensive posture in the Pacific. And Eichelberger

acknowledges, "Every troop movement in the Pacific depended on the Navy and Air Force for success . . . " This interdependence resulted in the close coordination and cooperation evident at all levels of MacArthur's command, especially in the Philippine campaign.⁶⁸

⁵⁴Walter Krueger, General, USA (Ret), *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II* (Washington DC: Combat Fores Press, 1953), 217.

⁵⁵Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 144. Also Lewis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years* (Washington, D.C.: 1962), Vol. 10., 250.

⁵⁶Morton, Vol 10., 361, 2. Also, General Albert C. Wedemeyer was on the General Staff Plans Division, War Department, from 1940-1942. Source: *US Army Military History Research Collection, Special Bibliographic Series No. 13.* (Carlisle Barracks, Penn).

⁵⁷Herman S. Wolk, "George C. Kenney: MacArthur's Premier Airman," In William N. Leary, ed., *We Shall Return: MacArthur's Lieutenants and the Defeat of Japan* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 88.

⁵⁸Wolk, 88. Also *Kenney Reports*, 32, and James C. Hasdorff, "USAF Historical Interview #806: General George C. Kenney." (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, April 20, 1974), K239.0512-806, 52.

⁵⁹*Kenney Reports*, 130, 324, 371, 392. Also, Morton, in the Army History claims that in spite of the divided command, "...On the whole, there was great cooperation, and without this, even unified command is not effective." Morton, Vol 10., 363. Craven and Cate disagree with the view that the theater commanders cooperated successfully with each other. They say, "there was in reality the vast abyss of the conflicting views of MacArthur and the Navy, reflected in the sharp debates over strategy and but poorly bridged by the cooperation which was substituted for unified command." Wesley Frank Craven, and James Lea Cate, eds. *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950), xiii.

⁶⁰*Kenney Reports*, 184. Also see Kenney, *The MacArthur I Know*, 55-6.

⁶¹George W. Garand, and Truman R. Strobridge. *History of US Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. IV: Western Pacific Operations* (Washington: Hq US Marine Corps, 1971), 293, Also *Kenney Reports*, 213, 218

⁶²Garand, 301-2.

⁶³*Kenney Reports*, 26. This is an interesting observation made by Kenney in *Reports* because later in a 1974 interview at HRA he implies that Sutherland got in the way between MacArthur and his combat commanders. He said he got things done by working directly with MacArthur. See Kenney Interview AF/HRA, 1974. This view of Sutherland (that he was an abrasive, yet capable general) is supported in a number of other sources. See Paul P. Rogers, *The Bitter Years: MacArthur and Sutherland*. (New York: Preager Publishing, 1991), Chapter 6: "Not a Chief Clerk." Even revisionist William Manchester calls Sutherland "efficient and ruthless." See William R. Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964*. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1978), 184. And finally, D. Clayton James explains, "The immediate headquarters staff accepted his [Sutherland's] faults and considered him an efficient chief of staff 'who got the job done no matter what it took,' but some who tangled with him would have agreed with a later evaluation by an Australian: 'Sutherland was the wrong kind of chief of staff for MacArthur, whose foibles he would not offset but nourish.'" See D. Clayton James. *The Years of MacArthur: Volume II, 1941-1945*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), 78.

⁶⁴*Kenney Reports*, 327, 336.

⁶⁵Stanley L. Falk, *Decision at Leyte*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966), 28-31.

⁶⁶Krueger, 61, 81, 83.

⁶⁷Krueger, 36.

⁶⁸Robert L. Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*. (New York: The Viking Press, 1950), 246-9.

Part II Chapter 4
FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The unique capabilities of forces from all Service components and supporting elements of the joint force should be considered in developing the concept of operations. . . . The capabilities and limitations of different aircraft are governed by such factors as range, payload, weapons carriage, night and all-weather capability, self-defense capability, . . . and aircrew qualification.

--Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations
JCS PUB 3-01.2⁶⁹

Allied Capabilities

JCS Pub 3-01.2 addresses friendly capabilities that the JFACC can take advantage of to accomplish his mission, but it does not offer advice in case of shortfalls. General Kenney was able to overcome problems due to technological shortfalls, the great distances involved in the Pacific, and manpower and equipment shortages, all the while accomplishing his mission. Most of these shortages occurred during the early phases of the war. The major discrepancy in capabilities during the Philippine campaign was the lack of airdromes close enough to provide air cover. Kenney temporarily solved this problem by recruiting the support of carrier air until bases were ready for his fighters.

Solving technological constraint problems would earn Kenney the title of "the Great Innovator."⁷⁰ The first problem Kenney's Fifth Air Force solved involved was the great distances in the Pacific. The new A-20 attack aircraft lacked the combat range to be effective. The A-20s also arrived in theater without their guns, so they had to be modified to be useful. The modification, led by Major Paul I. "Pappy" Gunn, consisted of placing two 450-gallon fuel tanks in the bomb bay to increase range, and fitting four .50 caliber machine guns in the nose bombardier station. The modification was so successful that it was eventually adopted as the A-20A in the European, Pacific, and China-Burma-India Theaters.⁷¹

In 1944, while the great distances still plagued the Allied Air Forces, Charles Lindbergh, the "Lone Eagle," paid Kenney a visit in the SWPA. Lindbergh stayed with a P-38 unit for a few weeks and was able to stretch the combat range of the P-38 from 400 miles to 600 miles. He had learned energy conservation, and throttle and fuel mixture techniques during his trans-Atlantic flight. When Kenney's airmen applied these lessons in the Pacific, it seemed that the operational range, or almost 800 miles, would be

attainable.⁷² This increased range gave the fighters in Fifth Air Force the capability to escort heavy bomber missions to key enemy bases previously out of fighter range.⁷³

Another technological shortfall was the inability to attack troops and supply accurately. Kenney remembered a parafrag bomb test from 1928. He had a number of the bombs delivered and tested in the SWPA. The parafrag bomb had a parachute attached to the tail and a supersensitive fuse. The parachute would "slow the forward momentum of the bomb and give the low flying attack aircraft a chance to depart the fragmentation pattern." This allowed the aircraft to release bombs while getting closer to the target thus greatly increasing accuracy. The fuse would burst the bomb into 800 to 1200 fragments, which was especially well suited "for aircraft, small open boats, searchlights, trucks, artillery tractors, mechanized forces, personnel and animals." These were typical targets in the jungles of New Guinea.⁷⁴

Fire bombs were also developed for these targets. In the Philippines, the enemy had changed from a forward defense to a defense in depth, therefore the campaign was protracted beyond the initial landings. The Fifth Air Force experimented with fire bombing to burn out the enemy. The first technique was to drop belly tanks filled with gasoline and then to strafe the area to ignite the fuel. Next, magnesium ignitors attached to the belly tanks did away with the second pass which undoubtedly exposed the aircraft unnecessarily to enemy fire. Finally was the development of a gasoline, oil, and rubber mixture: napalm. "Napalm became a primary weapon in close support." During the battle for Manila, typical of enemy ground defense late in the war, napalm dropped by Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers burned out enemy strongholds, enabling Sixth Army troops to walk into the city.⁷⁵

Weapons were not the only capability Kenney's air forces had to develop for close support. Communications and target identification were major shortfalls in the coordination between ground troops and the flyers.

