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THESIS

**THUMPING THE HIVE: RUSSIAN NEOCORTICAL
WARFARE IN CHECHNYA**

by

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CHECHNYA**

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ABSTRACT

Since the 1994 Chechen war, analysts have written volumes about the evolution of—and lessons learned from—this ongoing conflict. Why has success eluded this Cold War superpower in subduing the small Caucasian republic? Russia has since hiccupped back and forth across the spectrum of conflict in the region and the years have provided much speculation as to why. For a decade, researchers have described Chechen terror, erosion of the Russian military, and the inconsistent resolve of the Russian population to support the Kremlin's actions. These are significant independent variables that might explain Russian failure in 1994. However, another less tangible factor—Richard Szafranski's paradigm of Neocortical Warfare—may explain Russia's poor performance in the initial invasion and the improved performance in 1999.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

AAR—After-Action Report

COTS—Commercial Off-The-Shelf Technology

FAPSI—Russian Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information

GRU—Russian military’s Main Intelligence Directorate

HUMINT—Human Intelligence

IPB—Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

MOUT—Military Operations on Urban Terrain

MVD—Russian Interior Ministry

OODA—Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act

PA—Public Affairs

PSYOP—Psychological Operations

REB—Russian Radio Electronic Combat forces

RIC—Russian Information Center

RPG—Rocket Propelled Grenade

SIGINT—Signals Intelligence

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1994 Chechen war, analysts have written volumes about the evolution of—and lessons learned from—this ongoing conflict. Why has success eluded a Cold War superpower in subduing a small Caucasian republic? Russia has since hiccupped back and forth across the spectrum of conflict in the region and the years have provided much speculation as to why. For a decade, researchers have described Chechen terror, erosion of the Russian military, and the inconsistent resolve of the Russian population to support the Kremlin's actions. These are significant independent variables that might explain Russian failure in 1994. However, another less tangible factor—Richard Szafranski's paradigm of Neocortical Warfare (described in section D of this chapter)—may explain Russia's poor performance in the initial invasion and the improved performance in 1999.

To evaluate this concept, this paper will examine the influences of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and battlefield communications—prime factors in influencing combatants' perceptions—to gauge these factors' effects on the relative Russian performances in the separate invasions. In the course of this evaluation, the author will attempt to elucidate the interrelationships of information warfare, asymmetric warfare, and terror. He will then hold the results up to the Neocortical lens to evaluate whether the concept is pertinent to the ongoing conflict in Chechnya.

A. HISTORY

Pitted against the determined, resourceful Muslim tribes of the mountains and forests of the Central Caucasus, Russia's military forces compiled a frustrating record that reflected many of the difficulties inherent in armed conflicts between Western-style, conventional armies and non-Western, unconventional forces in theaters lacking a highly developed transportation and communications infrastructure common to urbanized societies. Repeated Russian failures, the product of errors and the increasingly skillful leadership of the resistance, forced Russian military analysts to reexamine their approach.¹

¹ Robert F. Baumann, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 1.

This passage, from Dr. Robert F. Baumann's *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*, was published in 1993 and described Russia's effort to subdue the Caucasus from 1801 to 1864. Contemporary historians and scholars have witnessed obvious parallels to the current Russian push into the Caucasus. Analyst Les Grau, writing in 1995, described more recent events in the region, where "[t]he Chechens turned every city, village and hamlet into a fortress and inflicted serious casualties on the Russian columns."² History has, in many ways, repeated itself.

In 1801, Russia found itself attempting to subjugate elusive mountaineers who were "able tacticians on the defense or in staging small guerrilla-type incursions", whose "experience taught them never to engage a superior enemy when he could bring his full power to bear but rather to use nature as their ally and lure the enemy into combat on unfavorable terms."³ Russian military officers, confronted by this vexing situation in the Caucasus, offered solutions and analyses throughout the 19th century. Commander of Caucasus forces General Ermolov (1816-27) sought to clear and secure roads throughout the Caucasus. A young officer from the General Staff, Captain I. Mochulskii (1837), wrote of Chechen spiritual and military prowess in an inhospitable terrain; he described bad logistics, training and morale amongst Russian troops. Another, Captain Dimitrii Miliutin (1839-43) advocated better understanding the local culture while promoting trade and industry in order to subdue the Caucasian populace.⁴ In the late 1850s, the Russian General and viceroy of the region, Prince Bariatinskii destroyed villages, crops, and forests, "leaving the Chechens to choose between death, flight, or settlement on Russian territory."⁵

Eventually, staff analysis and dogged resolve facilitated decisive action and the Russian empire prevailed, capturing the insurgent leader Shamil in 1859. The region took on many characteristics one identifies with the American western frontier in the same era as Saint Petersburg sought to establish control via a collection of military

² Lester F. Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny," INSS Strategic Forum 38 (July 1995), 4.

³ Baumann, 7.

⁴ Ibid., 19-20.

⁵ Ibid., 26.

outposts. A tribal native population grumbled under the offered civilization; the imperial system, in turn, displayed a particular arrogance toward its new responsibility, exemplified by Ermolov's famous assertion (inscribed on his statue, erected by Stalin in Grozny in 1949): "There is no people under the sun more vile and deceitful than this one."⁶

Stalin evidently shared Ermolov's views regarding the Chechens; his paranoia, when juxtaposed with the aforementioned difficulties in subduing the Caucasus, prompted that people's mass deportation to Central Asia during the Second World War. This was one event in a series of such deportations, which sought "...to remake the ethnic map of the Soviet Union through the deportation of whole nationalities, allegedly in the interest of security... In effect, these operations applied the principle of the purge to the nationalities; their purpose was to achieve ethnically homogeneous populations in sensitive areas, thereby eradicating any putative source of disloyalty."⁷

One can imagine the reaction in a people whose cultural heritage held revenge in high regard, especially after having witnessed the end of the mighty Tsarist Empire in the 1917 revolution. (The Chechen independence movement grew alongside the Bolsheviks, but once Lenin was firmly in power he quashed Chechen nationalism as actively as had his predecessors.) During World War II, Stalin exiled the parents of 1994's Chechen guerrillas and one could surmise that the experience was vividly communicated to the next generation:

They would not have been pushed out into eternal exile so energetically and swiftly had it not been that regular army units and military trucks were assigned to help the *Organs*. The military units gallantly surrounded the auls, or settlements, and, within twenty-four hours, with the speed of a parachute attack, those who had nested there for centuries past found themselves removed to railroad stations, loaded by the trainload, and rushed off... Within one day their land and their property had been turned over to their "heirs"... they were exiled solely on the basis of *blood*. There was no filling out of questionnaires; Party members, Heroes of

⁶ Aleksei Ermolov, quoted in Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 62.

⁷ Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 290.

Labor and heroes of the still-unfinished war were all sent along with the rest (*italics in original*).⁸

The “heirs” Solzhenitsyn describes were usually ethnic Russians, especially petroleum engineers and apparatchiks loyal to Stalin. These reliable *homo sovieticus* families did indeed move into the vacated Chechen homes and radically changed the region’s demography. When Khrushchev brought the exiles back to Chechnya in 1957, each was given 1000 rubles to buy back his home, but the thirteen years away from Chechnya had served to galvanize the often-quarreling tribes into a national identity. There is nothing that Khrushchev or his successors could have done to prevent or mitigate the collective fear of Russian expulsion and occupation that now characterizes Chechen nationalism.

These feelings, like those of other Soviet nationalities, gained a striking effervescence in the interim between 1989 and 1991. As the Berlin Wall dropped and Mikhail Gorbachev allowed the Warsaw Pact to crumble along with it, many former Soviet Socialist Republics sought and gained independence. Former Soviet Air Force Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev emerged as champion of Chechen secession. As armed groups sprang to life, so did kidnapping and theft; the once-robust Chechen economy declined appreciably as petroleum production and distribution subsequently grew more problematic—industry professionals simply left and oil transport lost its profitability. The Yeltsin government made hollow threats to “defend constitutional order”⁹ as nationalist fervor skyrocketed and the northern Caucasus grew less civil and secure. By 1992, the Soviet armories in Chechnya had all been looted of their military hardware.¹⁰

Fired by nationalism and the desire to secede, hyper-aware of every historical offense from the north, rich in national resources and well-armed unemployed males, Chechnya was now volatile.

⁸ Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973), 84.

⁹ Gaal and deWaal, 98.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 113.

B. EROSION OF RUSSIAN MILITARY POWER

The Russian government stood on the brink of utilizing its forces to invade this angry republic in its southern periphery. To preserve the nation's sovereignty, Russia's military forces would likely be tasked to move into the Chechen capital to capture or eradicate the center of resistance. This effort would, of course, require a capability to conduct Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT).

One scholar estimates that "the Soviet Army freed 1,200 cities from the German Army"¹¹ in the drive from Stalingrad to the Reichstag. Commanders had gained the knowledge that successful urban warfare necessitated at least a 4:1 ratio in the attack, a blockade to seal off the city, and plenty of trained light infantry to seize and defend buildings along the line of march. Fire support from accompanying tanks and artillery was essential, as well as a working command, control, and communications apparatus to coordinate attacks.¹²

By the 1980s, however, Soviet emphasis on urban warfare had withered in favor of a more likely mechanized conventional confrontation on the plains of central Europe. When Russian troops did move on Chechnya's capital, however, other problems made themselves evident. The eleventh-hour formation of ad-hoc units to take Grozny not only brought confusion to the battle, but also eradicated the possibility of any unit cohesion. Soldiers must train together to comprise an effective unit, down to the squad level.; grabbing warm bodies from a variety of sources in order to fill assault vehicles directly contradicts this practice. A RAND study compiled in 2001 reveals, however, that this dangerous practice existed higher up the chain as well:

The Russian army was simply in no shape to fight a war. It had not held a divisional or regimental field exercise since 1992. It suffered tremendous shortages of junior officers and qualified NCOs. The military was

¹¹ V.G. Reznichenko, *Taktika* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 326; quoted in Andrei Raevsky, "Russian Military Performance in Chechnya: An initial evaluation," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1995): 682.

¹² Olga Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 6-7.

receiving perhaps 30-40 percent of its requirements for funding and supplies, and not a single regiment was at full strength.¹³

This inadequate training and hastily cobbled order of battle also enabled fratricide. If previously unacquainted infantrymen could not dismount a tracked vehicle together and protect it, one can imagine the difficulty in safely calling for fires and close air support. Ineffective night vision capabilities and inadequate maps in the hands of armed, untrained, and inexperienced conscripts exacerbated the problem.

The Russian Air Force, which had destroyed its miniscule Chechen counterpart early in hostilities and confronted a hardly formidable air defense system, could not fly in adverse weather. As Russian military affairs expert Pavel Baev writes in his assessment of Russian air operations in Chechnya, “on average, during December-February in Chechnya there are up to 95 percent of heavy cloud and fog days.” The most capable aircraft over the Chechen battlefield was the Su-24, which, regardless, was hindered by the same readiness circumstances. Baev points out that these pilots held an average of only 20-40 flying hours within the previous year, undoubtedly due to vastly curtailed funding. Money was short, but so were supplies; Baev states that only around half the required fuel, lubricants, and spare parts were made available to Russian ground crews. “In order,” he writes, “to maintain even this minimal level of supplies for a task force of roughly 140 combat aircraft, the Air Force Command had to strip the reserves of many units in other military districts.”¹⁴ A quick downward spiral in Russian Force readiness levels ensued, where “cuts in financing inevitably lead to reduced maintenance, and this also results in an increased accident rate.”¹⁵

Rotary-wing assets were in similar straits. The shrinking inventory held largely older helicopters and thus necessitated round-the-clock work in available maintenance facilities.¹⁶ Thus both the Russian air and ground forces revealed marked erosion in capability vis-à-vis that of the Cold War. If one looked at the usual operational factors like spare parts, money, and technology, he could predict continued erosion in Russian

¹³ Ibid., 14.

¹⁴ Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Airpower in the Chechen War: Denial, Punishment, and Defeat,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 10, No. 2 (June 1997): 9.

¹⁵ Ibid., 14.

¹⁶ Oliker, 57.

performance. The improvement between the invasions of 1994 and 1999, however, demands that researchers look beyond these reports to assess Russian military operations in Chechnya.

C. CHECHEN USE OF TERROR

Instances of terrorism are worthy of discussion in any analysis of the Chechnya situation, as these changed its character. Events at Budennovsk, Kizlyar/Pervomaiskoe, and Moscow's Nord-Ost Theater hold some common characteristics, but each is a clear example of greater asymmetry within this conflict.

Recent Chechen terror is usually described as a consequence of liberal Russian air and artillery strikes. Baev's airpower assessment for the 1994 effort is a prime example:

If the assumption was that a terrorized and demoralized population would deny support for resistance fighters, it failed to take into consideration such features of the Chechen national character as staunch dignity, pride in independence and tribal loyalty... [The devastation wrought by air strikes] invariably produced outrage and determination to continue resistance. Military aircraft had become a symbol of a cruel force that punished the innocent but missed the brave. In fact, the indiscriminate bombings had made it possible—at least in the eyes of many Chechens—to justify and even glorify such acts of terrorism as seizure of hostages in hospitals in Budennovsk in June 1995 and Kizlyar in January 1996.¹⁷

Indirect fire of any sort, indiscriminate but highly destructive munitions fired by a usually invisible enemy, brought forth a logically asymmetric response from Chechen fighters. When Shamil Basayev attacked the local police station and seized the hospital at Budennovsk in June of 1995, a standoff ensued and led to at least two botched attacks by the elite Russian Alpha counter-terrorism unit and a number of dead hostages. The media was present and became a key factor in the event:

The dramatic television pictures of women hostages screaming and waving sheets at the hospital windows had already been transmitted round the world and shaken the whole country. It was an absolute public relations disaster for the government. Suddenly Russian forces were seen as the brutal ones... In an unprecedented step, [Prime Minister] Chernomyrdin actually negotiated direct with Basayev over the phone.

¹⁷ Baev, "Russia's Airpower...", 7.

The atmosphere crackling with tension, the Russian prime minister allowed television cameras into his White House office to film his negotiations with Basayev...¹⁸

Eventually, the siege ran its course and after five days of negotiations, Basayev gained seven buses, approximately 100 hostages (which included government deputies and sixteen Russian journalists), and a refrigerator truck to carry the fourteen Chechen dead on a two-day trek back to Chechnya.

The effects of Budennovsk were immediate on both sides of the fight. Basayev, of course, became a Chechen national hero. The aforementioned “absolute public relations disaster”¹⁹ had a similar profound effect on the Russian populace:

The Russians, handed the proof that the Chechens were terrorists, should have been able to take the moral high ground for once. Yet through their own incompetence and heavy-handedness they ended up the losers. In the final analysis, as many people died in the Russian attempts to storm the hospital as in the Chechens’ original attack on the town. Many in the country, while loathing the Chechens, blamed the government for allowing it to happen. The raid was seen as a direct consequence of the war, and the law enforcement agencies were shown as incapable of protecting the population from terrorism.²⁰

If Budennovsk was ugly, the January 1996 hostage raid on Kizlyar and subsequent siege of Pervomaiskoe—both in the more Russia-friendly republic of Dagestan—emerged uglier for Russian government forces. A Chechen insurgent leader, Salman Raduyev, led 250 guerrillas on another bus trip to Pervomaiskoe, where the Russians reinforced their cordon around the city. Subsequent attacks, led again by elite Alpha teams with coordinated rotary-wing, armor, and artillery support, proved unsuccessful:

...the Russians pulled back their infantry and pulverized the city with firepower. However, the Chechens had already exfiltrated through the Russian positions before the village was destroyed. The media covered

¹⁸ Gaal and deWaal, 270-1.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 275.

the assault and reported the excessive military and civilian casualties, causing a general public condemnation of the Yeltsin government's conduct of the war.²¹

The Russian response to these acts, and to the later hostage situation at the Nord-Ost Theater in Moscow, followed a pattern: unexpected incidents beyond Chechnya's borders, dead hostages, and international scrutiny via broadcast media. One scholar has stated that "[t]he Chechen weapon that brought down the Russian giant is terrorism."²²

After ten years, however, Russian forces are back in Chechnya prosecuting a war; so the aforementioned line of reasoning may be a bit premature. Yeltsin's advisor on Ethno-national Relations, Emil Pain, argues that after Budennovsk the Russian populace grew more supportive of government initiatives to send troops into the Caucasus. The Kremlin needed little help to demonize Chechen insurgents, and Pain describes the emergence of "something akin to mass hatred for Chechen terrorism," supported by consistent *Literaturniaia Gazeta* polls in late 1999 that made Basayev the most hated person amongst the Russian citizenry.²³ When one considers further that it is this Russian citizenry that re-elected Yeltsin in the wake of Chechen terror attacks, it is hard to support the implication that the Chechens have emerged victorious by using terror in this battle of wills.

One must also consider that the Chechen culture is well-suited to conduct both terror and asymmetric warfare. Professors John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik describe this culture as "fiercely independent" and inform the reader that:

It is part of their lore that they come together to fight for autonomy from empires. The ways in which Chechen society revolved around kinship-based relations were reinforced by a very deep sense of economic community, and an instinctive will to fight "infidels" inspired by Islamic culture... [M]ost Chechens were included in either the Naqshabandiya or Qadiriya *tariqat*, the Islamic orders that demand spiritual perfection from

²¹ Robert M. Cassidy, *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), 46.

²² Diane Lee Sumner, "Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya" (Graduate thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1999), 1.

²³ Pain, "The Second Chechen War: The Information Component," *Military Review*, Vol. LXXX, No. 4 (July-August 2000), 64.

their members. These orders provided the ideological basis and organizational forms that inspired resistance to imperial Russian expansion for over three hundred years.²⁴

The network structure inherent in Chechen society as well as the ideological strength of Islam are ideal enablers for terror operations.

