



SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

POWER PROJECTION: MAKING THE TOUGH CHOICES

By

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ABSTRACT

This study concludes airpower will play an increasingly dominant role in future US contingency responses. Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Power projection contingencies are characterized as wars and operations short of war, but not conflicts that are global or total in nature. Future contingencies that demand a US response may occur without warning, be time sensitive, and require short duration deployments. US forces may not have immediate access to or a previously established presence in potential theaters of operation. Due to the changing nature of the international environment and domestic priorities, the President defined a new National Security Strategy that emphasizes projecting military forces in response to regional conflicts. The military services are currently modifying their doctrine and force structures to reflect the shift towards power projection. The services agree power projection forces must be lethal, flexible, deployable, mobile, and capable of surviving an increasingly hostile threat environment. Comparing force characteristics reveals airpower has greater flexibility, deployability, mobility, and is better able to survive future threat environments than surface forces. New domestic imperatives have also forced the services to engage in a healthy competition to preserve their share of a shrinking defense budget. In terms of efficiency, apportioning resources according to an arcane formula that does not reflect force capabilities or the future utility of primary service functions is illogical. Building a strong power projection capability requires a thorough evaluation of the relative efficacy of air, land, and sea power to perform the power projection mission. This evaluation concludes airpower has a great potential to achieve national security objectives decisively in future contingency responses.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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We are a superpower, and we're always going to want to have the capacity to deploy military force to safeguard American interests and preserve our capacity to influence events in the world.

Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney

INTRODUCTION

Secretary Cheney's remark should not surprise anyone who is familiar with the recent military history of the United States. Power projection is not a new concept. With a few exceptions, America has not been reluctant to call upon its uniformed services to protect its interests. After World War II, military force planning and development revolved around the need to maintain a considerable presence in Europe and Korea. However, recent changes in the international and domestic environments has forced the Defense Department to adopt a new planning strategy. As a result, power projection has taken on new meaning for the services.

There is no "official" Department of Defense definition for power projection. For the purposes of this paper, power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions.¹ Power projection spans the spectrum of conflict, including operations that fall short of war.² Crises that catalyze a US response may arise with or without prior warning and require rapid, short-duration deployments of joint forces.

Each of the military departments is now in the process of planning their future power projection forces and employment strategy. While the services agree a major contingency response will require a joint effort, parochialism has not ceased to exist in the Pentagon. Each service understands the better they "sell" their power projection capabilities, the better they will do in preserving their force structure from budget cuts. While advocacy is a necessary part of the resource competition process, statements like "the best strategy is a maritime strategy" and "the Marines Corps is the expeditionary force for the nation" appear all too frequently in national

publications.

This paper examines the question of power projection and the ability of the services to contribute to future power projection contingency responses. Chapter One briefly reviews the early history of American power projection capability, from actions off the Barbary Coast to the war with Spain at the turn of the century. Chapter Two examines the decisive potential of air, sea, and land power in more recent contingency responses. Chapters Three and Four review the changing international and domestic environments to determine their impact on future force development and force employment. Chapter five discusses the new national strategy that has evolved to deal with the rapidly changing security environment. Chapter Six reveals how the services are responding to the new strategy. Chapter Seven develops an aggregate set of characteristics needed for future power projection forces. Comparing the attributes of sea, land, and airpower to the aggregate set provides an indication of the potential effectiveness of each force in future contingency responses. Finally, Chapter Eight suggests one approach the Department of Defense could follow to reduce redundancy and increase the efficiency of its projection forces. The results of these analyses may surprise power projection traditionalists. While contingency responses as a whole will remain a joint service effort, airpower will play a predominant role in projecting military influence abroad during the 1990s and beyond traditionalists. While contingency responses as a whole will remain a joint service effort, airpower will play a predominant role in projecting military influence abroad during the 1990s and beyond.

NOTES

- 1 This paper's definition of power projection is an adaptation of Kenneth J. Hagan's definition of gunboat diplomacy: "the finite application of force to effect discrete political ends in distant places." Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy (New York: Free Press, 1991), 350. This definition differs from Hagan's in two respects. First, power projection is not limited to the actual use of force. Second, "distant places" is more specifically defined, since the phrase is rather ambiguous.
- 2 The clause "finite application of military power" indicates power projection does not include the application of military force at the extreme end of the spectrum of war. This author believes extreme forms of warfare (such as total war) invoke a vastly different set force planning/employment conditions and influences than do more limited conflicts.

CHAPTER 1

EARLY POWER PROJECTION EFFORTS

Blockade. Forced Entry

The American Revolution left the United States with a military incapable of projecting significant force outside its own borders. As citizens of a weak nation, Americans traveling abroad were vulnerable to the depredations of foreign powers such as the Barbary states of the Mediterranean. Seeing the US as an easy source of tribute, the Barbary states were wont to seize American ships traveling through the Mediterranean.¹ In 1793 Algerian warships captured ten American vessels and enslaved 105 US citizens. In response to the continuing threat and President Washington's urgings, Congress authorized the construction of six frigates, including the USS Constitution, United States, and Constellation. This building program alone was sufficient motivation for the Dey of Algiers to negotiate a treaty temporarily resolving the difficulties.² Unfortunately, the treaty required the US to continue paying Algiers in return for safe passage of its shipping and citizens in the Mediterranean. After further provocations, in 1801 President Jefferson dispatched a squadron of warships to the Mediterranean to escort American shipping and perform other acts such as blockading troublesome Tripolitan ports. Despite the growing might of the US Navy, US shipping remained a target of opportunity in the Mediterranean.

On 3 August 1804 a large task force under Commodore Edward Preble laid siege to the port of Tripoli. Unable to conquer the city through a blockade alone, a 400 man expeditionary force led by US Marines marched 600 miles from Egypt to assault the port from land in March 1805.³ Confronted with a combined land-sea threat, the Bashaw of Tripoli agreed to release his American hostages. The significance of these actions is two-fold. For the first time the US Navy

had used the tactics of blockade and forced entry in the course of a naval campaign. Also for the first time, US policy makers successfully used the power projection capability of its naval forces to protect American citizens abroad.

Show of Force and the Genesis of Gunboat Diplomacy: China. Japan

The expansion of American business in the early 19th century and subsequent search for foreign markets motivated the US Government to send Commodore Lawrence Kearney with the USS Boston and Constellation to "persuade" China to open its ports to American trading vessels. This show of force was sufficient to gain trading rights at several ports, including Canton. When the Chinese rioted against the foreign presence in 1844, US Marines landed in Canton to protect American citizens and property.⁴ In 1852 President Millard Fillmore dispatched an expedition under Commodore Matthew Perry to establish coaling stations and spread US influence in the Pacific. Arriving in Japan in 1853, Perry unsuccessfully demanded US access to Japanese markets and the right to refuel and replenish American vessels. Another show of force in 1854 led to the signing of an agreement with Japan, opening two ports for American trading ships. Power projection had acquired a new meaning for the young nation. A foreign policy that freely employed gunboat diplomacy established the US Navy and Marine Corps as important tools for expanding American influence around the world.

US Army--Power protection and Manifest Destiny

While the Navy and Marines Corps developed their capability to project military power abroad, the US Army helped the nation expand its sphere of influence in its own backyard. The desire to grow as a nation in the first half of the 19th century was evident in the westward migration of a restless people seeking a plot of land to call their own. As settlers moved into what is now the Southwest United States, they were sure to experience resistance from the traditional regional power. After the US annexed Texas in 1845, incursions across an uncertain

border resulted in a conflict with Mexico. To support the Union's newest state, President Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor to occupy the disputed border areas with 3500 men, about 1/2 of the American Army.⁵ After the US declared war on 13 May 1846, Taylor crossed the Rio Grande to meet the Mexican Army as the US Navy blocked Mexico's Gulf coast. Following a three-day battle in August, Taylor captured the Mexican city of Monterrey. General Winfield Scott continued the campaign by attacking Vera Cruz, while General S. W. Kearney moved on Santa Fe and California. When Vera Cruz fell to a combined land-sea campaign on 29 March 1847, General Scott was in the process of marching on Mexico City. After a temporary armistice, the battle for Mexico City opened on 13 September. Driving the forces of Santa Anna back from their fortified positions, General Scott accepted the city's surrender the next dawn. This successful campaign marked the end of the conflict. The Mexican War of 1846 was significant for a number of reasons. The first and most tangible result was the vast amount of territory gained by the United States. More importantly it firmly established the United States as a nation capable of projecting land power beyond its borders.

Sea Control. Land Conquest

For the next fifty years American trade, presence, and influence around the Pacific rim continued to increase. To protect expanding US interests, Congress authorized a naval building program in the 1880s.⁶ The concept of "manifest destiny" and maritime theories so eloquently expressed by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan fired the imaginations of naval and political leaders alike. Understanding the need to find foreign markets for a young, industrialized nation, President Grover Cleveland and President Benjamin Harrison supported naval excursions throughout the Pacific. In the days of the coal-fired steamship, no Navy could operate for long outside of its own coastal waters without access to refueling stations. By the 1890s the US had established numerous Pacific refueling facilities, allowing the Navy to guarantee freedom of

navigation for US shipping interests. Yet the expanded American presence had not gone unnoticed or unchallenged by other maritime powers interested in the vast marketplaces and resources of the Pacific, including Great Britain, Spain, and Germany. The establishment of US and German coaling stations in Samoa nearly resulted in a conflict between the two nations in 1889.⁷ Spain's extensive holdings in the Pacific included the Philippine Islands. When war between the US and Spain erupted in April 1898 over the Cuban insurrection, the Secretary of the Navy ordered the US Asiatic Squadron under Commodore George Dewey to proceed to the Philippines with orders to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet of Rear Admiral Don Patricio Montojo.⁸ catching the weak Spanish fleet at anchor in Manila Bay on 1 May, Dewey attacked, destroying eleven ships and capturing two others. Unable to assault the city proper with his small fleet, Dewey established a blockade and waited three months until US Army troops under General Wesley Merritt arrived from the United States. Confronted with a formidable land-sea force, Manila surrendered on 13 August 1898 after a token show of resistance. The capture of Manila, the nerve center of Spanish resistance, resulted in the overthrow of Spanish rule. The combined forces of the US Navy and Army led to the domination of an entire nation, a domination that would not end for nearly fifty years. The military power projection potential of the United States had matured from a few wooden ships capable of protecting shipping to a joint force capable of winning a war with a major colonial power far from its own shores.

These few examples of 19th century conflict are representative of the traditional use of military force in a power projection role. The US Navy and Marine Corps established a blockade and eventually performed a forced entry to protect US citizens and sea lanes of communication in the Mediterranean. In China and Japan a show of force was sufficient to open ports to US traders. Buoyed by the idea of Manifest Destiny, a combined land- sea campaign expanded US

influence in the Western Hemisphere by defeating Mexico. By the turn of the century, the US Navy, Marines, and Army combined to defeat a major colonial power and establish a strong presence in the Pacific. US power projection capability was well-established by the beginning of the 20th century. As a young and idealistic nation, we had used our military capability to spread our influence and presence around the globe. Yet expansionism was soon viewed with disfavor as the nation matured as a responsible member of the international community. Nevertheless, the power projection missions of the past have not been forgotten. Dewey's destruction of the Spanish Fleet at Manila are a permanent part of the Navy's heritage. The Marines Corps will never forget the role they played in projecting US might abroad during the 19th century, as the Marine Corps Hymn so eloquently states ("From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli"). As is so often true, the successes of the past are likely to be reflected in military doctrine of the present. Yet power projection operations are no longer limited to the land and sea. Warfare in the third dimension has revolutionized this nation's ability to project influence abroad. Despite the maturation of airpower, some military traditionalists maintain only land or sea forces have the potential to be decisive in future power projection contingencies.

CHAPTER 1 NOTES

- 1 E. B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, 2nd ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 89-93.
- 2 Edwin P. Hoyt, America's Wars and Military Excursions (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), 102.
- 3 Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy (New York: Free Press, 1991), 61.
- 4 Edwin P. Hoyt, Pacific Destiny (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 25-27.
- 5 Hoyt, America's Wars, 199.
- 6 Potter, Sea Power, 159-160. After the civil War, US naval forces experienced severe neglect. By 1870 only 52 ships were in commission. With the vast span of the Atlantic between the US and potentially hostile European powers, the nation returned to a strategy that emphasized coastal defense. The advent of technological innovations such as all-steel hulls, breech-loading guns and high-speed steam turbines, coupled with an expansionist economy, forced the US to rebuild its navy. On the eve of the Spanish-American War, the US Navy had a fleet that included six battleships, twelve cruisers, and numerous gunboats, torpedo boats, and monitors.
- 7 Hoyt, Pacific Destiny, 31. Both the German and US Governments acquired refueling and trading rights from Samoa. In March 1889 a US squadron confronted a German squadron in Apia harbor, but a typhoon effectively destroyed both forces preventing a hostile exchange.
- 8 Potter, Sea Power, 178-180; David F. Trask, The War With Spain In 1898 (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 95-107.

CHAPTER 2

THE DECISIVE POTENTIAL OF SEA, LAND, AND AIRPOWER

The Problem--Claimed Dominance of a Particular Medium

While each service cites the need for operating jointly in future power projection contingencies, they also identify how the characteristics of their particular force mix enhance the nation's power projection capability. Occasionally, a service apologist betrays a more parochial viewpoint. In a 1990 article one Army officer wrote:

Put another way--the Army is the only force that can finally win wars. Air power and sea power are also crucial in any major conflict, and military operations will be joint. But enemy nations do not live in the oceans or in the air, nor do they cling to the seashores, they live on the land. And in an armed conflict, finally ending the war by taking that land is and has always been the Army's job.¹

Is this just the stray opinion of one officer, or does this statement accurately reflect the true feelings of the Army hierarchy? A 1990 article written by Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono could lead one to believe this sentiment is held at the highest levels:

As long as groups and nations continue to compete for land, resources, and political control of people, the words of the historian Fehrenbach will ring true. "You may fly over a land forever," he wrote in his "This Kind of War," You may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life. But if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did--by putting your young men in the mud."²

A careless reader might conclude General Vuono believes only land forces will be decisive in war. A closer inspection shows this is not his intent. General Vuono is actually saying under certain circumstances, such as the need to hold territory, ground forces must be used. By carefully qualifying his assertion, General Vuono is on better ground than the first officer, who believes "the Army is the only force that can finally win wars." These two statements highlight an issue that is central to determining how to project military power abroad for various contingencies. Each service describes conflict as a "spectrum of war." For our purposes we are

concerned with conflict that falls short of the extreme end of this spectrum. In this context, is the Army the only service that can finally win wars? No. Recent history shows no single medium (air, sea, land) dominates every possible form of military conflict. Preaching the absolute dominance of a medium in a power projection role is an error in logic that some have made in the past, including airpower advocates. This does NOT mean that for a particular contingency, force expressed through one type of medium cannot be decisive in achieving the desired ends. Before continuing with contemporary examples of the decisive employment of air, land, and sea forces in power projection roles, it is necessary to define exactly what is meant by decisive. One explanation that fits our purposes comes from Air Force Manual 1-2, published in 1955. Although this definition specifically addresses airpower, it has equal application to land and sea power:

The essentially basic determinant of the success of air operations is not the weight of effort involved, or the extent of destruction that is imposed upon an enemy and its people. It is the extent to which the operations contribute to attainment of the condition, which the government considers to be necessary for the war to be concluded successfully.³

Taking this definition one step further, it is possible to conclude a force was decisive if it made the major contribution towards achieving the desired end state. Using the attainment of national or theater security objectives as the ultimate measures for success also avoids the trap of using "body counts" which may not accurately reflect progress towards a desired end state, as Vietnam so clearly demonstrated. There are numerous examples of contemporary contingency responses where sea power or land power were the dominant force in achieving the desired national security objectives. The US Navy can claim several recent successes, including the freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra and Persian Gulf tanker ref lagging operation.

Sea Power Projection

A traditional mission of the US Navy is demonstrating the right of all nations to transit

international waters. For this purpose, the US Navy has conducted numerous freedom of navigation exercises (FONs) over the years.⁴ In 1973 Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya laid claim to the Gulf of Sidra, a significant projection of the Mediterranean into the northern coast of Africa. In keeping with the stated policy of recognizing only the internationally agreed twelve nautical mile limit, the US conducted periodic FONs in the Gulf. During one such exercise in August 1981, two Libyan Su-22 Fitters attacked two F-14 Tomcats from the USS Nimitz, to their ultimate dissatisfaction. After losing both aircraft, Colonel Qaddafi did not actively challenge US navigation exercises until March 1986. Following the 27 December 1985 terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports, President Reagan approved a series of FONs in the Gulf. On 24 March 1986 a task force containing the USS Coral Sea, Saratoga, and America entered the Gulf of Sidra. In response to aggressive acts by Libyan forces, including the launch of surface-to-air missiles at Navy aircraft flying outside the twelve-mile limit, the task force attacked a missile site at Sirte and sank two Libyan patrol craft.⁵ While further acts of Libyan state-sponsored terrorism led to a combined US Air Force-Navy strike on Libyan targets in April, the US Navy had successfully achieved the desired objective of demonstrating US resolve to preserve the right to navigate in international waters. Freedom of navigation exercises to support a stated national security objective represent more than a traditional use of naval forces.

Maintaining freedom of navigation is a mission for which naval forces are ideally suited. Only the Navy is capable of operating for extended periods of time (sustainability) in hostile waters without access to land bases for refueling or resupply. Another example of a recent power projection operation strengthens this point.

