

Intelligence Reorganization—Closing the Barn Door(s)?

Student A

IR Comprehensive Exam Part 2

15 Oct 04

Sub-Field D: Foreign Policy and Policy Process

Question 1.

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**THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ARTICLE ARE
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The Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on 9/11 were a tremendous shock. How could such things be done in such a grandiose scale without being detected beforehand? Who let us down? The Intelligence Community (IC). Heads must roll, reorganizations are needed, the barn door must be closed.¹

In March 2003 after months of making the case that there were WMD in Iraq, the US attacked, quickly overcame Iraqi defenses and opened Iraq to unhindered WMD searches. But the WMD, which were so clear and easy to find in the prewar, October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), remained elusive in Iraq. The IC blew it again. Heads must roll, reorganizations are needed, the barn door must be closed.

This essay will begin with an examination of what the barn doors are that need closing. Then it will analyze the IC reform proposals of President Bush and Senator Roberts with respect to their attempts to close the barn doors, take heads, and reorganize the IC, as well as their prospects for implementation. Finally, the essay concludes that the Roberts' proposal, which punishes and is radical in approach, would not fulfill its promise and would be impossible to implement. The Bush proposal, which offers minimal change, has greater likelihood of political acceptance. Neither plan shuts the barn doors.

The two barn doors end up actually being the opposite sides of the same door. The Congressional intelligence committees blamed 9/11 on the IC's inability to be creative enough to "connect the dots."² The IC was criticized for "a dearth of creative, aggressive analysts targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to comprehend the collective significance of individual pieces of intelligence."³ If only the analysts had been more creative in developing potential scenarios that would have tied in all the correct, and

none of the spurious, information, they could have predicted 9/11. On the other hand, the IC's prewar Iraq NIE was the result of being too creative in connecting the dots. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) faulted the IC analysts for falling into a group-think dynamic. The SSCI also admitted, "This bias was likely further reinforced by the IC's failure to detect the September 11th terrorist plot and the criticism that the Community had not done all it could to 'connect the dots.'"⁴

Other problems contributed to the main problems of connecting the dots. Information sharing was a big problem. The Congressional intelligence committees 9/11 report states: "This breakdown in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the agencies' missions, legal authorities and cultures."⁵ The Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act have since removed many of the legal obstacles to sharing intelligence between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies.⁶ Technology mismatches and less than state-of-the-art programs also affected the IC's information sharing as well as the production of intelligence. The general lack of translators created processing bottlenecks, and a lack of Arab-American agents limited opportunities to infiltrate Iraq and Al Qaeda organizations in the US and abroad. The CIA's failure to put agents on the ground in Iraq from 1998 until the war began was attributed to a risk-adverse culture: "Most, if not all of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management."⁷ The SSCI faults analysts and managers for not using "formalized IC mechanisms established to challenge assumptions and group think," but "found no evidence that the IC's mischaracterization or exaggeration of intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities was the result of political pressure."⁸

The barn doors hinge on the question of how to get analysts to separate the wheat from the chaff and draw correct conclusions from discontinuous, incomplete, and conflicting data. This rests on the ability, training and experience of analysts and managers.⁹ However, policy makers want to assure the public with visible fixes that 9/11 will not be repeated. “Taking heads” and forced reorganizations, though visible, are not likely to close the barn doors. Taking heads punishes organizations for their mistakes and presumably makes the new leadership wary of repeating them. It may stimulate reform from within, but it may also lead to a siege mentality, where all efforts shift to prevent repeating the last mistake, not looking for ways to avoid future mistakes. Reorganizations tend to focus on the concrete—wiring diagrams and the distribution of power (budgets and personnel) and turf (missions)—realizing, perhaps, that organizational culture and the impact of lead personalities is impossible to legislate.¹⁰ Reform plans also gravitate towards fixable problems such as information sharing, which in turn could presumably fill in more of the missing dots.