Marines in the South and Southwest Pacific were instrumental in developing a communications solution during the war. Early on, during the battle for Bougainville, Marines assigned in the Solomon Islands command (ComAirSols) used support air parties (SAP) as liaison between ground troops and air headquarters. The SAPs provided communications for air strikes, usually requested a day in advance. Planning for the amphibious landings in the Philippines included officers from all services and the airmen determined how much air support would be available. Kenney, unwilling to give operational control of his aircraft to the ground commander, established an air liaison similar to the SAP, and with better radio equipment, "could allow the attack and landing

force commanders to control the support aircraft *while the aircraft were in the objective area*" (emphasis in original).⁷⁶

"Real-time" close support required increased target identification capabilities. Airborne photography was limited and "could see no more than the human eye." Consequently, pilots had to become familiar with individual target areas over time, and this was not very useful with advancing forward lines. The forward lines themselves were difficult to determine as well. Eventually, friendly forces used colored smoke to mark the forward line of troops and white smoke to mark targets. Attempts at using panels and other ground markings were less successful, but when used in combination, the various marking techniques increased the effectiveness of close support dramatically.⁷⁷ Describing his "dash for Manila," General Eichelberger recalled: "Air support at this time . . . was expert and heartening. A-20s of the 3rd Attack Group were coming over low and dropping parachute bombs just ahead of our soldiers. P-38s were blasting enemy positions near the village of Aga."⁷⁸

During the defense of Leyte, Kenney integrated Marine night fighters in the operations. His P-61 Black Widow night fighters were too slow to intercept Japanese night bombers, so MacArthur had Kenney move Marines forward that had previously been under Nimitz in the SOPAC. Three squadrons of Marine night fighters were stationed at Tacloban airstrip and racked up an impressive combat record. Although the squadrons were never used in their true night sense (most sorties were flown during dawn and dusk) they proved their worth by shooting down enemy aircraft and sinking enemy supply ships every day they remained at Tacloban.⁷⁹ Along with the Corsair fighter squadrons of MAG-12, also stationed on Leyte, they flew a total of 576 combat sorties, destroyed 62 enemy aircraft, sunk 26 Japanese ships and other small surface craft, and bombed several key ground targets. Brigadier General Paul D. Wurtsmith, Commander of the Fifth Fighter Command recognized the Marines for their contribution with unit commendation citations.⁸⁰

Kenney's Allied Air Forces did not start the war equipped with sufficient fighters and aircrews to man them. The "Europe First" strategy enabled commanders in England to seize aircraft destined for the Pacific as soon as they came off the assembly line as long as there was a "bonafide emergency." Admiral Ghormley in the South Pacific also had priority for aircraft over Kenney. Kenney appealed to Arnold and put a stop to this practice as soon as he learned of it. Arnold was also quick to give Kenney P-38s in the beginning because the aircraft's long range would be beneficial in the Pacific. The Pacific also obtained B-24s and P-47s because Europe preferred the B-17 and P-51.⁸¹

Whitehead took these limited numbers of fighters and bombers and formed air task groups to maximize his flexibility in air operations.⁸²

While orchestrating the classic resources (aircraft, pilots, ordnance) to reach their goal, Kenney and Whitehead had another important capability at their disposal: Intelligence information gained through ULTRA.⁸³ During the New Guinea operations, ULTRA revealed that the Japanese planned to increase the numbers of aircraft and troops stationed in the Wewak area. By August, because of ULTRA information and a stepped up reconnaissance program, Kenney knew the location of the main enemy air force. Now he could better focus his efforts at defeating the enemy.⁸⁴

Whitehead, Kenney's "aerial tactician," had been practicing airfield neutralization with his forces. ULTRA would help time the attack to hit the largest number of enemy planes possible. The initial strike would come from heavy bombers to soften up enemy resistance. Then the medium bombers (B-25s) would strafe and drop parafrag bombs. Finally, reconnaissance would assess the damage.⁸⁵ The success of the Wewak raid typified the results Kenney and Whitehead would achieve in future operations. Their work ensured MacArthur's forces would be able to proceed unmolested by enemy air as they moved forward toward the Philippines.

Capitalizing on friendly capabilities with night fighters and ULTRA, and accounting for shortfalls in manpower, equipment and weapons technology, were only part of the story in the Pacific. General Kenney and the Allied Air Forces also dealt with the physical difficulties of developing airdromes in the SWPA, especially at Leyte. Poor Radio communications between headquarters was the bottleneck in information flow. There was also a shortage of drinking water and air and ground transport. Kenney and Whitehead were able to persevere through these problems by a determined strategy of "fitting the weapon to the task and adjusting the weapon to the theater."⁸⁶ By sticking to this plan, MacArthur's airman was able to neutralize enemy advantages, and seize upon enemy weaknesses.

Enemy Capabilities

Key features of a center of gravity are its importance to the enemy's ability to wage war, its importance to the enemy's motivation and willingness to wage war, its importance to the enemy political body, population, and armed forces, and the enemy's consciousness of these factors. . . . The enemy's key military capabilities or forces are often the preferred center of gravity because neutralizing them is often the most certain way to gaining victory.

Strategically, the Japanese squandered their beginning resources and were unable to match Allied production. Poor Army - Navy cooperation affected both technology development and wartime strategy. An inadequate pilot training and management program would have left the enemy air forces short on capability even if they could keep up with Allied aircraft production. Although in some cases the Japanese were able to reinforce defensive positions, failure to protect interior lines, and committing forces piecemeal to counterattack Allied advances enabled Kenney and MacArthur to systematically dismantle enemy capability.⁸⁸

Not only was Japanese Army - Navy cooperation poor, it bordered on outright competition. The two air arms developed independently and as such, each desired control of raw material and production facilities. Also, the failure to share new technologies slowed improvements in capabilities. In 1943, when the enemy recognized this handicap, an Army - Navy Air Headquarters was formed partly to study "joint research, design, and production of weapons and equipment." Unfortunately for Japan, this joint headquarters did not solve the problem as failure to decide on individual priorities prevented substantial cooperation from taking effect.⁸⁹

In addition to separate weapons procurement programs, the enemy air forces each trained their own pilots. In the beginning of the war, this had no adverse affect on the pilot corps as the Army and Navy each had a sufficient number of well trained-pilots. Each received an average of 300 flying hours prior to entering combat compared to the 200 hours of training for American pilots. On December 7, 1941, there were 6000 Japanese pilots available for combat. Many of these pilots had also gained combat experience in China, raising the average flying time to over 700 hours. Great combat losses in 1942 and 1943 prompted the enemy to decrease training requirements and increase pilot output. By the end of the war the total number of pilots available for combat tripled to 18,000, but the average experience had dwindled to a little over 100 hours. These inexperienced pilots were no match for the Allies.⁹⁰

Poor pilot resource management caused this low experience level, but by failing to understand airpower employment, the enemy was unable to take advantage of its superiority in numbers, and in the beginning, technical superiority. The Japanese began the war with aircraft that could out maneuver the Allies, but they were less sturdy and under armed. Production increased in number and quality during the war, but the divided procurement programs could not compete with the United States'. The combat losses were due to their fundamental inability to decisively mass their airpower. They were

able to establish temporary air control but never integrated this with sea or land operations, nor did they grasp the value of long term control of the air. Consequently, the enemy air forces reacted to Allied operations, never fully taking the offensive after the opening of the war.⁹¹

