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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Under current arrangements of the federated intelligence production program, each of the Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) at the Combatant Commands has responsibility for regularly scheduled finished intelligence in their area of operation or area of expertise. If current proposals to change the programs for shared production and federated intelligence are enacted, in the event of a crisis, the command joint intelligence centers will lose an important capability to leverage intelligence assets in support of Joint Force commanders. Restructuring the shared production program from its origins in the Cold War, with the primary emphasis on enemy order of battle, to a program flexible enough to meet the needs of Combatant Commands facing a variety of asymmetric threats makes sense. Taking the next step towards abandoning all scheduled intelligence production is short sighted at best and potentially dangerous to U.S. forces. As a nation with global interests and alliances, we cannot predict where the next "hot spot" will emerge therefore there will always be a need for certain baseline intelligence products addressing military geography, cultural intelligence, etc. to support planners and operational forces. Without established relationships and oversight, the federated intelligence process activated to support commands in a crisis is destined to waste time and resources. Finally, if support for shared production and federation is not forthcoming from the national level, additional resources need to be provided to the Command J2s in order for them to develop their capabilities internally.					
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
**What's a JIC to Do?**

**By**

**Mary E. Quinn  
Department of Defense**

**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily  
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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**18 May 2004**

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## Abstract

Under current arrangements of the federated intelligence production program, each of the Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) at the Combatant Commands has responsibility for regularly scheduled finished intelligence in their area of operation or area of expertise. If current proposals to change the programs for shared production and federated intelligence are enacted, in the event of a crisis, the command joint intelligence centers will lose an important capability to leverage intelligence assets in support of Joint Force commanders.

Restructuring the shared production program from its origins in the Cold War, with the primary emphasis on enemy order of battle, to a program flexible enough to meet the needs of Combatant Commands facing a variety of asymmetric threats makes sense. Taking the next step towards abandoning all scheduled intelligence production is short sighted at best and potentially dangerous to U.S. forces. As a nation with global interests and alliances, we cannot predict where the next "hot spot" will emerge therefore there will always be a need for certain baseline intelligence products addressing military geography, cultural intelligence, etc. to support planners and operational forces. Without established relationships and oversight, the federated intelligence process activated to support commands in a crisis is destined to waste time and resources. Finally, if support for shared production and federation is not forthcoming from the national level, additional resources need to be provided to the Command J2s in order for them to develop their capabilities internally.

## Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Background (How the System Worked)	3
Changes (& Why they Matter)	9
Recommendations	11
Conclusion	17
Appendix A: Extracts from DOD Directive Number 5105.21	19
Appendix B: Intelligence Dissemination –PUSH/PULL (Diagram)	20
Bibliography	21

## List of Illustrations

<b>Figure</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Page</b>
1.	Intelligence Products	5
2.	RFI process for Components	6
3.	Production Responsibilities by Component	14-15
4.	Dissemination Process (PUSH-PULL)	20

## INTRODUCTION

Under the current arrangements of the federated intelligence production program, each of the Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) <sup>1</sup> at the Combatant Commands has responsibility for regularly scheduled finished intelligence in their area of operation or area of expertise. To supplement the efforts of the JIC, our allies in Canada, United Kingdom and Australia have agreed to produce intelligence in areas where they have greater expertise or presence as part of intelligence exchange programs. Since the development of the process in early 1990s, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has had management responsibility for federated intelligence production within the Department of Defense. The J2 element of DIA managed the federation arrangements among the commands and the Directorate for Analysis (DI) has been the production functional manager for the DoD Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP). In general, national level organizations (DIA and the service production centers) refer to the process as adherence to DoDIPP and it is more likely to be thought of in terms of federated intelligence production or the shared production program by the commands. As program manager, the Director of DIA held overall responsibility for General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funds that paid for all of these activities at DIA, service centers and Command JICs.

DIA has been reevaluating its missions and functions and the DI in particular has been moving further away from its traditional areas of emphasis in intelligence production and reconsidering how engaged it should be as an organization in managing the federated production program. The agency's decision is beyond the scope of this paper so it is not going to be addressed except in those instances when it directly effects the operations of the

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<sup>1</sup> EUCOM has a Joint Analysis Center or JAC at RAF Molesworth UK per an agreement with the British government, rather than a Joint Intelligence Center. For clarity, however, only the abbreviation JIC will be used in this paper.