The President Bush and Senator Roberts reform proposals define the spectrum of IC reform.¹¹ The Bush proposal, resting atop the Patriot and Homeland Security Act improvements and actions taken under executive order, splits the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) current three major taskings among two people, but does not reorganize the rest of the IC.¹² The new National Intelligence Director (NID) becomes the president’s principal intelligence advisor and the head of the IC. A new Director of the CIA is responsible for the CIA. See Chart 1. The Bush proposal appears to give the NID a bit more power than the DCI currently has with respect to budgets and personnel issues, although it is clear that no major reforms are envisioned.¹³ The Bush proposal also

calls for a cabinet-level Joint IC Council (JICC), which would “advise the National Intelligence Director on setting requirements, financial management, establishing uniform intelligence policies, and monitoring and evaluating performance of the Intelligence Community,”¹⁴ This tends to leave the NID-IC relationship as murky as today since the IC currently advises DCI on these issues and the NID does not have substantially more power than today’s DCI over the IC. No heads roll, reorganization is minimal, and President Bush stands firmly against larger reform efforts, claiming that major reorganizations would disrupt intelligence support to the ongoing war effort.

The Roberts proposal takes heads, and radically reorganizes the IC. The first bullet in his press release on the proposal calls for renaming the IC to the “National Intelligence Service to indicate unity of effort and purpose.”¹⁵ The name change is significant in indicating the degree of reform that Sen Roberts seeks. In order to create this ‘Service,’ he proposes chopping up the CIA into three independent agencies (heads must roll), each with a new name. His proposal also tears the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA’s) Human Intelligence Service from DoD. It realigns budget and personnel authority for the intelligence units of Treasury, DOE, DOS, DHS and the remaining analytic units in DIA, and takes away the FBI’s direct line control over the FBI’s Counter-Intelligence (CI)/Counter-Terrorism (CT) units. The organizations, authorities, and control are then rationally recast into the ‘Service,’ led by the new NID and his four deputies (ANIDs): for Collection; for Analysis and Production; for Research, Development and Acquisition; and for Military Support. See Chart 2.

The Roberts proposal significantly strengthens the NID's position over that of the current DCI. The NID has "complete budget and personnel authority, including hire and fire authority, and direct control over the national collection agencies currently residing in the ... DoD," as well as "over the intelligence units of Treasury, Energy, Homeland Security, State Department, and the remaining analytic elements of the DIA, but they would continue to report to their home agencies on a day to day basis to maintain their analytic independence."¹⁶ Finally, the ANID for Collection has "direct line control over the FBI's Counter-Intelligence /Counter-Terrorism units, but they would continue to operate within the FBI for administrative and support purposes, and would still be subject to Attorney General guidelines."¹⁷ The DCI currently has much more limited inputs on IC members' budgets and personnel, except for the CIA's.

The Roberts proposal presumes to increase coordination and intelligence sharing by consolidating all IC intelligence collectors under one roof.¹⁸ Collected intelligence would then be disseminated to all analysts. This would free analysts from pressure or technical restrictions forcing the use of the home agency's data. All analysts would be able to access and review all data sources and incorporate them all into comprehensive multi-source analyses. The NID, ANID for Analysis and Production, ANID for R&D&Acquisition, and ANID for Military Support would only have to talk with one office, the ANID for Collection, when they have any questions, concerns, requests, or orders for IC collection. This would eliminate problems, for example, like the CIA keeping some information in-house.¹⁹ It would also streamline NID's control over technology since ANID for R&D&Acquisition would be in a position to force standardization of systems on all IC members, which would eliminate technology hurdles

to information sharing. NID could also then be held directly accountable for NSA's presumed technical shortcomings.²⁰ The Roberts proposal would also increase SSCI jurisdiction and power since NSA, NRO, NGA, and parts of DIA would no longer be shared with the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Bush proposal would not directly lead to any changes in intelligence sharing above those already instituted in accordance with the Patriot and Homeland Security Acts. The NID takes over the existing Deputy DCI's Community Management staff and the modified National Intelligence Council to support IC coordination, but can no longer fall back on the CIA budget and personnel to support IC activities. Since the CIA's core mission is to support the President, NSC and national security policy makers, the CIA is likely to maintain its favored position as the primary author of multi-source intelligence analysis for the NID and national policy makers.²¹ Consequently, the NID would be beholden to the CIA, but have no more control over it than any other IC member. The NID would be unable to reign in the CIA if it were to persist in withholding information from the IC. In fact, it is possible that the NID and the Director of the CIA could struggle over the CIA because of its centrality to the NID's mission to advise the President. The NID would also have no more power than today's DCI to encourage IC members to procure systems that facilitate information sharing.