The Japanese developed the *SHO* plans to maximize what remained of their capabilities. The four defensive plans (SHO-1 thru SHO-4) provided for the concentration of the remaining air, land, and sea forces to keep the Allies out of : (1) the Philippines; (2) Formosa and Southern Kyushu; (3) Remaining Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu; and (4) Hokkaido. The SHO plans relied on a critical reinforcement supply system. Even though enemy supply lines were shortened, Allied land and carrier-based airpower, along with allied submarines, continued to spoil reinforcement attempts. Guerrillas in the area reported an enemy weakness in Leyte, so the Allies chose to attack there. Leyte afforded apparent weakness in enemy ground and air strength, and the ground situation promised an Allied advance to Tacloban airfield where badly needed Allied fighter cover could be based.⁹²

The Philippines were critical to the defense of the Japanese home islands. Consequently, the enemy moved its Second Air Fleet, in coordination with the Combined Fleet, to the area. They were now willing to commit the remainder of their forces, which had been held in reserve to defend the home islands, to the defense of the Philippines. They recognized that the Allies could use the Philippines to launch an invasion into Japan. Unfortunately, the Japanese carriers were not yet fully capable and Admiral Yamashita, the "Tiger of Malaya," would have to "improvise" with what he had. His carriers had been back in Japan recovering from devastating losses in the "Marianas Turkey Shoot."⁹³

Despite unprecedented weakness, the Japanese still planed to defeat the Allies through decisive battles. The Fourth Air Army was tasked to "annihilate" the American invasion force as it hit the beaches. Other Army and Navy aviation units had similar instructions aimed at defeating Allied carriers and land-based aircraft. Army ground forces were to withdraw from the landing zone and defend the islands in depth. The Imperial Navy would wait for the Allies and meet them with "all the strength it could muster." Unfortunately for the enemy, they could not "muster" up enough strength.⁹⁴

When the Americans invaded Leyte on October 20, the Japanese decided to fight with their ground forces, an idea previously regarded suicidal. Enemy losses were devastating. Hundreds of Japanese aircraft, innumerable ground reinforcements obtained from the China theater, and critical supply and transport ships, all fell prey to Allied forces. In an effort to slow the American advance to Japan, the enemy intended to defend

Luzon even though his supply lines were cut. "He prepared to undertake his task with understrength, underfed, and underequipped ground combat forces, the leadership and organization of which left much to be desired."⁹⁵

In a desperate attempt to compensate for shortfalls in capabilities, the enemy began to conduct suicide, or *kamikaze* air attacks. The Battle for Leyte Gulf saw the first large scale employment of these suicide attacks which would not only target shipping, but eventually Allied aircraft airborne and on airfields, and ground troops as well. Although the Allies term the *Kamikaze* "suicide" attacks, the Japanese formed Special Attack Units who felt they were a "human bomb which would destroy a certain part of the enemy fleet for his country."⁹⁶ These units were manned with both volunteers and draftees. The draftees, though they had the option to turn down the suicide missions, rarely did so because of the Japanese belief in "keeping face." A compilation of results of these attacks shows that:

The suicide plane was by far the most effective weapon devised by the Japanese for use against surface vessels. Over a period of only 10 months of the 44-month war, suicide planes accounted for 48.1 percent of all United States warships damaged and for 21.3 percent of the ships sunk. But the suicide effort was expensive. During the 10-month period of the employment of the suicide tactic, the 2 air arms expended 2,550 planes to score 474 hits on all types of Allied surface vessels for an effective rate of 18.6 percent.⁹⁷

The suicide attacks showed the enemy was acting in desperation. He recognized his capabilities were far short of those required to defend the Philippines, and eventually, the home islands. Allied forces intended to capitalize on these weaknesses and General Kenney was charged with the air plan first to cover the landings, and then to defend Allied forces once ashore. In the Philippine campaign, MacArthur's airman would integrate and coordinate Navy, Marine, and Army air forces of the SWPA Allied Air Force to support the invasion, and to prepare to move on to Japan itself.

⁶⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-01.2: Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations*, 1 Apr. 1986, III-3, IV-4.

⁷⁰Herman S. Wolk, "George C. Kenney: MacArthur's Premier Airman," In William N. Leary, ed., *We Shall Return: MacArthur's Lieutenants and the Defeat of Japan*. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 88.

⁷¹Timothy D. Gann, Major, USAF, "Fifth Air Force Light and Medium Bomber Operations During 1943: Building the Doctrine and Forces that Triumphed in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid," (SAAS Thesis, May 1992), 15-18.

⁷²Excerpt from unpublished document, *Anders Fighting Airmen*, "The Number One Take-Out Man: George C. Kenney," USAF/HRA Document # 168.7103-24, 36-37. Lindbergh's account of this affair is a little different. He does not mention being *invited* by Kenney, but claims that he offered help to MacArthur and Sutherland. Once MacArthur and Sutherland accepted his proposition to increase the combat range of Kenney's fighters, he said, Kenney whole heartedly agreed. See Charles A. Lindbergh. *The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), 870-4.

⁷³USSBS, Vol. 71, *The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan*. (Washington, 1947), 19.

⁷⁴Gann, 15-18. Also USSBS, Vol. 71, 75-76. These were the progenitors of current day "high drag" munitions.

⁷⁵USSBS, Vol. 71, 75.

⁷⁶Joe Gray Taylor, *Close Air Support in the War Against Japan*, US Air Force Historical Study No. 86 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF/HRA, 1955), Document # 101.86, 129. Also, See Taylor, "American Experience in the Southwest Pacific." in Benjamin F. Cooling, ed. *Case Studies in Close Air Support* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1990), 333. And George W. Garrand and Truman R. Strobridge. *History of US Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. IV: Western Pacific Operations* (Washington: Hq US Marine Corps, 1971), 306-7.

⁷⁷Taylor, HRA Doc. # 86, p. 127, Also Taylor, "American Experience," 332.

⁷⁸Robert L. Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*. (New York: The Viking Press, 1950), 193.

⁷⁹Unpublished Marine Aviation History, 1943, Part 17, Chapter 18. USAF/HRA Doc. # 186.011, 10-15.

⁸⁰Garand, 326, 333.

⁸¹George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War*. (New York, Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1949), 12, 112, 121, 128, 215.

⁸²Donald M. Goldstein, "Ennis C. Whitehead: Aerial Tactician," in William M. Leary, ed., *We Shall Return! MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan 1942-1945*, 199.

⁸³Edward J. Drea. *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945*, (Lawrence, University of Kansas, 1992), xi. Drea explains that the "British used the code word ULTRA from mid-1940 to alert the initiated that special intelligence was the source of what they were reading. . . . In the Pacific and Southeast Asia, no uniform policies governed the use and distribution of special intelligence, and ULTRA as a code word did not gain currency in the Pacific until March 1944." He then indicates there is a difference with MAGIC by treating "only in passing the well-known American efforts (MAGIC) that penetrated Japanese diplomatic codes."

⁸⁴Drea, 230-1.

⁸⁵Gann, 45-48.

⁸⁶History, Headquarters, Fifth Air force Historical Record. USAF/HRA, 40.

⁸⁷USAF. *JFACC Primer*, February 1994, 23.

⁸⁸USSBS, Vol. 62, *Japanese Airpower* (Washington, 1947), 1-3.

⁸⁹USSBS, Vol. 63, *Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics* (Washington, 1947), 3.

⁹⁰USSBS, Vol. 62, *Japanese Air Power*, (Washington, 1947), 34-40.

⁹¹USSBS, Vol 1, *Summary Report (Pacific War)*, (Washington, 1947), 9-10.

⁹²Robert Sherrod. *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II* (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1962), 269. George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge. *History of US Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. IV: Western Pacific Operations* (Washington: Hq US Marine Corps, 1971), 297. Douglas MacArthur, General, USA. *The Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*. Prepared by his General Staff (Washington: US Government, 1966), 173.

⁹³Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. V: The Pacific: Materhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953), 347.

⁹⁴Garand, 297-300.

⁹⁵Robert Ross Smith. *United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, Vol 11. Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1963), 90.

⁹⁶USSBS. Vol. 1, *Summary Report, Pacific War* (Washington, D.C., Military Analysis Division, 1947), 61.

⁹⁷USSBS. Vol. 1, 74.

Part II Chapter 5
PLANNING FOR COMBAT

As early as June 1944, planning staffs in the SWPA began to draft the MUSKETEER plans for the invasion of the Philippines. The operation would include four phases with the code names KING, LOVE, MIKE, and VICTOR. KING I and II were the plans for the invasion of Mindanao and Leyte. The LOVE plan was the establishment of lines of communication to the north and the invasion of southern Luzon. MIKE operations would complete the liberation of bypassed areas on Mindanao and finally, VICTOR would finish off any enemy garrisons remaining in the Philippines. The plans underwent numerous revisions, but the basic strategy remained the same for each of the phases.⁹⁸

In September, with the decision to invade Leyte, SWPA and POA began coordinating their efforts. The planning staffs of each area provided for integration of air assets at the highest level: "Detailed coordination of action of land-based bombers from PALAU will be arranged between the Commander-in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and the Commander, Third Fleet."⁹⁹ MacArthur approved the recommendations of the conferees and his staff began detailed planning for the operation.

Realizing that Allied Air Force Fighters would be out of range of the landing operations, early coordination between Admiral Kinkaid and General Kenney included provisions for the transfer of air support responsibility. Kenney and Kinkaid agreed that carriers would support the operation until such factors as "Number of fighters required, depending on the enemy potential [in the area], . . . Airdrome capacity, and service facilities, . . . " could be determined. General Kenney was apprehensive about the carriers' ability to support the operation because a smaller number of sorties could be flown from carriers as opposed to land-based air, and after a few days, the carriers would have to retreat and refuel. Kinkaid assured Kenney and MacArthur that his carriers, augmented by Halsey, would be able to do the job until relieved by Kenney.¹⁰⁰

Joint planning at the earliest stages included provisions for the airfields. In an internal memo for record, the SWPA Chief Engineer described his plan to develop the airdromes on Leyte. Three airfields captured on the first day would be available for four groups of fighters in three days: Dulag, Tacloban, and Dao. Five more fields would be captured by the tenth day and made ready for fighter and bomber operations anywhere from D+15 to D+60. Fighter operations could typically commence three to five days after capture, medium bomber operations fifteen days, and heavy bomber operations twenty days. The airfields were to be prepared with either steel or gravel, depending on

the weather and the type aircraft to be based at the field. Finally the plan accounted for dispersal of heavy bombers, and recognized that the plan might change due to arrangements between the AAF and the Navy.¹⁰¹ SWPA GHQ accomplished in-house studies to verify the plans. Much of the information addressed coordination because Navy aircraft would be under SWPA Air Force control. For example, the study pointed out since the original plan had the POA supporting the operation with PB4Y and troop carrier squadrons, SWPA GHQ would have to make adjustments when these squadrons were eliminated and the 611th VMB Squadron was substituted. Additionally, the support units for these Navy squadrons would remain in the POA, so the SWPA would have to furnish the required support. Among numerous topics, the study also recommended the construction of an Air Depot on Biak Island, verified the types and numbers of aircraft required in the plan, and provided for the establishment of one Air Sea Rescue squadron.¹⁰²

Brigadier General Beebe, Kenney's Chief of Staff prepared the capabilities annex to the Philippine Plan. For the invasion of Leyte, Beebe broke the report into fighter, medium and light bomber, and heavy bomber sorties. Heavy bombers would fly the bulk of the sorties during the invasion because of their range, and as the airfields became available, more medium and light bomber and fighter sorties would be flown. Fifth Air Force was capable of delivering 6500 support sorties in the first twenty days provided the Sixth Army seized the airdromes on schedule and the weather was good. After the initial landings, Fifth Air Force, augmented by three Navy Units, would move forward and pick up the "primary mission of . . . neutralization of enemy air and acquisition of air bases on Luzon from which naval operations to the north can be supported."¹⁰³ The Thirteenth Air Force, augmented by Navy and RAAF squadrons would pick up the southern mission and would protect friendly convoy routes, attack enemy resupply shipping, and continue to attack enemy airfields within their range.¹⁰⁴

Sixth Army G-2, working in close coordination with the Fifth Air Force, continually updated the enemy situation. Though much of the "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation" dealt with Japanese troop strength and location, the report also gave insight for possible air action. Since a major portion of the Allied air effort was directed at stopping enemy reinforcement, Fifth Air Force planners would capitalize on G-2 information that "Japanese reinforcement of the PHILIPPINES has progressively accelerated . . . and it is highly probable, that such reinforcement at equal or at a faster tempo will continue . . ." ¹⁰⁵ The report also covered expected enemy air and naval action directed toward Allied forces. It concluded "The effectiveness of such attacks will naturally be governed mainly by the degree of neutralization of enemy carriers and of the [enemy] PHILIPPINE

airfields achieved by Allied air forces beforehand."¹⁰⁶ Finally, air planners could coordinate after action reports with their own unit intelligence to estimate the results of their efforts.

General Kenney issued a Warning Order to the units under his command on September 10, 1944. This was to prepare the units for the type missions they would receive during the actual invasion. Generally, his Allied Air Force would support the SWPA Task Forces, the Third Fleet, and the Allied Naval Forces under General MacArthur. More Specifically, the Fifth Air Force would "Destroy hostile air forces in the rearward areas, . . . destroy hostile installations and sources of war materials, . . . and protect the western flank of [the] advance."¹⁰⁷ The Thirteenth Air Force was to support the Fifth Air Force and protect bypassed areas and the rear of the advance. RAAF, AirNorSols, and US Navy aircraft assigned would support operations as provided in previous orders from General Kenney. These orders were general in nature and targeted enemy shipping, provided for defense of SWPA bases, and ordered reconnaissance and other support missions.¹⁰⁸

Official correspondence between Generals Kenney and Whitehead from September 16, when SWPA decided to invade directly at Leyte, and the invasion itself, reveals Kenney's control of the joint air operations, and the precision with which Whitehead would carry out his orders. While they continued to use the same code names for operations (KING II for Leyte) the two generals updated the extent of the support the Fifth Air Force would be able to provide without the bases in the southern Philippines. In a single day, Whitehead and his staff were able to update the status of his capabilities and modified plans to include command and control units afloat, with which Whitehead could control the air attacks. Whitehead asked Kenney to coordinate with Admiral Barbey to make the communication vessel available to Fifth Air Force officers, and Kenney made it happen.¹⁰⁹

