

**RAND**

*Intervention in  
Intrastate Conflict*

*Implications for the  
Army in the Post-  
Cold War Era*

*Supplemental Materials*

*Thomas S. Szayna, Graham E. Fuller,  
Robert D. Howe, Brian Nichiporuk,  
Kevin Jack Riley, Ashley J. Tellis,  
James A. Winnefeld*

**Arroyo Center**

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## PREFACE

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This volume provides the supporting material to the main report, MR-554/1-A. That document focuses on helping the Army identify the issues and some of the answers associated with changes taking place in the nature of intrastate conflict. It focuses principally on intervention (and its termination) in intrastate disputes of interest to the United States. Its principal and somewhat unique contribution is the use of speculative "case studies" of possible future scenarios that might involve the United States in general and the U.S. Army in particular. This device is intended to help the Army experience the future before it encounters it, with the objective of providing insights that may be useful in performing strategic and program planning, updating doctrine, and deciding about intervention. This supporting volume presents the case studies in full, since the findings from the case studies underpin the implications and conclusions.

The contents of this report represent a true collaborative product. Ashley Tellis authored Chapter One, on how exit strategies have been implemented in the past. Thomas Szayna and James Winnefeld put together the conceptual framework for the case studies (Chapter Three). Ashley Tellis authored the Sri Lanka case study (Chapter Four), James Winnefeld wrote the Indonesia case study (Chapter Five), Graham Fuller wrote the Algeria case study (Chapter Six), Brian Nichiporuk authored the South Africa case study (Chapter Seven), Thomas Szayna wrote the Macedonia case study (Chapter Eight), and Jack Riley authored the Venezuela case study (Chapter Nine). Each of the above authors contributed to the specific portion of the global survey of intrastate conflicts (Chapter Two). Robert Howe brought his considerable Army expertise to bear and contributed to all of the

case studies. Thomas Szayna edited all of the case studies and coordinated the effort. The research reflected in this document was completed in summer 1994.

This research was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DAMO-SSP). The intended audience is mid- to senior-level planners, advisers, staff officers, and decisionmakers who occupy key roles in shaping Army plans, programs, doctrines, capabilities, and operations to serve national policy as it interacts with a changed intrastate conflict environment. The research was conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.

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## CONTENTS

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|                                                              |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Preface .....                                                | iii |
| Figures .....                                                | ix  |
| Chapter One                                                  |     |
| HISTORICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXIT STRATEGIES .....           | 1   |
| Low-Level Interventions .....                                | 1   |
| Counterinsurgency Operations in Greece (1946-1949) .....     | 1   |
| Dragon Operations in the Congo (1964-1965) .....             | 5   |
| Mid-Level Interventions .....                                | 9   |
| "Stabilizing" Peace In Lebanon (1958) .....                  | 9   |
| "Peacemaking" in the Dominican Republic<br>(1965-1966) ..... | 14  |
| High-Level Interventions .....                               | 18  |
| Punitive Operations in Grenada (1983-1984) .....             | 18  |
| Police Action in Panama (1989-1990) .....                    | 21  |
| Chapter Two                                                  |     |
| GLOBAL SURVEY OF INTRASTATE CONFLICTS .....                  | 27  |
| East Asia .....                                              | 28  |
| Secessionism and Intra-Army Conflict in Indonesia ...        | 28  |
| Return of Ethnic Chinese Insurgency in Southeast Asia ..     | 28  |
| The Fractioning of China .....                               | 29  |
| Insurrection and Terrorism in the Philippines .....          | 30  |
| South Asia .....                                             | 30  |
| Civil War in Afghanistan .....                               | 30  |
| Renewed Strife in the Sind (Pakistan) .....                  | 31  |
| Escalation of Sectarian-Based Insurrection in India ...      | 32  |
| The Tamil Insurgency in Sri Lanka .....                      | 32  |

|                                                                  |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| North Africa and the Middle East .....                           | 33 |
| Azeri Separatism in Iran .....                                   | 33 |
| The Kurdish Problem .....                                        | 34 |
| Iraq and the Shi'a .....                                         | 35 |
| Anti-Alawite Revolt in Syria .....                               | 35 |
| Jordanian-Palestinian Strife in Jordan .....                     | 36 |
| Fundamentalist Strife in Egypt .....                             | 36 |
| Civil War in Algeria .....                                       | 37 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa .....                                         | 38 |
| Islamic Fundamentalism and the Rebellion in Southern Sudan ..... | 38 |
| Political Breakdown and Social Unrest in Zaire .....             | 38 |
| Anarchy as the Final Stage of the Civil War in Angola ...        | 39 |
| Renewed Civil War in Mozambique .....                            | 40 |
| Civil War in South Africa .....                                  | 40 |
| Europe and the Former USSR .....                                 | 41 |
| Civil War in Bosnia-Herzegovina .....                            | 41 |
| Internal Strife in Macedonia .....                               | 42 |
| The Ethnic Hungarian Problem .....                               | 42 |
| The Ethnic Russian Problem .....                                 | 43 |
| The Western Hemisphere .....                                     | 44 |
| Post-Cedras Anarchy in Haiti .....                               | 44 |
| Post-Castro Unrest in Cuba .....                                 | 44 |
| Upsurge of Insurgency in Guatemala .....                         | 45 |
| Rebel Success in the Civil War in Colombia .....                 | 46 |
| Post-Coup Anarchy in Venezuela .....                             | 46 |
| The Unraveling of Peru .....                                     | 47 |
| Chapter Three                                                    |    |
| THE CASE STUDY FORMAT .....                                      | 49 |
| Chapter Four                                                     |    |
| CASE STUDY: IMPLEMENTING PEACE ACCORDS                           |    |
| ENDING THE CIVIL WAR IN SRI LANKA .....                          | 51 |
| Framing the Situation .....                                      | 51 |
| Background .....                                                 | 51 |
| The U.S. Intervention Decision .....                             | 56 |
| Mission .....                                                    | 61 |
| U.S. Army Preparation for the Mission .....                      | 64 |
| Termination of Intervention .....                                | 66 |
| Potential Unpleasant Surprises .....                             | 67 |

|                                                                                      |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Broad Implications .....                                                             | 70  |
| Scenario Bibliography .....                                                          | 71  |
| Chapter Five                                                                         |     |
| CASE STUDY: CONTROLLING PIRACY AMIDST CIVIL STRIFE IN INDONESIA .....                | 73  |
| Framing the Situation .....                                                          | 73  |
| Background .....                                                                     | 74  |
| The U.S. Intervention Decision .....                                                 | 78  |
| Mission .....                                                                        | 81  |
| U.S. Army Preparation for the Mission .....                                          | 84  |
| Termination of Intervention .....                                                    | 85  |
| Potential Unpleasant Surprises .....                                                 | 86  |
| Broad Implications .....                                                             | 88  |
| Scenario Bibliography .....                                                          | 88  |
| Chapter Six                                                                          |     |
| CASE STUDY: HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN A CIVIL WAR—RAVAGED ALGERIA .....                 | 91  |
| Framing the Situation .....                                                          | 91  |
| Background .....                                                                     | 92  |
| The U.S. Intervention Decision .....                                                 | 96  |
| Mission .....                                                                        | 99  |
| U.S. Army Preparation for the Mission .....                                          | 102 |
| Termination of Intervention .....                                                    | 103 |
| Potential Unpleasant Surprises .....                                                 | 104 |
| Broad Implications .....                                                             | 106 |
| Scenario Bibliography .....                                                          | 106 |
| Chapter Seven                                                                        |     |
| CASE STUDY: ENFORCING A CEASE-FIRE IN A MULTIFACTION CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA ..... | 107 |
| Framing the Situation .....                                                          | 107 |
| Background .....                                                                     | 108 |
| The U.S. Intervention Decision .....                                                 | 112 |
| Mission .....                                                                        | 116 |
| U.S. Army Preparation for the Mission .....                                          | 119 |
| Termination of Intervention .....                                                    | 120 |
| Potential Unpleasant Surprises .....                                                 | 122 |
| Broad Implications .....                                                             | 124 |
| Scenario Bibliography .....                                                          | 124 |

Chapter Eight

|                                                                                            |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| CASE STUDY: UPHOLDING MACEDONIAN<br>SOVEREIGNTY IN CONDITIONS OF STRIFE IN<br>KOSOVO ..... | 125 |
| Framing the Situation .....                                                                | 125 |
| Background .....                                                                           | 126 |
| The U.S. Intervention Decision .....                                                       | 131 |
| Mission .....                                                                              | 135 |
| U.S. Army Preparation for the Mission .....                                                | 138 |
| Termination of Intervention .....                                                          | 139 |
| Potential Unpleasant Surprises .....                                                       | 141 |
| Broad Implications .....                                                                   | 143 |
| Scenario Bibliography .....                                                                | 144 |

Chapter Nine

|                                                                                        |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| CASE STUDY: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AMID<br>POST-COUP SOCIAL UNREST IN VENEZUELA ..... | 145 |
| Framing the Situation .....                                                            | 145 |
| Background .....                                                                       | 146 |
| The U.S. Intervention Decision .....                                                   | 149 |
| Mission .....                                                                          | 153 |
| U.S. Army Preparation for the Mission .....                                            | 155 |
| Termination of Intervention .....                                                      | 156 |
| Potential Unpleasant Surprises .....                                                   | 157 |
| Broad Implications .....                                                               | 158 |
| Scenario Bibliography .....                                                            | 159 |

---

## FIGURES

---

|                                                              |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. Sri Lanka Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria . . .   | 60  |
| 2. Indonesia Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria . . .   | 79  |
| 3. Algeria Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria . . . . . | 98  |
| 4. South Africa Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria .    | 115 |
| 5. Macedonia Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria . .     | 133 |
| 6. Venezuela Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria . .     | 152 |

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## HISTORICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXIT STRATEGIES

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This chapter contains six historical case studies that discuss how the United States has implemented exit strategies in the period since World War II. The cases are categorized according to three levels of combat intensity:

- **Low level:** Greece (1946–1949) and Congo (1964–1965)
- **Mid level:** Lebanon (1958) and the Dominican Republic (1965–1966)
- **High level:** Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989).

After briefly discussing the interventions, we evaluate each against a backdrop of questions centered around whether and how well an exit strategy was integrated into the entry decision.

### LOW-LEVEL INTERVENTIONS

#### Counterinsurgency Operations in Greece (1946–1949)

The “communist” insurgency in Greece, which began well before the end of World War II, was rooted in the schism between royalists and republicans dating back to the early twentieth century.<sup>1</sup> Between

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<sup>1</sup>The historical data in support of the analysis in this section are drawn from Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980; Lawrence Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982; Ralph W. Hinrichs, Jr., *United States Involvement in Low*

1909 and 1941, royalists and republicans attempted to dominate Greek politics, mounting a series of coups and countercoups in a winner-take-all struggle for power. When the Germans invaded Greece in 1941, the royalists, who were then in control, escaped to form a government-in-exile in Cairo under the British aegis. Many of those who remained behind collaborated with the Germans, leaving the resistance movement, the National Liberation Front (EAM), under the control of the Greek Communist Party (KKE). Military operations were conducted through its field force, the National People's Liberation Army (ELAS).

By early 1944, a pan-Hellenic government, which included the EAM, was formed in exile under the leadership of George Papandreou. When Papandreou returned to Greece in late 1944, however, the EAM participants resigned, in part as a protest against his inability or unwillingness to prosecute the right-wing collaborators. A mass protest in Athens organized by the EAM ended in violence, and from then on the British army in Greece was tasked with rooting out the EAM/ELAS completely. The guerrilla war that began was brought to a halt by the Varkiza Accords in February 1945. These accords, *inter alia*, recognized the EAM/ELAS and promised free elections. Elections were held in March 1946 but were boycotted by the Left in response to what was perceived as the Right's entrenchment in power. Consequently, the elections were uncontested: a rightist government came to power and the former guerrilla members of the ELAS, led by the KKE military commander Vafiades Markos, took to the hills in August 1947. The Greek civil war had reignited.

The U.S. decision to intervene in this conflict can only be understood against the backdrop of the Cold War. The Cold War saw concentrated U.S. involvement in Western Europe, but President Truman

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*Intensity Conflict Since World War II: Three Case Studies: Greece, Dominican Republic and Vietnam*, Ft. Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, master's thesis, 1984; a multipart series of articles in Vol. 38 (1954) of *Marine Corps Gazette* by Colonel J. C. Murray: "The Anti-Bandit War: Part I," (January), pp. 14-23, "The Anti-Bandit War: Part II," (February), pp. 50-59, "The Anti-Bandit War: Part III," (March), pp. 48-57, "The Anti-Bandit War: Part IV," (April), pp. 52-60, and "The Anti-Bandit War: Part V," (May), pp. 52-58; Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece," *Military Review*, Vol. 37, June 1957, pp. 17-25; Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Selton, "Communist Errors in the Anti-Bandit War," *Military Review*, Vol. 45, September 1965, pp. 66-77; and Major Steven Bucci, "The Greek Civil War: What We Failed to Learn," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1989, pp. 46-55.

did not consider Greece an arena for U.S. intervention because the eastern Mediterranean lay within the British sphere of influence. Apart from offering some relief supplies and small loans, the Truman administration consequently stayed away from the Greek civil war—that is, it did until February 1947, when Great Britain announced its decision to quit Greece. The British decision materialized at a time when the Greek government was not faring well in the antiguerrilla campaign; the United States became fearful that the Soviets, smarting from their humiliation in Azerbaijan the previous year, might opt to assist the guerrillas in the civil war.

To prevent this possibility, Truman in a speech designed to “electrify the American people”<sup>2</sup> argued for and secured congressional support for intervention in Greece. Despite the expansive geopolitical rationale laid out in his address, Truman privately recognized that American intervention would have to remain limited. In large measure this was because General George Marshall opposed increasing U.S. commitments in the European periphery when the stability of Central Europe itself was so uncertain. This reluctance to intervene with military forces on a large scale was seconded by later Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) plans, which insisted that any substantive use of U.S. forces in Greece be accompanied by partial and perhaps general mobilization. The unpalatability of this option essentially implied that, despite the urgency of Truman’s public rhetoric, U.S. intervention would be kept deliberately measured and on a small scale. The principal instruments were economic aid and military equipment and training and assistance provided to the Greek National Army (GNA) by the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), a constituent element of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG).

The JUSMAPG, which was supposed to be staffed by 70 soldiers, eventually consisted of some 450-odd personnel by 1949. Despite this progressive increase in strength, however, it never deviated from its original goal: to provide military advice and training only. It provided military advisers down to the division and squadron level; it helped plan counter guerrilla operations and even accompanied the GNA in the field. But the objective of “training only” was rigidly en-

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<sup>2</sup>*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1947, Vol. 5, p. 47.

forced to the point that advisers who accompanied GNA patrols in the field were always unarmed. The Greek civil war finally ended in October 1949 when the guerrillas shifted to a strategy of conventional operations at a time when they were losing their sanctuaries in Yugoslavia. These twin developments resulted in their being overwhelmed by the large-scale offensives mounted by the GNA. The JUSMAPG was terminated and the AMAG turned its attention exclusively to economic reconstruction.

How do these counterinsurgency assistance operations stack up from the viewpoint of the termination issues discussed in Chapter Five of the main report? To begin with, exit strategies were well integrated into the original decision to intervene. The political objectives selected by Truman, and more precisely by Marshall, were clear, limited, and attainable: they consisted simply of preventing the insurgents from defeating the Greek government without having to deploy U.S. combat forces for its defense. The operational goals, too, were readily comprehensible and well synchronized with political objectives: U.S. military trainers were to train the GNA in tactics and operations and to help them achieve proficiency in the use of U.S. equipment. Though trainers in the field often planned operations and even accompanied GNA elements on missions, they were always unarmed, thus preventing any escalation of U.S. involvement. Fall-back strategies too were investigated, but the most obvious strategy at the time—unilateral escalation of the conflict by using U.S. combat forces—was to be avoided at all costs. Consequently, the JUSMAPG was tasked with helping the Greek government win the civil war without in any way contemplating active combat by U.S. forces then or in the future. These clear and attainable political objectives provided authoritative guidance for devising meaningful operational goals, and no attempt was made to deviate from them.

The clarity with which Marshall defined the objectives and limits of the U.S. intervention in Greece served as yardsticks by which the success of the mission could be evaluated. The exit conditions were alluded to publicly in congressional testimony, and Congress had full opportunity to lay down its understanding of the limitations that were to govern the conduct of U.S. forces. Despite the exigencies of the Cold War and the belief that the United States was in this for the long haul, having an exit strategy almost became a *de facto* condition for intervention, at least at the congressional level. Consequently,

Marshall spoke to these issues at some length and made solemn commitments about the limits of U.S. intervention; both JUSMAPG and civilian policymakers thereafter pursued the agreed objectives with remarkable constancy of purpose. Thus, even when the GNA suffered serious reverses in the first conventional Grammos/Vitsi campaign, no effort was made either by policymakers or by the field advisers to change either the political objectives or the operational mission. Rather, JUSMAPG simply continued assisting the strategy of slow attrition, coupled with the "hearts and minds" approach, because it was the right strategy to begin with.

This constancy was no doubt aided by the patience of civilian policymakers who recognized that counterinsurgency campaigns are essentially long-drawn-out affairs. Moreover, the errors made by the guerrillas, in part for reasons related to internal power struggles, coupled with the loss of their sanctuaries, for reasons connected with Tito's dispute with Stalin, helped to bring this war to a relatively quick conclusion. Good luck, therefore, probably played a part in assuring a clean and easy termination, but clarity of purpose and constancy of effort had more than just a trivial share in ensuring a successful outcome.

### **Dragon Operations in the Congo (1964–1965)**

The roots of the Dragon Operations in the Congo lay in the birth of Zaire as an independent state.<sup>3</sup> Having received independence from Belgium in 1960, Zaire found itself without the political resources to maintain its independence. The Force Publique, which was a combined frontier guard and police force manned by illiterate and poor locals and officered by Belgians, rebelled within days of independence. This rebellion provoked the reentry of the Belgian military in force. Almost simultaneously, the mineral-rich province of Katanga

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<sup>3</sup>The historical data in support of the analysis in this section are drawn from Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974; Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo*, Richmond: William Byrd Press, 1965; Howard M. Epstein (ed.), *Revolt in the Congo*, New York: Facts-on-File Inc., 1965; Fred E. Wagoner, *Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1980; and Major Thomas P. Odom, *Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964–65*, Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, Leavenworth Papers, No. 14, 1988.

seceded under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe, a secession that was supported by Belgian financial interests and aided, however tacitly, by the reentry of Belgian troops into the Congo. In response to Congolese appeals, the UN launched three military invasions with active U.S. support, both financial and logistical. By 1963, the Katangan secession was suppressed with active U.S. assistance, but several other rebel groups arose in different parts of the country. The objective of these groups was not secession but rather the complete overthrow of the existing order; it included a brutal destruction of the traditional elites who were seen as having "sold out" to the West.

The most important of these groups was headed by Nicholas Olenga's Simbas, who, while advancing triumphantly toward Stanleyville, engaged in a campaign marked by brutal savagery, cannibalism, and ritual killing. On capturing Stanleyville itself, they stormed the American consulate, besieging four officials who survived only by locking themselves in the consulate's vault. The Simbas also took several hundred European missionaries hostage as a deterrent against the deadly U.S.-supplied T-28 aircraft operated by the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), the loyalist armed forces. With the capture of Stanleyville, Olenga himself turned his forces toward Bukavu, leaving the hostages under the charge of one Alphonse Kinghis who, enjoying a penchant for public ritual killings, brought the crisis to a head.

The threat to U.S. consular officials and the Western missionaries at large transformed these developments into "an American crisis."<sup>4</sup> And although an interagency Congo Working Group was formed to develop solutions to the crisis, President Johnson appeared determined to avoid getting involved militarily. This was perhaps the most significant aspect affecting overall American involvement: the absolute reluctance of the President to get involved. This reluctance was conditioned by a desire to avoid complicating Johnson's upcoming bid for election, a desire to keep the Congo from displacing Vietnam and Turkey-Greece on the roster of American priorities, and, finally, a desire not to antagonize the congressional leadership, especially Mike Mansfield and John Stennis, who were already critical of the administration's creeping involvement as witnessed through the

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<sup>4</sup>Odom, *Dragon Operations*, p. 25.

aircraft transfers, the pilot-training programs organized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the presence of at least two U.S. servicemen providing logistics advice to the ANC.

This presidential reluctance to intervene was finally reflected in the initial rescue operations plans approved by Averell Harriman and McGeorge Bundy. Based on a Strike Command (STRICOM)-generated plan titled READY MOVE, a joint task force (JTF) called LEO, built around a single airborne platoon and using two CH-34 helicopters and four C-130s, was moved to Leopoldville in support of Operation FLAGPOLE, a rescue operation aimed only at the consulate. This force, much smaller than anything that would be required even for an operation of this scope, was further handicapped by highly restrictive rules of engagement that could not be altered without explicit permission from Washington. Both General Paul Adams, commander in chief of Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE), and the JCS recognized that a feasible rescue would require substantially greater forces than were represented by JTF LEO. In fact, STRICOM developed two alternative plans, READY MOVE III and HIGH BEAM, each of which was designed both to rescue the hostages and deliver the knockout punch against the Simbas. But these plans were overruled because they meant substantial U.S. involvement, and they were replaced by an alternative, Dragon Rouge, a complex joint American-Belgian rescue. The Belgian government was to orchestrate a group of mercenaries who would launch a three-pronged attack on the ground with the objective of rolling up the rebellion and liberating Stanleyville, while simultaneously providing a small force (the augmented 1st Parachute Battalion) that would conduct the actual rescue operation. This operation would be conducted when the three mercenary ground elements converged on Stanleyville, and it would use U.S. aircraft, U.S. communications and intelligence support, and a CIA ground team attached to one of the ground columns (Operation LOW BEAM).

Washington sought to control the entire operation from planning through completion in the hope that its execution might somehow be averted as a result of direct diplomatic negotiations with the Simbas. But the Belgians, who had a greater interest in executing the operation in order to roll up the rebellion, forced Washington's hand by publicly announcing the presence of what was previously only a covert force. The rescue mission, consequently, was undertaken

with much reluctance, but despite some tactical problems in execution, it succeeded in rescuing about 1,500 foreign nationals and about 150 Congolese at a cost of some 33 hostages lost, mostly to vengeful and panicky Simbas. The success of this operation led to a second rescue mission, Dragon Noir, which rescued about 375 foreign nationals at Paulis, even as episodic reprisals against European nationals began throughout the land. President Johnson appeared more supportive of the second mission; in part, this was due to the presentiment of easy success after Dragon Rouge, but he still decided that Dragon operations would be terminated immediately thereafter. Even though scores of foreign nationals remained trapped in Bunia, Watsa, and Wamba, U.S. policymakers did not wish to press their luck: International resentment against the operations was multiplying and violence against U.S. overseas posts was increasing; the bulk of U.S. nationals were rescued; and, consequently, President Johnson reasoned that any further operations should be exclusively Belgian in both conception and execution.

How do the Dragon operations stack up from the viewpoint of the termination issues discussed in Chapter Five of the main report? To begin with, exit strategies were not integrated into the original decision to intervene. In large part this is because the intervention itself was embarked upon most reluctantly, at least from the U.S. side. There is no evidence that U.S. decisionmakers had a clear picture about the end state the various Dragon operations were supposed to create. In fact, there was no decision about whether multiple operations would be launched at all. The decision to embark on Dragon Noir was purely improvisational and hinged on the success of Dragon Rouge. Even the latter's success was quite fortuitous and resulted in good measure from the poor coordination among the Simbas, from their lack of instrumental rationality, and from the absence of a clear command chain that might have exploited the vulnerability of the hostages even as the rescue missions proceeded.

U.S. objectives from the very beginning remained fixed on keeping a low degree of involvement. This meant that the operation itself might not have been activated if the Belgian government had not deliberately announced the existence of the force, thereby forcing an intervention decision. This objective of keeping U.S. involvement minimal became so important that it overwhelmed even those operational elements of force planning that could have made a differ-

ence to the success or failure of the mission. Almost certainly, it shifted attention from the need to systematically think through the requisite exit considerations; these were not announced publicly (except laconically after the intervention was under way), nor were they discussed before activating the mission. Also, very little thought was given to the possibility that the mission might fail; consequently, no discussion of fallback options is evident and little thought was given—even at the military level—to what operational-level actions might be needed to salvage the rescue mission in case of failure.

The lack of an exit strategy was arguably not problematic only to the degree that the two rescue operations were *tactically* successful. In a larger sense, however, it was deeply problematic because it failed to consider what premature termination would mean for the safety of the other hostages still at risk in other cities. The consequences were not long in coming. Outside of Stanleyville, Mike Hoare and his mercenary band of “wild geese” would recover the bodies of 24 priests and 4 Spanish nuns; in Wamba, the bodies of 185 European hostages and thousands of Congolese would later be discovered. From a humanitarian standpoint, therefore, the lack of an exit strategy turned out to be very painful. The United States earned all the opprobrium it received for intervening with much less to show for it than it might have achieved; and if the lack of an exit strategy had resulted in greater losses in Stanleyville and Paulis, the U.S. desire for a hasty exit would have been frustrated even more. The relatively clean termination of U.S. involvement in this case must, therefore, be attributed in great measure to luck, but it came at a high human cost.

## MID-LEVEL INTERVENTIONS

### “Stabilizing” Peace In Lebanon (1958)

The U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958, Operation BLUEBAT, was directly precipitated by religious factionalism in Lebanon and the threat it was seen to pose to the pro-Western president, Camille Chamoun.<sup>5</sup> Lebanese politics traditionally revolved around main-

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<sup>5</sup>The historical data in support of the analysis in this section are drawn from William B. Quandt, “Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970,” in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington,

taining a delicate sectarian balance between Christians and Muslims. Under the National Pact of 1943, the Lebanese president was always to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the chamber of deputies a Shi'a Muslim. By 1958, however, political trouble was brewing in Lebanon because Chamoun was perceived to be intent on destroying the power bases of rival politicians, both Muslim and Christian. In particular, he was seen as attempting to maintain his power by seeking a second term in office, even though such action was constitutionally proscribed. The Muslim community was suspicious of Chamoun, and his pro-Western stance was seen primarily as an attempt to secure external assistance for his own domestic ambitions. The United States, in contrast, fearful of the wave of Nasserism sweeping the Middle East, saw in Chamoun an obstacle to the success of Nasserism in Lebanon and, by extension, to the success of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

On May 8, 1957, the assassination of an anti-Chamoun journalist provided the spark that inflamed widespread violence. Rioting enveloped the city of Tripoli, and three days of street violence produced 120 casualties. In Beirut, the Army, the police, and the various armed factions jostled for control. Three days after the event, President Chamoun hinted that he might request U.S. assistance, and when Druze fighters attacked the presidential palace, Chamoun formally did so. After Lebanon complied with U.S. conditions requiring it to complain to the UN about "external interference,"<sup>6</sup> seek public support from "some Arab states,"<sup>7</sup> and accept that U.S. assistance would not be directed toward resolving the succession question, President Eisenhower initiated the intervention. This decision was only accelerated by news that a pro-Nasser coup had occurred in Iraq. Eisenhower was determined to prevent a similar outcome in Lebanon. Accordingly, the closest elements of the Sixth Fleet were charged with executing the mission. At their peak, U.S. forces in Lebanon would include 14,000 troops, both Army and Marine, as

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D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978, pp. 222-288; and Roger J. Spiller, *"Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon*, Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, Leavenworth Papers, No. 3, January 1981.

<sup>6</sup>Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970," p. 229.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

well as the composite air strike force Bravo, consisting of 50-odd combat-capable aircraft and operating out of Adana Air Base in Turkey. The presence of these forces served to stabilize the situation and provided the Lebanese with an opportunity to resolve the disputed issue of presidential succession without large-scale violence. Lebanon experienced relative calm thereafter, and all U.S. forces were withdrawn by October 1957.

How does the peace-stabilizing operation stack up from the viewpoint of the termination issues raised earlier? To begin with, it must be admitted that despite the success of the operation, exit strategies were not integrated into the original decision to intervene. The political objectives sought by Eisenhower were only partially clear: While the objective of preventing the United Arab Republic-backed dissidents from overthrowing Chamoun and endangering American lives in Lebanon was easy to understand, the other objectives, deterring Soviet adventurism and enhancing U.S. credibility as a superpower in the Middle East, were more difficult to operationalize. At any rate, even the clear political objectives were not adequately translated at the operational level into goals that were clear and appropriate. Nor was any consideration given to fallback options should the intervention have failed. For starters, a mission that was focused on saving the Chamoun presidency should have resulted in a substantial force being deployed on the beaches or air-dropped in the vicinity of the seat of political authority. A large contingent would have enabled the expeditionary force to protect the palace if necessary, while still possessing adequate reserves to defend its lines of communication and reinforcement, beachhead, and staging areas, as well as to secure other critical targets as required. Such insertion in strength was fundamentally necessary because the extent of the opposition could not have been gauged in advance. In particular, there was no information about whether the Lebanese army, or at least its Muslim contingents, would oppose the landing. Despite these uncertainties, the actual insertion of forces proceeded in dribs and drabs.