The Russian response to Chechen terror is also pregnant with consequences that support the Chechen secessionist cause. “Military force,” states one RAND study, “can result in friendly casualties and the death of innocent bystanders; it can create terrorist martyrs and provoke retaliation; it can alienate world public opinion and reduce international cooperation...” Declaring war on terrorist leaders, this work further advises, “invites open-ended asymmetrical contests.”²⁵

D. NEOCORTICAL WARFARE

These arguments regarding the under-funded Russian military—with its old equipment and lack of MOUT training, confronting an enemy that does not play by the rules of conventional warfare—are coherent, but not complete. If one measures progress on the battlefield by tangible metrics like casualty counts and destroyed equipment, then these arguments carry some importance. One could draw graphs and exclaim “...over 120 dead at the Nord-Ost Theater!” or “The company made it back from Grozny with only 20 percent of its tracked vehicles!” if so inclined. When, however, one takes a diligent look at the conflict, there are other metrics to take into account. As the U.S. tragically learned in Mogadishu, when fighting a low-tech swarm of insurgents on urban terrain, this sort of corporate boardroom mentality—one obsessed with numbers, technology, and inventories—does little to predict victory. There is a less tangible variable that demands greater attention:

Guerrilla war is not dependent for success on the efficient operation of complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the

²⁴ John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 22, (1999), 210.

²⁵ Brian Michael Jenkins, forward to *Countering the New Terrorism*, by Ian O. Lesser, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), xii.

accuracy of electronic computers. Its basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his machines. He is endowed with intelligence, emotion, and *will* (italics mine).²⁶

On July 15, 2004, retired Army Major General and former Commandant of the U.S. Army War College Robert Scales supported this viewpoint before the House Armed Services Committee when he asserted that, “The center of gravity in war is no longer the enemy’s army, it’s the enemy’s people.”²⁷ If this intangible variable in the equation of conflict is “will”, how then can a combatant manipulate that variable’s value amongst both the enemy and his own troops?

Theorist Richard Szafranski, in his work “Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill,” asks this very question. He posits that militaries emphasize the brain’s left hemisphere, “where the enemy is a system, an assemblage of production nodes controlled by an organic brain. The campaign applies physical force to these nodes, as targets, using a presumed calculus that assesses effects on the whole system.”²⁸ He then suggests employing the brain’s right hemisphere to enable viewing “conflict as warfare against minds and envisioning weapons as any means used to change the enemy’s will.” The merging of these two hemispheric approaches produces a new mindset for fighting wars. “Neocortical Warfare is warfare that strives to *control* or *shape* the behavior of enemy organisms, but without destroying the organisms. It does this by *influencing*, even to the point of regulating, the consciousness, perceptions and will of the adversary’s leadership: the enemy’s neocortical system (italics in original).”²⁹

Szafranski then mentions John Boyd’s famous OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop paradigm, stating that the neocortical warfighter can disrupt his adversary’s

²⁶ Samuel B. Griffith, introduction to *On Guerrilla Warfare*, by Mao Tse-Tung (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 7; quoted in Cassidy, 25.

²⁷ Jason Sherman, “National Security School Called Essential for U.S.,” *Air Force Times*, 16 August 2004, 21.

²⁸ Richard Szafranski, “Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill,” in *In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 403-4.

²⁹ Ibid., 404.

OODA loop and therefore retard its cyclic pattern while tightening his own loop. The enemy's mind becomes the *Schwerpunkt*—the targeted center of gravity—for the neocortical attack:

[The protagonist seeks to influence] the adversary leaders' perceptions of patterns and images, and shapes insights, imaginings and nightmares. This is all brought about without physical violence. It is all designed to reorganize and redefine phenomenological designators to lead the enemy to choose not to fight.³⁰

To assail an enemy in this fashion demands effort, resources, and skill. The protagonist must understand the adversary's culture, perspectives and values; using this understanding he can influence and even manipulate the minds of both his own and the enemy's troops.

Russia's method of warfare has not subdued Chechnya, but her troops have not been forced out of Chechnya either. In fact, Russia's left-brain dominant approach to warfare has been augmented since 1994 by attention to the softer, right-brain facets of combat. Regarding the traditional left-brain approaches to warfare, Russian forces are better preparing the battlespace with intelligence and have improved their ability to communicate within that battlespace. If this concept of Neocortical Warfare is applicable to Chechnya, evidence will show that Russian efforts in both Public Affairs and Psychological Operations have occurred since 1994 and are having concrete effects on the adversary's consciousness, perceptions and will. One can then make the case that in the near future Russian strategic thinkers will graft the two "brains" together and make the leap to the neocortical paradigm.

This thesis will attempt to verify the following matrix regarding attention to the aforementioned 'softer' facets of warfare:

³⁰ Ibid.

Case	IPB	PA	PSYOP	Battlefield Comms
1994	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited
1999	Improved	Improved	Improved	Improved

Table 1. Matrix.

The results of this attempt will reveal whether the Neocortical Warfare paradigm is applicable to the previous decade's Russian experiences in Chechnya.

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II. 1994 INVASION

In reviewing the events of 11 December 1994, one can surmise that the Russians were riding the left hemisphere into catastrophe. Some preliminary, scattered bombing occurred in Grozny before tanks entered the city. The Russian parliamentarian Anatoly Shabad, who celebrated the first day of 1995 in Grozny, suggests that, like Prague in 1968 or Moscow in 1991, Russian commanders believed that tanks would “go and park in the town, and that way create political pressure so the government would not be able to survive any longer.”³¹

Russian troops entering the capital were suffering from all the symptoms of the aforementioned erosion in military capability—“underpaid, poorly equipped, poorly clothed, and uninformed about the purpose and goals of the operation.”³² Three separate armored spearheads rolled toward the capital, confident of victory. The plan was to take the railway and broadcast stations, as well as the presidential palace. This blueprint eerily resembled the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; the template was used as successfully in Afghanistan in 1979.

The series of events that led to the committal of Russian troops is disheartening. The Kremlin wanted to invade Chechnya and kept its consultation with the military to a minimum. Defense Minister Grachev, once given the warning order, threw himself into making it happen but failed to adequately prepare his soldiers for the task. “There was no apparent concept of operations behind the incursion beyond a vaguely defined injunction to disarm illegal formations and to lend fire support to MVD troops.”³³

The invasion’s initial history is well documented. Chechen guerrillas allowed these heavy Russian columns to advance toward objectives and then initiated ambushes with snipers and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). The cooperation between Russian

³¹ Gall and deWaal., 14.

³² Cassidy, 30.

³³ Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Russia’s Air War in Chechnya,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 19, (1996), 378.

infantry and armored vehicles was abysmal. Entire units were wiped out as Chechen fighters took generations of revenge culture and lessons learned fighting in forests and adapted these to the urban battlefield.

Appendix J: Lessons Learned from Russian Military Operations in Chechnya 1994-1996 in *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3 Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT)* holds some disturbing statistics for the left-brain analysis. The ratio of lost armored vehicles to the total is 105:120 in the initial attack on Grozny; the Chechen anti-tank teams were thus batting about .875. The Chechen success curve dropped to about .700 soon after New Years' Eve, but this lapse in performance may have been eclipsed when the guerrillas expunged approximately 1000 soldiers from the Russian 131st Maikop Brigade at Grozny's central railway station. This brigade ceased to exist, and later interviews with survivors offer some clues as to why:

Survivors... said they had no idea they were driving towards such a big battle. Their orders were vague and unrealistic... [T]hey were ordered to go into the city 'without arms, and no shooting'.³⁴

Russian commanders failed to arm their troops with pertinent information or guidance; the adversary showed no such shortcomings:

...Chechens had been preparing for the battle of Grozny for at least 3-4 months before Russian troops entered the city. During this time they developed war plans, divided up zones of responsibility, trained their militia, and *set up effective communications*. In fact, they were putting into practice all the things that Soviet analysts had identified as key lessons of World War II... The rebels were well-trained and drilled, many of them veterans of the Soviet military who had apparently retained more of their training than had many of their Russian counterparts... *[T]he rebel soldiers knew their city well...* Closely set buildings and a network of underground passages enabled them to change position unseen by the Russians (*italics mine*).³⁵

By the end of February the Russians had capitalized on their previously-mentioned artillery and air superiority and drove the Chechens from the capital. In August 1996 the insurgents attacked and took Grozny back, a victory that eventually brought negotiations and Russian withdrawal.

³⁴ Gaal and deWaal, 13.

³⁵ Olikier, 16-7.

By the time Russia brought her troops home in 1996, Western sources calculated that 20-30,000 had died on both sides of the conflict;³⁶ all of which were technically citizens of Russia. Moscow's treasury had doled out "upward of \$5 billion in direct operating expenses, not counting the additional costs of aircraft and vehicles lost or damaged... Ministry of Defense arrears in wages and debts to suppliers now total over \$2 billion."³⁷ The effects of this operation on Russian society and economy beyond these numbers would be difficult to calculate.

Envision the blindfolded man lurching toward a piñata, swinging away with a sledgehammer. A closer look reveals this unfortunate man's emaciated physique, the result of a few years of malnourishment and relative inactivity. His hammer is chipped and scratched, but still functional. While his colleagues have not spun him around and disoriented him, they have pointed him in roughly the right direction and kicked him in the seat of his pants. These colleagues know also that if he is successful in smashing the piñata, he'll wander around disoriented and later clean up the mess after the goodies have been harvested.

As the conflict in Chechnya developed, however, the perception of both the contest and the Grozny piñata had changed; the metaphorical protagonist, however, doggedly kept swinging away at a target that was mobile and did not play by the rules.

A. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (IPB)

IPB is a tool commanders employ "to decipher the effects of the terrain, weather, and threat in order to predict how the enemy will act to help the commander select the best course of action for the friendly unit."³⁸ Doing so, while protecting one's own capabilities from enemy analysis, gains what the U.S. military calls "information operations". Filtering, fusing, and filing this information into a useful product helps military leadership to gain "decision superiority". The product of this is "intelligence".³⁹

³⁶ Ibid., 375.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, *Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for Urban Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), xv.

³⁹ Ibid., 4.

The Red Army had focused since the Second World War on its tanks charging through the Fulda Gap to assail NATO. The envisioned tank-on-tank war of destruction on the plains of Central Europe, however, was quite different from taking down a modern city. One would surmise that one of two Cold War superpowers would have little trouble subduing one of its secessionist republics, especially given the relative ground, air, missile, and electronic orders of battle. Russia still held both space-based and air-breathing reconnaissance platforms—though, again, the post-1989 erosion of military capability applies. A quick left-brain analysis would conclude that the culture, which blasted the word sputnik into the American vernacular, could easily monitor the activities of rebellious tribal guerrillas.

High-tech, however, does not translate into high situational awareness in the urban battlespace:

Buildings and infrastructure tend to degrade the capability of imaging and communication equipment. Urban infrastructure, including electricity, media, satellites, and other resources, increase the capabilities and numbers of people producing, sharing, and receiving information via television, Internet, telecommunications, and radio. The masses of people in an urban area simultaneously provide more sources of information in the form of HUMINT (human intelligence) and act to overwhelm the collection and analysis that all-source intelligence can provide. The sheer density and diversity of all features of an urban area—buildings, infrastructure, people—flood extant technologies in ways that often make information superiority unreachable.⁴⁰

This assessment assumes that the protagonist is interested in preparing the battlespace before pumping blood and treasure into it. In the neocortical context, “We cannot hope to influence or condition what we do not understand.”⁴¹

Indeed, reconnaissance aircraft and satellites were not the only legacies of the Soviet power structure. Former dissident Sergei Kovalyov describes the 1994 incursion as:

...a purely Soviet chain of events in which the most important thing was not to make the best decision, but to ensure that the boss was always right: ‘It is a law of Soviet politics. Not a single adviser in the Soviet system

⁴⁰ Ibid., 5.

⁴¹ Szafranski, 409.

can allow himself to say something different from what the boss wants to hear. That means he falls out of the system, he is not playing by the rules... Of course a nomenklatura politician, if he is dealing with the Chechen issue, of course he thinks about solving it, but the main thing for him is not that problem at all. The main thing is to coincide with the opinion of the boss.’⁴²

One therefore wonders if—even if it had performed to its potential—the Yeltsin government would have listened to its intelligence apparatus’s objective assessments. In order for this system to reach that potential, though, it would have to have been organized and tasked in some efficient manner. The President’s irrational response to November’s failed black operation to unseat Dudayev provided little time or incentive, however, to emphasize efficiency in planning. Only after the true strength of the Chechen adversary was revealed in reports of twisted, blackened Russian equipment and smoking corpses, did the government begin to worry about which of its ministries was responsible for IPB.

The Defense Ministry held only limited capability to collect intelligence inside Russian territory, so the counter-intelligence arm, the FSK (successor to the KGB’s domestic directorate) was charged to do so. The Ministry of the Interior (MVD), meanwhile, had little reconnaissance capability, so it chose a more reactive rather than proactive approach to IPB—it appeared that the MVD’s method was to compile Chechen order of battle by exposing its own troops to fire.⁴³ While a huge waste of blood and treasure, this method was more reliable than principle FSK sources. “The FSK’s information was undoubtedly fatally flawed since its main source was the self-serving anti-Dudayev opposition (within Chechnya).”⁴⁴

If the failure of Russian intelligence services to assess the adversary’s strength is (at its most benevolent assessment) due to bureaucratic confusion, its failure to orient its troops to Chechnya’s terrain was criminally negligent. Tsarist military engineers had laid Grozny’s cornerstone, after all, and Soviet city planners had surveyed and built its infrastructure. One could therefore expect military leadership to provide an accurate map of the city for Russian invasion forces in 1994, and in numbers that would facilitate

⁴² Gall and deWaal, 167.

⁴³ Ibid., 208.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

navigation, delineation of unit boundaries, and fire support for units down to company level. “Their maps were outdated and tended to be out of scale. On the other hand, the Chechens emphasized detailed reconnaissance and updated maps as part of their doctrine.”⁴⁵

Chechen IPB was certainly more thorough in most ways. A 1999 interview with Aslan Maskhadov reveals a particular diligence in the 1996 Chechen offensive:

I had been planning this operation for 6 months, as we always believed that the war would end with the recapture of Grozny. I thought about it constantly, even to the point of conducting radio rehearsals to provoke a Russian reaction. I had studied the maps, the Russian positions, the approaches, the routes of advance; I had everything ready. We held meetings with our commanders who gave us their intelligence reports. We had reconnoitered every inch, we knew the disposition of every Russian position, the numbers, the roadblocks, everything.”⁴⁶

Tourpal Ali-Kaimov, another Chechen leader, elaborates further:

[O]ur normal routine included a map reconnaissance, followed by a foot reconnaissance and then bringing the reconnaissance asset back to headquarters with his map. Chechen scouts briefed commanders and planners personally. Whenever possible, we ordered another reconnaissance mission to confirm the results of the first... Traditional reconnaissance methods were augmented by human intelligence and reconnaissance performed by elders, women, and children. Virtually every Chechen was an intelligence collector [and were] provided Motorola radios to enable timely reporting... The Russians did not possess the same quality or quantity of maps, nor did they conduct effective reconnaissance of the city to verify or validate the maps they did possess.⁴⁷

These interviews go on to mention a robust HUMINT network, often using females, traders at marketplaces, and captured soldiers from large Russian garrisons to better understand Russian bases, personnel, arms, stockpiles, and morale.

Clearly, in 1994, the Chechens held the advantage in IPB. A prime example of this lay in the Russian leadership’s “mirror imaging” in analysis of Chechen planning for

⁴⁵ Robert K. Ackerman, “Echoes of Chechnya Warfare Resound in Moscow, Quantico,” *Signal*, Vol. 54 No. 9, (2000), 41.

⁴⁶ David P. Dilegge, “View from the Wolves’ Den: The Chechens and Urban Operations,” in *Non-State Threats and Future Wars*, ed. Robert J. Bunker (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 2003), 178.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

the defense of Grozny. In fact, one can envision that leadership spreading one of their inadequate city maps on a big table, circling objectives with a marker, and then discussing the way to defend those objectives in order to develop possible Chechen courses of action. This practice is understandable if one is fighting a tabletop exercise. Somewhere along the way, however, this process diverged from reality—where one reviews data from collection platforms to determine enemy dispositions and possible courses of action—to a role-playing game where someone decided the Chechens would defend their capital against an armored attack much like the Soviets defended Kursk against the *Wehrmacht*. No one appeared to recognize the hazards of predicting a vastly different adversary's intent and possible responses via a fifty-year-old template—and the plan to take Grozny emerged accordingly:

Russian intelligence estimates established that the Chechen command had created three defensive rings to defend Grozny: an inner circle around the Presidential Palace; a middle circle up to five kilometers from the Palace and an outer circle that passed mainly through the city outskirts. The middle and outer defense rings were fortified strongpoints, while the inner line consisted of prepared positions from which to deliver direct artillery and tank fire.⁴⁸

The Chechens, of course, were not going to cooperate. If, for example, they did occupy a position it was temporary and was sited either in a basement or a building's upper floor in order to counter the elevation limitations in Russian main tank guns. The temporary nature of these positions was a facet of what Russian forces did encounter—the Chechen “defensive defense,” one that emphasized the mobile and elusive qualities of Chechen urban tactics. “By the time the Russians brought the necessary firepower forward to reduce the strongpoint, the Chechens would have already abandoned the position, further frustrating the Russians.”⁴⁹ This frustration, of course, bred impatience, inspiring Russian ground units to charge headlong into the city center, where the Chechens could ambush their armored columns in conditions where RPGs and snipers held the advantage.

⁴⁸ Dale R. Smith, “Commonalities in Russian Military Operations in Urban Environments” (Graduate thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 26.

⁴⁹ M.W. Kelly, “Grozny & The Third Block (Lessons Learned from Grozny and Their Application to Marine Corps MOUT Training)” (Graduate thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000), 18.

This disturbing and pervasive desire to use what had worked in the past, however, may have also seemed helpful when the Russian government began dealing with the media in the wake of this ill-fated invasion.

B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)

“...Russia’s invasion of Chechnya in December 1994 showed a far more advanced state of organizational decomposition and disarray than previously realized.”⁵⁰

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the event was facilitated by Gorbachev’s policy of *glasnost*, in which he called for “‘publicity’ of information, about the ills afflicting the system, for only such ‘openness’ could counteract ‘bureaucratic distortions’ and unleash the creative intelligence of the population.”⁵¹ This “publicity” opened the barn door and all the mutant animals of the system ran out into the corral; the Soviet farm’s shareholders ended up tearing the farm down to build a new one. The Yeltsin government, therefore, should have been aware of the importance of managing the media conduit; the average Russian could now turn on the television and see his government’s shortcomings—including the product of the aforementioned mirror imaging in Grozny. Governments are created and maintained because there are certain responsibilities that only governments can carry out. Securing media support for the execution of these responsibilities is imperative:

Any government worthy of its name has to do what it thinks necessary for the good of the country, but its course can be greatly eased if it has public opinion on its side. Decision making demands a knowledge of how the people are thinking and feeling—and why.⁵²

There seemed to be little attention paid to getting the Russian public solidly behind the Chechnya intervention. Perhaps the Yeltsin government figured that simply repeating characterizations of Dudayev’s administration like Aleksandr Rutskoi’s of October 1994—“This is not democracy, it is banditry.”⁵³—would suffice.