In 1987 the Gulf conflict between Iran and Iraq had degenerated into a bloody war of attrition. In an attempt to discourage regional support for Iraq, Iran targeted commercial shipping

transiting the Persian Gulf, including Kuwaiti oil tankers. These attacks represented a grave threat to regional stability. On 21 July 1987 the US Navy initiated Earnest Will, an operation to escort US flagged shipping in the Gulf, including ref lagged Kuwaiti tankers.⁶ According to Undersecretary of State Michael H. Armacost, US objectives were to stabilize regional tensions, maintain an unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and ensure freedom of navigation.⁷ From July to December a single carrier battle group successfully escorted 23 Gulf convoys.⁸ In the course of operations, US forces captured or destroyed several Iranian vessels demonstrating harmful intent and destroyed three oil drilling platforms in retaliation for Iranian mining operations.⁹ Operation Earnest will was terminated in August 1988 after a UN-sponsored cease fire ended hostilities between Iraq and Iran. The operation was considered a success, not only for its protection of shipping, but for its impact on regional stability. According to a US Senate report, "increased regional stability resulting from US presence has enabled the moderate Arab nations to make common cause in countering the Iran threat."¹⁰ Operation Earnest will is an excellent example of a contingency for which naval forces are ideally suited. Although the USAir Force provided essential reconnaissance and aerial refueling support, only naval forces could have successfully completed such an extensive convoy operation. Both the FON exercises and Gulf escort operations illustrate sea power can be a decisive instrument for achieving national security objectives abroad.

US Marine Corps

There are also recent examples where the Marine Corps was the ideal instrument for a contingency response. According to Concept and Issues, an official Marine Corps publication, noncombatant evacuations (NEOs) are one of a number of missions for which the Marine Corps is particularly well-suited. In September 1988, Marine components deployed off Burma in preparation for a possible NEO. Although American citizens were eventually able to evacuate

via commercial air carrier, the Marine presence helped stabilize the situation ashore. On 5 August 1990 President Bush ordered a Marine force consisting of a reinforced rifle company and two helicopter extraction teams to fortify the US Embassy and evacuate American personnel from sites in Monrovia, Liberia. The overall objective was "for the purpose of protecting American citizens and not to alter or preserve the existing political status quo or to make the US presence felt in any way. "¹¹ The evacuation was successfully completed without confrontation or escalation of regional tensions. When the contingency calls for a rapid deployment of a small, self-contained air-land-sea force with excellent forced-entry capability, the Marines Corps will continue to be the instrument of choice.

Land Power Projection

Although the Army is still developing its power projection doctrine, recent operations prove it continues to have a considerable capability to project its forces abroad. Over the past six years the Army has become a major player in the national drug interdiction campaign. Since 1986 Army helicopters have supported police and drug enforcement officials in the Bahamas. Army Military Training Teams (MTTs) are now training Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian police to deal with drug cartels and insurgent activities. Army technicians are also teaching helicopter maintenance and flying skills in a number of South American nations. Occasionally, Army forces will take a more direct role in interdicting the deadly flow of drugs into the US. Responding to an invitation by the Bolivian Government, Army units supported the US Drug Enforcement Agency and Bolivian police in a drug interdiction campaign called "Operation Blast Furnace." For six months in 1987 the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion and 193rd Infantry Brigade helped locate and destroy cocaine production and storage facilities in the jungles of Bolivia.¹² During the course of operations the flow of coca products were reduced by approximately 90 percent; unfortunately, the long-term impact was negligible.¹³ Nevertheless,

Operation Blast Furnace demonstrated the capability of Army forces to actively assist in the drug interdiction campaign as well as the depth of US commitment to stopping the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States.

Operation Golden Pheasant was another instance where Army forces were used to demonstrate US resolve. In response to Nicaraguan incursions across the border of Honduras, President Reagan ordered two 82nd Airborne and two 7th Infantry battalions to Honduras in a show of force on 16 March 1988. His intent was to send a "signal to the governments and peoples of Central America of the seriousness with which the United States views the current situation in the region.,¹⁴ Although the deployment coincided with a previously planned exercise, Nicaragua was convinced the US intended to actively defend its friends in Central America. By 29 March, Sandinista troops were withdrawing across the border and had negotiated a truce with the Nicaraguan Contras. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs announced the exercise demonstrated the "responsiveness and deployability of the Army's light forces."¹⁵ In December 1990 the Army accomplished a forced entry into Panama in order to safeguard US citizens, protect US interests in the Panama Canal, reestablish the lawfully elected government deposed by Manuel Noriega, and bring Noriega to trial for drug-related offenses.¹⁶ Army light infantry, airborne, and special operations forces, combined with US Air Force, Navy, and Marine contingents, successfully achieved all objectives. within twelve hours, elements from six Army divisions, 32 Air Force squadrons, various supporting naval assets, and one Marine division supported by a Marine air wing liberated Panama from the oppressive dictatorship of Manuel Noriega. ¹⁷While this is a prime example of a joint power projection mission; it is realistic to assume success would not have been possible without the use of land forces. Only land forces have the capability to ferret out and capture a criminal leader hiding

within an urban complex while inflicting an absolute minimum amount of collateral damage. Both operation Golden Pheasant and Just Cause are excellent examples of the Army's versatility and ability to deploy land forces to achieve national security objectives in a power projection role. According to one Army officer: "Putting Army units on the ground in or near an adversary's home soil, as in Honduras and Panama, is a strategic action of the highest order, the most convincing proof that the US is dead serious"¹⁸

These few examples of Navy, Marine Corps, and Army employment are representative of the traditional use of US military forces in power projection roles. The maturation of airpower in the 20th century added a new dimension to our capability to achieve national security objectives abroad.

Airpower Projection

Past examples of Air Force power projection missions clearly reveal the potential dominance of this third medium. As Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice wrote in a White Paper titled Global Reach--Global Power, the ability to supply rapid global mobility using airlift and aerial refueling is one of the Air Force's primary power projection objectives.¹⁹ The 1948 Berlin and 1973 Yom Kippur airlifts remain two of the premier examples of the decisive use of airpower in power projection contingencies that fall short of actual war.

On 24 June 1948 the Soviet occupation force in Germany severed all land and water routes between Berlin and the western zones of Germany. According to a US Department of State background paper, the Soviet's "undisguised intent was to force the Western Allies out of Berlin and into the Communist fold."²⁰ On 26 August the US Air Force, assisted by the air forces of France and Great Britain, initiated an airlift to relieve the beleaguered city. Despite hazardous weather conditions, primitive navigational aids, and poor airfields, USAF C-47s and C-54s transported up to 5600 tons of supplies a day. By the time "Operation Vittles" ended on 30

September 1949, approximately 30,000 sorties had delivered 1,783,000 tons of fuel, medical supplies, and food. Operation Vittles handed the soviet Block one of its first defeats in its campaign to gain hegemony over Europe. In a post-action study of the airlift, General Lucius D. Clay, Commander in Chief European Command, commented: "the magnitude and accomplishment of the airlift has elevated American prestige to new heights."²¹ The US Navy, Army, and units from Great Britain and France were partners of the Air Force in the Berlin Airlift. The Navy provided strategic sealift for critical items such as aviation gasoline and aircraft engines, while the Army controlled surface transportation to the airheads. Like many 20th century power projection contingencies, the Airlift was truly a combined affair. Yet there is no denying airpower was the decisive element in achieving US national security objectives in Berlin. The 1973 Yom Kippur War airlift also demonstrated airpower's decisive potential in operations short of war.

On 6 October 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked the Israeli- occupied Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula. Concerns over Israel's continued survival and the presence of a Soviet airlift to reinforce Egypt and Syria led to operation Nickel Grass, the US airlift to supply Israel with critical war materiel. Within seven days of the outbreak of hostilities, soviet AN-12 and AN-22 transports had delivered approximately 5,000 tons of weapons to Egypt and syria.²² The United states decided the conflict could not be allowed to escalate into an exchange between the superpowers, nor could the soviet Union be permitted to use the crisis to enhance its standing in the Middle East at the expense of Israel and the US. Needing a course of action that would demonstrate resolve while minimizing the chances of escalation, the President called on the Air Force. In a news release Commander of the Military Airlift Command General Carlton stated:

An appreciable American effort was seen as urgently needed to reestablish the military balance in the area in hopes of ending the hostilities. Within nine hours of

the October 13 decision to undertake the airlift operation, the first of what became a steady stream of MAC C-5 Galaxy and C-141 Starlifter jet transports was loaded and airborne.²³

By 16 October up to 1000 tons of weapons, ammunition, spare parts, and medical supplies were arriving in Israel each day. When the airlift ended on 14 November, a total of 145 C-5 and 421 C-141 missions had delivered approximately 22,500 tons of materiel.²⁴ critical supplies included M-60 tanks, M-48 tanks, CH-53 helicopters, TOW missiles, and a vast array of expendable.²⁵ Numerous reports comment on the success of the airlift and ability of air forces to supply critical supplies to our allies in minimum time. Reporting from Tel Aviv during the airlift, a writer for Aviation Week & Space Technology said heavy- lift aircraft were "providing the US with the capability of transforming its military equipment stockpiles into diplomatic and political muscle by rapidly deploying them over vast distances on short notice."²⁶ Operation Nickel Grass helped maintain the strategic balance in the Middle East and assisted Israel defend itself against superior invading forces.²⁷ The characteristics of airpower were particularly well-suited for this contingency. Airpower's speed, range, and flexibility enabled the US to quickly respond to a crisis located thousands of miles from our nation's borders.

The Berlin and Yom Kippur War airlifts are just two examples where air forces were used in a power projection role. Since the Air Force became an independent service in 1947, military historians have accounted for over 570 separate power projection operations ranging from actual combat to disaster relief missions.²⁸ Eighty-two are categorized as presence/show of force operations. Among these are deployments of E-3A aircraft to North Africa to demonstrate US resolve to counter Libyan aggression. Rescue and humanitarian relief missions range from the August 1989 search for Congressman Mickey Leland's aircraft that crashed in Ethiopia, to the May 1972 intra theater airlift of more than four million pounds of cargo in the Philippines

following widespread flooding. Such missions do much to build US influence abroad.

The Decisive Potential of Airpower in War

Most defense experts readily agree airpower has the potential to be decisive in contingencies that fall short of war. However, since the end of World War Two there has been a continuing controversy over airpower's decisive potential in an actual war. The uncertain results of the air campaigns in Korea and Vietnam did little to clarify this highly controversial issue. The controversy continues today despite the decisive employment of airpower in the recent war with Iraq.

On 2 August 1991 Iraq began its illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Airpower's role in freeing Kuwait began shortly after the Iraqi invasion when President Bush ordered two F-15 squadrons to prepare to deploy to the Middle East. Less than twenty-four hours after the President approved their deployment the squadrons arrived in Saudi Arabia.²⁹ Some defense analysts believe the rapid arrival of US airpower helped deter Iraqi ambitions south of the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia Border.³⁰

When the nature of the allied response became apparent to Saddam Hussein, his strategy became one of a combined strategic military defensive and political offensive. The Iraqi strategic defensive was based on the last war fought against Iran.³¹ Iraqi troops constructed extensive fortifications and physical barriers in depth to defend the borders and coastline of Kuwait. By ordering this action, Saddam hoped to deter coalition forces from initiating a massive land assault to retake Kuwait. If deterrence failed, Iraq was determined to either rebuff the invasion or inflict enough casualties so the coalition forces would question the wisdom of continuing the campaign.³²

The Iraqi political offensive was aimed at splitting the coalition by appealing to Arab brotherhood; Scud attacks on Israel, and a war of propaganda via the media. The challenge

American forces faced was achieving the President's strategic objectives while preserving the coalition and strong domestic and international support for military action against Iraq.³³ To do so, the war would have to be quick, decisive, and fought in a manner that would minimize casualties to friendly forces as well as Iraqi noncombatants. Saddam's combined military/political strategy was shaped by his underestimation of the strength of the coalition, overestimation of his army's capability to inflict casualties, and, ultimately, grossly underestimating the ability of coalition air forces to destroy the critical political, military, and economic assets needed by Iraq to prosecute a strategic defensive.

Airpower was decisive in the Gulf War due to its ability to nullify Saddam's military and political initiatives. The allied air campaign was aimed at key political, military, and economic targets, the destruction of which would cripple Iraq's will and capability to continue its occupation of Kuwait. Weapons of mass destruction had to be ferreted out and eliminated so they could not be employed against neighboring states or to threaten the coalition.³⁴ Gaining air superiority was an absolute necessity, therefore the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) had to be neutralized as quickly as possible. Iraqi forces in Kuwait had to be cut off from their sources of strategic direction and resupply. General Colin Powell stated: "our strategy for dealing with this army is very simple. First we're going to cut it off, and then were going to kill it."³⁵ Airpower achieved all of these objectives. When the air campaign began on 17 January 1991 more than 2400 coalition aircraft began flying up to 2600 sorties a day against targets in Iraq and Kuwait.³⁶ F-117As employed their stealthy characteristics to penetrate to the heart of Baghdad to eliminate high-value command and control installations with precision guided munitions (PGMs), while F-16s and A-10s devastated Iraqi artillery and armored units. B-52s staging out of airfields as far away as England dropped 500 and 750 pound bombs on Republican Guard units in Kuwait and

Iraq. In 39 days airpower inflicted a crippling amount of damage to every element of the Iraqi war machine. After achieving air superiority in a few short days, coalition air forces destroyed "the ability of the Iraqi military to wage an effective defense."³⁷ Table 1 summarizes official Air Force estimates of the damage sustained by the Iraqi war machine prior to the inception of the ground campaign:

<u>Table 1.: Iraq Military Capability Destroyed By Air</u>
Iraqi Aircraft: 261 out of 850 destroyed or lost
Artillery and Tanks: 45 percent
Armored Personnel Carriers: 34 percent ³⁸
90 percent of logistics flow to Kuwait interdicted by 30 January ³⁹
Iraqi front-line units suffered 50-75 percent attrition ⁴⁰

Along with destroying Iraq's capability to wage war, airpower (in conjunction with artillery and naval gunfire) was credited with breaking the morale of the Iraqi ground forces.⁴¹ These results show how successful airpower was in eliminating the offensive military capability so crucial to the success of Saddam's strategic defensive. Airpower allowed the coalition to fight a war of movement while Iraq was preoccupied with fighting a war of attrition. Airpower also nullified Saddam's political offensive. Strict targeting controls coupled with the use of PGMs kept collateral damage and civilian casualties to an absolute minimum, limiting Saddam's effectiveness in manipulating the media. The precision- delivery capability of F-111s, F-15Es, and F-117As significantly reduced the number of aircraft and airmen exposed to Iraqi air defenses. The much-publicized F-117A strike that destroyed the Iraqi Air Defense Headquarters building by placing a 2000-pound bomb down an airshaft would have "taken a raid of B-17s-- 150 or 300 airplanes" during the Second World war.⁴² Even more dramatic was the low number of American casualties sustained during the entire course of Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations.⁴³ This is all the more remarkable considering some authorities predicted (prior to the

air campaign) a ground assault would produce 5-10000 casualties.⁴⁴ The political impact of Scud attacks were offset by an aggressive air initiative to seek out and destroy Scud stockpiles, launch sites, and manufacturing facilities. Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites controlled by the USAF Space Command were used to detect and track missile launches thereby providing Patriot missile crews information critical to their interception attempts.⁴⁵ without an effective strategic air campaign, Saddam's attempts to break the coalition, win the war of words, and wage "the mother of all battles" may have succeeded.