Although the Roberts proposal consolidates intelligence collectors under one roof, it keeps analysts separate and at their home agencies, ostensibly to ensure diversity and independence in analysis, i.e., to prevent group-think. However, this implies that analysts have ties to their home agency. In that case, they are unlikely to work on analyzing intelligence outside of their perceived mission area. In DoE, for example, if data is not

nuclear-related, there is no reason to analyze it. In the post-9/11 world, one would expect DoE to pass such data on to the rest of the IC. However, mission and organizational culture (as well as budget and time constraints) call for "sticking to the knitting."

Consequently, the presumed independence would only come into play when there is a sense of overlapping missions by two or more IC members.²² On the other hand, if analysts develop stronger ties to the intelligence 'service' than to their home agencies, which is a potential side-effect of centralizing all budget and personnel decisions in the NID, group-think might actually be encouraged. This aspect of the Roberts' proposal spins the JCS-Goldwater-Nichols analogy on its head since the military services are the pool, from which personnel are rotated into temporary joint assignments; whereas the Roberts proposal seems to take all the analysts and transform them into a permanent joint intelligence service pool.²³ The military loans personnel to the joint world, but they keep their service identity and culture. The Roberts proposal seems to envision eventually loaning personnel from the joint intelligence service to the specific agencies. The intelligence service culture and identity would then trump the agencies'.

The Roberts proposal appears to leave the ANID for Analysis and Production with just the former CIA DI to apparently provide all multi-source intelligence analysis for the President, Congress and their staffs. Consequently, ANID for Analysis and Production becomes NID's main source of intelligence for advising the President, leaving it, although less powerful, in a similar situation as the CIA today. This would still give it an edge on setting the interpretation of intelligence, with potential group-think implications, as well as potentially lead to struggles between the NID and the ANID for Analysis & Production because of the centrality of its importance to the NID's mission.

The Bush proposal, by separating the NID from the CIA, potentially allows for more competition among analysts in the IC, but the CIA would still be central to the analysis of any NID intelligence destined for the President and other policy-makers. Consequently, the IC organizational structure is not likely to affect whether group-think occurs any more than today.

The Roberts proposal is an invitation to a major political fight on several fronts. It offers up one head, the Director of CIA, by splitting the CIA up into three new independent entities. This message may be jarring enough to inspire the IC to fix the “broken corporate culture and poor management.” The step also eliminates the possibility of a continual power struggle between the NID and the Director of the CIA, although the NID may still have problems with the weakened ANID for Analysis and Production. The biggest problem, however, is that removing NSA, NRO and NGA from DoD would incite powerful opposition. As former DCI Robert Gates wrote this year:

More than 80 percent of foreign intelligence dollars are spent by agencies under the control of the secretary of defense. ... In the real world of Washington bureaucratic and Congressional politics, there is no way the secretary of defense or the armed services committees of Congress are simply going to hand those agencies over to an intelligence czar sitting in the White House.²⁴

It is not just about money—it is also about mission. As the military increasingly integrates near-real-time intelligence into combat operations and the tactical and strategic distinction blurs, DoD becomes ever more committed to keeping its intelligence assets. Actual control of the intelligence assets is critical to DoD. As Richard Betts wrote: “The military services will never accept dependence on other departments for performance of their core functions, ... and politicians will not override military protests that their

combat effectiveness is being put at risk.”²⁵ Furthermore, DoD can point to recent joint intelligence/combat operations successes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The situation with the Treasury, DIA, DOE, DHS and DOS appears equally daunting. They are unlikely to acquiesce and give NID full budget and personnel authority over their intelligence units. Who would assure the collection and analysis of agency-specific intelligence needs? If analysts stay at their home agencies, these agencies will want control over the budgets and personnel since they are presumably providing analysis in support of the home agency's missions. The situation would be similar for the FBI. Giving the NID line control over the FBI CI/CT units while keeping them under the FBI for funding and legal oversight would be practically and politically next to impossible. The FBI will fight to keep control over its CI/CT units.