⁵⁰ Stephen J. Blank, “Preparing for the Next War: Reflections on the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in *In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 68.

⁵¹ Malia, 412.

⁵² Lloyd A. Free, “The Role of Public Opinion,” in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 118.

⁵³ Gall and deWaal, 97.

When Russian forces entered Chechnya a short time after Rutskoi made this remark, both Russian and international journalists were given outlandish freedom to roam and record the operation's progress. The Chechens took full advantage of this marvelous media bonanza. Anecdotes of insurgents risking their lives to bring journalists to the action are common,⁵⁴ but this was only a standard tactic in the overall operation to broadcast their perspective to the world:

The rebels were very open to press interest, granting interviews and generally making themselves available to domestic and foreign journalists. But they were not averse to more creative approaches. For instance, the few tanks the rebels had were dug into multistory buildings in the center of the city. When the Chechens fired from these positions, Russian returned fire inevitably hit civilian housing, schools, hospitals, and day care centers. When the cameras recorded and sent these images home, the Russians looked especially heartless, and the Chechens appeared even more the victims.⁵⁵

The Chechens also remembered Afghanistan and its role in fracturing the politburo's credibility vis-à-vis its own populace. State newspapers like *Pravda* had repeatedly shown happy Afghan children receiving new schools from smiling Soviet paratroops. Meanwhile these soldiers came home and each—whether silently from a sealed coffin or angrily from behind a bottle—had imparted the ugly truths of that conflict to his fellow Soviet citizens. Chechen insurgents—some of which had fought for the Red Army in Afghanistan—therefore knew the potency of media manipulation and its role in taking down a superpower.

When the Russians secretly accompanied opposition forces into Grozny in November 1994, not only did Dudayev's forces soundly defeat this effort (these loyalist fighters, it emerged, would rather loot Grozny shops than carry out the intended coup), but proved Russian participation and exposed false claims in Russian state-run media:

[O]ne of the captured Russian soldiers told his story to reporters under the watchful eye of his Chechen captors in the basement of the State Security building. Andrei Chasov, twenty-one, a small, frightened, sandy-haired boy, said he was a conscript who had served seven months in the Kantemirov Tank Division outside Moscow. Two days before the attack

⁵⁴ Ibid., 18.

⁵⁵ Olikier, 22.

he was sent down to Mozdok and told only that they were being sent to control a demonstration. ‘They told us nothing, they do everything in secret,’ he said. When they reached the edge of town his comrades fled and Chasov was captured, still having only a vague idea where he was... The debacle was made worse by the official Russian news agency Itar-Tass and the First Channel of Russian television, which had been primed to release news of the attack. They flashed up the news that the fight had reached the Presidential Palace and Dudayev was fleeing, then they were forced to make a humiliating retraction.⁵⁶

This passage reveals at least two flaws in the Russian approach to Public Affairs, one a symptom of recent democratization and a second the residue of totalitarianism. Granting journalists unimpeded access to the Chechen opposition and the insurgency’s message, while good for basic freedom in a democratic state, served up the initiative to Yeltsin’s clever adversaries in Grozny. Losing this initiative in the chaos of conflict is a danger that contemporary analysts have mentioned repeatedly:

Potentially, the impact of any event can be raised to the strategic level of war. The “strategic corporal” may be interviewed or filmed by media in the area. Collateral damage or civilian casualties are often fodder for sensationalized news that can enrage both local and international audiences.⁵⁷

The discrepancy between the state-controlled press message and reality proved harmful, though it is difficult to shed habits derived from 70 years of tight control. One cannot help but think of that system’s efforts to distill the news for its population’s consumption via the Soviet Department of Agitation and Propaganda.

In the age of the internet and the digital camera, however, restrictive totalitarian models have proven themselves inadequate:

News reporters are present on the battlefield in greater numbers than ever before... [B]ecause of the proliferation of smaller, more portable media devices, information technology is altering the political landscape of the battlefield. Violence must be applied in a more discriminate manner because even the most minor acts of violence can be broadcast to millions of voters. The more people with portable commercial equipment, the

⁵⁶ Gall and deWaal, 156-7.

⁵⁷ Medby and Glenn, 35-6.

greater the chance that battlefield drama will be recorded... Today, uncensored information can be provided to the public in near-real-time, video form.⁵⁸

The Chechen insurgency was obviously aware of both the advance of technology and the “strategic corporal” concept, where a lone deployed soldier at the tactical level can affect national strategy via the presence of journalists. The Chechens thus used captured Russian soldiers like Andrei Chasov to their advantage. Their use of Grozny noncombatants for cover, concealment, and support, however, enabled even greater gains vis-à-vis the media. The “indiscriminate killing of civilians provides a moral and psychological advantage to the enemy, erodes domestic and international support for the use of force, and strengthens the will to resist among the indigenous population,”⁵⁹ and the Russians certainly provided this stimulus.

One would expect augmented efforts to restrain both the media via access controls and the military via clear and concise rules of engagement. When Russian forces decided to minimize friendly casualties by greater emphasis on bombing and shelling, closing the barn door on media access meant little. By December 1995, analyst Andrei Raevsky was already writing in an international journal that “gross violations of human rights committed by Russian security and armed forces in Chechnya... have been widely reported.”⁶⁰ Again, ugly animals were soon roaming about the corral in front of the international audience.

C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

If Russian efforts to enhance support from their own population via the media bordered on negligence, actions to win Chechen noncombatants over were downright laughable.

The Soviet Union held plenty of experience in Psychological Operations (PSYOP), but the bulk of this lay in its sponsorship of insurgents during the twentieth century. One scholar describes this sponsorship as:

⁵⁸ Sean J.A. Edwards, *Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 43-4.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 59.

⁶⁰ Raevsky, 687.

a vital instrument in Ho/Mao-type wars of national liberation, especially the early stages where revolutions are hatched from grievances of the masses by communist incubation and kept at the right emotional temperature by thousands of native agitators. Without this skillful and massive agitprop and organizational effort, which has been characterized as “half the revolutionary task,” there could be no successful liberation wars... PSYOP use, however, must be carefully calculated in policy and operations to reach the grassroots level. Whoever gets to the people first, with ideas that stimulate self-interest, gains a decisive lead...⁶¹

The conflict in the Caucasus, while dormant during the Soviet period, had been alive for centuries. In their interaction with a tribal society and its rich oral tradition, the Russians may have lost the grassroots Chechen populace the first time the 19th century Tsarist general Ermolov opened his mouth.

There was, however, opportunity in Chechnya for a concerted PSYOP effort against the Dudayev regime. By January 1994, write Gaal and deWaal, there was gunfire in the streets of Grozny and its citizens were huddled around gas rings on stoves to maintain warmth. Black marketers were growing astronomically rich, while unpaid public service employees like doctors and teachers sat at desks in overcoats because the government could not provide heat to their institutions. Public dissent was silent under Dudayev, but it existed, according to the *imam* of central Grozny’s mosque, who estimated that two-thirds of Chechnya’s population opposed their government and its leader. “[Dudayev] has done nothing for the republic,” said the *imam*, who went on to lament the erosion of public respect for mullahs and the lack of a proactive construction program for public needs. Under the Dudayev regime, it appeared, the rich were getting richer while the government failed to build mosques, schools, or hospitals.⁶²

Russian leaflet drops, blaring loudspeakers, and interference with Chechen radio broadcasts were employed,⁶³ but seemed to accomplish little in the face of indigenous resolve to seek independence. A look at the individual leaflets may help elucidate the reason:

⁶¹ William F. Johnston, “Some Thoughts on Psychological Operations,” in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 97.

⁶² Gall and deWaal, 103-4.

⁶³ Arquilla and Karasik, 217.

They were in turns threatening and condescending. ‘Come to your senses! You are protecting not sovereignty and freedom, but the money of Dudayev... that he stole from the people,’ one read. Another, headed ‘Ultimatum’, warned: ‘Any provocation against the Russian forces will rapidly be met with all the might of Russian firepower! Those caught with weapons will be annihilated!’⁶⁴

Chechen families who simply wanted to be left alone thus had to choose between the Russian Scylla and Chechen Charybdis—neither of which promised security or prosperity.

Classic Russian authors like Pushkin and Lermontov had depicted a Caucasus full of bandits and cutthroats, a region perilous to the Russian visitor even almost two hundred years ago. The precedent had thus been set when the “White Book” emerged to elucidate crimes against Chechnya’s Russian population under Dudayev:

It is a depressing catalogue of muggings, kidnaps and murders but it is an insidious document because it misleadingly presents the crimes as having been a deliberately targeted anti-Russian policy by the Dudayev government. The White Book was handed out to Russian soldiers during the war. Almost all the incidents in the book probably occurred, but its unbalanced focus on the sufferings of Russians as an ethnic group consolidated the image of ‘cut-throat Chechens’ and helped to legitimize atrocities by those same soldiers against the local Chechen population.⁶⁵

This is, again, part of a long tradition in Soviet PSYOP. Author Lev Yudovich, in his article “Indoctrination of Hate,” says that Soviet military doctrine cultivated hatred in its troops for three reasons: to inspire a belief in victory, to prepare soldiers to act in dangerous situations, and to psychologically prepare them for the rigors of modern warfare. He cites a passage from a contemporary Soviet scholar to support this conclusion. If one mentally substitutes the word “Chechen” for “Enemy”, he can again perceive the residue of Cold War doctrine and derive the reason the average Chechen could more easily support Dudayev:

In case of war, the Soviet soldier will face a strong and brutal enemy who has been well indoctrinated in a spirit of irreconcilability toward the Soviet people. The Soviet soldier must therefore have a clearly defined attitude for the enemy: hate, contempt, and a feeling of superiority over

⁶⁴ Gall and deWaal, 248.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 116.

them. We must show the soldier the strong and weak points of our enemies. We have to define the enemy in terms of his psychological characteristics (or stereotypes) that are related to his nationality or ethnic group.⁶⁶

The “White Book” certainly served this aim, but one wonders how much effort was really made to indoctrinate these soldiers as they were charging into Grozny in 1994 with no real comprehension of their goals or whereabouts.

Evidence of this failure to psychologically prepare troops is best drawn from the reports of Russian military doctors. One study of 1,312 Russian soldiers in the conflict showed an alarming psychological illness rate of 72 percent. Breaking this number down further, 46 percent displayed depression, lethargy, insomnia, hypochondria, or panic attacks; the other 26 percent included psychotic reactions, “deterioration of moral values or interpersonal relations, excitement or acute depression.”⁶⁷

The Chechens, conversely, excelled in preparing their fighters for the hazards of conflict. Beyond the tribal and ethnic loyalties, past the unifying force of Islamic religion, the majority of the Chechen population (and a good portion of the Russian inhabitants) oriented their ire toward the invader after losing homes and loved ones to indiscriminate Russian firepower.

While Dudayev’s lieutenants also employed leaflets before operations in order to both incite surrender in Russian soldiers and evacuation in civilians⁶⁸, their “dirty tricks” were more effective in the urban battleground. This toolkit included the Chechen snipers’ practice of aiming for the legs and subsequently shooting Russian rescue parties. Booby-trapping dead and wounded Russian soldiers was common. Masquerading as workers from nongovernmental organizations or civilian noncombatants in order to guide

⁶⁶ M.P. Korobeinikov, *Sovremenniy Boy I Problemii Psikhologii*, quoted in Lev Yudovich, “Indoctrination of Hate,” in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 197.

⁶⁷ V.S. Novikov, “Psikhofiziologicheskoe obespechenie boevoy deyatel’nosti voennosluzhashchikh” (Psycho-physiological Support of Combat Activities of Military Personnel), *Voenno-meditsinskiy zhurnal* (Military Medical Journal), No. 4, April 1996, 37-40; quoted in Lester Grau and Timothy L. Thomas, “‘Soft Log’ and Concrete Canyons,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 83, Issue 10, (October 1999), 72

⁶⁸ Oliker, 30.

Russian units into ambushes also brought some success. These practices surely contributed to the aforementioned malaise and “deterioration of moral values” in the Russian ranks.

These three factors—mixed messages to the average Chechen citizen, a slipshod (but vitriolic, if one was lucky enough to receive a copy of the “White Book”) effort to psychologically prepare Russian soldiers for the rigors of combat, and brutal Chechen practices on the streets of Grozny—facilitated atrocities in the form of the “*zachistka*”. This word, used to describe diligent search operations in villages for guerrillas and their arms caches, literally means “cleansing”. “It has become synonymous,” write Gaal and deWaal, “with looting, violence and mass detentions of the male population.”⁶⁹ One such infamous operation on 6-8 April 1995 in Samashki by the Interior Ministry’s (MVD) Sofrinskaya Brigade was particularly noteworthy.

After Russian units delivered yet another ultimatum to the village and were rebuffed, the soldiers pulled back and slammed it with an artillery barrage. When this was lifted, armored personnel carriers moved in, MVD troops dismounted, and over 100 people were driven out of their burning homes to be shot in the street. The Interior Ministry, confronted with reports of 200 destroyed homes and 100 men dragged away to the infamous filtration camps (where they were held without charge; many disappeared in these facilities), claimed the dead were all Chechen insurgents:

The military log also only registers the killing of ‘fighters’. But the men on the ground, shaken and angered by their losses, were just taking it out on anyone they found. There was revenge in the air for those comrades who had been killed, according to [one of the senior Russian participants]. ‘They brought back one APC that was burnt. The men inside were just cinders and pieces of bones,’ he said, still angry nearly two years later. He expressed no remorse, just bitterness that the brigade received so much flak for carrying out orders. As he was leaving, he confided, ‘It was better in Soviet times, then we just did our job and there was no talk about civilians.’⁷⁰

This brutal tit-for-tat state of affairs became commonplace as Chechen fighters refused to either follow Russian directives or play by the rules (booby-trapping and

⁶⁹ Gaal and deWaal, 244.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 245.

mutilating corpses or torturing prisoners to death, for example), Russian troops subsequently lived in a state of edginess, and unaffiliated civilians ended up the losers when some event sparked a firefight. Inevitably, in the course of these events, Russian commanders would tire of losing people in the town and would pull them out. The insurgents would see this occur and evacuate the village, so that only the nonaligned would remain in their homes and receive whatever occurred when frustrated Russian troops reappeared. Dudayev's minions ensured that these events received maximum publicity both within and without Chechen territory; eventually everyone in the Chechnya area of operations ended up taking a side in the conflict.

The Russian government lost the PSYOP battle when it entered this repeated cycle of violence against the people it was allegedly there to save. A combination of heavy-handed Russian messages and Dudayev's media manipulation thus exacerbated a complicated state of affairs.

D. BATTLEFIELD COMMUNICATIONS

Russian commanders also needed to convey messages to their units. The nuts-and-bolts aspects of modern battlefield communications as well as the transmission of lessons learned in combat demand scrutiny within the scope of this study.

In nearly every evaluation of the 1994 invasion, authors mention the Russian habit of broadcasting in the clear. Common communication security procedures such as cryptography employment and pre-scheduled frequency changes were often laid aside in the effort to remove some of the aforementioned confusion within and amongst Russian combat formations.

As in nearly every Cold War conflict, walking around a combat zone under a large, thirty-year-old antenna brought more than the usual danger to a combatant; the Chechens targeted and killed a large number of radiotelephone operators. There is evidence that this peril grew even greater if one's specialty was fire support coordination:

Rebel forces made a special effort to hunt down Russian forward air controllers (*avianavodchiki*), of which some 40 had been attached to the ground forces. In one example cited, no sooner had a FAC gone on the air near Chechen-Aul than massive shelling commenced on his position. The

rebels did good work triangulating his location until a Russian motorized infantry unit finally pinpointed and seized the offending direction finding equipment.⁷¹

The resourceful Chechens were, of course, intercepting this radio traffic, a practice that presented opportunities for both passive and active exploitation measures. Several scholars have cited cases of Chechen fighters deceiving Russian pilots into bombing Russian forces⁷² and calling in fire missions to Russian artillery batteries.⁷³ There are also accounts of Chechen commanders exploiting these transmissions in order to make their own tactical decisions.⁷⁴

At the siege of Pervomaiskoye in January 1996, an officer from the elite Alpha counterterrorism unit recounted to Gall and deWaal that ““They (the Chechens) knew what units were moving in to fight, and when and where there would be artillery strikes.”” Russian forces, according to this account were also assailed by their own artillery and helicopters,⁷⁵ a development doubtless facilitated by the fact that Russian “communications were so basic that units could often only talk to their base command and not to other groups around them.”⁷⁶ To elaborate, Russian equipment and procedures (especially with formations cobbled together from interspersed Ministry of Defense and MVD assets) were so incompatible that “intelligence frequently could not be shared, and units were unable to transmit their locations to supporting air forces.”⁷⁷ Indeed, their opportunities to resolve these issues were constrained by the urban conditions exemplified in Grozny. “There are only a few FM frequencies, most in the lower bands, that work in cities; thus both sides will be trying to use the same part of the electromagnetic spectrum.”⁷⁸

⁷¹ Lambeth, “Russia’s Air War...,” 373.

⁷² Cassidy, 39-40.

⁷³ Richard D. Wallwork, “Artillery in Urban Operations—Reflections on Experiences in Chechnya” (Graduate thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), 57.

⁷⁴ Kelly, 37.

⁷⁵ Gaal and deWaal, 301.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 207.

⁷⁷ Olikier, 14-5.

⁷⁸ Lester W. Grau and Jacob W. Kipp, “Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter,” *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 4, (July- August 1999), 14.

