Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy: Totalitarian Menace or Monolithic Illusion? An Analysis of the Axis Coalition
Abstract
Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 irrevocably changed the European geopolitical framework. After 1935, Mussolini would come increasingly under Hitler's influence. Hitler would also begin to free Germany from the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and Anglo-French encirclement. Using 1935 as a point of departure, this thesis traces the development of the Italo-German coalition, its strategic interests, outlook, commonalities, and areas of contention. The advance of Italo-German interests during from 1935 to the beginning of the Second World War--an era characterized by the Great Depression and appeasement--also created an aura of totalitarian success and collaboration. The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Rhineland (1936), Austria (1937), Czechoslovakia (1938), and Albania (1939) lent credence to this perception. This period was also critical to Germany and Italy's efforts in building a coalition. Based on an examination of strategic interests and outlooks, this thesis analyzes Germany and Italy's mutual efforts at developing their partnership. It also examines their strategic decision-making apparatus to determine their ability to effectively implement strategic decisions. Thus, this thesis examines the relationship between the Axis partners, the basis of their coalition based on strategic interests, and the organizational environment in their respective countries to develop and implement strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 17, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA428878
Entities
People
- James L. Burch
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College