

THE ROLE OF RELATIVELY SMALL-SCALE FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS
IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF RELATIVELY SMALL-SCALE FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS IN
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The challenges of multinational land operations are to integrate various force contributions that are different in organization, capability, and size. This situation creates problems for smaller nations with limited ability to provide larger scale force contributions.

The experiences from the case studies point towards several problem areas but they also indicate areas where relatively smaller scale forces can provide meaningful contributions.

This thesis concludes that smaller nations should take advantage of distinctive national capabilities and prioritize responsive small-scale niche capabilities that are organized, equipped, and trained for rapid integration in multinational formations. Dependent of the mission, integration can be done in two ways: either direct integration to the multinational land force structure or indirectly through bilateral or multinational established medium-sized forces, which in turn can be integrated in a multinational formation.

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ACRONYMS

AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CIS	Communication and Information system
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DCI	Defense Capability Initiative
FM	Field Manual
FSO	Full-Spectrum Operation
IFOR	Implementation Force
INTERFET	Intervention Force in East Timor
JP	Joint Publication
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PEO	Peace Enforcement Operation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PO	Peace Operation
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
STANAG	Standardization Agreement
QSTAG	Quadripartite Standardization Agreement

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Where commonality of interests exists, nations will enter political, economic, and military partnerships. These partnerships can occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek to opportunities to promote their national interests or seek mutually security against real or perceived threats.¹

ABCA Coalition Handbook

Background

The world has changed over the last decades. The risks of large-scale conventional military aggression against the Western democracies are greatly reduced; the traditional national territorial defense makes neither military nor political sense any longer. The times of the large-scale army--the heritage from Napoleon--are vanished.

The imposed stability of the Cold War has been replaced by instability of the multipolar world with its multidimensional threats.² International terrorism has become the major security challenge of the twenty-first century. Additional challenges are international organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery. Less obvious, but important, are mass displacement of people, ethnic, and cultural conflicts, habitually involving actors not identifiable as states or countries--nonstate actors. Hence, future security challenges represent a wide span of diverse and unpredictable threats, which in short can be characterized as complexity.³

International security policy recognizes and emphasizes the importance of regional stability and the necessity to deal with such threats. Attempts to avoid or prevail

in diverse conflicts that may occur are dependent on international involvement mutual endeavor. In this context, the benefits of international contribution can be described as:

All participants bring certain individual contributions to the table. However, mission cannot be accomplished without the total-sum of all parts. This total-sum builds synergy.⁴

Furthermore, establishment of long-term stability in conflict areas requires coordinated and effective use of all instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) means. Recent experiences, related to the increased number of smaller scale operations, underline the fact that military forces cannot solve these problems alone.

On the strategic level, however, gaining mutual agreements among different nations will be difficult, and the political process in such situations will provide significant friction and hamper effective international involvement. Though involved nations have different expectations and pursue conflicting agendas, it is not unproblematic or sometimes even possible to achieve consensus upon mutual goals. On the other hand, participation in a coalition, ideally based on humanitarian aspects with United Nations (UN) endorsement, may play a significant role as the nations strive for acceptable agreements and thereby act as an integrated part of the international community.⁵ In addition, legitimacy is also of vital importance, and today, the reaction of democratic states depends heavily on how their governments and peoples' perceive the legitimacy of the combatant's actions. From a European perspective, this was clearly illustrated by the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999.⁶

In the face of these and other difficulties, the process, though slow and rarely one hundred percent effective has been to rely on international laws and organizations as a

foundation from which solutions can be built, solutions with which most of the involved actors can live. Democratic values and norms have frequently been used as a basis from which to form potential lasting solutions to conflicts, as has been done in the Balkans and other conflict areas.

In short, attainable political agreements will normally require harmonization of the various national agendas and motives of the involved nations. International complex connections and relationships appear to be the norm that have evolved in an increasingly globalized world, with its intricate web of economic, informational, and diplomatic relationships.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, an increasing number of multinational operations have taken place in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Multinational operations for most smaller Western nations' forces have become the norm, not the exception. Even though multinational operations, from a military perspective, are being received with skepticism, the political foundations for such operations are a reality, and thereby the situation military leaders are facing. However, in a historical perspective, coalitions have been characterized as the small nation's problem, with limited ability to influence the strategic and operational thinking of large powers. It is, however, important to realize that coalitions are not only a one-sided relationship. Small nations also benefit from coalition warfare, such as assistance of very large powers and the opportunity to participate in major conflicts,⁷ as well as the opportunity to exert international influence. This situation creates serious challenges for smaller nations--the coalition's junior partner.

During the Cold war, many Western European nations based their security policy solely upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and collective defense as the

main security guarantor. The defense budgets within the NATO nations were relatively stable for many decades, but the end of the Cold War changed this situation radically. Smaller nations with limited economies and other social needs, reduced defense spending. In addition, modern forces are becoming increasingly capital intensive. Consequently, this situation is leading smaller nations to a marginalized position and confronts military leaders with a unique set of challenges and demands.⁸

From a military perspective, the new security challenges have resulted in a paradigm shift from a narrow military focus to a broader and more international perspective. Due to the development towards more asymmetrical threats, force projection tends to be the most likely response, which again dictates a requirement for adapted capabilities with high degree of flexibility, mobility, and effectiveness.⁹

This thesis will primarily address the challenges related to relatively small-scale niche capabilities and their role within multinational force structures. The approach of the addressed challenges will be as seen from a smaller nation's perspective. This chapter--chapter 1--embodies an introduction that states the nature of the problem and defines restrictive research limits, including definitions and assumptions. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of literature relevant to the research topic. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used to resolve the problem. Chapters 4 and chapter 5 comprise the heart of the thesis. These chapters seek to answer both the primary and secondary questions.

Definitions

Alliance: The result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for more broad, long term objectives which further the common interests of the (alliance) members.¹⁰

Coalition: An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.¹¹

Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO): The range of operations army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war. FSO operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.¹²

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW): Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.¹³

Multinational Operations: A collective term used to describe military actions conducted by forces from two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of an alliance or coalition.¹⁴

Peace building: Postconflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.¹⁵

Peace Enforcement Operations (PEOs): Apply military force, or threaten its use--normally pursuant to international authorization--to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike Peacekeeping Operations, PEOs do not require the consent of all parties. PEOs maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.¹⁶

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): Operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of

cease-fire, truce, or other such agreements and to support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlements.¹⁷

Peace Operations (POs): A broad term that encompasses PKOs and PEOs conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.¹⁸

Stability Operations: The ability of army forces to stabilize a crisis is directly related to their perceived ability to attack and defend as necessary.¹⁹

Assumptions

The first assumption is that future security challenges will require the use of military forces, and participation--force contribution--from several nations will be of political and strategic importance.

The second assumption is that multinational operations will be the norm in the foreseeable future, and integration of forces will be a major challenge in these operations.

The third assumption is that the ongoing transformational process, and consequent force reductions, will constrain smaller nations from providing larger-scale force contributions to multinational formations.

Limitations

This thesis does not get into detailed arguments and explanations in order to better illustrate trends and experiences and to provide possible solutions.

In this thesis, the experiences and lessons learned from the three case studies are mainly found in various articles and published reports, most of US origin, but supplemented by NATO, Australian and British documentation. This restriction limits the broad perspective, but as these experiences reflect the multinational aspects of the

operations, they make it sufficient, to provide a conceptual perspective of military operations

The chosen operations are used to illustrate different aspects of multinational operations, without any detailed description of how events unfolded. Such details would detract from a principal view and impede the clarity of the research. The object is to perceive trends and to use them to answer the research questions.

A detailed military solution for the Norwegian Army is not the focus of this paper, even though Norway is being used as a reference nation: a typically small nation with a limited force structure. The scope of this thesis is conceptual--primarily of relevance for smaller Western industrialized nations with access to modern technology. The research focuses solely on multinational force projection operations, and does not include individual territorial security requirements for national defense.

This thesis will not aim to analyze implications of the balance of smaller nations force structures. This will be addressed as a recommendation for further research.

Significance of the Study

The importance of multinational operations is highlighted in most Western nations, including US, and in the foreseeable future will be the type of operations with which military commanders will have to deal with. Traditionally, force integration on the tactical level, apart from peacekeeping missions, has from a military point of view been a situation that has been avoided. The new security challenges and the ongoing transformation processes facing most Western military forces, imply that multinational force contributions to a greater extent will be integrated in future operations.

Furthermore, limited force contributions could aggravate the cohesion and thereby the combat effectiveness of multinational formations. Although doctrine and operational concepts mainly are developed by large nations, the smaller nations with limited resources and ability to provide force contributions will have to find their own approach in order to be able to provide relevant forces to multinational formations.

In acknowledgment of these challenges, it is of utmost importance that future multinational forces obtain the optimal combat effectiveness. The force contributions will therefore have to be flexible and capable to provide the required capabilities.

¹The American-British-Canadian-Australian Program, *ABCA Coalition Operational Handbook* (Arlington: Primary Standardization Office, 2001), ix.

²Brigadier General Tom Knutsen, “Hard Choices: How Much, How Hard?”, in *A Second Aerospace Century: Choices for the Smaller Nations*, ed. Lars A. Olsen (Trondheim: The Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, 2001), 259.

³Philip A. Sabin, “The Changing Face of Conflict”, in *A Second Aerospace Century: Choices for the Smaller Nations*, ed. Lars A. Olsen (Trondheim: The Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, 2001), 79

⁴Cornelius Easter, *Organizational Climate Building and Cultural Integration in Coalition Warfare* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1996), 19.

⁵Sabin, “The Changing Face of Conflict”, in *A Second Aerospace Century*, 95.

⁶*Ibid.*, 94.

⁷Richard Overy, “Coalition Warfare: The Small Countries’ Contribution,” in *From Manoeuvre Warfare to Kosovo?* ed. Lars A. Olsen (Trondheim: The Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, 2001), 141, 148.