The Chechens thus knew both exactly where to mine necessary information on the electromagnetic spectrum and how to employ it to sow confusion in the ranks of their enemies. “One such method was to use the seams between the Russian units, coupled with the poor coordination between Russian units, to provoke the Russian elements to fire at each other... Often enough, they kept firing at each other until sunrise the next morning when helicopters providing assistance could observe and clarify the situation.”⁷⁹

Chechen battlefield communications revealed greater efficiency and attention to operational security:

For their own communications, hand-held Motorola and Nokia radios were sufficient, and simply speaking in their native language was enough to keep communications secure given the dearth of Chechen-speaking Russians. The Chechens’ security was also enhanced by careful control of information, which was disseminated strictly on a need-to-know basis.⁸⁰

Russian communication systems and security measures left much to be desired when one scrutinizes the adversary’s methods to achieve the same ends. Each seven- or eight-man Chechen team, according to one article, used one of the aforementioned Motorola walkie-talkies, which “were much more technologically advanced than anything the Russians had.”⁸¹ These radios, however, did not represent the only example of Chechens communicating via commercial off-the-shelf technology (COTS).

...Chechens were very innovative in their use of ham radio contacts and television feeds to relay information to combatants and civilians alike. These older information technologies were useful in informing Chechens of general news events, and helping families and relatives to stay in touch. They kept Chechen fighters and civilians informed about where travel was dangerous. And, during periods of intense fighting, Chechen commanders used ham radios and cell phones extensively to issue orders and maintain overall command and control of their widely scattered forces.⁸²

The tribal nature of Chechen society, galvanized by a common religion and drive to eject Russian power from within its borders, also facilitated communication. When one considers that “almost 100 percent of Chechen adult males were conscripted into

⁷⁹ Cassidy, 39.

⁸⁰ Olikier, 19.

⁸¹ Ackerman, 41.

⁸² Arquilla and Karasik, 219.

military service”⁸³ under the Soviet regime, one can see that a technical and tactical knowledge base was available when Russian forces invaded. The previously mentioned Chechen oral tradition enabled transmission of what the U.S. military calls after-action reports (AAR) and the passing of lessons learned amongst guerrilla units.

Arquilla and Karasik assert that “Chechen small unit cohesion during the war benefited greatly from the fact that fighters were almost always serving in combat with their kinsmen... [and] a particular clan would always have units in action.”⁸⁴ These fighters would “commute” back and forth to battle:

[When home, however,] they would share, through story-telling sessions, their latest experiences with other units of the *taip* [clan structure], offering advice about how to fight the Russians, as well as technical tips [to modify and upgrade basic military equipment]... [T]here is also much evidence that, confronted by a dire Russian threat, a good bit of inter-clan information transfer went on as well. This was very important because, overall across clans, Chechen men had important insights to offer each other—based on combat experiences in Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.⁸⁵

Afghanistan permeates all pertinent literature on this conflict, especially in the context of organizational evolution; it is like an unpleasant meal that the Russian military continued to burp up throughout the 1994-96 hostilities. General Aleksandr Lebed, a traditionally influential and acerbic voice in Yeltsin’s military, said in the midst of this that, “Step by step the Afghan war experience is being repeated in Chechnya.” He opined to his colleagues that “We risk getting involved in a war with the entire Muslim world. Individual guerrillas will indefinitely shoot at our tanks and pick off our soldiers with single bullets.”⁸⁶

The reason for this institutional inertia is *at least* indirectly attributable to the Russian incapability to share lessons learned in combat amongst its own formations; the last Russian units had left Kabul, after all, only five years before. In two years of combat, the Russians lost 6,000 in Chechnya; in ten years of fighting the Afghan

⁸³ Ackerman, 44.

⁸⁴ Arquilla and Karasik, 210.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 211.

⁸⁶ Gaal and deWaal, 181.

mujahidin, the number was 14,000.⁸⁷ If the Russians had continued to fight another eight years in Chechnya without an effort to learn from their experiences, a left-brain assessment would thus put losses somewhere near 30,000. Looking at this estimate, one can speculate that the human costs of attaining victory in this particular war would be astronomical.

Russia certainly lost the information war in the first Chechen conflict. Intelligence collection was sloppy and dissemination to troops at the front—from whichever ministry—was hardly efficient. Journalists, meanwhile, ran rampant throughout the battlespace and the Chechens were better at manipulating these messengers in order to promote the secessionist cause. The clumsy Russian PSYOP effort incited scared and demoralized troops to drop fire on noncombatants. Meanwhile, faulty equipment and procedures in Russian battlefield communications brought further advantage to the adversary.

The Russian military, however, has shown a historical adaptability in such periods of crisis—for example in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40. In such conflicts, Russian forces took full advantage of a break in the fighting to improve and maximize advantage in subsequent engagements. The interval between 1996 and the second invasion in 1999 would provide such opportunity for improvement.

⁸⁷ Cassidy, 48.

III. 1999 INVASION

In April 1996, Russian communications specialists had pinpointed Chechen President Dudayev's location when he turned on his satellite phone. Russian strike aircraft then killed him with a precision-guided munition. This high-tech operation revealed two important characteristics of this conflict. First, the Russians were still competitive in their use of leading-edge technology and information to achieve military goals. The time period between Dudayev switching on his phone to the moment the orbiting pilot released a munition was short enough to enable success. One scholar has described this information-targeting loop in Kosovo thusly: "Hitting the right target on time requires sorting out the right coordinates from a pile of information (interpreted correctly) at the right time, a degree of data management that is difficult to achieve."⁸⁸ This was certainly true for the success in hunting down Dudayev.

Secondly, Dudayev's death did not end or even erode the insurgents' will to continue hostilities. In less than five months' time, the Chechens launched an offensive into Grozny, killed another 2,100 Russian soldiers, and "broke the political will of the Russian government to continue the fighting."⁸⁹

In August 1996, Dudayev's successor Maskhadov met with General Aleksandr Lebed in Dagestan and hammered out "Joint Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic". The so-called Khasavyurt Agreement brought a ceasefire and negotiated Russian withdrawal; the two sides would have five years to decide Chechnya's relationship to Russia. "It was full," write Gall and deWaal, "of lofty ideals about protecting human rights, the right to self-determination, and the rights of ethnic minorities," but its proposals did not stand up well to the region's realities.

Circumstances in Chechnya did not improve after the Khasavyurt Agreement. The document ensured that "a joint Russian-Chechen commission was set up to run the economy. The commission was a face-saver for Russia, [however,] since it did virtually

⁸⁸ Tim Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," *Parameters*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, (Spring 2000), 22.

⁸⁹ Wallwork, 51.

nothing during its short existence and the Chechens soon took over.”⁹⁰ Former Russian Interior Minister Anatoliy S. Kulikov describes the subsequent stagnant economy, rampant unemployment, vigorous arms trade, terror, kidnapping, and growing culture of violence. As bad as things were under Dudayev, he implies, the Chechen president’s death brought a dangerous vacuum in leadership:

Chechen leaders cannot influence the field commanders or their armed formations, nor solve any of the republic’s everyday socio-economic problems. Hence, they attempt to distract the people and quell their growing dissatisfaction. They do this by further igniting anti-Russian sentiments, inculcating extremist Islamic ideology and carrying out “cosmetic” reorganizations in the government that supposedly show the official government becoming stronger. With the goal of forcing Russia out of the Caucasus completely, foreign fundamentalist Islamic organizations and special services from a number of states are helping Chechnya move toward becoming an Islamic state. These same organizations are in no rush to help Russia resolve any of Chechnya’s social or economic problems.⁹¹

He surmises that these conditions had pushed Chechen foreign policy to seek international recognition and money, but the lack of both a viable economy and real Russian acquiescence to its development had prevented success. The attempt to pull neighboring Dagestan into the Chechen orbit is thus natural, according to Kulikov:

They fully understand that if their plan succeeds, Chechnya gains access to Caspian Sea oil resources and establishes control over the region’s key transportation nodes and communication lines. They assume that having control of these resources will bring recognition of Chechnya’s independence by states interested in developing economic relations with the North Caucasus. Even if recognition fails, at the very least large-scale foreign investments would flow into the region.⁹²

It was no surprise to the Russian leadership when the Chechens did, in fact, move on Dagestan in August of 1999. Chechen guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev (“regarded as one of the great contemporary Chechen heroes”⁹³ after the aforementioned Budennovsk

⁹⁰ Gall and deWaal, 359.

⁹¹ Anatoliy S. Kulikov, “Trouble in the North Caucasus,” *Military Review*, Vol. LXXIX, No. 4 (July-August 1999), 46.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 47.

⁹³ Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 124.

incident) took several villages and attempted to establish Islamic law inside them. Though also a Islamic, the Dagestanis were not the majority in their more pluralistic republic and Dagestan as a whole proved unreceptive to the Chechen effort. It took Russian forces six weeks to drive Basayev and his guerrillas back into Chechnya; it is likely that greater Russian attention to force readiness before deployment would have expelled the insurgents sooner.

A concurrent series of terrorist bombings in Russia and a new, more vigorous prime minister in the Kremlin—Vladimir Putin—galvanized Russian public opinion toward a second invasion “to protect the population from crime and terrorism.”⁹⁴ According to former Russian Ethno-national relations advisor Emil Pain, success in Dagestan was especially important:

People began saying that the Chechen problem could be solved by force, that an “iron hand” could restore order in the entire country. Previously it was General Alexander Lebed who had personified the image of the strong leader, but now that image belongs to Vladimir Putin. The Chechen war added to the new Prime Minister’s respect. As time went by, Putin began to use this newfound political capital and respect to win support for the federal government’s militaristic policy in the North Caucasus.⁹⁵

The invasion plan was divided into three phases—an air campaign, a ground campaign, and subsequent “destruction of bandit groups in the mountains while restoring law and order and establishing conditions for the return of refugees to their homes.”⁹⁶ The political goal morphed over time, seemingly to grasp and maintain public support:

The first goal was to repulse Chechen aggression; then the goal was to establish a sanitary cordon to protect Russian regions from Chechen raids; and by November 1999 the goal had become the complete annihilation of the ‘terrorists’. Putin changed that goal once more on 1 January 2000 when he noted that the operation was designed to ‘protect the integrity of Russia.’⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Ibid., 50-51.

⁹⁵ Pain, 61.

⁹⁶ Wallwork, 52.

⁹⁷ Timothy L. Thomas, “Information Warfare in the Second (1999-) Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform,” in *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*, ed. Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 222.

Putin also “gave the military *carte blanche* to conduct the operations as they saw fit and provided them with considerably more resources than they had had in the first war (italics in original).”⁹⁸

Meanwhile, Russia’s military forces continued the aforementioned post-Cold War decline and a conscious effort was made to avoid urban training in her schools.

The blood their troops shed in Grozny convinced Russian planners that the best approach to urban combat was to avoid it altogether. Soldiers and officers should prepare to prevent an urban fight, not to win it. Therefore, training for urban combat was deemed a waste of time and money.⁹⁹

This does not mean that the Russian military blundered back into Chechnya without a plan for conducting the urban fight. Just like it had done opposite the Finns’ Mannerheim Line in 1940, the general staff started evaluating lessons learned all the way back to Afghanistan. According to scholar Robert M. Cassidy, when the Russians realized that the metaphorical piñata was actually a beehive, they decided to employ their superior technology against it. “[D]uring the second Chechen conflict, the Russians relied more on their technological advantages in artillery and bombing stand-off ranges to avoid close urban combat...”¹⁰⁰

One suggested method was first to isolate all avenues of approach to a defended city and employ reconnaissance assets to find key installations and buildings on the city perimeter. Secondly, artillery preparation and occupation of assault positions would enable seizing these objectives. The third action would be seizure of—in order—the city’s residential, industrial, and central sections. The final and probably most difficult step consisted of eliminating trapped enemy units, clearing mines, confiscating weapons, and establishing military control.¹⁰¹ The test of this new doctrine would show the Russian protagonist, further weakened since the Cold War and bled from its first encounter with the “piñata”, playing to his strengths.

⁹⁸ Pavel K. Baev, “The Challenge of ‘Small Wars’ for the Russian Military,” in *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*, ed. Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 196.

⁹⁹ Olikier, 38.

¹⁰⁰ Cassidy, 50.

¹⁰¹ Grau “Changing Russian Urban Tactics...,” 2.

The Chechens, by contrast, were neither short of funds nor volunteers as both rolled in from around the Islamic world. Training camps around Chechnya once again countered the Russian superiority in fires by teaching asymmetric solutions: tactics of terrorists and partisans, marksmanship, heavy weapons employment and maintenance, diversionary methods, psychological operations and ideological warfare.¹⁰²

The Russian colossus thus moved once again toward his objective. This time he approached the hive wielding not a sledge but a shotgun. He had a notebook of lessons learned in his back pocket and a Russian public cheering him on. He was even skinnier now and scarred up by the stings of 1994-96. Most importantly, that experience had pulled the blindfold from his eyes and, since the bees had earlier followed him back to his house, he was arguably more determined to neutralize the hive.

A. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

At the end of September 1999, *The Russia Journal* advocated seizing the initiative, securing the Dagestani border, and moving Russian operations again into Chechnya. To successfully do so, Russian forces would employ “massive air-bombing, missile strikes, artillery shelling, and special operations aimed at wiping out terrorists.”¹⁰³ The key, according to this article, lay in intelligence support to Russian troops.

By this point, the Chechens had a diverse array of intelligence collection assets, including optical-electronic, acoustic, radiotechnical, and radar technology.¹⁰⁴ To communicate this information, Chechen collectors, hubs, and warfighters used cellular, ham radio, both stationary and mobile tele-broadcast stations, short wave, and cable COTS technology. “Satellite communications in Chechnya were conducted via INMARSAT and IRIDIUM systems, offering access to both intercity and international communication nets, and the Internet.”¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Olikier, 40.

¹⁰³ Alexander Golts, “Russia unable to fight a bigger war,” *The Russia Journal*, 27 September 1999, n.p. Available at <http://www.therussiajournal.com/index.htm?cat=1&type=3&obj=1393>. Accessed June 2004.

¹⁰⁴ Olikier, 70.

¹⁰⁵ Thomas, “Information Warfare,” 213.

While this simpler yet robust intelligence apparatus appeared formidable, Russia, which had worked for the entire Cold War to gain advantage over NATO—the world’s most technologically capable alliance, could better exploit and counter such measures. Russian Radio Electronic Combat (REB) units brought *Vega* radio-technical reconnaissance systems to Chechnya while both GRU (Russian military Main Intelligence Directorate) and FAPSI (Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information) assets began intercepting Chechen communications and harvesting data via radio electronic reconnaissance satellites. With this augmented SIGINT effort, the technical means like those that facilitated Dudayev’s death were employed with greater frequency:

In order to “take out” a transmitter, radio interceptors first ascertain the location of a target. A reconnaissance group then goes out to discover the precise location of the enemy, and to ensure that the ‘intercept’ is real and not set up to ensure unacceptable collateral damage to the civilian population. Once the target is verified, the information is passed to the fire control command post, and a strike launched.¹⁰⁶

One can presume that repeated experience shortened each cycle’s duration from radio intercept to call for fire. Even if such a strike was unsuccessful or not tasked, collected coordinates for Chechen “communications centers, control points, concentration of forces, and firing means” enabled Russian analysts to paint a fairly accurate picture of the adversary’s communications network.

The Russian commanders called these REB groupings the eyes and ears of the forces. Their systems’ ability to supply real-time enemy emission sources that were used for target reconnaissance and target data served, in essence for the first time, as prototypes of reconnaissance-strike systems on the tactical and operational levels.¹⁰⁷

The improvements to these units revealed enhanced resource allocation. “Whereas in 1994-1995 the Russians were limited to a relatively narrow bandwidth, this time Russia’s electronic warriors were able to operate on more frequencies. Improvements in training and equipment made it far easier for them to track the source of

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 214.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

enemy transmissions.”¹⁰⁸ In contrast to the 1994 invasion, one may surmise that a Chechen guerrilla switched on a radio with a bit more wariness. Each time a clever insurgent attempted to manipulate a Russian Close Air Support mission, for instance, there was a greater chance he would be putting himself in the crosshairs.

This “reconnaissance-strike” cycle, however, did not demand cuing from a communications specialist. Another contrast to the previous invasion lay in more robust and efficient employment of ground reconnaissance units. In mid-November, Russia infiltrated the Grozny outskirts before the main force surrounded the city two weeks later. “[S]niper teams, supported by the army and MVD special forces units, found targets and, equally important, provided intelligence on the whereabouts and movements of Chechen forces in the city. The snipers served as spotters and called down artillery fire on suspected rebel positions.”¹⁰⁹ Support that U.S. ground commanders take for granted, such as topogeodesic “terrain” teams and meteorological specialists, were also on hand, more diligent, and better organized for the Second invasion.¹¹⁰ Improved technology for collection, though, represents only a fraction of the total sensory input available in urban warfare. The Russians considered the more low-tech platforms and augmented that capability this time as well.

For the 1999 invasion, Russian forces also brought more reliable Chechen loyalist forces, which vastly improved human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities:

[This development] overcame many problems associated with tactics and language in the city. Chechen combatants friendly to the federal cause and led by (loyalist Bislan) Gantemirov could talk with the local population and get intelligence on the rebel positions and dispositions. Chechen human intelligence often proved more valuable than Russian signal intelligence.¹¹¹

One can safely assume that this development also improved Russian signals intelligence (SIGINT), as few people outside the Chechen culture can converse in its indigenous

¹⁰⁸ Olikier, 52.

¹⁰⁹ Timothy L. Thomas, “Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned,” *Military Review*, Vol. LXXX, No. 4 (July-August 2000), 51

¹¹⁰ Sergei Sokuit, “The ‘God of War’ is Changing Tactics,” interview with Colonel Mikhail Karatuyev, *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 19 November 1999, 1-2, as translated by FBIS; cited in Thomas, “Grozny 2000...,” 54.

¹¹¹ Thomas, “Grozny 2000...,” 57.

language. Russian troops would therefore be more aware of their environment this time and could thus incorporate gathered information into a more sophisticated targeting mindset. In the past invasion, Russian forces worked to simplify the urban terrain by pounding a three-dimensional landscape into two. Consequent collateral damage and danger to noncombatants predictably contributed to the aforementioned erosion of support from the Chechen citizenry. The 1999 operation reveals evidence of a shift from concentration on terrain to a more effects-based targeting scheme:

The second war saw strikes against key nodes such as the phone system and the electricity supply designed to reduce the ability of the Chechens to control their operation. This also restricted the ability of the Chechens to fight the information war as successfully.¹¹²

Developments in targeting therefore contributed to the overall improvement in Russian intelligence activity between the wars. Whereas in the first war this force mirror-imaged its enemy, carelessly passed the SIGINT advantage to him, and apparently conducted reconnaissance for its armored columns by drawing fire, Russian IPB efforts in the second showed much improvement. The hypothetical protagonist did not charge toward Grozny this time blindly swinging.