The first U.S. force to arrive in Beirut was the 2nd Marine Battalion, and it had little idea of what awaited it ashore or what the nature of the threat actually was. Even intelligence about physical conditions on the beach was lacking, with the result that the landing force's wheeled vehicles proved less suitable for operations than anticipated. Lacking a clear idea as to what was expected of them, the

Marines focused on consolidating the beachhead. And to the degree that they sought to control outcomes inland, they focused on securing the main roads as if, in the words of one study, "the real threat was going to reveal itself in the rather conventional form of a foreign, communist-dominated army, probably from Syria, marching from Damascus to invest Beirut."<sup>8</sup> This concern with securing the beachhead and the main roads, natural though it was in the context of a piecemeal deployment with minuscule forces, persisted well into the intervention, indicating that even at this stage the deployed forces had no idea that the external threat they expected would never materialize. In the early phase, however, such misperception had potentially dangerous consequences. On the first day, it actually resulted in the battalion commander refusing to provide reinforcements to defend the presidential palace—despite frantic requests from President Chamoun, who had received word of an imminent coup. If such a coup had in fact materialized, the political objectives of the intervention itself would have been completely frustrated and the peace "stabilization" mission that evolved thereafter might have degenerated into open combat with the Muslim factions in Lebanon.

That such an outcome was in fact averted was in good measure thanks to the foresight of General Fuad Shehab, the Lebanese army commander who assiduously sought to prevent any friction between his army and the landing forces, prohibited the expeditionary force from entering the Basta (the Muslim quarter of Beirut), and, finally, positioned *his* forces between the armed Lebanese opposition and the U.S. expeditionary force. Equally important to the pacific outcome were the reluctance of the Lebanese opposition to escalate their campaign against Chamoun by attacking the U.S. landing force, even when it was most vulnerable, and the diplomatic skill of Robert Murphy, who used the presence of the force to broker a deal that enabled a presidential transition acceptable to all parties. In the final analysis, therefore, the presence of the landing force (together with the air capabilities deployed at Adana) was instrumental in creating the necessary urgency to get the principal actors to negotiate and thereby defuse the crisis, but the fact that it survived unmolested—especially in the early weeks when it was most vulnerable—cannot

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<sup>8</sup>Spiller, *Not War But Like War*, p. 20.

be attributed to the success of U.S. planning either at the political or at the operational level.

The failure at the political level consisted in not foreseeing the need for such intervention well in advance and mandating the requisite contingency preparation (despite the existence of the Eisenhower doctrine, which postulated the possibility of such intervention); in not reviewing the operational goals required to support the political objectives for which the intervention was initiated; in miscalculating the nature of the threat in the Lebanese crisis; and finally, in the failure to adequately trim the political objectives in light of what was actually possible at the operational level in the short term.

The failure at the military level consisted in not developing adequate operational goals that dovetailed with the political objectives for which the intervention was initiated, and in the piecemeal deployment of forces that could have threatened the integrity of the whole operation if resistance had materialized. Inadequate intelligence in support of the operation at the tactical level and above only aggravated the problem. If the intervention was successfully completed and terminated in the face of these failures, exogenous factors, including an ample measure of good luck, deserve the credit here.

With respect to the other questions pertaining to the termination decision, the following must be noted: Eisenhower publicly described the conditions under which the intervention would be terminated. He exercised personal control over the level of forces after the deployments were under way, and he continually sought to use the forces deployed to secure diplomatic rather than purely military goals. Though mission evolution did take place in the sense that the expeditionary force deployed as if to fight external aggressors but stayed on to oversee peace in the city of Beirut, this transition from inchoate goals to more manageable objectives was successful only because the external environment was not as hostile as the expeditionary forces first assumed it to be. Thus, although the force benefited immensely from possessing good fire discipline (which resulted in a primarily nonviolent U.S. response even in the face of harassing small arms fire and, consequently, prevented a wholesale conflagration from breaking out) and from attempting to integrate with the Lebanese army (which resulted in a coordination of effort that exploited Lebanese army intelligence and its familiarity with the

ground environment), this intervention was successfully terminated thanks mainly to external factors beyond the control of U.S. forces. And in mid-level interventions where the stakes are higher because the level of involvement is proportionately greater, such an outcome is not reassuring.

### **“Peacemaking” in the Dominican Republic (1965–1966)**

The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic was conditioned by the objective of preventing the establishment of what was assumed to be another radical Castroite regime in Central America.<sup>9</sup> To prevent this outcome, the Kennedy administration began first by seeking to reform the Dominican political structure, but these unsuccessful efforts were ended by the time of Rafael Trujillo’s assassination in May 1961. After the assassination, the United States oversaw a complex struggle for power among Trujillo’s heirs that culminated in an election which brought a left-of-center Trujillo opponent, Juan Bosch, to power. Bosch’s leftward leanings, however, soon alienated important Dominican constituencies as well as the United States, and he was overthrown in a military coup within seven months of assuming office. The civilian head of the junta that replaced Bosch, Donald Reid Cabral, also alienated the military in turn, in part by pursuing a program of rooting out corruption. His austerity program alienated the populace as well, and it was becoming increasingly obvious to all that Cabral planned to either cancel or rig the elections scheduled for 1965 with the intention of maintaining his hold on power.

The disenchantment with Cabral resulted in a military uprising in April 1965. It was carried out by a small group of young colonels who styled themselves the “constitutionalists” because of their opposition to the military’s Trujillist heritage. This uprising gained widespread

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<sup>9</sup>The historical data in support of the analysis in this section are drawn from Jerome N. Slater, “The Dominican Republic, 1961–66,” in Blechman and Kaplan, *Force Without War*, pp. 289–342; Lawrence A. Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966*, Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, Leavenworth Papers, No. 15, 1988; Bruce Palmer, Jr., *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989; and Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, “The U.S. Dominican Intervention: Success Story,” *Parameters*, Vol. 17, December 1987, pp. 18–29.

support, and the constitutionalists tried to checkmate a possible military counterresponse by the "loyalists" in the armed services by passing out arms to thousands of civilians. The loyalists themselves appeared indecisive until the constitutionalists announced their objective of returning Bosch to power. Fear of Bosch's return alarmed the loyalists, who then attempted to suppress the uprising by force. The Johnson administration, which was monitoring developments in the Dominican Republic, was concerned about communist involvement in the uprising; hence, the attempt by the loyalists to suppress the insurrection was well received in Washington. The loyalist counterresponse failed because its tanks were bottled up by thousands of armed constitutionalist supporters in the narrow streets of Santo Domingo, and the intermingling of both sides in an urban environment did not allow air power to be used effectively. By the end of April, therefore, the constitutionalists succeeded in capturing important police stations within the city, the military forces outside Santo Domingo refused to intervene, and it appeared as if the Johnson administration's worst nightmare of a "second Cuba" was about to materialize.

Faced with this possibility, and fearful of the safety of 1,200 Americans still in Santo Domingo, the Johnson administration initiated intervention. A naval force deployed in Caribbean waters, Task Group 44.9, consisting of six naval vessels and the 6th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), was tasked with evacuating U.S. citizens. A few days later, the 82nd Airborne Division was deployed to Santo Domingo with the objective of helping the Marines create an "international security zone" (ISZ), which would provide sanctuary for noncombatants and protect U.S. residencies and other foreign embassies in the area. Operation POWER PACK had begun. The operation lasted eighteen months, and although it was intended, at least initially and somewhat inchoately, as a means of supporting the loyalists, it later evolved into an effort aimed at separating the belligerents and getting them to agree to a negotiated settlement. Toward the end of the operation, U.S. forces were supplemented by an Inter-American Peace Force. Together, they supervised the peace settlement reached between the two sides and the subsequent election, which resulted in a decisive loss for Juan Bosch.

How does POWER PACK stack up from the viewpoint of the termination issues raised earlier? Once again, it must be acknowledged that

despite the eventual success of the operation, exit strategies were not integrated into the original decision to intervene. The political objectives of the intervention were only partially clear. The first objective was to protect U.S. citizens. That was simple, distinct, and understandable. The second objective was to prevent a communist takeover in Santo Domingo. What this entailed, however, was not at all obvious. The murkiness was compounded by the fact that while the administration articulated the first objective publicly, it was reluctant, for both domestic and diplomatic reasons, to admit the second. This objective was admitted only much later in the crisis, although it was the salient reason why such a substantial deployment had in fact been effected. The imprecision in political objectives was only reflected at the operational level. The clear goal of safeguarding and possibly evacuating U.S. citizens was readily understood and effectively executed. The 6th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the 82nd Airborne cordoned off the ISZ and, through some creative tactical innovations, defended it against any serious intrusion. The important issue now was how these forces could be used to secure those operational goals, which dovetailed with the political objective of preventing a communist takeover. These goals were not established before the intervention and, hence, had to be defined by a process of trial and error once the intervention was well under way.

General Bruce Palmer, commander of the U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic, pushed for the most logical military solution: engage the constitutionalists in Santo Domingo and end the uprising. President Johnson, however, sought to avoid committing himself to this course of action in the hope that a cease-fire sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS) might resolve the issue. So long as the constitutionalists were incapable of changing the status quo by force, this strategy had some chance of success. What that implied, however, was that U.S. forces could do nothing other than sanitize the ISZ and marginally enlarge its boundaries. A large-scale enlargement of the ISZ would involve military action against the constitutionalists, and this Johnson appeared reluctant to contemplate. U.S. forces, therefore, were left without a clear operational goal: They could only interposition themselves between the strongholds of the two sides, but they could not change the status quo despite the fact that the success of the constitutionalist revolt was the reason for their being present in the first place. By itself,

interpositioning may have been a viable operational goal, except that neither the U.S. President nor the military understood this to be the mission when the intervention was initiated. Instead, "peace stabilization" as an operational goal simply "evolved" as the intervention developed.

The eventual success of this operation derived in large part from the fact that Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS, was able to provide the clarity of political objectives that was missing at the beginning of the intervention. Bunker's determination that a negotiated settlement would be the object pursued, though arrived at well after the intervention was under way, at least served to define the desired political ends. He convinced General Palmer that U.S. interests were best served not by blindly supporting the loyalists but rather by an impartiality that induced both sides to come to a cease-fire and reach a negotiated settlement. General Palmer, then, translated this new political objective into a viable operational goal: He defined maintaining the sanctity of the ISZ in such a way as to isolate both the constitutionalists and the loyalists, thereby preventing both factions from pursuing a military solution that might have deepened the crisis. Toward that end, he successfully targeted cease-fire violators on both sides when necessary. This goal of freezing the status quo in the field in order to enable movement in negotiations at the political level was only assisted by the success of U.S. military civic action—civil affairs and psychological warfare programs that served to defang a good deal of the opposition initially expressed by the populace. This muting of opposition, in turn, reduced the pressures on U.S. forces even more and further reinforced the constitutionalists' lack of inclination to engage the expeditionary forces in any substantive way.

From the viewpoint of termination, therefore, this intervention can be judged only a qualified success. This is because success in large part accrued for accidental reasons: The United States was simply lucky to have a seasoned diplomat in the person of Bunker and a politically sensitive soldier in the person of Palmer. Together, they provided the exit strategy that eluded decisionmakers at the beginning of the intervention. The eventual success at termination, therefore, owed less to the viability of the decisionmaking process than it did to idiosyncratic factors. Moreover, the intervention decision also fell short of the ideal on several other grounds. Decision-

makers had not prepared for a failure of the mission, nor had they discussed alternatives to use if the intervention had truly gone sour. The scant consideration of fallback options is understandable, however, given that the mission's objectives were unclear to begin with. Improvisation was therefore the order of the day, and the United States was lucky to have made a relatively clean exit in such circumstances.

## HIGH-LEVEL INTERVENTIONS

### Punitive Operations in Grenada (1983–1984)

The U.S. intervention in Grenada was precipitated by the intersection of intraregime conflict and Cuban and Soviet penetration of Central America and the Caribbean.<sup>10</sup> After receiving its independence from Great Britain in 1974, Grenada was ruled by fairly authoritarian regimes. The first regime, that of Sir Eric Gairy, maintained friendly relations with the United States. But with the leftist coup mounted by Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement in 1979, Grenada turned increasingly to Cuba for assistance. The Cubans provided a large quantity of arms and military assistance, which culminated in an effort to build a major airport at Point Salinas. The airport was ostensibly to be used for resupplying Cuban troops in Africa and could be made available to the Soviet Union for purposes of interdicting seaborne traffic in the Caribbean in case of war. This level of Cuban and Soviet penetration concerned the United States, which responded by excluding Grenada from its regional economic assistance programs.

Faced with this campaign of hostility, Prime Minister Bishop initiated some diplomatic overtures to the United States. Unfortunately, these attempts invoked the wrath of his more ideologically committed colleagues, and on October 13, 1983, Bishop was deposed, held under house arrest, and replaced by his deputy, Bernard Coard. Six days later, the Grenadan army commander Hudson Austin an-

<sup>10</sup>The historical data in support of the analysis in this section are drawn from Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, *American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury,"* Boulder: Westview Press, 1985; and Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "Presidential Decisionmaking and Use of Force: Case Study Grenada," *Parameters*, Vol. 21, Summer 1991, pp. 61–72.

nounced that Bishop and five of his cohorts had been killed. The situation in Grenada had become extremely tense: A 24-hour shoot-on-sight curfew was imposed, allegations of Cuban complicity in the power struggle began to emerge, and news of many more deaths in the power struggle appeared in the press. The concern of U.S. policymakers in the crisis initially appeared to be the safety of U.S. nationals in Grenada, in particular the several hundred medical students working on the island. This concern, however, was soon subordinated to larger grand strategic considerations: The Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) had been perturbed about the increasing radicalization of Grenada, and these concerns provided the United States with the requisite political cover to attempt to eliminate the Cuban presence in Grenada once and for all.

The objective of evicting Cuba from the East Caribbean conditioned President Reagan's orders with respect to the invasion of Grenada, which began on October 25, 1983. A combined force, Joint Task Force 120, consisting of Navy and Marines together with Rangers and the 82nd Airborne, was tasked with securing the island with minimal casualties. The Marines were responsible for securing the northern half and the Army the southern half. After four days of combat, some of it fairly intense, all U.S. objectives were secured. By December 12, all major combat elements had departed the island, except for military police, support personnel, and a peacekeeping force composed of OECS troops. Operation URGENT FURY had passed into history.

How does this combined rescue and punitive operation stack up from the viewpoint of the termination issues discussed in the main report? It can be easily admitted that despite the several tactical difficulties encountered during the operation, exit strategies were fairly well integrated into the original decision to intervene. The political objectives of the operation, despite not being announced publicly in their entirety, were clear and simple. They consisted of restoring a friendly government on the island, eliminating Cuban activity in Grenada, and, as a distant third, guaranteeing the safety of all U.S. citizens. These political objectives resulted in fairly clear operational goals: A small, combined, Ranger-SEAL team was to rescue Governor General Sir Paul Scoon from house arrest, free the remaining political prisoners from Richmond Prison, and arrest the Grenadan leadership consisting of Hudson Austin and his cohorts. The rest of the Rangers, together with the 82nd Airborne, would seize the Point Sali-

nas airfield in the south, capture the Cubans operating in the vicinity, rescue the students at the Grande Anse campus, and move on to capture St. George's. The Marines were to capture the airstrip at Pearls, the village of Grenville, and the northern half of the island. While the operation ran into some tactical difficulties, thanks to the stout resistance put up by the Cubans who were present in larger numbers than anticipated, the intervention secured all its objectives fairly rapidly; thus, the termination of the mission did not pose any untoward difficulties.

The methodology of setting clear political objectives and translating them into manageable operational goals paid off handsomely. The principal problems that arose had more to do with the conduct of combat than with a lack of clear objectives. These problems consisted mainly of imperfect intelligence about the level of the Cuban resistance. The field commanders, however, were able to respond rapidly to the increased level of threat encountered: Two additional battalions of the 82nd were employed, and the mission proceeded in accordance with plans. To be sure, various other difficulties at the level of mission execution were uncovered, the most galling ones being those related to interservice coordination, but these did not in any way seriously affect the prospects of success. The material and tactical superiority of U.S. forces essentially guaranteed that mission goals would be attained one way or another, and a clean and decisive termination of the intervention was never in doubt. For this reason, the lack of attention paid to fallback options by the national command authority was perhaps appropriate.

At the political level, President Reagan took great pains to depict the intervention as being a coalition activity in pursuit of limited aims. Because coalition forces did not take active part in combat operations, terminating U.S. involvement was not seriously affected by the presence of OECS peacekeepers. Rather, the completion of tactical tasks alone determined the time and character of the final exit. The operation was designed to conclude well within sixty days, thus allowing the President to brief Congress about the intervention but without making it subject to the provisions of the War Powers Act. The end state desired was also announced privately in briefings to the legislative branch and publicly via a televised address to the nation at the onset of the intervention. However, a certain creative latitude was employed in defining U.S. objectives for purposes of

congressional and public consumption: The issue of rescuing the medical students was emphasized, while the geopolitical rationale was generally understated. Finally, neither policymakers nor military commanders prepared for anticipated changes of mission or alterations in how the operation would be prosecuted. In large part this was because the probability of failure was minuscule to begin with. And U.S. military commanders only minimized that probability further by sending in large Army and Marine contingents. So, as one analysis concluded, "while fewer or less well equipped forces than were sent might have done the job adequately, true economy of force was served by sending all that could reasonably expect to be used."<sup>11</sup>

### Police Action in Panama (1989–1990)

General Manuel Noriega's control over the Panamanian state became a source of concern to the United States only in the late 1980s when a former associate, Colonel Diaz Herrera, publicized his links with the drug trade and his involvement in the murder of a political opponent.<sup>12</sup> Noriega's corruption and brutality were recognized well before this event, but elements of the Reagan administration chose to overlook his unsavory politics because of his role in assisting the Contras in Nicaragua. The increasing importance of the drug war, however, caused Noriega's drug ties to become the subject of internal U.S. government investigation, and matters finally came to a head when the Justice Department drew up indictments against Noriega in February 1988 for his role in drug trafficking.

The seething hostility between Noriega and the United States now burst into the open, and it was exacerbated by U.S. demands that he relinquish control over the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and

<sup>11</sup>Frank Uhlig, Jr., "Amphibious Aspects of the Grenada Episode," in Dunn and Watson, *American Intervention in Grenada*, p. 96.

<sup>12</sup>The historical data in support of the analysis in this section are drawn from Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras (eds.), *Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991; Rebecca L. Grant, *Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, N-3265-AF, 1991; John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992; and Lawrence A. Yates, "Joint Task Force Panama: JUST CAUSE—Before and After," *Military Review*, Vol. 71, October 1991, pp. 58–71.

move Panama toward democracy. Noriega responded by using his military and police forces to harass U.S. servicemen and violate U.S. facilities in the canal zone. The United States responded by augmenting its forces slightly, initiating the development of contingency plans for a variety of military operations, and creating a Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama to provide command and control in the event that executing these plans became necessary. The war of nerves with Noriega continued, but it was hoped that the Panamanian elections announced for May 1989 would result in his graceful exit from power. Far from that occurred: Noriega rigged the elections, suspended the counting process, and used his "Dignity Battalions" to attack the principal opposition candidate, Guillermo Endara, who was widely credited with having won the suppressed election. President Bush responded by augmenting U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) forces further (Operation NIMROD DANCER) and reducing the number of military dependents in Panama (Operation BLADE JEWEL).

The crisis deepened when some junior PDF officers attempted to depose Noriega. SOUTHCOM used its crisis response exercises (CRE) to assist the coup by means short of intervention (as the plotters had requested), but Noriega survived and dispatched the plotters with his customary brutality. All branches of the U.S. government had by now concluded that Noriega, if not removed, would become a serious threat to U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests in Panama. On December 15, the Panamanian Assembly controlled by Noriega declared that a state of war existed between Panama and the United States. And in the tense days that followed, PDF sentries fatally shot a U.S. Marine lieutenant and, subsequently, violently abused a U.S. Navy lieutenant and his wife. Unfortunately for Noriega, these events occurred at a time when U.S. contingency plans, JTF-South Operations Order (OPORD) 90-2, were complete, ready, and waiting.

Operation JUST CAUSE was executed on the night of December 19, 1989. More than 13,000 continental United States (CONUS)-based forces joined the 13,000-odd troops based at SOUTHCOM in a complex joint operation (involving airborne, air assault, armored, light infantry, and special operations forces) against the 15,000-man PDF, of whom only 3,500 or so were soldiers. By the end of the combat phase, the PDF was neutralized as a fighting force, Noriega was ar-

rested and deported to the United States to stand trial, and a civilian government headed by Guillermo Endara was elevated to power.

How does Operation JUST CAUSE stack up from the viewpoint of the termination issues raised earlier? Depending on the objectives one takes to be salient, the integration of exit strategies with the decision to intervene can be deemed either a qualified success or a complete success. The uncertainty here arises simply because the salience of each political objective actually pursued is somewhat clouded. President Bush, in his televised address explaining the operation, defined the political objectives of the intervention to be to protect U.S. personnel and facilities, to restore democracy by installing the Endara government, apprehending Noriega and destroying the PDF, and to protect the Canal. If, in a power-political sense, the removal of Noriega and the destruction of the PDF are taken to be the primary political objectives (because achieving them resulted in protecting U.S. personnel, installations, and interests), then the intervention can be said to have more than completely succeeded. These objectives were clear and comprehensible, and the operational goals too were adequately designed to achieve the objectives at minimal cost. The operational goals, identified in the JCS Execute Order, were clearly defined: protect U.S. lives, sites, and facilities, neutralize PDF forces, and neutralize PDF command and control. The tactical missions predicated by these goals were in fact farmed out to no less than eight distinct task forces, each pursuing specific purposes that ranged from assaulting PDF barracks through releasing political prisoners to disabling the television tower and securing critical bridges.

In fact, it is important to note that not only was the operation conducted skillfully despite the existence of highly restrictive rules of engagement, the intervention itself was initiated only when political authority felt that the time was appropriate. This is most clearly reflected in the fact that although a coup materialized against Noriega on October 3, the Bush administration refused to be tempted into an unplanned, opportunistic intervention on behalf of the plotters. Instead, SOUTHCOM utilized a previously planned crisis response exercise to provide all support short of combat, but nothing more. JUST CAUSE would be initiated only when the President felt it was appropriate, and OPOD 90-2 would not be ready for at least another four and possibly six weeks. The decision to intervene, therefore,

was undertaken deliberately and only after policymakers were comfortable that the operational goals fully cohered with the desired political objectives. As a result, fallback options did not receive much consideration at this stage. The Bush administration was simply determined to ensure that when combat began, fallback options would become utterly unnecessary: To ensure this, force planners, reasoning conservatively, committed sufficient forces so as to achieve an 8:1 superiority in numbers of combat troops. Given such advantage, together with the great benefit of having substantial numbers of forces residing in-country, the success of Operation JUST CAUSE was never in serious doubt.

The uncertainty about the success of termination, therefore, arises only because it is not certain how important the goals of "restoring" a viable and functioning democracy actually were. Clearly, at some level they were part of the political rhetoric, but such is to be expected in a liberal polity. They even found their way into the Execute Order promulgated by the JCS: After combat operations were concluded, JTF Panama, which was deactivated to be replaced by JTF South before the intervention, was reactivated in order to pursue the nation-building program, dubbed PROMOTE LIBERTY. This program, however, was riddled by delays, confusion, and deficiencies. Consequently, it could be asserted that if promoting democracy and nation-building were truly as important as the other political objectives of destroying the PDF and arresting Noriega, the exit strategy in JUST CAUSE was not completely successful because concentrated attention was not lavished on this mission in the way that it was on other combat-related goals. On the other hand, if nation-building was simply part of the public posturing and of no great priority to the military, then the relative inattention to nation-building was perhaps understandable. This issue only underscores *a fortiori* the need to have clear political objectives and operational goals whose relative salience is well understood by all. This is particularly true in those situations when "exoteric" rationalizations for public consumption intermingle with true, but understated, priorities.

This issue aside, several other facets of the exit strategy are of interest in this case. The first and perhaps most important is that having an exit strategy became a *de facto* condition prior to intervention. This approach was necessary because JUST CAUSE was intrinsically more risky than URGENT FURY: the size of forces was larger, their com-

position was more complex, the rules of engagement were incredibly restrictive because of the need to operate on urban terrain, the adversary was larger and more capable, and the nature of the operation was vastly more complex, involving first the marrying up of a large number of forces from CONUS with the forces already in place and then the orchestration of these forces into near-simultaneous attacks on some 27 different strategic locations. With an operation of such complexity, having a complete exit strategy prior to intervention became inevitable in some sense.

Further, the exit conditions were announced publicly by the President in large part to defuse international criticism. And, finally, since the operation went largely according to plan (albeit with some delays in apprehending Noriega), no rethinking of the conduct of the intervention was required, except perhaps the nation-building operation in the terminal phase, which went through some revision as the intervention wound down. All in all, therefore, the issue of termination was handled respectably, considering the vast complexity of the mission.

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**GLOBAL SURVEY OF INTRASTATE CONFLICTS**

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We now turn to a survey of potential intrastate conflicts around the world. The scenarios included here were developed by the authors of this volume, employing their area expertise. The six major case studies selected as the focus of this report were culled from this global survey.

For purposes of easy comparison across regions, the description of each specific case follows a standard format. First, a brief scenario description introduces the case. For ongoing conflicts, the description simply defines the origins and the current issues in the armed strife. For potential conflicts, the description sketches the reasons and the possible course toward the outbreak of armed conflict. Second, the immediate causes of armed conflict are listed. Third, the main actors involved in the armed strife are defined. Fourth, the likelihood for U.S. involvement in any outside intervention is assessed. Finally, the specific missions that the U.S. armed forces might be asked to undertake in an intervention are listed. The list follows a regional format.

The survey should in no way be taken as an indication of expectation of conflict (in cases where it is only potential), nor should it be taken to imply in any way that a U.S. intervention would be forthcoming in any of the cases, actual or potential. The authors wish to reemphasize the speculative and illustrative nature of the whole exercise.

## **EAST ASIA**

### **Secessionism and Intra-Army Conflict in Indonesia**

Conflict might arise incident to the Suharto succession and involve a mix of Indonesian army factionalism (principally in Java) and ethnic separatism outside Java. Disappointing economic performance and army factionalism contribute to potential strife. Indigenous army weakness might lead to ethnic separatist conflict mounted by Sumatran Bataks and/or Dayaks in Kalimantan against distracted army garrisons. Alternatively, some army commanders may set up regional power bases that exploit ethnic unrest. Civil conflict might prompt various factions to stop international maritime traffic (exercising the right of innocent passage) in Indonesian waters to stop arms flow to insurgents or obtain funds to support conflict. Pirates, already active in Indonesian waters, might become more bold in attacking and holding up international maritime traffic.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Death of Suharto and conflict among Army elements.

**Actors:** Indonesian government loyalists, dissident army factions, ethnic groups outside Java, pirates, the international community attempting to safeguard regional maritime shipping lanes and protect own nationals in Indonesia.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** High, particularly to suppress piracy and unlawful interference with international shipping; probably under UN auspices.

**Potential missions:** Traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (anarchy), peace enforcement (organized actors).

### **Return of Ethnic Chinese Insurgency in Southeast Asia**

An increasingly assertive international posture by China (perhaps the result of a new leadership in Beijing) in Southeast Asia (e.g., Spratlys, Vietnam border disputes, saber-rattling against Taiwan, early occupation of Hong Kong, appeals to overseas Chinese for allegiance to homeland) might result in repression of ethnic Chinese minorities by some governments (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia) and a renewal of the

insurgencies of the early post-World War II decades. These insurgencies, particularly if supported by China, might result in border conflict (e.g., Thailand and Malaysia) or maritime interdiction perhaps supported by Chinese special forces.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Death of Deng Xiaoping followed by aggressive "young Turk" People's Liberation Army (PLA) national leadership with assertive foreign policy. Separately or coincidentally, an eruption of conflict over the Spratlys could lead to repressive measures against ethnic Chinese in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states.

**Actors:** China, ASEAN states, ethnic Chinese minorities, outside powers alarmed at Chinese adventurism and regional instability.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** High, particularly if Chinese forces are involved directly.

**Potential missions:** Peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (organized), foreign internal defense.

### **The Fractioning of China**

The economic revolution now under way in China has fostered dislocation of populations and great regional disparities in economic benefits. Overlaid on these events is an impending major leadership change within China with the passing of Deng Xiaoping and continuing factionalism and regionalism in the PLA's leadership. While the Chinese population is remarkably homogeneous, there are significant ethnic minorities in the borderlands that could become more assertive with any weakening in central power.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Death of Deng Xiaoping and jockeying for power, temporary paralysis of PLA because of internal conflict.

**Actors:** Regional leadership cliques backed by PLA elements, the central government in Beijing, the core of the PLA itself, migrant and/or indigent workers, ethnic nationalist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low, unless foreign nationals endangered or international sea/air traffic interrupted.

**Potential missions:** Traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement (organized) (e.g., Taiwan Straits).

### **Insurrection and Terrorism in the Philippines**

Continued economic difficulties, inefficient land use patterns, and a global economic downturn could result in stepped-up internal instability. Armed conflict between the government and the New People's Army (NPA) and Muslim elements in the south continues and would intensify. U.S. nationals might be targeted and killed in large numbers if the government loses control of most territory outside the larger cities.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** A rapidly worsening economy and sharpened ethnic differences.

**Actors:** Government forces, variety of insurgent forces fostered by sectarian and/or economic differences, foreign nationals in the Philippines, regional powers.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** High, if large numbers of foreign nationals harmed or maritime traffic interrupted.

**Potential missions:** Peace building, traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement (anarchy), foreign internal defense.

## **SOUTH ASIA**

### **Civil War in Afghanistan**

The ongoing civil war in Afghanistan stems from conflict between President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, two prominent members of the Islamic Leadership Council (ILC) that replaced the former Soviet-sponsored Afghani government headed by Najibullah. The civil war is essentially a struggle for power, with each individual trying to extend his political base at the expense of the other. Each has sought to ally with various other *mujahideen* and militia commanders in an attempt to rout the other on the battlefield and gain control of strategic population cen-

ters. Large-scale fighting continues, including significant missile attacks on cities.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Power struggle in the aftermath of Soviet occupation and withdrawal.

