United States Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Implementation in Iraq
Abstract
This thesis examines the conduct of the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq from the end of March 2003 through March 2004. While examining how the U.S. Army is implementing existing counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, the thesis also addresses the topics of what the doctrine is and where it came from. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine implementation in Iraq. Chapter 2 is a literature review of the nature and background of insurgencies, the U.S. Army's response to them, the background of the Iraqi region, and the doctrine the U.S. Army developed to defeat insurgencies. Chapter 3 examines the history of U.S. Army experiences in counterinsurgency operations with regard to the Moro Rebellion in the Philippines between 1898 and 1905, the Hukbalahap Insurrection in the Philippines from 1946 to 1951, the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1975, and the El Salvador Uprising between 1971 and 1988. Chapter 4 focuses on current U.S. Army counterinsurgency operations in Iraq based on interviews with participants, news reports, and reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned. The last chapter examines how doctrine fails to adequately address the role of U.S. forces as an occupation authority and makes recommendations. The author concludes that basic principles outlined in U.S. doctrine are still applicable in Iraq, but U.S. and coalition forces are not applying them as intended. They should be unifying their military efforts with a comprehensive economic, social, and political reform plan. A list of 44 sources that were consulted but not cited also is included. (52 refs.)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 18, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA428901
Entities
People
- Jonathan K. Graff Jr
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College