B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

If Russian IPB identified and targeted the adversary's ability to send messages beyond his borders, so too did Russian Public Affairs. If the new post-Soviet Russian government made serious mistakes in its 1994-96 PA effort, the 1999 performance shows both improvements and an augmented initiative to make them.

Emil Pain, in his 2000 article "The Second Chechen War: The Information Component," describes this initiative's evolution:

After the first Chechen war, the Russian military concluded that it had lost the information war to the Chechen resistance, which had morally disarmed Russian public opinion. Hence, Russian strategists saw reprogramming the public consciousness as the primary goal in their battle with the Chechen separatists. They wanted to eliminate public apathy

¹¹² Wallwork, 82.

toward the military's task of retaining Chechnya as part of Russia. They wanted to win public support of Moscow's use of force against the Chechen separatists.¹¹³

According to Pain's statistics, the subsequent Public Affairs effort successfully coupled this support to the government engine. Between October 1995 and November 1999, for instance, when a random survey asked if the Chechnya effort was necessary to prevent the collapse of Russia, the "Agree" column had jumped by 33 percent. When asked if Russia should conduct "military actions until the Chechen fighters are completely destroyed," respondents showed a 60 percent gain in agreement.¹¹⁴ How did this occur? There are three generally recognized factors in the shift in Russian public support.

First, the Russian government acknowledged and worked to remedy the dearth of an effective Public Affairs effort. In December 1999, President Yeltsin—on his way out of the Kremlin—enacted Russian Federation Resolution Number 1538, to "filter military information from Chechnya, and to select which foreign information would be disseminated in Russia about the conflict."¹¹⁵ The simultaneous creation of the Russian Information Center (RIC) constituted an important component in this filtration process. "The RIC," according to Pain, "filters information from the combat theater before it reaches the mass media. It also selects for dissemination information from the foreign press that does not contradict the Russian government's view of events in Chechnya."¹¹⁶

Any change in doctrine, however, needed a tough and driven helmsman to monitor the environment and keep the initiative on course. A month after the announcement of Resolution 1538, acting President Vladimir Putin thus appointed Yeltsin's Press Secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky to oversee the Kremlin's PA for its activities in Chechnya. He soon began to tighten restrictions on the media and its access

¹¹³ Pain, 63-4.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 60.

¹¹⁵ Timothy L. Thomas, "Manipulating The Mass Consciousness: Russian And Chechen 'Information War' Tactics In The 2nd Chechen-Russian Conflict," n.p. Available at <http://fms0.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/chechiw.htm>. Accessed January 2004.

¹¹⁶ Pain, 60.

to the battlefield. His threats against the careers of maverick Russian reporters, however, would do little to curb the international media's enthusiasm. His consequent statements are thus worthy of notice:

...Yastrzhembsky displayed contempt for Western opinion that he regarded as predictably negative, citing the fact that Western media had been particularly harmful to Russia's military actions in Chechnya in the past. He cited the West's oil interests in the Caucasus and a desire to see Russia fail in Chechnya and lose influence in the region as reasons for negative Western reporting... The military mass media repeated this theme ("Western oil interests are out to submarine Russian interests in the Caspian") on many occasions.¹¹⁷

His efforts to restrict Russian Mass Media, to denigrate reporting from foreign sources, and his particular concerns about the power of television,¹¹⁸ certainly attached a filter to the outflow end of the information pipe. The subsequent trickle of Chechen propaganda to the Russian populace displays a marked contrast to that of the 1994-96 operation.

The recently concluded NATO Operation Allied force to liberate Kosovo surely influenced Yastrzhembsky's fixation on television. The impact of this 1999 air campaign over the Balkans represented the second factor in Russian PA improvement between the Chechen wars. "In Russian eyes," according to Pain, "the bombings of civilian targets that took the lives of innocent civilians and even foreign diplomats justify similar actions by the Russian military." Furthermore, Yastrzhembsky's anti-Western remarks capitalized on the fact that "statements by politicians and public officials from NATO countries that Russia has exceeded the acceptable limits in the use of force are perceived in Russia as hypocritical, a political double standard."¹¹⁹ NATO dropping its bombs into a sovereign Serbia (with a similar Slavic, Orthodox Christian culture) in order to curtail a centuries-old ethnic conflict over the secessionist Kosovar region held serious implications for the Kremlin. The Serbs had fought a conflict that was older than and as bloody as Russia's efforts to subdue the Caucasus. The end of the Cold War also brought both sides' fervent nationalism to the fore—just as it had in Chechnya—and destroying an adversary's ability to make war appeared to lead to the peace table. In contrast to

¹¹⁷ Thomas, "Manipulating...", n.p.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Pain, 61.

1994's confusing Rules of Engagement and infantry-intensive urban combat, therefore, a Russian strategy of employing indiscriminate air and artillery to meet its strategic goals appeared less odious (and more promising) in light of the Kosovo precedent.

These two factors—the evaluation of PA and Operation Allied Force—enabled the third. Vladimir Putin and his appeals to patriotic fervor in the face of Chechen lawlessness had accordingly stoked the Russian national will. When Yeltsin stepped down in 1999, his prime minister, Putin, became acting president. His duties were, however, not the only baggage Yeltsin could pass on to Putin. “Public opinion polls revealed that there was little support for Yel’tsin. He was widely perceived to be responsible for the financial collapse that had resulted in the devaluation of the rouble in August 1998, and these events had destroyed what little legitimacy he had.”¹²⁰ The outgoing president's obvious linkages with the first Chechen war also lay heavy on the Russian public.

Putin's relative clarity of purpose regarding Chechnya certainly endeared him to the Ministry of Defense:

[Putin wanted to] protect Russia against terrorism and instability encroaching from the south. The armed forces eagerly embraced this clarity, which also involved an opportunity to cover the defeat in Chechnya with a new victory, as well as the new leader, who appeared to have a genuine affection for ‘big guns’. This mission secured the army an instant stream of support and sympathy from society...¹²¹

If the situation in Chechnya was an ailment, Putin, did not just offer a prognosis. His frequent encouragement to the Russian patient made him a very popular physician:

...Putin played a prominent role in leading and coordinating the anti-terrorist operation. He was uncompromising in his determination to exterminate what he saw as a terrorist nest in Chechnya, stating in September that Russian forces would ‘*be following terrorists everywhere. If we catch them in a toilet, then we will bury them in their own crap*’. His rise in the opinion polls was correspondingly meteoric (italics in original).¹²²

¹²⁰ M.A. Smith, “The Second Chechen War: The All-Russian Context,” *Strategic & Combat Studies Institute Occasional* 40 (September 2000): 7.

¹²¹ Baev, “The Challenge...,” 193-4.

¹²² M.A. Smith, 8.

Putin's rhetoric and Chechen acts of terror fanned the flames of nationalism on both sides. He charged that Chechen terrorists planned to "break up" and "Islamize" Russia¹²³ and referred to Chechen insurgents as "scum".¹²⁴ Putin's language and direct manner left little confusion as to how he perceives his—and Russia's—security responsibilities.

Leadership comes from the top down, the old saying goes, and a new syntax arrived with the new President to describe Russian efforts in the Caucasus. Journalists now mimicked the Russian military's language. "Aircraft are not bombing and the artillery is not firing on towns, but rather, as the journalists put it, they are 'working on towns.'"¹²⁵ In the first campaign, Russian forces 'assaulted' Grozny; now they conduct 'special operations', 'mop-up' towns¹²⁶, or conduct 'cleansing' operations.¹²⁷ In contrast to the first invasion, Russian journalists appeared to have grown nearer to the aspirations of Russian commanders.

In the second Chechen War, according to one expert, reporters were less likely to aid the Chechen insurgents in any case. The reasons for this change of heart are well-defined and well-known. Firstly, the practice of kidnapping Westerners netted several journalists, a situation that soon reflected ire in Russian publications. In some of these kidnappings, hostages ended up dead, including non-governmental organization workers and private businessmen working to improve the situation in the Caucasus. The aforementioned incursion into Dagestan was clearly an act of aggression and the press described it as such. Any attempt to describe the average Chechen insurgent as an underdog who wanted to finish the war so he could go back to peacefully herding goats suffered accordingly. "Finally," information warfare expert Tim Thomas writes, "the Russian government accused the Chechens of bombing several apartment complexes in Russia itself, bringing terrorism not only to Russia's doorstep but inside its house. This changed the minds of many Russians, including reporters."¹²⁸ Indeed, to the average

¹²³ Jim Nichol, *Chechnya Conflict: Recent Developments* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 3 May 2000), 10, RL 30389.

¹²⁴ M.A. Smith, 9.

¹²⁵ Pain, 59.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Thomas, "Information Warfare...", 222.

¹²⁸ Thomas, "Manipulating...", n.p.

Russian, Chechnya's descent into lawlessness was one thing. Its migration into the heartland through the medium of terror was something else entirely and therefore demanded action.

To counter this, the Chechens used nearly the same PA techniques as they had since 1994. "Missions included forming an anti-military mood and a desire to stop military activity, discredit activities and the military-political leadership of Russia, and misinform Russia's leadership about future Chechen plans."¹²⁹

September 1999, however, offered the Russians an opportunity to counter these efforts and this opportunity was fully exploited. In the midst of the Dagestan operation, the Kremlin received a video of Chechen guerrillas decapitating a Russian prisoner. Russian TV showed the film unedited, which brought two of the previously mentioned facets of the Public Affairs conflict to the fore. First, this gruesome spectacle revealed a clear change in government resolve as the Kremlin pushed the throttle to the stops. Broadcasting this video served to wipe out the last residue of Russian sympathy for Chechen fighters; the Russian public was now less likely to admonish its government for regulating messages in the media. Second, the populace watching this new development had recently experienced the NATO air armada's progress over Kosovo each night on the television news. "This translated into permission to apply force in Chechnya, since Russia faced problems with Chechens similar to Kosovo's problems with the Serbs, from a Russian perspective."¹³⁰ This catalyzing event enabled a largely unrestricted Russian PA effort.

Villages are liberated at will, casualties are low, civilians respect what Russia is doing, and generals describe the flight of the enemy. TV coverage of the war was described as entertainment, since there were no dead bodies, only missiles flying and tanks moving. No casualties were shown. Russian media shaped the flow of information out of Chechnya and onto Russian TV screens in a manner unprecedented since the time of the USSR.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Thomas, "Information Warfare," 230.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 221.

¹³¹ Thomas, "Manipulating...", n.p.

Soon, however, the aforementioned contrast between the state-controlled message and the battlefield reality again eroded some of these gains. Recent leaps in information capability—most notably the internet—are key facets of the new technology that speeds this erosive trend. The juxtaposition of reality and government messages helped bring down the Soviet Union in the wake of Afghanistan. This evolution in information technology thus demands some discussion within the scope of this study.

Famous “Third Wave” theorists Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe three revolutions (the first two being the Neolithic and industrial) where the military and economies were transformed and affected entire societies. The current wave, the Third, emphasizes knowledge and intangibility as focal variables in the equation of civilizational shift. The Tofflers have supplied an innovative lens through which scholars can scrutinize both *glasnost*’ and information warfare.

As civilization evolves into this third paradigm, it becomes harder for governments to control citizens’ access to information. The previously described erosion of Soviet power in the wake of Afghanistan is a fine example; when the government’s message to the masses does not correspond to the trickle of unfiltered truth that always makes it through, citizens start questioning that government’s credibility. Often, moreover, that constrained measure of information is an essential component for competitive innovation:

The further a country advances toward Third Wave economic and social systems, the less likely central censorship or control will work. Third Wave economies thrive on open ideas and information systems, the irrepressible Internet being the most obvious example. The attempt by the Soviets to micromanage opinion through monopoly control of the media, and their efforts to quarantine the population against news and opinion from the outside world, stifled the spirit of innovation—and hence the very technical and economic progress that they needed to survive. The Soviets, in fact, waged information warfare against their own people and shot themselves in the brain.¹³²

Like any other technology, however, information technology can represent a tool or a weapon depending upon the user’s intent. Much progress has occurred since 1989

¹³² Alvin and Heidi Toffler, “Foreword: The New Intangibles,” in *In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), xvii-xviii.

(when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan)—more miniaturization, digitization, and faster communication, for instance. When a reporter can capture an event on a cellular phone camera and can transmit the image across the world in near-real-time, government information control—regardless of its intentions or that event’s context—is not so easy:

[T]he new media of the Third Wave include powerful new technologies that “de-massify” audiences and permit one-to-one customized communication. They also put cheap diffusion power in the hands of anyone with access to the Internet. Marshall McLuhan once wrote that the photocopying machine made everyone his or her own publisher. That was true on a tiny scale. The Internet makes everyone a potential media producer on a global scale.¹³³

This constituted the dilemma for the Putin government: restricting a society’s information flow can stifle the innovation that brings economic prosperity. At the same time, as this section has revealed, seizing control of the media had greatly augmented public support for the second Chechen war. While Russians still largely support the effort, there are two factors that served to erode confidence in the Kremlin’s Public Affairs apparatus.

The first was the Internet, the insurgents’ natural countermeasure to Putin’s censorship apparatus. The Chechens used it to collect financial contributions, to reach and inform Chechen expatriates throughout the world, to broadcast streaming videos of battlefield successes against Russian forces, to proclaim support for the Palestinian cause (thus implicitly linking it to their own), to show alleged Russian atrocities, and to market Chechen multimedia propaganda such as compact discs. Juxtaposed with Yastzhembsky’s filtered reports from the front, whether the claims aired on these images were accurate representations or not becomes irrelevant. As religious and political extremists around the world have learned, “to put one’s position on an issue and not have to justify it”¹³⁴ is one of the great advantages of disseminating information via this medium. To be sure, the Russian government used it, too, but only as another implement from its Public Affairs toolbox. The Chechens largely alienated the news organizations they had carefully cultivated in the first war. To make up for the loss of international media support, Chechen websites were comparatively more dynamic and easier to access

¹³³ Ibid., xvii.

¹³⁴ Thomas, “Information Warfare...,” 227.

internationally than their Russian opposites. The Kremlin countered Chechen sites via hacking or stern warnings against operating them from Russian territory. This versatile information conduit, however, remains open.

A second important hindrance to Russian PA is the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, a Russian grassroots organization and another important legacy from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. This organization is known for its criticisms of both the 1994-96 war and the long-standing practice of *dyedovshchina* ("the exploitation, frequently with loathsome cruelty, of the newly joined conscripts by the 'grandfathers', the older conscripts and the volunteer soldiers"¹³⁵) in Russian barracks. When this organization began to compile and disseminate its own casualty lists and to publish them in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, the discrepancy between government propaganda and battlefield realities certainly served to erode the Russian public's trust in its government and—by extension—its mass media.¹³⁶ Like the Internet, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers thus represented a facet of the PA war with which the Kremlin would have to struggle during hostilities in Chechnya.

Emil Pain describes other mitigating factors for Russian Public Affairs. Casualties, he writes, "will have the greatest impact in changing society's mood, particularly given that almost none of those who support the military actions wish to participate directly or send their children to participate."¹³⁷ The participators and their families, it follows, will grow even more disenchanted with each new list from the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. Pain also forecasts that the war's effects on the Russian economy will hold similar erosive effects for the national will.

In December 1999, former Minister of Finance Mikhail Zadornov estimated that 7-8 percent of Russia's national budget went to Chechen operations per month.¹³⁸ When one considers how the economic collapse of 1998 stained the Yeltsin presidency, this rate of expenditure holds serious political significance. The fact that Russia has destroyed most of the Chechen economic infrastructure dictates that even with a secessionist defeat,

¹³⁵ Lieven, 290.

¹³⁶ Olikier, 65.

¹³⁷ Pain, 69.

¹³⁸ *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, April 2000, 8; cited in Nichol, 12.

this percentage is going to grow. Pain summarizes: “[T]he Russian public’s support for the second Chechen war is not deep-seated and is largely a consequence of pervasive myths and illusions that were created to manipulate public opinion.”¹³⁹ The costs, therefore, of sending uninterested people to fight an expensive war and spurring them on with “pervasive myths and illusions” will likely nullify any gains from this improved Public Affairs performance. The insurgents, on the other hand, consistently hurt their own Public Affairs effort by exacerbating this perception of lawlessness and assassinating their government’s officials.

Relative to its performance in the first Chechen war, even with the aforementioned factors working against it, the Russian Public Affairs campaign has shown improvement. Restricting journalists’ access to the battlefield, as well as the effort to identify Chechen insurgents with international terrorism (especially after 9/11) have made this second war more palatable to both Russian and international opinion.

C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

In 1999 operational planners knew there was a good chance that Russian forces would return to the Chechen capital. From the 1994 war, these planners also knew that every person in the urban landscape represented a potential insurgent:

Unlike more traditional operations in open terrain, where merely spotting an unknown entity would assist in deciphering friend from foe, urban areas are packed with individuals and groups that might have the capabilities, interests, or intentions that can threaten a unit’s mission. An analyst will not be able to distinguish urban friend from foe just by looking at him.¹⁴⁰

Identifying the enemy had been, however, only one psychological stressor the Russian soldier faced in the first war.

“It was clear from the fighting in the first Russian-Chechen conflict that the moral-psychological stability of a soldier could be easily upset and then manipulated by the side with the best information support devices.”¹⁴¹ Accounts of the second war show

¹³⁹ Pain, 69.

¹⁴⁰ Medby and Glenn, 34.

¹⁴¹ Thomas, “Information Warfare...,” 224.

enhanced Russian attention to alleviating battlefield stress and thus taking care of the troops on the twenty-first century battlefield.