**Actors:** Various *mujahideen* groups based in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, the old Afghani government militia led by General Abdul Rashid Dostam, and the forces led by Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, loosely coalesced into groupings led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and by Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low to medium, though potential for a UN intervention is high. The UN is already engaged in a sustained way, trying to bring the combatants to the negotiating table. UN advisers are present on the ground in Afghanistan.

**Potential missions:** Peace building, traditional peacekeeping.

### **Renewed Strife in the Sind (Pakistan)**

The competition between the *muhajirs* (post-1947 migrants into the Sind, favored by the federal government) and the region's original residents explodes into open strife again. The influx of Pathans and Afghans in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in increased competition that led to violence in 1985–1986 (as the Sindis, Pathans, and *muhajirs* fought street battles in an attempt to protect their turf). Martial law was declared in the Sind in June 1992, and the Pakistani army continues to maintain order through force.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Government crisis in Islamabad, renewed migration/refugee flows into the Sind.

**Actors:** The government of Pakistan, the Pakistan army, the Muhajir Quami Mahaz (MQM) party, the Islamic Jamhhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance), and the Pakistan's People's Party.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Very low.

**Potential missions:** Peace building.

### **Escalation of Sectarian-Based Insurrection in India**

Stepped-up assistance from south and southwest Asian countries to the two sectarian-based rebellions in India (Muslims in Kashmir and Sikhs in Punjab) could lead to substantial escalation in fighting. The conflict in Kashmir is essentially a struggle between insurgent Muslim Kashmiris, who either want to merge with Pakistan or achieve independence, and the Indian government, which desires to maintain the status quo. The conflict in Punjab is a struggle between insurgent Sikhs, demanding a separate independent state called Khalistan, and an Indian government determined to prevent such an eventuality. Pakistani assistance for both insurgencies has been widely documented. The Punjabi insurgency is currently coming to an end because of a fairly successful counterinsurgency campaign. Any exacerbation of the Kashmir crisis carries the possibility of full-fledged war (including nuclear use) between India and Pakistan.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Government crisis in India, stronger external support (especially from Islamic fundamentalist sources) for Muslims in Kashmir or Sikhs in Punjab.

**Actors:** Indian government forces, Pakistan, approximately 140–180 separate insurgent groups in Kashmir (assisted by factions from Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan), approximately 20–25 insurgent factions and organizations in Punjab.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low to medium. Some UN involvement likely as pressure mounts to monitor human rights conditions. A UN presence is a possibility, but U.S. participation probably will not be accepted by India. The high stakes—potential nuclear war—mean that a strong international effort will be made to control the violence.

**Potential missions:** Peace building, humanitarian intervention.

### **The Tamil Insurgency in Sri Lanka**

The Tamil insurgency against the majority Sinhalese government has gone through many phases (including combat against an Indian intervention), but the phase of violently attempting to deny the ability of the Sri Lankan government to control the north and northeastern

areas of the country has led to a stalemate. Indecisive regular and irregular fighting continues.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Ethnically based discrimination has led to long-lasting open fighting. A potential end in sight to the ongoing strife could lead to outside intervention to shore up the peace process.

**Actors:** The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government of Sri Lanka.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low to medium. The Sri Lankan government has appealed for U.S. assistance on several occasions during the last several years. These appeals were constrained by Indian opposition and eventually rendered moot by the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. The failure of that intervention implies that India would be extremely reluctant to provide any forces in the foreseeable future. The new Indian reticence will leave the United States a strong candidate to participate in a peacekeeping mission.

**Potential missions:** Peace building, traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

## NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

### Azeri Separatism in Iran

The achievement of independence by the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan opened up the potential for ethnic separatism of Iranian Azerbaijan, which has approximately twice the number of Azeris as does the new state of Azerbaijan itself. The Iranian government would react with force to any attempt at such a breakaway movement in Iranian Azerbaijan. The Iranian government would see Turkey as the beneficiary of the unification of the Azeris; Turkey and Iran would hover on the brink of war.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Surge of Azeri nationalism, support for Azeri separatists in Iran from Azerbaijan.

**Actors:** Azeri separatists, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey, Russia.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low, but the United States would be interested in containing the conflict.

**Potential missions:** Traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention.

### **The Kurdish Problem**

The Kurds mainly inhabit Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The ongoing armed Kurdish rebellion in Turkey and the Turkish counterinsurgency campaign has brought a real specter of civil war to Turkey, while the situation of the Kurds in Iraq has already invoked a U.S. intervention in the aftermath of the post-Gulf War Kurdish revolt against Saddam. A UN operation with heavy U.S. involvement has led to the establishment of a protection zone for the Kurds in northern Iraq. The autonomous region set up by the Kurds means they will resist any effort by Saddam to reconquer the area. An Iraqi attempt to establish control over the Kurdish zone will result in major fighting. The problem is intertwined with that in Turkey, since the flight of Kurds from Iraq into the Kurdish region of Turkey will exacerbate sharply the current armed struggle of radical Kurds for autonomy or independence in that country. Many of the Kurds in northern Iraq originally fled from Turkey. The Kurdish problem has the potential of drawing Turkey, Iran, and Iraq into the conflict.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Attempt by Saddam to reconquer the semisovereign Kurdish region in northern Iraq.

**Actors:** The Kurdish guerrilla organizations, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria, UN-sponsored forces already on the ground.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium to high. U.S. intervention is not theoretical but actual, it may not be terminated anytime soon, and it could escalate to a higher level of involvement. The United States would face moral and political pressure to continue to defend the Kurds against Saddam. This situation will not change as long as Saddam is in power. In Turkey, the United States would face pressure not to allow a strategic ally to founder.

**Potential missions:** Peace enforcement (organized), foreign internal defense/support for insurgency.

### **Iraq and the Shi'a**

The Shi'a of Iraq revolted against Saddam at the end of the Gulf War and were repressed by his forces. The UN, with heavy U.S. involvement, has established a special "no-fly" zone in the Shi'a area of southern Iraq, although Saddam's forces have continued a military campaign against most of the population. Saddam's renewed use of airpower or intensification of gross violations against the population will put pressure on the United States to upgrade its military commitment to protect the Shi'a.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** An attempt by Saddam to open air operations in the Shi'a area of southern Iraq.

**Actors:** The Shi'a guerrilla organizations, Iraq, Iran, UN-sponsored forces in the region.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium. The United States has already become militarily involved in enforcing the no-fly zone, and could become involved in reaction to the near-genocide proportions of Saddam's repression. Potential for U.S. Army involvement is low.

**Potential missions:** Support for insurgency.

### **Anti-Alawite Revolt in Syria**

In the aftermath of a general Israeli-Arab settlement (that includes Syria), pressure mounts on changing the authoritarian character of the Syrian government. Tension between the ruling 'Alawi minority (12 percent of the population) and the majority Sunni population could grow to proportions of a civil war.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Resistance against continued authoritarian rule and/or democratization pressures as Arab-Israeli peace becomes reality.

**Actors:** Syrian government forces, Sunni organizations, Israel.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low to medium. Concerns for Israel's security could lead to U.S. involvement in a UN-sponsored attempt to bring about a cease-fire.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

### **Jordanian-Palestinian Strife in Jordan**

A general Arab-Israeli peace accord may expose the internal fault-lines in Jordan. As the Palestinians set up their own state on the West Bank (or a confederation with Jordan) and nationalist euphoria sweeps the Palestinians, the Palestinian majority in Jordan may try to assume greater power and influence. Armed conflict between the government and Palestinian forces (such as that which took place between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan in 1970) may be replayed.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Ethnic strife as Arab-Israeli peace becomes reality.

**Actors:** Jordanian government forces, PLO, Israel.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium. Concerns for Israel's security could lead to U.S. involvement in a UN-sponsored attempt to bring about a cease-fire and to prevent an early end to the Arab-Israeli peace.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (organized), foreign internal defense.

### **Fundamentalist Strife in Egypt**

The Egyptian government is facing an increasingly difficult situation with growing violence from radical Islamic groups within the country. The groups are offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood and include the Islamic Jihad and the Gama'a Islamiyya (especially in the southern part of Egypt). The government has so far matched the violence and has moved with considerable harshness against anyone suspected of affiliation with Islamic activism, including groups heretofore categorized as moderate. Dissatisfaction is growing at the popular level and the radical groups have exploited it. A situation akin to the virtual civil war in Algeria may result if the cycle of violence continues to escalate. A breakdown of civil order in Cairo, one

of the world's largest cities, would affect millions of people. The potential disruptions in trade and commerce and the danger of renewed conflict with Israel would place the problem high on the agenda. Egypt's strategic location and its security relationship with the United States make some form of U.S. assistance likely.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Growing strength of Islamist radicalism, indiscriminate government repression, economic and social calamity.

**Actors:** Several Islamic radical groups, the Egyptian government, southern European countries.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium, probably under UN auspices and aimed at preventing further escalation of violence or the collapse of services in Cairo.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

### Civil War in Algeria

The military-dominated Algerian government is currently engaged in a virtual civil war against Islamist (fundamentalist) groups that have grown in numbers and strength. Turmoil in Algeria could send tens of thousands of political refugees out of Algeria into Europe. Southern European countries, dependent on Algerian gas reserves, are alarmed at the growing cycle of violence and instability, as well as at swelling numbers of immigrants.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Growing strength of Islamist radicalism, government repression, economic calamity.

**Actors:** Islamic radical groups, the Algerian government, European countries on the Mediterranean littoral—especially France.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low to medium. Western Europeans are likely to take the lead and press for a NATO role in preventing further escalation of strife.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

## **SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

### **Islamic Fundamentalism and the Rebellion in Southern Sudan**

The further swing toward Islamic fundamentalism by the Sudanese government leads to a step up in the campaign against the decade-old ongoing revolt in southern Sudan by the non-Muslim, non-Arab, Christian, and animist African peoples. As starvation in southern Sudan continues, pressure builds to alleviate the suffering. If the Sudanese government actively tries to destabilize the neighboring states (e.g., Egypt), a U.S. response may follow.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Mass starvation in southern Sudan, publicized in international media, and more blatant efforts by the Sudanese government to export radical Islamist views.

**Actors:** Various southern Sudanese guerrilla groups, Sudanese government, Egypt, Iran.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low, though there are many similarities with the situation in Somalia. If the world media focuses on the starvation in southern Sudan in the same way it did in Somalia, a UN-sponsored effort may be forthcoming. If the Sudanese government becomes more active in supporting radical Islamist organizations in the region, then a "quarantine" of Sudan (similar to that of Iran) might be undertaken.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement (anarchy), support for insurgency.

### **Political Breakdown and Social Unrest in Zaire**

Continuing economic problems and growing social unrest could worsen to a point where open strife becomes widespread in Kinshasa and its immediate environs. The outcome may be brought about by an unstable division of political power between the ruling regime and the opposition coalition. The two movements are deeply hostile to each other, and the division of powers could paralyze the day-to-day functioning of the government to the point where one of the factions could make a bid to seize complete political power. The result is likely to be widespread violence with a probable disruption in food

distribution and potential for famine and outbreak of disease. If the fighting were to spread to the provinces, ethnic allegiances to one or the other of the factions would come into play. A continuation of strife for several months would carry strong potential for the disintegration of Zaire. A UN-sponsored intervention would aim to restore order in Kinshasa, compel all Zairean military units to return to barracks, and distribute food and medicine to civilians.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Economic and social unrest, unstable arrangement for the sharing of political power, deep ethnic cleavages.

**Actors:** The established Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution, the "Sacred Union" opposition coalition, France, Belgium, Organization of African Unity (OAU).

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium. France and Belgium are likely to take the lead in any intervention, but at least U.S. support units might be involved, especially in view of longstanding U.S. ties with Zaire.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (anarchy).

### **Anarchy as the Final Stage of the Civil War in Angola**

Fighting between the MPLA-dominated government and UNITA-led rebels has gone on since the country became independent in 1975, punctuated by occasional truces and cease-fires. The heavy ethnic dimension to the conflict precludes any easy solutions. Currently, the conflict appears to be motivated mainly by a pure struggle for political power between the two main actors. UNITA controls much of the countryside while the government controls most of the urban centers. Both sides may become so exhausted that the country will descend into total anarchy, with warlords seizing control of the various regions.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Ongoing "intractable" conflict between two heavily armed groups that seem to have become used to strife as a way of life.

**Actors:** MPLA-dominated government, UNITA.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low to medium. The UN has been involved in attempts to end the conflict (notably in holding the elections in 1992), and its continued involvement is likely.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement (anarchy).

### **Renewed Civil War in Mozambique**

The longstanding civil war between RENAMO and the government is currently dormant, and the UN is overseeing the implementation of peace accords. A potential South African civil war might spill over to Mozambique, as elements of RENAMO again take up armed struggle. Anarchy and famine again might spread to portions of the country.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Longstanding conflict from the Cold War sparked by spillover of open strife from South Africa.

**Actors:** The Mozambican government, RENAMO, ARM, and Inkatha from South Africa.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low to medium. The UN has a substantial presence on the ground and, if it is threatened, a larger force (including a U.S. component) may be forthcoming.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement (anarchy).

### **Civil War in South Africa**

An ANC-dominated government may be unable to deal with the economic and social problems of post-elections South Africa. Disputes over Inkatha's control of the labor unions in Natal could develop into large-scale clashes and an outright insurgency. As the government deploys troops to the province, several senior Afrikaner South African Defense Forces (SADF) unit commanders take the Inkatha side; intra-SADF fighting breaks out. The Afrikaner Resistance Movement (ARM) declares a sovereign Afrikaner republic south and southwest of Pretoria. Inconclusive fighting then would take place as much of the country slides into anarchy.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Turmoil in post-apartheid South Africa; Afrikaner and Inkatha resistance to the new government.

**Actors:** ANC-dominated government, ARM, the Inkatha movement.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium to high, particularly in conditions of widespread anarchy; most likely under UN auspices.

**Potential missions:** Traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (anarchy), peace enforcement (organized actors).

## **EUROPE AND THE FORMER USSR**

### **Civil War in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The ongoing civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a consequence of the unraveling of Yugoslavia and the downfall of the communist system in general. The conflict has stabilized, but the strife has become ingrained and it will be difficult to put the state back together. Some form of a confederation, made up of ethnic homelands, may be the solution. UN and NATO troops are deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; they are likely to play a large role in implementing any peace accords.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Instability in the aftermath of transition from communism, ethnic scapegoating, breakup of Yugoslavia.

**Actors:** Bosnian Serbs, Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnia-Herzegovina government forces, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, the UN, NATO, Western European Union (WEU).

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium to high, as part of any implementation of the peace accords, though a U.S. Army role is not at all a given and U.S. involvement may not require actual deployment of ground forces.

**Potential missions:** Peace building, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

### **Internal Strife in Macedonia**

One of the successor states to the former Yugoslavia, Macedonia has had a difficult time obtaining international recognition. All of its neighbors view the new state with some suspicion. Internally, there is a deep division between the ethnic Albanian population (anywhere from 20 to 50 percent, depending on who provides the figures) and the Slavic Macedonians. The contiguity of mainly ethnic-Albanian-inhabited areas of Macedonia to Kosovo in Serbia (and the explosive situation in that province) could provide the spark that would lead to widespread fighting in Macedonia, possibly complicated by outside abetment. Should fighting erupt in Kosovo, it probably would spill over into northwestern Macedonia, with UN observer troops caught between the combatants. NATO then may organize an effort to seal off the border and to prevent cross-border raids and infiltration. Alternatively, tensions between the ethnic Albanians and Macedonians may lead to internal strife in Macedonia (with potential spillover into Kosovo).

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Serbian repression against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, ethnic tensions between Albanians and Slavs in Macedonia.

**Actors:** Serbian military and paramilitaries, ethnic Albanian groups in Kosovo and Macedonia, Macedonian government, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium to high. A U.S. unit is already on the ground in the prevention mission. Preventing the unraveling of Macedonia and a potential regional war (that could involve Greece and Turkey on opposite sides) is a high U.S. priority. The intervention might take place under NATO, WEU, or UN auspices.

**Potential missions:** Peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (organized), foreign internal defense.

### **The Ethnic Hungarian Problem**

Significant numbers of ethnic Hungarians inhabit Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia. A swing to an extremist nationalist regime fol-

lowed by a crackdown against the ethnic Hungarians in any one of these countries could result in open fighting. An incident like the local ethnically based riot in Tirgu Mures (Romania) in 1990 might be a spark that could lead to wider strife. The Hungarian government would be hard pressed not to assist its ethnic kin. The situation of the ethnic Hungarians in Serbia is especially precarious.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** A neofascist swing in selected states and consequent repression against the ethnic Hungarians, long-standing tensions between the ethnic Hungarians and the neighboring peoples, fundamental problems of social and economic transition from communism.

**Actors:** Serbia, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, ethnic Hungarian organizations, nationalist groups in Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low, though Hungary would apply strong pressure in a variety of international forums in favor of some form of intervention. NATO, WEU, or the UN might sponsor such an intervention.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

### **The Ethnic Russian Problem**

As a result of the breakup of the USSR, some 25 million ethnic Russians now live outside the territory of the Russian state, where they face varying levels of discrimination. Conflict might erupt as a result of an attempt by the ultranationalist forces (e.g., Zhirinovsky) in Russia to stir up a riot in, for example, northeastern Estonia, that would then put pressure on Russia to intervene. If Russia does not intervene, strife may still persist. The most likely flashpoints for such a scenario are Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

**Actors:** Former Soviet republics, Russian ultranationalists, ethnic Russian organizations in the former (non-Russian) Soviet republics.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Very low, though conceivable in some areas (e.g., the Baltic states) and under conditions of lack of central authority in Moscow. The Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe (OSCE) or the UN would probably sponsor such an intervention.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

## **THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

### **Post-Cedras Anarchy in Haiti<sup>1</sup>**

The former military government, led by Commander in Chief Raoul Cedras, was forced out by a U.S.-led effort. The effort returned deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Aristide, though nominally in control, will be hard pressed to improve economic, social, and political conditions. Subsequent crises, including a potential backlash against his leadership, looting and rioting, and other forms of unrest, may develop. The situation may be further complicated by the presence of U.S. and other UN-sponsored forces.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Fundamental social and economic pressures; backlash against Aristide's inability to effect change quickly.

**Actors:** Aristide, the United States, UN-sponsored forces in Haiti, Cedras loyalists, elements of the Haitian military and police.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium to high. The United States is already involved and its role is unlikely to be aborted.

**Potential missions:** Peace enforcement (anarchy).

### **Post-Castro Unrest in Cuba<sup>2</sup>**

Fidel Castro may be ousted from power amidst food riots and student demonstrations. The new leadership then could ask for inter-

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<sup>1</sup>Also see Colonel William W. Mandel, "The Haiti Contingency," *Military Review*, January 1994.

<sup>2</sup>Also see Edward Gonzalez and David F. Ronfeldt, *Storm Warnings for Cuba*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-452-OSD, 1994, and LTC Geoffrey B. Demarest, "The Cuba Contingency," *Military Review*, January 1994.

national assistance and aid in rebuilding the country. Elements in the Cuban military could attempt to overthrow the new regime; although fighting might be inconclusive, reports of famine and anarchy would spark an urgent call for action.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Castro's ouster and/or fall from power, near-subsistence-level conditions in much of Cuba.

**Actors:** The Cuban military, post-Castro leadership, Cuban militia, the United States, Organization of American States (OAS).

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium to high. Any OAS-led intervention is likely to have a U.S. component to it, though it might not include any major Army role due to political sensitivities.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement (anarchy).

### **Upsurge of Insurgency in Guatemala**

A 33-year guerrilla war continues in Guatemala. Right-wing Civilian Self-Defense Patrols roam the countryside, deepening tensions with leftist forces. Conflict is very likely to continue in Guatemala, and the prospects for another coup remain moderate. Alternatively, should signs of a breakthrough and peace accords become evident, a U.S. role in an internationally sponsored peace-building effort might be forthcoming.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Coup, increased strength of the rebels.

**Actors:** The Guatemalan military, right-wing militia, left-wing rebels.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low. The United States suspended all military and law enforcement aid to Guatemala in the aftermath of the 1993 coup, and frequent human rights abuses by the military limit prospects for cooperation during future crises. However, a new government may be extended greater support.

**Potential missions:** Foreign internal defense, peace building.

### **Rebel Success in the Civil War in Colombia**

Colombia is beset by persistent conflicts between drug-trafficking syndicates, left-wing terrorists, and right-wing death squads. The left-wing terrorists are explicitly committed to overthrowing the state; the drug syndicates have joined with the death squads to purge the countryside of leftist forces, and they continue to corrupt and intimidate the government. Colombian military and police forces are actively involved in campaigns against all three groups. There is a potential for a resurgence of drug related and supported violence that weakens state power and exacerbates rural tensions; these problems may strengthen the leftist insurgency. In the event of impending governmental collapse, U.S. military intervention would become probable.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Ongoing and longstanding strife among a variety of actors.

**Actors:** The Colombian military and police, drug trafficking syndicates, left-wing terrorists, right-wing death squads, the United States, OAS.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium. U.S. assistance is currently confined to providing training and equipment for counter-narcotics operations, although there are questions as to whether Colombians use some equipment in counterinsurgency efforts. U.S. involvement is escalating because of a renewed interest in source-country counternarcotics programs. Unilateral U.S. intervention (without significant backing) might take place because of the high level of U.S. involvement in Colombia.

**Potential missions:** Foreign internal defense, humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement (anarchy).

### **Post-Coup Anarchy in Venezuela**

Another coup attempt may lead to intramilitary fighting, followed by widespread unrest, riots, and strikes (as in 1992). The Venezuelan military has not been politically neutral, and the current calm may only be temporary. The United States considers Venezuela to be an important guarantor of regional defense. Additionally, the United

States purchases about 8 percent of its oil imports from Venezuela, which is more than 50 percent of Venezuelan oil exports. Should the strife threaten to plunge the country into a situation reminiscent of Colombia or Peru, a U.S. intervention is likely.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Politicization of the military, widespread dissatisfaction rooted in diverse elements, including inflation, poverty, economic disparity, social policy, corruption, and government indifference.

**Actors:** The Venezuelan military, various political factions and social groups.

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Medium to high. If the unrest becomes regime threatening, the United States may well choose to intervene (perhaps under OAS auspices) to stop the country from plunging into a possibly long cycle of unrest and violence.

**Potential missions:** Humanitarian relief, peace enforcement (anarchy).

### **The Unraveling of Peru**

Peru confronts compound crises: a Maoist insurgency, massive drug trafficking, and grave economic conditions. There is no resolution in sight of the basic conflict between the guerrillas and the state. Independently of the Shining Path terrorist organization, drug trafficking continues to pose problems for the Peruvian leadership. Large portions of the Peruvian interior have been given over to drug trafficking, and efforts to control the drug industry are hampered by corruption and authorities' (particularly the military's) need to control the insurgency. Should the government lose control over additional areas of the country, anarchy and regional "warlord" leaders would become the norm.

**Immediate cause of conflict:** Ongoing and longstanding strife among a variety of actors.

**Actors:** The Peruvian military and police, drug trafficking syndicates, Shining Path (Maoist terrorists).

**Potential for U.S. involvement:** Low, due to concerns about the Peruvian army's human rights record and Peru's status as not a strategically important Latin American country. If conditions worsen, even limited U.S. counternarcotics training and assistance may be discontinued. Alternatively, potential Shining Path successes and increased U.S. attention to source-country counternarcotics programs may lead to greater assistance.

**Potential missions:** Foreign internal defense.

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## THE CASE STUDY FORMAT

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In order to allow easy comparison and analysis across regions and missions, each case study follows a uniform format, with each main point containing several subpoints. The format is as follows:

- **Framing the situation (summary of the situation)**
  - Intervention mission
  - Region
  - State
  - Time frame
  - Scenario actors
  - Summary description
- **Background**
  - Historical context
  - Initiating events
  - Likelihood of occurrence
- **The U.S. intervention decision**
  - U.S. interests
  - Arriving at the decision
  - U.S./UN/other cooperation
  - Needed U.S. capabilities

- **Mission**
  - Mission statement
  - Concept of operations
  - Consequences of time-bound operations
  - Rules of engagement
  - Command and control
- **U.S. Army preparation for the mission**
  - Priority forces
  - Support from other services
  - Predeployment training
  - Special needed capabilities
- **Termination of intervention**
  - Successful mission completion
    - Determinants of success
    - Temptation to proceed to another mission
  - Termination short of mission completion
    - Developments causing early termination
    - Hazards of early termination
- **Potential unpleasant surprises**
  - Events that might lead to mission evolution
  - Potential evolution to interstate conflict
  - What political authorities owe the ground commander
- **Broad implications**
- **Scenario bibliography**

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**CASE STUDY: IMPLEMENTING PEACE ACCORDS  
ENDING THE CIVIL WAR IN SRI LANKA**

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**FRAMING THE SITUATION**

**Intervention mission:** Peace building, traditional peacekeeping.

**Region:** South Asia.

**State:** Sri Lanka.

**Time frame:** 1996+.

**Scenario actors:** The government of Sri Lanka, the LTTE, the UN Security Council, United States, several Commonwealth states.

**Summary description:** The insurgency spearheaded by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has ground into a stalemate, with neither the government of Sri Lanka nor the LTTE able to secure decisive military victory on the battlefield. As a result, the two sides have reached a combined cease-fire-political accord, and the government of Sri Lanka appeals for an international peacekeeping force to help monitor/stabilize the situation and oversee the implementation of the peace accord. U.S. forces form a component of the UN peacekeeping forces.

**BACKGROUND**

**Historical Context**

The underlying causes of the civil war in Sri Lanka have deep roots. The Tamils, comprising both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils, constitute approximately 18 percent of the Sri Lankan population. The

Sinhalese constitute approximately 74 percent of the total population but, despite their numbers, have a defensiveness that led one observer to describe them as a "majority with a minority complex."<sup>1</sup> Conceiving of themselves as the chosen defenders of Buddhism on a tiny island facing 55 million Hindu Tamils in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the Sinhalese majority of Sri Lanka embarked in 1956 on a systematic policy of discriminating against the Tamil minority.

Discrimination took the form of declaring Sinhala to be the only official language recognized by the state, of increasing opportunities for Sinhalese in government jobs and university admissions over the traditionally better-educated Tamils, and of government-sponsored efforts to encourage the Sinhalese to settle in the north-central and northeastern regions of the country (regions traditionally regarded by the Tamils as ancestral homelands). The cumulative result of such efforts resulted in increased Tamil resistance to central authority, and it bred a generation of younger Tamils—already disenchanted with the political process—who were willing to seek recourse to violence.

The Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka began with sporadic attacks on government troops in the late 1970s, but it burst into sustained, large-scale violence after the July 1983 riot in Colombo. The riot, which resulted in the deaths of 2,000–3,000 Tamils and the loss of Tamil property estimated at \$300 million, was provoked by the killing of 13 Sinhalese soldiers in Jaffna as a result of an ambush by Tamil militants. The anti-Tamil riot following this incident was organized by political bosses affiliated with the ruling United National Party (UNP). The party's failure to disavow the actions of these individuals resulted in a dramatic shift in Tamil sympathy for the militants' cause.

The riots of July 1983 provided the final justification needed to challenge the Sri Lankan government. After the riots, increasing numbers of Tamil youth joined the various "Tiger" groups in armed resis-

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<sup>1</sup>Sankaran Krishna, "India and Sri Lanka: A Fatal Convergence," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 268.

tance. This increase in allegiance to the militant cause resulted in a marginalization of the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), then engaged in a dialogue with the Sri Lankan government, the TULF's replacement by the Tigers as the sole representative of the Tamil people, and most importantly, the beginning of a full-fledged civil war.

The Sri Lankan civil war, briefly, went through three phases. The first phase, from July 1983 to July 1987, consisted of a classic guerrilla war mounted by the Tamil Tigers against the Sri Lankan government with active assistance from both Indian intelligence agencies and co-ethnic Tamils based in southern India.

The second phase, from July 1987 to September 1989, consisted of a "peacekeeping" effort mounted by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka. The IPKF was set up after the Sri Lankan government signed a "peace accord" with India promising to subordinate Sri Lankan foreign policy to Indian grand strategic interests in the region and to foster a measure of political autonomy for the Tamils. When the IPKF attempted to disarm the Tamil Tigers as part of the accord, the Tigers rebelled and survived two years of bitter fighting with the Indian army. The presence of the IPKF also produced a violent reaction from radical Sinhalese who objected to the Indian presence on Sri Lankan soil. This Sinhalese reaction was successfully suppressed by the Sri Lankan army after much bloodshed, a feat made possible only because the latter was freed from the demands of anti-Tiger operations (thanks to the presence of the Indian Army in the north and northeast).

The third phase, from September 1989 to the present, was inaugurated when the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka under heavy pressure from the Sri Lankan government. The departure of the Indians resulted in renewed hostilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces. Military engagements have been characterized by guerrilla and conventional operations on both sides, high losses of life, equipment, and material, and alternating successes for the Sri Lankan army and the Tigers but no complete and decisive victory for either.

### Initiating Events

The cease-fire and political agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE that form the basis for this scenario thus come about against the backdrop of continuous but ultimately strategically indecisive military operations by both sides. A hypothetical end to the civil war may take the following form.