This is not to imply that Desert Storm was a war won by airpower alone. It was a war where air, land, and sea power combined to attain all of the coalition's strategic objectives. Nevertheless, the weight of airpower's contribution to establishing the conditions necessary for the coalition's leaders to declare victory was such that it is necessary to conclude airpower was decisive. This is supported by the opinion of no less an authority than General Colin Powell, who stated on 23 February 1991: "airpower has been the decisive arm so far, and I expect it will be the decisive arm through the end of the campaign, even if ground and amphibious forces are added to the equation. If anything, I expect airpower to be even more decisive in the days and weeks ahead."⁴⁶ Secretary of Defense Cheney echoed these sentiments when he said: "the air campaign was decisive" and Iraq could not effectively resist coalition attacks "because the air war turned out to be absolutely devastating."⁴⁷ Finally, during his commencement address to the USAF Academy Class of 1991, President Bush declared: "Gulf Lesson One is the value of air power."⁴⁸

These few examples show how each service or medium has the potential for being decisive in a power projection contingency, depending on a host of factors. Although each focus on a particular service, it is at least arguable that for some of the cases other services could have

completed the mission in a satisfactory manner. The key is to understand the nature of the environment within which the military instrument will operate. Clearly airpower, like land and sea power, has the potential to be decisive in power projection operations depending on the nature of the contingency, the nature of the operating environment, and political/military objectives.⁴⁹

CHAPTER 2 NOTES

- 1 Donald Maple, Lt Colonel, US Army, "The Army As A strategic Force," 45 Soldiers (January 1990): 25.
- 2 Carl E. Vuono, General, US Army, "The Strategic Value of Conventional Forces," Military Technology no. 10/90 (October 1990): 154.
- 3 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-2 United States Air Force Basic Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, 1 April 1955), 8.
- 4 Konrad Alder, "An Eye for an Eye, A Tooth for a Tooth," Armada International (January 1987): 35.
- 5 Adam B. Siegel, US Navy Crisis Response Activity. 1946-1989: Preliminary Report (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1989), 41.
- 6 Ibid., 42.
- 7 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, US Military Forces to Protect Re-flagged Kuwaiti oil Tankers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 27. 100th Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 11, 16, 1987.
- 8 Ted Stevens and others, US Presence in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 6. Report submitted to the US Senate Committee on Appropriations.
- 9 Siegel, 42. Also during this operation 37 sailors lost their lives when an Iraqi Exocet hit the Stark. The Vincennes gained notoriety by shooting down an Iranian airliner and the fast frigate Samuel B. Roberts was severely damaged when it struck a mine.
- 10 Stevens, 13.
- 11 George Bush, Communication from the President of the United States Concerning Armed Forces Sent to Monrovia. Liberia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 2. As required by the War Powers Act this Presidential communication was sent to the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2nd Session of the 101st Congress. About 62 US citizens were evacuated from two communication sites in Liberia.
- 12 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Department of Defense and Drug Testing and Drug Interdiction Programs (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 9. 100th Cong., 1st sess., July 23, 1987. HASC no. 100-19. This operation was discussed by Lt Gen Stephen G. Olmstead during a hearing of the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
- 13 John T. Fishel, Lt Colonel, US Army Reserve, "Lessons From Operation Blast Furnace," Military Review 71 (June 1991): 64-69. Lt Col Fishel served on the staff of US Southern Command where he gained experience in counternarcotics operations at the theater level.
- 14 Marlin Fitzwater, "Statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations on the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Honduras, March 16, 1988," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 24 (March 21, 1988), 355.
- 15 Otto Kreisher, "Operation Golden Pheasant," Army 38 (May 1988): 37.
- 16 Dennis Steele, "Operation Just Cause," Army 40 (February 1990): 36.

- 17 U.S.. Congress, House of Representatives Armed Service Committee, Building A Defense That Works for the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 123; 134. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., February 22, 28, March 14, 21, 22, 27, April 25, 1990, HASC no. 101-83. Prepared statement of General Carl Vuono given to the Armed Services Committee Defense Policy Panel, 14 March, 1990.
- 18 Maple, 25.
- 19 United States Air Force, The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach--Global Power (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, June, 1990), 11.
- 20 U.S. Department of state, Background Berlin--1961 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1961), 10.
- 21 Lucius D. Clay, General, US Army, "A Special Study of Operation Vittles," Aviation Operations (April 1949): 2.
- 22 John C. Brownlee, Jr, "An Air Bridge to Tel Aviv: The Role of the Air Force Logistics Command in the 1973 Yom Kippur War," Air Force Journal of Logistics 15 (Winter 1991): 36. Mr. Brownlee is a historian with the HQ AFLC Office of History. Much of the cargo consisted of surface-to-air missiles.
- 23 Paul K. Carlton, General, USAF, Commander of the Military Airlift Command. Unclassified message dated 14 November 1973, 1.
- 24 Ibid., 1
- 25 David A. Brown, "Israeli Airlift Flights Underscore C-5 Rapid Deployment Capability," Aviation Week & Space Technology (December 10, 1973): 16. Also see Brownlee, 16.
- 26 Brown, 16.
- 27 Like other power projection efforts, the response was a joint effort. Approximately 74 percent of the total lift was provided by sea, although the cease-fire had started before the first ship arrived. Global Reach--Global Power, 11.
- 28 United States Air Force, The United States Air Force and US National Security: A Historical Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1991), 1. This pamphlet includes entries where Air Force assets participated in power projection missions, either unilaterally or as part of a joint effort. The latest entry is for December 1990. The Navy also issued an informational pamphlet listing US Navy power projection missions (see note 5). According to the Center for Naval Analysis, there have been 187 crisis responses that naval forces have participated in since 1946. This report was entered into the 9 November 1989 Congressional Record by Senator John McCain.
- 29 President Bush ordered the squadrons to deploy 7 August. They arrived in-theater on 8 August.
- 30 R.A. Mason, "The Air War in the Gulf," Survival 23 (May/June 1991): 211. The rapid arrival of US aircraft in-theater also demonstrated the strength of the US commitment to reestablishing regional stability, greatly reassuring neighboring Arab states.

- 31 William Taylor (Vice President for International Security Programs) and James Blackwell (Deputy Director for Political/ Military Studies) of the Center for Strategic and International Studies labeled Hussein's strategy as "a static war of attrition dominated by the engineer and the artillery man." Their defensive preparations were "consistent with their experience in the Iran- Iraq War" and were "designed to defeat an infantry-paced assault of the kind it repeatedly faced in the Iran-Iraq War." William Taylor, Jr., James Blackwell, "The Ground War in the Gulf" Survival 33 (May/June 1991): 239.
- 32 There has been much speculation on Saddam Hussein's belief that the US was not able to fight an intense ground war that would produce numerous American casualties. Two defense analysts believe Saddam's strategy was based on threatening US forces with "a second Vietnam". Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won," International Security 16 (Fall 1991): 5. The same authors quote a widely-reported statement made by Saddam Hussein to US Ambassador April Glaspie just prior to the invasion that "Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle." "How Kuwait Was Won," 15, Also see Charles Lane, "Saddam's Endgame," Newsweek (7 January 1991): 16.
- 33 The President's strategic objectives were to secure the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, reestablish the legal Kuwaiti government, force Iraq to adhere to all United Nations resolutions, destroy their weapons of mass destruction, and secure the release of all prisoners of war and illegal detainees. George Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf," 16 January 1991, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27 (21 January 1991), 51. Also quoted in Mark Clodfelter, Major, USAF, "Of Demons, Storms, and Thunder: A Preliminary Look at Vietnam's Impact on the Persian Gulf Air campaign," Air Power Journal (Winter 1991): 20.
- 34 It was widely recognized that an Israeli retaliation against Iraq due to Scud attacks would seriously threaten continued Arab participation in the coalition.
- 35 Mason, 214.
- 36 Charles A. Horner, Lt Gen, USAF, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm: An Overview," Air Power History 38 (Fall 1991): 6. General Horner wrote that USCENTAF forces consisting of more than 1200 aircraft flew more than 1700 sorties a day at the height of the air campaign.
- 37 Taylor, 235.
- 38 Michael A. Nelson, Lt Gen, USAF, "Beyond the Storm: A Future Perspective on Air Force Operations and Intelligence," Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, USAF, 7 August 1991. Aircraft, artillery, tank, and APC estimates were extracted from Lt Gen Nelson's unpublished briefing notes. General Nelson is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, HQ USAF.
- 39 Mason, 219-220. This estimate is attributed to General Schwarzkopf who released it during a 30 January 1991 briefing in Riyadh.
- 40 General Schwarzkopf reportedly stated air attacks left Iraqi border units "at 50 percent or below. The second level, basically that we had to face--and these were the real tough fighters that we were worried about--were attrited to some place between 50 and 75 percent." Ian Kemp, "100-hour war to free Kuwait," Jane's Defence Weekly 15 (9 March 1991): 326. Also quoted in Clodfelter, "Of Demons, Storms, and Thunder," 32.

- 41 Taylor, 240.
- 42 Richard Mackenzie, "A Conversation With Chuck Horner," Air Force Magazine 74 (June 1991), 60. Reference found in Grant M. Hales, "Air Power in Desert Shield/Desert Storm Part II," Air Power History 38 (Winter 1991): 45.
- 43 United States Air Force, Reaching Globally. Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Office of Secretary of the Air Force, September 1991), 52. According to this report there were a total of 113 Americans were killed and 385 wounded by enemy fire.
- 44 Tom Mathews, "The Secret History of the War," Newsweek (March 18 1991): 37. Reportedly, final Army computer projections predicted there would be at least 5000 casualties. Earlier predictions had placed casualties at 10 percent of coalition forces involved in a ground assault.
- 45 Donald B. Rice, "Report of the Secretary of the Air Force," Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 124.
- 46 Mason, 225.
- 47 The first statement was made by Secretary Cheney on the television program "Meet the Press" on April 14, 1991. Secretary Cheney made the second declaration to Harry Smith during an interview for CBS television on 2 August 1991. USAF, Reaching Globally, 52.
- 48 George Bush, "Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs Colorado," 29 May 1991 in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27 (June 3, 1991), 685. Gulf lesson number two was "the value of stealth."
- 49 For example, while airpower was decisive in Desert Storm; it cannot be overemphasized that the wrong lessons must not be learned from the war. Conditions were quite conducive to air operations, greatly contributing to its effectiveness. Air Vice Marshal R. A. Mason outlined a number of these conditions:
- 1) The numerical/technological superiority of coalition forces
 - 2) Air defense net in Baghdad was centrally controlled
 - 3) Air operations were assisted by geography, including sparsely populated terrain and salient nature of the occupied territory
 - 4) Iraqi ground forces were relatively static, visible, and vulnerable to air attack
 - 5) Iraqi forces in Kuwait depended on replenishment from Iraq making lines of communication critical
- Mason, "The Air War in the Gulf," 212-213. Mark Clodfelter also highlighted a number of conditions that made airpower a particularly efficacious instrument of policy in the Gulf war:
- 1) Control of military forces was highly centralized since Saddam Hussein approved all major strategic and tactical decisions.
 - 2) 70 percent of the Iraqi population lived in urban areas and were used to modern amenities

- 3) Iraq was an industrialized nation heavily dependent on oil refineries and modern transportation/communication nets
- 4) Rail and road links to Kuwait could not be hidden
- 5) Army was designed to wage a conventional campaign

Clodfelter, "Of Demons, Storms, and Thunder," 24, 25.

CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The nature of future conflict must be thoroughly analyzed to determine a proper strategy and force mix required for potential contingency responses. This includes understanding the military power of the enemy, his strength of morale, alliance system, national culture, national infrastructure, relative industrialization, state of technology, and a host of other factors. In the past, naval forces were our only means of projecting military power abroad. As our standing army grew and matured, it became a continental and then an international force to be reckoned with. When man finally conquered the upper elements, air forces with their unique characteristics added a new dimension to the power projection capability of the US. Each type of force, naval, land, and air, has its own set of characteristics that enhance our power projection capability. Military planners have a formidable challenge in identifying a course of action and the forces needed for a particular contingency. But the problem is more than simply identifying which force or force mix will best do the job given the situational constraints. Long before military planners start building courses of action in response to a crisis, the services must organize, train, and equip forces suited for projecting power in the ever-changing international environment.

The Multipolar International Power Structure

For the first forty years following the end of the Second World War and the dissolution of the colonial empires, the international environment was dominated by two major military powers, the United states and the soviet Union. International conflict was characterized by a polarization for or against the two superpowers, often turning into a war by proxy. United states strategic and regional planners concentrated on the threat posed by soviet expansionism and the

vast forces of the Warsaw Pact. Even as late as 1988 the Commission On Integrated Long-Term strategy was able to conclude:

We should emphasize a wider range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have long dominated our alliance policy and force planning: the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and an all-out soviet nuclear attack. By concentrating on these extreme cases, our planners tend to neglect attacks that call for discriminating military responses and the risk that in these situations some allies might opt out.¹

In concert with strategic planning, the US military force structure was generally tailored to fit the possibility of a superpower conflict in Europe. For example, a 600-ship Navy was Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's answer to the expanding blue-water Soviet fleet. Yet the last three years have brought sweeping changes to the international environment. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics lost its cohesion as well as its name when the Republics declared their independence from the central government. Preceding and perhaps presaging the Soviet breakup was the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. Accompanying the fall of Communism was the continued rise of regional powers. In the Far East, China, Taiwan, and Korea are emerging as economic powers, while Japan is nothing less than an economic superpower. Europe has gained in strength both economically and militarily, as the spirit of cooperation and unification flourishes. The international environment is now generally recognized to be moving away from a bipolar and towards a multipolar structure.²

Nuclear. Biological. Chemical Weapons Proliferation

Along with the international power structure, the nature of the threat has also changed. Although the probability of a massive nuclear exchange between the United States and another major nuclear power is considerably less than it was during the cold war years, there is still a significant danger. Nuclear proliferation is a real threat to regional stability. Many regional powers already have fissile materials or the technology to refine it. According to the Commission

On Integrated Long-Term strategy:

This creates a potential for some of the countries, including several that are relatively poor and less industrialized, to build arsenals of a dozen or more atomic bombs. In the next century, forty or more countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere will have the technical wherewithal to build such arsenals within a few years.³

Complicating the issue is the threat posed by the loss of centralized control over the huge soviet nuclear arsenal and possible export of technical expertise. A leading candidate for Defense Minister of Russia stated there is no guarantee weapons would not end up in the wrong hands, since "the very size of the arsenals makes the situation dangerous."⁴ Considering there are some 30,000 strategic and tactical weapons now located within the former Soviet Union, the magnitude of the problem is apparent.⁵

Chemical weapons have also spread throughout the Third World, as relatively unsophisticated nations have little difficulty buying or inventing the technology needed for its manufacture. According to Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates, "a modern pharmaceutical industry could produce biological warfare agents as easily as vaccines and antibiotics."⁶ Gates also stated twenty countries have already developed or are developing NBC weapons.⁷ Delivery capability for weapons of mass destruction is also spreading. According to Secretary of Defense Cheney, at least 15 nations now have ballistic missiles.⁸ Operation Desert Storm revealed Iraq had a formidable stockpile of foreign and domestically produced missiles. China has developed a significant arms export industry, selling Silkworm missiles to Iran, intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia, and offering M-9 missiles to Syria.⁹

The Spread of High Technology Weaponry

Along with weapons of mass destruction, high technology has also transformed the battlefield. Wherever US forces may be required to deploy, they will most likely be confronted with a complex array of air, land, and sea threats.¹⁰ In January 1992 Robert Gates told the Senate

Committee on Governmental Affairs future technological exports from the former Soviet Union to the Third World may include stealth, counterstealth, electronic warfare, PGMs, fuel-air explosives, and thermal imaging. Proliferation of these critical technologies and weapon systems could endanger US forces deployed to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.¹¹

Regional Tensions

Along with arms proliferation, regional tensions have not subsided with the breakup of the Soviet empire. In fact, the breakup has had a destabilizing effect as long-repressed ethnic tensions and nationalism are allowed to run free. Complicating the issue is the continued use of terrorism by many disenfranchised groups and the flourishing drug trade. While Communism has virtually ceased to act as a vehicle for fomenting revolutionary movements, insurgencies will by no means become a thing of the past. As the world's population grows, competition for scarce resources and the desire for a better standard of living will increase, making conflict between have and have-not nations a very real possibility. As General Gray stated: "The underdeveloped world's growing dissatisfaction over the gap between rich and poor nations will create a fertile breeding ground for insurgencies."¹² This dissatisfaction is fed by the growing political awareness of much of the world's population, an unavoidable by-product of the revolution in world communications. Governments that can't satisfy the demands of its citizens for economic, social, and political progress are strong candidates for internal disorders. While the dissolution of the Soviet block has decreased the chances of a war in Europe, there is still a great chance the US will become involved in a low to mid-intensity conflict elsewhere. Desert Storm was not an anomaly.

Loss of Overseas Bases

One of the main tenets of our national security strategy is maintaining forward presence. For the past fifty years this has meant a significant number of US forces have been stationed at

overseas installations. During the Cold War the strategic value of military bases was largely a function of their capacity to contain the Soviet threat. As the long-range striking capability of the United States and Soviet Union matured, the strategic value of many of our foreign bases decreased. At the end of the Second World War, the United States operated more than 30,000 facilities at over 2,000 base sites.¹³ By 1988 this number had decreased to 794 base sites, with the largest number (627) located in NATO countries. Only seven US overseas base sites were located in Africa and the Middle East, including Diego Garcia and Southwest Asia.¹⁴ Bases were closed for a number of reasons, including domestic cost-cutting measures, decreasing utility, or by "invitation" of the host government.¹⁵ For example, by request of the Government of Spain, the 72 F-16s of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing had to leave Torrejon Air Base. The US Air Force wanted to build a new airfield for them at Crotone, Italy, but Congress did not fund the request in 1992 due to the need for fiscal constraint and the decreasing Soviet threat.¹⁶ Two of the most recent losses are Clark Field and the Subic Bay naval complex. Confronted with the rise in nationalism coupled with a critical need for solidarity to combat a strong insurgent movement, the Government of the Philippines chose not to renew the basing agreement, which expires in 1992. Subic Bay will be a significant loss for the Navy. It has a large ship repair facility equipped with three floating drydocks, as well as the largest overseas depot for the resupply of forward-deployed ships. A senior-ranking Navy official reportedly said: "The potential loss of Subic makes our current high level of readiness in the Pacific vulnerable. It will be difficult to maintain the level of readiness we have now."¹⁷

Along with military bases, the United States maintains a significant amount of prepositioned material abroad to reduce closure time in case of a regional crisis. Even this seemingly harmless presence can impact local sensitivities. Following the recent Gulf War, the

United States planned to leave a large amount of equipment stockpiled in Saudi Arabia. This equipment, including enough Bradley Fighting Vehicles and tanks to equip a division, was needed in the event another conflict broke out in the Southwest Asia region for which the US would not have five months to build its forces. Yet due to "Arab cultural and political sensitivity about the continuing US military presence," the US has started to remove the stockpiled equipment.¹⁸ This trend in base closures and consolidations will undoubtedly continue for the foreseeable future. Since all of the military services are dependent on foreign bases, each will have to change the way they plan to deploy and employ their forces abroad.