Authors John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt begin their book *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age* (published in 1997) by describing this battlefield. "In the new epoch, decisive duels for the control of information flows will take the place of drawn-out battles of attrition or annihilation; the requirement to destroy will recede as the ability to disrupt is enhanced."¹⁴² Any scholar can pick out episodes of attrition or annihilation in the first conflict, but disruption is also prevalent. The foe had continuously hindered Russian forces' efforts to perceive and communicate in the battlespace. Chechen insurgents held a robust and diverse set of both methods and implements for executing this disruption, but these methods had not evolved much by 2000: "agitation, leaflets, loudspeakers and radio stations, and capturing Russian soldiers by wearing Russian uniforms"¹⁴³ were all known Chechen methods. Russian planners had had five years to think about countering them by the time Russian soldiers girded their loins for Dagestan in 1999.

The insurgents had heretofore led by a big margin in preparing their own people for battle via emphasis on:

...the use of slogans, swearing allegiance on the Koran, and acceptance of the Jihad. National ideas, Islamic values, and the military history of Chechnya were often used in this regard. Islamic slogans were frequently tied to weapons and armoured vehicles. Work among the population included the development of several factors: a base of social-political support for the [Chechen] armed forces; the galvanizing of the population against Russians operating in their areas; the conduct of mass meeting, and teaching how to spread rumours; and the spread of Chechen military traditions and the ideas of Islam, using audio-video cassettes, leaflets, radio, TV and the press.¹⁴⁴

It would appear that Russian PSYOP in 1999 allocated less effort toward this hardcore indoctrinated Chechen guerrilla; the enemy's motivation was too strong to unravel via the available means. As depicted in the previous section, however, the Kremlin's Public

¹⁴² Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2.

¹⁴³ Thomas, "Information Warfare...", 229.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

Affairs effort had effectively grabbed the Russian citizenry's support. This left two target audiences for Russian psychological operations—the Russian soldier and the weary Chechen populace.

The first and most basic mental armor Russia could give to its soldiers was a clear reason why they were returning. Imbuing forces with a historical justification and a strategic mission became a major and justifiable goal. On April 25, 2000 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* published a statement from Colonel-General V. Manilov that elucidates this improved mindset. “Today,” he wrote, “Russia stands square on to the threat in the North Caucasus, defending not only its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the law and freedom of its citizens, but also Europe, and the whole world from the strengthening criminal-terrorist abyss.”¹⁴⁵

This self-identification with defending and preserving civilization was hardly new to Russia. The post-Cold War environment, however, offered at least one example of a former communist state slipping into chaos—an event that catalyzed Russian nationalism into action. In analyzing a 1999 piece by historian Roy Medvedev, one author summed up the contemporary Russian concern. Should Chechnya win its independence, “the very existence of the Federation itself as a multi-ethnic, multi-national state would be in serious doubt, and that, which had been built up over centuries, would descend into a multi-ethnic, warring mess, similar to the situation in the former Yugoslavia over the past decade.”¹⁴⁶ If nothing else, clarity of purpose in this new war helped block some of the soldiers' anxiety regarding the task of fighting one's own citizens.

In the Soviet Union, of course, political commissars were attached to military units to look after moral and psychological preparation. After 1991, it is not known whether any sort of political officers remained in the ranks; if such personnel remained, their activities became less obvious to observers. Both Chechen wars, however, had demanded constant vigilance from the individual soldier. Juxtaposed with awful weather

¹⁴⁵ Colonel-General V. Manilov, “Predotvrashcheniya. Sderzhivaniye. Partnerstvo,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 25 April 2000; cited in Steven J. Main, “North Caucasus Military District: Defending Russia's Interests in the Caucasus,” *Strategic & Combat Studies Institute Occasional* 40 (September 2000): 38.

¹⁴⁶ Steven J. Main, “ ‘Counter-Terrorist Operation’ in Chechnya: On the Legality of the Current Conflict,” *Strategic & Combat Studies Institute Occasional* 40 (September 2000): 34.

conditions, the psychological pressure in Chechnya necessitated action from the Russian government to fill this post-Soviet ideological vacuum and thus keep its troops motivated under adverse conditions.

Any military professional who has gone to the field knows the value of logistics to his troops' morale. Soldiers in miserable conditions respond well to hot meals and clean, dry protective clothing. Serious effort was made to provide these items along with other staples like fuel, ammunition, and vehicle maintenance. Medical care, once troops arrived at battalion aid stations, was better than adequate. Russian logisticians had noticed and adapted to many of these issues early on in the first war (though items such as clean drinking water¹⁴⁷ and spare parts¹⁴⁸ were always problematic). Postal service improved alongside recognition via battlefield awards and decorations.¹⁴⁹ In summation, "Russia's troops in Chechnya in 1999-2000, regardless of their service affiliation, were much better supplied than their predecessors. Soldiers had sufficient uniforms and generally received their rations."¹⁵⁰

Efficient supply, however, is not the only variable in an army's psychological maintenance equation. No matter how many beans and bullets the Russian staff threw at the conflict, something else was needed to counter tried and true Chechen psychological actions such as mutilation, torture, or using Russian casualties (alive or not) as cover during firefights. Educating Russian soldiers was one such measure, beginning with a periodic newsletter published by the North Caucasus Military District. Specially designated personnel began to visit units to teach soldiers about Chechen propaganda techniques and their intended effects. These instructors offered guidance about interaction with local civil and religious representatives as they cautioned soldiers to remain aloof from favors and disinformation.¹⁵¹ In fact, many of the former Commissars' practices appeared again, such as "twice daily fifteen minute combat

¹⁴⁷ Lester W. Grau and Timothy L. Thomas, " 'Soft Log' and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 83, Issue 10, (October 1999), 69.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 71.

¹⁴⁹ Kelly, 53.

¹⁵⁰ Olikier, 61.

¹⁵¹ Thomas, "Information Warfare...", 226.

briefings; a weekly political hour; weekly combat news sheets about soldiers who displayed gallantry; daily listening to radio news; agitators' conversations with personnel; and regular delivery of newspapers."¹⁵²

The Russians also brought more mental health expertise to the fight:

[Military Psychological Support] tasks included psychological preparation of servicemen for close support of combat operations, and psychological aid to servicemen when it was needed. Psychological preparation included practice in specific combat situations, and teaching methods of psychological self-regulation and emotional mobilization in times of stress. Psychological aid was focused at the combat crew and vehicle crew level. Mobile groups of psychologists with skills in psycho-diagnostics and correction and rehabilitation work, psychiatrists and psycho-neurologists did consultative and diagnostic work. Psycho-correction and rehabilitation programmes were provided on an as-needed basis.¹⁵³

This augmented logistic, education, and medical support thus showed vast improvement over the first war. Replacements and more frequent unit rest and relaxation rotations also aided this endeavor,¹⁵⁴; integrating these replacements and conducting training with fully-present, cohesive units has been identified as a key factor in overcoming the psychological stress of urban combat.¹⁵⁵

While these gains in preparing young Russian troops for combat were remarkable, the overall Russian PSYOP performance in the Second Chechen War was mitigated by further alienation of Chechen noncombatants. Commanders' inclinations to reduce Russian casualties, alongside the clear firepower advantage and less restrictive rules of engagement in the wake of Chechen terror attacks, created an environment receptive to more firepower. After all, the shock and the psychological terror produced by artillery and air strikes have long been considered by some leadership elements to be a psychological weapon.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Olikier, 51.

¹⁵⁵ Grau and Kipp, "Urban Combat...", 14.

Consider the reaction of one veteran CIA agent to a demonstration of the World War II era Katyusha surface-to-surface missile in 1984. This antiquated 122mm rocket, lobbed into the Egyptian desert, created quite an impression:

If you've ever heard one of these come at you, there's no way you wouldn't crap in your pants. I was three miles away from where it hit and I was scared. It was a frightening experience, like being in a minor earthquake. You just can't imagine what it would be like to be within fifty feet of one of those things.¹⁵⁶

More up-to-date surface-to-surface missiles (like the SCUD and SCARAB) were only one component of the Russian firepower demonstration in the Second Chechen War. Aerial bombs and fuel air explosives were also employed to cause "shock" and "psychological terror".

RAND Corporation analyst Olga Oliker writes that improvement occurred in close air support coordination. "This was despite poor weather and smoke and fog from oil fires and fighting that sometimes precluded the effective use of combat aircraft. Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft were responsible for a lot of fire support."¹⁵⁷ This translates, of course, to more bombs on target and less fratricide, which one would assume improved Russian morale.

These conventional weapons, however, were only so effective against guerrillas hiding in bunkers and basements. The Russian solution to this problem was thermobaric weaponry. Its concept is simple, but catastrophic:

Fuel-air weapons work by initially detonating a scattering charge within a bomb, rocket or grenade warhead. The warhead contents, which are composed of either volatile gases, liquids, or finely powdered explosives, form an aerosol cloud. This cloud is then ignited and the subsequent fireball sears the surrounding area while consuming the oxygen in this area. The lack of oxygen creates an enormous overpressure. This overpressure, or blast wave, is the primary casualty-producing force.¹⁵⁸

Pressure at the explosion's center can hit 427 pounds per square inch and a temperature of over 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Loose objects are pulled toward the center to fill the

¹⁵⁶ George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 319

¹⁵⁷ Oliker, 53.

¹⁵⁸ Lester W. Grau and Timothy Smith, "A 'Crushing' Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 2000," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 84, Issue 8, (August 2000), 30.

void, causing further damage to personnel beyond severe crushing and burning effects. It is effective against terrain, fortifications, equipment, foxholes, minefields, and vegetation. In its indiscriminate and destructive effects, “a fuel-air explosive can have the effect of a tactical nuclear weapon without residual radiation.”¹⁵⁹ The obvious attraction for using them against urban communication centers and strongpoints made the thermobaric weapon a very popular option for Russian commanders.

Fire and iron, however, are not the only items with which Russian forces watered the Grozny garden. Beginning in early December 1999, the Russian aircraft dropped leaflets to warn noncombatants away from the battlespace. Loudspeakers advocated surrender as government forces set up assembly areas for anyone wishing to capitulate.¹⁶⁰ Then strike aircraft rolled in, guns traversed, and fuel-air rockets arced toward the capital as reconnaissance units called for fires. The intended audience probably received the Russian preparatory PSYOP message but it is doubtful the recipients could do much with it—the guerrilla fighters were not likely to surrender and all the capable noncombatants had already moved on:

Grozny had 20,000 to 30,000 residents still huddled in basements when the battle for the city began. These residents were too old, too afraid or too isolated to exit the city. Reportedly, about 4,000 Chechen fighters remained in the city. Russian psychological operations depicted the defenders as Muslim fanatics and agents of an international, fundamentalist terror network¹⁶¹.

Russian forces had surrounded the city and slowly moved toward Minutka Square, a hub for major roads and subterranean communications lines. Strike aircraft employed their mobility advantage by servicing a target list that spanned the region—“suspected terrorist hideouts, cellular relay towers and communications facilities... They sought to isolate the defenders in Grozny from any external support and supply.”¹⁶² Russian planners knew, from the first war, the psychological blow one experiences when his logistics are retarded and his communications network is unreliable.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Thomas, “Grozny 2000...,” 56.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 51.

¹⁶² Ibid.

The balance sheet shows that Russian PSYOP had therefore improved when compared to the first war. The great herd of confused, uninformed, frightened Russian conscripts riding to their doom in downtown Grozny with total strangers, inadequate equipment, and un-secure communications were a thing of the past. The Russian soldier of 1999 was better clothed, fed, indoctrinated, and medically treated. He knew his superiors' goals and his unit had trained together to realize them. Through better Public Affairs and media management, his government had both assured him of the Russian public's support and shielded him from the distraction of foreign information and propaganda sources.

The enemy, however, seemed no less resolute. Whether it had utilized Islam, nationalism, or the cultural network, the opposition had bound its fighters together with a code that loudspeakers and leaflets were not going to penetrate.

The average Chechen citizen fared worst. Whether in the urban capital or the rural hamlet, there was an overwhelming chance he would lose his home and livelihood. The Russian shift to a doctrine of pulling troops back from obstacles and blowing those obstacles apart improved forward momentum, but served to further alienate the people that Russian forces had arrived to gallantly rescue from pervasive terror and banditry. Huddling in one's basement to ride out an artillery barrage probably provided some terror in itself. At the same time, the deliberate Russian effort to eradicate the insurgency's infrastructure—supplies, consumers, communications channels, and logistics apparatuses that also served the struggling economy—may have been perceived as simply more banditry.

D. BATTLEFIELD COMMUNICATIONS

To assess improvement in Russian battlefield communications between the first and second wars, one must look at both technical innovations (or their absence) and changes in Russian tactics whence one can derive the true advances in this realm.

The Russian forces brought better equipment and trained personnel to operate it. Secure communications, the bugbear of the first invasion, had been identified as a problem and by October 1999 the Chief of Signal Troops, Colonel-General Yuri Zalogin, acknowledged this problem to the press. "He cited the lack of encryption devices for

secure communications during the 1994-1996 Chechen conflict as a serious shortcoming for the federal forces. Zalogin noted that the latest *Akveduk* communication equipment would be delivered in November 1999 to almost every soldier... [who would thus] have the capability to send and receive scrambled communications, making it impossible for unauthorized persons to intercept or decipher transmissions.”¹⁶³ Providing this technological remedy, however, meant little if the soldiers did not understand or use it. According to Olikier, “Russian troops [still] repeatedly rendered their advanced technology meaningless by communicating in the open. This enabled the rebels to evade their assaults and to ambush them.”¹⁶⁴ At the same time, tactical field radios quickly drain batteries, and the Russian military took action to make these batteries more compatible with a greater variety of battlefield communication devices and therefore make greater use of their inventories.¹⁶⁵

The Chechens improved their own communications capability, once again, via COTS technology. In the period between wars the insurgents had acquired a two-base-station analog cellular network and set up a relay in neighboring Ingushetia to compensate for the region’s destroyed telephone system. The aforementioned Western- and Asian-produced hand-held radios supplemented this system; “the cellular network allowed each field commander to link with a network of 20-60 individuals, while radio transmitters allowed 60-80 personnel at a time to receive intelligence data.”¹⁶⁶

Both sides increasingly employed satellite communications as well. The Chechens again used Motorola Iridium handheld devices, which enabled international communication and Internet access. For a smaller, robust network of Chechen insurgents this was an ideal arrangement. The Russian effort to provide its larger conventional force with satellite communications was more problematic:

In August 2001, Colonel A.A. Petrov and Lieutenant-Colonel A.L. Safronov wrote in *Voennaya Mysl’* that satellite communications had improved command and control immeasurably. They noted that over 50 satellite communications stations attached to units and sub-units were used

¹⁶³ Ibid., 53.

¹⁶⁴ Olikier, 52.

¹⁶⁵ Thomas, “Grozny 2000...,” 57.

¹⁶⁶ Olikier, 70.

effectively in Chechnya to organize communications. Yet even this number of sets did not completely satisfy troop needs, as they lacked light, mobile, armour-protected stations. The satellites were also a problem due to their low traffic capacity.¹⁶⁷

Hence Russian forces confronted two questions inherent in modern military communications: Is the equipment rugged enough and is there enough bandwidth to go around?

The real improvement in Russian battlefield communications was visible not in the nuts and bolts, but the coordination successes that can only arise from a combat-derived learning curve and the subsequent change in battlefield procedures. There is no doubt that the Russians held the superior technology and firepower in this conflict. History shows, however, that it is not technology itself, but the organization of available technology that wins wars. *“Technological superiority, i.e. superior platforms and weapons, mean little without organizational superiority. And organizational superiority alone probably is worth more than superior platforms and weapons (italics in original).”*¹⁶⁸

Again, there are periods in Russian military history (Finland, the Second World War, i.e.) notable for a pause, a re-evaluation, and re-engagement on terms more favorable to Russian/Soviet capability. What advantages could Russian forces exploit in Chechnya? A GLONASS satellite orbiting the earth, one could easily argue, represents a superior platform. Its technological capabilities, fitted into a prime organizational context, “increased efficiency of missile troops and artillery units by 40 per cent. Munition consumption is cut four or five times, and artillery munitions by 1.7 to three times.”¹⁶⁹ Russian weaponry, such as precision air and artillery munitions, was certainly superior to the adversary’s and likely holds a big portion of the increased efficiency described above. This marriage of platforms and weaponry, therefore, yielded some success in the Second Chechen War. Russian forces, however, needed an organizational change to take advantage of it.

¹⁶⁷ Thomas, “Information Warfare...,” 218-9.

¹⁶⁸ Blank, 70.

¹⁶⁹ Thomas, “Information Warfare...,” 219.

Again, Afghanistan emerged as a classroom where students had learned valuable lessons and then forgot them at the recess bell: “The Afghan war demonstrated the need for better organized tactical groupings, for commanders to understand how to direct artillery or air support or to use reconnaissance troops properly, for infantry sections to be trained in fire and manoeuvre tactics and for snipers to be trained and used properly. All these lessons and many others were neglected or deliberately ignored, only to be repeated in the first Chechen war.”¹⁷⁰ During the years between Khasavyurt and Dagestan, however, Russian military analysts took advantage of the pause and re-evaluated their methodology for taking down the modern city: “The Russians now conclude that high-tempo mounted thrusts to seize cities are obsolete and that contemporary urban combat requires deliberate reduction.”¹⁷¹ The aforementioned increasing investment in personnel via training and psychological preparation increased the soldier’s value as a warfighting resource.

At the same time, Ministry of Defense formations held superiority in technology and weaponry—especially artillery. The subsequent plan—to empower tactical units to pull back 300 meters (the maximum effective range of both the Kalashnikov and RPG-7)¹⁷² and attack enemy strongpoints with indirect fire—thus conserved people while playing to strengths in fire support resources.

This new organizational model was known as the “zonal-target fire strike method” and its inherent “decentralized fire control allowed lower echelons initiative for more active, responsive and effective artillery use.”¹⁷³ The new practice of attaching a mortar or artillery battery to the paratroop or motorized rifle company certainly aided decentralization; if that unit needed more firepower, however, a quick call to the Battalion staff kick-started the zonal-target machine. This was quite a change from the previous fire support apparatus:

¹⁷⁰Michael Orr, “Better or Just Not So Bad? An Evaluation of Russian Combat Effectiveness in the Second Chechen War,” *Strategic & Combat Studies Institute Occasional* 40 (September 2000): 98-9.

¹⁷¹ Grau, “Changing Russian Urban Tactics...,” 2.

¹⁷² Lester W. Grau, “Technology and the Second Chechen Campaign: Not All New and Not That Much,” *Strategic & Combat Studies Institute Occasional* 40 (September 2000): 101.

