Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate
Abstract
Are U.S. nuclear weapons still needed in Europe now that the threat that brought them there is gone? This thesis examines whether basing theater nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe is useful, irrelevant, or counterproductive for maintaining European security. U.S. and NATO policy makers adhere to political and military utility arguments, while others argue that TNWs in Europe are irrelevant -- that their utility has been supplanted by political, cultural, and economic interdependence; modern conventional capabilities; and the deterrent effect of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation and arms control advocates argue that TNWs are counterproductive because they enhance, rather than deter, proliferation; undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); and impede cooperation in the NATO-Russia security relationship. This thesis demonstrates how economic and political ties, including widespread participation in nuclear planning; the increasingly important nuclear taboo; prospects for conventional deterrence; and the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella render TNWs in Europe irrelevant. Emphasizing their utility provides incentive for others to join the "nuclear club," degrades the nonproliferation regime, and creates a roadblock for NATO-Russian arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This thesis recommends withdrawing U.S. theater nuclear weapons from Europe, relying instead on a strategy of conventional deterrence and reassurance while maintaining general nuclear deterrence via strategic forces. (2 tables, 1 figure, 82 refs.)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA427697
Entities
People
- Brian G. Polser
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School