While General Kenney's FEAF Staff prepared the final plans for each operation, he coordinated with other theaters of operation for special requirements. For the Leyte operation, Kenney requested that Twentieth and Fourteenth Air Forces from the South East Asia Command conduct bombing operations on Formosa to keep the enemy busy. The POA sent aircraft warning units to General Whitehead to augment his own SWPA trained men. And as they had been cooperating with the SWPA operations moving toward the Philippines, the "POA also sent into KING II 12 air liaison parties whose purpose was to report ground force needs for air support to the appropriate air commanders." Kenney's assessment: "On the whole, this system worked out well."¹¹⁰

Admiral Kinkaid's orders to Task Force 77 relayed Kenney's Concept of Operations to the carrier aircraft. In the beginning of the Operations Order he pointed out that the carriers would support the landing operation until "the earliest practicable date after the establishment of fighters and light bombers [of Allied Air Forces] in the LEYTE area, as arranged with the Commander, ALLIED NAVAL Forces [CANF]."¹¹¹ While describing the individual support missions assigned to each of the units, the order also outlines the air units to be assigned to Kenney once the land bases are established. The "second objective" (A+15) indicates the first Marine squadron assigned is to be a VMR squadron. By the "fourth objective" (A+45) Kenney would have Navy PB4Y squadrons in addition to his own Army Air Force aircraft.¹¹²

⁹⁸Robert F. Futrell, Capt, USAF, *History of the Far East Air Forces, Vol I: Activation and Organization, Planning and Assault Operations Against the Philippines, Planning and Assault Operations Against Japan*. Unpublished USAF/HRA Doc.# 720.01 June 1944-September 1945, 104-111.

⁹⁹Forest Sherman, Rear Admiral, USN, and S. J. Chamberlin, Major General, USA, Unpublished Memo to CinC SWPA, and CinC POA, "Coordination of Operations," 21 Sept 1944, USAF/HRA Doc. # 720.322, Jul-Oct 1944, 1-11.

¹⁰⁰R. E. Beebe, Brigadier General, USA Air Corps, "General Headquarters Operations Instructions Number 60," 3 August 1944, Unpublished USAF/HRA Doc # 720-322, "Operational Planning, 8 Sept-4 Oct 1944."

¹⁰¹L. J. Sverdrup, Brigadier General, USA, SWPA Acting Chief Engineer, Unpublished Memo for Record, 31 July 1944, USAF/HRA Doc. # 720.322, Jul-Oct 1944, 2.

¹⁰²A-5 FEAF, 22 Sept 1944 *GHQ's Staff Study KING II Operation, 4th Edition*, Unpublished USAF/HRA Doc. # 720.322, Jul-Oct 1944.

¹⁰³R. E. Beebe, Brigadeir General, USA Air Corps, 1 Aug 1944, "Allied Air Force Operations Instruction," USAF/HRA Unpublished Doc. #720.322, Jul-Oct 1944., 1-2.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵Headquarters Sixth Army G-2, "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Mike One Operation," 5 December 1944, Unpublished USAF/HRA Doc.# 780.609-2, 7.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 14-15.

¹⁰⁷R. E. Beebe, Brig Gen, USA Air Corps, "Warning Instruction," 10 September 1944, Unpublished USAF/HRA Document # 720.322, Jul-Oct 1944, 1-8.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰⁹Unpublished Correspondence between Generals Kenney and Whitehead, 14 April 1943 - October 1945, USAF/HRA Doc. # 730.161-3. 18 September 1944, 1,3.

¹¹⁰George C. Kenney, General, USA, Ret. Unpublished Leyte Monograph, USAF/HRA Doc. # 720.3069, 25.

¹¹¹Unpublished USAF/HRA Doc.# 180-277-13, "Commander Task Force Seventy-Seven, CANF SWPA - Operation Plan 13-44," 26 September 1944, 5.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, p. 4. PB4Y is the designation for a Navy derivative of the B-24 Liberator. Source: Unpublished Thirteenth Air Force records USAF/HRA Doc. # 750.308-1, 1.

Part III
COMBAT SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSION

Combat air operations for the invasion of the Philippines went as planned, and continued to reflect the island-hopping nature of the SWPA. The only change to the typical pattern was that the jump to Leyte was out of range of General Kenney's air support. In an effort to provide support for the Leyte invasion, the FEAF also bombed enemy airfields on Morotai in September. Kenney directed most of the Allied air effort toward enemy "airdromes, personnel areas, supply concentrations, and shipping in the Halmaheras, due to their proximity to Morotai."¹¹³ On September 15, MacArthur's troops landed unopposed on Morotai under air cover from a joint force of carrier based aircraft, and night fighters, P-38s and B-24s from the Fifth Air Force.

Because of the bad terrain and weather, airdromes were not ready for heavy bombers in Morotai until after the Leyte target date. Morotai would play a major role in the reduction of Mindoro later in the campaign with its joint force of bombers and fighters of Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces, Navy PBYs (rescue), PB4Ys (recon) and B-34s. While Kenney directed the main air effort, General Whitehead with his headquarters now at Morotai, conducted attacks against the enemy in Mindanao that "forced a withdrawal from at least six of the Japanese airdromes."¹¹⁴

These air operations, while indirectly supporting the operations over Leyte by diverting and destroying the enemy capability to interfere, are not as famous as the carrier aircraft operations which provided direct support to the landings. Despite bad weather, Navy aircraft attacked Leyte and the surrounding areas in preparation for the landings. General Kenney credits them with "destroying 809 or more enemy airplanes." He also reported that the Navy cleared mines from the gulf waters, and "so devastated the enemy's beach defenses that the Sixth Army was established ashore with only a few casualties."¹¹⁵

The real fighting in the Battle of Leyte Gulf would occur on October 24-26 when the Japanese Navy challenged Admirals Kinkaid and Halsey. FEAF fighters did not participate in the last great naval battle of the Pacific that is credited with finally breaking the Japanese Navy until airdromes were ready at Tacloban on October 27. At this time, defense of Leyte was passed from the Navy to FEAF and the next buildup of joint air forces began.¹¹⁶

In preparation for the Lingayen landings, FEAF had established airfields within range of northern Luzon and conducted daily raids so that:

By the first week of January 1945, the following air units were being used against Luzon: two fighter groups and one Marine air group from Leyte-Samar; two attack-medium groups from Leyte; three fighter groups, two tactical reconnaissance squadrons, and an attack group from Mindoro; one Fifth Air force heavy group and one Seventh Air Force heavy group from the Palaus; and two Thirteenth Air Force groups from Morotai.¹¹⁷

To support the Luzon invasion, Kenney increased air activity at a remarkable rate. B-24s and B-25s continued to hit airfields on Luzon, Mindanao, and the central Philippines. Packages of P-40s, P-47s, P-51s, and F-4Us also hit enemy airfields and communication targets. A-20s dropped parafrag bombs and strafed rail and bridges on Luzon. Also, B-29s from Twentieth Bomber Command hit targets in Formosa and along the China coast.¹¹⁸

General Kenney designated Fifth Air Force as the air assault force in direct support of the landings, and his FEAF headquarters issued operating instructions to all other air forces involved. Thirteenth Air Force supported the operation with photo reconnaissance, attacks on by-passed enemy installations, and blockades of Japanese shipping in Makassar Strait. The RAAF carried out missions against "sources of war materials." FEAF gained tactical control of the Seventh Fleet aircraft except for anti-submarine sorties. Kenney also directed the missions of the supporting sorties from Fourteenth Air Force and Twentieth bomber command.¹¹⁹ On January 9, 1945, General Kenney's coordinated air effort supported MacArthur's operation in characteristic fashion.