JICs. This paper will assess the effects these changes will have on the Command Joint Intelligence Centers specifically by addressing three questions. First, is there still a need for scheduled intelligence production at the Combatant Command level or would the limited JIC assets be used more effectively in another way to support operational forces fighting asymmetrical threats. Many of the "product lines" of intelligence analysts originated during the Cold War when there was a clearly defined threat; is the requirement for the Commands to maintain order of battle data on all of the countries in their area of operation an outgrowth of that mindset or is there still a need to produce this data? The second question is whether the federated intelligence process, the facet of the shared production program activated in crisis situations, has performed as planned? Finally, if the commands have to take on more responsibility for intelligence production, is it reasonable to expect them to do so without a realignment of GDIP resources?

Based on interviews, research, and Lessons Learned reports from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the preponderance of evidence shows a need for a coordinated program for intelligence production. There is a direct linkage between a functioning shared production process and the effectiveness of federation support during a crisis because the shared production process gives partner organizations an opportunity to develop relationships prior to a conflict and confidence in the work of their colleagues. There needs to be a reallocation of GDIP personnel billets and resources if Command J2s are expected to maintain the current level of support to their components and take on additional management responsibilities for intelligence production. If the J2s do not receive the additional resources, they will be forced to make the hard choices over the

missions and issues their JIC can cover and which ones are dropped, and then hope they have chosen wisely.

## **BACKGROUND (HOW THE SYSTEM WORKED)**

In the defense drawdown following the Gulf War and as a result of lessons learned, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) issued findings for improving the preparation and dissemination of finished intelligence. Specifically, the recommendations cited measures for leveraging the assets of a smaller intelligence community in a way that would still afford policy makers and military commanders coverage of all of the regions of the world of interest to the U.S. The directives and studies prepared subsequent to the ASD (C3I) findings clarified some of the relationships that had generally been laid out in the joint publications on intelligence, and the subsequent Joint Pub 2 series delineated how the ASD (C3I) memorandum would be implemented at the national and operational level. There had been small scale delegated production programs for order of battle data but, with the Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP), a program was formally established across defense intelligence in June 1993 with the stated goals of:

1. Integration of General Military Intelligence and S&T Intelligence analysis to make all of the experts more readily available to the community.
2. Set shared policies, goals and responsibilities.
3. Minimize duplication.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> "DoDIPP 101 Briefing" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, accessed 4 April 2004), available from SIPRNET at: <http://dia.smil>. Briefing is unclassified.

The principal members would be organizations receiving General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funds, i.e., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Combatant Commands, the Service Production Centers (National Air and Space Intelligence Center, National Ground Intelligence Center, Office of Naval Intelligence), and our commonwealth allies. Because of its position vis a vis the GDIP, DIA assumed leadership of the production program specifically through the Director of Analysis (DI) as the production function manager (PFM) and the J2 taking the lead in coordination with the commands.<sup>3</sup>


The process of centralization, and the ceding of autonomy, was not universally welcomed by all of the participants initially but gradual buy-in was developed in large measure through the investments DIA made in the infrastructure to support the program. Using GDIP funds, the agency was responsible for creation of the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM), which gave all of the command JICs a means for submitting requests for information directly to the national community in support of their commanders' priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and a way to track the progress of the requests, and also contributed to the development of INTELINK<sup>4</sup>. The DoDIPP or shared production program (SPP) became a useful guide for planners in programming intelligence production because it clearly laid out the divisions of labor and responsibility. Given more time to plan, the intelligence staffs at the commands would not waste resources in duplicative efforts and would be able to identify gaps in coverage in their region earlier. With their smaller staffs (relative to DIA or the service production centers), a JIC commander no longer had to dedicate his limited analytical assets

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<sup>3</sup> See Appendix A for DoD Directive Number 5105.21, dated 18 February 1997, which formally assigned DIA responsibility for defense intelligence production. Pertinent paragraphs of directive are highlighted.

<sup>4</sup> INTELINK is the secure intranet created for the Intelligence Community as a means of sharing information, creating communities of interest on-line, and providing secure communications across organizations. INTELINK access is available via SIPRNET and JWICS.

to every intelligence issue, which could range from infrastructure and military geography, WMD, missile systems, medical intelligence to the ground order of battle for every country in his region. Figure 1 charts the categories of intelligence and the types of intelligence products tracked in COLISEUM that are produced in support of Combatant Command (COCOM) or Joint Task Force commanders.



