

CAREER PROGRESSION IMPACT ON ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT  
CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED SOLDIERS AS A RESULT OF  
A CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITIES RESTRUCTURING  
WITHIN THE ARMY

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

CAREER PROGRESSION IMPACT ON ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED SOLDIERS AS A RESULT OF A CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITIES RESTRUCTURING WITHIN THE ARMY, by MAJ Johnnie E. Edmonds, 74 pages.

Past and future mobilizations and deployments have placed an immense strain on the current capabilities of the Army's Civil Affairs forces. That has resulted in a recognized need for additional Civil Affairs structure and capabilities in the Army's Active Component. Since 96 percent of the Army's Civil Affairs structure and capabilities reside in the Army Reserve the problems of access, operational tempo and responsiveness have created a new requirement for additional Active Component Civil Affairs structure and capabilities. Although the actual number of forces impacted is small in the grand scheme of things, it can provide a potential picture of how this type of low-density capability might be increased in future force structure type efforts. Initially the investigator had anticipated finding that this new requirement would have significant career progression impacts on both Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted. Therefore, the study was designed to identify and assess the impacts, but the lack of documentation regarding clearly defined proposals and career progression models hampered both identification and assessment of how realigning a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component might affect career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted. As a result the investigator concluded that the absence of formal information, discussion and guidance regarding the alignment of capabilities is a clear indication that Civil Affairs, Active or Reserve Component, career progression has not attained the level of visibility and importance that it demands.

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## ACRONYMS

AAR	After-Action Report
AC	Active Component
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AR	Army Regulation
ARAD-MD	Army Reserve Active Duty-Management Directorate
ARNG	Army National Guard
CA	Civil Affairs
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAR	Chief Army Reserve
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CONUS	Continental United States
CSA	Chief of Staff - Army
CZ	Combat Zone
DA	Department of Army
DOD	Department of Defense
EAC	Echelon Above Corps
FA	Functional Area
FM	Field Manual
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism

HA	Humanitarian Assistance
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
JP	Joint Publication
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPCON	Operational Control
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PMO	Personnel Management Officer
POE	Posture of Engagement
POTUS	President of the United States
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SDTE	Swiftly Defeat the Effort
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
TAADS	The Army Authorization Document System
TACON	Tactical Control
TG	Technical Guide
TM	Technical Manual
TPU	Troop Program Unit
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command

TSP	Theater Security Plan
US	United States
USA	United States of Army
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command
USACAPOC	United States Army Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Command
USAFMSA	United States Army Force Management and Structure Agency
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve Components today is not the best for the future. We need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve Components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce the strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process. (Rumsfeld 2003)

Army Current and Future forces must be able to project the appropriate military capability anywhere in the world, as rapidly as possible, to conduct operations in support of both the *2002 National Security Strategy* and the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Cohen 2001). This study examines personnel issues, specifically regarding career progression resulting from a realignment of Civil Affairs capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components of the Army.

#### Background

The recent mobilizations and deployments of United States Army Reserve forces in conjunction with Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have put an immense strain on the USAR mobilization/deployment process. In most cases, the process has failed to be effective, efficient, and responsive to the requirements outlined in the *2002 National Security Strategy* and *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* as they execute the Global War on Terrorism. The existing mobilization-deployment process was designed to meet the requirements of the *2002 National Security Strategy*, the *1997 National Military Strategy* and the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* in a much more deliberate under the assumption that time would be an asset to the forces of the United

States. When in reality there was no time to conduct preparation efforts once the Global War on Terrorism was embarked upon. The initial operational tempo has been a sprint, much faster than the existing mobilization-deployment process was ever designed to withstand. The Chief of the Army Reserve, LTG James R. Helmly, has on multiple occasions indicated that the current mobilization process is "agrarian" (Helmly 2003) in its effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness. Quite simply, it is not adequate to meet the operational tempo of the United States Army Reserve in today's Global War on Terrorism.

Many of the significant mobilization challenges stemmed from the existing mobilization-deployment process required by federal law to mobilize and deploy reserve soldiers and activate and mobilize and deploy reserve units. Both federal law and the existing force structure of the United States Army Reserve require a longer, more deliberate process to successfully activate and mobilize and deploy reserve soldiers and reserve units. As a result of recent comments and directives made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the new Chief of Staff Army, General Schoomaker, conduct a study to determine what capabilities must be realigned back into the Active Component to achieve the 'proper mix'. The obvious overarching reason for the Department of Defense directed study is to determine a method to increase the capability accessibility window for Department of Defense to access Army capabilities, while simultaneously responding to the high and rapid operational tempo developed to conduct the Global War on Terrorism. In other words, the Reserve Component possesses certain high demand and mission critical capabilities such as Civil Affairs and the accessibility to those capabilities is continuously hampered by a lengthy and deliberate mobilization-deployment process.

A requirement to meet this objective is to minimize (shorten) the United States Army Reserve activation-mobilization-deployment process required to bring reserve soldiers or reserve units on active duty for a specific operation or period of time. Again, this is another way to say an increase of Department of Defense's accessibility window for Army Civil Affairs capabilities is the driving reason for the study and any realignment of capabilities.

The Global War on Terrorism is an unconventional war requiring more focus on the unconventional skills offered by United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne). The Global War on Terrorism began in Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom and continues with Operation Iraqi Freedom and beyond. In many prior operations (Operation Just Cause, Operation Promote Liberty, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, various hurricane relief efforts and multiple Humanitarian Assistance efforts), Civil Affairs has an integral part of the operation and theater strategy. As a subordinate command and capability to United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), located at Ft. Bragg, N.C., Civil Affairs is on the leading edge of every operation and mission required to support the *2002 National Security Strategy* and the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* in current and future operations.

Since Global War on Terrorism is not a conventional war and will not be fought as such, the battlefield may be an urban setting, with many civilians in extremely close proximity, if not directly involved with the fighting. In this type of environment the Civil Affairs capability is absolutely critical to ensure that military forces only fight true

combatants and do not create combatants through misinterpreted actions or intentions on the battlefield.

Humanitarian Assistance efforts are another example of Civil Affairs augmentation to a commander. Humanitarian Assistance efforts fall largely into the preemptive action category, attempting to maintain a state's political-economic capacity to self-govern. Civil Affairs teams are working throughout Afghanistan, digging wells, rebuilding schools, bridges and hospitals. To fully understand and appreciate the importance of Civil Affairs capability, it is not a stretch of the imagination to say that "Civil Affairs soldiers are the field commander's link to the civil authorities in his area of operations" (Fort Bragg Public Affairs Office, 2002). The criticality of the Civil Affairs capability to the modern day combatant commander is quite obvious. If the combatant commander is to be able to effectively, efficiently and successfully achieve the mission, all of the necessary capabilities must be readily available.

Providing the capability of nation-building is a difficult task when the following fact is taken into consideration, "about 96 percent of United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)'s approximately 10,000 [Civil Affairs soldiers and positions] are in the Reserve Component and are located in 25 states" (Fort Bragg Public Affairs Office, 2002). Those commands are the 350th, 351st, 352nd and the 353rd Civil Affairs Commands. Each has subordinate brigades and battalions. The lone active duty Civil Affairs battalion is the "96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), with six companies" (Fort Bragg Public Affairs Office, 2002), also located at Ft. Bragg, N.C. The primary problem is that Department of Defense and the Army have a critical capability (Civil Affairs) structured in a component that is not readily available

for current day operations in the Global War on Terrorism. However, the remedy for this problem is realignment and restructuring of both forces, United States Army Reserve and United States Army. Restructuring and realignment will require mountains to move in respective political arenas. In addition, it will require that layers of force structure process be slimmed down to the absolute bare minimum or completely reengineer the force structure process to be more responsive to current day operations.

In order to continue to effectively support the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review, it is critical to understand the impact of such massive capability realignment on the personnel management system currently in place. Additionally, it is important to develop a career path model for current Civil Affairs soldiers, while beginning to understand the immediate and potential future impacts of any realignment.

### Research Questions

The primary question to be answered is how realigning a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component might impact the career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted? In order to answer the primary question, some secondary questions must be answered first by this thesis. The secondary questions are as follows:

1. What portion of United States Army Civil Affairs capabilities will be realigned from the Reserve Component to the Active Component?
2. What model for career progression existed for Civil Affairs soldiers (officer and enlisted) before realignment?

3. What model(s) of career progression (officer and enlisted) have been proposed in the realignment plans?

4. How do the existing and proposed career progression models for Civil Affairs soldiers (officer and enlisted) differ?

### Assumptions

In order to sufficiently address the primary research question of how realigning a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component impacts the career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted, several assumptions are necessary to make. The following is a list of assumptions that seem necessary to make in order to conduct this research. They are as follows:

1. Some Civil Affairs capability will remain in the Reserve Component after realignment Civil Affairs capabilities from Reserve Component to Active Component.

2. After the proposed realignment is completed, there are no other realignments expected in the foreseeable future.

3. Stable and predictable career progression is a significant factor in recruitment and retention of Civil Affairs soldiers

4. Retention of Civil Affairs soldiers and capabilities is critical in maintaining military effectiveness

### Definition of Terms

This section will identify key terms the reader must fully understand to better comprehend their criticality as it relates to the primary research question.

1. Career progression for the purposes of this research is defined as upward advancement potential by means of a significant quantity of higher-grade positions that

offer opportunity for advancement to the next higher grade for the soldiers currently in lesser grades.

2. Career model for the purposes of this research is defined as identification of specific assignment types that must be completed in order to achieve the highest promotion potential possible.

3. Capability realignment for the purposes of this research is defined as the reallocation of force structure from one Army Component to another to enhance the access and level of capabilities residing within that specific Army Component.

#### Limitations

This was designed to address the impact of realignment as it relates to the personnel management system for the Army's Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted. Specifically the study focuses on examination of career progression. The undertaking of this research project comes with some inherent limitations that must be known or stated from the outset. The limitations of the research being conducted are as follows:

1. Limited time available to conduct in depth research
2. Availability of and access to information: Classified information will not be used in this research
3. Researcher's limited experience
4. Lack of documentation and description of realignment proposals from higher levels of the Army.
5. Lack of a determination of what career models will be used in the realignment plan.

6. Potential bias because investigator believes insufficient attention is paid to career progression.

### Delimitations and Scope

The primary question of what career progression impact on Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs officer and enlisted soldiers will be the result of a Civil Affairs capabilities restructuring within the Army, is focused simply because the time available, information available and the overall scope of research required of such a realignment are far greater than the resources available to this researcher. For this purpose the primary question was focused on how realigning a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component might impact the career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted. To better understand the complexity of this research and the general importance of the issue of career progression, it is necessary to explain it by using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, People and Facilities (DOTMLPF) model. The nature of a realignment or restructuring requires vast amounts of organization and operational procedures be examined for relevance and improvement or adjustment. Additionally, the relevance of existing material (equipment), doctrine, training methodologies, leader development methodologies, facilities, and people. While people are the heart of the Army and most organizations, it is not uncommon for the career progression of those people to be overlooked or at best the last item to be addressed.

### Significance

The significance of the issue of career progression is simple. The United States has an all-volunteer professional military and the lack of career progression or the

illusion of a unstable career path will have significant adverse impacts on retention, morale, professionalism and effectiveness of the all-volunteer force. Although, the Civil Affairs community is small and the initial impact could be minimal in this time of changing and emerging threats to national security. Realignment will probably be required at some resulting in another shift in career progression, model or path. Society rewards professional education, professional competency and professionalism by means of promotion in grade, status and finances and a stable career path is the key to maintaining military effectiveness and dominance in an asymmetric world of threats with the very best professionals possible. The inability to develop and maintain a stable system for career progression for all professions within the military will force the best and the brightest soldiers to go elsewhere and effectively reduce overall effectiveness and ultimately limit the military's ability to ensure the *2002 National Security Strategy* and *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* are implemented. It is only in the event of a re-instituted draft will the same level of professionals will be in service regardless of career progression.

### Summary and Conclusion

Realigning a portion of the Reserve Component's Civil Affairs capability or development of more Civil Affairs force structure into the Active Component is critical to the *2002 National Security Strategy* and *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*. Therefore, it is critical to consider what the career progression impact of such realignment or restructuring would be. Impacts on the military personnel management system should demand the first priority of those in charge and certainly should be the first elements of the implementation plan to be developed. It is simplistic, but true to state without soldiers

there is no requirement to realign or restructure a force. If a soldier determines that career progression is not available in a line of work, the soldier will go elsewhere.

Soldiers demand senior leaders act within the guides of a future vision and educated analysis of future threats to the security of this nation, and soldiers are essential to military effectiveness. Soldiers are critical to the success of any future plans in those visions. Therefore, it should be obvious that career progression is a critical element of the Army's military effectiveness and should be a paramount concern to senior leaders.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this study is to examine how realigning a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component might impact the career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted.

To develop a better understanding of any anticipated impacts a realignment of capabilities may have on the Civil Affairs soldier's career progression, it is critical to understand how the present system developed as it is known today.

The Civil Affairs branch of the Army originated as Military Government during World War II to meet requirements for military specialists to administer areas liberated from German and Japanese occupation and to govern areas in Germany and Japan occupied by the U.S. Army during and after the war. Military personnel with appropriate civilian skills and education were formed into military government units to assure law and order and provide essential services to the populations of territories administered by the United States Army. After World War II, these units were renamed "Civil Affairs". "In its postwar mission of military government in Germany, Japan and Italy, United States Army Civil Affairs became the world's model for maintaining stability, restarting democratic civilian governments and preventing future wars " (Bingham, Rubini, Cleary, 2003). "By the early 1960s, almost all (96 percent) of the Army's Civil Affairs capability was in the Army Reserve, where it remains today. This was (and remains) appropriate because the professional competence of Civil Affairs personnel is derived principally from their civilian careers." (Bingham, Rubini, Cleary, 2003).

United States Army Civil Affairs have been involved with every operation since its establishment in World War II, everything from Korea, Panama-Operation Just Cause, Kuwait-Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti-Operation Uphold Democracy, Bosnia, Afghanistan-Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraq-Operation Iraqi Freedom (Bingham, Rubini, Cleary, 2003). The United States Army Civil Affairs' critical involvement in every operation since World War II and certainly every operation in the future significantly emphasizes the importance of this capability to the combatant commander and the Quadrennial Defense Review (postwar). The criticality of this capability demands a sense of urgency to develop, implement and debug the restructuring and realignment or multiplication of this capability as relates to the future employment of United States forces and implementation of this country's military strategy.

Civil Affairs capabilities development and realignment continue to receive focused attention at the highest levels of the United States Government. In a recent briefing to President Bush, increasing Civil Affairs capabilities was highlighted as a target area of the divestiture from the Cold-War force structure (Schoemaker, 2004). Restructuring and realignment and Development proposals are classified and are not readily available for the purposes of this manuscript. As yet no such document has been published or released to the public. However, multiple potential scenarios regarding realignment and development of Civil Affairs capabilities can be produced and war-gamed to reasonably determine their respective impact.

To date, many publications have proclaimed the criticality of the Reserve Component and the role(s) it plays the collective national defense of the United States. Yet the only available published documents that identify a restructuring and realigning

plan regarding the Reserve Component (Army Reserve and National Guard) are the 1994 Department of Defense's "plan to align Army roles and missions based on Reserve Component Core competencies" (Bockel, 2004) and the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative. Access to current details on restructuring and realignment plans is not possible.

Impacts on career progression for both the officer and enlisted Civil Affairs soldier initially appear to be in several broad categories: Personnel Management (assignments, promotions, professional education, retention), Training Management (Training and Doctrine Command's ability to sustain training, retraining and sustaining of the force's skills), Allocation of Resources (what level element of the Army will be allotted Civil Affairs capabilities for specific operations) and specific equipment and funding levels (required to achieve effectiveness of Civil Affairs capability).

It does not appear that Civil Affairs soldiers' career progression is an area of focus for senior leaders. Multiple interviews and briefings have demonstrated that senior leader focus is on realigning Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component to the Active Component for use in the Global War on Terrorism. While that is an important mission, it is equally important to consider the career progression impacts to the soldiers called on to conduct the mission.

Since approximately 96 percent of the Army's Civil Affairs capabilities reside in the Army Reserve, it would seem that the Chief of Army Reserve, would have more than a passing interest in the career progression impact. However, during a recent interview the Chief of Army Reserve, LTG Helmly addressed the topic of force structure, among other things and LTG Helmly acknowledged that "our units and our organization is out of balance with the reality of the Global War on Terrorism " (Helmly, 2004), but he does

not address the career impacts of a restructuring and realignment of Civil Affairs capabilities. The fact that the Chief of Army Reserve did not mention the critical area of career progression only suggests that the restructuring and realignment plan had not yet been published or fully developed. Much more so than many other senior leaders, LTG Helmly is extremely sensitive to the impact on the soldier in the face of broad changes such as workload, family readiness, civilian employer rights and career progression within the Army.

Another senior leader who seems to have a significant interest in Civil Affairs soldier career progression is the Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Peter Schoomaker. GEN Schoomaker has extensive background in the special operations environment, an environment that almost exclusively relies on the retention, professionalism, competency and care given to soldiers to accomplish some of the most demanding missions required of the nation's military. So it is no stretch to think that soldier care, which includes soldier career progression, should play an integral part in just about everything that he does, says and touches. However, in both an interview in the *Wall Street Journal* (Jaffe, 2003) and sworn testimony to the United States House Armed Services Committee, GEN Schoomaker did not mention the career progression impacts of realignment of capabilities from the Reserve Component to the Active Component. During his United States House Armed Services Committee testimony, GEN Schoomaker talked about the temporary increase in force structure end strength. GEN Schoomaker referenced reserve forces when he stated, "one promising way of boosting active duty end strength is by convincing reservists to go full time. Schoomaker's restructuring plans call for moving critical Reserve specialties, such as military police, Civil Affairs and psychological

operations to the active side (Maze, 2004). In a recent *Wall Street Journal* interview GEN Schoomaker spoke about the need for conducting and completing this all-important restructuring and realignment of the force. GEN Schoomaker further mentioned not having "Single Event Soldiers" any longer and having a more modular force to deal with the rising sea of threats that face the United States in the Global War on Terrorism (Jaffe 2003). However, the article does not mention career progression impacts on the Civil Affairs soldiers, or any other soldiers affected by the realignment and restructuring. As in many of the other articles written on the restructuring and realignment of the Army, much of the details of how this will actually work are not available. Either because they are in the realm of the super-secret or they have not yet been fully developed. Certainly, the Chief of Staff, Army has identified career impact and many other areas as critical to the success of any restructuring and realignment plan and the long-term health and effectiveness of the Army as a whole.