First, the air forces softened up Luzon by intensive air action which both isolated the target area and destroyed the Japanese air force. Second, the air forces assisted in the landing operations. Third, the air forces cooperated with the ground forces in the final destruction of the enemy on the ground.¹²⁰

The slow buildup of airdromes demonstrates the effect of the air campaign in the ground war. If the airfields were built up faster, the enemy would not have reinforced. General MacArthur agreed that future operations would not be undertaken without adequate land-based air support.¹²¹ Although General Krueger's requests for close support during the Battle for Manila were few, the sorties were expertly controlled by forward air controllers in jeeps with the First Cavalry. Kenney kept the planes of his FEAF busy in the other missions supporting the assault. Fighter bomber attacks with

napalm burned the Japanese out of defensive positions surrounding the city. Transport missions dropped supplies to the Sixth Army around the clock. Attack Bombers destroyed enemy supply shipping and sunk one destroyer while damaging two others. Frank Futrell cites in *The Army Air Forces in World War II*:

'Of the many Pacific tactical air operations,' the JCS observed at Potsdam, 'We think the most striking example of the effective use of tactical air power, in cooperation with ground troops and the Navy, to achieve decisive results at a minimum cost in lives and materiel was the work of the Far East Air Forces in the Lingayen-Central Luzon Campaign'¹²²

Post-war accolades seem to highlight the coordination and "cooperation" between the forces while achieving the strategic goals. But it is time to answer the questions outlined in the introduction of this paper.

1. Was unity of effort achieved in the Philippine Campaign? (reference criteria on page 9 above)

After June 15, 1944, unity of command existed in the Far East Air Forces. Unity of command does not necessarily ensure unity of effort though. During the Philippine Campaign, unity of effort was achieved through both the use of a single air commander *and* through the coordination efforts of General Kenney. Also, in situations where Army Air Force aircraft could not satisfy mission requirements, night defense in Leyte for example, Kenney employed more capable aircraft from another service.

As Winnefeld and Johnson have pointed out, many times coordination and cooperation was at its best in the face of adversity. This was true in the Philippine Campaign as well, even though the enemy air forces were comparatively weak. The decision to execute the Leyte landing was based on what was believed to be the best intelligence information at the time. This demonstrated extreme flexibility, and since Kenney initially opposed the operation because he could not provide air cover, he capitalized on his relationship with Kinkaid to provide for that support until he could move the FEAF forward.

This coordination also contributed to readiness because it demonstrated compatibility among the fighter forces as carrier-based aircraft could provide close support and air cover when the operation was out of range of land-based air. Readiness was also enhanced by the tactical support doctrine evolving in theater.

Given this information, it appears that unity of effort was indeed achieved during MacArthur's Philippine operations. This unity of effort was due in large part by the

efforts of General Kenney. We know this from the answer to our other question posed in the introduction:

2. Was General Kenney a prototype JFACC, and if so, are there lessons from which today's JFACC can benefit?

From the time he first arrived in theater, General Kenney maintained a close relationship with MacArthur and the other component commanders, Kinkaid and Krueger. These relationships enabled him to satisfy most of the responsibilities required of a typical modern day JFACC. He was responsible to MacArthur for the assignment of the air assets throughout the drive from New Guinea and on to the Philippines. He supported MacArthur's maneuver concept by emphasizing the primacy of air superiority, and by providing for air cover and close support to the amphibious landings. He was also directly responsible to MacArthur for the air defense of Allied areas reclaimed from the enemy, and carried out those and other duties by capitalizing on friendly capabilities while exploiting enemy weaknesses. As I have previously stated, these responsibilities are required of any commander, but General Kenney's actions in the Philippine Campaign support the JFACC concept because when MacArthur had a question, a task, or a requirement dealing with airpower in the SWPA, he went to the single air commander responsible to him: George C. Kenney.

CONCLUSION

"While history does not provide specific formulas that can be applied without modification to present and future situations, it does provide the broad conceptual basis for our own understanding of war, human nature, and aerospace power."

- AFM 1-1, 1992, p. vii.

General MacArthur's Air Commander, General George C. Kenney, is an excellent model for today's Joint Force Air Component Commander. Far East Air Force Operations in support of the Southwest Pacific Area of Operations Command supported the national strategic goals of stopping the Japanese and eventually, pushing them back to the home islands and to defeat. The operational air objectives supported MacArthur's drive by ensuring air superiority and supporting the ground troops and naval forces as they established forward bases in the island-hopping operations. The tactical air doctrine

that supported these operations was similar to that which evolved in the European theater of operations. Although General Kenney did not own *every* aircraft in theater, formal lines of command in FEAF established early on by General Kenney streamlined operations, and informal agreements between the Army, Navy, and Army Air Force senior commanders directed operations to ensure unity of effort. Planning at all levels reflected both MacArthur's and Kenney's intentions. And finally, every attempt was made to capitalize on friendly capabilities and to exploit known enemy weaknesses.

General Kenney had the formula for success in the Pacific. Being geographically separated from the pressures of Washington, he was able to form his own command structure to get the job done. He quickly saw the command structure already in place was ineffective and moved to reorganize along "traditional" group and squadron lines. Among other innovations, he created the Advanced Echelon Fifth Air Force to solve the particular problem of great distances characteristic in the Pacific. Special cooperation with Admiral Kinkaid ensured Navy carrier aircraft covered amphibious operations when the forward momentum of the Philippine operations carried the objectives out of range of land-based air.

He did not sit idle while the Navy covered these forward operations. Kenney's successful innovations included modifying the A-20, initiating the use of parafrag bombs, and employed the genius of Charles Lindbergh to increase the range of his fighters. These innovations helped him overcome initial limitations due to small numbers of aircraft and technical shortfalls.

With the organization and aircraft problems solved, Kenney then applied himself to supporting the strategy. He understood that advanced bases across the Pacific would give the US bases from which to interdict enemy surface supplies, bomb the Japanese home islands, and invade. The Japanese Army and Navy air force was the primary center of gravity and the attainment of air superiority was the first objective in every operation.

Working within the restraints and overcoming the technological constraints were the keys to meeting the objectives. Likewise, all available air resources were directed toward implementing the tactical air support doctrine, or operational strategy, of attaining air superiority, neutralizing hostile airfields, and preparing for the invasion.