**Figure 1: Intelligence Products**  
(from Joint Pub 2-01, chapter 3, page III-30)

As designed, after an intelligence problem or gap was identified by one of the command's components, it would be forwarded to J2 or JIC where the staff would assess whether they had the resources to meet that requirement in theater. If the collection or analytical assets were not available, the question was submitted as a Request for Information (RFI)/Production Requirements (PR) into the COLISEUM system. At DIA, the COLISEUM validating officer would determine if there was an existing product that met the requirement and, if there was not, task the requirement to the participant in the COLISEUM program with responsibility for that issue or country. The COLISEUM system was upgraded several times in response to the needs of the users in the field. One of the most important additions to the program was the section on guidance which allowed the requester to explain how the information was to be used to make sure the producer knew the format the information needed to be in, when it was needed and at what level of classification. Figure 2 was prepared by the JICs at SOCOM and CENTCOM to illustrate the process from the component level.




Figure 2 - RFI Process for Components

The federated or shared production program is based on a “push-pull” concept.<sup>5</sup> In addition to the SPP which assigned responsibility for intelligence issues and topics, defense intelligence components have access to their partner’s statements of intelligence interest (SII) so higher echelon organizations could push intelligence products down to units that needed it through the secure systems maintained within the intelligence community. INTELINK has been extremely helpful in providing a quick means for members of the community to pull finished intelligence as needed. Via INTELINK, analysts at the commands can search for specific information from experts in particular areas and collaborate on projects through the communities of interest. The ability to pull specific data as it is produced is one of the greatest advantages to “virtual” federation because analysts from one JIC no longer have to physically deploy to another JIC to support it during a crisis.

In the course of interviews with intelligence analysts at several commands over the past two years, some recurring comments suggest the shared production program is working largely as envisioned<sup>6</sup>. Virtually all of the analysts, no matter what their level of experience, were familiar with the push/pull means (although they may not have identified it as such) for getting intelligence through INTELINK and COLISEUM requirements. The analysts were very clear on their organization’s mission and production responsibility. They had a good understanding of where to go if they needed expertise in a different area and how to identify experts in another mission area in the partner organizations. One of the goals of the DoDIPP

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<sup>5</sup> Appendix B/Figure 4 (page 20) depicts the “Push-Pull” system.

<sup>6</sup> The interviews were conducted as part of the Intelligence Community- Collection Evaluation Program, a congressionally directed evaluation of DoD analysts use of collection resources. The survey data was used for several purposes including evaluation of how well national systems supported Combatant Commanders, level of training, acquisition recommendations. Author of this paper was the program manager of the IC-CEP and conducted the interviews with the analysts at the commands and reviewed the open text responses to the survey. The survey was conducted in 2002 at USFK, PACOM, NAIC & DIA and in 2003 at PACOM, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM.

was to eliminate duplication of effort and allow analysts to concentrate their work on the needs of the supported command. Interviews with Korea analysts working at USFK, USPACOM, and DIA, for example, revealed that each group was able to concentrate on responding to the PIRs at their level, which in turn created the broadest picture possible for defense intelligence on North Korea with minimal duplication of effort.<sup>7</sup> Their comments also suggest the shared production program is working as envisioned. As the DoDIPP or shared production program system matured in terms of connectivity and participants' confidence, the plans for federation support in response to a crisis also matured although the plans were primarily tested in exercises.

The paucity of imagery interpreters in relation to the amount of imagery collected is a generally recognized flaw in our current intelligence system. The inability to process information in a timely manner could become a critical point of failure in the event of crisis when the imagery analysts in theater cannot keep pace with Combat Assessment (CA)/Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) requirements needed for targeting. With the federated intelligence program, before a crisis develops, experts in particular fields have been identified to support the contingency and the details of the support have been brokered through DIA intermediaries ahead of time. Given the operational tempo of the last few years, partners in the intelligence community have had the opportunity to practice the augmentation process and it has been improving consistently. The presence of the GDIP program manager at the center of the process should not be discounted as a powerful motivational tool in addition to the genuine spirit of cooperation.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.: - reflects free text comments from survey and site interviews with analysts at USFK, PACOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM by author.