Certainly other senior leaders are less affected by the impacts realignment will have on the Civil Affairs soldiers' career progression. But they should be concerned about career progression for all soldiers. During a recent briefing on "Building Army Capabilities" to the President of The United States, the area of Civil Affairs was highlighted as a target area for increased strength through restructuring of other Army capabilities (Schoomaker 2004). Certainly it is not normal to expect that the President of the United States would be briefed on the actual career impact of such a restructuring and realignment effort. However, it is of significant concern that the area of career progression was not even addressed, if for no other reason than to make known that it had been addressed and was being worked.

The future leaders of the nation's Armies, Corps, Divisions and Brigades, those who will be Combatant Commanders, attend the United States Army War College. At the United States Army War College the future visions of the military are created and plans are developed to address growing and emerging threats. In a recent United States Army War College publication, LTC Robert W. Lindemann (Lindemann, Traylor, Tussing Kievit 2003) specifically addressed a proposed "protected category" status for Reserve Component soldiers as it relates to civilian employers, endorsed "accepting the Reserve [Component] chain of command certification of Soldier Readiness Processing and pre-deployment training, while maintaining overall training readiness oversight with the Active Component," (Lindemann, Traylor, Tussing Kievit 2003) and recommended that the Reserve Component be trained beyond its core competencies and accept a "Multiple Mission approach" (Lindemann, Traylor, Tussing Kievit 2003). The authors addressed only one area that seemed to be directly related to the restructuring and realignment impact on career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers. They mentioned that the Army should be "continu [ing] to resolve high-demand and low-density imbalances in the current force structure such as Civil Affairs and military police through Active Component and Reserve Component rebalancing and increased personnel and training readiness" (Lindemann, Traylor, Tussing Kievit 2003). This effort still fell short of addressing the career progression areas that are sure to garner the most attention from the Civil Affairs soldiers, both Active Component and Reserve Component once the ink has dried on the restructuring and realignment effort being considered for implementation, unless the career progression questions and concerns can be satisfactorily answered prior to implementation of any realignment plan.

In today's Internet-based global-media environment, much of what Army senior leaders plan, say and do or do not do becomes material for the service publications. The realignment of Army capabilities has garnered much attention and publicity from these publications over the past few months. In a couple of recent articles and interviews, the topics of realignment and how the Reserve Component should be used were discussed. COL (Ret) John O'Shea, Acting Director, Army Affairs, Reserve Officers Association, remarked that "The demand for certain types of units to meet the mission requirements of the Global War on Terrorism is higher in some than others; Military Police, Civil Affairs, Military Intelligence, Transportation and Biological Detection and Surveillance capabilities are the highest in utilization. Army Reserve capabilities in Civil Affairs and Medical support have been frequently cited as two of many examples of over-reliance on the Reserve. The Army Reserve has been able to meet the challenges to date, but structure change is required to meet the continuing demand for these skill-rich capabilities that are more practical to sustain in a Reserve force" (O'Shea 2003). COL (Ret) O'Shea's comments display an awareness of the criticality of the Reserve Component and some of the specialized units and capabilities. However, again there was no mention that career progression impacts had been considered.

In another article in *The Officer*, MG (Ret) Robert A. McIntosh United States Air Force also recognized the criticality of the capabilities residing in the Reserve Component. In fact, McIntosh remarked that these "Skills will be critical in augmenting the Active Component force to meet tomorrow's threat" (McIntosh 2003). As reassuring as it is to hear, from many sources, about how critical and relevant to the nation's military efforts the Army Reserve is, it is equally concerning to not hear any debate or discussion

about how some Reserve-related initiatives may impact the soldiers that make up the Army Reserve. Specifically, the lack of discussion of impact on career progression is disheartening.

Realignment and restructuring of capabilities, regardless if it is Active Component or Reserve Component would logically seem to have a custom-fit in the area of Transformation. However, in a recent article titled "*Beyond the Objective Force*" (Wilson, Gordon, Johnson 2003) addressed the transformation of the force as a whole. They briefly mentioned the Civil Affairs, in an "An Alternative Approach", indicates "In light of the increased importance of peacekeeping and stability operations, as well as that of special operations forces, it is probably necessary to free some Army end strength to provide more units in the active component suitable for those missions. Assuming that active end strength cannot be increased, the Army should be prepared to disband one of its 10 divisions and convert the resources into key combat service and service support units, such as military police, civil affairs, medical, transportation and engineering units" (Wilson, Gordon, Johnson 2003). They do not address the career progression impact on the Civil Affairs soldier, regardless if they are Active Component or Reserve Component. Everything that has been reviewed dealt almost exclusively with the macro level approach regarding Active or Reserve Component Civil Affairs capabilities realignment and restructuring, specifically regarding career progression impact. There was no mention of any specific plan on addressing the Personnel Management.

It is certainly an understatement to say that Civil Affairs career progression was not mentioned. To illustrate this point it is interesting to note that in reviewing the *Department of the Army Regulation 600-8-29; Officer Promotions*, dated 30 November

1994 the terms career progression, career model, career path and promotion rate were not part of the text of this regulation. Furthermore, the term leadership was only found once in the body of this regulation. In the *Department of the Army Regulation 600-8; Military Personnel Management*, dated 1 October 1989 the terms Career progression, career model, career path, promotion rate and promotion potential were absent from the body of this administrative regulation. As before, the term leadership was only used once in appendix C, C-1, N2, p15. A Regulation that should be the first to incorporate terms like career model and career path should be *Department of the Army Regulation 611-1; Military Occupational Specialty Structure Development and Implementation*, dated 30 September 1997. However, the terms leadership and career progression were used. Leadership was only used once in the context of Warrant Officer and the term career progression was used in a broad general context relating to the commanding general's vision for the Objective Force guidelines (Department of the Army 1997). Certainly, the *Department of the Army Regulation 135-205; Enlisted Personnel Management*, dated 1 September 1994 would address career progression. This regulation actually did mention career progression; however it was only mentioned twice. The first instance was in the Qualitative Retention Program (Department of the Army 1994) and the other mention of career progression is under the Command Sergeants Major advancement portion (Department of the Army 1994). The *Department of the Army Regulation 140-158; Enlisted Personnel Classification, Promotion and Reduction*, dated 17 December 1997 mentions career progression three times (Department of the Army 1997) the first and second instance address the requirements of promotion as it relates to promotion potential. The third instance notes that career progression is part of the normal pattern of

career progression. The *Department of the Army Regulation 600-8-19; Enlisted Promotion and Reduction*, dated 20 January 2004 only superficially addressed career progression. The regulation address career progression in much the same manner as the previously mentioned regulations, usually in the early chapters and as minimal as possible (Department of the Army 2004). The final two regulations that were examined regarding career progression were *Department of the Army Regulation 600-3; Army Personnel Proponent System*, dated 28 November 1997 and *Department of the Army Regulation 600-8-111; Wartime Replacement Operations*, dated 13 August 1993. In either case career progression was only mentioned in terms of definition, not guidance to the soldier. It is clear that *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3; Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, dated 1 October 1998 is the most current career progression guidance available to the Active or Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers.

The next avenue that was investigated for possible information on career progression as it relates to the current force and the career progression model to be used for any future forces was the *Army Campaign Plan*, dated 12 April 2004. Although, the Army Campaign Plan mentioned the rebalancing of Active Component and Reserve Component capabilities, it failed to address the focus on Civil Affairs capabilities and specifically Active Component or Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldier career progression.

In recent *Army Times* articles, specifically regarding transformation of the Army from its current structure to the future force-Unit of Action structure, much discussion was made regarding the lethality, modularity and overall better equipping of the soldier

(Cox 2004 and Cavallaro 2004). However, in neither article was the issue of Active or Reserve Component Civil Affairs career progression addressed. Lastly, in a recent article MG Michael A. Vane, Commander, Air Defense Artillery Center made significant mention of career progression, comparatively speaking, by stating [that the realignment and restructuring plan] "could affect command opportunity and career tracks for officers" (Tice 2004). The article further noted that Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, dated 1 October 1998, is in the process of being rewritten.

It is a disheartening indicator of the importance level career progression warrants from the senior leadership of the Army, when out of all the Department of the Army Regulations and Pamphlet that have been examined searching for information on career guidance the only current guidance was developed in October of 1998. Additionally, it is a significant flag to the crisis level that Active Component and Reserve Component career progression is approaching with the use of irrelevant guidance.