The lessons for airpower strategists in future conflicts are clear: 1 - Streamlined centralized control of airpower assets has proven itself in many examples from history. Though this tenet of airpower should not be followed blindly, it likely will apply in most situations. 2 - Technological shortfalls should be prevented with good peacetime planning so resources can be applied directly to combat and are not used up improvising

during war. 3 - Air Superiority is the first objective of any operation. According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report,

Control of the air enabled surface forces to sail the seas as far as that control extended, even within range of enemy land-based airplanes. Control of the air permitted amphibious landings at any point where that control could be assured. . . . Control of the air over lines of communications permitted effective interdiction of them to the enemy and preserved them to ourselves. . . . The first objective of all commanders in the Pacific war, whether ground, sea or air, whether American, Allied, or Japanese, was to assure control of the air.¹²³

4 - Although the Japanese air forces were destroyed to such a degree as to force their resorting to desperate *kamikaze* attacks because they were unable to launch any other decisive air operations to oppose the Allies in the Pacific Campaign, air forces of FEAF were instrumental in supporting MacArthur's concept of maneuver. And Finally, 5 - Working with Kinkaid and Krueger since August 1942 fostered relationships among the commanders that proved instrumental in the coordination of assets to ensure unity of effort. Joint peacetime training exercises provide can provide today's JFACC, his staff, and the actual combat units the opportunity to practice and test working relationships that MacArthur's commanders learned under fire. General George C. Kenney's Command in the Far East Air Forces of the Southwest Pacific Area of Operations during World War II is a model for today's JFACC Concept, the US Air Forces answer to command and control joint air operations.

¹¹³Robert F. Futrell, Capt, USAF. History of the Far East Air Forces, Vol I: Activation and Organization, Planning and Assault Operations Against the Philippines, Planning and Assault Operations Against Japan. USAF/HRA Document # 720.01, 15 June 1944 - 2 September 1945, 242.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 245-9.

¹¹⁵George C. Kenney, General, USA, Ret. Unpublished Leyte Monograph, USAF/HRA Doc. # 720.3069, 31-33.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 38-9.

¹¹⁷Futrell, 305.

¹¹⁸Futrell, 305-311. Also Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller, Compilers, *US Army Air Forces in World War II Combat Chronology 1941-1945*. (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1991), 525-550.

¹¹⁹Kenney, Unpublished Luzon Monograph, USAF/HRA Doc. # 720.3069, 27-32.

¹²⁰Ibid., 42.

¹²¹Futrell, 281.

¹²²Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds. *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. V: The Pacific: Materhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945*. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953), 429.

¹²³USSBS. Vol. 1, *Summary Report, Pacific War*. (Washington, D.C., Military Analysis Division, 1947), 27.

APPENDIX A.
SIGNIFICANT DATES
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
ALLIED AIR FORCES SWPA
FIFTH AIR FORCE
FAR EAST AIR FORCES

SOURCE: USSBS, Vol 71, 99-108

Philippine Campaign, 8 December 1941-- 7 May 1942

8 December 1941

(Phil. Time)--Japanese aircraft destroy approximately half of the Far East Air Force at Clark and Iba Fields.

17 March 1942

General MacArthur reaches Australia.

6 May 1942

Corregidor surrenders.

Defense of Australia, Jan. to July 1942

18 April 1942

Allied command under General MacArthur has been established in Australia.

20 April 1942

General Brett is announced as commander of the Allied Air Forces.

4/7 May 1942

Battle of the Coral Sea. Some B-17s, B-25s, and B-26s participate.

16 May 1942

Trial of gasoline bombs at Lae.

**The Popuan Campaign, 20 July 1942 -
23 January 1943**

20 July 1942

GHQ SWPA is closed at Melbourne and opened at Brisbane.

4 August 1942

Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney succeeds General Brett as commander of the Allied Air Forces.

3 September 1942

Fifth Air Force is constituted and General Kenney named its commander. V Bomber Command reconstituted.

12 September 1942

9 A-20s escorted by P-400s drop parafrags on Buna air strip. This is the first use of this type of bomb in the SWPA. Support of ground forces is begun in weight.

1/4 March 1942

Allied air victory in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea results in sealing off the Huon Gulf from Japanese convoys and proves the effectiveness of the modified B-25 strafer in mast-head attack.

17 August 1942

12 B-17s, 36 B-24-s, 32 B-25s, and 85 P-38s make a coordinated attack on the four Wewak airdrome. 3 heavy bombers are lost.

Netherlands, New Guinea, 30 March -17 August 1944

30 March thru

16 April 1944

Fifth Air Force carries out 993 bomber and 572 fighter sorties against Hollandia, dropping 1,832 tons of bombs. Japanese air strength in this area decimated.

27 May 1944

Planes from Fifth Air Force bases made their first reconnaissance of the Philippines. Landing on Biak by U.S. forces after 15 days of aerial bombardment by the 13th Air Task Force and the Fifth AF.

15 June 1944

Formation of Far East Air Forces (Prov.) under General Kenney to include the Fifth AF under Lieut. General Whitehead, and the Thirteenth AF under Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett. Formation of Far East Air Service Command.

23 June 1944

The A-26 makes its operational debut in the SWPA with a barge sweep.

15 September 1944

MacArthur's forces, coordinated with the Third Amphibious Forces attack on Palau, land on the southwest coast of Morotai island. Decision made to proceed direct to Leyte.

20 October 1944

A strong force of American troops land on Leyte island in the Philippines.

22 October 1944

Headquarters of an advance echelon, Fifth AF, arrives on Leyte.

27 October 1944

34 P-38s of the 49th Fighter Group land at Leyte. Allied Air Force relieves Allied Naval Force of the air defense of Leyte.

3/5 December 1944

Fifth AF "Snoopers" inaugurate attacks by Allied Air Forces bombers on Luzon establishments by hitting Clark and Zoblan airdromes.

14 December 1944

Fifth AF begins a series of dawn to dusk attacks on enemy airdromes on Negros.

19 December 1944

Fifth AF fighters begin operating from San Jose air strip on Mindoro.

7 January 1945

40 B-25s and 97 A-20s with P-38 escort make a low-level bombing and strafing attack on Clark Field destroying or badly damaging at least 60 enemy aircraft on the ground, prefacing regular air coverage of the area.

9 January 1945

U.S. Sixth Army lands at points on Lingayen Gulf.

15 January 1945

Fifth AF fighters begin operating from Lingayen strip on Luzon.

17 January 1944

Allied AF relieves Allied Naval Forces of responsibility for direct operation with the ground forces in the Lingayen area and for protection of convoys en route to and from Lingayen Gulf.

28 January 1945

Air fields in the Clark Field area are entirely under American control.

3 February 1945

The 1st Cavalry enters Manila. units of the 11th Airborne Division make parachute landing.

16 February 1945

Paratroopers of the 503d Regiment land on Corregidor.

25 February 1945

All effective enemy resistance is eliminated in Manila according to GHQ.

21 June 1945

Okinawa Campaign.

7 April 1945

U.S.S.R. denounces neutrality pact with Japan.

5 July 1945

Entire Philippines Liberated.

6 August 1945

First Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima.

8 August 1945

U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan, effective 9 August 1945.

9 August 1945

Second Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki.

14 August 1945.

Official surrender text transmitted by Swiss to State Department, carried to White House by Secretary of State Byrnes, and at 7 P.M. President Truman announces end of War.

