Paramount Interest: Command Relationships in Amphibious Warfare
Abstract
In 2001, U.S. amphibious forces abandoned sixty years of established command and control doctrine, replacing the traditional senior-subordinate relationship between Navy and Marine commanders with coequal command. Why did it change? This paper examines the development of amphibious doctrine during World War II, when command relationships were worked out under fire. There were differences between the Pacific and European theaters, reflecting the service traditions of the landing forces, as well as British command traditions. Comparing U.S. experience with command models at Guadalcanal and Tarawa with that used at Salerno highlights contrasts between the two approaches. There have been many changes both in technology and practice in amphibious warfare since World War II. An overview of these developments shows why the old doctrine needed to change and how new practices made change possible. Modern amphibious practice works well in the slightly hazy uncertainty of coequal command, which provides flexibility to the joint task force commander. As the Expeditionary Strike Group concept develops, the advantages of coequal command should not be forgotten.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 18, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA425987
Entities
People
- Hitch Peabody
Organizations
- Naval War College