## CHANGES (AND WHY THEY MATTER)

The federation concept has been field tested to support EUCOM, CENTCOM and SOCOM in OEF, OIF and GWOT and, while the system has yet to reach the elusive goal of “seamlessness”, the general trend appears to be improved processes with participants gaining confidence that it can work. The significant challenge to this progress is DIA’s decision to shift its focus away from scheduled production on countries in all of the regional commands to tailored intelligence products on a select group of high priority countries and issues of interest to defense policy makers. Most countries of the world will fall into the “monitor” status for DIA.<sup>8</sup> The prevailing opinion appears to be to no longer consider the SPP part of a list of deliverable intelligence products for participants but a regulation or recommended “business practices” with the USDI now taking the lead for military intelligence.<sup>9 10</sup>

For the Combatant Command J2, the problem that becomes immediately apparent with this change is that most of the countries in the world for which the combatant commanders are responsible fall into what DIA has identified as “monitor” countries. The potential pitfall to this theory is that since the first Gulf War, with the exception of our current involvement in Iraq, every other country where U.S. forces have been sent has been a monitor state. European Command is increasingly concerned with pockets of instability throughout the commander’s area of responsibility and how to integrate new international

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<sup>8</sup> U.S. European Command (EUCOM) FY 04 Theater Intel Production Meeting Minutes, Aug 03 – The discussion on the shift in emphasis had remained primarily internal to DIA after a series of Town Hall meetings with the Director in the Spring of 2003. The reference to “monitor” only was used during these Town Hall meetings and the term was never clearly defined.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> To determine whether there had actually been a change in DoDIPP/SPP production, I reviewed the DIA Product Knowledge Online website on 12 Apr 2004 (via SIPRNET) and saw that no new products in support of deliberate planning or infrastructure had been posted/published within the last 30 days. Based on my experience working at DIA this does indicate a significant decline in production. I also searched the SIPRNET site for the most current references to DoDIPP and found the following agenda item for the 22 June 2004 Military Intelligence Board Meeting “After DoDIPP – the Way Ahead” to discuss the restructuring of the GDIP community.

partners into U.S. military operations.<sup>11</sup> Similar issues confront the commanders at each of the regional combatant commands. Much of the intelligence preparation work for contingencies is being shifted back to the COCOM J2's but it is being done without a concomitant shift in assets with which to do that work. That puts the J2 staffs and JICs in an untenable position. DIA has reassured the commands that the agency can turn production back on quickly in the event of a crisis, but much of the detailed work that cannot be done at the commands cannot be turned around quickly at the national agencies either, notwithstanding the experience of the analysts working at the national level. For a rough comparison of scale in terms of analytic depth, in the survey of analysts conducted at DIA and JICPAC in 2002, DIA had approximately 700 analysts working in 22 mission areas while JICPAC had approximately 80 analysts working in 10 mission areas.<sup>12</sup>

The federation agreements that were activated in support of CENTCOM for OIF were largely deactivated before summer in 2003.<sup>13</sup> According to several of the lessons learned reports, the federated intelligence support, especially with regard to target development support, battle damage assessment, and missile Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) was critically important to forward deployed forces.<sup>14</sup> Overall, sixteen different intelligence functions were federated during OIF with 12 partners (service centers, allies, commands) participating in the process in support of CENTCOM and EUCOM.<sup>15</sup> Managing

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<sup>11</sup> EUCOM FY 04 Theater Intel Production Meeting Minutes, Aug 03

<sup>12</sup> Hendrickson, et.al.

<sup>13</sup> Gliot, MAJ Edward. Briefing "(U) Crisis Intelligence Federation ISO Operation Iraqi Freedom"(S/REL UK) (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency/J2O, 23 April 2003, accessed 4 April 2004); available from SIPRNET site: <http://dia.smil>.

<sup>14</sup> Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS)- Long Report Format Number 41436-94678 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Tampa, FL: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 13-April-2003, accessed 26 April 2004); available from SIPRNET site: <http://centcom.smil>.