In conclusion, many pools of information have been examined, assessed, and reviewed regarding Civil Affairs Personnel Management, specifically regarding career progression. The literature review focuses on the importance of Civil Affairs and the need to have these capabilities more readily accessible, therefore the need for Active Component and Reserve Component capabilities realignment and restructuring is obvious. However, there has been little or no published discussion of the impact on Civil Affairs career progression. The most relevant information still seems to come from Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3. This Department of the Army Pamphlet cites a career progression model or path that has not been updated since October 1998.

However, Department of the Army Pamphlet may not be current enough to address the career impact of such a huge restructuring and realignment effort. The Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 probably was not drafted with restructuring and realignment in mind and thus does not address the specific impact that will arise from restructuring and realignment in those specific areas previously mentioned.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to collect, organize and analyze the information available to address the primary research question, the researcher used a comparative approach to assess the situation before 11 September 2001 to the situation after that day, when the United States declared a Global War on Terrorism. The primary research question asks how does realigning a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component impact the career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted?

To address the primary question, the investigator divided the information into two categories: (1) pre-11 September 2001 and (2) post-11 September 2001. Categorizing and organizing the information into those areas provided the clearest possible delineation between “the way things were” and “the way things are.” Those categories were further divided into subcategories. Each subcategory was then examined and analyzed in order to answer the primary and secondary questions. The subcategories and a brief explanation of what each area is anticipated to discuss, examine and analysis are presented in the latter portion of this chapter.

The rationale used to collect and analyze pre-11 September 2001 information was both subjective and objective. The basis for this approach to organizing this information is a direct result of the availability and accessibility of historical data. Regarding post-11 September 2001 information, much of this information is new and unproven via historical data. A great deal of the post-11 September 2001 information will be developed through

interviews and extrapolation of personnel management policy memos, real world personnel management procedures and initiatives. Although objectivity is the primary focus, much of the information in the post-11 September 2001 category will require a subjective examination and analysis.

The pre-11 September 2001 information includes Active and Reserve Component personnel regulations, policies, and procedures as they relate to the management of Civil Affairs soldiers. Additionally, the investigator contacted past Personnel Management Officers or Branch Managers, Personnel Management Directors or Personnel Chiefs and Civil Affairs soldiers for their input. The post-11 September 2001 information also includes input from current Personnel Management Officers or Branch Managers, Personnel Management Directors or Personnel Chiefs and Civil Affairs soldiers who were contacted by the investigator.

After categorizing the pre-11 September 2001 and post-11 September 2001 information, the investigator examined the differences between the pre-11 September 2001 and post-11 September 2001 Active Component career progression paths. Likewise, after analysis of the pre-11 September 2001 and post-11 September 2001 information, the investigator examined the difference between the pre-11 September 2001 and post-11 September 2001 Reserve Component career progression models. Any resulting discrepancy(ies) between current and past career progression model(s) were compared and contrasted to determine the net effect on the career progression of Active or Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers.

Upon comparison and contrast with any more current career progression model guidance for both active and reserve, an analysis of the net effect on career progression

model(s) was conducted for the Civil Affairs soldier in both components. Through determination of the net effect on Civil Affairs soldiers' career progression, productive changes to the respective career progression model can be accomplished. Through analysis of the current and past career progression models of both components a better insight will be gained regarding the personnel management system of the Active and Reserve Civil Affairs Components of the Army. Insight gained through analysis of any current and past career progression model(s) will provide a better understanding regarding the validity and potential impact of how a realignment of capabilities within the Army might actually impact soldiers and their future career progression.

#### Subcategories

As noted earlier, to support the primary question the categories of pre-11 September 2001 and post-11 September 2001 were further divided into subcategories. Each subcategory was then analyzed to assess career impact and ultimately, in chapter 4 and chapter 5, the estimated net effect on the Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted. In each subcategory and respective component, Active or Reserve, the corresponding table addresses Civil Affairs officer and enlisted career progression are separately.

The first subcategory is titled pre-11 September 2001 Active. The single Active Component Civil Affairs battalion's role in the support of the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review was examined and analyzed in order to assess the impact on career progression for Active Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted.

The second subcategory is pre-11 September 2001 Reserve. The Reserve Component Civil Affairs battalions' roles in the supporting the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review were examined and analyzed in order to assess the impact on career progression for Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted.

Both the Active and Reserve Component pre-11 September 2001 subcategories were further divided: (1) Current Civil Affairs officer career model or path, (2) Current Civil Affairs officer branch qualifying positions (if applicable), (3) Current Civil Affairs officer available branch qualifying and nonbranch qualifying positions, (4) Current Civil Affairs enlisted career model or path, (5) Current Civil Affairs enlisted branch qualifying positions (if applicable), (6) Current Civil Affairs enlisted available branch qualifying and nonbranch qualifying positions, and (7) Officer and enlisted promotion rates in the Civil Affairs community .

The third subcategory is post-11 September 2001 Active and the fourth subcategory is post-11 September 2001 Reserve. As with pre-11 September 2001 Active and pre-11 September 2001 Reserve, these subcategories were further divided: (1) Potential Civil Affairs officer career model or path, (2) Potential Civil Affairs officer branch qualifying positions, (3) Potential Civil Affairs officer available branch qualifying and non-branch qualifying positions, (4) Potential Civil Affairs enlisted career model or path, (5) Potential Civil Affairs enlisted branch qualifying positions, (6) Potential Civil Affairs enlisted available branch qualifying and non-branch qualifying positions, and (7) potential officer and enlisted promotion rates in the Civil Affairs community.

Information for all subcategories was collected from the literature and other sources, ranging from input provided by personnel managers to Active Component Civil Affairs soldiers (officer and enlisted) to Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers (officer and enlisted). Once the information was collected it was categorized, examined and analyzed in order to address the primary and secondary questions.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

To sufficiently answer the primary question, of how will realign a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component impact the career progression for Civil Affairs officer and enlisted soldiers, the following four secondary questions were developed

1. What portion of United States Army Civil Affairs capabilities will be realigned from the Reserve Component to the Active Component?

2. What model for career progression existed for Civil Affairs soldiers (officer and enlisted) before realignment?

3. What career progression model(s) have been proposed as part of the realignment of capabilities plan?

4. How do the existing and proposed career progression models for the Civil Affairs officer and enlisted soldiers differ?

To address the first secondary question, what portion of United States Army Civil Affairs capabilities will be realigned from the Reserve Component to the Active Component? it is important to understand the process that was conducted by the Army staff to determine what restructuring efforts would actually be undertaken. The Army aligned realignment efforts and plans in accordance with the *2002 National Security Strategy* and the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* indications of potential threats to the United States, likely natures of those scenarios and likely high demand assets and capabilities given those scenarios and threats. The consensus scenario (table 1)

recognizes that failed states will potentially make up the base of threats facing the United States in the future. It must be stated that failed states are comprised of local populations consisting of local governments and agencies that were unsuccessful for various reasons.

Table 1. Consensus Scenario

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**Table 2–3. Consensus Scenario**

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**In 2001–2025, U.S. military forces need to prepare for:**

- military challenges by a regional competitor;
- attempts by a regional competitor to attack the U.S. homeland utilizing asymmetrical means;
- use of antiaccess and area denial strategies by regional competitors;
- use of WMD by regional competitors as part of antiaccess operations;
- involvement in failed states and in response to nonstate threats at the discretion of national command authorities (but some degree of involvement is inevitable);
- operations in urban terrain and under "chaotic" conditions (by some, but not all, of the force);
- continual diffusion of military technology to potential competitors and nonstate actors;
- high level of information warfare.

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*Source:* Department of Defense, *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC; GPO, September 2001) table 2-3

The Divergence and Contradictions (table 2) data from the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* indicates the potential nature (note item 3) of potential scenarios that may face the United States. This is a further indication of the significance a failed state(s) will play in the emerging threats to the United States. As the number of failed states increases, certainly the threats to the United States do as well. That being the case it is apparent that a potential solution to stemming the wave of threats to the United States is through an aggressive Civil Affairs policy, thereby increasing the requirements for Civil Affairs capabilities in the military.

Table 2. Divergence and Contradictions

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**Table 2-2. Divergence and Contradictions**

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**Nature of conflict:**

- 1. A. It is unlikely that two MTWs would happen simultaneously.  
*or*  
B. Two nearly simultaneous MTWs will remain a possibility.

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- 2. A. Future wars will be more brutal with more civilian casualties.  
*or*  
B. Information operations and precision weapons will make warfare less deadly.

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- 3. A. Chaos in littorals or panic in the city are more likely contingencies than MTW.  
*or*  
B. MTW will remain the primary threat to security.

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- 4. A. Space will be a theater of conflict.  
*or*  
B. Space will remain a conduit of information, but not a combat theater.

**Threats:**

- 5. A. A near-peer competitor is inevitable over the long term; we need to prepare now.  
*or*  
B. Preparing for a near-peer will create a military competition (thus creating a near-peer).

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- 6. A. Overseas bases will be essentially indefensible.  
*or*  
B. Future capabilities will be able to defend overseas bases.

**Opposing Strategies:**

- 7. A. Current (legacy) U.S. forces will not be able to overcome antiaccess strategies except at high cost.  
*or*  
B. Techniques of deception or denial of information will remain effective in allowing legacy systems to penetrate future antiaccess efforts.