⁸Norwegian Defence Minister, Kristin Krohn Devold, *What We Want and Where We’re Aiming: Goals and Priorities for the Defense Policy in 2003* (Hva vi vil og hvor vi skal: Mål og prioriteringer for forsvarspolitikken i 2003), Speech in Oslo Military Society, Oslo, 6 January 2003.

⁹Nils Størkersen, *Mine Warfare at Sea: A Norwegian Niche Capability within NATO* (Minekrig til sjøs: En norsk nisjekapasitet i NATO), Speech in Oslo Military Society, Oslo, 10 March 2003.

¹⁰Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense 2000), GL 4.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army, 2001), 1-4, 1-15.

¹³Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 2001), GL-13.

¹⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 2000), VII-1.

¹⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 1999), GL-7.

¹⁶FM 3-0, *Operations*, 9-7.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 9-21.

¹⁸JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, GL-8.

¹⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 2003), 9-17.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

To approach the primary question whether small-scale niche capabilities are relevant force contributions to multinational operations, the basis of this thesis relies upon doctrine, primarily of US and NATO origin. This chapter will initially review the most relevant doctrinal publications, and subsequently answer the following secondary questions: what are multinational operations, what are the capability requirements for ground forces across the full spectrum of operations, and what are the consequences of integrating force elements into a multinational force structure?

Thereafter, the chapter consists of a review of literature that addresses the experiences from the multinational operations being used in the thesis. The material covers selected case studies and is provided from a combination of books, public statements, internal government documents, and published articles in military journals, or foreign affairs publications.

Review of Doctrine

US doctrine consists of a substantial hierarchy of up to date doctrinal publications that cover all services and operations across the range of conflict, including multinational operations. The doctrinal publications are developed from the perspective of a dominant power reflecting the military dominance and resources of the US Armed Forces. Consequently, the multinational aspects of the US doctrine hierarchy are to some extent limited to a lead nation role and thereby not directly applicable for smaller nations. To complete the perspective provided by US doctrine, an examination must be made of doctrine that covers multinational diversities and would be more useful to smaller

nations. NATO doctrine is developed for multinational operations within the framework of the Alliance, and covers the operational and tactical levels of multinational operations. NATO doctrine also serves as the basis for national doctrine development for NATO members, as well as Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations. The influence of NATO doctrine among the Western European nations is thereby significant. Another aspect of NATO doctrine is that the US, as a NATO member, affects NATO doctrine development. US and NATO publications are thereby to some extent complementary.

Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*,¹ provides guidance and principles for the US Armed Forces when operating as part of a multinational force and describes multinational operations. The publication describes the fundamentals of multinational operations and reviews multinational command relationships as well as considerations for planning and execution of multinational operations. Chapter 1 addresses the various types of multinational operations--war, MOOTW and others--while chapter 3 describes considerations for planning and execution of multinational operations, especially command relationships and command and control structure of multinational operations. Specific political and military considerations during planning and execution of operations are: capabilities, integration, and employment. The publication identifies the operational land forces capabilities to be: operational mobility; interoperability; versatility, and sustainability.

Field Manual 3-16 (100-8), *Multinational Operations*,² provides guidance for Army operations in a multinational environment across the full range of military operations. The manual addresses the Army's roles and functions within a multinational operation: multinational leadership, command relationships, including possible command

relationships, and key functional planning considerations. This manual is primarily based on the *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*.

Allied Joint Publication-3, *Allied Joint Operations*,³ describes the fundamental operational aspects of joint operations and provides guidance on the conduct of the full range of military operations at the operational level. Chapter 1 addresses the nature of allied joint operations, while command and control is discussed in chapter 2. Furthermore, chapter 6 addresses termination and post-conflict operations. This publication addresses the joint capabilities to be: command and control (C2), intelligence, planning, maneuver, fires, targeting, information operations (IO), logistics, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), and press and information (PI).

*ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*⁴ is designed for the nations--US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand--when serving together in any coalition. The ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook (COH) provides coalition commanders and staff with general information on important topics for coalition operations, and is a reference for fundamental issues and interfaces that coalition partners have to cover to create an effective fighting force. Due to differences in national doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), this publication serves as a reference manual of fundamental issues and interfaces that must be addressed to conduct successful coalition operations. Furthermore, the manual incorporates information from the Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs) and Advisory Publications (QAPs), which are standards that have been developed within specific areas to bridge the gap and thereby reduce operational friction among these nations forces.⁵ The challenge of multinational operations is to orchestrate various forces with differences in organization, capabilities, and doctrine.⁶

The content of this publication is quite similar to FM 3-16 (100-8), *Multinational Operations*.

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*,⁷ defines full-spectrum operations to be: offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Any operation will consist of elements from all types of operations. The nature of the mission will, however, dictate the proportion and relationship between these types of military action. The elements of combat power include: maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and information. All land forces should be capable of conducting operations across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Doctrine Analysis

The central idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to be sound must be principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance.⁸

J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*

Doctrine consists of fundamental principles for military forces that serve as a guide for actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but it is important to understand that application requires sound judgment.⁹ Based upon this, one must realize that doctrine does not provide solutions to every military problem. Nevertheless, doctrine is essential because it serves as a keystone whereon operational concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are based. The nature of multinational operations requires a common platform to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort. The purpose of multinational doctrine is therefore to create the common basis for effective planning, coordination and execution of missions in a multinational frame.

A multinational operation is defined in Joint Publication 3-16 as: “a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually

undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.”¹⁰ Based on this definition, multinational operations can be broken into two categories: alliance or coalition. Furthermore, the Joint Publication 3-16 defines an alliance as: “the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the (alliance) members.”¹¹ NATO serves as perhaps the best-known example of an alliance, and the Alliance has developed and refined Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) to deal with a broad range of procedures of interoperability. The long-term perspective and mutual knowledge among the alliance member nations makes multinational cooperation significantly smoother compared to coalitions. A coalition is, according to Joint Publication 3-16, defined as: “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.”¹² The nature of coalitions is generally short-term with limited objectives. A consequence of the short-term perspective, coalition partners will normally not have any established, formal procedures and standardization agreements. Instead of depending on formalized relationships, coalitions will to a greater degree, depend upon cooperation and coordination. Coalition actions will therefore present military leaders with significant complexity and challenges related to difference in doctrine, organizations, and operational concepts. In this thesis, the term multinational operations will be used to cover both coalition and alliance actions.

Capability is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as: “the ability to execute a specified course of action.”¹³ Consequently, the capability requirement is dependent on the specific mission and the operational environment, and will therefore vary from operation to operation. To provide the necessary versatility the capability of the land

forces must be capable of conducting full-spectrum operations--war and MOOTW. Although the capability requirements are stated somewhat differently in the various doctrine publications, there is a common view that the capabilities of land forces at the tactical level are based upon combined arms. At the operational level, the joint capabilities are dependent on the interaction and cooperation between the services. Consequently, the role of multinational force contributions in multinational operations will be to provide required capabilities either at the tactical level--combined arms--or enabling capabilities at the joint level.

Integration is defined in Field Manual 100-17-3 to be: “the synchronized transfer of authority over units and forces to a designated component or functional commander for employment in theater of operations.”¹⁴ The prerequisites for unit integration are that: the unit must become operational and mission-ready and the unit must be absorbed into the joint force.¹⁵ In short, this means that the force contributions must be in place in the theater before integration can take place. In an out of area operation, strategic and operational mobility--by air or sea--is a requirement to make the force contribution available for the multinational commander. Rapid integration is critical to the success of operations that depend upon quick response action. Adequate planning and coordination can contribute to greatly reducing the integration time. In accordance with NATO doctrine, successful integration of multinational forces will rely on common doctrine, standardized equipment and procedures. Future operations will, however, most likely involve troops of many nations, principally from member nations, but also from partner countries.¹⁶ Successful multinational operations will, according to doctrine, primarily require capabilities that cover the full spectrum of conflict combined with the ability to

deploy forces that enable timely integration of the multinational force. All publications underline the necessity that the forces have the equipment, personnel and multinational training to successfully carry out their tasks. The force commander will play an important role in building the required confidence and mutual understanding that is necessary for successful multinational cooperation.

Case Studies

The case studies that are being used are: Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Stabilise, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The selection of these operations is based upon the point that all these operations represent a wide variety of missions in different operational environments, as well as, that they cover different multinational force structures. They all demonstrate modern operations--peace enforcement and combat. Other multinational missions, for example Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, could have been used. However, these operations are not fundamentally different from the operations being used in this thesis and would as such, not provide any significantly different perspectives.

The literature covering the case studies sifts and sorts some information on the experiences from the various operations. Some of the literature this thesis builds on is of US origin. In other instances, however, the thesis relies heavily on Australian, British or NATO literature to diversify and complete the picture. The material provides various perspectives to the major viewpoints.

Operation Joint Endeavor

Operation Joint Endeavor represents an important milestone regarding peace operations. It was NATO's first ground force operation, the first "out of area"

deployment operation, and the first joint operation with NATO's Partnership for Peace nations and other non-NATO countries, including Russia.

*Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*¹⁷ edited by Larry K. Wentz, is a book consisting of a series of articles dealing with challenges facing US and NATO personnel during Operation Joint Endeavor. This book covers the lessons learned from the first NATO led coalition peace support operation--Implementation Force (IFOR)--conducted by NATO, US, its allies, and coalition members. The summarized findings, insights and lessons are based on interviews of personnel and personal experiences, covering both US and NATO. Study insights and results are provided to doctrine developers, as well as for use at all levels of professional schooling. To some degree this book covers the aspects of smaller scale force contributions in this operation.

*Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review Conference Report*¹⁸ is an overview of the essence from the Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review conference that examines the strategic implications of Operation Joint Endeavor. The focus of this report is the planning, preparation, deployment and early entry operations from a US perspective. The intent of the report is to serve as a source document for planners of future peace operations. From a US perspective, Operation Joint Endeavor is characterized as a huge success in terms of US PfP relations. Nevertheless, the numerous improvisations and ad hoc solutions have formed the basis for the issues and need further improvement. Even though the issues of this report reflect the US perspective, the findings include the multinational perspective as well as the PfP program.