<sup>15</sup> Briefing "(U) Crisis Intelligence Federation Partners: Operation Iraqi Freedom" (S/NF), "(Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency/DI, 3 April 2003, accessed 4 April 2004); available from SIPRNET site: <http://dia.smil>

the process, which involved deployment of personnel and assets as well as virtual support, required a tremendous amount of coordination from small offices in the JCS/J2 and DI. Yet the DI office is likely to be cut even further. To expect JIC staffs to take people from their already lean staffs to manage shared production and federated agreements for crisis support will drain resources that are already stretched thin.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the premises of this paper is that there is a need for an organized plan or schedule for intelligence production in support of the COCOMs. Regularly scheduled intelligence products tend not to be sexy and generally suffer in comparison to the higher visibility work of preparing warning estimates and doing policy support. Nevertheless, the detailed work put into a contingency support package or human factors analysis becomes critically important to commanders in the field as soon as U.S. forces get warning orders for deployment. Every producer of intelligence should be encouraged to innovate when it comes to finding ways to get her finished product to the people who need it in the most expeditious way, but innovation in delivery or format does not mean that the base product is no longer of value.

If the Combatant Commands are formally given responsibility for management of shared production and crisis federation support, there are several alternative scenarios for how the system will be changed:

Alternative 1: All production is locally driven. Each J2 determines what needs to be produced to support his or her combatant commander such that requirements within defense intelligence are completely independent and flexible to meet the needs of that particular

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commander. There is no longer any centralized control of the process, which thus eliminates a layer of bureaucracy in getting materials from the producer to the consumer.

Alternative 2: No organization prepares any formal "products". Intelligence personnel at commands and service centers concentrate on developing expertise in specific fields and responding to ad hoc requirements. This alternative eliminates the need for analysts to spend time on products that sit on shelves, and helps ensure that responses to requirements are always current and tailored to the specific need of the customer.

Alternative 3: Each of the partner organizations and commands will continue to produce intelligence in accordance with their DoDIPP or shared production program "lane in the road" but they will do so without external management or oversight.

For each of the alternatives, the federation process could continue but it is internally directed by the commands without DIA involvement. The benefit of leveraging assets continues but DIA does not have to get reengaged in the process. The other option would be for each command to plan on using only those assets available in theater in the event of a crisis.

Evaluation of Alternative 1: This alternative provides the J2 and the JIC commander with considerable flexibility in determining how they use their assets but it also imposes more work on the JIC managers, who now assume even more production management responsibility. The J2 should be very confident that he can anticipate every contingency in the region because he is going to have to do long term planning on future issues with the current work force while recognizing that there is not any guaranteed partner organization with collaborative production responsibility. The JIC may look for additional support from the component intelligence organizations but these efforts will have to be done in a way that

they do not infringe on service equities. Work will likely be done more expeditiously but there is no safety net for areas or issues that do not get covered.

Evaluation of Alternative 2: Like alternative 1, this option is attractive because it gives the JIC commander flexibility in meeting mission requirements. Practically, it presents a challenge because it is difficult to develop expertise in creating target folders or doing imagery analysis without actually creating the folder and reading out imagery. It is much more reassuring to know that the JIC staff has put support packages together before the crisis rather than waiting for the crisis to test the theory. Preparing detailed analysis on a short suspense in the event of a crisis with only a collection of ad hoc responses to draw from would not necessarily lead to the most cohesive, complete work to support planners.

Evaluation of Alternative 3: As much as some of the participants may have chafed at DIA's position as the production function manager in the shared production plan, having a central manager did allow the group to establish some standards for quality control and consistency which made it easier to exchange products among organizations. If the commands opted to create their own federation process, there would have to be a method to guarantee consistency and quality control.

Evaluation of Federation Alternatives: The success or failure of group managed federation would be almost completely personality dependent, which makes it inherently risky. Since none of the commands have "enforcement" authority over their peers (which DIA retained through the management of GDIP funds), compliance with federation agreements would be contingent on the goodwill among the participants. The experiences of OEF and OIF demonstrate that it is unrealistic to expect that a command could meet all of its

crisis intelligence production needs with internal assets unless the crisis was extremely limited in scope and time.

None of the alternatives offer an optimal solution but Alternative 1 is probably the most viable course of action. Unless the JIC leadership is able to negotiate for additional support from their component intelligence organizations, some missions and functions will have to be dropped. Figure 3 depicts the existing production responsibilities for the JIC and the components in the theater.