In addition to the bureaucratic struggles for turf between the agencies, the Roberts proposal would also destroy the existing organizational cultures within the IC. By definition, intelligence agencies are closed societies, with an emphasis on loyalty and professionalism.²⁶ There is clearly a pecking order between organizations, people associate themselves with their organizational mission and culture, and civilians tend to be long-time employees. NSA, for example, is a mix of collectors, analysts, technicians and R&D, all geared towards signals intelligence or information security. The Roberts proposal appears to strip NSA of its non-collector units, potentially strewing these units among the ANIDs, where they will have to redefine themselves within their new organizations. In addition, military members make up part of the DoD agencies' personnel, and the agencies are commanded by military officers, which contributes significantly to their cultures. There would be no need for military heads of agencies

under ANIDs and the numbers of military personnel in NGA, NSA, and NRO would logically shrink to liaison minimums, which would also reduce overall IC manning.

Military ties to the collectors and analysts would become tenuous.

Although it is possible to form new organizational cultures at the National Intelligence Service level or in the supporting agencies, and intelligence collectors and analysts are theoretically used to shifting priorities and emphasis, there would obviously be a period of disruption during the transition. Seemingly minor decisions such as where to house the NID and ANIDs would have major symbolic repercussions.²⁷

It is debatable which proposal would actually improve US intelligence. The real problem underlying 9/11 and the prewar Iraq NIE is the ability of intelligence analysts to know when to be creative and when to be conservative in interpreting the dots. Training and experience are the keys to this problem, but neither proposal directly addresses this. The Roberts proposal is more radical, and on its surface would increase intelligence sharing by massively reorganizing the IC. However, the Homeland Security and Patriot Acts have already implemented some reforms in this area at less cost, and the Roberts proposal may not effectively stop group-think. The Roberts proposal is also politically unrealizable. Political battles would rage within the IC, in Congress between committees, and in public forums. Depending on the elections, the Bush proposal could be implemented and may placate the public, but it is unlikely to bring significant improvement over the current IC structure. Intelligence is less than perfect, and analysts will still be confronted with the dilemmas of whether or how to bridge gaps in knowledge. Improved information sharing makes the bridges smaller, but managers and analysts will still confront pressure to conform.

Notes

¹ In addition to recommendations for reorganizing the IC, the Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence clearly calls for Inspectors General of the CIA, DoD, DoJ and DoS to conduct investigations of individual omissions and failures to identify, prevent or disrupt terrorist attacks, for the agency heads to discipline employees for such acts, and to report the disciplinary and administrative actions to the president and congress. See the Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Recommendations*, 107th Congress, 2D Session, S. Rept. No. 107-351, H. Rept. No. 107-792, Dec 2002, pp. 15-16. www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html, 10/3/04.

² See for example, *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Abridged Findings and Conclusions*, p. xv: "No one will ever know what might have happened had more connections been drawn between these disparate pieces of information." Certainly problems with translation speed and information sharing contributed to the IC's inability to come up with the correct puzzle picture. However, if one takes all the disparate scraps of information known to the IC and revealed in the Congressional Intelligence Committees' and in the 9/11 Commission's reports, one would still not come up with 9/11, unless one starts with 9/11, works backwards, and ignores all spurious information.

³ *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Abridged Findings and Conclusions*, p. xvi.

⁴ United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: Conclusions*, 108th Congress, Ordered Reported on July 7, 2004. Under "Conclusion 3." www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/.html, 10/3/04. Hereafter labeled "SSCIR."

⁵ *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Abridged Findings and Conclusions: Factual Findings*, p. xvii.

⁶ Richard A. Best Jr., "Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies," *CRS Report for Congress*, 6 Aug 04, p. CRS-11. Received through the CRS Web, 10/3/04.

⁷ The quote refers to a perceived lack of backbone in the CIA because of its unwillingness, or inability to put CIA officers on the ground in harms way in Iraq. See Conclusion 6 in SSCIR.

⁸ See Conclusions 3 and 1 in SSCIR. One would have expected the SSCI's to probe why analysts and managers did not follow in-place mechanisms to minimize group-think. With respect to political pressure, all managers, briefers and senior analysts should be able to withstand policy-makers probing of the intelligence analysis and estimates. Such interactions are beneficial to both sides and should reveal a more complex picture of varied levels of uncertainty to the policy-maker. That is what is supposed to happen. Although policy-makers would naturally prefer that intelligence analysis and estimates support their views, the bigger problem is that policy-makers find it difficult to make policy based on wishy-washy intelligence estimates and consequently want to push the analysts off the fence and make them take a position.

⁹ There is no pool of analysts and managers available to replace the current set. The IC has a shortage of Arabic area specialists, and there is no easy mechanism to bring people from outside, without clearances and intelligence experience, into middle and upper management positions.