Other relevant sources that address NATO experiences from Operation Joint Endeavor are covered in various articles in *NATO Review*.¹⁹

Operation Stabilise

Operation Stabilise is, in many perspectives, a “different” multinational peace operation where US force contributions shifted from a lead role to a discrete supporting role of the Australian-led coalition force on East Timor.

*From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and “New Age” Coalition Operation*²⁰ by Alan Ryan is a study that argues that coalition operations are the norm, and that the Australian Defence Force must be configured to participate in coalition operations. The author emphasizes that experiences from operations in the Gulf and the Balkans have demonstrated the need for an appropriate, conventional ground-force capability. The key to success for future coalition operations is that force-contributing nations need to design their forces accordingly, and produce commanders with cross-cultural skills, participate in training programs and develop shared doctrine. Furthermore, the lessons of coalition operations underline the requirement for military preparedness and the ability to sustain land operations.

*“Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor”*²¹ by Alan Ryan, is a study that examines the Australian Defence Force experience acting as a lead nation for the International Force East Timor. This mission provided the greatest test of the Australian Defence Force capabilities in helping to form and manage the coalition and deploy troops to East Timor. The findings, insights and lessons are based on interviews of key military personnel who were involved in INTERFET. The main experiences from an Australian perspective are that the ability to undertake extensive ground-force operations requires access to sufficient strategic lift, even in a littoral environment. The operation also

demonstrated the need for Australia to optimize its capabilities by developing the ability to integrate capabilities held by partners and providing complementary support to them. Last but not least, specific doctrine for coalition operations must be developed as well as more integrated training with potential partners.

*Australian Army Cooperation with the Land Forces of the United States – Problems of the Junior Partner*²² by Alan Ryan, is a working paper that outlines some of the historical lessons that the Australian Army has derived from its role as a junior partner in its military relationship with United States. As a small military force with limited resources, the Australian Defence Force can only make the most of its capabilities by establishing complementary synergies with other armed forces. The INTERFET operation demonstrated that US contribution with its unique range of capabilities made it possible for Australia to accomplish its role as a lead nation. Furthermore, the new security challenges and commitment to the War on Terrorism underlines the necessity for defense preparedness. Future requirements will therefore have to go beyond merely establishing tactical interoperability with its major partners.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation Iraqi Freedom is an ongoing operation that demonstrates that the capability requirements of coalition forces have to cover a wide spectrum, including high intensity warfighting. Peace operations of the last decade have misled some to believe that this type of combat capability is no longer required.

*The “Instant Lessons” of the Iraq War: Main Report*²³ by Anthony H. Cordesman is a report that raises lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom. As the operations are ongoing, the author underlines that judgments about the final success of the operation

will be apparent at a later stage. The report is primarily based on data and official statements from the Department of Defense, the US Central Command, the British Ministry of Defense, and the Australian Ministry of Defense. However, many of the key details of the combat--tactics, the integration of combined and joint arms--are still not available. The use of these lessons will therefore require judgments from the reader. Nevertheless, the lessons, as used in this book, are most likely relevant to acquire an overall impression of the challenges related to the coalition forces combat operations. The final outcome of the post-conflict operations will be more unpredictable. One of the interesting aspects of this book is that it cover not only US operations and experiences, but also the British and Australian. As such, this documentation provides a broad perspective and cover different levels of force contributions of this operation.

*Operations in Iraq: First Reflections*²⁴ is a report aiming to set out an account of the operation to date, and provide some early indicators of the British lessons for the future. As such, the report reflects the lessons for the campaign so far in Operation Enduring Freedom (or Operation Telic, as it was known in the UK). The report covers the UK planning and preparations and the operation phase, as well as, equipment capability and logistics. The UK role as a coalition partner and the cooperation is described in this report.

Other relevant sources that address experiences from Operation Iraqi Freedom are covered in various articles in *Jane's Intelligence Review*.²⁵

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 2000).

²Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-16 (100-8), *Multinational Operations* (CGSOC Draft-Not for Implementation) (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army, 2003).

³North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, AJP-3, *Allied Joint Operations* (Ratification Draft 2) (Brussels: NATO Standardisation Agency, 2001).

⁴The American-British-Canadian-Australian Program, *ABCA Coalition Operation Handbook* (Arlington.: Primary Standardization Office, 2001).

⁵*Ibid.*, i-ii.

⁶*Ibid.*, A-1.

⁷Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army, 2001).

⁸J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1993), 254 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

⁹ AJP-3, *Allied Joint Operations*, GL 5.

¹⁰JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, GL 4.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 2003).

¹⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-17-3, *Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army, 1999), 6-1.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 51.

¹⁷Larry K. Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998).

¹⁸US Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review Report, 19 May – 23 May 1996* [report on-line]; available from <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/bosrep2a.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 Oct 03.

¹⁹Leighton W. Smith, "The Pillars of Peace in Bosnia," *Nato Review* no. 4 (July 1996): 11-16 [article on-line]; available from <http://nato.int/docu/review/1996/9604-3.htm>; Internet; accessed on 28 January 2004.

²⁰Alan Ryan, Study Paper No. 302, *From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and "New Age" Coalition Operations* (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000).

²¹Alan Ryan, Study Paper No. 304, "Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks" *Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor* (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000).

²²Alan Ryan, Working Paper No. 121, *Australian Army Cooperation with the Land Forces of United States: Problems of the Junior Partner* (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2003).

²³Anthony H. Cordesman, *The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War: Main Report*, Eight Working Draft: 14 May 2003 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003).

²⁴Ministry of Defence, *Operations in Iraq: First Reflections* (London: Director General Corporate Communication, 2003).

²⁵Jane's Information Group, "Security and Foreign Forces: Iraq," 20 November 2003 [article on-line]; available from <http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp/K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/gulfsu/iraqs150>; Internet; accessed on 18 December 2003.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The thesis is an exercise in qualitative analysis. It studies a problem that requires the collection of information that cannot necessarily be dissected and explained through empirical approaches and methods. The sources of information include a variety of books and articles that must be interpreted and analyzed. Specific issues and details are not as important as the broad perspective and trend development.

The study has adhered to the steps that the scientific method demands. The steps include: identification and isolation of the problem; development of a hypothesis; collection and classification of information and its sources; discussion and arguments on the information found; development of conclusions; and presentation of the aforementioned steps in an organized format.

The primary question queries whether relatively small-scale niche capabilities are relevant force contributions to multinational operations. To establish a foundation for evaluating the relevance of smaller force contributions, the secondary questions were formulated to provide partial answers, and as such, provide building blocks to answer the primary question. The secondary questions are:

1. What are multinational operations?
2. What are the capability requirements for ground forces across the full spectrum of operations?
3. What are the consequences of integrating multinational force elements, and how does it affect the capabilities of the multinational force?

4. What force contributions have smaller nations committed to multinational operations, and what capabilities did they provide?
5. What were the military implications of integrating these multinational contributions?
6. How can the identified problem areas be improved to reduce the multinational friction in future operations?

The nature and sequence of the secondary questions were chosen to allow for a systematic approach for getting to the primary question. Their order reflects a logical progression in which the answer to one question provides the building block for the next. The analysis is twofold. The first part is a doctrine analysis to examine the doctrinal foundation of multinational operations and as such, answers the first three secondary research questions. The second part will answer the latter secondary questions. It consists of three case studies of multinational military operations during the last decade: Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, and Iraq. These three examples offer a wide range of the type of conflicts in which the international society is most likely to engage: a NATO-led peace operation, an Australian-led humanitarian intervention, and a US-led major theater war with limited aims. The ongoing natures of these operations make final success or failure difficult to measure. However, all these operations provide useful data for the study that is within the scope of this thesis.

The thesis intent is to explore origins, trends, implications, and possible consequences. The analysis rests on information found in the literature review and various documentary citations. The thesis is based on open-source materials. The governing assumption is that the information found in open sources captures the salient

elements of authenticity. The argument is theoretical, with all the advantages and limitations of such an approach.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS

This chapter covers three case studies: Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Stabilise, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. These case studies serve as basis for the analysis and will answer the following secondary questions: what force contributions have typically smaller nations provided, what were the military implications of integrating these multinational force contributions, and how can the identified problem areas be improved in advance of future operations?

Today, there is a prevailing recognition that the main challenge to effective cooperation between US, allied forces, and other coalition partners is related to the increasing capability gap, especially in the field of technology. As a result of this, the NATO established the Defence Capability Initiative (DCI). To bridge the capability gap, the DCI identified the five fundamental problem areas to be: mobility and deployability; sustainability; effective engagement; survivability; and interoperable communications.¹ Mobility and deployability refer to the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are needed, while sustainability is the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases, and to ensure sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations. Effective engagement depends upon the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations, while survivability is the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats. Interoperable communications addresses the requirement for command, control and information systems that are compatible, to enable forces from different nations to work effectively together.

As the identified capability initiatives also reflect problem areas facing smaller nations' contribution in multinational operations, these five areas are used as reference for the analysis of the operations.

Operation Joint Endeavor

The Operation

Operation Joint Endeavor was the first NATO-led operation in history, the first out-of-area deployment, the first significant cooperation with other international organizations, and the Alliance's first peace operation.² The joint multinational force in Bosnia was called the Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter--peace enforcement--and the UN mandate was to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The tasks of IFOR were to: ensure continued compliance with the cease-fire; ensure the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to respective territories, and ensure the separation of forces; ensure collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilization of remaining forces; create conditions for the safe, orderly, and speedy withdrawal of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that were not transferred to the NATO-led IFOR; and maintain control the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina.³

To accomplish the mission, the IFOR headquarters (HQ) divided the area of operations (AO) into three division sectors. The three sectors were: the US-led Multinational Division (North) (MND(N)), the British-led Multinational Division (South East) (MND(SE)), and the French-led Multinational Division (South West) (MND(SW)). Operation Joint Endeavor began on 16 December 1995, and was limited to twelve

months. On 20 December 1996, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR. While the role of IFOR had been to enforce the peace agreement, the role of SFOR was to continue this process and stabilize the peace.