Appendix B: ESSAY ON SOURCES

Herman S. Wolk, the Air Force Historian, wrote a bibliographic essay in his "George C. Kenney: the Great Innovator," published in *Makers of the United States Air Force*. In the essay on Kenney, Wolk emphasizes Kenney's ingenuity, and as the title states, he was a great innovator. Most of the information I was able to extract from the essay was of great help in my paper. The information concentrates on Kenney's troubleshooting. In effect, the essay is written at the tactical level. Wolk tells the stories of how Kenney adapted the skip-bombing to attack ships in the Pacific, and how he used innovative airlift techniques to transport army troops and equipment across New Guinea in the campaign for Hollandia. He also mentions that Kenney reorganized the 5th Air Force upon his arrival in the Pacific and shows that this organization had a positive effect on operations. Wolk quotes MacArthur when he praises Kenney to show that they had a good working relationship. Later in the essay he tries to show operational effect, but the conclusions are general. The bibliographic essay along with a telephone conversation I had with him, provided a good jumping off point for a bibliographic search.

The natural starting point for research on General Kenney is the Kenney Papers in the A.F. Historical Research Agency. Unfortunately, these papers consist of a collection of his post World War II studies and speeches. There are some speeches that cover the W.W. II period, but most of that information is contained in his published book, *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War*. This book is a good narrative of the general's experiences in the war, but does not include important decision making information. The book provided some good background information on the general conduct and chronology of events.

Wolk pointed out additional works that proved somewhat helpful. Grace Person Hayes' *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan*

is written almost entirely from primary sources. This work is a good overview of strategic decisions at the JCS level and provides more background information. Likewise, Lewis Morton's *Strategy and Command, the First two Years* provides information on official command relationships in the Pacific, but very little on *how* and *why* decisions were made. Finally, another official history that proved somewhat disappointing was Craven and Cate's *The Army Air Forces in World War II*. Undoubtedly, this work an excellent history for general information, however, specific decision making correspondence and conversations are not included.

Trying to get more specific information, I read General J.V. Crabb's *Fifth Air Force Air War Against Japan September 1942 - August 1945*. This official history provided some information on the flexibility of Kenney's 5th A.F. He shows how "organization changed as the situation changed or as a new operation was necessary." He also provided some information to show that the operational commanders were considering the capabilities of their own forces when they were committed to combat. They were "fitting the weapon to the task and adjusting the weapon to the theater."

I searched through General Kenney's interviews in the A.F. HRA for some clues to how the decisions were made. Whenever he talked about the Pacific, he liked to start out by telling the story of how he put General Sutherland in his place and came on strong to MacArthur in order to make a good first impression. One good piece of information from the interview that proved valuable was that Kenney prided himself in the fact that he worked directly for MacArthur. The distance from Washington, and consequently "Hap" Arnold, enabled Kenney to make decisions for the Air Force without having to get approval from headquarters. This is a valuable lesson that contemporary JFACCs are already trying to incorporate. Unfortunately, this independent decision making is not always possible when manpower and materiel approval must come from headquarters also. For example, MacArthur was not very happy with the Twentieth Bomber Command with its B-29s being controlled from Washington. He would rather have had

them under Kenney's, and thus, under *his* command. Washington put MacArthur in an accept it or lose it position. Kenney's personality and his long standing relationship with General Spaatz enabled him to form a good working relationship between 20th and 5th.

There are a number of other interviews in the A.F. HRA. One that was of particular interest to me was the interview with General Ennis Whitehead. Whitehead was Kenney's immediate subordinate in the Pacific and he is thought by some to be the designer of all Kenney's decisions. Likewise, Donald M. Goldstien wrote a dissertation about Whitehead. Excerpts from the book are featured in "Ennis C. Whitehead: Aerial Tactician" in *We Shall Return! MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan*, edited by William M. Leary. Goldstien provides the argument that Whitehead is the unsung hero of the Pacific War. He used a number of primary sources, mostly from Whitehead's private papers. Goldstien showed that Whitehead had all the leadership qualities required by a senior air commander, especially that of delegation of authority. "When one of his moving air task forces participated in amphibious assault, separately from the rest of the Fifth Air Force, Whitehead delegated to the task force commander complete authority for carrying out the aerial function of the mission." He also showed that Whitehead displayed good coordinating skills like those that will be expected of today's JFACC. "Whitehead's mission in complementing this strategy was to coordinate the role of his forces with the carrier-based aircraft in protecting the U.S. invasion of Mindoro." Finally, Goldstien leaves some questions unanswered. Where did Whitehead and Kenney get the information to tip them off of the Japanese reinforcements at Lae? And why did they doubt the wisdom of MacArthur's decision to move up the proposed Leyte invasion? Answers to these questions are found in Edward J. Drea's *Mac Arthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945*.

MacArthur's Ultra answered these questions, but did not provide any additional insight to the decision making process. In fact, Drea's conclusion was contrary to my in-going belief that ULTRA could have made a significant contribution to the process.

Instead, "ULTRA appears to have reinforced basic personality traits. It convinced forceful commanders to take risks and push forward, just as it persuaded prudent ones to go even more slowly." An example he gives is when Kenney "enjoyed great success [he] presumably regarded ULTRA as authentic and reliable. Yet when ULTRA challenged Kenney's cherished belief that airpower alone could force the enemy to desert the Admiralties, he simply disregarded the evidence." As far as the prudence of the early Leyte invasion, ULTRA warned Kenney and Whitehead of the strength of the Japanese forces and consequently they cautioned MacArthur. But, like Kenney himself, MacArthur disregarded ULTRA when it did not support his operational desires. Though their use of ULTRA may seem similar at first, Drea explains "Clearly, ULTRA guided Kenney's air operations with a higher degree of consistency than it did the ground campaigns." In sum, this book, like the other sources cited above, is broad and general in its treatment of decision making and command channels.

There are a number of books published from the memoirs of involved commanders. These are listed in the bibliography and all seem to support General Kenney as an excellent commander. One of the books that was neutral toward Kenney was Admiral Barbey's *MacArthur's Amphibious Navy*. Like the other authors (Krueger, Eichelberger, and MacArthur's Staff), he wanted to tell the story that he felt had been neglected by history. Since he was trying to show that his amphibious operations were indeed decisive in the war in the Pacific, he necessarily excluded any information pertaining to the FEAF.

My purpose in the thesis was not to present opposing views that attacked MacArthur or Kenney, but I did review some works such as Eric Larabee's *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*, in which he supports Nimitz and criticizes MacArthur. Also, the JFACC concept is the Air Force answer to unity of effort, but the other services have offered alternatives in numerous articles in professional journals such as *Proceedings*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and *the Marine Corps Gazette*.

APPENDIX C: Glossary of Acronyms

A-Day	Day of Leyte Invasion
AAF	Army Air Force
ACTS	Air Corps Tactical School
AFM	Air Force Manual
AirNorSols	Aircraft Northern Solomons
ASW	Anti-submarine Warfare
ATO	Air Task Order
AWPD-1	Air War Plans Division
CBI	China Burma India Theater
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CG	Commanding General
CinC	Commander in Chief
CVE	Escort Carrier
D-9	9 Days Prior to Plan Execution
FAEF	Far East Air Forces
FM 31-35	US Army Field Manual
G-2	Intelligence Directorate
GHQ	General Headquarters
HRA	Historical Research Agency
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JMO(AIR)	Joint Maritime Operations (Air)
JTF	Joint Task Force

MAG-12	Marine Air Group - 12
MAGTAF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
OPCON	Operational Command
POA	Pacific Ocean Areas
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
SAP	Support Air Party
SOPAC	South Pacific
SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area
TACON	Tactical Control
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
VMB	Marine Bomber Squadron
VMF	Marine Fighter Squadron
VPB	Navy Patrol Squadron

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