After several years of fairly high-intensity violence, the LTTE decides to mount a large-scale attack on Sri Lankan military bases: the air base at Palaly and the naval base at Karainagar in the Jaffna Peninsula. The objective of the attack is to overrun and occupy the bases, thereby inflicting a major psychological blow to the Sri Lankan government. The attacks on the two bases succeed after much fighting. The bases are occupied by LTTE force for three days before heavy government counterattacks recover the facilities. The casualties on both sides are extremely high, and the success of the rebels, despite being only temporary, jolts the Sri Lankan government out of its complacent belief that a purely military solution against the LTTE can suffice. The high losses suffered by both sides in the counter-attack force the rebels to recognize that a complete and definitive military defeat of the government is also out of the question, and that the continuation of such a strategically indecisive war risks the progressive loss of Tamil sympathy and support.

Given that both sides recognize that diminishing returns to the conflict have set in, both have an incentive to discuss an end to the war. Under the mediation of Kenneth Fernando, the Anglican Archbishop of Colombo, who had earlier made contact with the LTTE leadership, cease-fire discussions begin and result in a comprehensive cease-fire and a political settlement.

The settlement has four main provisions. One, both sides promise to cease military operations. The Sri Lankan armed forces promise to return to peacetime configurations. The LTTE promises to surrender arms to an international peacekeeping force as a symbol of its good intentions while the Sri Lankan government undertakes the political initiatives required for a return to normalcy. Two, the Sri Lankan government promises to legislate constitutional commitments to preserving a multiethnic, multilingual, federal state that defends the rights of all individuals and preserves the social and cultural heritage

of all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Three, the Sri Lankan government promises to conduct a free and open referendum in the Eastern Province with a view to ascertaining whether it desires to maintain its own separate identity or to amalgamate with the Northern Province to form a single Tamil-dominated state. Four, the Sri Lankan government promises to hold elections to the Provincial Council/state legislature in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The last three obligations are to be completed prior to the exit of the peacekeeping forces.

Both sides jointly ask the UN for help in ensuring that the agreement is implemented as scheduled. Sri Lanka simultaneously sounds out the United States, UK, Australia, and several African nations about contributing troops; it asks the United States and the UK to take the lead in forming an appropriate multilateral force for the task. It also informs the various South Asian nations of the pending request. The UN Security Council accepts the Sri Lankan government's request, for it sees an opportunity to finally end a long-running and bloody conflict.

### **Likelihood of Occurrence**

The cease-fire and political accords have an even probability of occurring if the future performance of the Sri Lankan army and the Tigers conforms to the pattern established so far. In principle, there are three possible outcomes. One, the LTTE defeats the Sri Lankan army and sets up a sovereign Tamil state. This outcome is unlikely. Two, the Sri Lankan armed forces defeat the LTTE and eliminate it as a viable resistance force. On the basis of current performance, this outcome too is unlikely. Three, the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE are locked into a long war of attrition, where neither can achieve its political objectives through force. This is the likeliest outcome given present trends, and in turn, it predicates one of two possibilities. Either both antagonists continue the struggle indefinitely, or the realization of steadily accumulating costs with no attendant benefits forces both sides to negotiate a cease-fire and a political accord that ends the conflict. At the present time, both actors have opted to continue the struggle, but unless one side can develop the capabilities to eliminate the other relatively quickly, a negotiated settlement will be the only possibility left down the road. Given pres-

ent trends, the probability of a negotiated cease-fire that the UN is called upon to police must be judged low to moderate because both sides still believe that military solutions are feasible.

## THE U.S. INTERVENTION DECISION

### U.S. Interests

The United States has no primary strategic interests in Sri Lanka that would require unsolicited military intervention for purposes of peace enforcement. However, it does consider maintaining the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka to be an important objective in the context of its South Asian regional policy in particular and its Indian Ocean/Asian policy in general. Assisting Sri Lanka in ending the civil war is important for a variety of reasons.

One, Sri Lanka has always supported U.S. foreign policy objectives, including the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, throughout the Cold War. Assisting Sri Lanka now via a peace-building operation is a way of tacitly repaying a "debt," supporting a friendly state in a difficult situation, and signifying in a nonprovocative way the promise of continued U.S. support for Sri Lanka's territorial integrity.

Two, Sri Lanka has excellent airfields and port facilities, particularly Trincomalee, which possesses the finest natural harbor between the Suez and Singapore. Having access to these facilities would be useful in an emergency arising either in southwest or southeast Asia. In an era when traditional overseas bases have become subject to political uncertainty, maintaining the possibility of access to Sri Lankan facilities for refueling, replenishment, and rest and relaxation is an objective worth pursuing.

Three, it is in U.S. interests to help Sri Lanka maintain a certain freedom of action vis-à-vis its neighbor to the north, India. Sri Lanka, like all the smaller South Asian states, has constantly struggled to maintain its autonomy in the face of Indian preeminence. Indian provisions of sanctuaries, training, and equipment to the Tamils in the early years of the civil war were at least partially responsible for the evolution of events during the last decade. A flare-up in the Sri Lankan civil war only weakens Sri Lanka's ability to maintain its autonomy vis-à-vis India. Hence, assisting Sri Lanka at this point

communicates U.S. support for Sri Lankan independence as well as opens the door to acquiring diplomatic and logistical leverage in the Indian subcontinent should that be required down the line.

### **Arriving at the Decision**

Given the nature of U.S. interests outlined above, the participation of the United States in a peace-building operation in Sri Lanka becomes worthwhile because the cease-fire and political accords reached between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE contain the following ingredients. One, there is a fairly durable commitment by both sides to maintaining the cease-fire. This includes a commitment by the Sri Lankan government to confine all its fighting forces operating in the Northern and Eastern provinces (with the possible exception of command and communication elements) to their barracks as the international peacekeeping force begins peace-building operations in Sri Lanka. There is also a commitment by the LTTE forces to surrender their weapons to the peacekeeping forces, which will secure and store these weapons until the political initiatives to be undertaken by the Sri Lankan government are completed. If one or both sides fails to exhibit the minimum motivation required to make the cease-fire stick (expressed in this context by the willingness to remain confined to barracks and surrender arms for safekeeping), a peace-building operation will not succeed.

Two, the Sri Lankan government has promised to undertake three political initiatives immediately: (a) legislate constitutional commitments to preserving a multiethnic, multilingual, federal state that defends the rights of all individuals and preserves the social and cultural heritage of all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka; (b) conduct a free and open referendum in the Eastern Province with a view to ascertaining whether it desires to maintain its own separate identity or whether it desires to amalgamate with the Northern Province to form a single Tamil-dominated state; (c) hold elections to the Provincial Council/state legislature in the Northern and Eastern provinces. These three initiatives will be completed prior to the exit of the peacekeeping forces. A cease-fire accord that does not include a political agreement to undertake these three political initiatives will be nothing other than a pause before further hostilities resume.

Without the political agreement, peace-building efforts will be ultimately inconclusive and risky to any peacekeeping forces.

Since the two main ingredients for success are incorporated in the cease-fire and political accords, a peace-building operation has a fair potential for success and, consequently, the question of whether the United States should participate becomes a viable issue for consideration.

There are several arguments for why the United States should participate in a peace-building operation in Sri Lanka under the aegis of the UN or the Commonwealth. One, the mission requirement is not overly demanding, given the present (scenario-assumed) condition of the conflict's evolution. Two, the largest regional state that has sufficient capability to undertake the mission, India, has no inclination to undertake it because of its past experience on the island.<sup>2</sup> Three, the Sri Lankan government has no inclination to ask for Indian assistance, and for a variety of reasons, none of the principal social groups in Sri Lanka desires any Indian presence. Four, only countries like the United States and the United Kingdom have the right combination of sophisticated military capability and appropriate political detachment from the principal combatants to put together quickly a viable peace-building force. Five, there is good evidence that both parties intend to make the agreement stick. The Sri Lankan government, for its part, begins the political/legal process of introducing legislation to federate the island and devolve powers to the legislatures, while the LTTE observes a stand-down of military operations.

The principal argument for why the United States should not intervene as part of a multilateral force is that the cease-fire may degenerate into renewed warfighting if one side or the other believes that its opponent is not living up to its obligations. Given this possibility, the United States should agree to participate in a peace-building operation conducted by a multilateral force only if both parties are willing to honor their obligations in spirit and to the letter. This condition need not be publicly announced, as doing so might give recalcitrant elements on each side an opportunity to frustrate a po-

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<sup>2</sup>Of course, the Indian leadership may resent the perceived U.S. intrusion in what it regards as its own sphere of influence.

tential settlement, but it should be privately communicated. Both combatants should thus be forewarned that the multilateral peace-building force remains the last chance for an honest peace in Sri Lanka and that any attempt to undercut the accord and secure unilateral advantage will result in a withdrawal of the force irrespective of the future consequences for both parties. The U.S. decision flow and intervention criteria are portrayed in Figure 1.


### **U.S./UN/Other Cooperation**

The ideal multilateral peace-building force in Sri Lanka would consist of Commonwealth contingents, with the exception of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. India would be unwelcome for historical reasons, and though Pakistan and Bangladesh share no such comparable disability, India would view very antagonistically their presence on a peace-building mission. The UK alone could not undertake such a mission unilaterally, simply for lack of resources (though this option would be most preferred by India). Even if it had the resources, the UK does not have the requisite stature among all the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka to pull off such an operation alone. The peace-building contingent would therefore have to consist of forces from the United States, the UK, and/or Australia, and at least two other non-European states with Commonwealth ties, such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Other potential participants include such countries as Egypt. For political purposes, it would be an operation nominally under the UN, but with operational control maintained by either the United States or the UK.

### **Needed U.S. Capabilities**

It will be important that the force build up rapidly to prevent the shift of recalcitrants from a controlled region to an uncontrolled region. This implies a maximum commitment of lift during the deployment phase. Much of the airlift required would be needed to move passengers and could be supplied by chartered civilian airliners. However, a great deal of mobility assets, albeit mostly relatively light wheeled vehicles, would be required as soon as possible. This implies a significant commitment by the U.S. Air Mobility Command for the deployment phase. The use of a high-speed roll-on/roll-off vessel from the Military Sealift Command also would be necessary.

RANDMR554/2-1



NOTE: Factors for participating in UN and other peace operations based on Clinton administration policy issued May 1994.

Figure 1—Sri Lanka Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria

The operation will require helicopters and communications capabilities in numbers high in relation to the number of people involved to maintain contact with the many small observer detachments. Compatibility of the communications assets is essential. There is a need for a construction capability to quickly prepare protected and secure storage for LTTE arms and ammunition turned in. After the construction phase, the engineer capability will be useful for maintaining surface routes and preparation of helicopter landing areas as needed.

After the initial deployments, the bulk of the supply tonnage required will be fuel. This should be available commercially. The remainder of the required supplies can easily be delivered through the available seaports with airlift available for high-value, time-sensitive, or perishable items. Most of the lift required can be commercial.

## **MISSION**

### **Mission Statement**

The mission would center on the goal of helping to bring about the end of the Sri Lanka civil war in circumstances where the warring parties have agreed in good faith to stop fighting. The President's statement describing the mission might take the following form:

"Under the aegis of the United Nations and pursuant to a Security Council Resolution, the United States in collaboration with the United Kingdom, Australia, Egypt, and Zimbabwe will form a UN peace-building force to oversee the recent cease-fire accord reached between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The mission of the force will have five tasks.

"One, to monitor the confinement of Sri Lankan troops and aircraft in their cantonments and air bases throughout the Northern and Eastern provinces.<sup>3</sup> Two, to supervise the collection and safekeeping

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<sup>3</sup>There are 18 principal military facilities in these regions: In the Northern Province, there are brigade HQs at the cantonments at Vauniya, Mannar, Pooneryn, Kayts, Palaly, Elephant Pass, and Mullaitivu; naval facilities at Karainagar and Jaffna Lagoon; and air bases at Palaly and Vavuniya. In the Eastern Province, there is a division HQ at the cantonment at Batticaloa and brigade HQs at Ampara, Welikanda, and Trincomala-

of LTTE arms and to ensure the safety of LTTE commanders should they request such protection—these arms will be returned to the government of Sri Lanka after the political commitments in the cease-fire accord are successfully completed.<sup>4</sup> Three, to maintain law and order in the Northern and Eastern provinces. This may involve supplanting the local police forces and antirebel Tamil militia in law-and-order duties.<sup>5</sup> Four, to supervise the referendum on amalgamation in the Eastern Province and subsequently prepare for regionwide elections. Five, to supervise the elections to the Provincial Councils/state legislatures in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The peace-building force will be deployed only to the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. The expected duration of the mission is one year, and it will not last longer than 18 months. The force will be withdrawn earlier if the mission is completed earlier than scheduled.”

During the U.S. planning leading up to the President’s decision to participate in the intervention, it is likely that Army officials would voice concerns about clarifying the mission in case fighting broke out anew while the UN forces are deployed in Sri Lanka. Who would be authorized to investigate any incidents of UN troops being fired upon? What would be the reaction to U.S. casualties suffered accidentally, say through mines?

### Concept of Operations

The force will operate with two major components. The first and most critical is an element of unarmed observers composed of both civilians and military personnel. A group of five to ten observers will be assigned to each cantonment of the Sri Lankan military to moni-

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lee, naval and air bases at Trincomalee and Batticaloa, as well as an air base at Ampara.

<sup>4</sup>There are approximately 5,000–7,000 Tamil Tigers with supporting arms that include light artillery, mortars, and anti-aircraft weapons. There is also a sizable naval contingent, the “Sea Tigers,” which possesses a variety of speedboats, zodiacs, and unpowered fishing vessels. The Tigers are also rumored to have acquired microlight aircraft or at least appear to be attempting to acquire a microlight force for suicide missions.

<sup>5</sup>Since the military units of both sides will be in barracks or cantonments and since the militia in the two provinces is compromised because of its active involvement in military operations alongside the government forces, the intervening troops may have to support local police units.

tor compliance with the agreement to cease military operations. Observer groups will also be stationed at each point designated for the turn-in and storage of LTTE arms. An additional element of the observer group will help set up and monitor the elections. The peacekeeping element of the force will be responsible for ensuring free travel for UN personnel, for security of supply routes, for guarding weapons and ammunition turned in by the LTTE until they can be turned over to the government, and for security in the Tamil area to facilitate their turn-in of weapons and ammunition.

The initial size of the observer group will be about 500 personnel, but this is likely to increase as the elections near. The peacekeeping force will consist of four brigades of roughly 2,500 personnel each. A support force of about 6,000 personnel will include a battalion of engineers whose initial task will be to construct facilities for the security of weapons turned in by the LTTE. The remainder of the support force will be primarily personnel support, medical, food service, supply, and maintenance units.

### **Consequences of Time-Bound Operations**

This operation will be initiated with an expected time schedule of one year and, in any event, will not exceed 18 months. The time schedule would not impede the operation in any way, and it would act to reduce the incentive of either party to procrastinate in preparing for the elections. The LTTE should be delighted with any reasonable time schedule. The Sri Lankan government may drag its feet, citing logistical problems.

### **Rules of Engagement**

The peacekeeping force will be authorized to use deadly force as a last resort to protect itself or the observer group. The peacekeeping force will also, as appropriate, assist civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order but will be authorized to use only nonlethal means to do so. The peacekeeping force will not intervene to prevent new outbreaks of fighting between the Tamils and the government forces. Both sides will be informed clearly (though informally) that renewed fighting on any significant scale would be grounds for ter-

mination of the operation regardless of which side appeared to be at fault.

### **Command and Control**

The commander of the operation will likely be either American or British, but there are good arguments for an Australian. Control of the peacekeeping force will be straightforward if the African nations that contribute forces are countries where the use of English is common. In this case the normal exchange of liaison officers will be adequate to smooth out differences in operating practices. The individual in charge of the observer force will not be military, and that group will have a separate command structure from the military chain of command. Good communications with the observers will be necessary, however, to ensure prompt reporting of violations and for the security of the observers in the event of problems.

An important consideration will be to achieve adequate coordination with the Sri Lankan armed forces operating in the Northwest, North Central, Central, and Uva provinces adjacent to the Northern and Eastern provinces. The Sri Lankan forces operating here will have to control any potential radical Sinhala reaction to the presence of the peacekeepers. In addition, because any hot pursuit operations in these provinces may spill over into the peacekeepers' area of responsibility, adequate command and control arrangements need to be worked out *a priori* to avoid unnecessary incidents.

### **U.S. ARMY PREPARATION FOR THE MISSION**

#### **Priority Forces**

The highest-priority forces for this operation will be an engineer battalion with experience in tropical construction and a peacekeeping unit (likely a brigade) equipped for and acclimated to the tropics. Since Sri Lanka is in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility, the actual selection of the units will likely be the responsibility of that command, but U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) will be called on

to supply people and equipment to fill out and sustain the selected unit. Hence, early coordination will be important.

### **Support from Other Services**

The Army will require extensive deployment support from both the Air Force and the Navy. It would be useful at the time of initial deployment to have a Marine Expeditionary Unit stationed in the vicinity of Sri Lanka to assist in the evacuation of the force if the situation turns out not to be benign. Subsequent to deployment there should be limited support from other services required. The United States will need at least some individuals with Tamil language skills, particularly at the command headquarters where a liaison is maintained with LTTE leaders. Prabakaran, the current LTTE chieftain, does not speak any English. The Sinhalese, especially the military and civilian leadership, all speak English fluently. There will be few, if any, individuals within the U.S. Army who speak Tamil and have any experience with Sri Lanka. If the other services have any such individuals, the Army should ask for their attachment to the Army element of the force.

### **Predeployment Training**

Of particular importance before the force deployment will be training regarding the nature of the conflict, the differences physically and culturally between the Tamil and the Sinhalese, and indoctrination regarding cultural taboos. Tropical orientation is necessary but also routine.

### **Special Needed Capabilities**

Special capabilities needed, in addition to the obvious language and culture knowledge, will be in tropical medicine. There is also likely to be a need to obtain special vehicles for the force. The infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) of a mechanized force are heavier than would be needed for an operation of this type, and light infantry do not have the needed vehicles.

## TERMINATION OF INTERVENTION

### Successful Mission Completion

**Determinants of success.** The mission will have been accomplished successfully if: (a) the disarmament of the LTTE is carried out without major incidents; (b) a reasonably honest referendum is carried out in the Eastern Province in an atmosphere where none of the ethnic groups (Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, and Moors) have to fear the consequences if they vote freely for a political arrangement of their choice; (c) there are fair elections in the Northern and Eastern provinces undertaken pursuant to a devolution of powers at the federal level.

**Temptation to proceed to another mission.** There are few temptations to proceed to another mission once the original mission is accomplished. The United States must be prepared for the possibility, however, that the Sri Lankan government requests some forces to stay behind to train the Sri Lankan army in internal defense (counterinsurgency) operations. This issue should be treated as completely separate from the peace-building effort. Ideally, the United States should insist that some time elapses between accomplishing the peace-building mission and any follow-on training assistance. The latter should also be carried out by different personnel than those participating in the former mission, and the location of this training should be restricted to the "dry zone" in Sri Lanka.

### Termination Short of Mission Completion

**Developments causing early termination.** At least four different paths could lead to the breakdown of the original agreement, leading to an imposed choice between either a pullout or an evolution of the original mission to one of peace enforcement (organized actors). The specifics are discussed in the next subsection.

**Hazards of early termination.** The hazards of early termination are a function of how the entry decision is configured. If the decision to enter is publicly predicated on the willingness of both sides to continue to abide by the cease-fire agreements and accept the outcomes of the referendum-elections called for in the political accords, a decision to terminate short of completion will not redound to the dis-

advantage of the UN/United States. This is because any termination short of completion will occur only if one or both parties reneges on the cease-fire agreement and changes the military environment within which peace building is to take place. Even if the decision to enter is not publicly predicated on the cooperation of both antagonists, a decision to terminate short of completion can be salvaged if it is formulated in terms of "we cannot help those who will not help themselves." Of course, the important point is not to reach this juncture in the first place. Consequently, the UN/United States should not even contemplate intervention unless there is good evidence to begin with that the cease-fire and political accords are made in good faith. For this reason, the UN/U.S. command should insist that the induction of peace builders will not begin until the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE initiate the steps identified earlier as evidence of their intention to make the peace accords viable.

## **POTENTIAL UNPLEASANT SURPRISES**

### **Events that Might Lead to Mission Evolution**

There are at least four potential ways in which the mission could evolve from one of peace building to peace enforcement (organized). One way stems from the appearance of significant resistance on the part of certain LTTE factions to disarm. In such circumstances, the Sri Lankan government has every incentive to encourage the peacekeeping force to undertake military operations to either destroy the recalcitrants or capture them by force. The peacekeeping force must resist every temptation to let the mission evolve in this direction inadvertently. If, somehow, a peace enforcement mission is ultimately to be undertaken, it must be done as a conscious and deliberate decision, not an inadvertent one. Such a decision would be easier to make if the number of recalcitrants could be assessed and if they were judged to be relatively few. If they are many, it calls into question the entire premise underlying the UN/U.S. decision to intervene and, consequently, calls for a complete reexamination of the intervention decision itself. Since the Tiger factions are usually organized around a charismatic leader, patient negotiation with the leader of the faction or approaching other faction leaders who have surrendered their arms to act as intermediaries may be more productive in

obtaining the surrender of the holdouts than a recourse to military operations.

Another type of mission evolution stems from the possibility that the LTTE might perceive the peacekeepers as being sympathetic to the Sri Lankan government rather than impartial and, as a consequence, take up arms against them. This scenario would be a variant of the events involving the Indian peacekeeping force in 1987. Such an outcome would be unlikely unless the peacekeeping force in its actions and demeanor exhibited strong and manifest pro-government sympathies. The principal reason for suggesting this to be a low-probability outcome is that the LTTE now would be a signatory to the accord, unlike in 1987, when it had no legal standing in the Indian-Sri Lankan agreement. This fact notwithstanding, it is important that the peace-building force execute its mission in as impartial a manner as possible, particularly because (in terms of the definitions inherent in the situation) the government already possesses the presumption of legitimacy whereas the LTTE does not.

A third mission evolution emerges from the possibility that the LTTE may not like the results of the referendum oriented to the question of whether the Eastern and Northern provinces should be merged. There is a significant chance that in fact the Eastern Province may choose to remain a separate entity. This outcome is possible because although in the Northern Province the LTTE can count on the assent of a solid Tamil majority, the Tamil population in the Eastern Province has been reduced to minority status (thanks to government-sponsored Sinhalese in-migration) over the years. Today, the Tamils command an overwhelming majority only in the Batticaloa district of the Eastern Province and are merely large minorities in the Trincomalee and Amparai districts. Consequently, a referendum that fails LTTE expectations of a merger erodes the territorial basis of Tamil nationalism and may cause the LTTE to renege on the cease-fire accord. Should this occur, the UN/U.S. command will be faced with a decision either to terminate the mission before completion or alter the mission and transform it into peace enforcement.

A fourth mission evolution represents a subset of the third and emerges from the possibility that there may be a Sinhala backlash if the Eastern Province chooses to merge with the Northern. A choice to merge in this instance could frustrate Sinhala expectations that

the substantial Sinhala majorities in the Eastern Province (with support from the Moors and the Burghers) would choose to remain separate. If these expectations are dashed because the Moors and the Burghers choose to support the Tamil cause, the Sinhalese both within the Northern and Eastern provinces and outside could embark on a campaign of violence. Dealing with the latter situation would be relatively easy. Presumably, the Sri Lankan army would suppress any Sinhala violence outside the Northern and Eastern provinces, but complications could arise for the peace-building force in the event of spillover violence or hot-pursuit actions. Dealing with the former situation, however, would be extremely messy. Sinhala violence within the Northern and Eastern province would affect directly the peace-building force. It would necessitate the immediate switch to peace enforcement operations because LTTE disarmament would not proceed if Tamils in these provinces became victims of Sinhala violence as a result of their frustration with the referendum results. Moreover, government forces would be unavailable to counter this situation because under the terms of the cease-fire agreement they would be confined to barracks. Consequently, should this outcome occur, the U.S. force would either have to terminate the mission short of completion or change to peace enforcement operations directed at the Sinhalese in the Northern and Eastern provinces. This would be the most difficult potential situation confronting U.S. decisionmakers and the Army.

### **Potential Evolution to Interstate Conflict**

The potential for evolution to interstate conflict is extremely low, since the Indian leadership would have no stomach for intervention despite possible calls for it in the Tamil-dominated southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The "pressure" for Indian involvement could come about only if the Tamils in Tamil Nadu believed that the UN force would systematically discriminate against the Sri Lankan Tamils and, consequently, urge the Indian leadership to move in (most probably, preemptively) "in order to do a better job."

### **What Political Authorities Owe the Ground Commander**

Political authorities owe the ground commander first and foremost good judgment and a sound political assessment of whether the

cease-fire accords reached between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE are durable enough to warrant a peace-building intervention. If a strategic error about the willingness of the actors to desist from conflict is made, no amount of operational ingenuity by Army officers will clear the subsequent morass. Hence, political authority owes the ground commander a reasoned judgment with respect to the decision to intervene. This decision should be supported by the best available intelligence as well as Army advice about the feasibility of executing the mission successfully given the information available at the time this scenario becomes operational.

### **BROAD IMPLICATIONS**

A successful execution of the Sri Lankan peace-building mission would have significant ramifications for U.S. policy in the region. To begin with, the United States will be seen as an actor of much greater relevance in South Asia. All the smaller South Asian states would perceive the United States as being supportive of their efforts at preserving political independence and autonomy. These concerns are critical to the smaller South Asian states because of their constant fear of intimidation by India. A successful peace-building mission in Sri Lanka would thus communicate to the smaller states in the region that the United States, in principle and within certain limits, is committed to helping them maintain their political integrity.

Because the U.S. intervention essentially would be solicited by the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil rebels, it also communicates the limits of U.S. interests in the region. The fact that the intervention in Sri Lanka would take place only on the basis of an invitation would remove any presumption that the smaller South Asian states could engage in unproductive political contests vis-à-vis India with the United States running interference for them. The U.S. intervention in Sri Lanka, as set out in this scenario, offers the possibility of the best of both worlds: it communicates U.S. commitment to the security and independence of the smaller South Asian states without in any way raising unrealistic expectations about automatic U.S. assistance in case of a local conflict with India. In the South Asian region, that is perhaps the best for which U.S. security policy can aim.

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**CASE STUDY: CONTROLLING PIRACY AMIDST  
CIVIL STRIFE IN INDONESIA**

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**FRAMING THE SITUATION**

**Intervention mission:** Combination of traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, and peace enforcement (anarchy).<sup>1</sup>

**Region:** East Asia.

**State:** Indonesia and adjacent waters.

**Time frame:** 1995+.

**Scenario actors:** Central government of Indonesia, three to five rebel commanders on Sumatra and one in Kalimantan, various pirate gangs in southeastern Sumatra, the UN Security Council, various Arab states providing contingents to the UN peacekeeping forces, the United States.

**Summary description:** The death of Suharto precipitates a failed coup, which leads to armed conflict between regions and army factions. After attacks take place on international shipping in waters adjacent to Indonesia, and after considerable international uproar,

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<sup>1</sup>Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey describes the interface between traditional peacekeeping (Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and large-scale peace enforcement (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) as "aggravated peacekeeping," which he defines as "military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all the major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy." See his "U.S. Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations," in Dennis A. Quinn (ed.), *Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994, p. 5.

the ineffective central government requests UN assistance. U.S. forces form a component of an intervention group.

## **BACKGROUND**

### **Historical Context**

Indonesia has a history of separatism and deep military involvement in political and economic affairs. Java and the Javanese have dominated the nation's political and economic life. Indonesia is gradually becoming developed, with the economy growing at a pace that, in recent years, has stayed sufficiently ahead of population growth to bring about an increase in the nation's standard of living. Nevertheless, there are sufficient strains (caused largely by mismanagement and corruption) to warrant a guarded view of the future. Macroeconomic problems after a period of rapid growth have accentuated the distinctions within Indonesian society. Moreover, there are signs of conflict between Muslim activists and the more secular organs of the Indonesian government. Due to his advanced age, the long-standing authoritarian ruler of Indonesia, President Suharto, may be physically removed from the scene in the next few years.

### **Initiating Events**

As with any other regime of its type, the authoritarian regime in place in Indonesia is susceptible to a succession crisis that turns quickly into a fundamental legitimacy crisis upon the demise of the main leader. An illustrative scenario of one set of events that may stem from such a crisis could take the following form.<sup>2</sup>

The death of President Suharto leads to a military coup against a successor civilian government. Dissident regional military leaders, exploiting growing separatist tendencies in portions of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, challenge the central military government and set up "provisional republics." Sporadic fighting between gov-

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<sup>2</sup>Somewhat similar situations could occur in the Philippines as a result of endemic ethnic, regional, or religious unrest growing out of current events. A corresponding situation could occur in Malaysia as the result of conflict along regional and ethnic lines.

ernment and regional forces ensues, with ethnic separatists in Sumatra and Kalimantan exploiting the situation further. Fighting spills over into the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and the Java Sea, as the various sides attempt to harass and to interdict the flow of arms and supplies to each other. Cases of international shipping being seized, and in some cases attacked, make the international headlines. Sumatra-based pirates in the Straits of Malacca step up their attacks against transient shipping.

As incidents of piracy multiply, a U.S.-owned tanker transiting the Malacca Straits is boarded by Sumatran rebel forces and taken to a Sumatran port. The next day, a Japanese container ship is hijacked in the Straits, ten crew members killed, and the ship run aground. Sumatran rebel forces announce that all ships transiting the Straits will be boarded and forced to pay a "transit tax."