¹⁰ Legislating missions has an impact on organizational culture, the concept of organizational culture encompasses much more than the mission. It deals with how the mission and its submissions are perceived and how the organization goes about performing them. Does the organization start early or end late? Does a collegial atmosphere prevail, or does a formal hierarchy regulate actions and behavior? Some aspects of organizational culture obviously affect information sharing and group-think. See for example, James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, (New York: Basic Books, 2000) pp. 90-110.

¹¹ Appendix A provides a table format comparison of the two proposals.

¹² President Bush already amended EO 12333 of 4 Dec 1981 to incorporate some of his proposed changes. The White House, "Executive Order Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community," 27 Aug 04, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-6.html, 10/3/04.

¹³ For example, the Bush proposal calls for the NID to "determine, develop, and present" the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget to the president, and would require NID concurrence in hiring

IC agency heads. The White House, "Reforming and Strengthening Intelligence Services: Fact Sheet: Leading the Way on Reforming and Strengthening Our Intelligence Services," 8 Sep 04, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/print/20040908-5.html, 10/3/04.

However, the 1947 National Security Act already instructed the DCI to "facilitate the development" of the annual NFIP budget and to prepare and approve each IC member's part of the NFIP budget, and the DCI is already the approval authority for NNFIP reprogramming or transfers into or out of the NFIP.

Consequently, it does not appear that the NID's budgetary powers would be significantly changed above or beyond the current DCI's. With respect to hirings, the DCI is already supposed to concur on NSA, NRO and NGA chief hirings, but SECDEF can override DCI's non-concurrence; DCI is supposed to 'consult' on DIA, DoS, and DoE intelligence chief hirings; and the FBI is supposed to inform DCI in a timely manner on FBI appointments. Alfred Cumming, "The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*, updated 12 Aug 04, pp. CRS-3, CRS-9-CRS-10. Received through the CRS Web 10/3/04. Since the current system is often summarized as one in which the DCI has 'concurrence' on hirings of new chiefs in IC organizations, the Bush IC personnel reforms appear quite limited.

¹⁴ The White House, "Reforming and Strengthening Intelligence Services."

¹⁵ "Senator Roberts Calls for Real Intelligence Reform with 9/11 National Security Protection Act," Press Release 23 Aug 04. www.roberts.senate.gov/08-23-2004.htm, 10/3/04.

¹⁶ Roberts

¹⁷ Roberts

¹⁸ The idea of centralizing all collectors under one roof is not new. In fact, the Scowcroft Commission, headed by Lt Gen (ret) Brent Scowcroft, the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for President George W. Bush, is reported to have recommended that DoD cede control over NSA, NRO and NGA to the DCI. The report was never formally presented or made public, presumably because of SECDEF Rumsfeld's opposition. See Alfred Cumming, "The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*, updated 12 Aug 04, p. CRS-19. Received through the CRS Web 10/3/04.

¹⁹ See for example, Conclusions 6 and 7 in SSCIR.

²⁰ See for example, Findings 7 and 8 in *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Abridged Findings and Conclusions: Factual Findings*, pp. xvi-xvii.

²¹ *United States Intelligence Community 2001*, CIA 2001, p. 7.

²² This of course, assumes that the agency intelligence units are not predatory. The uniqueness of their missions, which are currently tied to the home agency's mission (and budget indirectly through the NFIP) ensures that they meet the home team's needs first. Since there is an oversupply of information, it is unlikely that analysts will have time or interest to go searching for solutions to non-agency problems. In the current system, there are no rewards for DoE analysts to examine non-nuclear issues.

²³ The 9/11 Commission drew a better analogy in its reorganization wiring-diagram, which showed a Deputy NID essentially for the CIA, a Deputy NID for DoD, and a Deputy NID for Homeland Intelligence, all of whom hired, trained, acquired, equipped and fielded people and systems that then were dispersed to various National Intelligence Centers, under which they jointly collected and analyzed intelligence. See the *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9-11 Commission") Report*, p. 413. The military services find that an officer with too much joint service becomes useless since the officer loses touch with what is going on in his/her service. Consequently, the officer has problems returning to the service, but also cannot provide up-to-date service perspectives to the joint world.

²⁴ Robert M. Gates, "Racing to the Ruin of the C.I.A.," *New York Times*, June 8, 2004, p.25. as quoted in Richard A. Best Jr., "Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies," *CRS Report for Congress*, 6 Aug 04, p. CRS-9. Received through the CRS Web 10/3/04.

²⁵ Richard K. Betts, "The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work this Time?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004, p. 6. As quoted in Richard A. Best Jr., "Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies," *CRS Report for Congress*, 6 Aug 04, p. CRS-9. Received through the CRS Web 10/3/04.

²⁶ Although normally very high standards prevail, loyalty to the US can sometimes become twisted into loyalty to the agency. Professionalism implies a concept of service before self and a sense of a higher calling and perhaps higher standard than society. If both of these admirable traits are manipulated and entwined, things like withholding information, group-think, or things like Iran-Contra can occur. However, the importance of 9/11, the war on terrorism, the war in Iraq and the high level attention being paid to the IC should help straighten out twisted individual perceptions or organizational cultures.

On a slightly different tack, Don Snider has done some interesting work on how the Army tries to manage the dual nature of being both a professional calling (continual self-improvement and ability to adapt and apply knowledge and experience to new and complex situations) and a bureaucracy (standard operating procedures, routines, etc.), as well as a look at how it must defend its professional area of expertise from encroachments from the intelligence world for example. See *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, project directors Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002).

²⁷ For example, keeping the NID and Director of CIA together in the CIA headquarters complex could increase tension between them. Keeping the three CIA successors on the same compound would cause confusion as to whether anything really changed. The old CIA culture would have longer staying power without a clear break, but moving units around can be expensive and disrupting.

President Bush's Proposal




Chart 1

Sen Roberts' Proposal




Chart 2

ANID has direct line control, FBI provides admin/spt

Attachment A: Comparison of Proposals and Current IC Status

Sen Roberts' prop	White House prop	Current situation	Comments
Create NID and 4 Assistant NIDs	Create NID, in exec branch, not Cabinet; Take over DCI's duties as head of IC; Authority over collection activities; Coord domestic and foreign IC activities	DCI heads IC; DCI is POTUS' principal intell advisor; DCI also heads CIA; Deputy DCI for community management;	Sen Roberts calls for radical reorganization; The president calls for a separation of DCI (new NID) and Director of CIA;
NID complete budget & personnel authority (hire/fire) of IC	NFIP budget—determine, develop, present to POTUS; Concurrence hiring agency heads in IC; Receive direct appropriation and dispense to IC;	DCI facilitates development of annual intell budget; DCI approves budgets of all IC before incorporation into NFIP; Participate in development of DoD's JMIP & TIARA; DCI approval for NFIP reprogramming or transfers in or out of NFIP appropriation; DCI, with Director OMB approval, can transfer personnel and funds within IC for up to 1 year if develops procedure with affected agency—however, agency heads can prevent transfers by stating objection in writing to DCI; DCI cannot transfer FBI funds/personnel;	Sen Roberts calls for radical increase in NID budget and personnel authority throughout IC; The president calls for a bit more control over budgets and personnel

Sub-Field D: Foreign Policy/Policy Process

Currently SECDEF receives appropriation and disburses to CIA and IC; No DCI hire/fire authority outside of CIA—Concurrence on NSA, NRO and NGA, but SECDEF can override Consults on DIA, INR and DOE intell; FBI informs DCI in timely manner on FBI appointments

NSA & NGA from DoD to ANID for Collection

Big change

NRO from DoD to ANID for R&D& Acquisition

Big change

CIA's DO (name changed) & DIA's HUMINT become independent agencies under ANID for Collection

CIA eliminated

ANID for Collection has direct control over FBI CI/CT, but they remain in FBI for admin/support and under AG guidelines

Complicated situation with dual chains for FBI CI/CT

CIA's DI (name change) under ANID for Analysis/Production

Only one analysis agency?

CIA's DST (name change) under ANID for R&D& Acquisition

NID budget & personnel authority over intell in Treasury, DoE, Homeland Sec, DoS, analytic elements of DIA; but all remain under home agencies

Rename IC to NIS

Create NCTC

Create NCTC

Create cabinet-level Joint Intell Community Council to advise NID
Create National Intelligence Council under NID to provide NIEs

Big change

Implications of 'service?'

Already in operation

What would JICC do?

Have to give NID something to do?