International Force Contribution

The multinational IFOR contribution, consisting of approximately 60,000 troops from thirty-five countries, was a military milestone for NATO. The significant size of IFOR was necessary to provide a relative military parity in the region. For the first time since World War II, American and Russian forces shared a common mission. In addition, all sixteen NATO nations, as well as, eighteen PfP nations, participated in this operation. The overwhelming force contribution to this operation underlined the international importance, but from a NATO perspective, the wide variety of NATO and non-NATO force contributions represented significant challenges.

The main contributing nations, US, UK, and France, provided approximately brigade size formations. These formations included divisional headquarters, infantry, artillery, engineers, army aviation, as well as, logistics and transportation units. The main force contributions from smaller nations were typically maneuver units--mechanized infantry battalions and smaller units. To illustrate the span of force contributions, Spain and Turkey each provided two mechanized infantry battalions, while the Baltic nations--Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia--each contributed one infantry platoon.




Figure 1. Ground Force Contribution: Operation Joint Endeavor

Figure 1 shows the various types and size of multinational ground forces that contributed in the operation. The multinational contributions were organized as brigade or battle groups (BGs) within the three MNDs, employed and tasked in accordance with their distinctive capabilities. Despite the absence of combat actions, the IFOR mission--implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement--required a combat capable force, but just as important was the requirement for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) capabilities. The force contributions indicate, however, that relatively few smaller nations provided CS and CSS units to the operation. Finland Norway, and Canada, was the only smaller nations that provided engineer and logistics units of

battalion size. Germany's contribution in this field was significant, and included a field hospital, one engineer battalion, one transport battalion, and one logistics battalion, as well as, one army aviation battalion. In addition, SOF, engineer, and transportation units were task organized as multinational force elements due to requirements for additional capabilities in these areas. The lead nations of the three MNDs--US, Britain, and France--provided other capability shortcomings, especially command, control, communications and information (C3I).

Experiences from the Operation

From a smaller nation's perspective, Operation Joint Endeavor provided important lessons related to multinational cooperation in the fields of logistics, combat capability, and interoperable communications.

Logistics

The general principle of logistics in multinational operations is that this is a national responsibility. All nations that commit forces to a multinational operation should therefore--according to doctrine--be independent in this field. This is, however, not the reality of most multinational operations, and Operation Joint Endeavor was no exception. Many smaller nations have problems in providing independent force contributions that are capable to fully support battalion, or even company size formations, in an out of area operation. This is partly a result of lack of responsive, deployable CSS assets, as well as, deficiencies in available strategic lift. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was aware of this problem and organized a series of force planning conferences to ensure that the requisite capabilities were in place prior to the mission. Despite this effort, the force generation process resulted in a force structure with significant weakness

in the CSS structure. The capability shortcomings were primarily within the areas of logistics, medical, military police and civil affairs (CA). As an example, Turkey and Norway were the only smaller force contribution nations that provided logistic units of battalion size to the operation. Germany's contribution was primarily logistics capabilities, consisting of a field hospital, one transportation battalion, one logistics battalion, and one army aviation battalion.⁴ Other nations--for example Greece, Austria and Luxemburg--provided transportation companies and smaller size units. Another factor that aggravated the logistics problems was the stove piped national logistics arrangements. Most nations established their respective national support elements (NSEs), but insufficient coordination, lead to duplicated CSS capabilities in some areas, while others were not sufficiently covered. Insufficient transportation and maintenance capability limited the various nations' ability to provide timely support to their respective units.

This situation required action from IFOR. The CSS organization had to be adjusted to make it more efficient. To meet the operational requirements, the CSS shortfalls were covered by a combination of task organized multinational CSS units, as well as, the three MND lead nations were assigned responsibility for coordinating support for the various brigades and battalions to work in their sector. An IFOR Commander for support was established to coordinate the sustainment, movements, medical, engineering, and contracting operations of the national logistic elements, as well as, commanding selected multinational IFOR CSS units.⁵ From a smaller nation's perspective, this underlines that CSS units represent an important capability within a multinational formation.

The task organized Nordic Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade--consisted of contributions from Poland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland--realized that close cooperation and coordination were required to meet the operational requirements of the brigade. The respective NSEs were therefore all co-located in Pecs, Hungary, and established the NORDPOL Multinational Support Element (MNSE). This support element operated in accordance with the framework nation model. In short, the framework model implies that each of the contributing nations is responsible for covering one or more functional areas. The funding was provided by the contributing nations in accordance with formal established agreements. In this specific case, the responsibility for the different classes of supply, transportation, maintenance, medical, and other areas, were divided between the contributing nations. The benefit from specific areas of responsibility was significant. As an example, units from Finland, Norway and Sweden all used the SISU armored personnel carriers (APCs). By having one nation--in this case, Finland--responsible for maintenance of this type of vehicle, the other nations could focus their effort in other areas. Similar arrangements in most areas of supply made the CSS organization more cost effective, and thereby capable to provide an increased level of support for the units of the NORDPOL Brigade. This framework CSS cooperation model represents an example of how multinational stove piped logistic arrangements can be reduced, and thereby decrease the requirement for independent national CSS capabilities.

Conclusion: Operation Joint Endeavor illustrates that CSS represents a major capability requirement that heavily affects the multinational formation's combat capability and sustainability, and thereby its ability to accomplish the mission. Those

nations, who provided battalion size CSS capabilities to IFOR--logistics, including transportation and medical--were highly valued and represent an example of relevant, but relatively smaller force contributions.

The MNSE framework model of the NORDPOL Brigade, based upon formal multinational agreements, was of significant advantage to effectively support the battalions of the brigade. This multinational cooperation model represents a cost effective method where the advantage from divided national responsibilities decreases the requirement for full national CSS responsibility.

Effective Engagement

Despite the lack of combat actions in Operation Joint Endeavor, the capability requirement for a peace enforcement operation (PEO) requires combat capable forces. The force commander must have the authority to use force to confront violence, in addition to having the ability and determination to defeat offending parties. This implies larger, better-equipped and interoperable forces that are able to possess a deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that has characterized traditional peacekeeping.⁶ However, national political restrictions, for example rules of engagement (ROE), will limit the commander's ability to fully exploit the units' capabilities. The IFOR structure comprised a wide variety of units and capabilities, whereof many without experiences from previous multinational cooperation or training with NATO member nations. Most multinational force contributions were successionaly integrated into different brigades or battle groups (BGs), as the operation was ongoing. Due to lack of multinational training, the task organized multinational BGs, brigades, and divisions were not fully capable of conducting combat operations in a combined arms frame.

A relevant example to illustrate this could be the NORDPOL Brigade, which was a subunit of the MND(N). As a task organized formation consisting of a combination of NATO and non-NATO contributions, the challenges related to different operational procedures, insufficient interoperability and limited mobile command and control systems were distinctive. Any operation that required unity of effort from more than one battalion was a time consuming process, and required extensive planning and detailed rehearsals. These problems were, however, significantly reduced after some months. This was partly achieved through establishing standard operational procedures (SOPs), whereof implementation of NATO terms and TTPs within the brigade was essential. In addition, an increased level of mutual understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the different units were achieved through internal command post exercises (CPXs). This effort was necessary to achieve full integration of the different national contributions, as well as, an adequate level of combat capability.

Another example where the benefit of multinational cooperation proved to be essential was in the field of fire support. Several incidents--ethnic clashes and demonstrations--were effectively dispersed by combat ground troops, supported by US attack helicopters. The helicopters were provided by MND(N), but directed by the brigade's organic tactical air control parties (TACPs). These teams are trained to direct all types of heavy fires--mortars, artillery, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft--and proved to be a very useful and flexible capability of the brigade. Consequently, smaller multirole teams, capable of utilizing available assets and capabilities, proved to be valuable and reduced the requirement for organic fire support.

The nature of the IFOR mission required qualitative intelligence analysis beyond the traditional military domain. Units' actions are, to a large degree intelligence driven. Unity of effort of the intelligence operations was achieved through multinational cooperation. These operations clearly demonstrated the ability and will of the NATO member nations to cooperate and leverage their resources in support of a common NATO mission.⁷ Several of the troop contributing nations provided essential intelligence services to IFOR through liaison officers (LNOs) supported by their national intelligence centers (NICs).⁸ The relatively small-scale human resource intelligence (HUMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT) elements proved effective and valuable intelligence collecting assets within the force structure. These HUMINT elements achieved information from their contact with civilians, as well, as traditional patrolling and surveillance missions. Technical systems, for example, SIGINT and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also proved to be important capabilities in enhancing the effectiveness of the intelligence operations.⁹ SIGINT was capable of detecting radio and telephone traffic, thereby, provided early warning to the ground troops, while UAVs were used both for area surveillance and live documentation of incidents. In combination, the synergy of these capabilities were key elements in providing the commander with needed information to ensure compliance of the former warring factions and direct own actions.

Conclusion: The force structure of IFOR represented a deterrent threat that was capable to confront violence and defeat offending parties despite different political restraints. However, the IFOR structure comprised a wide variety of forces and capabilities, many without any experiences from previous cooperation or training with NATO nations. In order to increase the combat capability of multinational formations

force contributions must be organized, equipped, and achieved a professional level of multinational cooperation through extensive training before they are committed to an operation.

The limited number of fire support assets was compensated through flexible use of attack helicopters, which proved to be a credible capability. Flexible use of helicopters proved to be most effective when directed and controlled by multirole TACPs that are trained and equipped to cooperate with aviation units.

