U.S. Nuclear Weapons. Future Strategy and Force Posture
Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been reexamining the role of nuclear forces in its national security policy. Traditional U.S. nuclear strategy was primarily intended to deter a Soviet attack against the United States, along with a few lesser objectives. This strategy called for a nuclear arsenal held at constant high alert and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (STOP) that would make execution of a retaliatory strike as simple, quick, and effective as possible. Today, the United States faces a more diverse set of potential threats. Political instability in established nuclear states such as Russia and Pakistan is a major concern. The deterioration of military command and control in Russia increases the chances of accidental or unauthorized launch. The possible emergence of new nuclear adversaries poses a further threat because of the wide variety of strategies and capabilities they may present. Nuclear weapons may become instruments of the weak rather than the strong. Weak regimes opposed to the United States may attempt to deliver nuclear warheads on trucks or ships, thus eluding U.S. tactical warning systems. States or groups that embrace radical, anti-American ideologies and feel that they have nothing left to lose may not be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Long before the current Bush administration took office, it was clear that the United States needed to rethink its fundamental nuclear posture. RAND Project AIR FORCE examined a range of strategies and force postures that the United States could adopt to make the most effective use of its nuclear forces in an uncertain world.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA427768
Entities
Organizations
- RAND Corporation