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- 8. A. Nuclear deterrence will remain a vital aspect of security.  
*or*  
B. Nuclear deterrence will have an increasingly smaller role in future security.

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- 9. A. Conventional military force will not deter terrorism or nonstate threats.  
*or*  
B. U.S. military capabilities will retain considerable deterrent or coercive effects against terrorism and nonstate threats.

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*Source:* Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington DC; GPO, September 2001),

table 2-2

The significance of the Civil Affairs capability in the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* is readily apparent in the next table (table 3), where Civil Affairs is identified as a future force requirement, a low density-high demand asset.

Table 3. Low Density-High Demand Assets

<b>Table 10-3. Low Density/High Demand Assets</b>	
<b>Capability Being Managed</b>	<b>Number of Systems Affected</b>
Reconnaissance/Battle Management Assets	8 platforms or systems such as Airborne Warning and Control System, Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, Joint Surveillance, Target Attack System, and both piloted and unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms
Electronic Combat Aircraft	2 platforms
Special Operations Forces	9 types of units/equipment; includes a Civil Affairs Battalion, 7 Special Operations Units (helicopter and fixed wing aircraft), and Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Team delivery vehicle task units
Patriot Air Defense	All active Patriot batteries and battalions
Rescue Aircraft	2 platforms
Chemical/Biological Defense	2 units (Chemical Company and Technical Escort Unit)

Source: Derived from Joint Staff Global Military Force Policy Orientation Briefing, September 20, 2000.

Source: 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington DC; GPO, September 2001) table 10-3

In order to meet the requirements posed by the threats as perceived by the national leadership, the Army staff began the process of examining the *Total Army Analysis-2011* Swiftly Defeat The Efforts (SDTE) model. As the definition of SDTE indicates, this is a model to Swiftly Defeat the Effort of an enemy threat. With that model comes a certain level of requirements that must be met to achieve the standards of this model. Through that detailed examination of the SDTE model, Posture of Engagement model and other requirements it was determined initially that the Army, as a whole, had a shortfall when

compared to those requirements. The shortfall began at "9.7k of unresourced force structure requirements for the first 15 days of the SDTE" (Department of Army-Operations Officer 2003). As the staffing process continued it was ultimately determined and stated that "a requirement to rebalance 4.7K, comprising 47 units from the Reserve Component to the Active Component " (Department of Army-Operations Officer 2003) would be required. This is Program Change Proposal 2006's recommendation to decrease the reliance on involuntary mobilizations of Reserve Component forces within the first 15 days of any conflict. The Army staff also submitted Program Change Proposal 2007, which outlined an additional "requirement to convert 4.1K of Reserve Component and 842 spaces of Active Component force structure to resource these high demand unit shortfalls" (Department of Army-Operations Officer 2003). These recommendations seem to meet the guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense regarding rebalancing of the force. In that guidance Secretary of Defense-Donald Rumsfeld indicated that three approaches would be undertaken to effectively rebalance the force and these approaches should be the focus of the services' efforts to rebalance the force. The approaches outlined in a Department of Defense document indicate the focus of the services to be as follows (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs-Readiness, Training and Mobilization 2004):

1. Enhance early responsiveness
2. Resolve stressed career fields
3. Employ innovative management practices

According to Rebalancing Forces: Easing the stress on the Guard and Reserve-Final, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs-

Readiness, Training and Mobilization (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs-Readiness, Training and Mobilization 2004), three of the key assumptions underlying the restructuring efforts were:

1. The allocation of capabilities both within and between the active and Reserve components may change.

2. The steady state for the next three to five years will find the Reserve components supporting Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and other Posture of Engagement operations with a total of about 100,000-150,000 personnel. Primarily Army Guard and Reserve Component forces will fill this requirement, but all Reserve Component forces will contribute.

3. The early conflict phase of future operations will be met by immediate response forces consisting of both Active and Reserve Components, with a minimal use of involuntary mobilization.

Although there are no detailed figures specifically regarding Civil Affairs positions migrating from the Reserve Component to the Active Component and even though Civil Affairs is not specifically identified in the Army staff G3 memorandum, it is mentioned in the Secretary of Defense's Rebalancing Forces document. One context in which Civil Affairs is mentioned and discussed is of prior transformation efforts that have already been implemented, as of fiscal year 2003. The document states, "Beginning in 2001, the Army reprogrammed over 30,000 spaces in the Active and Reserve Components. Almost 3,000 of those conversions were implemented in fiscal year 2003, providing additional capabilities in the areas of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations,

Special Operations forces, Intelligence and Military Police" (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs-Readiness, Training and Mobilization 2004).

Another context and perhaps more telling context of Civil Affairs discussion is in the discussion of future actions. In that discussion, the following statement is made "To meet the requirement for Civil Affairs personnel during Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Reserve component Civil Affairs units operated with overstaff personnel within existing Reserve component end strength. A rebalancing course of action has been identified to increase the size of the units as well as to integrate Active personnel into this stressed field" (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs-Readiness, Training and Mobilization 2004).

To gain a better understanding of how many and what type of positions have and will be changing components, from Reserve Component to Active Component would require significantly more research time than what is available and would certainly cause this thesis to become a classified document. That being stated, it is the best assessment of the material available that the actual number of spaces undergoing the conversion process will be within the range of 4,700 to 9,000. The previously mentioned Program Change Proposal 2006 will require approximately 4700 spaces, of various types be converted from Reserve Component to Active Component. While in the follow-on Program Change Proposal 2007 approximately 4100 spaces, of various types will be converted from Reserve Component to Active Component.

While it is noted that Reserve Component Civil Affairs currently has not been identified as a force structure provider for the Active Component Civil Affairs force structure requirements. It is prudent to note that the actual number of spaces to be

converted is fluid and not yet or will likely ever be concrete. The last statement referred to in the Rebalancing Forces; Easing the stress on the Guard and Reserve-Final document regarding integration of Active Component Civil Affairs personnel with Reserve Component Civil Affairs is certainly a fore shadowing of future force structure changes that may be determined to be sound and necessary. To summarize, at this time there are no accessible definitive figures regarding the actual number of spaces of Reserve Component force structure that may be realigned to the Active Component.

Answering secondary question number two, what model for career progression existed for Civil Affairs soldiers (officer and enlisted) before realignment?, was a much clearer and easier task to accomplish. The simple fact of the matter is this, there has not been any new and more relevant career progression oriented guidance developed and distributed to the field regarding career progression for the Civil Affairs soldier, Officer or Enlisted since October 1998. During October 1998, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 was published to designate the career path or model to be followed by the officer corps, chapter 20 Civil Affairs branch (Branch 38-Reserve Component only) and chapter 27 Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Functional Area (Functional Area 39).

Upon detailed examination of the governing regulation, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 as it relates to the career progression of the Civil Affairs officers, it became obvious that the methodology dictating how officers in the Civil Affairs community would be promoted had escaped the events and emerging mission requirements of the past few years. To better appreciate the condition of this regulation and the chapters that have such a dramatic impact on Civil Affairs officer career progression; it was wiser to review them one at a time. Before that could be done the

investigator had to consider that in chapter 27 of Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Civil Affairs is used strictly as a functional area. This mindset alone is a clear indication that the thinking as it relates to Civil Affairs has not caught up with the governing regulation in the Active component. However, in Chapter 20 of the same regulation, Civil Affairs is treated as a branch, and is considered a Reserve only type of branch and subsequently has a significantly different set of assignments that allow an officer successful career progression.

As indicated earlier, the Active Component had implemented transformation efforts in fiscal year 2001 that were aimed at increasing the level of Civil Affairs capability within the Active Component. Additionally, in a recent Civil Affairs Command redesign plan the new structure was discussed. In the new structure design it is apparent that more spaces are identified to be added, approximately 1738 (Department of the Army Force Structure, 2001-2004). The assumption was that many of those positions would be both career enhancing and branch qualifying for the officer and the enlisted Civil Affairs soldiers. This being stated, a peculiarity about the current governing regulation that leaps out at the average reader and demands to be questioned regarding relevancy and of overall soldier focus-career centric guidance is the developmental assignments of "Reserve Officer Training Corps or United States Military Academy faculty and staff" or the "Branch or Functional Area Generalists" (Department of the Army Adjutant General 1998) during the early years as a captain, as a major and through out an officer's career (see figure 1). The Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 clearly indicates that career progression and career assignments do not always coincide. In other words, captains and above can likely expect assignments in branch immaterial or


generalists type assignments, such as Reserve Officer Training Corps or United States Military faculty and staff, and Inspector General. None of those assignments has any relevant career progression value and simply does not further the officer's career. Additionally, it is plain to see that those assignments are non-branch qualifying for the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers. It takes on the look as a waste of scarce and valuable time to gain the status of branch qualified, as it relates to promotion. As an additional note, it also bears further examination of the actual number of command or branch qualifying positions before any realignment or restructuring efforts.