The success of the intelligence operations was primarily a result of joint multinational planning and cooperation, as well as, flexibility and the resolve to overcome problems. Smaller scale HUMINT and SIGINT teams demonstrated their usefulness as very valuable intelligence collection sources.¹⁰

Interoperable Communications

Compatible communication and information systems (CIS) in multinational operations are a prerequisite for forces from different countries to communicate and work effectively together. Before Operation Joint Endeavor, NATO had never worked operationally with the non-NATO nations except for minor NATO PfP exercises. These PfP exercises had primarily focused on small scale, traditional PK missions, and comprised company size force contributions. Consequently, there were no existing procedures on how the CIS capabilities of the non-NATO nations would be accommodated and integrated into the IFOR operational network. The shortfalls of the existing NATO CIS infrastructure were well known at the start of the IFOR mission, and interoperability evolved to be a major challenge for the operation.¹¹

Due to the significant size of the force, no single NATO, or other nation, was capable of providing the entire single CIS infrastructure to support the operation. NATO therefore turned to the nations to assist in the form of experience, staff, and CIS capabilities. The US, Britain, and France played lead nation roles in this regard, and the operation could not have been successful without the extensive capabilities from these nations.¹² The large number of nations involved in the operation, whereof many without access to advanced technology, had significant interoperability, sharing, and operational effectiveness issues that NATO had to deal with.¹³ As an example, the non-NATO troop contributing nations did not have direct access to the IFOR CIS network, and a special network was therefore set up using the public switched network. However, as a result of the proliferation of different information systems, the CIS capabilities were not exploited due to lack of training and adequate understanding of the full potential of the systems being deployed. In short, there were too many systems and many were duplicative.¹⁴ On the tactical level, the requirement for broadband communications pipes to lower echelons was not adequate to meet operational dissemination needs, especially in the field of intelligence.¹⁵ However, military to military liaison and combined training exercises helped establish the framework for interoperability among the forces, particularly PfP nations, and cross-border movement of troops in the theater.

Conclusion: Interoperable communications depends on standard equipment and interfaces. Interoperability problems can to a certain degree be solved through ad-hoc improvisations, but will normally lead to significant weaknesses regarding information exchange capacity and reliability. NATO's interoperability trials and exercises must therefore continue to ensure that future NATO and US-led coalitions achieve a near real-

time, easy accessible, common picture of the battlefield for all coalition partners.¹⁶

Smaller nations must fully realize that extensive sharing of information and collaboration is necessary, and that various national CIS being purchased and used by the force contributing nations must have the capacity to meet the information requirements. Specific requirements for standardized systems and protocols to ensure technical interoperability will be a key issue to achieve interoperable communications and effective information exchange in future multinational operations.

Operation Stabilise

The Operation

On 15 September 1999, the UN Security Council authorized Australia to lead the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter-- peace enforcement. INTERFET intervened in East Timor from September 1999 to February 2000. The mandate of INTERFET was to restore peace and security of East Timor, and to protect and support the UN mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the organization tasked with administering the referendum; and within force capabilities, provide humanitarian assistance.¹⁷ The UN Security Resolution 1264 unequivocally underlined the multinational force to take all necessary measures to restore security in the crisis-ravaged territory of East Timor.¹⁸ Operation Stabilise was accomplished in February 2000 by the transition to UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

The military objectives for INTERFET were primarily to: establish and secure ports of entry (POEs) on East Timor; secure the border between West and East Timor, and thereby; cut off support for the Militia from West Timor.

International Force Contribution

The INTERFET contribution consisted of many relatively smaller force contributions from a wide variety of nations. The total force counted approximately 9,500 troops--air, maritime, and ground elements--from twenty-two countries, many of them from the Asia Pacific region. The tense and complex situation on East Timor required a force that was capable to deal with the existing threats. Combat operations were likely to occur, as well as, the humanitarian situation required focus and effort. Nevertheless, the multinational force contributions were primarily a wide variety of light combat units, and minor CS, and CSS elements.




Figure 2. Ground Force Contribution: Operation Stabilise

Figure 2 shows the various types and size of multinational ground forces that contributed in the operation. Based upon the mission and available forces, the AO was divided into three sectors--Sector East, Sector Central, and Sector West. The sectors were further divided into a total of six national battalion AORs. One of the unique challenges for a relatively smaller state, as Australia, taking the lead in organizing a multinational operation is the limited size of the national force structure and thereby limited CS and CSS capabilities to support the multinational formation. Due to limited multinational commitment of such capabilities, additional support from the US was crucial to accomplish the mission, especially in the fields of communications, intelligence, CA and heavy lift.¹⁹ The US Forces INTERFET (USFI) provided essential enabling capabilities, but the contribution did not include ground combat troops.

Experiences from the Operation

From a smaller nation's perspective, Operation Stabilise provided important lessons related to multinational cooperation in the fields of deployability, mobility, combat capability, and interoperability.

Mobility and Deployability

The nature of the humanitarian crisis on East Timor required rapid deployment of forces to restore security in the crisis-ravaged territory. The fact that two of the most central players in this operation--Australia and New Zealand--already had their forces in the proximity of the island enabled a swift deployment. The first elements of INTERFET landed on the island only five days after the UN had authorized Australia to take the lead of the operation. Multinational Special Forces elements from Australia, New Zealand and Britain were the first units on the ground. These units were in place and operating in the

AO prior to the deployment of the INTERFET main forces. Deployment of other multinational contributions was directed via Darwin, Australia, to conduct the final preparations including mission specific training, and to ensure the right sequencing of troop deployment into the AO. The deployment of combat ready forces into the AO was conducted through a combination of air and sealift, whereas the main bulk of troops, equipment and logistics were sealifted. Thereafter the flow of forces continued simultaneously with the build-up of logistics. The rapid deployment of INTERFET was to a large degree possible due to the US strategic lift assets that enabled many of the multinational contingents to deploy.²⁰ From an operational perspective one can argue that it is better that one or just a few nations provides the strategic lift capabilities. This could probably be acceptable in this specific operation, but the primary concern will be a situation where any rapid deployment totally depends on support from these few nations. Having more nations that are capable of providing contributions in this area will increase redundancy, as well as the total lift capacity. This does, however, not mean that all smaller nations must have these capabilities, but through bilateral agreements and force pooling, the overall level of capabilities, as well as, flexibility can be achieved.

Tactical mobility of the forces was, to a great extent, dependent on air mobility due to the harsh terrain and limited network of roads on East Timor. During the operation, the INTERFET conducted several company size airmobile operations to rapidly seize key areas and installations. Helicopters were also used to resupply the forces, and support the CIMIC operations, including humanitarian organizations. Utility helicopters proved to be an important capability and provided significant flexibility and

tactical mobility. This enabled the INTERET commander to conduct responsive actions, as well as, timely support of the ground units.

Tactical ground mobility is important in all military operations. Mobility outside the main roads was difficult, but all-terrain vehicles could be used in some areas. Armored personnel carriers, were however being used only by Australian troops in areas that were feasible for this type of vehicles. The combat vehicles also provided relevant protection and firepower for the troops. Responsive actions and flexibility were achieved through a combination of tactical air and ground mobility.

Conclusion: The success of Operation Stabilise depended on rapid deployment of forces. Australia depended on significant US strategic lift support to achieve a rapid deployment of forces into the theater of operations and simultaneously conduct logistics build up. Available strategic lift--by air and sea--at high state of readiness was a prerequisite for the successful accomplishment of the mission and should, to a greater extent, be prioritized also by smaller nations. The staging of force contributions in Darwin prior to deployment to East Timor was effective for final mission preparations and ensured a timely and sequenced deployment of combat ready forces into the AO.

The use of helicopters and APCs provided responsive and flexible air and ground mobility. Air mobility is required in most operations and utility helicopters are therefore, a valuable niche capability that should be prioritized by more nations.

Combat Capability

INTERFET encountered minimal armed resistance during the operation and the forces did not have to address the stress of sustained combat.²¹ However, the backbone of the INTERFET mission relied on a credible combat capability able of engaging offending

parties effectively. As the main bulk of combat units were light infantry units, they would heavily depend on heavy fire support if engaged by a robust adversary force. As the INTERFET task organization did not consist of fire support units, the maneuver elements had to be able to call in heavy naval gunfire support (NGS) and close air support (CAS) at short notice, if required. Consequently, all ground forces must be able to interoperate with forces from as other services--navy and air force formations--as well forces from other nations.²² These requirements were not matched by some of the nations' contributions due to lack of qualified personnel and insufficient communications means. Smaller nations should therefore prioritize smaller multirole teams that are capable to direct air, land and naval fires and conduct combined training before operations commence.

During the staging process in Darwin, the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) Land Battle School conducted a seven-day preparation program, which included reception, deployment training, situational briefings, and acclimatization training.²³ According to the diverse nature of the force contributions, the weeklong program was assessed to be the minimum requirement to prepare the INTERFET contingencies for the mission and ensure the required situation awareness to deal with the situation they would face.

Due to the rapid deployment to East Timor, the forces depended on accurate intelligence. Multinational SOF elements were inserted at an early stage of the operation, and provided key information about the situation on the island. In addition, strategic satellite imaginaries were also available from US intelligence support.²⁴ The combination of HUMINT and imaginary intelligence (IMINT) means proved to be effective

intelligence collectors, able to provide the key information as required for the deployment of INTERFET.

The military tasks of restoring security and--within force capabilities--provide humanitarian assistance, had to be conducted simultaneously.²⁵ The humanitarian aspects of the operation depended upon close cooperation between the military forces and the UN Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) team. The CIMIC conceptual framework included coordination arrangements and military support to the humanitarian tasks. To ensure interlink between the military operations and the humanitarian relief, CMO elements from the 96th (US) CA Battalion, were deployed to East Timor.²⁶ Key tasks were to establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC), as well as, train INTERFET units to deal with the humanitarian situation. The CMO can be described as a success and illustrates that military units were capable to cooperate and facilitate humanitarian activities in parallel with ongoing operations. Humanitarian relief operations will therefore require CMO units that can respond quickly to crises and conflicts.

Conclusion: One of the primary experiences as stated by commander of INTERFET, Major General Cosgrove, was: "forces structured and equipped, ready if necessary, for war were actually very effective, probably more effective than had they been less capable."²⁷ Solely light infantry contributions do not create a fully combat capable force. Ground forces require mobility and firepower, as well as having the ability to utilize available CAS and NGS, if required. An effective operation is dependent on timely deployment of combat ready forces and accurate intelligence. Smaller SOF elements played an important role and provided critical information prior to the deployment of INTERFET. Civil Military Operations elements represent an important

capability in most POs to facilitate humanitarian relief effort. Special Forces and CMO elements are limited resources in most operations and smaller nations should, to a greater extent, prioritize such niche capabilities to multinational operations.