To write a comprehensive forward-looking strategy for the future, military planners must understand the nature of the environment they will operate in. Forces designed and trained for a clash between the superpowers may not be suitable for the most likely forms of future conflict. The bipolar nature of the international environment is continuing its evolution towards multipolarity. Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, nationalism and regional tensions have not subsided. The proliferation of NBC and high technology weapons has made future deployments of American forces to Third World regions a more hazardous proposition. Further limiting US ability to project power is the loss of forward bases. Together, these changes increase the need for a change from a positional warfare/garrison mentality to a flexible, global projection strategy. The US military must adapt to the changing international environment if it is avoid fighting the wars of the future with the forces and strategies of the past.

CHAPTER 3 NOTES

- 1 Fred C. Ikle', Albert Wohlstetter and others, Discriminate Deterrence (The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988), 2. This report was presented to the Secretary of Defense and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
- 2 Many would argue the shift has been from a bipolar to a unipolar power structure. While this is currently true in terms of military power, the potential consolidation of Europe and rise of economic superpowers such as Japan show the trend is definitely towards a multipolar international system. It all depends on how "power" is defined. This author chooses to define power as will multiplied by capability, where capability is a measure of a nation's ability to project military, economic, political, and social influence.
- 3 Ikle', 10.
- 4 Bruce B. Auster, Julie Corwin, and Robin Knight, "The Soviet Nuclear Arsenal: No Assembly Required," US News & World Report (March 16 1992): 50. This statement was made by Andrei Kokoshin, currently the Deputy Director of Moscow's Institute of the USA and Canada.
- 5 Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), vi.
- 6 William Matthews, "Arms-Race Torch is Passing to the Third World," Air Force Times (January 27 1992): 24.
- 7 Ibid., 24.
- 8 Cheney, vi.
- 9 Jim Abrams, "Experts Say China's Military Threat is Exports," The Montgomery Advertiser (October 14, 1991): 7A.
- 10 In an official statement submitted to the House of Representatives Armed Services committee, General A.M. Gray wrote:

Throughout the world, the proliferation of arms is increasing at a dangerous pace. The variety of weapon systems available and their lethality has dramatically increased. The range of weapons technology encompasses nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles technology, sophisticated aircraft, submarines, armor, armored vehicles, and precision guided munitions for use against land, sea, and air targets.
- U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Building A Defense that Works for the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 157. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., February 22, 28, March 14, 21, 22, 27, April 25, 1990, HASC no. 101-83.
- 11 Matthews, 24.
- 12 Ibid., 4.
- 13 James R. Blaker, United States Overseas Basing (New York: Praeger, 1990), 9.
- 14 Ibid., 32.

- 15 Another reason for base closures was the withdrawal of strategic nuclear forces to the continental United States. Technology and air refueling helped extend the operational range of bombers, eliminating the need for many forward bases.
- 16 Associated Press, "Senate Panel Refuses Funds For NATO Air Base in Italy," Washington Post (13 September 1991): 14.
- 17 Ed Offley, "Subic Bay's Loss Would Hurt, Navy Official Says," Seattle Post-Intelligencer (13 September, 1991): 2. Mr. Offley reported this statement was made by a senior Navy official who was speaking "on condition of anonymity."
- 18 John Lancaster and David Hoffman, "Postwar Security Umbrella Shrinking at Saudis' Request," Montgomery Advertiser-Journal (20 October, 1991): 2A.

CHAPTER 4

UNDERSTANDING THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

While the services plan to cope with changes in the international environment, they must also be responsive to the realities of the domestic environment. As the 19th century military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz stated, war exists in the domain of a paradoxical trinity consisting of the people, the military commander, and the government.¹ Without the support of the people, military undertakings will suffer in both their execution and outcome.² Military planners have long understood strategy and force structure are shaped by the national culture and fiscal realities. Prior to committing military forces to any contingency, senior military leaders (and the NCA!) must consider the extent of popular support, possible duration of the conflict, role of technology, and the "American way of war."

The American Way of War

What is the "American way of war"? According to noted historian Russell F. Weigley, the history of American conflict shows Americans prefer short, decisive conflicts with clearly delineated objectives that minimize the loss of life on both sides.³ American involvement in the Korean conflict initially enjoyed widespread support, yet when the war stagnated with our troops entrenched just above the 38th Parallel with no hope for a quick military resolution, popular support quickly faded. America was ready to send its sons to fight communism but was not so eager to have them "die for a tie." Perhaps the most inflammatory conflict in recent American history was the Vietnam War. Again, the majority of the American public initially supported intervention in Vietnam. When the war dragged on and US involvement expanded with no end in sight, domestic opinion clearly shifted towards withdrawing from what was increasingly viewed as a civil war, even if it meant an eventual victory for North Vietnam. Vietnam "had a profound

impact upon public and official American attitudes towards the outside world. ...For the American people and their leaders, avoiding another Vietnam became a kind of national obsession.”⁴ For many years after the end of the conflict, US politicians have understood the need for "no more Vietnams.”⁵ In an address to the National Press Club in 1984, Secretary of Defense Weinberger acknowledged these realities when he said: "We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom.”⁶

Technology and the American Way of War

The blood of US servicemen is a most precious commodity. America does not like to send her fighting men to die in foreign lands for relatively unknown causes. The US defense establishment understands this, and is constantly seeking methods of minimizing American war casualties. Traditionally, military planners have looked to technology for the answer. This was evident in Vietnam where the services enlisted the help of technology to counter the extremes of terrain, weather, and the irregular tactics of the Viet Cong. During the recent war with Iraq, most will agree the use of precision guided munitions reduced American casualties and minimized collateral damage to noncombatants. Harnessing technology for the purposes of war continues to be a part of our national culture and service acquisition strategies, yet technology does have its limitations. Perhaps the most important limitation is its cost.

Military Funding cuts

While America readily turns to its military in times of crises, it is not so ready to maintain a large standing force in time of peace. Massive cuts in military spending after the First and Second World Wars were a direct result of public opinion and the desire for a smaller federal budget. With the advent of the Cold War, higher military budgets were seen as necessary to contain an aggressive Soviet Union. Following the fall of the Soviet empire, popular demand for

a "peace dividend" in the form of military spending cuts is again widespread. In his 1992 State of the Union Address, President Bush stated: "there are still threats, but the long, drawn-out dread is over."⁷ complicating the budget issue is the lagging US economy. The slow recovery from a recession combined with the perception of a decreasing strategic threat cause an inexorable pressure to reduce military spending. All of the military departments realize the halcyon days of the Reagan Administration budgets are gone for at least the foreseeable future. Plans for a forty-wing tactical Air Force and a 600 ship Navy were abandoned for a number of reasons, including the state of the US economy and decreased strategic threat to our national security interests. In 1986 defense expenditures equaled 6.3 percent of the gross national product (GNP). By fiscal year 1992 the military budget had slipped to 4.7 percent of the GNP.⁸

In his 1992 Annual Report to the President and the Congress Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney announced an additional 25 percent force cut. As a result, the Army will suffer a one-third loss of its active duty forces, the Navy one-fifth, and the Air Force one-fourth of their current end strength.⁹ On 24 March 1992 Secretary Cheney revealed additional cuts in Reserve and Guard forces. Overall, "these cuts and the additional \$50 billion in reductions proposed this year will reduce the U.S. military to its lowest end strength since before the Korean War."¹⁰ In terms of the gross national product, the defense budget will be approximately 3.5 percent of the GNP by 1997, "by far the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor."¹¹ Weapons development programs are not exempt from the budget ax. Over the past two years the Defense Department terminated more than one hundred military systems/weapons programs.¹² Such large reductions require the services to make many hard decisions about force structure, weapons acquisition, and even the way they intend to wage war.

US history books are filled with examples of Americans riding to the rescue of a

struggling nation or continent. Raising the sword of righteous indignation, American fighting men and their superior weapons struck down the forces of evil, saving Europe, South Korea, Kuwait, etc. This is the idealistic way we prefer to think of our past conflicts. Behind the rhetoric lies some basic truths about how America likes to fight her wars. Long, protracted conflicts are the antithesis of the American way of war. Quick, decisive battles that exploit superior American technology are seen as the best way to win a lasting victory and minimize American casualties. During periods of relative calm, Americans are unlikely to support a large standing military unless they are convinced there is a need to deter a chronic threat. These factors--time, sacrifice, technology, and abhorrence of a large standing military--are more than just momentary preferences that have governed our past expeditions. These predispositions are deeply ingrained in the US national psyche and must be considered when designing future national military strategies and force structures.

CHAPTER 4 NOTES

- 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
- 2 A similar sentiment was expressed by Jose P. Magno in 1986 in his article "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines," Asian Survey 26 (May 1988): 507. As the Commander of Regional Unified Command 3, Luzon, Magno understands the need for popular support as he leads the fight against insurgent forces.
- 3 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977). Professor Weigley traces the history of American military conflict from the Revolutionary through the Vietnam Wars. His major theme centers on why Americans prefer fighting a quick war of annihilation instead of a costly, extended war of attrition.
- 4 Cecil v. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 548-549.
- 5 Ike Skelton, US Congressman, "What Next for US Policy In Central America?", Army Magazine 39 (January 1989): 18-24.
- 6 Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting For Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 439. Also during the speech, Weinberger outlined what is now known as the "Weinberger doctrine." Before US forces are committed to combat, six general criteria should be satisfied:
 - 1) US vital interests are at stake
 - 2) The issues must be important enough that the US is willing to commit enough force to win
 - 3) There must be clearly defined political and military objectives
 - 4) The size of the force fits the objective
 - 5) The action enjoys the support of the American people
 - 6) US forces are committed only as a last resort
- 7 George Bush, President of the United States, "1992 State of the Union Address," 27 January 1992. From author's notes of the address.
- 8 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Almanac 91 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September/October 1991), 19.
- 9 Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 1.
- 10 Ibid., 1.
- 11 Ibid., 1.
- 12 Ibid., v-ii.

CHAPTER 5

RESPONDING TO CHANGE: A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

From Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response

Since the end of World War Two the US defense establishment based the majority of its strategic and force development planning on the possibility of a major war with the Soviet Union or a Soviet satellite state. The probability of a regional conflict was perceived as greatest in Central Europe, Korea, or in a hot spot such as the Middle East. Following the 1950 invasion of South Korea, the US and its NATO allies began building a large conventional force in Europe to deter a Warsaw Pact assault through traditional invasion routes such as Germany's Fulda Gap. A large force was also maintained in Korea after the cease fire to curb the hard-line communist North Korean Government of Kim II Sung. To deter the possibility of a nuclear conflict and balance the massive Soviet nuclear threat, the US strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers was developed and deployed, while strategic doctrine evolved from the Massive Retaliation policy of the 1950s to one of Flexible Response. Throughout the late 70s and 80s, the service departments built a strong conventional capability to respond to a variety of threats ranging across the spectrum of conflict. A catalyst for the development of this ability to project power abroad was the Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the Carter Administration.

The Carter/Reagan Doctrines

In February 1979 the Shah of Iran was ousted by revolutionary forces headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. This revolution resulted in the loss of a staunch US ally and significantly reduced US capability to respond to a crisis in the Persian Gulf region. On Christmas Eve 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, purportedly to "support" the socialist Afghan

government. Concerned with the loss of American presence in the Gulf and the threat of Soviet expansionism, President Carter reacted by declaring what became known as the "Carter Doctrine": "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by any means necessary, including the use of force."¹ This declaration led to the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and later Central Command, headquartered at MacDill AFB. By 1980 forces assigned to support the RDJTF included the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, 24th Mechanized Division, three Marine Amphibious Brigades, and considerable air and naval forces.² The Reagan Administration continued to strengthen US military power projection capability by initiating a considerable buildup of conventional and strategic forces. In 1986 President Reagan declared what is commonly referred to as the "Reagan Doctrine":

At injuries to its citizens, or at violent acts against its national interests, or at threats to subvert the governments of allies, the United States will strike back with exquisite calibration on a schedule of its own choosing, and in a way that presses its advantages in economic power and military technology--retaining popular support at home by avoiding as much as possible the expenditure of US lives.³

While the Carter and Reagan doctrines forced the military departments to shift their focus towards more power-projection oriented force structures and employment strategies, the primary emphasis remained on strategic nuclear forces and maintaining a large forward presence. However, the military, political, and social revolutions of the last few years have led to a new, more comprehensive revision of our national military strategy.

A New Defense strategy

Responding to the unprecedented changes in the international environment, President Bush implemented a new defense strategy that centers on responding to regional threats instead of countering a global Soviet power. First announced by the President on 2 August 1990 in

Aspen Colorado, this regionally- focused strategy is designed to attain national security interests in a post-cold war world, deter regional crises, and support the growth of democracy world-wide. The four basic pillars of the nation's new strategy are strategic deterrence/strategic defense, forward military presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.⁴

As the 1992 Annual Report to the President and Congress eloquently states: "Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented."⁵ Since this is inherently true, one of the primary missions of the US military establishment will continue to be deterring nuclear attacks against the United States its allies. Strategic defense has become an increasingly important part of the national strategy due to the proliferation of missile and nuclear capability. Despite reductions in overseas forces, forward presence remains a key to deterring regional aggression. Maintaining a forward presence demonstrates this nation's deep commitment to preserving regional stability and established formal alliances.⁶ Forward- based forces also provide an initial response capability if a regional crisis requires a US intervention. Yet the number of forward-based forces will, by necessity, decrease. Therefore CONUS-based forces must be capable of rapidly responding to regional crises, the third pillar of the new national defense strategy. Building responsive units requires forces that are readily deployable, need very little advance warning, can rapidly project into remote areas, and are readily sustainable.⁷ The final leg of the new strategy is reconstitution. Reconstitution is simply the ability to regenerate forces as required to meet any type or size conflict. Without this capability, current force reductions will jeopardize the military's ability to prevail in higher order conflicts, should they arise.⁸ This concept will require a future "base force" consisting of a mix of reserve and active duty units capable of rapid integration.

Joint/Combined Operations

Parochialism aside, the defense establishment understands the United States must be capable of coping with threats that span the spectrum of conflict. Disparate forces must also be

capable of working together since future power projection contingencies will most likely require a joint effort. Due to the changing domestic environment the services no longer have the luxury of paying lip service to jointness. As former Secretary of the Navy Lehman stated to the House Armed Services Committee:

It is important, however, that we go beyond single-service advocacy. As was abundantly clear from the testimony on future contingency forces, the Nation will best be served when it has a flexible, responsive power projection capability. No service alone can adequately meet the nation's needs. So we must seek power projection solutions that build on the combined capabilities of all the services.⁹

Along with a better capability to fight together, the services must continue to cooperate with the forces of allied nations. While the global power structure is changing, the need for nations to work together for their collective security will not.

Taken as a whole, President Bush's new defense strategy is a realistic and necessary approach to coping with the changing security needs of the post-cold war world. The most significant aspect of the strategy is its emphasis on building a strong power projection capability. Deterrence will remain the overall thrust of our national security strategy, but it will be more dependent on the ability to deploy forces when and where needed. Using this new strategy and the changing characteristics of the international/domestic environments, it is possible to summarize the critical attributes of potential power projection contingencies and forces.

Characteristics of Future Contingencies

Future contingency responses are likely to require rapid projection of CONUS-based forces to distant theaters. Crises may arise with little warning and require an immediate response without the luxury of an extended period of time for force deployments. The operating environment is likely to be increasingly hostile due to the proliferation of high-tech weaponry while prepositioned forces may or may not be available for immediate use. While the battlefield

will continue to offer a wide range of challenges, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact significantly reduces the chance the US will have to fight a high- intensity conflict in the near future. Therefore the character of war will most likely range from low to mid-intensity. Table 2 summarizes these characteristics:

<u>Table 2.</u>	
Probable Nature of Future Power Projection Contingencies	
Crisis may occur with or without warning	
Response is time-critical	
Contingencies are likely to be regional in nature	
Conflict will be low to mid-intensity	
Forces may or may not be prepositioned in-theater	
Force deployments to distant operating locations required	
Operations will likely be joint/combined	
Operating environment will be increasingly lethal	

Similarly, it is possible to compile the criteria for US power projection force and employment planning:

<u>Table 3.</u>	
Critical Requirements for Power Projection Forces/Force Employment	
<u>Forces</u>	<u>Force Employment Planning</u>
Enhances survivability	Must minimize casualties
Maintains technological edge	Place fewer Americans in harms way
Easy to deploy	More emphasis on reconstitution
Rapidly deployed	Less reliance on forward basing
Easy to sustain	Rapid response required

These two tables expand the definition of power projection as presented in the Introduction. They represent the basic criteria against which service planners must measure their future force development and employment strategies.

CHAPTER 5 NOTES

- 1 E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, 2nd ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981, 385.
- 2 Raymond E. Bell Jr., Colonel, US Army Reserve, "The Rapid Deployment Force: How Much, How Soon," Army Magazine 30 (July 1980): 22.
- 3 Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, The Recourse To War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1988), 121. The authors attribute this quote to an article written by William Safire. William Safire, "The Reagan Doctrine," The New York Times (28 March 1986): A-35.
- 4 Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), vi.
- 5 Ibid., 7.
- 6 In addition to its continuing commitments to NATO, the US is a signatory of six other mutual defense treaties with Australia/New Zealand, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and various American nations via the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Ibid., 15.
- 7 Ibid., 8, 9 .
- 8 Ibid., vii.
- 9 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Building A Defense That Works for the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 324. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., February 22, 28; March 14, 21, 22, 27; April 25, 1990, HASC 101-83. Testimony given by John Lehman to the Defense policy Panel, 27 March 1990.

