Carrots or Sticks?: Libya and U.S. Efforts to Influence Rogue States
Abstract
Dramatic changes in the international system since the early nineties, namely the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 ascendancy of the Bush Doctrine, have left many to wonder whether Cold War era influence strategies such as deterrence, compellence, and engagement are viable against new U.S. threats rogue states. This thesis will examine U.S. efforts between 1986 and 2004 to convince Libya to cease its support for international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. influence strategy towards Libya was a short term failure and a long term success. The compellence and deterrence policies established by President Reagan and strengthened by later administrations served to isolate Libya economically and diplomatically and set the conditions for successful conditional engagement. Positive behavior change by Libya began first with the Clinton Administration's introduction of conditional engagement. The Bush Administration, benefiting from years of Libyan isolation and the positive response to conditional engagement, continued to engage Libya in an incremental fashion. Libya renounced its terrorist ties in August 2003 and weapons of mass destruction in December 2003. Since then Tripoli has taken actionable steps to verify this change of policy and both governments are currently on course for reconciliation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA427119
Entities
People
- Jamie A. Calabrese
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School