Korean Arms Control: Political-Military Strategies, Studies, and Games
Abstract
This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula), the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA428208
Entities
People
- James C. Wendt
- Richard E. Darilek
Organizations
- RAND Corporation