CHAPTER 6

RESPONDING TO CHANGE: THE SERVICES

Exactly how are the services responding to the new national security strategy? The defense establishment believes the current impetus for changing how to plan, equip, and train for war is part of an evolutionary process that has gathered momentum over the last twenty years. The service departments understand the changing international power structure, increased regional tensions, and new domestic priorities require a corresponding change in how they will achieve security objectives established by the National Command Authority. The proliferation of nuclear and high-tech weaponry will make the battlefield of the future increasingly lethal for land, sea, and air forces, while the loss of overseas bases will further limit US ability to maintain forward presence. Each service has recognized the need for change and is actively pursuing options to maximize power projection capability by modifying their basic doctrine, strategy, tactics, and force structure.

The Role of Doctrine

Before delving into a detailed description of doctrine as it applies to power projection, it is important to understand military doctrine is not a hard and fast set of rules the services follow in a prescriptive manner, but rather a guide for action. According to DOD Joint Publication 1-02 doctrine consists of “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”¹

As Colonel Drew of the Airpower Research Institute so succinctly wrote, "Military Doctrine is what we believe about the best way to conduct military affairs."² Based on these definitions, a comprehensive study should include official doctrine as well as service "beliefs"

about power projection as expressed by senior officers in venues such as professional publications and white papers. In addition to doctrinal and structural changes, it is important to examine what characteristics each service claims for its power projection forces. As the "traditional" power projection service, we will start with the US Navy.

The Changing Navy

Due to the changing international/domestic environments and new national security strategy, the Navy and Marine Corps believe they must "reshape naval force structure, strategy, tactics, and operating patterns that are wedded too closely to the concept of an Armageddon at sea with the Soviet Union."³ While the Navy is currently in the process of rewriting its strategic policy to reflect the shift towards power projection, the "enduring principles" of the maritime strategy will still form the basis for planning.⁴

The Maritime Strategy

Written at a time when the Soviet Union was gaining a blue water capability, The Maritime Strategy describes the "Global contribution of the Navy and Marine Corps in carrying out US National security strategy across the entire spectrum of conflict."⁵ According to this document, naval forces help fulfill national security requirements through flexible forward positioning, early global deployment, and the ability to seize the initiative should deterrence fail. The Maritime strategy breaks conflict into three phases. The main objective of Phase I, labeled "Deterrence/Transition to War," is controlling escalation. This phase encompasses rising tensions, deterring crisis escalation, and the outbreak of hostilities. During peace the Navy's main objectives are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance and treaty commitments, support national diplomacy, and maintain the capability to rapidly respond to a wide range of threats. If deterrence fails, the Navy would shift to Phase II, "Seize the Initiative." The main objective in Phase II is to establish maritime superiority, thereby guaranteeing access to vital sea- lanes for

the US and its allies while denying the same to the enemy. During Phase III "Carry the Fight To The Enemy," naval forces would fight at the appropriate level of intensity to achieve a favorable conflict termination.⁶

In The Maritime Strategy, the four most frequently mentioned characteristics of sea power are flexibility, mobility, deployability, and endurance. At any level of conflict the maritime strategy is designed to exploit the characteristics of flexibility and mobility inherent in sea power. According to Colin S. Gray, the maritime strategy:

brings unique qualities of flexibility and mobility to national strategy. Mobility lies in the very nature of maritime power. Given the extent and interconnection of the world's oceans, maritime power permits flexibility in its employment unmatched by territorially bounded land power, by a land-based air power restricted by fixed-site airfields.⁷

The maritime strategy also indicates the inherent endurance and deployability of sea forces greatly enhance the Navy's power projection capability: "A particular strength in using maritime forces for such purposes is the ability to rapidly constitute the required forces in a forward area and maintain the perceived threat of direct military action for an extended period of time."⁸ The Navy fully exploits these four characteristics of sea power when planning for the power projection mission.

The Maritime Strategy lists a number of representative unilateral sea power projection options available to national command authority for contingency responses. These options include deployment/presence, intelligence operations, special operations, cruise missile strikes, naval gunfire support, air strikes, forward surveillance operations, amphibious demonstrations, amphibious raids, NEO operations, air defense suppression, and amphibious assaults.⁹ National command authority may direct naval air forces to achieve local air superiority, suppress defenses, and conduct either coastal raids or deep penetration air and cruise missile attacks where

and when required with little dependence on friendly host nations for support. Many of these missions require the use of Marine Corps forces. While the maritime strategy includes both the Navy and Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marines Corps General P.X. Kelley published an article titled "The Amphibious Warfare strategy" to address Navy-Marine amphibious force employment.¹⁰

Marine Corps Power Projection Doctrine

"The US remains unalterably a maritime nation, dependent on the seas which provide the avenues for our commerce and the links to our allies and friends. ...Naval forces are uniquely valuable to the Nation for they provide special advantages and flexible options in their employment."¹¹ These two excerpts neatly summarize current Navy and Marine Corps philosophy on the role of maritime forces in a power projection contingency. The amphibious warfare strategy follows the Navy's three-phase approach, describing how Marine forces will operate across the spectrum of conflict. A Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) can be selectively tailored to fit a given task and rapidly deploy by sea or airlift. Marine forces can perform special operations, act as a combined air-sea-land expeditionary force, or accomplish forcible entries. According to one Marine Corps publication, amphibious forces "provide an unmatched forcible entry capability."¹² Great emphasis is placed on forward presence as the key to conventional deterrence. Forward presence is enhanced through the peacetime deployment of forces such as the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the Pacific and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) in the Mediterranean. Maritime prepositioning ships in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Ocean carry 30 days of supplies for a Marine Amphibious Brigade.¹³ All of these assets have the effect of reducing response time in the event of a regional crisis.

The ability to respond quickly with forces tailored for a particular contingency give the

Marine Corps a significant capability to act as an expeditionary force. According to General Kelley, characteristics such as the ability to forward deploy, independently loiter for extended periods of time, or rapidly move ashore have made Navy-Marine forces the traditional instrument of choice "particularly in the early stages of a crisis response."¹⁴ Forward-deployed Marine units such as amphibious ready groups (ARGs) serve as a "visible and credible indicator of American capability to react to sudden, unforeseen crises involving U.S. interests."¹⁵ These units can loiter over the horizon at sea without a need for forward basing or external sustainment, ready to assault the beach if so ordered. A force structure that is deployable, sustainable, and has an excellent forced-entry capability presumably enables the Marines Corps to "meet the national need for an expeditionary/rapid deployment force."¹⁶ In the final analysis, one of the most cherished traditions of the Marine Corps is their past history as the nation's expeditionary force. Whether or not they will remain so in the future is hotly contested. In his 1989 testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray said the Marine Corps remained this nation's expeditionary force ready to respond to a wide range of crises without the need for mobilization.¹⁷

Sea Power Projection Forces

The new national security strategy centers on maintaining a strong nuclear retaliatory capability, a credible forward-presence, force reconstitution, and crisis response. According to the Navy and Marine Corps' vision for the future, "Around much of the globe the Navy and Marine Corps will be the primary means of preserving US regional influence."¹⁸ This philosophy forms the basis for the current and future development of naval forces required to meet the needs of the new national strategy.

In the past, the Navy has maintained about one-third of its fleet with approximately 110,000 sailors and 30,000 Marines either at sea or at foreign bases to achieve the objectives

outlined in the maritime strategy. To meet future threats the Navy and Marine Corps believe there is actually a need to INCREASE forward presence as the availability of overseas bases decreases. Reality dictates otherwise. Although forward presence certainly remains a major requirement for the Navy and Marine Corps, fewer assets will change the architecture of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups, as well as the length and location of their deployments.¹⁹ For a crisis response, forces will have to have an adequate surge capability as well as the ability to act as a self-contained expeditionary force. Sea-based prepositioned forces will help decrease closure times of Marine and other land-based forces, as will a robust sealift capability. To fulfill projected commitments, the Navy and Marine Corps foresee the need for 450 active and reserve ships, eleven active and two reserve carrier air wings, three active and one reserve Marine divisions, and a strong Trident and attack submarine force.²⁰ These forces will be a part of the Navy Department's base force for the new national security strategy.²¹ Above all, the Navy and Marine Corps believe the US must continue to capitalize on the synergy that results from joint power projection operations in order to protect US national security interests.²² To face the challenges of the future, the Navy and Marine Corps intend to preserve the unique mix of capabilities that allow their forces to "act swiftly and decisively anywhere in the world-- through unilateral action, joint US force operations, or as part of a coalition of allies" without depending on foreign basing or political access.²³

The Changing Army:

The Army also understands the need to adapt to the changing national and international environments in order to maintain a strong conventional capability. General Carl Vuono believes "in this environment, we must recognize that the key to the defence of our vital interests in the next century will rest with our conventional forces."²⁴ This conventional capability must allow the nation to defend its interests whenever and wherever necessary through the global projection

of land power. The Army has published a new manual titled AirLand Operations to guide future development of power projection doctrine and forces. This document traces how the Army will shift from a strategy based primarily on maintaining a forward defense posture to one of power projection.

AirLand Operations

The Army released AirLand Operations on 1 August 1991. A product of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, AirLand Operations will guide the development of future Army power projection forces and doctrine. According to this document,

the capability to project and employ land combat power is also fundamental to securing our national interests. Thus, the national military strategy is based on twin pillars of Maritime and AirLand Operations (both rely on the uninterrupted use of space) to promote national security, to deter aggression, to project power rapidly throughout the globe, and, when required, to fight decisive land battles.²⁵

This excerpt is particularly interesting because it claims the national military strategy is based on two pillars of sea and land power supported by airpower instead of a triad of air, land, and sea power.²⁶ Key elements of the Army's plans are maintaining forward presence, deploying forces capable of projecting from the CONUS in response to regional crises, and preparing to wage combined/coalition warfare should deterrence fail. Other strategic Army operations include providing support to civil authority and interagency operations such as disaster relief, civic actions, humanitarian assistance, and foreign internal defense. Similar to the Navy and Marine Corps, the Army breaks the "operational continuum" into three general states labeled peacetime competition, conflict, and war. The Army has four major subcategories for operations that fall short of war: "Support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and contingency operations."²⁷ Contingency operations include providing national assistance, disaster relief, counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuations,

shows of force, rescue and recovery operations, strikes and raids. The break-point between operations short of war and wartime operations is participation in "extended combat operations." Simply stated, the Army's role in land warfare operations is to "deploy rapidly; to apply maximum combat power against the enemy center of gravity; and through swift, synchronized unified, joint, and combined action, to destroy the enemy's critical elements and will to resist."²⁸

The US Army places a high priority on developing its power projection capability. AirLand Operations states: "The fundamental mission of the Army is achieving deterrence through demonstrating a credible capability to project overwhelming combat."²⁹ To achieve its mission, the future Army must be versatile, deployable, lethal, and expansible. Versatility describes the ability to tailor forces as necessary to meet a wide array of threats. Deployability is a combination of interoperability and ability to rapidly deploy globally. Lethality is the capability to quickly defeat an opponent while sustaining a minimum of casualties, while expansibility describes the total-force concept of expanding the active component with reserve forces. According to AirLand Operations, these four characteristics are absolutely essential to the future strategic Army.

Army Power Projection Forces

The Army's initiative to develop a better capability to project forces from the CONUS instead of maintaining large force complements abroad is a realistic approach to fiscal limitations and the shrinking availability of foreign basing. Land force deployability will be essential as units currently stationed in Europe and Korea return home. The future strategic Army will have the capability of selectively tailoring forces for a given situation, with an array of armored, light, and special operations units available for packaging. The Army base force will be reduced from eighteen to twelve active divisions by 1995 while reserve divisions will decrease from ten to six. The Army predicts this mix of heavy, light, and special operations forces will give it the

versatility and deployability needed to meet the security needs of the new national strategy.³⁰

While AirLand Operations acknowledges the need for sea forces capable of protecting the sea lines of communication, it also states:

Historically, we have relied upon a maritime strategy to protect our nation, our institutions, and our national interests, and to provide time for preparation when war became necessary. In our shrinking world with its changing threats, a maritime strategy is not enough. Given the evolving world environment, the capability to project and employ land combat power is also fundamental to securing our national interests.³¹

In other words, a power projection capability based solely on sea power is not enough; it will take a combination of land and sea forces to do the job. Future crises must be dealt with through joint and/or combined operations. It is significant to note that Commander of the USAF Tactical Air Command General Michael Loh signed the document's cover sheet indicating it will complement existing doctrine in guiding the future development of TAC's power projection capability.

The Changing Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice recognized the need for the Air Force to adapt to the changing defense environment in the seminal airpower projection White Paper titled Global Reach-- Global Power. Secretary Rice wrote the future Air Force must increasingly emphasize force projection capabilities.³² Five major objectives provide a framework for Air Force planning: sustain deterrence, provide versatile combat forces, supply rapid global mobility, control the high ground, and build US influence. Providing versatile combat forces encompasses joint/combined operations as well as unilateral operations to achieve presence or directly apply force. Rapid global mobility using airlift and tanker forces are essential to a strong national power projection capability, as is controlling the high ground with a wide array of space and airbreathing command, control, communications, and intelligence assets. Building US influence

through security assistance, counternarcotics operations, training foreign air forces, and humanitarian airlifts will remain an important power projection requirement for the Air Force.

Throughout Global Reach--Global Power Secretary Rice emphasizes how the "unique characteristics of the Air Force-- speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality--can contribute to underwriting US national security needs in the evolving world order."³³ In a March 1990 address Secretary Rice explained how each of these characteristics add to the power projection capability of air forces. Speed refers to the ability of air forces to rapidly project power in order to influence, deter, or strike in a matter of hours. Range allows operations to be conducted over vast distances without suffering the physical limitations imposed by land or sea obstacles. Lethality describes the ability of air forces to directly attack the heart of the enemy without need for extensive outside support. Moreover, airpower can deliver this ordnance with precision, minimizing collateral damage. Flexibility allows a rapid shift in the priority or place of employment. Secretary Rice added survivability to the list of characteristics, since airpower can avoid threats or rapidly transit high threat areas as well as minimizing the number of people placed at risk.³⁴

Much as the Navy and Marines Corps emphasize the United States is a maritime nation, Secretary Rice called the United States an aerospace nation, based on its airpower projection capability and leading role in the international aerospace industry.³⁵ By labeling the US an aerospace nation, he was **not** claiming the Air Force was capable of or desired to operate in a vacuum. In both his White Paper and March 1990 speech, Secretary Rice clearly stated power projection was a mission for all of the military services. By saying this, Secretary Rice joins the other services in recognizing the need for cooperation in maintaining a strong power projection capability.

Air Power Projection Forces

While nuclear deterrence will remain the first priority, planning will increasingly emphasize conventional forces that are flexible, precise, lethal, and can rapidly respond to global contingencies. Since the requirement for forward presence will remain, long-range aviation and aerial refueling will help alleviate some of the difficulties imposed by fewer overseas bases.³⁶ The Air Force is now in the midst of a massive organizational restructuring program that will allow it to better meet the wide range of possible threats with a reduced force structure.³⁷ Air Force tactical fighter wings will be reduced from 36 to 26.³⁸ Other major initiatives include strengthening the chain of command, decentralizing authority, consolidating resources under single field commanders, removing unnecessary staff layers, and clarifying responsibilities. Three of the Air Force's major combatant commands will merge into two new commands. The new Air Combat Command will contain fighters, bombers, ICBMs, and some tankers and airlifters, while the Air Mobility Command will contain the majority of the airlifters and tankers. These changes should "better prepare the Air Force to employ air power as an integrated whole to support national objectives."³⁹

The Air Force is also forming a number of "composite wings" that operate several varieties of aircraft. For example, the proposed composite wing at Mountain Home AFB will include F-16S, F-15Cs, F-15Es, tankers, AWACs, and possibly B-52s. This composite force will be designed to quickly intervene when and where needed. A-10s, OA-10s, F-16s, and C-130s based at Pope AFB will form a team with the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, ready to globally deploy at short notice.⁴⁰ Such teamwork will enhance the service's ability to cooperate in joint operations.

Increasing Force Survivability, Lethality

The increasingly intense nature of the battlefield has forced the services to tailor their

forces to meet the challenge. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim recently wrote: "This proliferation of high-tech weaponry among even poorer Third World states has ratcheted up the requirement for more sophisticated capabilities on the part of states seeking to project their forces into these areas. "⁴¹

The US Navy understands the need to deal with the increasingly lethal array of land and sea-based threats it must face as it plans to project power ashore in the 21st century, including "small coastal-patrol boats, shore-launched cruise missions, and shallow-water mines." The Navy plans to fully exploit the land-attack potential of Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from surface vessels and attack submarines, enhancing the survivability of its surface ships. Stealth technology is another area the Navy intends to exploit. Although the A-12 was recently cancelled, the Navy is continuing its efforts to develop a stealthy attack aircraft. In Concepts and Issues, the Marine Corps lists numerous weapon and combat support systems that will help its forces survive on the future battlefield. Among the most notable are the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, a family of light armored vehicles, advanced amphibious assault craft, and F/A-18 aircraft variations.