Amidst international concern for the safety of shipping, the central government agrees to a UN offer to provide an antipirate force. The Indonesian central government in Djakarta and some rebel force commanders agree to the stationing of UN peacekeeping forces at four Sumatran sites: Bagansiaptapi, Bengkalis, Palembang, and Padangtikar. The agreement by both sides comes about at one of the peace-negotiating sessions between the central Indonesian government and some dissident commanders on Sumatra (taking place in Kuala Lumpur, on neutral ground). The UN Security Council (with China abstaining) approves the formation of a peacekeeping and pirate-suppression force covering southeastern Sumatra and southwestern Kalimantan. The possibility of a regional organization—ASEAN—undertaking the mission at Indonesia's request does not get far off the ground, as the organization has neither the mechanism nor the perception of neutrality to undertake the task.

The Indonesian decision to cooperate in the stationing of foreign troops on its soil is a surprising one, but it stems from the urgency accompanying the threat perceptions of the central government authorities, who see a danger to the continued existence of the Indonesian state and a threat to the position of the current ruling elites. The decision comes at a time when pirate attacks continue, with neither the central government nor the Sumatran rebel commanders able to suppress them. Indeed, the piracy reappears in a strength not seen

for a decade, and the central government in Djakarta clearly proves unable to counter the problem.

### Likelihood of Occurrence

There is a moderate possibility that civil strife accompanied by a reappearance of piracy will occur in the next five years as Suharto passes from the scene. The possibility of the scenario increases if the Indonesian economy cannot continue to grow at a rapid enough rate to keep up with population growth. The army continues to be a principal repository of political power in Indonesia. Moreover, regional army commanders tend to be relatively independent from central authorities.<sup>3</sup> Any split within the armed forces (ABRI) hierarchy leaves open the possibility of internal strife. In previous successions, the central government has lost control of regional military commands. Some analysts recently have pointed out the presence and the growth of open tensions between Suharto and groups within the armed forces leadership. The cabinet shakeup in 1993 and the increasing prominence of B. J. Habibie (Minister of Research and Technology) as a powerful figure in the government may point to his potential role as a political rival to any future military successor to Suharto. These tensions, combined with potential instability and unrest stemming from social and economic reasons, could lead to any one of a number of coup scenarios either against Suharto (unlikely) or against any civilian successor or a military successor who did not have the confidence of the ABRI.<sup>4</sup>

There are continuing ethnic divisions in the country (outside Java) that provide a breeding ground for separatism. The history of ethnic separatism is especially strong in Sumatra, but the phenomenon has great potential appeal in a number of the other islands. The increasing prominence of the ICMI, an organization of Muslim intellectuals, in political life provides another possible rallying point for those who are disaffected with the more secular political cadres that dominate Indonesian politics and the bureaucracy.

<sup>3</sup>For a historical discussion of this point, see Frederica M. Bunge (ed.), *Indonesia: A Case Study*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1983, pp. 56, 225-231.

<sup>4</sup>Andrew MacIntyre, "Indonesia in 1993," *Asian Survey*, February 1994, pp. 111-115.

Piracy has been endemic in the Malacca Straits for decades. Only the combined efforts of the Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian governments have succeeded in controlling the problem in recent years. Should that cooperation break down, the reemergence of piracy is likely. Also, the Indonesian economy has shown signs of difficulty in sustaining high growth rates and increasing exports.

Countering these trends and possibilities is the gradual increase in a nationalistic outlook among most segments of Indonesian society, seemingly pointing to some success in the nation-building process. While coup attempts may occur, some observers believe that any attempt to split the state would meet with strong resistance from the ABRI and many echelons of Indonesian society.

As indicated earlier, Indonesia is extraordinarily sensitive to any foreign intrusion in its internal affairs and would, under *today's* circumstances, bitterly oppose any U.S. or UN interference. Moreover, under today's circumstances few outside states would want to intervene militarily. This scenario is predicated on the potential unraveling of the Indonesian state incident to a succession crisis compounded by adverse economic, separatist, and religious trends and events.

There are precedents for U.S. military involvement in Indonesian affairs. The United States directly supported peace operations in Indonesia during the winter of 1947–1948, when it provided the USS *Renville* to serve as “neutral ground” near Djakarta for UN fact finders investigating the Indonesian rebellion against Netherlands colonial authorities.<sup>5</sup> During the late 1950s, when various rebellions against the central government in Djakarta occurred, the CIA reportedly became involved in support of some rebel factions.<sup>6</sup> In recent years the United States has conducted some exercises (mostly naval) with Indonesian forces and has intermittently implemented International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs with that state, until concern over the Indonesian record in human rights resulted in IMET's suspension with Indonesia.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1948, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> A CIA-sponsored aircraft was shot down and the pilot captured.

<sup>7</sup> In 1992 the U.S. Congress suspended military training aid to Indonesia as a result of events on Timor. However, Indonesian officers continue to receive the training at Indonesian government expense. Some maintenance and repair of U.S. naval vessels is conducted at shipyards in Surabaya. *Pacific Research*, February 1994, pp. 17–18.

## **THE U.S. INTERVENTION DECISION**

### **U.S. Interests**

The United States has a strategic interest in the area because of the crucial importance of the Straits of Malacca for international shipping and trade routes. Piracy in the Straits would raise the issue of freedom of navigation in international waters, an issue of primary concern for a maritime power such as the United States. The United States also has a keen interest in limiting the disruption to world trade flows. Using the auspices of the UN to protect these U.S. interests also would demonstrate support for such operations by the UN.

A corollary to the strategic interest in the area is the U.S. interest in restoring stability in an important regional state such as Indonesia. Finally, the United States has a need to protect its citizens. For deterrence purposes, it would need to react to the seizing of U.S.-owned merchant ships and mistreatment of their crews.


### **Arriving at the Decision**

The U.S. President determines that vital U.S. interests are involved (freedom of seas, regional instability), consults with allies, and raises the matter at the UN Security Council. The central government in Djakarta agrees to a substantial UN peacekeeping and "freedom of navigation" (antipirate) force with U.S. support. Although Indonesian central government authorities accept U.S. support units, they insist that the peacekeepers themselves be selected from Muslim states. After some negotiations, there is agreement that the pirate-suppression force will be made up of units from the member states of the FPDA, Indonesia, and the United States. The peacekeeping units supported by the United States are from Pakistan, Egypt, Morocco, and Oman. The U.S. decision flow and intervention criteria are portrayed in Figure 2.

### **U.S./UN/Other Cooperation**

The UN peacekeeping units, almost completely dependent on U.S.-provided logistics support, are to be inserted (with U.S. support) in three locations in Sumatra and one in Kalimantan. UN military co-

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NOTE: Factors for participating in UN and other peace operations based on Clinton administration policy issued May 1994.

Figure 2—Indonesia Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria

ordination offices are set up in Djakarta (to maintain liaison with the central Indonesian military command) and at the headquarters of two dissident military command headquarters in Sumatra (Sriwijaya, 17 Augustus). The high command of the UN peacekeeping force is set up in central government-held Palembang on Sumatra. The high command of the UN pirate-suppression force is set up in Singapore, as is the U.S. joint task force (JTF) headquarters (both the Indonesian central government and dissident commanders objected to establishing such a headquarters on Indonesian soil). The U.S. JTF headquarters is responsible for U.S. forces supporting the peacekeeping operations and antipirate operations. This scattering of the various headquarters and liaison offices makes planning, coordination, and situation monitoring extraordinarily difficult and requires numerous liaison officers and excellent communications to support effective operations.<sup>8</sup>

The UN "chain of command" flows from UN headquarters in New York to the high command of the UN peacekeeping force in Palembang and in a parallel chain to the UN pirate-suppression force commander in Singapore. The chain of command for U.S. forces runs from the national command authority (NCA) through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) to the U.S. JTF headquarters in Singapore. The JTF commander has operational control of U.S. pirate-suppression units. Coordination between the UN pirate-suppression and peacekeeping force commanders is ad hoc.

### **Needed U.S. Capabilities**

The mission requires logistics support sufficient to support six infantry battalions (two Pakistani, two Egyptian, one Moroccan, one Omani), two helicopter battalions (two U.S.) and three other support

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<sup>8</sup>Readers who find this arrangement bizarre (and something the United States would not put up with) are referred to the similarly bizarre arrangements in Allied Command Europe during most of the Cold War. Many command arrangements and headquarters locations made sense only on the basis of the aggregate of national sensitivities. Command arrangements in Desert Storm and the various phases of U.S. operations in Somalia had some of the same attributes. The point is that when the need to collaborate and/or intervene is urgent enough, the difficulties of the military in conducting effective operations are likely to be masked by more important political concerns.

battalions (one U.S. signal, one U.S. engineer, one U.S. transportation, plus assorted medical and personnel support units). The large size of the peacekeeping force is justified by the large number of locations to be monitored and the distinct possibility that the peacekeeping forces may come under attack by dissident forces not party to the agreement. Other capabilities that will be needed are (1) Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, and Batak linguists, (2) tropical medicine support, (3) landing craft (including air cushion vehicles) suitable for operations in a tropical tidewater environment, and (4) a communications organization sufficient to support the entire UN and U.S. force.

## **MISSION**

### **Mission Statement**

The operation would have two missions: (1) provide logistics and other noncombat support to the UN peacekeeping force commander (a Pakistani) until the force is withdrawn, or as otherwise directed, in order to assist the UN in restoring peace and stability in Indonesia; (2) assist the UN "freedom of navigation force" commander (a Malaysian) in suppressing pirate and other attacks on international shipping in order to restore security to the sea lines of communication in the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca, and the Java Sea. U.S. forces would be authorized to conduct pirate-suppression operations on the high seas and in Indonesian coastal waters as authorized by the freedom of navigation force commander. Hot-pursuit operations in or over Indonesian territory must be approved by the peacekeeping force commander in Sumatra. The President's statement describing the mission might take the following form:

"Today I have directed the Secretary of Defense to provide transportation and logistics support to UN peacekeeping forces to be stationed at selected points in Indonesia. These forces have the mission to help both central and local authorities restore order and reach an agreement to resolve their differences. Their presence has been requested by both the central government and the principal regional commanders in Indonesia. These forces are not intended to have a combat role, but they will protect themselves if fired on. U.S. forces in Indonesia will remain under U.S. command, but the U.S. com-

mander's mission is to provide full support to the peacekeeping force commander. U.S. forces will be withdrawn when the peacekeeping force's mission has been accomplished or if conditions eventuate that do not warrant their continued presence. Concurrent with this action I have also directed that U.S. forces assist UN forces in suppressing piracy and other illegal acts that hazard lawful international commerce in and near Indonesian waters. In taking this action I have consulted with our regional security partners and have asked that they share in the costs of these actions intended to benefit the larger community of nations in East Asia."

During the U.S. national planning leading up to the President's decision to intervene, it is likely that the Army and other officials familiar with peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations would voice concerns about clarification of the mission and about knowledge of ground force capabilities. Concerning the former, there is a danger that the two simultaneous missions (peacekeeping support and defense against pirates) could become incompatible. The relationship between pirates and dissident regional commanders in Sumatra is not clear. UN and U.S. maritime commanders would have to keep a broad mission perspective: in other words, killing pirates in coastal waters may have repercussions for U.S. and UN troops ashore. The U.S. role may lead to insufficient on-scene force self-protection capabilities. Moreover, the United States should not unknowingly take political positions that potentially endanger U.S. troops. Because of this danger, planning should specify classes of events that are likely to lead to termination prior to mission accomplishment. The President's statement says merely that conditions may "eventuate" that could justify withdrawal of U.S. forces before accomplishment of the ASEAN peacekeeping mission.

The NCA needs to know details of the ground force's capabilities, including the limits of integral self-defense capabilities of support units, the contingent need to mount an extraction/rescue operation on short notice, the amount of support "tail" needed to support UN forces, the ability to support ground forces in tropical terrain where the dividing line between maritime and ground environment is imprecise, and the effect of committing scarce Army active support forces on its ability to support simultaneous contingencies elsewhere.

### **Concept of Operations**

The ground forces concept of operations in Sumatra consists of interposing UN peacekeepers between attacking central government and opposing regional forces for the duration of reconciliation talks (held at Kuala Lumpur). The forces are to be withdrawn when requested by either side. The intervening troops are to set up UN force support bases in cantonments designated by each side.

### **Consequences of Time-Bound Operations**

This operation would have no explicit time limits set before the intervention begins, either by the Security Council or the President of the United States. Accordingly, U.S. forces will deploy with the understanding that their commitment may be of long duration, perhaps a year or more. Since the troops would be withdrawn when asked to do so by either the central or regional authorities, the issue of set time limits does not apply.

### **Rules of Engagement**

The U.S. support element to the UN peacekeeping force would be authorized to fire only in self-defense, but it would provide logistics support to any engaged UN peacekeeping forces. As for the U.S. forces supporting the UN freedom of navigation force, under the direction of a UN force commander, their rules would be to escort international shipping on innocent passage through Indonesian coastal waters and neutralize irregular or other forces attempting to interfere with it. Hot-pursuit operations would be coordinated with the UN peacekeeping force commander.

### **Command and Control**

For UN forces, the command channel would run from the UN Secretary General in New York to the respective commanders of the UN peacekeeping and freedom of navigation task forces. For U.S. forces, the channels would run from NCA through USCINCPAC to U.S. JTF in Singapore. JTF retains operational control (OPCON), with limited

tactical control (TACON) of U.S. forces given to the two UN task force commanders. Command and control could become a nightmare because of the geographic separation of various oversight and command echelons.

## **U.S. ARMY PREPARATION FOR THE MISSION**

### **Priority Forces**

The highest-priority support forces and capabilities for this operation will be command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), inter- and intratheater lift, and personnel support (including medical).

### **Support from Other Services**

The Army would require extensive deployment support from both the Air Force and the Navy. The U.S. Air Force would provide airlift, C3I, and surveillance. The U.S. Navy would provide sealift and landing craft (and possibly some amphibious support elements such as beachmasters, obstacle-clearing and salvage units, and special amphibious craft such as LCACs). There also might be a need for Navy/Marines/Air Force rapid extraction support and covering forces.

### **Predeployment Training**

Tropical orientation would be necessary, including tropical medicine. In addition, area familiarization (local economy and customs, political-military situation), and routine self-defense brush up would be needed.

### **Special Needed Capabilities**

Knowledge of basic target-country languages (plus Arabic, the common language of the UN peacekeeping forces) would be sorely needed.

The deployed forces would have to have the ability to support operations in a tropical environment with poor indigenous communications and economic infrastructures. Intelligence on Indonesian re-

gional and military politics (intelligence preparation of the "battlefield" may be the most important needed special capability) also would be essential. Other capabilities include surveillance of pirate operations and the establishment of multiple communication nets for UN and U.S. commanders and political authorities.

## TERMINATION OF INTERVENTION

### Successful Mission Completion

**Determinants of success.** For the UN, the mission will have been accomplished successfully if there is a reconciliation between Indonesian factions and if piracy is suppressed in Indonesian and adjacent waters. The United States has the same determinants of success, although it also has the goal of gaining regional acceptance as a positive force for stability and respect for international law.

**Temptation to proceed to another mission.** Effective completion of the maritime escort mission might foster a desire to destroy pirate strongholds on Sumatra. Such a task would have to be fully supported by the Indonesian central government and various local (and perhaps still dissident) regional military headquarters on Sumatra. In effect, this would be evolution to a peace enforcement (organized) mission. Another path to mission evolution would occur if the UN peacekeepers were to be given the task of delivering humanitarian aid to destitute populations in Sumatra, while regional Indonesian commanders saw that as an intrusion on their role (endangering their political clout) and opposed it. In effect, this would be evolution to a humanitarian mission with a heavy potential for a peace enforcement (organized) mission.

### Termination Short of Mission Completion

**Developments causing early termination.** A number of potential developments could cause a breakdown in the Indonesian consensus allowing the deployment of the UN forces and lead one of the actors to ask the force to leave (implying a threat of mission evolution if the UN force does not leave). Some of these developments include the following: the peacekeepers and U.S. support units come under serious and continued attack by dissident elements who see the truce

as working in favor of central government attempts to regain control; a successor Indonesian central government sees political gains in demanding withdrawal of "foreigners from our soil"; fighting between factions degenerates into a full-blown civil war, with the UN forces caught in the middle; rebel military commanders "win" in Sumatra, declare a new Sumatran state, and see no need for any foreign presence on the island.

**Hazards of early termination.** Besides the continuation of piracy in the Straits (indeed, the strengthening of it as a result of an early UN withdrawal) and further instability in Indonesia, two issues specific to the deployed U.S. forces would come into play: (1) the need for extraction of U.S. support forces, endangered by continuing UN/U.S. attacks on pirates near or affiliated with rebel commanders; (2) inability prior to the withdrawal to free any U.S. hostages that might have been taken.

## **POTENTIAL UNPLEASANT SURPRISES**

### **Events That Might Lead to Mission Evolution**

Among the variety of surprises that could come up subsequent to intervention, the most important would develop if the intervening UN troops were to be drawn into the secessionist/regionalist strife. One possibility centers on the inability of UN peacekeepers to keep the peace, accompanied by attacks on peacekeepers and U.S. support forces by either side in the Indonesian civil strife. Another option is the possibility of hot pursuit of pirates into lairs near either central government or regional forces, leading to the spread of fighting. A complicating element, either in conjunction with other actions or by itself, is the possibility that warring factions could attack U.S. nationals in rebel-held areas, leading to a forced mission evolution. Still another possibility stems from the potential sheltering of pirates by warring factions in Indonesia. For example, if the Sumatran dissident military authorities provide shelter to the pirates, the action could lead to UN (and U.S.) naval and air attacks on bases, which leads to attacks on peacekeepers and support personnel. In this case, the mission would shift from a mixture of traditional peace-

keeping and peace enforcement (anarchy) to extraction, hostage rescue, and a possible withdrawal while under attack. Should the mission evolve beyond the original parameters, the United States will need to have the capability for a rapid extraction of support units and for a rapid reinforcement of U.S. support units under attack.

### **Potential Evolution to Interstate Conflict**

Interstate conflict might occur if the evolving situation in Indonesia were to result in a new central government that based its existence on resistance to outside interference. If that government were unable, at the same time, to control piracy and stop impediments to the safety of international shipping in its coastal waters, a conflict could develop between Indonesia and states that rely on maritime transportation transiting Indonesian coastal waters (under the right of innocent passage).

A less likely case would involve the Indonesian government's prevention of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations on outlying islands (beyond Java), while engaging in a campaign of repression/genocide against them (a major escalation of the type of situation that currently exists on Timor).

### **What Political Authorities Owe the Ground Commander**

The Security Council and the UN Secretary General need to understand the possible conflict between the missions of peacekeeping and pirate suppression. Interface between dissident military leaders and Sumatran pirates is the critical dimension. Since the limited defensive capabilities of U.S. support forces in Sumatra makes them vulnerable to attack, the United States must insist on adequate UN protection of U.S. support bases. The United States must keep a rapid response force ready (at sea or in adjacent ASEAN states) to assist any U.S. support forces inadequately protected by UN peacekeeping forces. Military commanders must assure up-to-date vulnerability assessments of exposed U.S. support forces and must keep the NCA promptly informed of indications of possible attacks against U.S. support forces and inadequate peacekeeper protection.

## BROAD IMPLICATIONS

The mission of Army forces committed to the support of UN forces outlined in this scenario does not involve combat or even traditional peacekeeping, but rather a broad range of combat service and deep logistics support. Although the usual mission involves putting together a combined arms package with the requisite support, this mission involves providing a balanced support package tailored to the forces of others and for commitment in a region where the U.S. Army has had little experience since the Vietnam era.

Because so much of the Army's support structure is in the Guard and reserve components, a major commitment of support elements for an extended period could jeopardize the Army's capability to respond to the first major regional contingency (MRC) in the two-MRC national military strategy. This possibility may argue for placing the international support mission and units in the reserve and Guard structure, with the command headquarters in the active structure.

The missions the Army might have to discharge in this scenario is one justification for continued cultivation of military-to-military contacts with Indonesia. In the past, IMET funding has been tied to Indonesian performance on civil rights issues of interest to the Congress. While there may be significant political justification for accepting the adverse impact on military-to-military relations, there could be a major (and currently unclear) price to pay if U.S. forces play a substantial role in operations in Indonesia and need good contacts in the Indonesian military (including some who may become future dissidents).

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**CASE STUDY: HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN A  
CIVIL WAR–RAVAGED ALGERIA**

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**FRAMING THE SITUATION**

**Intervention mission:** Humanitarian relief with aspects of peace-keeping/peace enforcement and peace enforcement (anarchy).

**Region:** North Africa/Middle East.

**State:** Algeria.

**Time frame:** 1995+.

**Scenario actors:** The central Algerian government, two army factions in favor of negotiations with the Islamists, hard-line security services, two factions of the Islamist organization FIS (radicals in favor of armed struggle and “moderates” in favor of peaceful accession to power), regional Algerian military commanders, the UN, NATO, France, the United States.

**Summary description:** The Algerian government is no longer able to contain the violence conducted by Islamic fundamentalists (Islamists) in the country. As the government cannot maintain effective control, a virtual civil war results and regional power centers emerge. Supply lines to cities and basic services break down. Vital energy (gas line) supplies to Western Europe are in danger of disruption. Massive refugee flows cross the Mediterranean to Europe. The UN, acting through NATO (with France taking the lead), sponsors a humanitarian relief mission. A contingent of U.S. troops forms a part of the intervention force.

## BACKGROUND

### Historical Context

An Islamist opposition movement has been building against the Algerian government for nearly a decade, but the confrontation has intensified since 1991. The National Liberation Front (FLN) has ruled the country for three decades (since independence) as an authoritarian, socialist, single-party regime. Once seen as the heroic spearhead of the long guerrilla struggle for the liberation of Algeria from French colonialism, the FLN has attracted increasing popular hostility for its mismanagement of the economy, heavy-handed police-state tactics, lack of popular participation in the political process, and the deteriorating social situation dominated by growing unemployment, severe housing shortages, and inadequate social services. Urbanization has grown in an unchecked manner, creating large numbers of unemployed (currently around 30 percent), many of whom are marginalized with little hope of ever finding jobs or meeting their living needs. Out of recognition of the regime's unpopularity and failing policies, the FLN began a liberalization campaign in 1989 that opened the country up to national elections and increased political activism.

The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS in its French acronym) is a grouping of Islamist movements and forces that have demanded political and social change. In the face of government ineffectiveness and the virtual absence of other grass-roots party alternatives, the FIS has grown in power. It competed with considerable success in municipal elections and, in 1991, won a plurality in the national parliamentary elections, with some 30 percent of the vote. Prior to the election, the ruling FLN had structured the electoral balance in such a way as to facilitate its own expected victory by plurality to achieve majority representation in the parliament. Faced with a plurality instead by the Islamists, the military decided it could not let them come to power, despite their electoral victory. The military hence seized power at the end of 1991 and has been the power behind the scenes since then.

The Islamists, cheated of their electoral victory, turned to violence. In turn, key leaders of the FIS were arrested. The violence from the government provoked counterviolence from the Islamists. Since that

time the country has been under virtual siege. Thousands of people have died as a result of terrorism and even more sweeping counter-terror by security forces. The government cannot restore order, military units in the provinces are beginning to defect, and the FIS seems to enjoy much popular support, or at least draws on popular discontent with the government, which has been able neither to stabilize the political and economic situation nor to govern effectively. The country is also becoming polarized between a French-speaking (Arab and Berber) elite and other elements of the population that represent a more Arab-nationalist orientation that tends to sympathize more with the FIS. The former are more secularist and strongly oppose any Islamist victory. The ethnically distinctive Berbers, concentrated in the northeast, fear an Arabization campaign and are strongly opposed to the fundamentalists. The Berbers could even consider some separatist movement if they were oppressed by a future Islamist regime.

With the increased violence and polarization, the most violent radicals have now come to dominate the FIS. It is now uncertain whether the government's even tentative consideration of negotiating with the FIS could have any effectiveness, since the militants now believe they may be able to achieve total power by armed (guerrilla) struggle. The country is seriously divided—especially at the elite level—about the wisdom of negotiating with the Islamists at all.

### Initiating Events

The state of virtual civil war has the potential to cause a humanitarian disaster in Algeria. A hypothetical scenario leading to such a situation may take the following form.<sup>1</sup>

Following a lengthy impasse in the civil war, the government of Algeria becomes badly split over whether to negotiate with the Islamists. Martial law and curfews have been extended, but the country has moved toward gradual paralysis as political violence, especially in the capital, has escalated sharply to civil insurrection levels. A stalemate has emerged. Even the army, once the backbone of the

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<sup>1</sup>A somewhat similar situation could occur in Egypt in a few years, if the present Egyptian government is unable to stem the tide of Islamist violence.

regime, splits over the confrontational policy and loses much effectiveness as senior commanders quarrel over policy and control; some are sympathetic to the Islamists.

The continuing conflict radicalizes the various factions and groupings in the country. The Berber population of northeast Algeria, concerned for its own security, attempts to establish *de facto* autonomy from centralized control so as to keep out Islamist forces. Civil conflict over ideological issues thus takes on ethnic overtones as well.

Foreigners, already the declaratory target of the radical Islamists for their support of the regime, have almost all fled abroad, taking with them much technical expertise and many major commercial relationships. Wealthy elites and Westernized elements also increasingly flee the country, mostly heading for France. As violence, political repression, and a possible Islamist victory loom, considerable elements of the middle class leave as well, placing France, but also Spain and Italy, under considerable pressure to accept Algerian refugees—who normally are not politically, racially, or economically welcome in those countries. The West European countries take increasingly stronger measures to stem the flow of refugees.

Concern grows in Spain, France, and Italy when gas terminals are targeted by guerrilla fighters seeking to discredit the regime, place it under economic pressure, and make clear to the outside world that the present leadership does not constitute a legitimate government and is not in control. Disruptions in natural gas supplies to Western Europe (Spain will soon receive most of its natural gas supplies from Algeria) occur more and more frequently.

As a result of civil disorder and confrontation between security forces and the Islamists, city services grind to a halt. Water supply is damaged, electricity and gas service breaks down, disease spreads, and food runs short. The refugee crisis deepens as thousands of people seek to leave the country, by boat to Europe, or overland to Morocco and Tunisia.

The massive refugee crisis, and the international reaction to it, forces the rump government in Algeria to face its loss of control and the gravity of the humanitarian situation. In response to the international attention, it appeals to the UN to help stem the refugee flow by meeting urgent humanitarian needs of the urban population.

The French government, concerned for French investment, property, and remaining French citizens in Algeria, demonstrates particular willingness to carry out an operation of humanitarian intervention in order to maintain a semblance of order and daily life in the cities, to intercept refugee boats crossing the Mediterranean, and to take care of those intercepted or living in camps outside the cities to avoid urban warfare. Both France and Spain are particularly anxious over the situation and the consequences it entails for the continued flow of natural gas to Europe.

The UN requests that NATO act on its behalf and provide assistance in patrolling the coasts, helping refugees, bringing in food and technical assistance, restoring power and water facilities, controlling looting, and sending needed medical supplies. With France taking the lead, and with U.S. backing, NATO organizes an assistance effort on the condition that the Algerian government will agree to negotiations with Islamist forces in an effort to reach an interim compromise settlement. The condition is satisfied, as the Islamist forces, anxious to bring about change in the political and military stalemate, welcome an end to the bloodshed and the opportunity to enter negotiations made possible by foreign intervention. Most Algerians welcome the foreign troops as a potential way to break the endless cycle of fighting, restore a semblance of normalcy, and to break the impasse between opposition forces in a way that saves the face of both sides.

### **Likelihood of Occurrence**

The continuing deterioration of the Algerian situation, leading to major internal conflict or chaos, has a medium to high probability. Currently, a military victory by either side seems unlikely. There is no clear sign yet of any firm resolve on the part of the Algerian government to seek a negotiated solution, though that may change if the situation worsens. The willingness of Islamists to accede to Western intervention to keep order and play honest broker in a situation otherwise out of control would be a very positive event in the region. Such willingness by Islamists, especially the most radical elements during such a conflict, is among the most debatable assumptions in this scenario.

The European states, especially France, are worried about a major deterioration of order and security in Algeria and consequent refugee flows. The growing energy dependence raises the stakes for Western Europe considerably, giving it high prominence when humanitarian aspects are considered as well. The likelihood of French or UN involvement in the situation in some way seems good. NATO or U.S. involvement seems less likely, though it is one option. While the United States is exceedingly unlikely to seek involvement in a civil war, humanitarian involvement is a distinct possibility.

## THE U.S. INTERVENTION DECISION

### U.S. Interests

The United States has strategic interests in North Africa generally (in the context of European and Mediterranean security) and in Algeria specifically, as the largest and most important of the North African states. In addition, it has a broad interest in the continued flow of energy resources (oil and gas) from Algeria because of the impact that disruptions in the flow would have upon Western Europe.

The United States also would like to lessen the chances of Islamist government takeover in Algeria, especially by revolutionary force. It is concerned for the stability of other friendly countries in the region that would be affected by such an event, Morocco and Egypt in particular. While the U.S. interest in preventing an Islamist takeover may not warrant the high cost such a task would entail, the United States could act to manage the problem politically so as to assure a less radical outcome. Even an *electoral* victory by the FIS within legal parameters would be far more desirable than extralegal seizure of power in the flush of authoritarian revolutionary zeal.

### Arriving at the Decision

In view of the strategic interests and the desire to moderate the effects of the Islamist takeover, a decision to participate in a humanitarian intervention would probably come when at least the government sought assistance to handle the deteriorating urban situation. There is also a chance that the Islamists could welcome an end to the fighting implied by the government's seeking assistance to meet civil


needs (the implication of a cease-fire). Without Islamist agreement on the humanitarian role, the UN, NATO, or a U.S. humanitarian intervention would not be possible, though intervention on a peace-keeping, anarchy-prevention scenario would still be possible. The U.S. decision flow and intervention criteria are portrayed in Figure 3.

### **U.S./UN/Other Interfaces**

The United States might be willing to act in concert with other concerned states in the region, such as France, especially if it can be arranged under NATO auspices. U.S. involvement would come first politically via the UN Security Council resolutions, and then operationally via NATO acting in response to the UN. The UN is most likely to turn to NATO and/or France because of proximity, experience, and interests there, as well as willingness to assist. Because of general European interest and concern for the problem, the area would also be a prominent candidate for NATO out-of-area interest. UN consultation and participation would be desirable in order to avoid the impression of yet another case of "Western imperialism" acting in the region. Security Council agreement would be considerably contingent upon the justification and goals of the operation.

France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Russia all might be candidates as potential participants. France might be expected to take the lead given its deep historical involvement and extensive economic and cultural interests in Algeria. For these same reasons, however, France could be perceived as engaging in "neo-colonialism" and be a provocative element to much of the population in some respects—again depending on the goal of the mission. French disinterest and a clear willingness to help adjudicate a political settlement while providing humanitarian assistance would be necessary to convince Islamists that the French role would be neutral and beneficial to them as well. Suggestions of "neoimperialism" on the part of the French or NATO would doom the acceptability of this group to the Algerian public. Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt might lend an Arab aspect to the operation, but could conceivably be resented by the Algerian public. Moroccan participation would be especially questionable on this point. Russia's long association with Algeria gives it some clout. Russia has an interest in both stemming

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NOTE: Factors for participating in UN and other peace operations based on Clinton administration policy issued May 1994.

Figure 3—Algeria Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria

the spread of fundamentalism and preventing excessive U.S. or NATO monopolization of international peacekeeping operations.

### **Needed U.S. Capabilities**

The primary requirement in this operation is the provision of services and supplies. Both are normal civilian activities and can and will be provided by civilian agencies in this case. Delivery and distribution of relief supplies will be by UN agencies and such non-governmental organizations as are willing to participate. The restoration of essential services will be by contract personnel, who will to the extent possible be from Arabic-speaking countries. The primary military task will be to provide security to the relief agencies during transportation and distribution operations within the country, although limited urban security tasks (in emergency situations) will fall on the military due to the probable lack of civilian police available to the operation.

The primary focus of the operation will be on the urbanized north of the country within approximately 200 miles of the Mediterranean coastline. Twenty-five battalions will be used for the security mission initially to ensure visibility to the populace. The number will be gradually reduced as order is restored. These security forces will be drawn from European and North African participants. The United States will station a Marine Expeditionary Unit offshore during the early stages of the operation to provide security during the insertion and withdrawal if one of the parties withdraws from the agreement after deployment begins. The U.S. Army will deploy an airmobile brigade to serve as a general reserve for the force.

## **MISSION**

### **Mission Statement**

The mission would have the goal of ameliorating the civilian population's suffering in conditions where normal distribution channels for basic services have ceased to function. Under no circumstances should any of the intervening actors (the UN, NATO, France, the United States) commit themselves to the prevention of Islamist participation in a new government. The credibility of the U.S. and West-

ern effort in Algeria would strongly hinge on their neutrality in a process that led to free and open elections. The President's statement describing the mission might take the following form:

"The United States has agreed to participate, under UN auspices, and in conjunction with NATO allies, in a humanitarian effort in Algeria designed to prevent a catastrophe for the civilian population while the key combatants find a venue for resolution of the civil conflict. The humanitarian effort will involve meeting the urgent needs of the urban population suffering from lack of police, urban services, water, food supplies, and medical services. The mission will also provide similar aid to refugees who have fled from the urban fighting. The refugees will be given assistance on Algerian soil in order to obviate their need for flight to Europe. The United States is also interested in helping Algeria to maintain its energy exports to Europe, which is of critical importance to the Algerian and to some European economies.

"U.S. forces, as part of a NATO operation, will leave Algeria as soon as basic services and order can be restored to the cities and urban life returns to some normalcy. The UN will then continue to provide its good offices for negotiations as long as it is required. If civil conflict and urban warfare continue, that is, if the parties to the conflict choose to continue fighting, NATO troops will be withdrawn until such time as the parties agree there is a need for a cease-fire, external assistance to rebuild urban services, and assistance in brokering a political agreement."

During the U.S. planning leading up to the President's decision to participate in the intervention, it is likely that the Army would voice concerns about clarification of the mission. Most of all, the Army would want to know the reaction at the political level if the intervening forces encounter resistance in some areas. The Army also would want to insure that the political authorities would not hesitate to withdraw the U.S. troops if the mission shows signs of failure.

### **Concept of Operations**

The UN force will assign operational sectors in such a way that there is one security battalion for roughly each million inhabitants. The units will escort relief convoys, secure distribution points, and (in

certain emergency situations) engage in urban police duties in order to provide for the security of personnel providing services. Elements of the airmobile reaction force will be available for an additional show of force when the occasion calls for it.

### **Consequences of Time-Bound Operations**

The operation would come to an end as soon as urban services were restored and could be turned over to Algerian authorities to continue. Emergency military police operations would continue as long as both parties to the conflict agreed on the need to help preserve order and abstain from fighting. Although no time frame for withdrawal would be set prior to the intervention, the intervention's linkage to the negotiations to end the civil strife would imply certainly no more than a year of substantive involvement by outside forces.

### **Rules of Engagement**

Forces will use deadly force only in extreme circumstances to protect themselves or personnel providing relief and services from serious injury or death. In the event of hostilities between indigenous groups, the action of the UN force will be to contain the spread of violence in the specific locality and to protect others, but it will not intervene to terminate such hostilities. The parties will be warned that further violence may jeopardize the continuation of the UN mission. Personnel participating in what are essentially police activities may use lesser forms of force, such as riot batons, as necessary but will use deadly force only for self-protection.

### **Command and Control**

The individual in overall charge of the operation will be a civilian from a European NATO country (most likely France) who also would serve as the UN Secretary General's representative. Another civilian, probably from the UN headquarters, would coordinate the relief effort. The military command is a NATO field headquarters augmented with staff and liaison from non-NATO countries participating in the intervention. Operational sectors are assigned by nationality to minimize difficulties of language and interoperability. A critical

control element for the operation will be civil-military coordination centers at each operational echelon to coordinate the schedules of the relief agencies and their security forces.

## **U.S. ARMY PREPARATION FOR THE MISSION**

### **Priority Forces**

The highest-priority U.S.-provided force for this operation will be the airmobile reserve force. This force will come from CONUS, since no such brigade exists in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Support units required will come from the European Command, although there may be some need to backfill USAREUR for the sustainment of forces not committed to the Algerian operation.

### **Support from Other Services**

The Marine battalion and an aircraft carrier will be critical during the deployment phase of the operation, both for actual security and as a show of force to limit interference with the deployment. Due to bulk and limited airfield facilities, the airmobile brigade should be deployed by fast sealift, which will require the commitment of at least one SL-7 from Military Sealift Command. The Military Airlift Command will need to support the initial deployment and to establish regular flights to sustain the operation.

### **Predeployment Training**

Predeployment training will concentrate on the rules of engagement and the need to rely on a show of force to accomplish the mission rather than the actual use of force. In addition to the usual cultural briefings, attention will be given to working with international relief organizations and what can be expected of them.

### **Special Needed Capabilities**

The primary special capabilities are language skills. There should be a reasonable availability of French-speaking individuals, but it will take considerable effort to locate a sufficient number of Arabic

speakers to meet the needs of the force for liaison. The units selected for the mission should be ones that have recently completed training for urban operations.

## **TERMINATION OF INTERVENTION**

### **Successful Mission Completion**

**Determinants of success.** The operation will have been accomplished successfully if (a) basic law and order is restored, (b) the urban logistical crisis is eased and a semblance of normalcy returns, including basic services, and (c) widespread further refugee flight from the country is prevented.

**Temptation to proceed to another mission.** A peace-building or a traditional peacekeeping effort may be tempting as a follow-on to a successful humanitarian effort, for the latter implies that negotiations would result in an agreement to end the civil strife. Outside participation in assisting the implementation of the agreement then seems likely, since any interim Algerian government would need the full support and cooperation of the intervening forces in the initial period after the accord.

### **Termination Short of Mission Completion**

**Developments causing early termination.** A number of paths could lead to the breakdown of the conditions that allowed for the initial intervention. One path centers around the continuation of the fighting and the spreading of it to involve the intervening troops: (a) if both warring parties (assuming only two) could not agree on negotiations and fighting flared back up, catching the intervening troops in the crossfire; (b) a variation of the preceding path is if outside agitation and support by, for example, Libya or Iran, fueled the hostilities, and the fighting continued with the intervening troops caught in the middle; (c) if the intervening forces came to be perceived as parties to the conflict, leading to open attacks upon them; or (d) if there was a falling out in the relations between the intervening forces and the leaderships of the interim government and the Islamists. Another path centers around the inability of the intervening troops to restore order without a massively increased presence.

**Hazards of early termination.** The main hazard of early termination would be return of the situation to the *status quo ante*. The negative consequences would be regional perception of what might be described as a defeat for the West (France, United States, NATO) in its attempt to stop the advance of Islamist governance in the Middle East. In principle, an Islamist government emerging from the chaos would then be doubly suspicious of the basic Western intention to prevent it from coming to power *by any means*, including a victory at the ballot box. Other regional states would be highly intimidated by an Islamist victory by force in Algeria and would become more vulnerable to their own Islamist forces, although not necessarily with a fatal result.

Failure of the intervention to manage the situation, leading to withdrawal without fulfillment of mission, would add to the lore of the "invincibility" of Islam in Muslim eyes against superpowers—as was demonstrated in Afghanistan, and "now in Algeria."

## POTENTIAL UNPLEASANT SURPRISES

### Events That Might Lead to Mission Evolution

The mission could evolve to one of full peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (anarchy), peace enforcement (organized), or even foreign internal defense.<sup>2</sup> All of these possible mission evolutions involve the stepping up of effort (perhaps justified as an attempt to keep the negotiations on track) in the face of resistance to the foreign presence by some of the parties to the Algerian conflict.

It is important to remember that most Muslims in the Middle East probably do not want a radical Islamist government in power, but they often gravitate to support of such forces as a protest, and as a means of combating entrenched, inefficient, and illegitimate authoritarian governments. Often, Western intervention in principle is so resented by so many forces that it can lead to temporary popular support for radical figures in protest against the West, hence the

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<sup>2</sup>The mission, as set out in this scenario, involves limited peacekeeping/peace enforcement and peace enforcement (anarchy) functions.

broad popular support in North Africa for Saddam Hussain during the Gulf War. Thus, any intervention by Western forces in the region carries with it the seeds of sparking resentment and opposition among a large segment of the population.

In the same vein, the regional impact of the intervention needs to be considered. For example, the Western military intervention in Algeria could lead to a deterioration of security conditions in other North African states (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt) as a result of protests of sympathy by local Islamist movements, threatening the stability of those governments as well.

Finally, a consideration to keep in mind is the possibility of European nervousness about the wisdom and efficacy of intervention in the face of the mission's weakened moral credibility, caused by continued unrest in Algeria or strong international opposition among the developing countries (perhaps with Russian backing) to the operation.

### **Potential Evolution to Interstate Conflict**

No neighboring state would be likely to intervene to attempt to stop U.S., Western, or UN forces. Distant radical states like Iran and Iraq might offer to send volunteers, but this would have no significant impact on the U.S. mission other than a possible intensification of radical terrorist attacks against U.S. and other forces. Conceivably, hostile states could attempt terrorist actions against U.S. forces or officials elsewhere in the region or the world. No neighboring state would be likely to attempt seizure of Algerian territory during the conflict.

### **What Political Authorities Owe the Ground Commander**

Political authorities owe the ground commander a commitment not to waver over a decision either in favor of a mission evolution or a withdrawal, if the consensus among the warring parties in Algeria that led to the intervention breaks down. An evolution in the original mission would involve substantial hazards to the forces on the ground.

## BROAD IMPLICATIONS

The most important broad implication for Army operations in the future in the Muslim world would be the potential regional perception that the United States was willing to go to any length to prevent Islamists from coming to power, and that was the real agenda behind the operation. If, in fact, free and open elections were finally held that led to an Islamist victory, and if the results were tolerated by the United States and the West, then the impression of unremitting Western hostility to Islam would be much ameliorated.

It is important that the Army forces (and the U.S. government more broadly) not be perceived in the region to be an anti-Islamist instrument per se. If it were, cooperation with other militaries in the region (for example, Egypt) would become more complicated and politicized than it already is.

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**CASE STUDY: ENFORCING A CEASE-FIRE IN A  
MULTIFACTION CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA**

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**FRAMING THE SITUATION**

**Intervention mission:** Combination of peacekeeping/peace enforcement and aspects of peace enforcement (anarchy).

**Region:** Sub-Saharan Africa.

**State:** South Africa.

**Time frame:** 1995+.

**Scenario actors:** The National Party, the ANC, Inkatha, the Afrikaner Freedom Movement (AFM), the South African military and national police, the UN, the United States, the UK, France, several African countries contributing contingents to the UN forces.

**Summary description:** A wave of instability in the aftermath of the end to white minority rule leads to a civil war and the fracturing of South Africa into four separate political entities. Fighting takes place in Natal province (especially the KwaZulu homeland), in the Western Cape province, and in the Orange Free State region south/southwest of Pretoria and Johannesburg. A UN-brokered cease-fire shows signs of collapsing, the UN launches a peacekeeping/peace enforcement effort in order to prevent a lengthy period of strife and to create a stable environment in which peace negotiations between the various factions can proceed. The United States provides a strong component of the UN intervention force.

## BACKGROUND

### Historical Context

The current phase of political development in South Africa began in early 1990, when the newly elected president, F. W. De Klerk, released African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela from prison and embarked on a program to abolish apartheid, hold democratic one-man, one-vote elections in 1994, and create a new constitution. De Klerk's motivations for starting this dramatic reform process were pragmatic. Growing civil strife and international isolation were pushing the country toward social chaos and ungovernability. A long, tortuous four-year process ensued in which the ANC and De Klerk's National Party (NP) came together in an uneasy centrist movement of national unity to try to head off growing extremist opposition to the reforms from both the militant black elements and the uncompromising white racists. After a period of great uncertainty in 1993, the ANC/NP bloc was able to outmaneuver the various extremist movements, contain at least partially the Inkatha movement (a Zulu-based political movement operating out of Natal), and hold the elections.

The April 1994 elections resulted in a government led by the ANC. Nelson Mandela assumed the presidency of South Africa. De Klerk took the position of first deputy executive president. The NP, the rightist Afrikaner Freedom Front, the Liberal Democratic Party, and Inkatha all received some representation in Parliament as well as regional political offices. The NP was able to establish a presence for itself in the Cabinet, being awarded the powerful post of Finance Ministry, among others. The leadership of the police and the South African Defense Forces (SADF) has remained largely as it was before the elections. A system of checks and balances has been installed informally to ensure that virtually every significant political organization in the country has control of at least a few regional political offices or Parliament seats. At the regional level, both the NP and Inkatha have carved out geographical power bases for themselves. The NP has taken control of the Western Cape province (which includes Cape Town), while Inkatha has taken power in Natal. The other seven provinces have ANC governments.

### Initiating Events

Several influential groups in South Africa were either opposed to the elections or gave them only lukewarm support. Should the precarious political consensus break down now, violence may easily erupt. An illustrative scenario of one set of events that might follow such a crisis could take the following form.

A period of reasonable stability follows the elections in South Africa, as all sides concentrate on jockeying for political power in the new environment. However, danger signs are apparent on several fronts; most worrying of all, the economic situation steadily deteriorates. The government's new economic program causes short-term dislocations that push up the unemployment rate in the townships. Despite the lifting of sanctions, foreign investors are slow in coming to South Africa, fearing political instability. Even more worrisome is the flight of South African capital out of the country.

Initially, the ANC and the NP cooperate warily on a wide range of issues within the framework of a coalition government. For example, they work together on legally dissolving the KwaZulu homeland in Natal. But as disagreements between the two movements mount, the NP leaders claim that the ANC is not giving their views proper weight. Angry rhetoric from both sides raises the political temperature in the country significantly. Two key NP cabinet ministers threaten to resign if there is no change in ANC policies.

At the same time, Natal province witnesses a steady stream of violent clashes between Inkatha and ANC activists. The clashes increase in intensity over a period of several months, with heavy casualties suffered by both sides in almost every incident. Inkatha Chief Buthelezi, angered by the dissolution of the KwaZulu homeland, urges his followers to prepare to defend themselves against a government invasion of Zulu areas north of the Tugela River. Amidst the rising rhetoric, 3,000 fresh SADF troops are sent into Zulu areas to bolster the garrison that is already there. However, the SADF does not take any aggressive action against Inkatha, instead preferring to sit on the sidelines except during the most violent clashes, when it intervenes with minimum amounts of neutral force. Foreign reporters claim that the Inkatha militia has several large arms caches that are being supplemented daily by smuggled weapons and ammunition. As

Buthelezi's rhetoric becomes even more aggressive, rumors spread that he is on the verge of proclaiming much of Natal to be a sovereign state. The national government begins laying plans to dissolve the regional government in Natal and to mount military strikes against the various headquarters offices of Inkatha.

The final point of friction is guerrilla activity in the rural Afrikaner agricultural regions west and southwest of the area of Pretoria/Johannesburg. The Afrikaner Freedom Movement (AFM) seems to be linked to a series of bombings of government buildings and sniper attacks on local officials. Some of these attacks result in a loss of life. Rumors circulate that some officers of South African military intelligence are providing target information to the AFM. The AFM is a shadowy underground organization made up of cadres from the old Afrikaner Resistance Movement, disgruntled SADF veterans, and small Afrikaner farmers fearing government nationalization of their land.

South Africa slides into outright civil war when the NP quits the governing coalition and condemns most of the ANC's policies. The leaders of the NP declare Cape Town and the rest of Western Cape province to be an NP sanctuary with political autonomy. Several SADF units immediately side with the NP leadership and deploy to guard Cape Town against assault. The government sends 15,000 members of the new Popular Militia (an ANC offshoot) to surround Cape Town. After a few days of heavy fighting, a stalemate develops in the mountains around the city. The NP uses SADF tactical air units to bomb and strafe Popular Militia positions and declares itself willing to claim full sovereignty for the Cape Town area.

When the fighting begins around Cape Town, Inkatha sees an opportunity to take advantage of the weak position of the central government and increases its attacks upon ANC cadres in Natal. The SADF and police units in the area prove unable or unwilling to restrain the Inkatha paramilitary forces. ANC Popular Militia units are sent into Natal to protect ANC members, and the fighting escalates into large unit battles. Inkatha holds its own in this fighting. Its morale bolstered by the success, the Inkatha leadership feels secure enough to proclaim the birth of a fully sovereign Zulu nation-state in Natal. Inkatha sends emissaries to the UN demanding full international recognition of the new state.

Once the violence escalates in Natal, the AFM sees a window of opportunity and declares that a large swath of territory south and southwest of Johannesburg/Pretoria (in the agriculturally fertile Orange Free State) is a sovereign Afrikaner "Volkstaat." Several SADF battalions immediately pledge their loyalty to the AFM and deploy on the borders of the new political entity. Pro-government SADF units attack the Afrikaner enclave, but after a couple of weeks of heavy fighting, they find that they lack the manpower to pacify the area and withdraw under severe harassment from AFM irregulars. Within a month, the fighting on the borders of the Volkstaat develops into a series of intermittent artillery barrages and commando raids.

At this stage, there are six main military actors: the SADF units that remain loyal to the government, the ANC Popular Militia, Afrikaner irregulars, the SADF units that join the AFM, the Inkatha paramilitary units, and the SADF units that fight for the NP enclave in the Western Cape province.

Six months after the outbreak of widespread fighting, and as the casualty count in South Africa continues to rise, the international community makes a concerted effort to achieve a cease-fire through the United Nations. Heavy UN pressure on all four parties results in a nationwide cease-fire. The cease-fire is to provide a respite during which negotiations among the four political parties can produce a peaceful settlement to the conflict. A team of unarmed UN monitors is dispatched to South Africa to observe and report on cease-fire violations. All forces are frozen in place, prisoners are exchanged, and heavy weapons and combat aircraft are impounded by the UN monitors. After a few weeks in-country, however, the UN monitor force is hit by a wave of terrorist attacks launched by extremists of several political persuasions. As a result, the UN Security Council votes to deploy a heavily armed peacekeeping/peace enforcement force to the region. Several countries, including the United States, are called on to contribute troops. The peacekeepers are to be deployed in the volatile border regions of the Western Cape province, in Natal province, and along the edges of the Afrikaner enclave.

### **Likelihood of Occurrence**

The probability of the above scenario has to be rated in the medium range because it is a composite of several different local political sit-

uations that all explode into conflict at the same time. The chances of post-election combat between Inkatha and the ANC in Natal must be rated as high. The likelihood of the emergence of an Afrikaner homeland in the Orange Free State through violence must be rated as low. Finally, the chances of combat around an NP enclave in Cape Town are probably in the moderate range.

The pre-election violence in Natal that resulted in thousands dead is a strong indicator that some continued violence in that part of South Africa is quite possible and likely. Even Inkatha's participation in the election does not remove that possibility, since there are allegations that Inkatha committed vote fraud in Natal province. These allegations could taint the legitimacy of the regional Inkatha government, causing tensions to continue in Natal for a long time to come. The bitter election campaign in the Western Cape between the ANC and the NP involved a very harsh level of rhetoric and exposed the deep differences between the two movements. The NP victory in the Western Cape gives it a power base in one of the most prosperous parts of South Africa. At the same time, the geographical location of the province—with its access to the coast and mountainous outskirts—makes it a convenient political enclave for the NP. The enclave is so situated that someday it could be transformed rapidly into a sovereign state if the political situation should develop in that direction.

The high visibility of apartheid as a matter of concern for the UN and the international attention to the recent political developments in South Africa indicate a high level of attention to the country, making extensive UN involvement likely in case the situation develops in a negative fashion. Because of the high visibility of apartheid as a political issue in the United States and the strong U.S. interest in the South African transition, a substantial U.S. contribution to a UN effort designed to stabilize the situation seems quite likely.

## **THE U.S. INTERVENTION DECISION**

### **U.S. Interests**

The United States has a number of strategic interests in South Africa. Besides its important location astride major shipping lanes, South

Africa is the most developed country in Africa and could become an important U.S. ally if it manages a peaceful transition to a democracy. The establishment of a stable, democratic, multiracial state in sub-Saharan Africa would be a watershed event and would have great importance for the entire continent.

These same reasons also contain a negative strategic rationale for U.S. interest in South Africa. If the end result of a bitter civil war in South Africa were the rise of one or more extremist, anti-Western regimes on South African territory, and should the sophisticated indigenous weapons-production capabilities fall into the hands of a radical regime, South Africa could serve as a new arms supplier to rogue states throughout the developing world. Last but not least is the nuclear issue. By its own admission, South Africa possessed a small stockpile of nuclear weapons in the 1980s. In 1993, then President De Klerk claimed that all the nuclear weapons had been dismantled. Even if one assumes that this is true, there is still the risk that enough indigenous nuclear research and production capability exists in the country to allow one or more militant regimes to begin the process of producing nuclear weapons once again. If such a scenario were to develop, the actions of the South African successor states would become a matter of global, not just regional, attention. The implications for the future of the U.S.-supported global non-proliferation regime would be ominous indeed.

There is also the question of the regional effect of unrest in South Africa. If allowed to continue unabated, a large-scale civil war in South Africa could further destabilize Mozambique and Angola (as well as Namibia and Botswana), thus crippling much of the UN's credibility as an effective actor in southern Africa. In a worst-case scenario, much of the southern part of the continent could become a disaster region, full of seemingly intractable strife.

Finally, an important dimension of the U.S. interest in South Africa is the existence of strong emotional ties to South Africa's political development. The ties, based on some assumed parallels between the United States and South Africa, and evidenced during the divestment debates of the 1980s, add up to the fact that political development in South Africa is also an important U.S. domestic political issue that no U.S. President can ignore.

### **Arriving at the Decision**

Despite the considerable U.S. interests, any decision to deploy substantial U.S. troops as part of a UN operation to South Africa is likely to come only after an intense, prolonged, and divisive public debate, launched by the UN Secretary General's request for U.S. participation in a UN South Africa Force (UNISAF). After an initial period in which the anti-intervention forces have a clear edge, television footage of the carnage in South Africa begins to sway the opinions of both editorial writers and legislators. The fact that a lack of response is damaging in the domestic political sense places any anti-intervention spokesmen on the defensive.

Within the executive branch, the State Department (especially the career officers in the African Affairs section) proves to be the most vociferous advocate of intervention. As the international media and the UN Secretary General press ever harder for U.S. participation in UNISAF, the President convenes a series of private National Security Council (NSC) meetings in which the Secretary of State slowly but surely persuades his colleagues to commit to UNISAF. The U.S. decision flow and intervention criteria are portrayed in Figure 4.


### **U.S./UN/Other Cooperation**

The U.S. component of UNISAF would be a part of a large multinational military team that would also include soldiers from the UK, France, Nigeria, Kenya, and Egypt. These national contingents would be selected so as to provide a balance between North American, European, and African forces. No countries would be consciously excluded from UNISAF, but the United States and the UN are likely to be far more selective in nominating national contingents than they were during the Somalia operation.

### **Needed U.S. Capabilities**

In view of the multisided civil war situation and the expectation of combat with at least some of the sides involved, UNISAF would need substantial forces. The UN would be likely to expect the U.S. contribution to be most vital in the following areas: sealift/airlift, civil af-

RAND MR554/2-4



NOTE: Factors for participating in UN and other peace operations based on Clinton administration policy issued May 1994.

Figure 4—South Africa Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria

fairs personnel, trucking units, attack and transport helicopters, light infantry, and some military police.

A total of 85,000 troops would be deployed to South Africa, of whom 20,000 are Americans. In all, seven battalions of U.S. ground combat troops would be deployed (five Army, two Marine). The U.S. force roster would include one Army mechanized infantry brigade, two Marine Corps battalions, one airmobile brigade (one airmobile infantry battalion, one attack helicopter battalion), strategic airlift/sealift assets, in-country transport (both ground and air), military police, a robust complement of civil affairs troops, and the core elements of a military intelligence brigade.

Language should not be a major problem, since most South African elites speak English. However, the military intelligence brigade deployed should include a substantial number of Xhosa and Zulu linguists.

## **MISSION**

### **Mission Statement**

The mission would have the goal of ensuring that a fragile cease-fire would last and lead to a negotiated solution to the conflict. The officially stated rationale for the mission would have three major goals: to preserve stability in southern Africa, to help build democracy in South Africa, and to alleviate the hardships being suffered by South African civilians. The President's statement describing the mission might take the following form:

"Beginning immediately, a force of 20,000 American troops will deploy to the Western Cape, Natal, and Orange Free State provinces of South Africa as part of a UN effort to halt the bloodshed in that nation and facilitate peace talks which can bring about a peaceful resolution of the political differences that have emerged in that nation since the 1994 elections. U.S. forces shall remain neutral throughout their time in South Africa and will seek to establish working relationships with all the local parties involved. The U.S. forces will strive only to make peace and not to take sides. U.S. troops will have two major missions during their time in South Africa. The first is to enforce the UN cease-fire by neutralizing any party seeking to use vio-

lence to achieve political ends in the areas covered by UNISAF. Secondly, American troops are given the task of restoring civil order in those areas in their assigned sectors where anarchy and lawlessness have broken out as by-products of the civil war. At this time, no attempts at disarming the various local military factions are contemplated. There is no fixed termination date for this operation. U.S. forces will leave the country when fighting associated with the civil war has ended and a political settlement has been reached at the bargaining table. Once this objective has been achieved, all U.S. forces will be withdrawn from South Africa. There will be no permanent American military presence left in the country."

During the U.S. planning leading up to the President's decision to participate in the intervention, it is likely that Army officials would voice concern about the escalation potential of the intervention. The Army probably would want a definite answer from the political authorities regarding the course of action to take if the troops encounter widespread hostility in some of the areas where they deploy.

### Concept of Operations

The Army concept of operations involves the setting up of a handful of garrison strongpoints in each battalion area. Small, platoon-sized mobile teams fan out from each of the garrisons to patrol the battalion area of responsibility. The mobile patrols have the task of controlling any outbreaks of organized violence. These small patrols (mounted on HMMWVs and Bradleys) can be reinforced by company-sized quick reaction forces consisting of 2-3 attack helicopters and heliborne light infantry. The two Marine battalions will be deployed close to the coast in Natal province (where they could be supported by the Navy), while the Army mechanized brigade is deployed further inland. The airmobile brigade is divided up into company team quick-reaction task forces distributed throughout the country to offer rapid support to any UN unit that may need assistance. U.S. commanders order that the use of heavy firepower is to be kept to a minimum. Civil affairs troops are distributed widely throughout the U.S. force. Local U.S. civil affairs officers are ordered to make contact with the local populace and the local political leaders and to set up crisis management centers in each district. The civil affairs troops

will play a crucial role in monitoring any emerging tensions and defusing crises in their initial stage.

### **Consequences of Time-Bound Operations**

The U.S. administration declares that the American presence in South Africa does not have a fixed end date. However, senior White House aides privately tell the press that they wish to withdraw all U.S. troops from South Africa after six to eight months. The setting of a specific duration for the operation prior to deployment could have the counterproductive effects of allowing the various combatants to simply play for time in the negotiations and prepare to resume violence after the departure of the UN forces.

### **Rules of Engagement**

The rules of engagement issued to UN forces are not restrictive. All UN troops are empowered to use force when they judge themselves to be in danger or when they witness a cease-fire violation.

### **Command and Control**

The overall command of UNISAF is given to a U.S. Army general. He is empowered by the UN to make all necessary military decisions relating to the deployment and employment of UNISAF forces. His deputy is a Nigerian general. The U.S. commander reports to the Secretary General's special representative for South Africa on all UN matters. On U.S. issues, he reports to the commander of the U.S. European Command. Each national contingent of UNISAF has its own area of operations (in order to reduce problems resulting from language and doctrinal differences), so there is little chance for command confusion resulting from the mixing of different contingents. The U.S. airmobile brigade and two French parachute battalions are held in strategic reserve to support any element of UNISAF that finds itself in military difficulty. At the local level, there are eight zones of UNISAF operation, each headed by a district commander who reports directly to the overall American UNISAF commander (CINCUNISAF).

## **U.S. ARMY PREPARATION FOR THE MISSION**

### **Priority Forces**

The highest-priority U.S. Army units for this operation will be transport units (trucking and transport helicopter), the airmobile reaction brigade, and civil affairs personnel. The greatest initial attention must be given to the civil affairs personnel, as there are relatively few on active duty and the Army will probably have to rely on reservist volunteers. The relatively robust infrastructure that exists in much of South Africa reduces the demand for heavy, space-consuming support engineering units.

### **Support from Other Services**

The Army naturally requires deployment support from both the Air Force and the Navy. The deployment of both the mechanized and airmobile units will require fast sealift, as weight and/or bulk make each difficult to deploy by air. In addition, the two Marine battalions will be supported throughout primarily by the Navy. Navy Seabees will be employed to repair some of the South African port facilities. Once established in country, the Army will require only routine supply effort by the other services.

### **Predeployment Training**

Predeployment training will be largely limited to mission orientation and country familiarization, as the military tasks will be consistent with current troop training. The participating U.S. troops would need to be briefed on the need to be sensitive to the different cultures existing in South Africa. This is especially vital for the Americans going into Natal province, where relations with both the Zulu and Xhosa ethnic groups must be handled carefully. There will be adequate time for this training during the transport of equipment, which will be by sealift. If the Army has to dip into the reserve components to find trucking units for UNISAF, then some predeployment training (three to four weeks) of these reserve units might be required.

In view of the critical role of and the need for the effective use of civil affairs personnel, all civil affairs officers will be extensively briefed on the specific situation in South Africa before they deploy. They would be given great autonomy and would be allowed to operate outside normal chains of command during exceptional circumstances. Acting as liaisons with the local populace, the civil affairs officers would have advance knowledge of any developing crises and would act to defuse them prior to their evolution to armed clashes.

### **Special Needed Capabilities**

Depending on the sector assigned, there may be little need for special capabilities. It may be necessary to locate individuals with particular language skills and cultural knowledge if an operational sector is assigned in, for example, the Zulu area.

## **TERMINATION OF INTERVENTION**

### **Successful Mission Completion**

**Determinants of success.** The mission will have been accomplished successfully if the cease-fire lasts long enough to facilitate a comprehensive national political settlement. This means that the UN has to suppress all major violence in the country during the negotiations. At the point when a settlement is signed during a period of tranquility, the United States would withdraw its forces from the country. Any early U.S. withdrawal could easily trigger renewed conflict, as one or more sides might see an opportunity to make additional military gains before sitting down for a final round of negotiations.

**Temptation to proceed to another mission.** A success for the United States in this contingency could spark demands for it to become more deeply involved in the South African peace process. As such, a South African request for U.S./UN presence in a mission of peace building may follow. Alternatively, should some radical elements fail to abide by the peace agreement, there may be a request for U.S. assistance in counterinsurgency operations. In effect, that would mean

a mission of foreign internal defense. If the uncompromising elements are small in number, there may be a temptation to continue U.S. involvement in the South African peace process in such a fashion.

A variation of the above also could result in the case of a partially successful U.S. intervention, that is, one in which some violence continues in South Africa and/or significant U.S. casualties are sustained. The United States then would likely find itself cast in the role of the long-term guarantor of South Africa's future. Although this does not necessarily mean that U.S. troops would remain on the ground in South Africa permanently, it could imply that the United States retain a commitment to return its forces to South Africa in the event of any return to strife. In essence, the United States could find itself committed to maintaining an over-the-horizon military presence in the area. Such a posture would also compel U.S. diplomacy to become more actively engaged in South Africa over the long term than it is now.

### **Termination Short of Mission Completion**

**Developments causing early termination.** The most profound danger is that U.S. forces will be perceived by one side as favoring its main rival and/or as having lost their neutrality. In such a situation, the U.S. mission could face the prospect of an evolution into a de facto full-blown counterinsurgency operation against a well-armed and dispersed foe with combat experience. If this were to happen, the result could be a hasty U.S. withdrawal.

**Hazards of early termination.** Besides a potentially difficult operation to extricate U.S. forces from a failed operation, an early withdrawal would damage not only U.S. but also UN credibility in the entire region. Finally, in case of failure of the mission, the ongoing UN efforts to restore political stability to Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia also might begin to unravel. Moreover, an unsuccessful intervention in South Africa probably would lead to a lengthy and indecisive period of strife in the country, and this would make the development of a democratic South Africa a distant option.

## **POTENTIAL UNPLEASANT SURPRISES**

### **Events That Might Lead to Mission Evolution**

There is a high risk of mission evolution in this scenario. One path toward mission evolution could be triggered by a general turn against the UN operation by the populace at the "street level." This does not necessarily mean that the populace would become actively hostile to the U.S./UN forces, only that there would be a general refusal to cooperate with these forces, leaving them politically isolated and not trusted at the local level. Such a situation could make it difficult for the leaders of the various South African factions to negotiate effectively and in good faith. It would also cause the credibility of UNISAF to be harmed and would lead to a mission with aspects of peace enforcement (anarchy).

Another path toward mission evolution could stem from the unwelcome discovery by the U.S. command in South Africa that the non-U.S. elements of UNISAF are far less militarily capable than expected. This could compel U.S. units to overextend themselves in order to meet some of the responsibilities of the foreign UN forces in addition to their own. Besides a stepping-up of commitments, such a development would imply greater peace enforcement aspects (since U.S. forces would participate in the brunt of the hostile activities).

But the most worrisome cluster of potential developments that could drive an evolution of the mission revolves around the possibility of one or more combatants in the South African civil war turning against the UN presence and working actively to force it to leave. In such a case, the mission could evolve to one of peace enforcement (organized). There are a number of triggers for such a development. One could stem from some of the foreign UN forces behaving in an overly aggressive fashion (even for "innocent" reasons, such as different doctrines), thus incurring the wrath of one or more of the South African factions against the whole UN effort. U.S. forces would have little means of preventing such a turn of events. Another evolution in this manner could take place by way of a perception among combatants that the United States has lost its neutrality.

There is also the possibility that some extreme elements of the South African police/intelligence establishment which are opposed to all

negotiated attempts to solve conflict in the country would undertake a terror campaign against UN forces. These elements have the wherewithal and the organizational expertise to conduct such a campaign in several regions at once. Since these elements are deeply embedded in the existing police apparatus, and since the UNISAF mission does not have a mandate to reform the South African police, this could prove to be a great challenge to the U.S./UN forces in South Africa.

Should the mission evolve to a full-blown peace enforcement mission in South Africa, the United States probably would need to deploy 4-5 additional light infantry battalions, a mechanized infantry brigade, 1-2 tactical fighter wing equivalents, a Ranger battalion, several additional companies of civil affairs and Special Forces troops, and 2-3 additional attack helicopter battalions. These new combat deployments would require an associated buildup in support forces. More ground transportation, heavy support engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, and maintenance units would be required. Needless to say, a large portion of the readily available U.S. strategic airlift and sealift assets would be tied down in transporting and sustaining this force for the length of the counterinsurgency campaign. Deployments of this magnitude would draw down the available U.S. conventional force structure, making it more difficult for the United States to respond quickly to regional crises in other parts of the world and perhaps even threatening U.S. capabilities in an MRC elsewhere. Any substantial peace enforcement operations in South Africa would probably result in high U.S. casualties, which could touch off a bitterly divisive domestic political debate over U.S. foreign policy in general.

### **Potential Evolution to Interstate Conflict**

There is little chance of an interstate war arising out of this scenario.

### **What Political Authorities Owe the Ground Commander**

If intervention in South Africa does occur, it is likely to be a substantial effort. Moreover, the risks of mission evolution are especially high in the volatile and polarized conditions in South Africa. Political

authorities need to keep in mind the substantial dangers to the U.S. troops involved in the operation. In view of the high stakes, U.S. political authorities should play a direct role in the peace negotiations among the South African combatants, so as to ensure the favorable evolution of the talks and to be aware of any problems developing down the road.

### **BROAD IMPLICATIONS**

A successful U.S. participation in UNISAF would have a great deal of positive fallout for the United States. It would be seen as a credible and impartial force for the spreading of stability and democracy in Africa. The UN's image in the area would also be enhanced. Successful U.S. involvement in South Africa would provide a precedent for potential future U.S. interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Because of its potential size, a U.S. intervention in South Africa (whether successful or not) would touch off a vociferous domestic debate about the wisdom of participating in multinational peace operations.

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**CASE STUDY: UPHOLDING MACEDONIAN  
SOVEREIGNTY IN CONDITIONS OF STRIFE IN KOSOVO**

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**FRAMING THE SITUATION**

**Intervention mission:** Peacekeeping/peace enforcement with some elements of interstate war.

**Region:** Europe and the former USSR (the Balkans).

**State:** Macedonia (the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia).

**Time frame:** 1995+.

**Scenario actors:** Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, the 3rd (Pristina) Serbian army corps, various Serbian paramilitary groups in Kosovo, the ethnic Albanian Kosovo "shadow government" of Ibrahim Rugova, various ethnic Albanian groups in Kosovo and Macedonia, UNPROFOR troops in Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, NATO, the UN Security Council, Russia, the United States.

**Summary description:** Ethnically based strife from Kosovo (Serbia) spreads to northwestern Macedonia because of the ethnic links between the Albanians inhabiting both sides of the border. The spillover results in casualties among the UN forces (including a U.S. Army contingent) deployed in the area. As evidence mounts of direct cross-border Serbian involvement in Macedonia, the UN, through NATO, reinforces the UN forces in Macedonia and gives them enforcement provisions in order to prevent the complete unraveling of Macedonia. Fears of a wider Balkan war provide the rationale for U.S. participation in the effort.

## BACKGROUND

### Historical Context

The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 resulted in the creation of a sovereign Macedonian state. The new state has had a difficult time attaining international recognition. Serbia reluctantly tolerates its existence, a policy liable to a quick change if the Serbian conflicts with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina become settled. Bulgaria recognizes the new state but refuses to accept that such a thing as a Macedonian nationality exists, claiming instead that Macedonians are in fact Bulgarians; to many Macedonians this phrasing suggests Bulgaria's territorial designs on Macedonia. Greece has openly tried to subvert the existence of the new state through economic embargoes and tactics of intimidation, claiming that the Macedonian authorities have designs upon northern Greece (where a large minority of Slavic speakers live). Albania has an uneasy relationship with Macedonia, with the mistrust stemming from the fact that 20–40 percent of Macedonia's population (depending on which side provides the figures) is ethnically Albanian. The ethnic Albanian population is concentrated in western and northwestern Macedonia, and the ethnic Albanian leaders have pressed for autonomy for the area. Complicating matters further is the position of Turkey, which ardently supports Macedonia. In this sense, Macedonia, known somewhat pejoratively as the "powderkeg of the Balkans" because of the history of rivalry between all of its neighbors over who will control the territory, has resurfaced as a crisis area in post-Cold War Europe.

Kosovo, an almost entirely ethnically Albanian province in Serbia, borders Albania and Macedonia. In Serbian nationalist mythology, Kosovo occupies an important role as the "cradle of Serbia," a perception tied to the medieval location of the Serbian kingdom. The fact that so few Serbs live in the province is a matter that evokes strong reactions among the Serbs, who fear the possibility of detachment of Kosovo and its eventual union with Albania. Since the early 1980s, the position of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has steadily deteriorated, and the province has been under martial law. Its autonomous status was revoked in 1989 by the authorities in Bel-

grade. Due to open discrimination, the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have formed a parallel society and government (under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova) almost completely independent from the Serbian-dominated official structures. Currently, the Serbian army has a strong presence in the province, there is evidence of widespread and sometimes random police brutality against the ethnic Albanians, and a number of Serbian ultranationalist figures (accused of being war criminals because of their activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina) operate in the province. The best known among these figures is Zeljko Raznatovic, alias "Arkan." There are repeated rumors that the Serbs intend to force the ethnic Albanians out of the province and settle Kosovo with ethnic Serbs. Indeed, the ultranationalist Serbian paramilitaries have made no secret of the fact that they would like to "ethnically cleanse" the province.<sup>1</sup>

Any ethnically based conflict in Kosovo would be difficult to contain within the province. The Albanian government has proclaimed openly that it would not stand still and watch while the ethnic Albanians were subjected to an ethnic cleansing policy. Ethnic Albanian leaders in Macedonia have made similar statements. The connections between the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia are especially close. Up until a few years ago, there was no state border between Kosovo and Macedonia, and the ethnic Albanians on both sides of the border are linked by many family and clan ties.

International concern over the possibility of Serbian aggression against Macedonia has led to the deployment of a UN protection force (UNPROFOR) to Macedonia. The protection force includes a contingent of U.S. Army troops. The troops are stationed on the Macedonian border with Serbia and Albania. U.S. concern over the possibility of a crackdown on the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has led both Presidents Bush and Clinton to issue warnings to Serbia.

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<sup>1</sup>For example, according to Reuters, in late April 1994, "Arkan" publicly "denounced the ethnic Albanians living in . . . Kosovo and alleged that thousands of illegal immigrants have flooded into Kosovo from Albania, and they, along with Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova, ought to be deported. Arkan emphasized that some 700,000 must be returned to Albania, and that only those who regard themselves as 'loyal citizens of Serbia' should be permitted to stay." *RFE/RL Daily Report*, May 2, 1994.

### Initiating Events

The explosive situation in Kosovo may blow up as a result of a number of factors. An illustrative scenario of one set of events that may stem from such a crisis could take the following form.<sup>2</sup>

After the stabilization of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a continued uneasy truce between Croatia and Serbia, the attention of the Serbian nationalists turns to Kosovo. The Serbian media launches a propaganda campaign asserting that Kosovo must be rid of its ethnic Albanian population. The Serbian ultranationalist paramilitaries step up their actions to intimidate the ethnic Albanians, while the Serbian government encourages ethnic Serbs to settle in Kosovo.

The terror/settler campaign is the last straw for the ethnic Albanians. Although they have been quiescent so far, for they recognize the overwhelming force on the side of the Serbs, the effort to drive them out of Kosovo altogether leaves them little choice but to resist. Major clashes take place in Pristina and other cities, with a heavy loss of life among the ethnic Albanians. Thousands of ethnic Albanians flee across the border to Albania and Macedonia, bringing with them stories of atrocities. Apparently, the bloodbath overshadows even the atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Albanian government launches an international effort to stop the fighting in Kosovo, but Russian objections to any international military effort in a constituent part of Serbia proper leads to only a condemnation of the action in the UN General Assembly. Albania attempts to provide some assistance and aid to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, and as a result, fighting between Albanian and Serbian armed forces erupts along the Serbian and Montenegrin border with Albania. The Albanian armed forces do poorly in combat against the Serbian military, and the fighting settles down to intermittent raids and shelling; the high mountains and poor infrastructure hampers any major cross-border military operations.

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<sup>2</sup>A situation somewhat similar to that in Kosovo, though less volatile, exists in Voivodina, a province within Serbia inhabited by a wide variety of ethnic groups but with a plurality of ethnic Hungarians.

As the extent of the fighting and atrocities in Kosovo leaks out, and as thousands of refugees cross into northwestern Macedonia from Kosovo, the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia also participate in attempts to aid their brethren in Kosovo. In addition, since the Serbs succeed in cutting off supply routes to Kosovo from Albania, northwestern Macedonia becomes the only available ground route for aid to reach Kosovo. It is also a route for ethnic Albanian volunteers (from Albania, Macedonia, and from among the refugees from Kosovo) to return to Kosovo to take part in the fighting.

In an attempt to cut off all aid to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Serbian armed units widely ignore the Serbian (Kosovo)-Macedonian border. Besides the fact that the boundary line between Macedonia and Serbia is new and remains mostly undelineated, the border runs through the southern part of the Sar mountains (a rugged and steep range with peaks reaching up to 9,000 feet), terrain that makes it difficult to control movement. Trying to intimidate the ethnic Albanians living on the Macedonian side of the border, Serbian paramilitaries carry out "punitive" raids on ethnic Albanian villages and refugee camps. Regular Serbian army units pursue groups of Albanians into Macedonian territory. Serbian aircraft also repeatedly stray into Macedonian territory and bomb communications choke points and refugee camps in northwestern Macedonia. The Serbian government denies responsibility for the intrusions, claims that it is respecting the border with Macedonia, and says the acts are the work of Albanians trying to provoke an intervention.

The ethnic Serb minority in Macedonia becomes aggressively assertive in calls for northern Macedonia's reincorporation into Serbia. The Macedonian government, distrustful of the ethnic Albanians and fearful of Serbian designs, is paralyzed. The inaction only radicalizes some of the political forces in Macedonia. The infant Macedonian military is ineffective in controlling northwestern Macedonia. Greece steps up measures designed to strangle Macedonia economically, and armed incidents on the Albanian-Greek border multiply. Groups of volunteers form in Bulgaria to aid their "Macedonian ethnic brothers." Turkey calls for a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. There are reports of Turkish "advisers" in Albania, and Turkish troops in eastern Thrace (near the Greek border) increase their readiness.

The UNPROFOR troops in Macedonia, including a U.S. contingent of 500 troops, suddenly find themselves in a war zone. A U.S. Army squad on patrol near Vaksince (just south of the Kosovo and Serbian borders) is ambushed and wiped out. A quick investigation shows that some of the troops had surrendered and then were murdered, execution-style. This is the third incident of UN troops taking casualties in two weeks: one caused by artillery fire, another because they strayed into a newly planted minefield. Albania and Serbia trade charges accusing each other of being responsible, but evidence points to a "Greater Serbia" paramilitary group associated with "Arkan," the accused war criminal. Amidst sporadic fighting, ambushes, intermittent shelling, and raids along the Serbian (Kosovo)-Macedonian border and among fears that a general Balkan war is about to break out, the UN Security Council (with Russia abstaining) responds to the Macedonian government's request and authorizes the strengthening of the UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia and gives them limited enforcement powers. Although the Greek government declares that it does not support the operation, the UN authorizes NATO to act as the regional organization in charge of the undertaking.

### **Likelihood of Occurrence**

The scenario has a moderate to high possibility of occurrence during the next five years. Probability of strife in Kosovo becomes greater as the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and along the Serb-Croat border decrease in intensity or settle to uneasy cease-fires. Any settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina will probably involve substantial population movements and, as has been the pattern with ethnic Serbs from Croatia (many of whom have been settled in formerly non-Serb housing in Voivodina or the parts of Croatia seized by Serbia), the Serb government will probably encourage some Bosnian Serbs to settle in Kosovo. Previous settler campaigns in Kosovo have not been successful, but the provision of greater incentives may elicit a response the next time around. The settler campaign could provide a spark to set off the conflict.

All of the important elements of the scenario are already in place, with only the spark missing. The idea of an ethnically homogeneous greater Serbia is a blueprint with wide support in Serbia, especially

among the current Serb leadership. Serbian paramilitaries already operate in Kosovo, and there is evidence of a widespread and officially sponsored campaign of intimidation against the ethnic Albanians. Serb atrocities in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been well documented over the past three years.

On the Macedonian side, the Macedonian military is starting almost from scratch, and it will take several years for it to be built up to a point where it would be able to secure northwestern Macedonia in the face of Serbian and Albanian armed activity. The UNPROFOR forces have been deployed in Macedonia since 1992; they operate in areas close to the Serbian and Albanian borders. If anything, the UN forces will be increased. There are no negative sensitivities to the presence of U.S. troops in Macedonia, making their reinforcement unproblematic from a host-state standpoint.

## THE U.S. INTERVENTION DECISION

### U.S. Interests

The main U.S. interest is the strategic concern to limit further Serbian aggression and to prevent a regional war that could easily lead to the unraveling of NATO. A lengthy and indecisive conflict in Macedonia is likely to lead to a regional war involving Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, with the latter two on opposite sides. If fighting between Greece and Turkey were to erupt, the war could mean the end of NATO in its present form. As NATO forms the basis for a U.S. presence in Europe and is among the most important, if not the most important, of U.S. alliance commitments, the United States would go to great lengths to keep the alliance from unraveling. In addition, a regional war of Balkan dimensions would have the potential of further stimulating the growth of ultranationalist forces in Russia, while the refugee flows would cause further social and political problems in Western Europe. The strong U.S. presence among the UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia is a recognition of the importance of preventing the spread of fighting to Macedonia. The unilateral U.S. warnings in 1992 to Serbia over launching an "ethnic cleansing" policy in Kosovo also should be seen in the light of preventing the spillover into Macedonia.

### **Arriving at the Decision**


The U.S. President issues warnings to Serbia that Serbian transgressions of Macedonian sovereignty will not be tolerated. The warnings follow repeated appeals by the Macedonian government for international assistance. The deaths of U.S. Army personnel lead the U.S. President to address the UN Security Council, where he requests that the UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia be increased and allowed to take on enforcement provisions. The U.S. President declares that the time has come to draw a line. Any Serbian armed intrusion into Macedonian territory will be treated as hostile and will be fired upon. As an indication of U.S. resolve on this point and the desire to punish those guilty of murdering U.S. servicemen, he offers a U.S. brigade and substantial air assets as part of a multilateral force to keep Macedonian sovereignty intact. He also asks that the UN designate NATO as the organization that would be in charge of UN operations in Macedonia.

Russia acts to insure that the UN forces will have no mandate to extend operations into Kosovo, and the Russian foreign minister blames the Albanians for the problems in northwestern Macedonia. Russia abstains from the vote. Greece declines to support the Security Council decision. France, Britain, Netherlands, and Spain all promise to send troops as part of the commitments; they emphasize that they will do so only if the troops are given enforcement powers. Canada hesitates in offering troops. The U.S. decision flow and intervention criteria are portrayed in Figure 5.

### **U.S./UN/Other Cooperation**

Besides the United States, the major NATO countries (except for Germany) would take a prominent role. The insertion of the troops would amount to a large reinforcement of the currently deployed UN task force. German participation, even in a logistics role, would be counterproductive, due to historical legacies. A large Italian role also could be problematic, so the Italian participation is limited to logistics and support tasks. Although Turkey would offer anything that NATO might need from it, its offer would be declined because of the regional problems Turkish participation would cause. France and Britain each would send two battalions. Spain and Netherlands each

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NOTE: Factors for participating in UN and other peace operations based on Clinton administration policy issued May 1994.

Figure 5—Macedonia Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria

would send one battalion. Greece would not cooperate, and Greeks would be seen as hostile by Macedonians and Albanians. Sweden and Finland each would provide a reinforced company. Poland (and perhaps Slovakia and the Czech Republic) might offer a mountain battalion. The West Slavic countries' role could be useful because of the common linguistic background, but their participation would be problematic because of communications and interoperability problems.

Bulgarian participation would not be welcome because of alleged Bulgarian designs on Macedonia; in any event, Bulgaria has declared that it will not participate in any peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

Russia asks that a Russian team be a part of a UN supervisory group in Skopje that would make sure the troops did not exceed their mandate. The proposal is refused in favor of periodic reports on the activities of the forces presented to the Security Council. U.S.-Russian tensions over the issue rise and lead to heated exchanges at the UN. U.S.-Greek relations become tense, as NATO and the European Union issue communiqués deploring the Greek action.

NATO's Commander in Chief, Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) directs the action. Troops are flown into Macedonia through Albanian airspace with Albanian concurrence. Some equipment and supplies are flown in, but most materiel is delivered overland using routes through Bulgaria, Albania, and (to the extent the Greeks will allow) Greece. A total of about 7,500 combat troops and an additional 7,500 support forces deploy to Macedonia. In addition, some 2,000 troops are assigned to operate and improve the supply route through Albania and 1,000 to operate the route through Greece. The headquarters of the operation is established in Skopje with a U.S. Army officer in command.

### **Needed U.S. Capabilities**

The mission requires logistics support to allow for extensive operations by a force equivalent to three brigades (of which one is a U.S. brigade). The emphasis is on extensive airmobile capabilities. As this is a NATO operation, English language is used throughout the intervention. Swedish and Finnish troops are not a problem on this

point. Interaction with Macedonian police, military, and government officials will necessitate substantial linguistic needs; fluency in Macedonian will be needed (though Bulgarian and/or Serbo-Croat proficiency would suffice in most cases). Albanian language skills would be useful in dealing with the local and refugee population in northwestern Macedonia. Serbo-Croat and Albanian linguistic capabilities would be needed in actual operations. In terms of special combat training, units trained in mountain warfare would have an advantage.

## **MISSION**

### **Mission Statement**

The operation would have the goal of upholding Macedonian sovereignty, especially in the northwestern part of the country, and preventing foreign encroachments into Macedonia. The President's statement describing the mission might read as follows:

"In response to the lawlessness in northwestern Macedonia and in reaction to the unprovoked murder of U.S. servicemen engaged in a UN-directed peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, today I have instructed the Secretary of Defense to take steps to implement the UN Security Council resolution and to prevent any armed foreign encroachments into Macedonia. I want to make this clear: no further Serbian aggression will be tolerated. The time has come to demonstrate our resolve. This means that the UN forces, operating through NATO, will be substantially strengthened and they will be given provisions to enforce the UN resolution. We deplore the events in Kosovo and we will not allow them to spread further. Anyone possessing arms in the border region is liable to being stopped and the weapons confiscated. Anyone using arms in the border region will be considered liable to being fired upon by the UN forces. This action has been requested by the government of Macedonia. This is a temporary mission that is undertaken because the Macedonian government cannot yet fulfill these functions. When the border is secure and the Macedonian authorities can take over the duties of effective border protection, we will review the reasons for the deployment. We do not envision that the U.S. presence in substantial numbers will be required for more than two years at the maximum. The Ser-

bian government claims that it respects Macedonia's sovereignty. If that is indeed the case, then Serbia has nothing to worry about concerning the UN-sponsored mission. In addition to the military response, we are preparing an emergency economic package to assist Macedonia, and we also will continue to be involved in the UN refugee relief effort in Albania and Macedonia."

During the U.S. planning leading up to the President's decision to step up the involvement in Macedonia, it is likely that the Army would voice concerns about the course of action that the intervening troops would be allowed to take if they faced fire from Kosovo territory. The Army would probably ask for an explicit answer from the political authorities to specify under what conditions the pursuit of Serb units across the border into Kosovo would be allowed. Any Albanian transgressions would be an especially difficult issue, in view of the fact that the United States would sympathize with the plight of the Albanians, but for reasons of mission effectiveness, it would strive to keep an image of objectivity. The Army would probably want the political authorities to specify beforehand any policy (informal or not) of differentiation regarding the Albanians.

### **Concept of Operations**

The concept of operations involves establishing battalion-strength NATO forces in sectors adjacent to the Macedonian border with Serbia and Albania. The main focus of operations would be on the Macedonian-Serbian (Kosovo) border; a lesser presence would be established on the Macedonian-Albanian border and the Macedonian-Serbia border proper. The units would engage in aggressive patrolling of the border area and in surveillance and interdiction of any armed group movements across the border. Any armed groups would be stopped, disarmed, and turned over to the Macedonian authorities. Anyone firing upon the NATO forces would be considered hostile; all necessary force would be used to suppress such opposition.

The logistics concept for this operation will be very complicated. Macedonia is land-locked, with poor land lines of communications other than into Greece. It is expected that Greece will reluctantly allow the use of Salonika for supply of the NATO force but would likely insist on control of the cargo to ensure that supplies are not being

brought in for the Macedonian economy. Since Greece could close this route at any time, full reliance on it would not be prudent. Hence, NATO will also open a supply route through the Albanian port of Durres and will assign a military engineer battalion as well as contract resources to improving the rail and road link into Macedonia (Durres-Urake road and rail links, then road transport to Ohrid and beyond in Macedonia). Some material will continue to be shipped on the circuitous rail route through Bulgaria to keep that open as well.

### **Consequences of Time-Bound Operations**

Subject to modification, this operation would have a two-year limit set on its duration. The reasoning behind the time limit is that two years should be enough time for Macedonia to build up its own capability to control its territory against armed incursions. Subject to parallel efforts, either by the United States and/or by proxy (Turkey), to build up the Macedonian military, the time limit should have no easily discernible and direct effect on the conduct of operations by NATO forces. It may be the case that as indigenous Macedonian capabilities grow, the UN-introduced units will be withdrawn earlier and replaced by Macedonian units.

### **Rules of Engagement**

In addition to having permission to fire in self-defense, units also will be authorized to stop, search, and interrogate anyone suspected of armed activity. Anyone entering Macedonia from Kosovo would be liable to be stopped and interrogated. Anyone attempting to escape being searched or refusing to stop may be considered hostile and may be fired upon. The decision will rest with the immediate commander on the ground. Any groups or individuals offering resistance will be suppressed and/or pursued if necessary.