PRODUCTION - PART ONE					
	Indications & Warning (I&W)	Current Intelligence	General Military Intelligence	Target Intelligence	Science & Technology (S&T)
Joint Staff J-2/DIA	Principal agent, worldwide, theater backup	Department of Defense focal point for fused all-source analysis and reporting	Intelligence communications, All-source assessments, Manages Defense Intelligence Agency distribution process (DIP)	Supports Commander in Chief (CINC) / joint task force battle damage assessment cell. Train target (intelligence) personnel	Manages Department of Defense scientific and technical centers, coordinates scientific and technical intelligence requirements with CINC, provides joint captured materiel exploitation center personnel support
Combatant Command J-2	Theater expert, operates I&W center	Authoritative theater estimates, maintains data bases	Theater assessments, maintains data bases, DIP participant	Target system analysis, produces target validation materials, battle damage assessment validation target development, target notation	Validates national technical intelligence requirements, coordinates movement of captured materiel

<b>PRODUCTION - PART TWO</b>					
	<b>Indications &amp; Warning (I&amp;W)</b>	<b>Current Intelligence</b>	<b>General Military Intelligence</b>	<b>Target Intelligence</b>	<b>Science &amp; Technology (S&amp;T)</b>
<b>Subordinate Joint Force J-2</b>	I&W consumers; monitors / reports	Mission specific intelligence; prioritizes request for intelligence	User of general military intelligence; tailors to joint task force focus	Collates operational battle damage assessment; target analysis; target development; target neutral	Executes technical intelligence mission in the operational area
<b>Subordinate Joint Force Components</b>	I&W consumers; monitors / reports	Customers; provide request for intelligence to joint task force joint intelligence support element	Intelligence Production Schedule	Report mission battle damage assessment; target analysis; identification; target development; target neutral; weaponing	Provide technical intelligence collection requirements to forces
<b>Military Services</b>	I&W consumers; train personnel in defense I&W system	Customers; augment National Military Joint Intelligence Center	DPP participants; augment joint intelligence center production	Train target personnel; provide specialized functional products	Manage scientific and technical centers; provide personnel augmentees to joint task force; provide specialized analysis

**Figure 3: Production Responsibilities by Component**  
 (from Joint Pub 2-01, Appendix H, pages H-5 & H-6)

In the event of a crisis, there has to be a central focal point for arranging support for the command in conflict. Hoping that all of the participants will work well together when they have not trained together and no one is clearly taking the lead is folly. The commands can agree among themselves on a plan for rotating leadership of the federation program or they can adopt one of the recommendations from the JFCOM OIF Lessons Learned report and delegate this authority to STRATCOM<sup>16</sup> but they cannot afford to find themselves in the midst of a crisis without a plan that has been tested beforehand.

Most importantly, if the trend is going to continue with DIA analytic emphasis focused more evenly between support to policymakers and warfighters and less on regularly scheduled production, there has to be a realignment of resources within the defense

<sup>16</sup> (FOUO) Joint Lessons Learned -Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Major Combat Operations (S/NF). (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 1 March 2004, accessed 7 May 2004); available on SIPRNET at: <http://jfc.com.smil>.

intelligence community with a shift of GDIP funded billets back to the Command JICs. The J2 at DIA is not currently staffed to take on the responsibilities handled by the DI in terms of analytical support to the commands or management of federation agreements.<sup>17</sup>

The analysts assigned to the DIA/J2 are focused on current intelligence issues and they are regionally or country focused; they have not been hired or trained to become experts in information operations or C4IEW. The JICs, which lost people with the creation of consolidated Defense HUMINT Service and the larger analytic staff at the Service Production Centers and DIA, will need to have billets returned to handle their larger work load. Adding the military billets to the Combatant Commands may not be as difficult as transferring civilian billets because for years DIA has had difficulty filling military billets when personnel PCS because the priority for the services has been support to the operational units. DIA may have some limits in the number of people it can shift to the J2 because of restrictions on the number of people assigned to the Joint Staff, but the current J2 staff is stretched very thin and will not be able to take over complete responsibility for managing federation without some assistance.

There is still a need for scheduled production because the schedule helps maintain focus on the bigger picture as well as minimize the number of gaps in coverage. As noted, most of the places where U.S. forces have deployed in the past 10 years were places that were not on the radar scope as pre-identified "hot spots" so had a JIC not been tasked with maintaining current data on that area and submitting RFIs through COLISEUM we would have been at a distinct disadvantage.