The US Army is working to improve the survivability and lethality of its forces. To increase the Army's deep-strike capability on the battlefield, AirLand Operations emphasizes developing "long-range intelligence and accurate long-range fires for the operational commander. The ability to project lethal, accurate fires at depth--which allows a smaller force to defeat a larger force--is key to success."⁴³ Examples of systems that will aid this effort include attack helicopters, tactical air, unattended air vehicles, and the Air Force's Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). Weapon systems with precision guidance and tactical agility will improve force lethality. Better training and protection against NBC weapons will be

essential for increasing force survivability. The US Air Force is also working to increase the survivability of its forces through a number of initiatives. Stealthy aircraft currently under development include the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter and B-2A multi-role bomber. The C-17 transport will include built-in active and passive features that will help it survive the surface-to-air threat. Precision guided munitions will increase force lethality while decreasing the need for restrikes and exposure to high-threat target areas.

Overall, the services are actively engaged in developing forces and employment strategies that fit the future power projection environment identified by the new national security strategy. Increasing the lethality and survivability of power projection forces are but two examples where services are concentrating their efforts to prepare for future conflicts. However, public demand for a "peace dividend" and the uncertain budget priorities of the US Congress represent a formidable obstacle for solid, long-range planning.

CHAPTER 6 NOTES

- 1 Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 December 1989), 118.
- 2 Colonel Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), 163.
- 3 Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, and Commandant of the Marine Corps General A.M. Gray, "The Way Ahead," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (April 1991): 36.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 38.
- 5 Department of the Navy, *The Maritime Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1989), 3.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 24.
- 7 Colin Gray, "The Maritime Strategy Is Not New," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 116 (January 1990): 71.
- 8 *The Maritime Strategy*, 22.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 22.
- 10 General P.X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy," *The Maritime Strategy*, ed. James A. Barber, Jr., (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, January, 1988), 18-29.
- 11 *Concepts and Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1991), 1-2. Published annually, this document provides considerable insight into Navy and Marine Corps power projection doctrine and strategy.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy," 25.
- 14 *Concepts and Issues*, 1-3.
- 15 "The Amphibious Warfare strategy," 25.
- 16 Gene D. Hendrickson, Colonel, USMC, "A Vision of the Marine Corps," *Marine Corps Gazette* 74 (February 1990): 14.
- 17 US Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Projection Forces and Regional Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 19. 101st Cong., 1st ses., March 10; April 20; May 2, 15; June 5, 1989, S. Doc. 101-251, pt. 4.
- 18 "The Way Ahead," 38.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 41.

- 20 Ibid., 45; Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 74, 82. The Navy's primary projection aircraft are currently the A-6, F-14, and F/A-18. These will eventually be replaced with the Advanced Strike Aircraft (A-X) and F/A-18E/F.
- 21 Cheney, 74; 83. Three active and one reserve Marine Aviation Wings are also part of the base force. Marine expeditionary aircraft are now the F/A-18, A-6E, AV-8B, and EA-6B. The A-6Es are scheduled to be replaced with F/A-18Ds.
- 22 "The Way Ahead," 39.
- 23 Ibid., 47.
- 24 Carl E. Vuono, General, US Army, "The strategic Value of Conventional Forces," Military Technology no. 10/90 (Oct 1990): 150.
- 25 Department of the Army, AirLand Operations (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1991), 3-4.
- 26 Perhaps this is a holdover from the traditional school of thought that airpower is most effective when used to support the ground campaign.
- 27 AirLand Operations, 26.
- 28 Ibid., 10.
- 29 Ibid., 9.
- 30 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Building A Defense That Works for the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 170- 171. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., February 22, 28; March 14, 21, 22, 27; April 25, 1990, HASC 101-83. Testimony given to the Defense Policy Panel, 14 March 1990 by General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff. Also see Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 68-69. The twelve active Army divisions will be consist of one airborne, one air assault, two light infantry, six mechanized, and two armored.
- 31 Department of the Army, AirLand Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August, 1991), 3.
- 32 United States Air Force, The Air Force and US National Security: Global Reach--Global Power (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, June 1990), 3.
- 33 Ibid., 1.
- 34 Donald B. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force, "Global Reach, Global Power," remarks to the Washington Chapter of the National Security Industrial Association, March 1, 1990.
- 35 Global Reach--Global Power, 15.
- 36 Ibid., 328. From testimony given by former Commander-in-Chief of the strategic Air Command General Russell E. Dougherty on 27 March, 1990.
- 37 United States Air Force, Air Force Restructure, A White Paper (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, USAF, September 1991), 2. This USAF White Paper contains specific details of the restructuring as well as the rationale for change.

38 Cheney, 1. These 26 wings will form a part of the Air Force's total commitment to the new national security strategy. Nine of the wings that will be cut are active duty and one will be from the reserves, leaving fifteen active and eleven reserve units.

39 Ibid., 6-7.

40 Michael A. Nelson, Lt Gen, USAF, *Beyond the Storm: A Future Perspective on Air Force Operations and Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, 7 August 1991).

41 DOV S. Zakheim, "New Technologies and Third World Conflicts," *Defense* 86 (July/August 1986): 8. At the time he wrote this article, Mr. Zakheim was Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources.

42 "The Way Ahead," 40.

43 *AirLand Operations*, 36.

CHAPTER 7

TOWARDS A FUTURE POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY

Faced with massive force cuts, the Department of Defense is striving to identify the most effective force mix for projecting power abroad. One method that might provide a relative indication of effectiveness is comparing the attributes of air, land, and sea power to an aggregate set of characteristics needed for future projection forces. Based on service guidelines discussed in Chapter Six it is possible to extrapolate the general force characteristics the services believe are necessary for a strong 21st century power projection capability. The Navy claims its forces have great flexibility, mobility, deployability, and endurance. The Marine Corps contributes its ability to forward-deploy, perform forced-entries, and an organic sustainability. Army units are versatile, deployable, lethal, and expandable, while the air assets of the US Air Force have great speed, range, flexibility, lethality, and survivability. A simple compilation reveals a number of similarities between how the services define the characteristics required for power projection missions:

Table 4.--Force Characteristics			
<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
Flexible		Versatile	Flexible
Deployable	Forward Deploy	Deployable	Speed
Endurable	Sustainable		Range
Mobile	Forced Entry Capable	Expandable Lethal	Survivable Lethal

While there are differences in how each service defines a particular characteristic, most definitions are quite similar. For example, the Army's AirLand Operations describes versatility as the ability to tailor forces to meet a wide array of threats and rapidly project them where needed.¹ To the Air Force, flexibility is a close approximation of versatility, as it allows a rapid shift in the priority, place, or nature of employment.² To the Navy, a flexible force structure will

be mobile, interoperable, and capable of meeting a variety of threats.³ From these definitions we see the meaning of flexibility is slightly different for each service, but not remarkably so. This is true for most of the repeated characteristics. Extrapolating from Table 4, the services believe future power projection forces must be flexible, deployable, mobile, lethal, and survivable to be effective in future contingency responses. This list is not exhaustive in content but simply reflects those force characteristics the services consider most important for the power projection mission.⁴ It is no surprise they also fit the force criteria identified in Chapter Five.

Future Force Development

The preceding discussion suggests five general force characteristics needed for an effective power production capability. For many responses, a balanced combination of air, land, and sea forces will produce a synergy that increases our power projection potential. There are also contingencies for which the characteristics of a single force or weighted force mix will best serve the interests of the United States. Using these five aggregate characteristics as measures of merit, it is possible to estimate the relative effectiveness of air, land, and sea power in future contingency responses.⁵

Measure of Effectiveness: Flexibility

The aggregate definition of flexibility includes the concepts of interoperability, versatility, and expansibility. Service interoperability has been a recurring problem, as the fiasco at Desert One and less than optimal Grenada rescue operation showed. Since Grenada, the Army and Air Force have gone to great lengths to improve their interoperability, especially since each is required to work closely together in any major land campaign. One Army-Air Force initiative produced AirLand Operations, signed by the commanders of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command. This document "sets the general azimuth for evolution of doctrine, organization, training,"⁶ The new materiel, and leader development by

both services. The new composite air wing formed to directly support the Army's 82nd Airborne Division is an early product of the AirLand initiative. As part of the same service department, the Navy and Marine Corps work well with each other, as might be expected. Yet the Navy's interoperability with the Air Force could be improved, as demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm:

Navy officials now say carrier-based aviation could have made a larger contribution to Operation Desert Storm if there had been better USN co-ordination with USAF and the US Central Command in assigning targets and sorties. ...The co-ordination problem was exacerbated by none of the four aircraft carriers in the Gulf or the two in the Red Sea having the computer hardware and software to fully participate in establishing the daily Air Tasking Order...without this [computer capability], the navy "didn't have the flexibility" it might otherwise have had to adjust any element of a strike package including tanking schedules, targets, and ordnance, said the navy official.⁷

While the services must continue to improve their interoperability, it will be a difficult task in a period of great fiscal restraint.

A versatile force is able to adapt to changing circumstances and threat environments rapidly while preserving the ability to perform a variety of actions. Airpower's speed, range, lethality, and multirole capability give the theater commander a great ability to quickly shift and concentrate his forces across the length and breadth of the battlefield. Theater airlift can expeditiously reinforce or resupply ground forces at the point of contact with the enemy.⁸ Naval aviation has the capability to perform a variety of roles including fleet defense, sea control, support of amphibious operations, air supremacy, and provide limited support for land campaigns. The air-land-sea organic capability of Marine forces also gives them great versatility in performing their primary functions.

As the budget crunch continues to eat into active duty forces, reserve units will play an increasingly important role in future operations. This makes expansibility, the ability to

incorporate reserves into active duty units quickly, absolutely essential. All of the services believe in a "whole force" concept where reserve forces will augment regular units when needed. Yet each service seems to treat their reserves a bit differently. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm there was considerable consternation over the Army's seeming reluctance to deploy its Guard and Reserve combat units. Many were given additional training to bring them up to regular force readiness and were therefore unable to deploy in time to participate in the hostilities. The Marine Corps did not have this difficulty, as it deployed a large portion of its reserve forces without delay. The Marine Corps has long considered its reserves as a pool of combat-ready forces capable of augmenting its regular units. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve is organized into division, wing, and force service support groups that can easily integrate with active duty units. The 1990 edition of Concepts and Issues states "Total Force, with integrated and complementary Active and Reserve contributions, is an established reality in the Marine Corps. "⁹This enlightened approach gives the Marine Corps an excellent capability to expand their forces as needed for future power projection contingencies.

The Air Force has fully exploited the benefits of its reserve forces for many years, assigning them operational roles formerly performed by regular forces. The 1973 airlift to Israel and 1990 air shuttle in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm would have been crippled without the assistance of reserve airlifters.¹⁰ In recent testimony to Congress, General Russell E. Dougherty, former Commander-In-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, stated Air Force reservists were:

winning the bombing derbies and carrying half the missions in the MAC and flying voluntarily in combat missions and so forth. I believe a reserve pilot is every bit as valuable to the national security in carrying out the deterrence and defense of this country as an active duty pilot. I don't see the distinction.¹¹

The Navy also acknowledges there is a great need to exploit the potential of its reserve

forces. Testifying to the same congressional panel as General Dougherty, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman stated

a significant fraction of the ships and aircraft can be shifted to the ready reserve. Such reserve ships and squadrons would be manned 50% by active and 50% by weekend warriors. They would be firstline ships and planes kept fully abreast of fleet upgrades. They would operate on weekends and for longer active duty during fleet exercises. The savings are enormous.¹²

These initiatives could result in significant savings while preserving the Navy's capability to expand to meet any threat. But as Secretary Lehman's subsequent testimony indicates, a significant change in how the Navy has perceived its reserve forces in the past may also be necessary:

Officers and sailors on active duty, seeking to go into the reserves should not be treated as treasonous wimps.

The admirals, alas, fail to grasp the wisdom of this course. In the Reagan years the Naval Reserve was nearly doubled, its commander raised to three star rank. New officer and enlisted programs were started aimed at bringing college and technically oriented kids onto active duty for two years followed by long reserve commitments. All of these programs have been dropped or strangled in recent years and the Commander of the Naval Reserve has been demoted to two stars.¹³

To maximize the effectiveness of this nation's power projection forces, the service departments must continue to fully exploit the skills and knowledge of our reserve warriors.

Measure of Effectiveness: Deployability /Mobility

All of the services consider mobility and deployability as desirable attributes for power projection forces. The aggregate definition for deployability focuses on the ability to project forces globally from forward bases or the CONUS when needed, without respect to range or terrain limitations. Mobility is a measure of the ability to move where needed to strike the enemy or support friendly forces. It is possible to evaluate the relative deployability/mobility of air,

land, and sea forces based on response time.

Rapidity of response is often critical for crises requiring US intervention. A rapid forward deployment can defuse a regional crisis and deter the outbreak or escalation of hostilities. The Navy and Marine Corps cite their great potential to deploy based on the free access to the ocean mass, forward positioning, and prepositioning of critical materiel. However, care must be taken to distinguish between the benefits of sea access with those derived from speed of mobilization. Sea forces take time to arrive in a forward operating location. While response time is reduced by materiel prepositioning, this advantage will decrease if the US loses access to foreign depots. Response time will also suffer as the Navy and Marine Corps reduce forces maintained at sea and overseas. These reductions will leave certain regions partially or completely uncovered by naval forces.

To deploy from the CONUS, the Army is almost completely dependent on the strategic airlift and sealift assets of the other services. Their forward posture is also on the wane, especially in Europe. In fact, General Duane Cassidy stated: "Reducing our troop strength in Europe will not only exacerbate our ability to rapidly reinforce Europe but other theaters as well."¹⁴ The Army understands its limitations and has taken a number of steps to improve its ability to deploy for power projection missions. In 1980 the Army's two infantry divisions had a combined weight of 58,404 tons. By 1989 these two units had been transformed into light infantry divisions with a combined total weight of 27,068 tons, a significant improvement. However, all of the Army's divisions have not enjoyed a similar loss in weight. During the same period of time the combined weight of mechanized divisions increased from 135,766 tons to 180,432 tons, a 40 percent jump. A number of airborne, air assault, and armored divisions also suffered a significant weight increase. According to one 1989 analysis, "it takes far more airlift

to get the Army's US-based forces into combat than it did 10 years ago."¹⁵ In another initiative to reduce closure time the Army implemented a program called Prepositioning Of Materiel configured to unit Sets (POMCUS). POMCUS equipment includes some of the heaviest and most difficult to deploy, such as tanks, artillery, and trucks. But POMCUS is not a cure-all.

General Otis, CINC US Army Forces in Europe, stated:

for a variety of reasons, such as cost and storage limitations, approximately one-third of the equipment... is not authorized for prepositioning. In addition, a significant portion of the authorized POMCUS equipment is actually not in storage because of lack of funds, lack of warehouses, and other reasons.¹⁶

The Army continues to face a formidable challenge in improving its force mobility and deployability.

Airpower offers one characteristic land and sea power lack to one degree or another: access. General Dougherty emphasized this point when he said "long-range aerospace forces give you access anywhere in this globe and soon in other areas, for any purpose, be it defensive, offensive, be it surveillance, be it passive, but it gives you total access. It is the only force that gives you that, and it gives it to you in a matter of hours."¹⁷ Airpower is not restricted by terrain, seas, or other such terrestrial obstacles. Airpower can quickly shift to a new point of attack and concentrate at the most critical areas. No other force has as great a capability to reposition in response to a rapidly changing situation. Aircraft can project into a theater of operations within a few hours, while long-range bombers and air refuelable fighter-bombers place enemy targets at risk from bases in the CONUS. In 1983 six B-52H bombers launched from their bases in North Dakota, delivered a full load of conventional bombs on a target airfield in Egypt, and returned to North Dakota non-stop.¹⁸ On the first day of Desert Storm seven B-52Gs departed Barksdale AFB, flew 17.5 hours and launched 35 conventionally-armed ALCMs against high-priority Iraqi

targets before returning to Barksdale. This mission was the "longest single air combat mission in history."¹⁹ Shorter-range assets are dependent on airfields located in or close to the theater of operations. Air refueling extends their operational capability, but it does have its limits. If access to forward basing is restricted it will impact the Air Force's ability to deploy its shorter-range forces.

Measure of Effectiveness: Survivability

The Air Force enjoys an unmatched ability to operate in the high-threat, high-tech battlefield of the future. Using a combination of active and passive defense measures, airpower can avoid or destroy the majority of threats anticipated in future power projection contingencies. Incorporating stealth technology in newer aircraft will minimize the chance of being detection while more conventional aircraft can rely on their speed, altitude, and maneuverability to avoid the most lethal threats. Modern U.S. military aircraft combine precision, stealth, and speed to destroy critical targets while reducing time of exposure to hostile threats and number of American servicemen held at risk. This is an important consideration given the predilection for the American public for the fewest casualties as possible. The advent of precision-guided munitions also helps minimize noncombatant casualties, a critical distinction considering the impact of domestic and international opinion on the formulation of US national security policy.

This does not imply other services do not have the ability to survive on the battlefield of the future. Nothing could be further from the truth. But the vulnerability of surface forces to the types of weapons that are likely to be found even in a "low intensity" conflict is significant. Warships operating in contiguous waters are increasingly likely to be threatened by the air and missile forces of a hostile nation.²⁰ Mines and patrol boat attacks also pose a serious danger, especially in waters that limit the freedom to maneuver such as the Red Sea or Persian Gulf. In the 1982 Falklands War, eleven British ships were sunk or damaged by Argentinian air attacks.

The HMS Sheffield was gutted by a single French-made Exocet missile. Naval apologists claim special circumstances placed the British fleet in a vulnerable position, such as the lack of a long-range surveillance capability which forced the British to use ships (including the Sheffield) as isolated radar pickets.²¹ Despite this rationale, the Falkland Islands conflict demonstrated that ships operating in contiguous waters without an adequate defense or supported by defenses designed for blue-water operations, are very vulnerable to land-based attacks. But even "adequate" defenses are limited compared to air forces. An aircraft, like a ship, can defend itself by destroying the threat. Aircraft can also defeat a threat using stealth technology, maneuver, speed, and altitude, while surface ships operating in close proximity to shore are difficult to hide, relatively slow, and have very little room to maneuver. The Iraqi air attack on the frigate Stark in the Persian Gulf is a case in point.

Measure of Effectiveness: Lethality

Defined as the ability to effectively and efficiently defeat an opponent while minimizing casualties, lethality is closely tied to survivability. The relative lethality of various power projection force mixes will vary depending on the nature of a conflict and overall strategic goals. If the conflict is of the low intensity variety, fought using guerrilla tactics, it is quite possible that land forces, supported by airpower, offer the best potential to defeat the enemy. Airpower by itself may be ineffective given certain conditions. Bombing jungles where the enemy can easily avoid detection is not very effective or efficient, as our country now understands. It is difficult to identify the centers of gravity of an insurgency and even more difficult to select one that presents a suitable target for an air campaign. This is not meant to imply airpower or sea power has little utility in low intensity conflicts. It does imply the value of a particular type of force imposed via a particular medium varies according to the conditions. For a primarily sea or amphibious campaign, naval power will be the decisive instrument. In medium to high intensity conventional

land conflicts, airpower is absolutely essential to victory. Air forces can avoid the enemy's forces, penetrate to the heart of his nation, and destroy what he holds most dear. Air Force Manual 1-1 indicates "strategic attacks are carried out against an enemy's centers of gravity including command elements, war production assets, and supporting infrastructure."²² These attacks may prove decisive in some contingencies. Airpower can directly attrit, delay, or defeat the enemy's forces. The recent air campaign against Iraq proved airpower's potential to incapacitate the war-making potential of a country. The relatively few casualties suffered by Coalition forces during the land campaign were a direct result of the air campaign. Again, such results depends on the nature of the conflict.

In terms of naval or amphibious campaigns, the U.S. Navy can project the most lethal forces in the world. In terms of influencing land campaigns, sea power is rather limited. Naval aviation's potential to project force ashore is constrained by the need for fleet defense and the limited range and payload of its strike aircraft. During the war with Iraq, six carrier battle groups contributed to the air campaign. Four operated from the Persian Gulf and two from the Red sea.²³ According to the commander of Carrier Group Two, fully 50 percent of carrier air sorties originating from the Persian Gulf force "were devoted to force defense."²⁴ Once air superiority had been won, the Persian Gulf carrier group closed to within 150 miles of the coast to increase their sortie rate. In the Red Sea,

Typical strike packages of 24-26 aircraft on a 650-nautical- mile strike....required pre-target and post-target airborne tanking to the tune of 386,000 pounds of fuel for an A-7 wing and 514,000 pounds for an F/A-18 wing. To illustrate, if Red Sea forces had to conduct organic strikes, sorties over the beach would have been reduced by more than two-thirds.²⁵

Of course, aircraft strikes were not the only contribution the Navy made to the Persian Gulf conflict. Nine cruisers, five destroyers, two battleships, and two submarines launched a total of

288 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) against Iraqi targets.²⁶ The potential of TLAMs to save lives when employed against heavily-defended targets is significant. Despite this success story, the capability of naval forces to strike the heart of the enemy is physically limited in both its effectiveness and efficiency. As Admiral Mixson wrote "war-winning weapons need to penetrate and destroy strategic, hardened war-winning targets."²⁷ Exactly so.

Analysis Results

All of the services understand there is a pressing need to develop an effective and efficient force mix for present and future power projection contingencies. Comparing individual force attributes against the aggregate characteristics needed by future power projection forces may help make this determination. Based on this analysis, air forces have greater flexibility, survivability, and deployability/mobility than surface forces. Lethality varies according to the nature of the conflict, but in a conventional land campaign, it is arguable a matured air force again enjoys a distinct advantage, depending on the nature of the conflict and conflict environment.

While this analysis sheds some light on the power projection force development problem, it does not address one of the greatest limits to future force development--the defense budget. In an unconstrained fiscal environment, each service would be able to develop and acquire the forces they consider necessary to meet future challenges. A shrinking budget is forcing each service to reexamine their future plans and acquisition strategies. If the US is to maintain its capability to project power abroad, some tough choices must be made.

CHAPTER 7 NOTES

- 1 Department of the Army, AirLand Operations (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August, 1991), 6.
- 2 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Air Force, 16 March, 1984), 2-2.
- 3 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Maritime strategy (Washington, D.C., 1989), 50-51.
- 4 Forced entry capability is not included on this provisional list since it is more of a capability than a characteristic.
- 5 The aggregate definitions are located in Appendix One. Continuing the precedent set in Chapter six, these definitions are extracted from AirLand Operations, Global Reach--Global Power, "The Way Ahead", The Maritime Strategy, Concepts and Issues, Congressional testimony, and various other publications.
- 6 AirLand Operation, i.
- 7 "Desert Storm: the USN's War," Jane's Defence Weekly 15 (30 March 1991): 471. This article appeared in the Analysis section of Jane's Defence Weekly.
- 8 Global Reach--Global Power, 7-8.
- 9 Concepts and Issues (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1990), 2.4-2.6.
- 10 Guard/Reserve aircrews manned 62 percent of C-5 aircraft, 53 percent of the C-141s, and 44 percent of the C-130s. Michael A. Nelson, Lt Gen, USAF, Beyond the Storm: A Future Perspective on Air Force Operations and Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, 7 August 1991).
- 11 Ibid., 373. In fact, the US Air Force Airlift Master Plan states "A significant number of USAFR forces are assigned to augment MAC. Reserve aircrew members, flying and maintaining C-5 and C-141 aircraft, comprise about half of MAC's intertheater aircrew strength and over one-third of its maintenance force. USAFR C-130 airlift units account for more than 20 percent of MAC's intratheater airlift capability." Department of the Air Force, Airlift Master Plan (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Air Force, 29 September 1983).
- 12 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Armed Services committee, Building A Defense That Works for the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 348. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., March 27, 1990, HASC 101-83. Secretary Lehman was testifying to the Armed Services Defense Policy Panel.
- 13 Ibid., 349.
- 14 Quoted by Benjamin F. Schemmer in "Airlift, Sealift in Short Supply at Very Time Need Grows Fastest," Armed Forces Journal International (May 1989), 66, 68. General Duane H. Cassidy was the Commander-in-Chief of the US Transportation Command and the Military Airlift Command at the time he made this remark.

- 15 Schemmer, 68. Schemmer continues by saying "By AFJI's calculations, in 1980 it would have required 7,052 C-17 sorties to move just the Army's active divisions overseas; today it would take 9,661 sorties, a 37% increase."
- 16 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Projection Forces and Regional Defense (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 107. 100th Cong., 2nd sess., March 23; April 12, 14, 1988, S. 100-790, pt. 4.
- 17 Building A Defense That Works For The Post-Cold War World, 326
- 18 The bomber formation penetrated Egypt and flew a demanding low level route before delivering their munitions on-target, within 3 seconds of their planned timing. The last bomber landed 32.2 hours after takeoff. This author was privileged to be a pilot on that aircraft.
- 19 William Matthews, "Barksdale B-52s Launched Missiles at Iraq," Air Force Times (January 27 1992): 10.
- 20 The 1992 Annual Report to the President and the Congress emphasized this point: "Rather than fighting open ocean battles, naval forces employed in regional conflicts could well have to operate in littoral areas, where they could face threats from mines supersonic cruise missiles, diesel submarines, or maritime terrorism." Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 74.
- 21 Dov S. Zakheim, Deputy Under Secretary for Defense, "New Technologies and Third World Conflicts," Defense International (July/August 1986): 12.
- 22 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Air Force, March 1992), 11.
- 23 Department of the Navy, The United States Navy In "Desert Shield" "Desert Storm" (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 May, 1991), 36.
- 24 Riley D. Mixson, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, "Where We Must Do Better," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 118 (August 1991): 39.
- 25 Ibid., 38. Air force tankers provided the majority of the refueling. Admiral Mixson acknowledged this when he wrote "The Navy is becoming hostage to Air Force land-based tanking for sustained power-projection warfare beyond 200 nautical miles from the battle force." If this is true, then carrier air forces would be limited to operating within 50 miles of the coastline without USAF support, if the carrier group was willing to close within 150 miles of the coast in the first place.
- 26 The United States Navy In "Desert Shield" "Desert Storm", 35.
- 27 Riley D. Mixson, 39.

CHAPTER 8

MAKING THE TOUGH CHOICES

Apportioning the Defense Budget

To build and maintain a strong power projection capability during a time of fiscal constraint, the services must tailor their forces to achieve the greatest military utility while reducing redundant capability. For a number of years defense budget apportionment was guided by a relatively simple formula of one- third to each military department. Many believe this methodology minimized friction and competition between the services. In reality, it simply allowed policymakers to avoid making the hard decisions necessary to maximize defense capability. Richard Hallion, a former advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force and currently Chief of Air Force History, recently said Pentagon officials should "step away from the 33-33-33 percent funding mentality in order to get to the business of what provides the most for our national security."¹ This viewpoint is also held by those who are ultimately responsible for the defense budget. On 27 March 1990 Congressman Herbert Bateman asked one service representative:

Are we going to go through another exercise of a budget resolution giving US a defense number and then we are going to allocate that number on some historic percentage. ...in order to come up with an authorization bill? Or are we going to make these tough decisions on weapon systems and mixes of forces and then put the money where our judgment tells US it ought to go instead of being bound by arbitrary historical formula.... not related to any strategy, to any national needs or requirements?²

How should Congress apportion the defense budget? Idealistically they would use some measure of merit that would maximize military utility. Perhaps Giulio Douhet was right when he wrote:

The resources which even the richest nation can put at the disposal of national defenses are not limitless. With a given quantity of resources it is possible to

secure a national defense just as efficient as the correct proportioning of the three factors. The more nearly just the proportions of these factors, the smaller will be the nation's expenditure for its national defenses.³

By the phrase "the more nearly just the proportions," Douhet did not mean the proportions should be equal. Rather, he was suggesting they should be determined based on the relative utility of each force in achieving the stated national security objectives. This is exactly what the Congress and the Defense Department must do in order to build a more efficient power projection capability. Before discussing which forces should or should not receive funding priority, it is necessary to understand the primary functions of each service.

Genesis of the Service Functions

Following the end of World War II, the US armed forces were reorganized into three separate departments by the National Security Act of 1947. Due to a shrinking defense budget and overlapping/redundant capability, considerable friction existed between the Navy, Army, and Air Force. A major point of contention was the Navy's intent to build more aircraft carriers while the Air Force desired a larger portion of the budget to fund an expansion to 70 combat groups and maintain its primacy in strategic bombing.⁴ The Navy believed the Air Force was attempting to gain control of all US air forces, including carrier aviation. To help alleviate the situation, Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal ordered the service chiefs to attend a conference in Key West during March 1948. The conference produced an agreement that specified the "primary" and "collateral" functions of each service. During his radio announcement of the conference results, Secretary Forrestal stated

Each Service is assigned specific functions in which that Service has a clear-cut responsibility. Such functions are defined as primary functions. In addition, each Service is charged with collateral functions, wherein its forces are to be employed to support and supplement the other Services, in carrying out their primary function, whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives.⁵

These functions were intended to achieve "effective strategic direction of the Armed Forces," integrate them into an "efficient team of land, naval, and air forces," prevent "unnecessary duplication or overlapping among the services," and coordinate operations to "promote efficiency and economy of resources."⁶ One important clause dealt with funding requirements. Services could ask for funds required to perform their primary function, but additional funds would not be allocated solely for the purpose of acquiring forces for a collateral function.⁷ This was a critical distinction, and one that is still with US today.

Current Functions of the Service Departments

The 1948 Key West agreement was formalized in a Department of Defense directive. Today, the direct descendent of the agreement is Department of Defense Directive 5100.1.⁸ This document lists the primary and collateral functions for each service. Like the original Key West radio release, it also discusses funding: "As for collateral functions, while the assignment of such functions may establish further justification for stated force requirements, such assignment shall not be used as the sole basis for establishing additional force requirements."⁹ This excerpt clearly indicates funding requests should be based primarily on the requirement to perform primary service functions. Thus, a logical place to look for possible reductions is in the area of service functions.

Allocating Resources for Power Projection

One function common to all of the services is "to provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interests of the United states.¹⁰ As this statement indicates, DOD Directive 5100.1 is the seminal document for the power projection mission. By assigning power projection as a common function, DOD Directive 5100.1 clearly indicates no service is primarily responsible for the projection of military forces abroad. Based on this clause, arguments for increased funding

supported by claims that a particular service has traditionally been the "primary power projection service" or "expeditionary force" for the United States should carry little weight. Instead, primary service functions should be evaluated according to their utility in achieving future national and regional security objectives.

Funding Navy Functions

According to DOD Directive 5100.1, a primary function of the Navy is "to provide the afloat forces for strategic sea ¹¹ This is one of the most critical functions for many future power projection operations. In his testimony to Congress in 1989, Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur stated 95 percent of the forces, weapons, and essential support needed to fight a war must go by sea. ¹² In fact, during the first sixty days of Desert Shield, "85 percent of all cargo sent to the Persian Gulf theater moved by sea." ¹³ As US access to overseas bases decreases, dependence on strategic sealift will increase. The possible loss of prepositioned materiel in regions such as Europe and the Middle East will exacerbate this problem. Maintaining and even increasing the capability to perform this function must remain as one of this nation's top priorities. Another primary function is to conduct combat:

Incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components-- specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. ¹⁴

A real grab-bag of missions, this function presents an opportunity for possible savings. The Navy's maritime strategy emphasizes the US is a maritime nation. Seapower advocates support this concept by citing US dependence on the sea lines of communication for power projection and commerce. It is true an overwhelming percentage of US imports and exports transit the sea

lines of communication, but developing a force structure based on being a "maritime" or an "island" nation misses the point. A better measure of merit would be to evaluate the current and future threat to US sea lines of communication. Although the Soviet Union had developed a real capability to interdict US sea lines of communications, that threat has decreased. How much of a decrease is for the Navy Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess, yet it is probably quite significant. Other than the diminished forces of the former Soviet Union, no nation hostile to the United States has a blue-water capability. The future threat to sea lines of communication, ports, American shipping, and naval forces will most likely originate from land-based forces. Naval operations in the Gulf conducted in response to land-based attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers is a good example of the types of missions the Navy will most likely be required to perform. Will these types of contingencies require a 600 ship Navy designed to defeat a Soviet blue-water navy? Obviously not. Will it require a 450 ship Navy that includes 14 or even 12 carrier task forces? Possibly not.

Top Navy officials have pointed out that "naval crisis response means much more than simply maintaining the capability to keep the sea lines of communication open to our allies and sources of critical materiel. We must be able to project credible forces rapidly to meet threats posed to our interests, in places where no friendly forces-in-being exist."¹⁵ How does this statement fit with the Navy's primary functions? In terms of maintaining the capability to perform forced entries, seize beachheads or ports necessary for inserting forces into a hostile area, this statement fits a primary Navy function. In terms of projecting power ashore to influence a mostly land-oriented campaign, this statement is on less solid ground. Notice the primary function quoted above begins with the phrase "Incident to operations at sea" and ends with "operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." Clearly, the focus

is on operations that are directly linked to naval campaigns.

Several other functions directly address naval participation in land campaigns:

To interdict enemy land power, air power, and communications through operations at sea. To conduct close air and naval support for land operations. ...To be prepared to participate in the overall air and space effort, as directed.¹⁶

These are all collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps. As such, they cannot be the sole basis for increased funding requests. This does not relieve the Navy of the responsibility to "support and supplement the other Military Service forces in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation shall result in increased effectiveness and shall contribute to the accomplishment of the overall military objectives."¹⁷ However, if the Navy was to follow the letter of the law, it would not request funding for forces that have a primary mission of interdicting land lines of communication or striking at the heart of an enemy's industrial capability. The services must continue to weigh their funding requests carefully so to avoid unnecessary duplication of capability.

Funding Marine Corps Functions

A Marine colonel recently wrote that a maritime strategy "is not only the best strategy in terms of protecting the real interests of the United States, it is probably the only strategy that can be implemented with diminished defense resources and that the perceived diminished threat will deem economically reasonable."¹⁸ This colonel continued by claiming "a Marine Corps that will fit the bill for complementing a maritime strategy is also one that can meet the national need for an expeditionary/rapid deployment force."¹⁹ Does DOD 5100.1 support the idea that a single service such as the Marine Corps should be this nation's rapid deployment force?