¹⁷³ Thomas, “Grozny 2000...,” 54.

Historically, to conduct a fire strike against an enemy, information from all types of reconnaissance flowed into the highest headquarters, which then assigned targets for all firing weapons, including mortars. Only then did information flow down the chain of command. This inefficient use of time-sensitive reconnaissance data often allowed the target to move before the fire mission could be conducted.¹⁷⁴

One can imagine the gains in accuracy, speed, and efficiency from such a system. The lynchpin of fire support—that essential component that maximizes effects while minimizing the possibility of fratricide—is communications capability. From the “Troops in Contact!” call to adjustment to battle damage assessment, reliable communication is focal.

Decentralization and enhanced communication also enabled some of the complex fire missions that Russian forces had not employed since Afghanistan: the fire block, artillery sweep, defensive box barrage, and fire corridor. Inadequate efforts to transmit lessons learned in combat caused some planners to erroneously regard these techniques as “new” when brought back for the second Chechen war.¹⁷⁵

Fire blocks are standing barrages designed to keep an enemy force from escaping. Artillery fire sweeps are the systematic use of evenly-spaced long range artillery fire to harass and damage an enemy located in an inaccessible area. Defensive box barrages are artillery fires which ring a forward defensive position to prevent an enemy from overrunning it. Fire corridors integrate the fires of several artillery battalions to shell possible enemy mortar and artillery sites systematically while conducting barrage fires on areas of possible enemy action.¹⁷⁶

Hence advances in Russian battlefield communications facilitated more complex but effective fire support practices. Artillery, however, is not the only arm to benefit from this improvement.

One must not forget that air forces also provide fire support and that fratricide is no less a concern. “In these early stages [of the second war] it was calculated that 80 percent of Russian firepower was delivered by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters and 15-17 percent by artillery. The proportion of air strikes (publication date September 2000)

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Grau, “Technology...,” 102.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

has fallen in recent months; according to the commander-in-chief of the Air Force 14,000 sorties were flown in the first year of the war and 60 percent of Russian fire missions were air delivered.”¹⁷⁷ According to Oliker, citing Russian Air Force sources, “accuracy improved significantly from the first war... and information sharing between forces and commanders increased.”¹⁷⁸

There were still some problems with Russian battlefield communications in the second war. MVD and Ministry of Defense forces still displayed some compatibility and coordination issues.¹⁷⁹ Again, “Russian troops repeatedly rendered their advanced technology meaningless by communicating in the open.”¹⁸⁰ On the whole, however, the Ministry of Defense has worked to provide more secure and reliable communication capability to its soldiers. Previous chapters have described the simultaneous effort to target and knock down the Chechen guerrillas’ communication system. The fact that Russia can successfully reintegrate coordination- and communications-intensive fire support methods from its experience in Afghanistan supports the conclusion that she has largely overcome the 1994-96 setbacks in battlefield communications.

¹⁷⁷ Orr, 94.

¹⁷⁸ Oliker, 74.

¹⁷⁹ Thomas, “Grozny 2000...,” 56-7.

¹⁸⁰ Oliker, 52.

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IV. CONCLUSION

One is tempted to use an obvious trend in the two Chechen Wars to explain every phenomenon of the fighting. Yes, terrorism has made a difference in the march of events. Of course the post-1989 erosion of Russian military capability is a factor in the Chechnya insurgency. Neither, however, is useful in explaining the improved Russian performance in the second war, relative to the first. One can show a disturbing picture of events at Budennovsk and describe it as terrorism; one can build a graph to describe Russian military erosion. At the end of such an effort, one could certainly better identify terror or graphically represent known data. However, taking a leading-edge paradigm in military-technical thought and testing the events of a conflict against it may yield greater dividends for future warfighters because it necessitates departure from the left-brain mindset. Using known metrics to make a point is easy; finding metrics to test compliance with a novel paradigm necessitates a step from what is known and easily charted to what is possible and conducive to innovation.

The “Neocortical” paradigm is one way to approach this task. The Tofflers’ Third Wave concept says that the world is undergoing a technological revolution and that information is at the heart of it. Technology has brought greater access to information than ever before and any paradigm through which the warfighter can manipulate that access becomes increasingly attractive. In Richard Szafranski’s article “Neocortical Warfare: The Acme of Skill”, he charts the development of the brain from reptilian to limbic to “the capstone of the brain, as we know it today... the *neocortex* or neo-mammalian brain... It enables us to think, organize, remember, perceive, speak, choose, create, imagine and cope with or adapt to novelty (*italics in original*).”¹⁸¹ It follows that attaining an advantage in neocortical processes, while disrupting an adversary’s processes, will ensure victory. At the same time, Szafranski posits that “adversaries will wage—are waging even as you read this—Neocortical Warfare against us... It is prosecuted against our weaknesses or uses our strengths to weaken us in imaginative

¹⁸¹ Szafranski, 400.

ways.”¹⁸² It is therefore implicit that protecting one’s own forces from such an attack is an important component in the neocortical paradigm.

Similarities to the concept of Psychological Operations are visible. In evaluating Neocortical Warfare, one should therefore also consider the Department of Defense definition of PSYOP:

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.¹⁸³

These operations certainly represent one component of the Russian brain war in Chechnya. The key phrase in this definition, however, is “foreign audiences”. Szafranski’s paradigm certainly encompasses PSYOP, but safeguarding one’s own OODA loop is equally important. Psychological Operations therefore are treated in this paper as an arrow in the neocortical quiver. Again, the ultimate purpose of Neocortical Warfare is to manipulate the perceptions of both one’s own and the adversary’s forces.

If scholars look to the current situation in Chechnya, two things are immediately visible. First, the opposing sides hold different perceptions of this conflict:

Following a long tradition, the Russian government has defined the conflict as a struggle against banditry and terrorism—much as it did in Central Asia in the 1920s and early 1930s, and in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s. This legitimizes Russia’s course of actions, however ruthless the means, as a police function in the name of public order. The Chechens, meanwhile, refer to their war as a “struggle for national and political liberation” and an Islamic holy war, or *jihad*. Neither side sees the conflict as a civil war. Russia will not honor the Chechens with political legitimacy, and Chechens refuse to accept the idea that they were ever voluntarily a part of the Russian Empire, Soviet state, or Russian Federation.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² Ibid., 407.

¹⁸³ *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms*. Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/04261.html>. Accessed August 2004.

¹⁸⁴ Lester F. Grau and Jacob W. Kipp, “Chechen Nationalism and the Tragedy of the Struggle for Independence,” *National Strategy Forum Review*, Vol. 10, Issue 1 (Autumn 2000): n.p. Available at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/chechnatism.htm>. Accessed January 2004.

Second, conditions conducive to winning wars have not improved much for either adversary. In mid-July 2004, for example, President Putin fired the chief of his general staff (Kvashnin), the top man in the Interior Ministry forces (Tikhomirov), the commander of the North Caucasus Military District (Labunets), and the deputy head of the FSB (Yezhkov). “The other three were punished for last month’s brazen separatist raid on Ingushetia, neighboring the rebel region of Chechnya, in which 90 people were killed, analysts said. Kvashnin’s dismissal followed a decree by Putin cutting the powers of the general staff and reducing it to a department of the Defense Ministry.”¹⁸⁵

This may represent the final act in a well-known conflict between Kvashnin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov for control of the Russian military. This state of affairs has existed since Kvashnin became Chief of Staff in 1997 and has constrained any effort to launch needed military reforms. “He has persistently clashed with defense ministers, calling for a buildup of massive ground forces at the expense of more sophisticated and modern branches of the military.”¹⁸⁶ Unity of command is hard to envision while Ivanov and Kvashnin fought; perhaps this new development will provide the Russian Ministry of Defense more clear and coherent guidance for readiness, budgeting, and doctrine. This may also help Russian political leadership to match its goals with military capabilities.

“Wars,” writes Barry Posen in *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, “seem to take on a life of their own. If these dangerous means are to be controlled, every effort must be made to subject them to the minimal discipline of political goals.”¹⁸⁷ Again, Putin’s stated goals in Chechnya have evolved over time: “to repel Chechen aggression” (August-September 1999), to seek a “sanitary boundary”, or to fence in Chechen terror (October 1999). In November 1999 Putin wanted to totally destroy Chechnya’s terrorists and on New Years’ Day 2000 he wanted to preserve Russia’s integrity.¹⁸⁸ Again, one wonders if a more unified Russian Ministry of Defense will better help Putin match political goals with actual military

¹⁸⁵ CNN.com (online), 19 July 2004. Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/07/19/putin.generals.reut/index.html>. Accessed July 2004.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 25.

¹⁸⁸ Pain, 62.

means. One must also consider the fact that other Russian ministries send armed people into the conflict; the MVD, Border Guards, FSB, and Ministry of Emergency Situations all have a stake in the Chechnya operation.¹⁸⁹ Coordinating their efforts in a wide range of missions has historically been a bumpy journey. Tightening up the military-political chain of command in Moscow is certainly a step in the right direction, especially when its counterpart in Grozny is experiencing difficulties of its own.

Days before Kvashnin was fired, the acting president of Chechnya, Sergei Abramov, was nearly killed by a roadside improvised explosive device; an explosion in May of 2004 assassinated his predecessor, Kadyrov.¹⁹⁰ This is a symptom of the lawlessness that now permeates Chechen society. Putin's wrestling with the correct syntax for dealing with this state of affairs is not hard to visualize; Russia, after all, bears some responsibility. In 1993 the Kremlin stopped paying Chechen pensions and salaries while cutting the region off from the central banking system. Chechnya's porous border and Grozny airport's frequent visitors from throughout the Middle East helped turn the recently-neglected capital into "a perfect place through which to channel dirty deals"¹⁹¹ and home to a vigorous (amongst other "unrecognized republics" in the Caucasus) black market economy. The Chechen oil system, by the time of Dudayev's death, had collapsed as thieves siphoned pipelines and stole the industry's equipment for later black market transactions.¹⁹² Oil extraction, however, was not the only well-equipped Soviet endeavor in the Caucasus. The years between 1991 and 1994 constituted a period "when rogue elements in the Russian armed forces were selling off weapons and it is logical to presume that the former Soviet general-turned-president Dudayev was buying."¹⁹³

When General Lebed and Chief of Staff of Chechen armed forces Aslan Maskhadov signed the Khasavyurt agreement on 12 May 1997, its terms dictated that Russia would help finance Chechnya's reconstruction. Unfortunately, this—and most other international aid—has not arrived, and Chechnya continues its downward spiral; the

¹⁸⁹ Olikier, 37.

¹⁹⁰ *CNN.com* (online), 13 July 2004. Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/07/13/chechnya.fighting.ap/index.html>. Accessed July 2004.

¹⁹¹ Gaal and deWaal, 125.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 128.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 129.

subsequent economic instability is ominous when one examines recent demographic trends. Chechnya's three universities have been largely destroyed, so providing higher education to young citizens is hardly feasible, while any working teachers are living on donations. Meanwhile, writing for the Strategic & Combat Studies Institute, scholar C.W. Blandy cites Russian statistics that say nearly 80 percent of the Chechen population is without work because the war has wiped out most of the industrial infrastructure and only 10 percent are employed in legitimate business.¹⁹⁴ Landmines have been sown in "15 percent of the republic's arable land... which greatly affected agriculture, reducing output and depriving the population of another avenue of legitimate employment."¹⁹⁵ A massive population of unemployed 15-30 year old males walking around a city in the United States makes any metropolitan police force wary; imagine keeping order in a city where many of these young men are carrying assault rifles or RPGs. This problem, however, is not unique to Chechnya. The recent 9/11 Commission Report asserts that:

By the 1990s, high birthrates and declining rates of infant mortality had produced a common problem throughout the Muslim world: a large, steadily increasing population of young men without any reasonable expectation of suitable or steady employment—a sure prescription for social turbulence. Many of these young men, such as the enormous number trained only in religious schools, lacked the skills needed by their societies. Far more acquired valuable skills but lived in stagnant economies that could not generate satisfying jobs... Frustrated in their search for a decent living, unable to benefit from an education often obtained at the cost of great family sacrifice, and blocked from starting families of their own, some of these young men were easy targets for radicalization.¹⁹⁶

This regional trend in demography, therefore, should concern any nation with stated security interests in the Muslim world; the leadership in such nations should pay attention to the Kremlin's conduct in Chechnya.

Perhaps Putin (and most of his constituents, thanks to the aforementioned Public Affairs effort) perceives Chechnya's problems as a cancer of instability. In a 2000 report

¹⁹⁴C.W. Blandy, "Moscow's Failure to Comprehend," *Strategic & Combat Studies Institute Occasional* 40 (September 2000): 15.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Official Government Edition), 2004, 53-4.

to Congress, foreign affairs analyst Jim Nichol describes a metastasis of “economic and security problems” to states along Chechnya’s borders which included:

...disruption of trade and transport through Chechnya, strains from hosting Chechen emigrants, drug and arms trafficking, and raids by Chechen criminals seeking booty or hostages to ransom. To address these problems, Russia has been building railroads and pipelines around Chechnya, and setting up checkpoints, digging trenches, and stationing troops along the border with Chechnya.¹⁹⁷

Nineteen months before jets slammed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. intelligence community had similarly acknowledged Chechnya’s state of lawlessness and possible effects on international security: “In testimony to Congress on February 2, 2000, Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet tended to foresee lengthy Russian fighting in Chechnya to prevent the separatist region from ‘becom[ing] the calling card of this millennium in terms of where do terrorists go and train and act.’ He warned that sympathizers from abroad were going to Chechnya to train and fight, and that they later could directly threaten U.S. interests.”¹⁹⁸ If, like Afghanistan, Chechnya has become such a training ground for Islamic terror, Putin’s work to at least seal off the border and thus contain the cancer is understandably in the interests of Russian security. The Kremlin’s efforts to excise this menace, again, are worthy of U.S. scrutiny, given the current state of international affairs.

Russian forces now occupying Chechnya are increasingly vulnerable to guerrilla activity. To be sure, the average Chechen is tired of the fighting, devastation, and heavy-handed treatment from Russian troops. “The abuses, amounting to war crimes, committed by Russian soldiers, ensure that the Russian administration in Chechnya has no legitimacy in local eyes.”¹⁹⁹ The fact that these abuses are still broadcast to the world via the latest information technology represents a development that Public Affairs and PSYOP planners in the United States should study. The problems that digital cameras and the Internet have brought to the Kremlin are now just as applicable to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Photographed events of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison somehow were

¹⁹⁷ Nichol, 1.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 18.

¹⁹⁹ Orr, 99.

transmitted to the international media and these acts certainly constituted a public relations disaster for the U.S. government. In an environment where improvised explosive devices, urban firefights, and asymmetric attacks are common, Iraqi citizens may not feel secure enough to rebuild a viable nation-state. The Abu Ghraib prison photos, broadcast not only via *al-Jazeera* but also the Internet, may have similarly eroded Iraqi support for U.S. policy in their country. “‘The latest poll in Iraq has not been something that gives me a great deal of confidence,’ said Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa. He noted that 71 percent of Iraqis say they depend for protection ‘on family and friends,’ not U.S. or Iraqi security forces... [and] 80 percent said they have ‘no confidence in U.S. or coalition authorities.’”²⁰⁰

Given the nasty asymmetric warfare and aforementioned attitudes of the populace in Chechnya toward Russian troops sent to protect them—ranging from frightened apathy to stark hostility, trivializing the Abu Ghraib prison scandal as a “college fraternity initiation”²⁰¹ reveals a dangerous level of arrogance and ethnocentrism in certain American political circles. William Bennett’s characterization of the photos as “al Qaeda recruiting posters,”²⁰² given the foreign aid to both Chechen and Iraqi insurgents from Islamic nations and the insurgents’ alleged ties to Osama bin Ladin²⁰³, is more grounded in reality. An army of occupation that abuses the native populace will find it increasingly difficult to hide these activities. The moment these activities are broadcast (whether via the Internet or international media), insurgents gain support. Given analysis of Public Affairs between the Chechen wars, one understands the importance of government efforts to control the flow of information both within and outside a battlespace. Proactive manipulation of the information flow, however, is just as important as its reactive counterpart. Greater effort to provide the right information to one’s own decision-makers may have averted some initial catastrophe in 1994.

²⁰⁰ Vince Crawley, “Iraqis Want U.S. Out—Now,” *Air Force Times*, 28 June 2004, 20.

²⁰¹ Terry M. Neal, “The Politics of Abu Ghraib,” *The Washington Post* (online), 12 May, 2004. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A18316-2004May11?language=printer>. Accessed July 2004.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Olicker, 40-1.

Herodotus said “No one is so foolish as to prefer war to peace: in peace children bury their fathers, while in war fathers bury their children.”²⁰⁴ This monograph has shown that Russia attempted during the relative peace between 1996 and 1999 to entomb some of their fathers’ inappropriate doctrinal assumptions. In 1994, however, a quick look at earlier lessons learned (most recently in Afghanistan, for example) could have influenced a less painful learning curve for Russian soldiers in the first invasion. Some enterprising young staff officer—even one ignorant of the region’s culture and history—could have presented to his superiors the Russian Empire’s experience in the nineteenth century Caucasus, where “unequivocal superiority of Russian tactical firepower, the product of the combined force of separate military arms and disciplined maneuver, only achieved telling effect when the enemy was forced to wage battle on conventional terms.”²⁰⁵ Even then, “conventional terms” meant neither mountains, nor forests, nor cities. While Tsarist Russia’s operations to subdue Chechnya represent a goldmine of useful lessons, the subsequent effort to transmit lessons learned would have been useful for peacetime study as well:

The Caucasian experience left only a modest legacy for the Russian Army. From an institutional perspective, no systematic effort was made to preserve and disseminate the lessons of the Caucasian theater, which had little relevance to European warfare. Even Miliutin, who served as war minister from 1861 to 1881 and whose analysis of the war proved so vital, subsequently became preoccupied with modernization of the Russian Army in a desperate effort to achieve parity with Germany and Austria. Furthermore, the long and bloody struggle in the Caucasus soiled many more reputations than it enhanced... Russia remained preoccupied with the greater threat of warfare on the European continent, and the events of the Caucasus did not become an essential part of the army’s institutional memory. *Within two generations, vital tenets of irregular and mountain warfare would have to be learned anew* (italics mine).²⁰⁶

This failure to record and disseminate lessons learned in battle is not exclusively a Russian phenomenon, but a facet of organizational behavior. “Once military organizations have prepared such standard scenarios,” writes Barry Posen in his 1984

²⁰⁴ Thomas Cahill, *Sailing the Wine-Dark Sea: Why the Greeks Matter* (New York: Nan A. Talese/Doubleday, 2003), 65.