Table 4. FA 39 Life Cycle Development Model (Active Component)

YEARS OF SERVICE	0	5	10	15	20	25	30
	LT		CPT	MAJ	LTC	COL	
	OBC		CCC	CSC	SSC		
		★	FUNCTIONAL AREA	★	CAREER FIELD		
FUNCTIONAL AREA QUALIFYING	FA 39 TRAINING (41-76 WKS)	ACS (12-18 WKS)		BN CMD, PSYOP GRP DCO, DVSJN JOINT STAFF		ANY FA 39 (A/B/C) POSITION	
	OP DETACHMENT CMD (39B)	CO or DET CMD (39 A/B/C)		ASST CORPS G5, CORPS PSYOP OFF			
	TACTICAL TEAM LDR (39C)	BN S3/XO (39 B/C)		TAACOM CA OFF			
DEVELOPMENTAL	ANY FA 39 POSITION (39 A/B/C)	TO&E UNIT STAFF		TO&E UNIT STAFF		ANY FA 39 (A/B/C) POSITION	
	ROTC/USMA FACULTY AND STAFF	USAJFKSWCS(39B)		USAJFKSWCS(39B)		BR/FA GENERALISTS	
		USACAPOC (39B/C)		CAC			
		MACOM STAFF		JOINT/COMBINED STAFF			
		AC/RC		DA STAFF			
		JOINT/COMBINED STAFF		BR/FA GENERALISTS			
		BCTP					
		TAACOM STAFF					
		ROTC/USMA					
BR/FA GENERALISTS							

Source: Department of the Army, DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 October 1998) figure 27-1

Table 5. FA 39 Life Cycle Development Model (Reserve Component)

YEARS OF SERVICE	0	7	14	21	24	30
	LT		CPT	MAJ	LTC	COL
	OBC		CCC	CSC	SSC	
 FUNCTIONAL AREA						
FUNCTIONAL AREA QUALIFYING	CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM MEMBER BATTALION STAFF	CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM MEMBER CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM CHIEF	CIVIL AFFAIRS TM MEM CIVIL AFFAIRS BDE STAFF CIVIL AFFAIRS CMND STAFF	BDE CDR CIVIL AFFAIRS TM MEM CIVIL AFFAIRS TM CHIEF CIVIL AFFAIRS CMND STAFF		
DEVELOPMENTAL	BATTALION STAFF	BN S2-3 BN XO DET CDR INSTRUCTOR CTC OBSVR-CTRLR USAJFKSWCS STAFF USACAPOC STAFF CIVIL AFFAIRS BDE ASST G3	BN CDR USSOCOM STAFF USAJFKSWCS STAFF	BDE CDR CIVIL AFFAIRS CMND DEPUTY CDR USAJFKSWCS STAFF USASOC STAFF (39B)		

Source: Department of the Army, DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 October 1998) figure 20-1

That is evident with the volume of opportunity or positions in the Reserve Component, with 96 percent of the Army Civil Affairs capabilities. Detailed examination of the Department of the Army pamphlet 600-3, chapter 20 indicates a career path that has some significant differences from the Active Component's career path. From the outset, it must be stated that for a Reserve Component Civil Affairs officer to be

favorably considered for promotion to the next higher grade he or she is not required to be branch qualified, as evidenced with a sustained greater than 90 percent promotion rate. Although having successfully completed what would be considered a branch qualifying type assignment could be a significant discriminator in regards to consideration for follow-on assignments and senior officer level schooling. In other words, it would not be a bad thing to have successfully completed a branch qualifying type assignment. What this subtle difference in career progression requirements between the Active Component and the Reserve Component means is that effectively there is not as severe a competition for branch qualifying type positions. On the surface that seems to be a good thing and most of the time the argument can be made that it is a positive aspect of this branch. However, the down side is the high performers will simply be promoted at the same rate as the slow or non-performers. Both systems have a negative impact on retaining quality Civil Affairs soldiers with positive and rewarding career progression.

Other issues that differentiate the Reserve Component Civil Affairs career progression model from the Active Component Civil Affairs career progression model is the type of assignments and the projected time in an officers career for each, see figure 20-1. For example, even though the Reserve Component Civil Affairs branch is a non-accession branch it does access junior officers from the field. That is a significant difference from the Active Component Civil Affairs career progression model. The accession of junior officers calls for assignments in the role of platoon leader, company executive officer, or battalion staff. On the Active Component Civil Affairs career progression model, lieutenants are not part of the equation. Officers are accessed in the rank of captain in the Active Component Civil Affairs functional area. Furthermore in the

Reserve Component Civil Affairs career progression an officer can literally spend his or her entire career in the field of Civil Affairs.

The Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 states that its goal is to provide and maintain a healthy, viable career path for Civil Affairs branch officers. It further states that force structure authorized Civil Affairs officer billets will allow adequate career progression for Civil Affairs officers (Department of the Army Adjutant General 1998). The presence of this paragraph in the Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 speaks volumes regarding the focus on the soldier's career. This implies that the current Civil Affairs force structure will support adequate career progression for the Civil Affairs officer. Additionally, it is a clear indication of the mindset used during the construction of this career progression guidance and an alert to the leadership of the irrelevance and inaccuracy of this guidance. The absence of this type of verbiage in the Active Component Civil Affairs career progression model speaks volumes regarding the Active Component's level of importance placed on the successful career progression of the Active Component Civil Affairs officer. The overriding message sent through this omission in the Active Component Civil Affairs career progression model is that Civil Affairs is a low skill area and does not warrant sufficient attention regarding career progression. It also signals to the officers that are fortunate or unfortunate enough to acquire multiple assignments in the Civil Affairs area that career progression will essentially end at the rank of major.

As previously mentioned no new or relevant career progression guidance had been developed or distributed to either the Active Component Civil Affairs soldiers or the Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers since October 1998. This is certainly

concerning if you are a Civil Affairs Officer or Enlisted soldier in either component. However, it appears to be more serious in the Active Component. Simply because, if the new Active Component Civil Affairs structure design is indeed being or been implemented as was stated in fiscal year 2001, then where is the plan to effectively grow the Active Component Civil Affairs officer corps. Given the new importance, as a result of the events of 11 September 2001, that Civil Affairs has taken on in both the Active Component and the Reserve Component in the Global War on Terrorism the inquiry must be made regarding the development of an Noncommissioned Officer or Enlisted Civil Affairs soldier career progression model. In addressing the third of the four secondary questions, what model(s) of career progression (officer and enlisted) have been proposed in the realignment plans, the investigator concluded that prior to 11 September 2001 the area of Civil Affairs was not identified as an area in the force structure that required growth and subsequent career progression. Since 11 September 2001, the area of Civil Affairs has been identified as a force structure growth area. However, the career progression oriented guidance for this new force structure growth area has not yet been established.

The fourth and final secondary question, how do the existing and proposed career progression models for the Civil Affairs soldiers (officer and enlisted) differ? The lack of solid information regarding the proposed realignment and the lack of discussion regarding career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers (officer and enlisted) resulted in an inability to completely answer the question. There is no appearance of any new development of new relevant career progression model guidance regarding Active Component or Reserve Component Civil Affairs officers or enlisted soldiers. To answer

the question it should be stated that a valid comparison was not possible for the reason that no new career progression models existed or were available to the researcher. As discussed in chapter 3, evidence regarding the absence of a new career progression model was obtained through conversations with selected Civil Affairs officers in both the Active Component and the Reserve Component. During those conversations the investigator asked about the impending influx of Civil Affairs capabilities (as a result of increased mission requirements) and about the career progression plan for those Civil Affairs soldiers, including whether a plan has been developed, and, if so, whether it is unclassified and available? It is interesting to note that none of the officers were unable to definitively state whether any new career progression model or guidance, Active Component or Reserve Component had been developed or distributed since Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 in October of 1998. An officer in the Active Component Civil Affairs field provided the most-interesting perspective. This officer noted that negotiations were likely still ongoing with proponentcy as to whether to allow promotable captains to be assigned into major positions. By far the most disconcerting response was from a newly accessioned Reserve Component Civil Affairs officer. The response indicated that a slating procedure was in place. The officer continued and defined that slating procedure simply meant that all officers were allowed to compete for all assignments that they were professionally qualified to be assigned to. The officer also explained that this was contrary to the scenario of a personnel officer arbitrarily assigning positions in order to fill personnel vacancy requests. The officer continued by explaining that this slating process essentially placed the officer's career progression in his or her hands and did not rely on personnel assignments officers. These comments send the

wrong message to the current Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted regardless if they are Active Component or Reserve Component. The anticipated potential impact and recommended solutions will be further discussed in chapter 5.

Finally, in addressing the primary question of how will realigning a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component impact the career progression for Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted, the investigator found that if Department of the Army ultimately decides to realign some Reserve Component Civil Affairs capabilities to the Active Component Civil Affairs structure without the development of a significantly improved career progression model the impact probably will be minimal at first. However, that is the brightest picture that can be portrayed. After the first couple of years, effectiveness likely will decline; retention may drop due to disgruntled soldiers or due to soldiers that require separation from service as a result of lack of career potential. The result could be that the Army will be faced with growing an entirely new capability with little or no institutional knowledge to pass on, as a result of lack of career progression model and vision.

To better illustrate the lack of initiative and lack of leadership in the area of Active Component Civil Affairs career progression for the Civil Affairs officer and enlisted soldiers, Table 1 clearly indicates the degree of inaction regarding career progression. Of interesting note (identified in table 1, Active Component Civil Affairs career progression) is a promotion rate for the grade of colonel of 33 percent in fiscal year 2003. On the surface 33 percent does not seem so adverse. However, once it is explained that the 33 percent promotion rate is a result of one promotion out of three officers considered, the promotion rate loses its appeal and luster. What can be inferred

from this awkward promotion rate is simply this; it is a systemic issue of not enough positions to promote qualified officers into. So the concern must be raised, what happens to the qualified Active Component Civil Affairs officers that were qualified but not selected for promotion to the next grade? Is there a natural migration to the Reserve Component Civil Affairs force structure as a reservist or is it as simple as those officers separate from service and move into the civilian sector to earn a living. The result is a significant loss of institutional knowledge and an experience level that took many years to gain and refine. That institutional knowledge and experience level is, at best difficult to replace. Equally as interesting to note is the absence of a career progression model for the Non-Commissioned Officer that is assigned more than once to the Civil Affairs area. This absence sends the signal to the enlisted ranks that Civil Affairs is not the focus of the Army and is not career progressive.

Table 6. Active Component Civil Affairs Officer

ACTIVE COMPONENT CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER		
FOCUS AREAS	LEVEL OF CHANGE AND IMPORTANCE	
	PRE 11 September 2001	POST 11 September 2001
Civil Affairs Officer Career Model or Path	Based on stagnate mission of one active component Civil Affairs battalion, one colonel position and overall managed as a functional area versus a branch	No Change
Civil Affairs Officer branch qualifying position(s)	CPT-Operational Detachment Command, Tactical Team Leader(39C) // MAJ-Company or Detachment Command, battalion S3/XO // LTC-Battalion Command, Division G5, Joint Staff, Assistant Corps G5, TAACOM CA Officer // COL-any FA 39 position	No Change
Available Civil Affairs Officer branch qualifying position(s)	ROTATION DEPENDENT and ARMY NEEDS DEPENDENT- CPT-Operational Detachment Command, Tactical Team Leader(39C) // MAJ-Company or Detachment Command, battalion S3/XO  // LTC-Battalion Command, Division G5, Joint Staff, Assistant Corps G5, TAACOM CA Officer // COL-any FA 39 position	No Change
Civil Affairs Officer non-branch qualifying position(s)	Unlimited, needs of the Army do not coincide with career progression of Civil Affairs officers	No Change
Civil Affairs Officer promotion rate	Promotion rates only available for colonel rank in the functional area of 39; fiscal years 2001 and 2002 (Promotion rates- 60% FY01 / 0% FY02 / 33% FY03) NOTE: FY03 promotion rate of 33% based on 1 promotion out of 3 eligible officers.	Data currently unavailable

Table 7. Active Component Civil Affairs Enlisted

<b>ACTIVE COMPONENT CIVIL AFFAIRS ENLISTED SOLDIER</b>		
<b>FOCUS AREAS</b>	<b>LEVEL OF CHANGE AND IMPORTANCE</b>	
	<b>PRE 11 September 2001</b>	<b>POST 11 September 2001</b>
Civil Affairs Enlisted Career Model or Path	Not considered an Military Occupational Speciality, therefore no career model for enlisted Civil Affairs soldiers existed	No Change
Civil Affairs Enlisted	Not Applicable	No Change
Available Civil Affairs	Not Applicable	No Change
Civil Affairs Enlisted non-branch qualifying position(s)	Unlimited, based on the needs of the Army / NOTE: Since this is area is not managed as a Military Occupational Speciality for Enlisted soldiers, it is considered time away from the base military Occupational Speciality and bares little wieght during the promotion process. If a soldier is assigned to multiple Civil Affairs assignments, he or she can experience promotion and career peril.	No Change
Civil Affairs Enlisted promotion rate	Since Soldiers are promoted based on performance in a Military Occupational Speciality and Civil Affairs is not managed as a Military Occupational Speciality this area is not tracked nor used in the promotion process criteria	No Data available

The loss of skilled and experienced Civil Affairs officers and enlisted soldiers is difficult to sustain, even with active measures to retain that expertise. Simply stated, in order to retain the best qualified personnel for current and future operations policies, procedures and standards must be consistently under review. A review of the Reserve Component Civil Affairs career progression Table 2 indicates that career progression as directed by Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 has not kept pace with the changing threat environment, no adjustments in the career progression guidance after 11 September 2001. It becomes obvious that the career progression salvation for the Reserve Component Civil Affairs officer and enlisted soldiers is not being required to be branch qualified for promotion. If this became a solid requirement, it seems the Reserve Component Civil Affairs capability would find itself in a similar crisis position the Active Component Civil Affairs officers and enlisted soldiers are faced with.

Table 8. Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer

<b>RESERVE COMPONENT CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER</b>		
<b>FOCUS AREAS</b>	<b>LEVEL OF CHANGE AND IMPORTANCE</b>	
	<b>PRE 11 September 2001</b>	<b>POST 11 September 2001</b>
Civil Affairs Officer Career Model or Path	Based on mission requirements for four Reserve Component Civil Affairs battalions, Managed as a branch // <b>IMPORTANT NOTE:</b> Branch qualification not required for promotion	No Change
Civil Affairs Officer branch qualifying position(s)	Branch Qualification not required for promotion; although DA Pam 600-3 mentions branch qualification for Reserve Component Civil Affairs officers, enforcement of this condition has never been witnessed and is not practical for the Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer	No Change
Available Civil Affairs Officer branch qualifying position(s)	Not Applicable: Branch Qualification not required for promotion	No Change
Civil Affairs Officer non-branch qualifying position(s)	Unlimited; based on the needs of the Army-Officer is assigned/managed as a specialists where applicable and as a generalists where Civil Affairs positions are not available	No Change
Civil Affairs Officer promotion rate	Percentage of LTCs promoted to COL as it relates to number of other branches promoted to COL was 5% or 17 officers promoted out of 334 total promotions	No Change

A detailed review of fiscal year 2003 officer promotions indicate a percentage of those branches promoted ranging from four percent (86 Civil Affairs officers promoted out of 2182 officers selected for promotion to major) to seven percent (93 Civil Affairs

officers promoted out of 1331 officers selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel) to the five percent noted above for the grade of colonel, promotion board summary results were not available.

Table 9. Reserve Component Civil Affairs Enlisted

<b>RESERVE COMPONENT CIVIL AFFAIRS ENLISTED SOLDIER</b>		
<b>FOCUS AREAS</b>	<b>LEVEL OF CHANGE AND IMPORTANCE</b>	
	<b>PRE 11 September 2004</b>	<b>POST 11 September 2004</b>
Civil Affairs Enlisted Career Model or Path	Managed as a Career Management Field (CMF) 38; SGT thru SFC Team member, SFC-Detachment NCOIC, Battalion or Brigade Civil Affairs staff position, MSG-Company 1SG, Battalion or Brigade Civil Affairs staff position	No Change
Civil Affairs Enlisted branch qualifying position(s)		No Change
Available Civil Affairs Enlisted branch qualifying position(s)	Based on mission requirements for four Reserve Component Civil Affairs battalions, Managed as a branch // IMPORTANT NOTE: Branch qualification not required for promotion	No Change
Civil Affairs Enlisted non-branch qualifying position(s)	Unlimited; based on the needs of the Army-Officer is assigned/managed as a specialists where applicable and as a generalists where Civil Affairs positions are not available	No Change
Civil Affairs Enlisted promotion rate	In the Fiscal Year Career Management Field 38 experienced a 100% promotion rate (two Civil Affairs soldiers were considered and two Civil Affairs soldiers were selected for promotion)	No Change

Although career progression appears to be operating efficiently in the Reserve Component Civil Affairs structure, it is alarming that there have been no adjustments for potential realignment in capabilities from the Reserve Component to the Active Component Civil Affairs structure. It appears that a lack of vision is guiding the career progression for the Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted. It may be many years before the true career progression impacts on the Civil Affairs soldiers are quantifiable and subsequently adjusted. That being stated, the actual impact on career progression is indefinable at this point and for this very reason, much of the focus must be on potential solutions and potential procedures that may be implemented by future leadership

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In addressing the primary question, of how a realignment of a portion of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component into the Active Component might impact the career progression for Civil Affairs officer and enlisted soldiers, the investigator reviewed relevant literature and other available information and, at the end, concluded that the Active Component Civil Affairs structure is in crisis and requires immediate development of a functional career progression model or path. At the outset of the research the investigator had expected to find that the Reserve Component Civil Affairs was the most at risk so this finding was quite startling. A previous promotion rate of 60 percent in fiscal year 2001 of lieutenant colonels to the rank of colonel and "no requirements for 39 officers in FY 02" (Department of the Army Adjutant General, 2003), and a 33 percent promotion rate for fiscal year 2003 are significant reasons to be considered in crisis from the perspective of career progression. Since people are the heart of the Army it only follows that this is an area in crisis.

It is further concluded that while the national military leadership has not yet publicly identified the Reserve Component Civil Affairs as a force structure provider for the Active Component Civil Affairs structure requirements, it is prudent to make plans with that possibility in mind. That possibility may be the next remedy to be prescribed for this issue because the Reserve Component Civil Affairs structure already has the militarily and civilian skills trained Civil Affairs officers and enlisted soldiers. The burden of Active Component Civil Affairs branch qualification is not on the Reserve

Component Civil Affairs officer, nor is it on the enlisted Civil Affairs soldier.

Conversely, that burden is well on the shoulders of the Active Component Civil Affairs structure. Also reconsider a small bit of the guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense on 15 January 2004, "To meet the requirement for Civil Affairs personnel during Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Reserve Component Civil Affairs units operated with overstaff personnel within existing Reserve Component end strength. A rebalancing course of action has been identified to increase the size of the units as well as to integrate Active personnel into this stressed field" (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs-Readiness, Training and Mobilization 2004). In other words, if the Active Component Civil Affairs rebalancing efforts fail, the Reserve Component Civil Affairs structure will be tasked and must be ready to go. The fates of both components, Reserve and Active are linked together and critically tied to the Army's ability to accomplish its mission in the Global War on Terrorism.

Initially, it was believed the intent of the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense and Department of the Army was to migrate Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component Civil Affairs structure to the Active Component Civil Affairs structure. However, the findings of this research suggest otherwise. Regardless, that does not mean it cannot or will not happen. Nor has the serious issue of career progression for the Civil Affairs officer or enlisted been answered. The only change is that instead of the burden of developing a comprehensive and functional career progression model or plan being on the Reserve Component Civil Affairs leadership, it is instead on the Active Component Civil Affairs leadership to do so. Additionally, there is an added burden of the lack of time, considering that Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers are and have

been actively engaged in the Global War on Terrorism for the better portion of two years since the events of 11 September 2001. That being said it is safe to conclude that the Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers are nearing the end of their statutory obligation to serve in this combat zone. Also it is worth noting that once the Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer, and enlisted return to their home station many of them will consciously decide whether their service is worth the time away from their family and civilian occupation. Finances and others may drive some or many of those decisions by Civil Affairs career potential.

Needless to say the time for a timely development, distribution and implementation of a functional career progression model or plan for the Active Component Civil Affairs officer and enlisted soldiers is grossly overdue. That being the case, it is quite apparent that this is crisis management at all levels regarding Active Component Civil Affairs career progression for officers and enlisted soldiers and the Reserve Component Civil Affairs career progression situation is only mildly trailing the Active Component Civil Affairs career progression crisis, neither has the luxury of time. As a result there initially appears to be two immediate obstacles that must be addressed in order to secure additional time for development of a functional career progression model or plan. The leadership must guard against loss of combat experienced Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted through separation from service as a result of voluntary reasons.

The other obstacle that must be mitigated or restrained is retaining the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted that have not yet been deployed into the combat zone. These soldiers, regardless of component will

serve as the next line of institutional knowledge for the furthering of Civil Affairs capabilities within the Army in the future years.

### Recommendations

The first recommendation that will achieve, at least temporarily, securing additional time to develop, distribute and implement a career progression model or plan for the Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs structure must be instituting a indefinite stop-loss policy effective on all 39 functional areas and 38 branches. This measure allows more time to implement crisis measures designed to maintain the capability and the effectiveness of the Army Civil Affairs capabilities until such time as the crisis has been restrained.

The second recommendation must be far more reaching and long lasting. In that, this crisis measure must address the root of the problem, lack of career progression in the Active Component Civil Affairs structure. To sufficiently attack this issue, the measure must dramatically change the career progression prospects for the Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs officers and enlisted soldiers. The change must be sufficient that the Civil Affairs soldiers, regardless of component see real change and opportunity in the system. A potential change that may be both an immediate fix and provide guidance for the permanent fix for the future of the Civil Affairs force within the Army would be the adoption of the Reserve Component Civil Affairs career progression model and standards for the Active Component. Specifically speaking, relax or eliminate the requirement for Active Component Civil Affairs officers to be branch qualified either in total or in specific assignments. Or allow the positions in both the Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs structures to be dual coded as Active Component and Reserve

Component. Ultimately, a merger of the two components maybe the answer, but will require both teamwork and time to achieve the end state of effective simultaneous Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs capabilities within the Army.

#### Future Research Areas

During the course of the research it became evident that there were a number of questions and areas for additional investigation. The areas of future potential research may indeed prove to be worthy of research as the Army proceeds down the path of enhancing capabilities to become more modular and adaptive to the environment of asymmetric threats to the United States and allies of the United States. The future areas of research have been categorized into three areas that seemed most applicable to the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Security Strategy: Strategic-Level Perspective table 3, Operational-Level Perspective table 4, and Soldier-Level Perspective table 5. It is interesting to note that most, over 50 percent of the future research areas are focused on the soldier level perspective. This would seem to indicate the level of attention that is required in this area.

As previously discussed, the investigator initially anticipated that significant levels of established information existed regarding the realignment of Civil Affairs structure from the one component of the Army to another. That initial anticipation or expectation was not supported. As the research indicates, formal discussion, written information and established guidance regarding any post-11 September 2001 capabilities realignment efforts proved extremely difficult to access and certainly would have fallen into the classified environment. That being stated it is certain that the absence of formal information, discussion, and guidance regarding the realignment of capabilities is a clear

indication that Civil Affairs, Active, or Reserve Component, career progression has not attained the level of importance that it demands.

Table 10. Future Areas of Research from a Strategic-Level Perspective

<b>STRATEGIC LEVEL PERSPECTIVE</b>	<b>FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH</b>
	How has the role of the Active Component Civil Affairs capability changed in supporting the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy with the influx of new structure and new capability?
	How will the Active Component Civil Affairs officers career model change with the addition of new Active Component Civil Affairs structure and personnel?
	What rationale did Department Of Defense and Department of the Army use to restructure and realign Civil Affairs positions within the Active and Reserve Components?
	How will this realignment impact the Army's ability to meet mission requirements set forth in the National Military Strategy and National Security Strategy?
	What are feasible implementation time lines and milestones for a realignment to be effective in supporting the National Military Strategy and National Security Strategy?
	What is the impact of realignment on the Training and Doctrine Command training pipeline?
	What is the estimated cost of realignment?
	Are there any potential Army and Department Of Defense gross dollar savings?
	How will this realignment effect the Army's efforts towards transformation?
What impact can be anticipated on recruiting efforts for USAR and USA from the realignment?	

Table 11. Future Research Areas--Operation-Level Perspective

<b>OPERATIONAL LEVEL PERSPECTIVE</b>	<b>FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH</b>
	Will an ad-hoc career model or path be required until the Active Component Civil Affairs personnel management system can get ahead of the training curve?
	Ultimately, what will a successful realignment look like on the organizational and soldier level?
	How would the USAR culture and the USA culture be effectively meshed together?
	What DA Civilian workforce impact can be anticipated (re-locations, lay-off's, termination) from the realignment?
	What installation impacts can be anticipated from the realignment?
	What impact can be anticipated on recruiting efforts for USAR and USA from the realignment?

Table 12. Future Research Areas: Soldier-Level Perspective

<b>SOLDIER LEVEL PERSPECTIVE</b>	<b>FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH</b>
	What is the Active Component Civil Affairs enlisted soldiers career model or path look like? Is there such a career progression model for the Active Component Civil Affairs enlisted soldier? If not, why not?
	How will Active Component Civil Affairs officer and enlisted promotion rates change after a capabilities realignment?
	How many active component CA officer branch qualifying positions will be created by a realignment of capabilities?
	How will Reserve Component Civil Affairs officer and enlisted promotion rates change after a capabilities realignment?
	If new soldiers are drafted into new positions in the Active Component Civil Affairs environment, how will they be rated, promoted, assigned and trained in relationship to their new peers?
	Ultimately, what will a successful realignment look like on the organizational and soldier level?
	How will career progression be positively and negatively impacted through this realignment?
	How would the USAR culture and the USA culture be effectively meshed together?
	What DA Civilian workforce impact can be anticipated (re-locations, lay-off's, termination) from the realignment?
	What installation impacts can be anticipated from the realignment?

To summarize, it became apparent to the investigator that both the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army identified the Civil Affairs capability as a mission requirement after 11 September 2001. However, since that time an incomplete plan has been drafted to realign and restructure these types of capabilities into the Active Component. The investigator determined the plan to be incomplete simply for the following reasons:

1. No published career progression model for Active or Reserve Component Civil Affairs soldiers, officer and enlisted.
2. Current career progression guidance still operates with pre-11 September 2001 mindset utilizing irrelevant career model(s).
3. No detailed figures or impact analysis available below United States Army Reserve Command level.
4. No relevant or available detailed discussion of realignment impacts from senior leaders.

Based on the above, it appears to be obvious that no all-inclusive plan exists for the realignment of Civil Affairs capabilities from the Reserve Component to the Active Component. However, the Civil Affairs capability mission requirements still exist and the plan that has been developed will be implemented with future fixes and adjustments to be implemented as they are developed.

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