Interoperable Communications

The command and control (C2) arrangements for INTERFET were distinctly Australian, despite the multinational character of the force.²⁸ The command structure of INTERFET was a unified command, and the CIS systems were primarily a lead nation responsibility. The US Forces INTERFET (USFI) established the long haul voice- and data communication in support of the operation. This was necessary due to the fact that only NATO and the US have the capability to establish a credible strategic command and control system. On the tactical and operational level, the INTERFET consisted of a combination of nations that possessed a high level of interoperability, as well as force contributions not being able to interoperate at all. The ABCA contingents from Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the US could interoperate as a consequence of years of shared training, exercises, standardization of doctrine and operating procedures, and compatible equipment. This underlines the value and importance of interoperable communications. In this operation a simple but reliable interoperable tactical communications network were established through a combination of Australian and US provided CIS resources.²⁹ Although the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) did not require a more extensive and digitized communications network, it clearly illustrates that intercommunication problems remain a severe challenge in multinational operations. Force integration depends on compatible CIS equipment. In addition, regular multinational

communications training will be an important factor to reduce the multinational friction, develop standing SOPs, and thereby enhance the ability to interoperate.

The lack of sufficient language trained personnel hampered effective command and communications within INTERFET. Most of these challenges were, however, solved through extensive use of LNOs. A higher OPTEMPO could seriously have aggravated the force's ability to control the pace of events.³⁰ Force contributions assigned to multinational operations must therefore master English as the command language.

Conclusion: Operation Stabilise clearly illustrates that intercommunication still remains a serious bottleneck for effective tactical integration of multinational contingencies. Force contributions must therefore be equipped with modern, standardized systems with the capacity to meet the information requirements for technical and operational interoperability. The extensive use of LNOs played an important role to reduce the intercommunication problems among the participating multinational forces. Enhancing linguistic literacy will have a high pay-off for increased interoperability in future multinational operations. Last but not least, increased multinational training and cooperation will be a key factor to gain experience and develop operational procedures related to interoperability problems.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The Operation

On 20 March 2003 a US-shaped and led operation, with multinational force contribution, began military operations against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. In only four weeks, the regime was removed and the Iraqi forces defeated. The coalition conducted the operation at a time its choosing, and from the beginning of the operation

they effectively dominated the battle space in such a way that the Iraqi opposition was rapidly overcome. Despite significant diplomatic efforts beforehand, it was reluctantly concluded that a UN Security Council consensus on a new resolution would not be possible. Nevertheless, the overriding political objective of the coalition operation was to disarm Saddam of his weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which threatened his people and neighbors. It also undertook to support the Iraqi people in their desire for peace, prosperity, freedom and good government.³¹

Despite a rapid military victory, the coalition was from an early stage of the operation, facing several post-conflict challenges. The problems of political and economical restoration have raised criticism over the lack of preparation for the post conflict phase.³² This thesis will, however, focus on the warfighting phase of this operation, and illustrate the key lessons of the multinational combat operations.

International Force Contribution

Operation Iraqi Freedom was overwhelmingly a US-shaped and led operation. The coalition force consisted of approximately four hundred and sixty-seven thousand troops, whereof; the US provided four hundred and twenty-four thousand troops.³³ Initially, some twenty countries offered or provided military forces or use of military bases to the coalition, but only US, British, Australian and a few dozen Polish troops took part in the actual combat operations.³⁴ Of the non-US contributions, Britain provided the most significant number of troops--approximately forty-five thousand--covering a wide variety of roles and special functions. The British contribution was taken into the US plan where it could best complement and enhance US capabilities, both political and militarily.³⁵ Other multinational contributions were primarily non-combat contributions,

theater security, host nation support (HNS) and other functions. However, the Australian two thousand-troop contingency and the Polish two hundred troop contingency were primarily SOF units--typical niche capabilities. In addition, the threat from potential Iraqi WMD facilitated nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) specialist decontamination contributions from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Ukraine.³⁶

By the end of the combat operations in early May 2003, the situation regarding multinational military involvement changed dramatically. From being a very selective coalition of the willing, several multinational force contributions were now welcomed to contribute with forces in the stability operations.

Experiences from the Operation

From a smaller nation's perspective, the limited multinational contribution in the combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom provided important lessons related to sustainability, and combat capability.

Sustainability

Based on experiences from previous long duration operations and as a thumb rule, military commitments cannot exceed more than one third of the available personnel in their force structure. This limitation was the primary reason for the rapid-downsizing and redeployment of the British troops shortly after the combat phase. Another aspect of sustainability is the US and British requirement for reservists. The responsiveness of reservists is more limited compared to active duty personnel and units. The reservists, however, fill many specialist and key niche capabilities, such as logistics, medical services, CA and psychological operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom underlined the necessity of having these capabilities available at an early stage of the mission to

facilitate the transition from warfighting to stability and humanitarian relief. These capability gaps were, however, only covered after mobilization and predeployment training.³⁷ This problem, however, creates an opportunity for smaller nations to contribute forces within the identified capability shortfalls, as though they are relatively smaller scale units, and simultaneously represent essential capability requirements. Psychological operations will, however, have many political constraints and are to a limited extent relevant contributions in many operations.

Conclusion: Operation Iraqi Freedom has fully illustrated the challenges regarding sustainability. Smaller nations could, by offering responsive capabilities in the fields of logistics, medical services and CA, provide relevant force contributions in warfighting operations.

Effective Engagement

Operation Iraqi Freedom was an impressive demonstration of the effectiveness of military power. One significant aspect of this operation as stated by Anthony H. Cordesman was that: “no military operation is perfect but the jointness has been huge in this campaign.”³⁸

Although combat capability is dependent on several factors, the basis for the success was not only a result of superior equipment and technology, it was to a large degree, dependent on professional soldiering, where individuals and small-unit tactical skills won the battles on the ground.³⁹ Individual training and the ability to fight remain the backbone for success in battle, and represent one classic experience of warfare from this operation.

The most unique experiences from this operation were the role of the SOF units. SOF and Ranger forces played a major role throughout Iraq and appear to have had more of an important role in this campaign than in the past.⁴⁰ The effectiveness of SOF has increased, and despite their limited size, their ability to gather accurate intelligence and provide air and missile support is considerable compared to other regular forces.⁴¹ The integration between ground and air operations made it possible for offensive strike aircraft to be used in more direct support of ground forces. Intelligence gathered by SOF elements enabled precision attacks from both the ground and air against targets such as, headquarters or meeting venues of the Ba'ath Party.⁴² Hence, due to their unique capabilities, SOF and Ranger units played a key role of the land battles. During the campaign, the small-scale multinational contributions--Australian and Polish troops--contributed primarily in this area.

Effective SOF operations are dependent on a set of balanced capabilities. The extensive use of SOF in Operation Iraqi Freedom required the ability to conduct offensive actions, combat search and rescue (CSAR), NBC incidents, and the wide range of logistics. The successful operations conducted by the Australian SOF contribution represent an example of how such contributions should be organized. This contribution included a Special Forces Task Group (SF TG), including a Special Air Service (SAS) squadron with CH-47 helicopters. The SAS squadron is capable of providing long-range, small group reconnaissance and limited direct-action (DA) operations. Other SOF support elements included a specialized unit for response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive incidents, and a quick support force. The quick support force is capable to operate in air, ground, and maritime environments, and trained to

conduct counter-terrorism actions.⁴³ The combination of the unique capabilities in this SOF “package” demonstrated to be very effective, and proved to be of great value within the coalition operations. The complexity of this relatively small contribution indicates, however, that SOF capabilities are dependent on the combination of professional soldiering and advanced technological equipment.

Other key experiences from the campaign related to niche capabilities were the UK mine clearance and explosives clearance capabilities.⁴⁴ The specialized mine detection and clearance capability, including divers, cleared ship berths inside the seaports.⁴⁵ The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts worked with specialized engineering teams to clear access to key areas of the Rumaylah oilfields so they could be returned to operating capability as soon as possible.⁴⁶ Due to the threat from WMD, the NBC troops and engineer elements, were necessary capabilities.⁴⁷ These specialist functions were primarily provided by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine. These specialized contributions were key elements for early success of the coalition, and indicate that available NBC capabilities were required to cover mission specific functions in the campaign.

Conclusion: The success of the ground combat operations, once again underlined the value of professional soldiering skills. High training standards of the individual soldier retain a key to success in combat. SOF units were active from an early stage and demonstrated the effectiveness and value of such units. Effective SOF contributions require a set of balanced capabilities, including combat actions, CSAR, NBC and logistics. Responsive combat ready SOF elements are therefore an important niche

capability. Based on the success of the SOF actions, the significance and importance of such units will most likely increase in the future.

Other niche capabilities--EOD, mine clearing, engineer, and NBC assets--proved to be key enablers to facilitate and support the land operation. Smaller nations should therefore specialize in these functions and be prepared to deploy them rapidly.

¹NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 52.

²David Lightburn, "Lessons Learned." *NATO Review* 49, no. 2 (summer 2001): 12 [report on-line]; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-toc.htm>; Internet; accessed on 21 November 2003.

³Larry K. Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998), 26.

⁴Steven R. Bowman, "Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations." *CRS Issue Brief* 93056 (16 December 1995) [article on-line]; available from <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/90-056.htm>. Internet; accessed on 19 February 2004.

⁵Wentz, *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, 51.

⁶Lightburn, "Lessons Learned." *NATO Review* 49, no. 2 (summer 2001): 15.

⁷Wentz, *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, 113-118.

⁸*Ibid.*, 313.

⁹*Ibid.*, 113-118.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*, 353.

¹²*Ibid.*, 283.

¹³*Ibid.*, 113-118.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 284.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 113-118.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Craig A. Collier, "A New Way to Wage Peace: US Support to Operation Stabilise," *Military Review* 81, no.1 (January-February 2001): 2 [article on-line]; available from <http://www-cgsc-army.mil/english/JanFeb01/collier.asp>; Internet; accessed on 27 October 2003.