### **Command and Control**

Direct channels would run from the UN Secretary General in New York to NATO SOUTHCOM, and from there to the intervening force headquarters in Skopje and then to the individual battalion head-

quarters in border sectors. The local communications infrastructure is poor and unreliable, making quick coordination with Macedonian officials difficult. A special Macedonian liaison team would be attached to the Skopje headquarters to ease cooperation.

## **U.S. ARMY PREPARATION FOR THE MISSION**

### **Priority Forces**

The highest priority would be on airmobile forces with mountain warfare training. Mountain-trained light infantry with attached lift would probably be the force of choice, but some armor and artillery support will be necessary. A Ranger unit for reaction forces and special missions would be desirable. An engineer battalion would be required to upgrade the route through Albania, but it would not need specialized training. Some communications support to other national detachments can be expected.

### **Support from Other Services**

Considerable airlift support will be required for the initial deployment. Given the long distances and tenuous nature of the land lines of communications, the U.S. Air Force will need to commit lift over the long term for critical items of resupply and be prepared to resupply the force entirely by air if events happen to affect all supply routes simultaneously. There is a lack of airports in Macedonia, which complicates the supply problem. In addition, substantial coordination from air traffic controllers would be required. A special problem with logistics would arise in the winter, when the communication lines through Albania would be almost impassable.

Because NATO would need to ensure Macedonian air space, some USAF assets would be based in Macedonia. To deal with the eventuality of the Serbs massing forces on the border with Macedonia, a substantial standby air capability (based in Italy) will be required. There should be no requirement for support by the U.S. Navy beyond the force that is normally committed to the Mediterranean.

### **Predeployment Training**

Familiarity with mountain warfare and operations in mountainous and forested areas will be important. If the intervention were to take place during the winter, substantial preparation for alpine ice and snow conditions would be necessary. Linguistic training in Serbo-Croat and in Albanian will be sorely needed. Familiarity with the basic elements of the Yugoslav breakup and the pattern of Serbian military actions since 1991, including the use of paramilitaries, would be useful for officers at all levels of the chain of command. Finally, troops would need to be aware of the pattern of ethnically based hostility among the national and ethnic groups in the region (i.e., why Greeks and Albanians and Macedonians generally do not trust each other or why Bulgarians sympathize with the Macedonians but the Macedonians distrust the Bulgarians).

### **Special Needed Capabilities**

The intervening forces will need the support capabilities to operate in a mountainous-forested area that has poor or nonexistent communications infrastructure. The presence of NATO personnel who had served with the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and have direct experience of observing Serb units would be useful.

## **TERMINATION OF INTERVENTION**

### **Successful Mission Completion**

**Determinants of success.** A reduction in the level of violent incidents in northwestern Macedonia carried out against the ethnic Albanians by Serbs and the elimination of uncontrolled border crossings between Kosovo and Macedonia would be the best indicators of success on the ground. Maintenance of Macedonian sovereignty and the prevention of the spread of the conflict in Kosovo to Macedonia (and the potential eruption of a regional war over Macedonia) would be the indication of success at the political level.

**Temptation to proceed to another mission.** There may be considerable pressure to expand the scope of the operations to Albania (i.e., to control the fighting on the Albanian-Serbian border). In addition, once the original intervention is successful, there may be pressure to use some of the forces deployed in Macedonia for any potential humanitarian operations in Kosovo.

The important point to keep in mind is that a success in preventing the spread of the Yugoslav conflict to Macedonia will not stop the Serb activities in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandzak, or Kosovo. As reports of Serb atrocities against the Muslims and/or Albanians continue, there is bound to be considerable support for using the forces in Macedonia to ameliorate some of the civilian suffering in Kosovo.

### **Termination Short of Mission Completion**

**Developments causing early termination.** The causes of early termination fall into four general categories: Serb-induced, Albanian-induced, Macedonian-induced, and a result of international pressures. Regarding the first category, the Serbian response to the intervention may be to up the ante. The Serbs may target the intervening forces with the specific aim of causing as many casualties as possible among the NATO troops. The effort may involve planting boobytraps, ambushes, and minefields. The effort may also be assisted by a terrorist campaign within Macedonia that would target the Skopje headquarters and NATO personnel in general. The dependency of NATO troops on airlifted supplies also opens up the possibility of Serbs downing some of the aircraft with man-portable surface-to-air missiles.

Regarding the second category, some Albanian groups may decide to harass the UN forces (and blame the Serbs for it) in order to deepen the UN involvement. Also, if the UN forces do interdict arms and ammunition from reaching the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo through Macedonia, then they will provoke the ire of ethnic Albanians, who will see them as an intervening force that simply aims to freeze the Serbian gains and cement the Serb advantage in place. In other words, what might happen is that the local ethnic Albanian population in northwestern Macedonia may come to consider the UN presence as contributing to fulfilling the Serbian designs.

Regarding the third category, it is far from a given that a Macedonian government will remain steadfast in its anti-Serb attitudes if there is fighting against the ethnic Albanians. Indeed, the Slavic-dominated Macedonian government is suspicious of its ethnic Albanian population, may be alarmed at the influx of ethnic Albanian refugees into Macedonia, and may strike an anti-Albanian deal with the Serbs. In such a case, the Macedonian government would ask the UN troops to leave Macedonia.

Finally, the survival of Macedonia as a sovereign state is far from given. Should the state begin to collapse, and should it become divided (peacefully or not) among Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania, the UN forces would be in limbo.

If the intervening forces face either a Serb escalation of effort or a sudden breakout of a regional war over Macedonia, they need to have sufficient air assets on hand (in bases in Italy) to allow them either to defeat the Serb efforts or to protect the UN forces while they are extricated from Macedonia.

**Hazards of early termination.** Early termination would probably entail the collapse of Macedonia as a sovereign state. Such a collapse would probably develop into a regional war, as the various neighbors would try to seize parts of Macedonia. One of the potential consequences of the intervention's failure would be the complete discrediting of collective security arrangements and a remilitarization by the Balkan countries. In retrospect, it probably will appear that a failed intervention was a marginally worse course of action than no intervention at all. The potential negative consequences could be as serious as the unraveling of NATO in its present form (as the institution would have shown itself incapable of dealing with post-Cold War conflicts) and perhaps an open conflict between Greece and Turkey.

## **POTENTIAL UNPLEASANT SURPRISES**

### **Events That Might Lead to Mission Evolution**

The mission could easily evolve to one of peace enforcement (organized actors). Should the Serbian government treat the intervention as a hostile move aimed against Serbia and if it ordered Serb

forces to increase the pressure on the intervening troops, *de facto* the mission would change. It would become one of UN forces engaged in combat operations against Serbian units in a given border zone. The resulting operations would resemble an interstate war against an adversary probably using irregular tactics. Since it is likely that such operations would spread to Kosovo (for example, strikes against artillery sites based on the Kosovo side of the border or the pursuit of some Serbian groups into Kosovo), the situation would resemble more a border war between UN forces and Serb units.

The mission could also evolve to one of peace enforcement (anarchy) or to foreign internal defense. Regarding the first option, the weakness of the Macedonian central government combined with the massive influx of refugees and a breakdown of local government could lead the local clans in northwestern Macedonia to take over a direct role in running the area. While the clans will probably unify in the face of Serb aggression, the chaos might also give them an opportunity to try to settle old scores with each other. The resulting situation would be akin to one of anarchy. UN troops then would be faced with considerable armed strife all around them. Regarding the second option, the mission could shift to U.S. support for Macedonian internal defense. As the Macedonian military takes on the tasks of ensuring the country's sovereignty, U.S. advice and support may be needed to make it effective.

### **Potential Evolution to Interstate Conflict**

Besides the evolution of the mission to a conflict against Serbia, the uncertain future of Macedonia presents a number of potential paths to an interstate conflict. Several of Macedonia's neighbors have not recognized it as a country and pursue policies that aim to subvert its future. Should Macedonia show signs of a collapse, Greece and Serbia would probably come to an agreement on its partition. Albania also could be involved in claiming the ethnic Albanian-inhabited western Macedonia. Bulgarian ultranationalists would like to see the incorporation of all of Macedonia into a greater Bulgaria. Turkey supports Macedonia, most of all because it sees Macedonia as a potential ally against Greece and Serbia. All of the intricate regional rivalries probably would lead to an armed conflict if Macedonia were seen as "up for grabs."

### **What Political Authorities Owe the Ground Commander**

Political leaders need to understand the precarious position of the UN troops if Macedonia shows signs of disintegration. They also need to keep in mind the too-easy transition from a peacekeeping/peace enforcement mission to full peace enforcement. The decision of mission evolution may be forced on the troops by the Serbs. U.S. military commanders need to make sure that the political leaders delegate power to them concerning the use of full force against Serb units that fire on UN troops.

### **BROAD IMPLICATIONS**

The mission in Macedonia outlined above would mean substantial U.S. Army operations against the Serbs. Because of the intervention's aim of upholding a new state, the difficult terrain of operations, and the patrolling and interdiction tasks against a supposedly cunning and determined guerrilla force, the intervention would elicit many comparisons with Vietnam. The internal U.S. debate over the strengthening of the deployment could be especially bitter and divisive, particularly since Greek leaders would portray the mission as going against Greek interests. The powerful Greek-American lobby might oppose the U.S. deployment.

The concentration of large airlift and air support capabilities in support of the Macedonian operation may diminish the ability to intervene in other, not easily accessible areas. How the commitment of the lift to Macedonia might cause a reduction in capabilities for another potential MRC must be examined before the intervention.

The missions that the U.S. Army may be called upon to perform in Macedonia and the potential consequences of inaction indicate a need to assist the building up of a Macedonian military. If the Macedonian military is strong enough, the UN might not need to intervene in the first place. This suggests that a greater U.S. effort to assist Macedonia is in order.

Finally, subject to potential NATO armed intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a NATO operation in Macedonia probably would be the first substantial combat operation for NATO since its inception.

This would mean changes in the organization, in order to square its activities with the "out-of-area" wording in NATO documents.

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**CASE STUDY: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AMID  
POST-COUP SOCIAL UNREST IN VENEZUELA**

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**FRAMING THE SITUATION**

**Intervention mission:** Combination of humanitarian relief and aspects of peace enforcement (anarchy).

**Region:** Western Hemisphere (Latin America).

**State:** Venezuela.

**Time frame:** 1995+ (increasing in probability with time, until 1998).

**Scenario actors:** Loyalist troops, rebel army troops, unions, students, local politicians, legislators, opportunistic ad hoc gangs, central government, security forces, unions, students, Organization of American States (OAS), the United States.

**Summary description:** A failed army coup, similar to the one in 1992, triggers prolonged urban unrest that exceeds the loyal Venezuelan military's ability to control. Urban centers decline into violence and chaos. Major industrial centers are threatened with takeover. After two months of fighting, the rebels and loyalists reach a cease-fire agreement and request humanitarian assistance from the OAS. An OAS-led mission to reestablish basic services and assist in the protection of oil production facilities follows. The United States provides a small contingent and some logistics support as part of the intervention force.

## BACKGROUND

### Historical Context

In February 1992, the Venezuelan army made an attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government and its president, Carlos Andres Perez. The attempt, led by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez Frias, struck a populist chord with broad segments of the population. Widespread unrest, including riots, strikes, and other coup attempts, followed the initial attempt.

Dissatisfaction appears to be rooted in diverse elements, including inflation, poverty, economic disparity, social policy, corruption, and government indifference. Historically, the Venezuelan military has not been politically neutral, and the coup attempt was an effort to reestablish its traditional role as a locus of political power.

In May 1993, Perez was indicted and impeached on charges of corruption. In December 1993, Venezuelans elected Rafael Caldera to the five-year presidential term. Caldera won the election by abandoning the COPEI (Independent Electoral Political Organizing Committee, also known as Social Christian) party, which he founded, and by securing the endorsement as candidate for 18 minor parties. Caldera now faces a badly divided parliament that will not face elections until he does in December 1998. Combined, Venezuela's two largest and increasingly centrist parties, Caldera's former COPEI and AD (Acción Democrática), control 63 percent of one chamber of the legislature and 53 percent of the other. Caldera's ability to pass legislation depends on support from the remaining three parties (Convergencia, Causa R, and Movement Toward Socialism [MAS]), all relatively leftist, and on support from dissident COPEI and AD members. Nevertheless, the election of Rafael Caldera appears to have calmed political tensions and, at least temporarily, doused the military's political ambitions.

Venezuela had erupted in turmoil once before in the recent past, in 1989. The Perez government implemented a much-needed austerity plan that eliminated many subsidies and exacerbated poverty conditions. Widespread rioting resulted shortly after the plan was announced.

### Initiating Events

The Venezuelan government is in a precarious position, and it is liable to fall, especially in view of the widespread dissatisfaction in the country. An illustrative scenario of one set of events that may trigger a government crisis and lead to open strife could take the following form.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout 1997 and into 1998, economic conditions in Venezuela continue to worsen. Inflation rates stabilize near record highs, and unemployment in most areas and among many segments of the population tops 30 percent. Privatization continues to add to the ranks of the unemployed, and thus to the public's dissatisfaction. The poor economic conditions occur amid charges of government mismanagement and corruption, particularly relating to the privatization of the Venezuelan oil industry. The electoral successes of the left and of the new national political parties encourage growth in radical political expression. But legislative action is stymied by the division of power between the five parties, and by Caldera's increasingly fragile health and inattention to political matters.

The Venezuelan military grows increasingly restive, not only because it is a victim of the unstable environment, but because the government appears incapable of addressing pressing national security issues, including the consequences of privatization, lingering border disputes, and the increasingly burdensome effects of drug trafficking. With few prospects for progress in most areas, key Venezuelan military leaders decide to intervene in order to stabilize the situation.

The coup attempt, substantially larger than the 1992 effort and involving 16,000–18,000 disloyal troops, is neither successful nor completely rebuffed. Two months of fighting leave both sides with victories. Two-thirds of the military (approximately 40,000 troops) remains loyal to the government, as does more than half of both legislative chambers. Numerous COPEI and AD legislators, however, support the coup. Additionally, coup leaders hold several police

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<sup>1</sup>Somewhat similar situations could occur in many other countries in the Caribbean basin and the northern part of South America. Many of the conditions in Venezuela are shared by other countries in the region.

units, military bases, television and radio stations, and secure public support in territory represented by the dissident legislators.

The lack of a clear resolution to the conflict triggers widespread civil unrest that neither the government nor the coup leaders are able to put down. Agitators seize opportunities to press their agendas. Rioting breaks out in the major cities, disrupting transportation links, public services, and economic activity in general. Some local authorities renounce loyalty to the federal government and usurp federal powers. Populist groups, unions, and students make various attempts to seize key industrial centers, including the oil production facilities.

With a stalemate developing after two months of intermittent fighting and unrest, and with growing dismay at the deterioration of social conditions, the neutral and key loyal legislators threaten to support the coup unless the government agrees to a cease-fire and a joint request with the coup leaders for outside assistance in restoring order. Fears for the territorial integrity of the country should the unrest continue also underlie the appeal. The government, fearful that it might succumb to the coup if the chaos continues, agrees to the demand. The coup leaders agree to the appeal for outside assistance in the belief that the length of the stalemate demonstrated the coup's strength, that the unrest had generated public support for a change of government, and that their support for the agreement indicates a recognition of their responsibility and interest in restoring stability and peaceful governance—important considerations in view of the expected negotiations with the central government. Consequently, both the coup leaders and the government of Venezuela agree to the cease-fire and jointly appeal to the OAS for assistance in resuming basic services and providing humanitarian assistance.

### **Likelihood of Occurrence**

Another, stronger (than in 1992) coup attempt has a low to moderate probability of occurring through 1998, with the greatest danger in latter 1998 and through 1999 (end of the current government's term and the beginning of the new government's term). The probability then decreases until the subsequent election cycle (2003). Elections are likely to be a turning point, not only because they tend to em-

phasize the failures of the current government, but because the new government may take dramatic actions that worsen the situation. In some sense, almost any path the new government chooses could worsen the situation. An austerity program could prompt a response similar to the 1989 violence, while a continuation of weak reform efforts could aggravate latent political pressures. The scenario could also unfold in the event that Caldera dies before his term is complete, not an unlikely occurrence given that his present age is 78.

A number of factors provide evidence of ongoing underlying tensions: severe divisions in the legislature with no clear power center, an aging president supported by a fragile, untested, and novice coalition, and a prolonged period of public dissatisfaction with reform efforts, punctuated by violent outbursts and coup attempts. The likelihood of improved economic conditions that would ease the tensions is low. The Venezuelan economy is still largely dependent on natural resource exports, particularly oil. These markets are historically volatile and will continue to buffet the Venezuelan economy. Privatization will only increase disaffection.

Although the United States has a history of unilateral interventions in Latin America, U.S. troops have not intervened in Venezuela. As such, there is no specific anti-U.S. animosity in Venezuela based on prior experience. The lack of animosity may contribute to an expectation of fewer problems.

## THE U.S. INTERVENTION DECISION

### U.S. Interests

Venezuela is an important strategic partner of the United States. Venezuela's role as a guarantor of regional security is a status that the United States has augmented through sales of military equipment, including F-16 aircraft. Venezuela provides stability in Central America and the Andean region through concessional oil sales and through its efforts to mediate regional conflicts. As one of Latin America's most prosperous economies and a country with a history of democratic governments, Venezuela also serves as an important example for the developing and democratizing countries in this region.

Additionally, the United States has a strong economic interest in Venezuela. It purchases about 8 percent of its oil imports from Venezuela, which amounts to more than 50 percent of Venezuelan oil exports. The United States would be concerned by any threat of unrest spreading to the Venezuelan oil fields and threatening disruptions in production. Western financial institutions hold large amounts of Venezuelan debt, both public and private. Lengthy unrest could cause financial problems for some Western banks.

### Arriving at the Decision

At the outbreak of the unrest, the Organization of American States convenes a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, followed by sessions of the OAS Foreign Ministers and the OAS General Assembly. Because of its strategic and economic interests, the United States plays a leading role in the deliberations. As it has on many other occasions, the OAS dispatches an unarmed observer force to Venezuela upon the commencement of hostilities. The OAS consultations are paralleled by convocation of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), an organization which, while part of the OAS budget, functions independently of the OAS and its suborganizations.

The OAS and IADB view the Venezuelan crisis as a genuine threat to hemispheric stability, a perception that precipitates a crisis at the OAS. Until the Venezuelan unrest, the OAS's statutory ability to use force as part of crisis resolution has been ambiguously stated. The situation was complicated by the IADB's quasi-independent powers and by the presence of the 1947 Rio Pact, which obligated the signatories to collective security. The Rio Pact had last been tested—and proved ineffective—during the Falklands War, when Argentina attempted to invoke its principles.

As a result of the hemispheric nature of the crisis and the Venezuelan government's appeal for assistance, the OAS in conjunction with the IADB moves quickly to provide military assistance under a joint intervention agreement. The intervention, sanctioned by the OAS and executed under the authority of the IADB, has at its core the extension of basic OAS peacekeeping principles. That is, the purpose of the intervention is to provide humanitarian relief while remaining neutral in the larger conflict between the coup leaders and the government. The distinction between the Venezuelan intervention and

previous OAS peacekeeping missions lies in the execution of the operation through the IADB, and the authorization of the mission to use force to protect itself.


The United States chooses to initiate the response through the OAS, rather than the United Nations, for several reasons. OAS-led assistance helps confine the crisis to the Western hemisphere, an outcome that a UN-based intervention does not accomplish. An OAS-led intervention helps isolate the crisis from other ongoing world tensions and from the UN's slow, and often indeterminate, efforts to resolve such matters. Second, OAS-based assistance keeps resolution of the crisis firmly grounded in an institution where the United States has a dominant role, not only through its influence in the OAS, but by virtue of its permanent leadership of the IADB.

The intervention decision meets with markedly little disapproval. Venezuela's immediate neighbors and the smaller Caribbean and Central American states all approve the OAS decision. Many of them are motivated by their reliance on concessional oil sales from Venezuela, and they hope that a quick resolution of the crisis will lead to the resumption of exports. In addition, they fear the longer-term consequences of the Venezuelan strife and worry that the example of a successful coup in Venezuela might encourage similar insurrections among their own military forces. The U.S. decision flow and intervention criteria are portrayed in Figure 6.

#### **U.S./UN/Other Cooperation**

The ideal makeup of the intervention force would consist of the major countries in the Western Hemisphere, thus limiting the U.S. role and visibility. The major contributors to the contingency might include Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and Costa Rica. Colombia's absence from the force, due to its ongoing border disputes with Venezuela, is notable because of its military's large size and experience in urban and riot-control operations. OAS solicits a Mexican contribution but the request is rejected by the Mexican government, which continues its policy of not committing its forces abroad. A Canadian might be a good candidate to be in charge of the intervention forces. The intervening forces are inserted in several Venezuelan urban settings and in the oil-producing region. The high command of the force is set up in Caracas.

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NOTE: Factors for participating in UN and other peace operations based on Clinton administration policy issued May 1994.

Figure 6—Venezuela Decision Flow and Intervention Criteria

### **Needed U.S. Capabilities**

The main requirement of the Venezuelan government is reinforcement of its security forces to help it restore order. Hence, the intervention forces need to be local security and police forces rather than large or heavy combat forces. To the maximum extent feasible, these forces should be Spanish-speaking and have had an extensive orientation on the roots of the Venezuelan strife. Their main concern will be to increase security without arousing animosity. Extensive logistics, transport, and communications assistance will be necessary. Much of this must come from the United States and/or Canada but will be provided as unobtrusively as possible to avoid the impression that the operation is being controlled by the United States. Altogether, the total U.S. Army commitment to the operation would consist of a force equivalent to two battalions.

### **MISSION**

#### **Mission Statement**

The primary mission of the intervention would be to provide humanitarian relief to Venezuelan urban and industrial centers. The participating forces would provide logistics and noncombat support to international relief agencies. Additionally, the OAS contingent will provide logistics and noncombat support to neutral Venezuelan security forces whose responsibilities include restoring civic order and protecting potential assets and targets, such as oil fields and industrial installations. The U.S. President's statement describing the mission might take the following form:

"The United States has agreed to participate, as part of an OAS force, in providing humanitarian assistance to the Venezuelan population affected by the recent unrest in that country. The mission is being undertaken in response to a request by both the loyalist and rebel sides in the Venezuelan strife. The joint request seems to be the first step toward the resolution of the violence in Venezuela. Fulfilling the request shows the U.S. commitment to the democratic process in Venezuela, our concern for the population of Venezuela, and our support for a further constructive role for the OAS. The mission is temporary and we anticipate that the effort will be scaled down after six months."

During the U.S. planning leading up to the President's decision to participate in the intervention, it is likely that Army officials would voice concerns about the course of action if the political situation in Venezuela were to change. The Army also would want an explicit answer from the political authorities regarding the authorization of force if the troops guarding fixed installations were to come under organized attack.

### **Concept of Operations**

The OAS forces assigned will supplement the Venezuelan security forces, but they will avoid any appearance of supplanting them. Hence, the OAS forces will concentrate on the security of fixed sites and on border patrol, letting the Venezuelan forces thus relieved accomplish the more visible activities of restoring order and services in urban areas. The OAS security forces will have Venezuelan liaison available at all times to conduct negotiations or to provide a government cover for OAS actions. Transportation and technical support for the restoration of services will be provided by civilian employees or contractors, with military personnel used only in emergencies.

### **Consequences of Time-Bound Operations**

This operation would have an expected duration of six to eight months, and it would not last more than a year. By that time, the parties to the conflict in Venezuela would be expected to come to an agreement and the rationale for the foreign forces would disappear. A specific time limit, communicated openly prior to the intervention, would not be advisable because it could act as a disincentive to the negotiations between the rebel and loyalist forces in Venezuela.

### **Rules of Engagement**

The OAS forces protecting fixed sites may use deadly force only to protect themselves from serious bodily harm. Lesser means of force such as riot batons may be used as a last resort when necessary to accomplish the security mission. Venezuelan forces will operate un-

der the rules of their own government but will be encouraged to follow the OAS example. The OAS forces on border-protection duties will have less restrictive rules of engagement.

### **Command and Control**

Since the primary mission is the restoration of calm and order in the Venezuelan territory, all actions will at least appear to be coordinated with both of the main combatants in Venezuela. The OAS will establish a coordination cell in Caracas to coordinate military and civilian activities, and subordinate cells may be established in other locations as appropriate. These cells will be clearly identified as coordination mechanisms to avoid the appearance of outside control. Intervening military units will have liaison officers in charge of coordinating their actions with local authorities, but they will remain under national command.

## **U.S. ARMY PREPARATION FOR THE MISSION**

### **Priority Forces**

The highest-priority U.S. Army units for this operation will be helicopter transport and communications units. Since SOUTHCOM has only a limited number of such assets, the Army will have to work with USACOM to select units from CONUS for the operation. There will also be a need for individuals with a Latin American background (Venezuelan to the extent possible) for liaison and other missions.

### **Support from Other Services**

The relative proximity of Venezuela and the limited commitment of U.S. assets limits the requirement for other service support. Deployment support from the U.S. Air Force will be necessary, and supply within the country may require the assignment of a few C-130 airlift aircraft. Navy and Marine Corps support will be limited to that required in the event of an emergency evacuation.

### **Predeployment Training**

There will be a limited requirement for predeployment training, and that training will concentrate on the background of the conflict and cultural sensitivities.

### **Special Needed Capabilities**

This operation will require little in the way of special capabilities. The missions to be performed will be routine, and there is no shortage of Spanish-language capability within the U.S. Army.

## **TERMINATION OF INTERVENTION**

### **Successful Mission Completion**

**Determinants of success.** The mission will have been accomplished successfully if (a) basic services, including water, electricity, banking, and schools resume functioning, (b) Venezuelan authorities take over full responsibility for maintaining civil order (this assumes some form of resolution of the conflict between government and coup leaders), and (c) Venezuelan authorities recognize that foreign assistance is no longer needed.

**Temptation to proceed to another mission.** There may be some temptation to proceed to a peace-building mission in the aftermath of an agreement between the loyalist and rebel Venezuelan forces. However, such a mission would imply a low level of effort.

### **Termination Short of Mission Completion**

**Developments causing early termination.** The political situation in Venezuela will be a matter of deep uncertainty. Another, successful coup might lead to early termination of the intervention, since the new government would likely request that the foreign troops leave. Presumably, the joint request for foreign assistance will imply a consensus among the loyalist and rebel forces not to let the situation worsen, but the consensus will be liable to break down. A worsening of unrest, progressing toward civil war, that poses a threat to the se-

curity of contingent forces (but falls short of coup) might force an early termination.

**Hazards of early termination.** Early termination would probably signal transfer of control from civilian authorities to a military junta. This could lead to the emergence of a situation in which international pressure fails to reverse a coup and an international embargo worsens conditions for noncombatants (essentially similar to what has happened in Haiti). Such an event would mark the first major reversal of democratization trends among the major Latin American countries.

## **POTENTIAL UNPLEASANT SURPRISES**

### **Events that Might Lead to Mission Evolution**

The potential unpleasant surprises revolve around the aftermath of a breakdown in the consensus between the loyalists and rebels in Venezuela. This would change the initial circumstances that led to the request for foreign assistance, and it could lead to the intervening forces being caught amid open combat and could force an evolution of the mission toward peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (anarchy), or a withdrawal. One path that may lead to mission evolution could be a strategy of deliberate attacks by either side on the intervening troops in an attempt to force their withdrawal. The foreign forces engaged in protection of fixed sites, such as oil production facilities, may be especially vulnerable to ambushes. The rationale for such an action could stem from dissatisfaction with the progress in negotiations. Besides a deliberate targeting of the intervening troops, there is also the potential for their being caught in a crossfire stemming, for example, from another coup attempt and a flareup into brief but intense fighting.

If the loyalist-rebel negotiations do not produce a solution and the conflict becomes prolonged, the social and economic infrastructure may deteriorate to the point where the initially ad hoc gangs become organized into (intrastate) regional alliances, power centers, and command organizations. Should an organization of such a type become dissatisfied with the foreign presence and request the departure of the intervening troops from the territory it controls, the whole mission might be placed in jeopardy.

### **Potential Evolution to Interstate Conflict**

The most likely scenario is one in which Colombia uses confusion and disorder to make good on its claims on Venezuelan territory. This territory, which includes mineral-rich portions of the Gulf of Venezuela, has long been in dispute, and military forces have been deployed in the past in preparation for armed conflict. Additionally, Venezuela maintains strong concerns about permeation of the Venezuelan/Colombian border by guerrillas, drug traffickers, and illegal immigrants. Such a conflict is most likely only in the absence of an international intervention, or in the case of early termination.

### **What Political Authorities Owe the Ground Commander**

Political authorities owe close attention to the situation on the ground and quick action, as needed, to pressure the rebels and the loyalists into continued negotiations should the process begin to falter. Involvement in a peaceful resolution of the Venezuelan strife provides the best insurance that the intervening troops will not be endangered through the deterioration of the initial consensus that led to the deployment of the troops in the first place.

### **BROAD IMPLICATIONS**

A successful resolution of the Venezuelan crisis with a multilateral OAS-organized military intervention has the potential to expand the exercise of OAS authority in lesser crises throughout the hemisphere. That is, the crisis and the mechanism chosen to address it could lead to a period of hemispheric activism as other, lesser, events are viewed through the prism of Venezuela. The result could be increased commitments for the U.S. Army in the Western Hemisphere, but also a growing effectiveness in dealing with regional instability.

From a different perspective, the use of OAS instead of the UN may lead to the strengthening of the regional forum at the expense of the global one, possibly undermining some of the authority of future UN missions in the hemisphere.

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