Iraq: Impediments to Democracy and the Role of Coalition Forces
Abstract
As USCENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks suspected might be the case when he urged planners to anticipate the possibility of catastrophic victory, the military outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom was never in doubt. Coalition forces decisively defeated the Iraqi military in a matter of days and Saddam Hussein's governing Baathist regime quickly fell. Contrary to the speed and efficiency of the battlefield victory, however, subsequent Coalition efforts to stabilize Iraq and effect regime change to a democratic (i.e. representative) form of government have proven anything but decisive. A year later a variety of overwhelming contextual factors continue to impede stabilization efforts and the transition to democracy. These factors include historic divisive tribal, ethnic, and religious fracture lines; a lack of precedent; and a pervasive antiwestern disposition. This paper focuses on identifying military courses of action (COAs) available to the operational level Coalition force commander to help bring democracy to Iraq. COAs identified include ensuring Coalition members remain committed; broadening the Coalition; recruiting Arab and other non-western coalition members; constructively engaging moderate clerics, while neutralizing extremist clerics; and stemming the flow of insurgents in Iraq.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 18, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA425933
Entities
People
- Warren J. Mcchesney Jr
Organizations
- Naval War College