²⁰⁵ Baumann, 35.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 35-6.

study of military doctrine, “they have an interest in finding ways to impose the scenarios on their adversaries through offensive action.”²⁰⁷ The 1994 invasion of Chechnya certainly bears him out, and in this light the hypothetical young staff officer would have been told to forget about the 19th century in order to focus on the desired operation.

Posen’s book also suggests, however, that failure stimulates innovation in organizations²⁰⁸, and the failure of the 1994 invasion has certainly facilitated innovation in Russian forces. “Strategic cultures,” writes John Arquilla, “like those of the Russian military ‘do not go gentle into that good night,’ and the way they respond to the experience of war in Chechnya may provide lessons for all militaries as they contemplate the context and conduct of future wars.”²⁰⁹ What will these future wars look like and what lessons from Chechnya will apply to them?

The 1999 RAND study *Countering the New Terrorism* points out that terrorism is an asymmetric war strategy which adversaries will increasingly employ against more conventional powers; “it may also represent an attractive means of striking at the United States directly, for symbolism or revenge, and as a means of influencing public opinion when the costs and benefits of intervention are in debate. Some of these objectives might be achieved simply through the *threat* of terrorist attacks (italics in original).”²¹⁰ This passage serves to illuminate terror as a tool in the asymmetric warrior’s kit. The sentence regarding “*threat*,” however, hints at a possible preventive measure for the more conventional adversary.

The RAND study forecasts further that “unconventional terrorist attacks on the sinews of modern, information-intensive societies will become the norm, largely replacing conventional conflicts over the control of territory or people. Carried to its logical conclusion, this is a future in which terrorism of all sorts, and especially information-related terrorism, becomes a more pervasive phenomenon, or even the

²⁰⁷ Posen, 46.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 47. Posen’s other reasons for innovation are pressure from without and the wish to expand. While both are pertinent to the current Russian military, they lie outside the scope of this paper.

²⁰⁹ Arquilla and Karasik, 223.

²¹⁰ Lesser et al., 94.

dominant mode of war.”²¹¹ Recent trends toward both asymmetry and urbanization in conflict thus make it imperative that policy-makers posit a solution to the inherent information warfare problem.

A. GROWING ASYMMETRY AND URBANIZATION

In his article on Chechen guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev, analyst Raymond C. Finch III uses the analogy of a football game to symbolize traditional force-on-force combat. He theorizes, however, that as the nation-state erodes, the game changes and his analogy adapts accordingly:

Alongside the deterioration of the state, the opposing team’s military has broken up, and some of these players have moved up into the stands, wreaking all sorts of havoc. While the US military must still prepare to defend against the traditional opposing team of a state-sponsored military, it is increasingly called upon to help settle fights in the stands... It cannot remain on the playing field, waiting for an opposing team to appear, while chaos reigns in the stands.²¹²

The “team” is tasked to go into the bleachers and establish order; the military, of course shuns this activity and mentions that there are other organizations better equipped for the situation in the stands; the team prefers to secure the field using its tried-and-true strategic playbook.

The difference between the Russian football team and the unruly insurgents in the stands puts her at a disadvantage. “Where the Russians fought to control and hold a territory, the rebels fought to make controlling and holding the territory as unpleasant as possible... [and t]o the Russians, territory captured was territory won. To the rebels, territory lost was a temporary retreat to regroup and attack once again.”²¹³ In effect, the Russian goal was to seize and hold real estate while the Chechen goal was to attrite Russian forces. Chechen commander Tourpal Ali-Kaimov recalled that “We knew we could not meet them in the conduct of conventional combat and win. However, we knew that if we met them in the urban environment we might be able to ‘punish’ them... [and]

²¹¹ Ibid., 95.

²¹² Raymond C. Finch III, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev,” *Military Review* LXXVII, No. 3 (May-June 1997), 39.

²¹³ Olikier, 73.

we now know that the city battlefield offers us distinct advantages.”²¹⁴ The Chechens, refusing to obediently form up on the 50-yard-line, thus adapted well to the bleachers and stayed there.

Russia, with its technology and firepower advantage, is grappling with the kind of war that Western militaries will increasingly confront. The asymmetric strategy will only become more prevalent. “Such a strategy seeks to apply one’s strength to an adversary’s perceived weaknesses, knowing that a strength-on-strength approach would be less profitable. Putting a strong opponent into unfamiliar and complex territory, blunting his edges in information gathering and command and control, and setting him among an unfriendly population are all tactics that embody asymmetric thinking.”²¹⁵ Part of the problem lies in entrenched traditions of training for force-on-force scenarios and then attempting to manipulate enemies into fighting conventional battles. America’s own military history holds examples of this error—“‘find, fix, fight, and finish’ the enemy became a much-repeated slogan during the Vietnam War,”²¹⁶ after all, and the asymmetric-oriented foe in that conflict certainly outlasted American resolve.

Scholar Robert M. Cassidy, in his work on Soviet/Russian operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya, wrote that “if the Russian military wants to be successful in small wars, it needs to cultivate a mindset and doctrine that does not focus exclusively on the big war paradigm and it needs to become an institution that can learn, innovate, and adapt... It also requires good intelligence and a very precise and minimal application of lethal force.”²¹⁷ This conditional statement, however, can hardly be confined to Russia.

Any expeditionary combatant with a conventional force—one who holds the advantage in technology and firepower—will need to cultivate these capabilities. The United States, with its post-Cold War shift from forward deployment to expeditionary forces, should also train for the urbanization of combat. Airfields and ports are critical to expeditionary operations and both are mostly found adjacent to metropolitan areas. If

²¹⁴ Dilegge, 178.

²¹⁵ Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, *The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 2.

²¹⁶ Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Doctrine, 1946-76* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1979), 32.

²¹⁷ Cassidy, 50.

these facilities “are located in a non-allied country and the locals welcome US forces, that feeling may change and fighting break out, as illustrated in Mogadishu [in October 1993 and described in *Black Hawk Down* by Mark Bowden]. If the locals are not initially happy with the arrival of US forces, the first battle may well be urban.”²¹⁸

Cassidy also wrote that the Chechen urbanization of the conflict was a natural outgrowth of their past successes against the Tsar’s troops in forest warfare. Further, by taking it to the city, “they could negate Russian advantages in firepower in open terrain from helicopters, combat aircraft, and tanks; and they could blend in with the local population to their advantage.”²¹⁹ This paper has previously examined the Russian countermeasure to urbanization—reliance on heavy firepower to transform the three-dimensional city landscape to two dimensions. History has shown, however, in examples such as the 1942 battle of Stalingrad, that “a city destroyed by artillery and bombs is just as good as an intact one for conducting guerrilla operations against conventional forces.”²²⁰ The world’s demographic trends also make the urbanization of warfare more likely: “The UN projects that by 2025, 60 percent of the world’s population (5 billion people) will live in urban areas.”²²¹ For a commander defending a city, more noncombatants are a benefit: one can force noncombatants to both erect and man defenses and even the presence of idle noncombatants increases the possibility of collateral damage when the enemy attacks.

Any future insurgent with a TV could have learned the lessons in real-time from the first Gulf War—open terrain forces one to fight on a conventional enemy’s terms and will probably bring a peace settlement on his terms as well:

Maneuver forces may now be possible only in the cities as long as high-precision systems dominate the open countryside. Maneuver by fire may be the only maneuver possible in the countryside. The presence of noncombatants and the nature of the city itself may render precision fire problematic. Precision strikes can target specific industries, facilities,

²¹⁸ Grau and Kipp, “Urban Combat...,” 11-12.

²¹⁹ Cassidy, 38.

²²⁰ Ibid., 45.

²²¹ Grau and Kipp, “Urban Combat...,” 10-11.

military infrastructure and sectors as part of an overall plan of maneuver by fire, but they cannot occupy and hold a city.²²²

Since Vietnam, when American families watched the war's progress every night on television, the US government has been averse to conflicts holding high casualty potential. The current situation in Iraq, however, has moved largely to the cities as insurgents target coalition forces with roadside bombs, snipers, and RPG attacks. The United States could pull its troops back to the countryside and employ its overwhelming firepower against centers of unrest. The Russian experience in Chechnya has, however, revealed shortcomings in this approach. Again, to counter the inherent information aspects of both asymmetric warfare and terror, more developed nations need an information-intensive paradigm upon which to base action.

B. NEOCORTICAL WARFARE

Between the first and second wars in Chechnya, the Russian Federation showed improvement in important information-intensive aspects of modern warfare. Intelligence assets better collected and disseminated both battlefield events and characteristics to decision-makers. The reconnaissance-strike cycle was accordingly shortened and contributed to a more efficient and diligent targeting effort against Chechen assets. The Putin administration threw a Public Affairs lasso around battlefield journalists and proactively harnessed the Russian population to its operations in Chechnya via appeals to both securing the nation and fighting terror. Great progress occurred in preparing Russian soldiers for the psychological pressures of modern combat. The technical problems inherent in communications support to a conventional force confronted Russian forces in the second war—secure communications and adequate satellite capacity represented recurring issues. The fact that Russian commanders could better support, defend, and escort ground formations with heavy artillery and close air support, however, supports the case for overall improvement in battlefield communications; so does the increase in Russian interception of Chechen communications traffic and location of Chechen transceivers.

The matrix described in this paper's introduction therefore remains intact.

²²² Ibid., 11.

Case	IPB	PA	PSYOP	Battlefield Comms
1994	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited
1999	Improved	Improved	Improved	Improved

Table 2. Matrix

Between 1994 and 1999 the Russians paid attention to each of these factors: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Battlefield Communications. Neocortical Warfare, however is, again, “warfare that strives to *control* or *shape* the behavior of enemy organisms, but without destroying the organisms. It does this by *influencing*, even to the point of regulating, the consciousness, perceptions and will of the adversary’s leadership: the enemy’s neocortical system (*italics in original*).”²²³ Each of the factors listed above holds influence over combatants’ consciousness, perceptions, and will—therefore a developments in each are applicable to neocortical analysis. Have the Russian forces enhanced capabilities in right-brain factors on the battlefield? Absolutely. This improvement, however, lay in controlling and shaping behavior in *Russian* organisms.

Firming up the resolve in Russian soldiers and citizenry has yielded serious dividends, but these PSYOP and PA activities are not oriented toward the Chechens. Little evidence exists to support the conclusion that Russian measures have altered perceptions in either *Chechen* soldiers or citizens. The perception of danger to one’s family and livelihood has forced thousands of Chechens to emigrate, but both sides have facilitated this exodus and neither profits from it.

Neocortical Warfare, therefore, does not currently apply to the Chechen battlespace. Russia faces both terrorism and asymmetric strategy within that battlespace—styles of conflict heavy with information, perception, and communication aspects. Russia between 1994 and 1999 worked to manipulate the battlefield reports its society received from Chechnya, to improve the perception of its troops and intelligence analysts, and to solidify the communication apparatuses necessary to improve battlefield performance.

Russian sources reveal at least an interest in neocortical matters. A 2003 book by Russian Information Warfare expert S.P. Rastorguyev defines the information weapon as

²²³ Szafranski, 404.

a “means directed at activating (or blocking) information system processes in which the subject using the weapons has an interest.” Further, an information weapon “can be any technical, biological, or social means or system that is used for the purposeful production, processing, transmitting, presenting or blocking of data and or processes that work with the data.”²²⁴ The same year, in the naval journal *Morskoi Sbornik*, Captain First Rank (Reserve) R. Bikkenin explained that Russian doctrine had delineated information warfare into information-technical and the softer information-psychological spheres. The information-psychological realm emphasized effects on perceptions of both civilian and military *people*, rather than electronic assets.²²⁵ These analysts emphasize manipulating both the message and the target audiences; Neocortical Warfare’s use of information to “*influenc[e]*, even to the point of regulating, the consciousness, perceptions and will,”²²⁶ is strikingly similar.

The best argument one can therefore make for Neocortical Warfare in the Russian forces is this: Via its attention to right-brain, softer aspects of warfare, Russian military *theory* is moving in that direction (and may be the most advanced in the world). The evidence says Russian military *practice* is far less developed toward that goal.

The “thumping the beehive” analogy is apt. The Russian colossus that marched back toward Grozny in 1999 was better equipped, better prepared, and more aware of his surroundings. He had exchanged a sledge for a shotgun and, while this weapon was not likely to destroy the bees’ resolve, it could obliterate their home. Better IPB had removed his blindfold, PA had garnered the partygoers’ support for his endeavors, and he had learned from previous stings (even if he had to relearn the pain of his previous confrontation with the Afghanistan hive):

In stark contrast to 1994, the troops who entered Grozny in 1999 were a sizable force, reasonably well-supplied, that had the benefit of better training. A unified chain of command ensured that air and artillery support would be forthcoming and that different forces knew their

²²⁴ S.P. Rastorguyev, *An Introduction to the Formal Theory of Information Warfare* (Moscow, 2003), 6-7. Cited in a conversation with Tim Thomas, 3 August 2004.

²²⁵ R. Bikkenin, “Information Conflict in the Military Sphere: Basic Elements and Concepts,” *Morskoi Sbornik*, No. 10 (2003): n.p. Cited in a conversation with Tim Thomas, 3 August 2004.

²²⁶ Szafranski, 404.

missions. Most important, they had a plan for capturing Grozny, and they had commanding officers whose orders were clear on the need to avoid casualties.²²⁷

The Russian was sure of his movements this time, but if the bees concentrated for an attack he could step back a bit and blast away at the source. The enemy had an instinct and a structure perfect for defending his home. “[Chechen guerrillas] were very much habituated to the decentralization of authority... [and] they had both the organizational suppleness and technical wherewithal needed to mount swarming attacks, then to dis sever and disperse, recombining later to resume the offensive.”²²⁸

This situation can endure for a long time. The Russian Federation, no matter what financial challenges it faces, will not run out of either shotgun or artillery shells in the foreseeable future. The Chechen resistance is unlikely to forget losses in either the current or past contests and, unless something changes, will continue to swarm and sting the intruder. Chechen terror has also set a precedent for stings inside Russia’s house if the hive’s success wanes.

To carry the analogy to its conclusion, one must also remember the ideal arrangement for a man and a nearby hive: the man protects the colony while the bees toil away and provide him honey. Again, this is an apropos metaphor when one considers the former Soviet Union and the oil it harvested from the Caucasus. Somewhere in man’s history, he stopped attacking hives and tried to learn something about the social habits and motivations of bees; perhaps this event could serve as a model for future Russian relations with Chechnya. Attempts to manipulate a swarm into perceiving itself as a piñata have heretofore yielded little success.

Fortunately, at least two members of the House Armed Services Committee understand the importance of strengthening this metaphorical apiculture. “The status of the subject matter experts—be they civil affairs officers skilled in building the institutions needed for a successful society or foreign-area officers with a deep understanding of the cultural and social forces at play in the region—must be elevated... These experts must be represented in greater numbers both in the staffs of operational headquarters and down

²²⁷ Olikier, 83.

²²⁸ Arquilla and Karasik, 224.

at the muddy-boot level.”²²⁹ The United States has held the capability—tucked away in silos, submarines, and bomb bays—to vaporize any nest of trouble for almost 60 years. A sterile left-brain analysis may find this approach acceptable. Results would be immediate; the enemy and his potential to harm friendly interests would be eliminated. Obviously, as revealed in the previous statement, Congressmen Ike Skelton (D-MO) and Steve Israel (D-NY) see the benefits of having right-brain perspectives available to military decision-makers. As this paper has shown, future wars will not be so clear, concise, and conventional—expeditionary militaries will need regional experts to assist in controlling and shaping an adversary’s perceptions and behavior.

This is the problem: It is very difficult to graft a strategic paradigm based on Boyd’s OODA loop to asymmetric conflict. One must remember that the origins of this theory are found in MiG Alley, where John Boyd flew the F-86 during the Korean War. In air combat, speed and surprise are emphasized; these qualities depend upon the pilots’ relative situational awareness. Errors are fatal. If a given pilot’s perceptions and responses are superior, therefore, to the adversary’s, that given pilot will win. Victory is obvious. If the enemy’s aircraft becomes a smoking hole in the landscape or his parachute pops open below the melee, then the other pilot wins:

Mismatches between the real world and our mental images of that world generate inaccurate responses. These, in turn, produce confusion and disorientation, which then diminish both the accuracy and the speed of subsequent decision making. Left uncorrected, disorientation steadily expands one’s OODA loop until it eventually becomes a death trap.²³⁰

One can imagine the advocate of this theory simulating dogfighting adversaries with his hands when describing the OODA loop with its tighter turn radius and consistent need for both cockpit-type situational awareness and initiative in the engagement. Asymmetric warfare differs from air-to-air engagements, which evolve faster and derive clear victories over an adversary.

²²⁹ Ike Skelton and Steve Israel, “‘Softer’ Skills Are Needed to Win Hearts and Minds in Post-combat Iraq,” *Air Force Times*, 2 August 2004, 54.

²³⁰ David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis,” in *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*, ed. Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 364.

Such a paradigm would work if the hypothetical Russian protagonist were fighting a duel rather than a beehive; the fact that most people have two hands and that each hand is similar to its partner in size and shape would adequately convey the engagement. Try to imagine, however, a person pantomiming the fight between a man and a hive with only two hands—through his gestures one could simulate swinging, shooting, or writhing in pain. Again, this is apropos since Russia's neocortical progress lay in preparing her own people and soldiers; her actions have not yet seriously affected the right brain of the Chechen insurgency.

Boyd's concept is replete with the air combat analogy of turning inside the opponent and making the kill, a simpler situation that is more quickly resolved than pacifying a swarm of angry assailants. Engaging a hive necessitates a longer-term, more complex paradigm—one that envisions conflict in terms of strategic war, rather than a tactical skirmish. To describe the asymmetric and information aspects of the Russian experience in Chechnya necessitates a theory with a greater number of hands.

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