¹⁸Adam Cobb, "East Timor and Australia's Security Role: Issues and Scenarios." *Current Issues Brief* 3 1999-2000 (21 September 1999) [article on-line]; available from. <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib03.htm>. Internet; accessed on 13 January 2004.

¹⁹Collier, "A New Way to Wage Peace: US Support to Operation Stabilise." *Military Review* 81 no. 1 (January-February 2001): 9.

²⁰Alan Ryan, Study Paper No. 304, "*Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks*" *Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor* (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), 22.

²¹Ibid., 3.

²²Ibid., 94.

²³Ibid., 63.

²⁴Collier, "A New Way to Wage Peace: US Support to Operation Stabilise." *Military Review* 81, no. 1 (January-February 2001): 3.

²⁵Michael Elmquist, "CIMIC in East Timor: An Account of Civil-Military Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration in the Early Phases of the East Timor Relief Operation," *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs* [article on-line]; available from http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/programs/response/mcdunet/0esttimo.html; Internet; accessed on 16 October 2003.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ryan, "*Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks*," 18.

²⁸Ibid., 82.

²⁹Ibid., 84.

³⁰Ibid., xi.

³¹Ministry of Defence, *Operations in Iraq-First Reflections* (London: Director General Corporate Communication, 2003), 3.

³²Nadia Schladow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters* 43, no. 3 (autumn 2003): 85.

³³Timothy Garden, "Iraq: The Military Campaign," *International Affairs* (July 2003) [article on-line]; available from <http://tgarden.denmon.co.uk/writing/articles/2003/030718ia.htm>; Internet; accessed on 25 November 2003.

³⁴Ministry of Defence, *First Reflections*, 7.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 19.

³⁶Paolo Pasicolan and Carrie Satterlee, "Coalition of the Willing Already Larger Than the 1991 Gulf War," *The Heritage Foundation*, Web Memo no. 225 (19 March 2003) [article on-line]; available from: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm225.cfm>; Internet; accessed on 17 February 2004.

³⁷Ministry of Defence, *First Reflections*, 31.

³⁸Anthony H. Cordesman, *The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War: Main Report*, Eight Working Draft: 14 May 2003 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 190.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 189.

⁴⁰Ministry of Defence, *First Reflections*, 13.

⁴¹Cordesman, *The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War*, 193.

⁴²Ministry of Defence, *First Reflections*, 11.

⁴³Cordesman, *The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War*, 310.

⁴⁴Ministry of Defence, *First Reflections*, 7.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 11.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Multinational operations require military forces that are capable of dealing with a wide range of missions and tasks provided by the force contributing nations. However, nations differ in many ways--in size, population, financial resources, political conditions, and military power. For obvious reasons, smaller states cannot muster the same amount of resources or military capabilities that larger states can bring. Consequently, there is not only a question of what multinational operations require, but also a question of what smaller nations can offer.

To answer the primary question whether relatively small-scale niche capabilities are relevant force contributions to multinational operations, an examination of doctrine was initially made to establish the theoretical platform for the nature of multinational operations across the full range of conflicts.

Multinational operations are defined as military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, and are conducted in the frame of alliances or coalitions. The short-term nature of coalitions make this type of operations more complex compared to operations within the frame of an alliance. Both US and NATO doctrine address the problem areas, which in short can be described as difference in organization, capabilities and doctrine.

Capability is the ability to execute a specified course of action, or a mission, across the FSO, including war and MOOTW. Consequently, the capability requirements will vary from mission to mission, dependent on the specific operation and the

operational environment. The role of multinational force contributions will therefore have the means to provide the required capabilities, either at the tactical level, or enabling capabilities at the joint level.

The wide span of missions as well as the different force contributions can create both advantages and disadvantages for the multinational formation. Although multinational operations, within joint and coalition structures, are the most common type of military operations, one can argue that despite the political value it is not an efficient way to create an effective warfighting capability. However, multinational contributions can also trigger military advantages. Multinational cooperation can add both strength in numbers and additional capabilities to a force. Other advantages can be access to national or regional infrastructures, and in certain circumstances, access to high value information and intelligence products. In short, the challenge of multinational cooperation is to establish a formation where the advantages of the total sum of elements outweigh the weaknesses.

Both US and NATO doctrine provide a relatively solid foundation for multinational operations. The role of small-scale contributions and niche capabilities are, however, to a limited extent reflected in these publications.

In this thesis, three case studies--Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Stabilise, and Operation Iraqi Freedom--are used to exemplify and analyze smaller nations' contributions in multinational--joint and coalition--operations. The diverse nature of these operations represents a wide range of multinational operations and different capability requirements.

Overall, the three case studies illustrate that typically smaller nations have carried a proportionally scale of burden, and provided relatively relevant capabilities to all these operations. However, the operations also indicate that there were capability shortfalls of the force structures, especially CS and CSS capabilities that could have been solved through bilateral cross-servicing agreements. Examples of critical capability requirements are SOF, intelligence, including HUMINT and SIGINT, combat engineers, logistics, including transportation, medical, EOD, NBC defense, and CMO. Some of these capabilities have been difficult to cover because relatively few nations are willing, or capable of providing forces with the required training standards within these areas. These shortfalls could, to a greater extent, have been covered by a combination of relatively small-scale niche contributions, and increased multinational cooperation and training.

Another aspect is the organizational weaknesses of the smaller nations' force contributions. Combat capability trained to standard is not enough. There is a need of means to ensure that forces can be deployed where and when needed, and that they can be sustained throughout the operation.

The ability for rapid deployment of forces is of vital importance and requires available strategic lift capacity--by air and sea. Combat forces require credible logistical support for the duration of the operation, as well as the units must be capable to operate, and if required, fight effectively in all types of operations. This requires professional soldier skills, first class weapons and equipment. Substantial parts of the logistics structure must contain the same qualities and ability to react, move and operate as the combat forces.

The ability to collect intelligence and information, process it and make sure it is made available for the users is necessary. The foundation for this concept is compatible CIS equipment that enables the flow of information and enhances command and control.

Future success of multinational operations requires a two-pronged approach from smaller nations to provide relevant force contributions to various military missions. First, the force contribution can provide enabling capabilities--for example SOF, intelligence, engineers, and logistics--that can be integrated directly into the operational or tactical level of a multinational formation. Second, nations that provide combat arms forces should primarily focus on well-equipped brigade size equivalents with multinational training experience. Although smaller nations will have problems in providing forces of this size that have sustainability for long-term commitments, formalized multinational agreements and cooperation could be the alternative to solve this problem. The Nordic Cooperation for Peace Support Operations (NORDCAPS) among Norway, Sweden and Finland and an equivalent cooperation between Australia and New Zealand, are examples of such initiatives. Through such multinational initiatives, relatively small-scale contributions and niche capabilities will remain the primary capability requirement from each nation.

Establishment of specialized military capabilities, which smaller and new NATO members may offer to multinational structures, each one on the basis of their own expertise and established comparative advantages. Specialized military capabilities may cover all types of forces. NATO and UN should therefore aim to identify the various capabilities needed as part of flexible multinational force packages for different operations. Such pre-planned force packages should also provide the framework for

training and exercises, operational planning and procedures to ensure sufficient operational readiness and interoperability.

In short, relatively small-scale niche capabilities are relevant force contributions to multinational operations if they are committed timely and comprise of capabilities that improve the ability of the multinational force to successfully accomplish its mission. Smaller nations should therefore prioritize smaller, high-quality niche capabilities that can be integrated into larger scale multinational structures in a meaningful way.

Recommendations

Providing ready and relevant force contributions to multinational operations require a clear ambition and a long-term perspective. The short-term ambition requires an enhanced ability to contribute with the resources that are available within today's force structure. The mid term challenge is to restructure and reorganize the forces into coherent force packages. In the longer term, procurement of equipment and transformation of forces will have to aim towards future requirements and increased multinational integration. Today's challenges related to multinational operations are therefore the trigger for further force restructuring.

Smaller scale niche capabilities could, in most operations, provide the multinational formation valuable and required capabilities. These contributions must, however, reflect shared sacrifice and danger of the operations, which means that the force contributions cannot always be limited to non-combat units. A niche capability approach will, to a greater degree, address national and global security concerns, as well as support the alliances and partners in a meaningful manner. By holding relevant key military

capabilities and make them available for multinational actions, even limited size, will enhance the relevance of smaller nation's contribution in multinational operations.

Such decision will, however, be a fundamental shift in the direction of most Western armies and will encounter significant resistance rooted in historical precedence and reluctance to change. Most Western smaller nations are currently in a marginalized situation and it would improve their credibility to adapt to such a change. In this way, adoption of a niche capability strategy can be realized and thereby promote more legitimate, effective and relevant multinational force structures.

A full adoption of a niche capability approach will, however, lead to consequences for the balance of smaller nations' force structure. The consequences have not been covered in this thesis. This issue will require more extensive analysis, and is therefore a recommendation for further research.

APPENDIX A

MULTINATIONAL TROOP CONTRIBUTION TABLES

Table 1. Operation Joint Endeavor: Troop Contribution (as of December 1995)		
Nations	Total number of troops	Unit type
United States	≈ 18,000	Division HQ (MND(N)), 2 x mechanized infantry battalions, 2 x armor battalions, 2 x armored cavalry battalions, 2 x SP artillery battalions, 1x engineer brigade, 1 x air defense battalion, SOF elements, 1 x aviation brigade.
Denmark	800	1 x mechanized infantry battalion.
Poland	600	1 x airborne (mechanized) infantry battalion.
Russian Federation	≈ 1,500-2,000	Brigade HQ, 2 x airborne (mechanized) infantry battalions.
Sweden	807	1 x mechanized infantry battalion.
Latvia	≈ 50	1 x infantry platoon.
Lithuania	≈ 50	1 x infantry platoon
Estonia	≈ 50	1 x infantry platoon.
Turkey	1,300	Brigade HQ, 2 x mechanized infantry battalions, 1 x logistics battalion.
Finland	850	1 x engineer battalion.
Norway	750	1 x engineer company, 1 x 1 Military Police company, 1 x medical company, 1 x logistics battalion.