DOD Directive 5100.1 includes a number of clauses that specifically address Marine Corps functions. One function assigns primary responsibility for amphibious operations to the

Marine Corps. Another states the Marine Corps shall "provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."²⁰ The condition that Marine Corps participation in land operations must be directly tied to naval campaigns is critical. It clearly indicates the Marine Corps should not request funding for forces primarily intended for land operations not "essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." However, the Directive correctly states the Marine Corps is liable to "perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct."²¹ Undoubtedly, these duties could include operations in support of a land campaign. However, the next two sentences clarify the situation: "These additional duties must not detract from, or interfere with, the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army."²²

Since changes must be made in light of the decreasing defense budget, should the Marine Corps be designated and funded as THE national rapid deployment force? Yes, if the rapid deployment force has the primary responsibility of supporting naval and amphibious operations. No, if the rapid deployment force has the primary responsibility of performing land operations that are not essential to a naval campaign. The real answer is to maintain a joint rapid deployment force that has the capability to do both functions. If cuts are needed, the Marine Corps should examine how it can eliminate capability primarily intended for its secondary function of supporting land campaigns. By doing so, redundancy between the Marine Corps and Army will be reduced.

Funding Army Functions

DOD Directive 5100.1 states a primary function of the Army is to "organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land--specifically,

forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.”²³ DOD Directive 5100.1 also designates the Army as the primary organization for developing airborne doctrine, procedures, and equipment for the Defense Department as well as forces for operating land lines of communication.²⁴ Is there room for reductions in the Army's portion of the defense budget? To make such an estimate, it is necessary to examine the specific threats on which the Army has traditionally based its force development. As late as 1990 one writer was able to report

As a strategic force, the US Army has identified its missions as encompassing the maintenance of a strategic reserve capable of responding to threats in the Western Hemisphere and other areas; deterrence or defeat of a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack on NATO and maintaining or restoring the Alliance's territorial integrity and security; support for allies in Asia, Latin America and Africa; denial of Persian Gulf oil to Soviet control; and defense of vital American interests in the Pacific.²⁵

In fact, the majority of Army forces were prepared to counter the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat. As discussed in Chapter 4, AirLand Operations addresses the changing threat and need to restructure the Army to fit the changing international environment. The Army has recognized its force structure will shrink as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Determining how deep the cuts will be is for Congress to decide, but care must be taken not to strip the Army of its capability to project its forces to regions where conflicts have the greatest probability of occurring.

Funding Air Force Functions

More than any other service, the Army is dependent on the Air Force for its support. This is reflected in DOD Directive 5100.1. A primary Air Force function is to "organize, train, equip and provide forces for close air support and air logistics support to the Army and other forces, as directed, including airlift, air support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications.”²⁶

Another primary function extends air support mission to include all of the armed forces. Airlift is

the critical element to this nation's ability to rapidly respond to a crisis. Without a robust airlift capability, a crisis response will be limited by the relatively slow transport of forces over the sea lines of communication. In an environment where a rapid response can be everything, where forward basing is decreasing, and at a time when fewer naval forces will leave gaps in regional coverage, an adequate airlift capability is absolutely imperative. Cutting the Air Force's capability to perform its primary airlift/air support function is not wise considering the range of crises that may require a US response.

The capability to interdict enemy forces and communications is essential to the land campaign. According to AirLand Operations, air interdiction missions will strike enemy forces located in the "joint battle" and "joint intelligence and air attack" areas to support the land campaign.²⁷ The close air support mission is also critically important to land forces. While the probability of fighting a protracted land battle has decreased, these missions will maintain their importance in many power projection contingencies. There are no guarantees there will never be another Desert storm.

Gaining and maintaining air supremacy, controlling vital air areas, and achieving local air superiority are primary functions of the US Air Force as defined by DOD Directive 5100.1. For any type of contingency, all of the services agree control of the air is an absolute necessity. Many Third-World nations have acquired an excellent air attack and air defense capability. In recent years, the Soviet Union demonstrated little reluctance to sell its most advanced aircraft to any nation that had the cash to pay for them. While cuts in the number of tactical wings will result from the need to shrink the defense budget, the Air Force must maintain its qualitative edge in fighter aircraft in order to counter the expanding air forces of other nations.

Organizing, training, and equipping tanker forces for aerial refueling is another primary

function which should not suffer a significant cut. According to the 1984 version of Air Force Manual 1-1:

Aerial refueling has a vital role across the spectrum of conflict. ...Its inherent flexibility enables the refueling force to assist in the rapid deployment and employment of conventional forces and to furnish logistic support to friendly nations. The aerial refueling force helps enhance our global power by reducing our dependence on forward basing and foreign enroute bases.²⁸

This definition of aerial refueling specifically addresses several of the current problems the nation faces in projecting its military forces abroad. With the decrease in forward basing, aerial refueling will be critically important to insert air, land, and sea forces into theaters of operation. Aerial refueling also extends the range of our air assets, allowing them to strike an enemy from secure bases. Without aerial refueling, F-111Fs operating from Great Britain could not have struck Libyan targets during Operation El Dorado Canyon in April 1986. During Operation Earnest Will, USAF refuelers flew more than 300 sorties in support of the Navy's escort operations in the Persian Gulf.²⁹ with its great potential to assist every service perform its power projection mission, aerial refueling should not be a major target for funding cuts.

The Air Force's primary function of providing "launch and space support for the Department of Defense" is absolutely essential to modern power projection operations.³⁰ Every service agrees space is a "dimension that has the potential to significantly alter or influence the nature of military operations."³¹ According to the Secretary of the Air Force,

Smaller force levels and access to fewer forward bases will increase dependence on the force multiplying capabilities of space systems. Space-based communications assets provide for global, secure, and reliable command and control of forces. Space-based navigation aids will enhance global deployments of air, land, and sea forces, as well as provide pinpoint weapons system accuracies. Space-based surveillance systems will provide unprecedented warning and threat assessments to battle commanders, regardless of the location of the conflict.³²

The value of space assets in power-projection contingencies was again proven during Desert Storm/Desert Shield, labelled by many as "the first space war."³³ Space systems acted as a force multiplier and helped reduce casualties while increasing force effectiveness. Space capabilities were "vital to the Coalition's success."³⁴ Space systems will increase, and not decrease in importance as the US plans and develops its future power projection capability. As the single-largest manager responsible for the majority of DOD space operations, the Air Force receives approximately 80 percent of the military space budget.³⁵ Cutting the Air Force budget by reducing funds allocated to space systems is inappropriate for a nation serious about power projection.

The final primary function we will deal with is "to organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic air and missile warfare."³⁶ with the advent of nuclear weapons, strategic air warfare was closely identified with strategic nuclear warfare. Based on this traditional definition, cuts in USAF strategic forces would seem to make sense, considering the decreased nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union. In fact, a large number of USAF B-52s and earlier generation ICBMs are being removed from the active force. But strategic warfare has a broader meaning than the delivery of nuclear weapons. The DOD defines strategic air warfare as "air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war."³⁷ This definition encompasses both the conventional and nuclear air missions. In a conventional conflict, strategic air warfare can be decisive, depending on the nature of the enemy, relative industrialization, strategic goals, and a large array of other factors. Operation Desert Storm again proved the value of strategic and tactical air attacks as coalition air forces

destroyed the capability and will of the Iraqi military to resist. However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to prove the decisive potential of conventional strategic bombing. It is enough to point out that forces capable of accomplishing strategic air warfare form an essential part of the US power projection potential. Only the Air Force has the organic capability to perform conventional strategic air warfare decisively. Therefore, cutting resources for this primary Air Force function will not reduce redundancy between the services, it will only reduce this nation's capability to accomplish a critical mission.

The Tough Choices

To recapitulate, the defense budget is apportioned based on an artificially derived method that does not address the relative merit of the service functions. DOD Directive 5100.1 assigns primary and collateral functions to each service. The intent is to promote service effectiveness, efficiency, integrate operations, and reduce overlap and redundancy in order to promote economy of resources. This directive also states the assignment of collateral functions "may establish further justification for stated force requirements. ...[but they] shall not be used as the sole basis for establishing additional force requirements."³⁸ DOD Directive 5100.1 presents a methodology for evaluating the utility of the service functions. Primary functions for which there is a decreased utility in the current and future threat environment are likely candidates for decreased funding.

Acquiring future capability for the express purpose of performing a collateral function is wasteful. Reducing such capability already acquired will promote the objectives of DOD Directive 5100.1. Based on these measures of merit, the following service functions are candidates for reduced funding:

Table 5--Candidates for Reduced Funding
<u>Navy</u> Primary Functions: Sea Control, Protecting Sea Lines of Communication Capabilities: Forces with the primary assignment of projecting power ashore beyond those that are essential to the prosecution of naval campaigns
<u>Marine Corps</u> Capabilities: Forces with the primary assignment of conducting land operations that are not essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign
<u>Army</u> Capabilities: Heavy forces primarily intended to counter the Soviet/Warsaw Pact land threat
<u>Air Force</u> Primary Function: Strategic Air and Missile Warfare (Nuclear) Capabilities: Forces with the sole assignment of supporting the primary function of strategic nuclear warfare

Table 5 is not exhaustive in its content, nor does this chapter cover all of the primary and collateral functions. It does suggest a methodology the Department of Defense and Congress could use to reduce the defense budget based on the future international threat environment and the shift towards developing a better power projection capability. There are no dollar amounts attached to this analysis. If the results were used to prioritize proposed reductions by service, the largest impact would be felt by naval forces, followed by land and air forces.

CHAPTER 8 NOTES

- 1 Caleb Baker, Robert Holzer, and Barbara Opall, "Services Gird for the Funding Fray," Defense News (September 2, 1991): 4.
- 2 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Building A Defense That Works for the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 369. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., February 22, 28; March 14, 21, 22, 27; April 25, 1990, HASC 101-83. This remark was addressed to General Dougherty during hearings in front of the Defense Policy Panel on 27 March, 1990. General Dougherty's response: "That third and third and third is really diabolical. It seems to me that is the way committees compromise. It is absent a strategic thought."
- 3 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 70.
- 4 Phillip S. Meilinger, Lt Colonel, USAF, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today," Parameters 19 (September 1989): 81. Colonel Meilinger is currently serving as a faculty member for the Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies.
- 5 James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, "Secretary Forrestal Announces Results of Key West Conference," (Office of the Secretary of Defense radio release number 38-48, March 26, 1948): 1.
- 6 Ibid., 2.
- 7 Ibid., 2.
- 8 Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 25, 1987).
- 9 Ibid., 13.
- 10 Ibid., 11.
- 11 Ibid., 17.
- 12 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Projection Forces and Regional Defense (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 281. 101st Cong., 1st sess., March 10; April 20; May 2, 15; June 5, 1989. S. Doc 101-251, pt. 4. This statistic was quoted by Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics during his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on 5 June 1989.
- 13 The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III, Secretary of the Navy, and others, "The Way Ahead," US Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1991): 44.
- 14 DOD Directive 5100.1, 16.
- 15 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Projection Forces and Regional Defense, 38.
- 16 DOD Directive 5100.1, 18.
- 17 Ibid., 13.

- 18 Gene D. Hendrickson, Colonel, US Marine Corps, "A Vision of the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette 74 (February 1990): 14. Colonel Hendrickson was assigned to the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command at the time he wrote this article.
- 19 Ibid., 14.
- 20 DOD Directive 5100.1, 16.
- 21 Ibid., 16.
- 22 Ibid., 16.
- 23 Ibid., 13.
- 24 Ibid., 14.
- 25 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Army as a strategic Force in 90s and Beyond," Army 40 (February 1990): 21.
- 26 DOD Directive 5100.1, 19.
- 27 Department of the Army, AirLand Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters United States Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August, 1991), 11.
- 28 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters; United States Air Force, 16 March 1984), 3-7.
- 29 Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Global Reach--Global Power (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1990), 12.
- 30 DOD Directive 5100.1, 20.
- 31 AirLand Operations, 35.
- 32 Global Reach--Global Power, 12.
- 33 Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 85.
- 34 Ibid., 85.
- 35 Global Reach--Global Power, 13.
- 36 DOD Directive 5100.1, 19.
- 37 Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 December 1989), 348.
- 38 DOD Directive 5100.1, 13.

SUMMARY

Potential for Decisiveness

Decisiveness is a relative concept that is dependent on the nature of the contingency, the operational environment, and strategic objectives. Each of these factors help determine which type of force or force mix is best suited for a particular contingency. Arguments that one medium or service can be decisive for all potential contingencies are ludicrous, yet some service apologists seem to do just this. Those who claim that early American history proves one service has an advantage over another are ignoring current realities. Dramatic changes in the international and domestic environments must be taken into account if the US is to forge a strong national power projection capability for the future.

Changes in the International and Domestic Environments

The dissolution of the Soviet empire has resulted in major changes in DOD future planning. Since the Korean War a massive forward deployment of US military forces helped contain the expansionist proclivities of the world's other superpower. Yet the end of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has not resulted in an end to regional conflict. The international power structure is no longer bipolar but multipolar in nature. Insurgencies, civil wars, border disputes, and even invasions continue despite the advent of a "new world order." High-tech weaponry and instruments of mass destruction are proliferating throughout the Third World, increasing the chance that a conflict may require a US response. Reduced access to forward bases and prepositioning depots will hurt the service's ability to respond to a crisis. At the same time, changes in the domestic environment are influencing how the services are planning for future responses. The American way of war has always favored quick, decisive conflict that risks a minimum of American lives. Vietnam reasserted the need to have clear objectives and popular

support for any conflict requiring US participation. New fiscal imperatives are forcing the services to "build down." In response to these influences, the services are rewriting their doctrine to emphasize the power projection mission.

Power Projection Doctrine

Each service has taken a slightly different tack in their doctrinal efforts. The Navy and Marine Corps are moving from a maritime strategy based on a large forward presence to developing a more expeditionary force. Traditional missions such as sea control, protection of the sea lines of communication, and amphibious assault will remain, but increased emphasis will be placed on developing forces that can rapidly deploy and sustain themselves without need for extensive support from the shore. The Army has developed, in conjunction with the Tactical Air Command, a doctrinal guide titled AirLand Operations that envisions a strategic Army with a good expeditionary capacity and a mixture of armored, light, and special operations forces. The Air Force's Global Reach--Global Power declares the Air Force is dedicated to joint operations, while the inherent characteristics of airpower give it an unparalleled ability to project power abroad.

Developing a Future Power Projection Capability

Since the services all proclaim that joint forces produce a necessary synergy, combining the attributes each service claims for its forces will result in a set of aggregate characteristics needed for future contingency responses. These characteristics are flexibility, deployability, mobility, survivability, and lethality. Tailoring future forces to have these characteristics can result in a more effective, efficient response capability. Using a holistic approach, it is possible to shed some light on the question of how these forces should be structured. The results of this analysis indicate airpower has a distinct advantage over surface forces for many of the most likely power projection contingencies.

Coping with Fiscal Constraints

Apportioning the defense budget to achieve the most effective and efficient force mix is a difficult process. Allocating resources by giving one-third to each military department makes little sense, especially with a shrinking force structure. The Department of Defense should seek to maximize capability by preserving the forces that are most capable in a power projection role. One instrument that exists for the very purpose of reducing redundancy and promoting effectiveness and efficiency is QQQ Directive 5100.1. This document assigns primary and collateral functions for each service and specifies that funding requests cannot be based solely on the need to develop forces for secondary functions. Comparing primary service functions to future power projection requirements can form a basis for establishing funding requirements. Table 5 in Chapter 8 shows the functions and capabilities that are likely candidates for reduced funding. Based on this methodology, the largest impact would be felt by naval, followed by land and air forces.

Making the Tough Choices

The United States is evolving towards a strategy of deterrence through power projection and away from maintaining a massive forward presence. This paper is not advocating our military and civilian leadership arbitrarily favor one service over another when allocating resources, yet that is exactly what has happened in the past. The "33-33-33 percent" formula for each service is about as arbitrary as it gets. To build a vibrant power projection force capable of maintaining the security of the United States, its allies, and friends, someone will have to make the tough decisions. Basing these decisions on a fair, unbiased comparison of the advantages air, land, and sea power offer to a future power projection force is an absolute imperative. The results will indicate airpower will play an increasingly dominant role in future contingency responses.

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APPENDIX 1

POWER PROJECTION FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

Flexibility

A flexible power projection force should be interoperable, versatile, adaptable, and expandable. Interoperability means the ability to efficiently operate with the forces of other services and nations. A versatile force is capable of adapting to changing circumstances and threat environments while preserving the ability to perform a variety of actions. Expansibility addresses the capability to rapidly expand forces to fit a particular contingency through the use of reserve elements.

Deployability

Deployability is best described as the ability to globally project forces from forward bases or the CONUS, without respect to range or terrain limitations. Since a contingency requiring a joint US military response could conceivably occur virtually anywhere in the world, a power projection force tied to any single medium will not suffice. US forces must have a capability to deploy through the air and over the land and sea. They must also be able to respond when needed, either immediately or on a follow-on basis.

Mobility

Closely related to deployability, mobility addresses the ability to move where needed, either for the purpose of force application or in support of deployed forces. Mobility encompasses strategic and tactical mobility, inter/intra-theater movements, on interior or exterior lines.

Survivability

US power projection forces must be capable of operating in a multitude of threat environments, including conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical. Forces must be designed to limit American and allied casualties to the maximum extent possible.

Lethality

This characteristic is defined as the ability to quickly defeat an opponent while minimizing noncombatant casualties. Forces must be capable of striking at the periphery or at the heart of an enemy, depending on the operational and strategic objectives.