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<sup>17</sup> Sper, M.K. and Michael S. Jackson, interview by author, Washington, DC, 3-4 April 2004.

Federation worked in OIF because the massive influx of data rapidly overwhelmed CENTCOM, as it would have any command, and without pre-existing federation agreements, the process that was already criticized as being too slow would have collapsed on itself. The critical part to making federation work is that there has to be an outside "disinterested" party to broker the agreements and to have some incentive to encourage participants (e.g., control over GDIP funds). If DIA chooses to withdraw from the process completely, the COCOMs will probably be able to negotiate support agreements vis a vis crises in their regions but enforcing the agreements will be a greater challenge because no command really has leverage over another (without poisoning the working relationship they were trying to facilitate in the first place).

## CONCLUSION

The Joint Intelligence Centers at the commands are uniquely tailored in their structure and mission to best meet the needs of their components and their commander but, as a group, the partners in the DoDIPP/shared production program have made significant progress in their ability to support each other and produce complementary intelligence work. If DIA opts to refocus its efforts with regard to scheduled intelligence production, the commands should not follow suit and lose the synergy that has been gained from working together. There will always be a need for certain baseline intelligence products to support planners and operational forces; military geography, cultural intelligence, and enemy weapons are always essential elements of information whether U.S. forces are facing a standing modern army or a group of terrorists. Given the United States' position as the world superpower and the fact

that we cannot predict where the next crisis will emerge, it is dangerous to be dismissive of any region of the world as unimportant.

There are limits, however, on how many times an organization can be told to “do more with less”. If the Joint Intelligence Centers are going to be given additional responsibilities, they should be given additional GDIP resources with which to do them. Within a theater, it may be necessary to look at a realignment of service intelligence assets and COCOM assets as well.

Finally, despite the good intentions of all of the parties involved, the shared production program and federation process work more effectively when they are managed externally by someone or some organization that can mediate disagreements, set standards for quality control, and represent the interests of the participants with the National Intelligence Community. This could be done by increasing the staff in the DIA/JCS J2 office or by ceding responsibility to STRATCOM or by establishing a process for a rotating chief of SPP among the commands, but someone needs to be clearly in charge of the process.

## Appendix A

Extracts from DOD Directive: NUMBER 5105.21

Dated February 18, 1997

SUBJECT: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

### 6. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

6.1. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency advises the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the ASD(C3I) on all matters concerning military and military-related intelligence; is the principal advisor on substantive intelligence matters to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the ASD(C3I); is the principal DoD intelligence representative in the national foreign intelligence process; and, with the agreement of the Heads of the DoD Intelligence Components, is responsible for coordinating the employment of DoD Intelligence Components' personnel and resources to satisfy DoD intelligence requirements. In the exercise of these responsibilities, the Director, DIA, shall:

6.1.2. Provide peacetime, crisis, contingency and combat intelligence support to the operational military forces.

6.1.3. Provide military intelligence support for the policy and planning activities of the DoD Components and, as appropriate, for similar activities of non-DoD national authorities.


6.1.4.1. Serve as Program Manager of the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP); develop the GDIP as an input to the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP); participate in the NFIP approval process; and oversee execution of funds appropriated for GDIP and GDIP-related activities.

6.1.8. Prepare intelligence assessments and estimates concerning transfers of technology, goods, services, munitions, and associated transfer mechanisms and participate in interagency, national, and international fora on such transfer matters as are provided for by DoD Directive 5105.51 (reference (i)) and DoD Directive 2040.2 4(reference (j)).

6.1.9. Provide intelligence biography, reference library, and research services, as appropriate, to facilitate accomplishment of the DoD Intelligence Components' mission.

6.1.24. Establish product standards for, exercise technical and quality control over, oversee the establishment of requirements for, and manage the non-duplicative, scheduled and unscheduled production of, integrated scientific and technical, and general military intelligence for all DoD Intelligence Components; and establish and maintain a DoD-wide system of distributed intelligence production.

## Appendix B



**Figure 4: Dissemination Process (PUSH-PULL)**

(From Joint Pub 2-01, Appendix H, page H-7)

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