United Kingdom	≈ 16,000	Division HQ (MND(SW)) 2 x mechanized infantry battalions, 1 x infantry company (RAF), 1 x armor battalion, 2 x recce companies, 1 x artillery battalion, 1 x engineer battalion, 1 x aviation battalion, 1 x signal regiment.
Canada	≈ 1,340	1 x armored recce squadron, 1 x engineer battalion.
Czech Republic	≈ 850	1 x mechanized infantry battalion, 1 x engineer company.
Malaysia	1,500	1 x mechanized infantry battalion.
The Netherlands	2,060	1 x mechanized infantry battalion, 1 x tank squadron.
France	≈ 7,500	Division HQ (MND(E)), 3 x mechanized infantry battalions, 1 x artillery battalion, 1 x engineer battalion, 1 x light recce squadron, aviation (recce) units.
Egypt	≈ 850	1 x mechanized infantry battalion.
Italy	≈ 2,200	1 x mechanized infantry battalion, 1 x armor company, 1 x artillery battery.
Morocco	≈ 850	1 x mechanized infantry battalion.
Portugal	900	1 x airborne (mechanized) infantry battalion.
Spain	≈ 1,000-1,500	2 x mechanized infantry battalions.
Ukraine	500	1 x mechanized infantry battalion.
Hungary	500	1 x engineer (bridging) unit.
Romania		1 x engineer (mine

		clearing) unit.
Germany	≈ 4,000	1 x engineer battalion, 1x transportation battalion, 1 x logistics battalion, 1 x field hospital, 1 x aviation regiment.
Belgium	≈ 300	Engineer units, logistics units.
Luxemburg	≈ 300	1 x transportation unit.
Austria	≈ 300	1 x transport unit, 1 x engineer unit.
Greece	≈ 1,000	1 x transportation unit, 1 x engineer unit.

Sources: (A) Operation Joint Endeavor Fact Sheet no 006-B (11 December 1995) [article on-line]; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/fs/fs006b.html>; Internet; accessed on 18 December 2003. (B) Larry K. Wentz, ed., *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998), 475-476. (C) Steven Bowman, Bosnia: "US Military Operations", *CRS Issue Brief* 93056 (16 December 1995) [report on-line]; available from <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/93-056.htm>; Internet; accessed on 19 February 2004.

Table 2. Operation Stabilise: Troop Contribution		
Nations	Total number of troops	Unit type
Australia	≈ 4,500	Land: HQ INTERFET, 1 x joint support unit, brigade HQ, 1 x signals squadron, 2 x infantry battalion groups, special forces, 1 x armored reconnaissance squadron, 1 x armored personnel carrier squadron, 2 x construction squadron, 1 x aviation regiment, 1 x reconnaissance squadron, 1 x brigade administrative support battalion, 1 x forward logistic support group, 1 x forward support base, combat engineer regiment. Maritime: 3 x frigates, 1 x landing ship, 3 x landing craft, 1 x tanker, 1 x Jet Cat, 1 x clearance diving team. Air: 12 x C130 transport aircraft, 2 x 707, 4 x Caribou aircraft.
Brazil	≈ 50	Land: 1 x MP platoon.
Canada	≈ 600	Land: 1 x infantry company group, 1 x construction troop. Maritime: 1 x tanker, 2 x helicopters. Air: 2 x C130 transport aircraft, air support team.
Denmark		Land: staff officers.
Egypt	≈ 70	Land: medical facility.
Fiji	≈ 180	Land: 1 x infantry company group.
France	≈ 500	Land: 1 x surgical team. Maritime: 1 x frigate, 1 x

		landing ship. Air: 3 x C130 transport aircraft, 3 x transport helicopters.
Germany		Land: casualty evacuation support. Air: 2 x C160 transport aircraft.
Ireland		Land: HQ element, 1 x ranger platoon
Italy	≈ 600	Land: 1 x company group. Maritime: 1 x landing ship. Air: 2 x G222, 4 x transport helicopters.
Jordan	≈ 500	Land: 1 x infantry battalion group.
Kenya		Land: 1 x infantry company, 1 x engineer troop.
Malaysia		Land: staff officers.
New Zealand	≈ 1,000	Land: 1 x infantry battalion group. Maritime: 1 x frigate, 1 x tanker. Air: 2 x C130 transport aircraft, 6 x transport helicopters.
Norway		Land: staff officers.
Philippines	≈ 1,000	Land: 1 x humanitarian task force (infantry). Air: 2 x C130 transport aircraft.
Republic of Korea	≈ 500	Land: 1 x infantry battalion group.
Singapore	≈ 250	Land: 1 x medical team. Maritime: 2 x landing ships.
Thailand	≈ 1,250	Land: 1 x task group (battalion size). Maritime: 3 x vessels. Air: 2 x C130 transport aircraft.
United Kingdom	≈ 250	Land: 1 x infantry company group, SOF units.

		Air: 2 x C130 transport aircraft.
United States	≈ 230	Land: 1 x logistic group, staff officers (intelligence and signals), CMOC 1 x signals company. Maritime: 1 x cruiser, 1 x helicopter support ship, 2 x support ships. Air: 4 x C130 transport aircraft, 1 x C12, 1 x EP3.

Sources: (A) Alan Ryan, Study Paper No. 304, “*Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks*” *Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor* (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), 131-132. (B) Craig A. Collier, “A New Way to Wage Peace: US Support to Operation Stabilise.” *Military Review* 81, no. 1 (January-February 2001): 3-9 [article on-line]; available from <http://www-cgsc-army.mil/english/JanFeb01/collier.asp>; Internet; accessed 27 October 2003.

Table 3. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Troop Contribution (as of March 2003)		
Nations	Total number of troops	Unit type
United States	≈ 424,000	Land: US V Corps HQ, 1st Armored Div., 4th Infantry Div., 101st Airborne Div., 82nd Airborne Div., 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) Air: Warplanes, transport planes, other planes. Maritime: Warships, support ships, other ships.
Australia	≈ 2,000	Land: 1 x special forces task group, incl. 1 x special air service squadron, troop-lift helicopters, WMD specialist troops, 1 x combat service support group. Air: Air element. Maritime: Naval elements.
Bulgaria	150	Land: Non-combat troops (chemical and biological warfare decontamination).
Canada		Land: Staff officers. Maritime: 1 x destroyer, 2 x frigates.
Czech Republic		Land: Non-combat troops (chemical and biological warfare decontamination).
Denmark		Land: Medical team. Maritime: Submarine and surface ships.
Jordan		Land: Manning for a Patriot air defense system.
Netherlands		Land: Manning for 3 x Patriot air defense systems.
Poland	≈ 200	Land: GROM elite commando troops, other

		non-combat units.
Romania		Land: Non-combat troops (chemical and biological warfare decontamination), medics, engineers, military police.
Slovakia		Land: Non-combat troops (chemical and biological warfare decontamination).
South Korea	≈ 500	Land: Engineer unit
Spain	≈ 900	Land: 1 x legion contingent. Maritime: 1 x frigate, 1 x medical support vessel.
Ukraine		Land: Non-combat experts (chemical and biological warfare decontamination).
United Kingdom	≈ 45,000	Land: Division HQ (MND(SE)), 1 x mechanized brigade, 1 x national support element. Air: Bomber/reconnaissance aircraft, tanker/transport aircraft, transport aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, transport helicopters. Maritime: warships, repair ship, other ships.

Source: Paolo Pasicolan and Carrie Satterlee, "Coalition of the Willing Already Larger Than the 1991 Gulf War," *The Heritage Foundation*, Web Memo no. 225 (19 March 2003) [article on-line]; available from: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm225.cfm>; Internet; accessed on 17 February 2004.

Table 4. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Troop Contribution (as of October 2003)		
Nations	Total number of troops	Unit type
United States	≈ 129,000	Land: US V Corps HQ, 4 x divisions (1 Armored div, 4 Infantry div, 101 Airborne div, 82 Airborne div).
Azerbaijan	150	Land: 1 x infantry company group.
Estonia	55	Land: 1 x infantry platoon, 1 x airport maintenance team, clearance divers.
Georgia	≈ 100	Special forces team, civilian police, medics, sappers.
United Kingdom	≈ 10,000	Land: Division HQ (MND(SE)), 1 x mechanized brigade, 1 x national support element. Air: Bomber/reconnaissance aircraft, tanker/transport aircraft, transport aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, transport helicopters. Maritime: 2 x frigates, 1 x repair ship, 1 x other ship.
Italy		Land: 1 x mechanized brigade, 1 x marine company, Carabinieri detachment.
Netherlands		Land: 1 x marine battalion group, helicopter detachment.
Denmark/Lithuania		Land: 1 x infantry battalion group.
Romania		Land: 1 x mechanized infantry battalion, 1 x Military Police company.
Czech Republic		Land: 1 x Military Police company, 1 x field

		hospital, transport and civil affairs personnel.
Norway		Land: 1 x engineer company.
Portugal		Land: 1 x security company.
Poland	≈ 2,500	Land: Division HQ (MND(CS)), 2 x brigade combat team, special forces, border guard forces, 2 x mechanized battalions, 1 x logistics battalion, 1 x field hospital, 1 x engineer detachment, 1 x Military Police unit, 1 x mobile bio-warfare lab, 1 x chemical decontamination company, riot police unit, air cavalry contingent, 6 x transport helicopters.
Ukraine	≈ 1,700	1x NBC battalion.
Spain	≈ 1,500	1 x legion contingent
Australia	≈ 2,000	Land: 1 x special forces task group, incl. 1 x special air service squadron, troop-lift helicopters, WMD specialist troops, 1 x combat service support group. Air: Air element. Maritime: Naval elements.
New Zealand		Land: 1 x engineer detachment.
Central American countries		“The Ultra Plus brigade”

Source: Jane’s Information Group, “Security and Foreign Forces, Iraq,” *Jane’s Sentential Security Assessment-The Gulf States* [report on-line]; available from <http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp/K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/gulfisu/iraqs150>; Internet; accessed on 18 December 2003.

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