Thoughts on Effects-Based Operations, Strategy, and the Conduct of War
Abstract
Advances in conceptual thinking have not kept up with advances in technology and precision. Much of the thinking about the uses of precision and stealth to create effects-based operations (EBO) has instead focused on the tactical employment of weapons systems. Military thinkers have focused on target destruction rather than on the psychological impact of military actions, despite evidence that war has remained a psychological endeavor. This paper examines how policy makers and military leaders should use EBO to achieve strategic, operational, and psychological effects, rather than focusing operations solely on the technological or tactical problems involved in hitting targets. Historically, leaders who were victorious in war (and its aftermath) had posed hard questions to their subordinates as to the possible strategic and political effects that potential military courses of action might have. From their examination of these historical examples, the authors of this paper conclude that the linking of the strategic outcome to means, military actions, and potential effects at least offers the possibility that the United States can proceed down a coherent path. Moreover, such a strategic framework offers the potential of overcoming or at least addressing the uncertainties and ambiguities that will always mark the making of strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA428069
Entities
People
- Kevin Woods
- Williamson Murray
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses