

POLITICS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARMY RESERVE: 1790-1920

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ABSTRACT

POLITICS AND THE MAKING OF THE ARMY RESERVE, by James J. Groark 105 pages.

This thesis examines failed attempts to create an effective federally controlled militia from 1790 until 1920. From the time President Washington and Henry Knox failed to persuade the Continental Congress to establish a federally controlled militia in 1790, numerous military and political leaders over the next 150 years repeated similar efforts only to be denied by the political environment in Congress. Attempts to rectify war and peacetime deficiencies in the state militia by the War Department and political leaders first met with ideological protests concerned with the impediment of states' rights and the threat of a large standing army controlled by a central government. These concerns gradually became political rhetoric utilized by political supporters of the National Guard including lobby groups led by the National Guard Association. Political supporters rallied against establishing a federally controlled militia several times between 1790 and 1920. In 1903 and 1908, Senator Charles Dick, President of the National Guard Association, engineered the defeat of federally controlled militia initiatives by sponsoring bills to increase the role and responsibility of the National Guard instead of creating another "reserve" component. This study specifically focuses on the efforts of politicians and military leaders, especially John McAuley Palmer, who attempted to create an effective federally controlled militia from 1912 to 1920. Their efforts resulted in the National Defense Act of 1916, which included the Organized Reserve Corps, later renamed the Army Reserve. Partisan politics and lobby groups also helped defeat post-World War I military policies, proposing a more robust Army Reserve. In 1920, both the Democrats and western Republicans rallied to defeat Palmer's expanded Army Reserve proposal by making the opposition of universal military training a 1920 election issue. Therefore, the post-war military policy became only an amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916. This amendment created a hollow Army Reserve manned almost exclusively by officers--a paper army.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After George Washington failed to persuade the Continental Congress to establish a federally controlled militia in 1783, military and political leaders picked up this torch several times over the next 150 years only to be snuffed out by the political environment in Congress. During the early 1900s, the different viewpoints on military policy held by Democrats, Republicans, professional officers, citizen officers, lobby groups, industrialists, farmers, socialists, and others all collided in the halls of Congress and eventually produced the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920. The National Defense Acts established a federally controlled militia, incorporating some of the ideas advocated by George Washington but did not create the federally controlled militia some military and political leaders had hoped for. Instead, political supporters of the National Guard convinced Congress to expand the role and responsibility of the National Guard instead of adopting universal military training (UMT) and a fully resourced federal militia.

Overall, the National Defense Acts did not provide the best possible military policy to prepare the United States for future wars in Europe. However, the National Defense Acts were the most acceptable solution: a political casserole everyone could stomach but no one felt tasted great. This study will examine how, from 1790 to 1920, partisan politics and lobby groups, more than anything else, hindered the creation of a fully funded, trained, and quickly deployable federal militia (Army Reserve).

From the time when the Mayflower rolled into the rugged shores of New England, some form of militia has existed in North America. In the 1600s, English colonists established a militia based on concepts established in the early Greek city-states. These

concepts included local recruiting, short tours of duty to face immediate threats, and territorial limitations. Two hundred years after the Mayflower, this model remained ingrained in the hearts and minds of the American people as well as participants in the Continental Congress attempting to establish a military force structure for the new government.

In 1775 the Continental Congress established the first American professional army, the Continental Army. Unlike the local militias, the federal government financed and controlled the Continental Army. Militia soldiers, including Colonel George Washington of Virginia, provided the manpower. The poorly equipped, dissimilarly dressed Continental Army combined with the local militia (minutemen) to form the American colonies' first dual component army comprised of both professionals and citizen soldiers. During the American Revolution, Continental Army officers often criticized the effectiveness of the minutemen, but ultimately both components were crucial to victory.

Shortly after the war, participants in the Continental Congress fiercely debated the proper military policy of the United States, centered on establishing a suitable military force structure for the nation's defense. This debate included determining the right combination of professional military and citizen militia necessary to meet the security needs of the nation. All participants remained cognizant that the force structure for national defense needed to fit within the ideological, economic, and cultural beliefs of the new republic.

This legislative debate over the proper balance, size, and role of a professional army versus a citizen militia surfaced numerous times throughout the history of the

United States and continues today. On 9 October 2003, Senator John Kerry commented, “We have overextended the military. This President has made our military weaker by overextending the Guard and Reserves.”¹ Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, current Chief of the Army Reserve and Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command, told soldiers in a recent video message, “Currently, our force structure, that is our units and our organization, is out of balance with the reality of the Global War on Terrorism.”² This study will examine the political and military debates and resolutions from 1790 to 1920 that determined the U.S. Army’s force structure balance between the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve. It will also explore why the War Department’s force structure proposals from 1790 to 1920, based on lessons learned from previous wars, never received congressional approval. These past events and ideas may shed light on the force structure challenges faced by the present day U.S. Army.

Three predominate schools of thought regarding military force structure from 1790 to 1920 impacted the creation of an Army Reserve. Proponents of each school of thought believed the U.S Army needed to predominately rely in a time of war on one of the three components: the Regular Army, the state militia (National Guard), or the federal militia (Army Reserve). The reasons why military leaders, politicians, and the American public favored one component over another are as diverse as America’s citizens and ideologies. This is one reason why no historian or political scientist has ever stated that it is easy to establish a military policy in a country governed by a democracy.

Proponents of the first school of thought regarding force structure believed the nation’s defenses needed to primarily rely on a professional army, not the militia. Beginning with Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists, reliance on a strong federally

controlled professional army instead of a citizen militia remained popular in the War Department from 1790 to 1920. Neo-Hamiltonians such as John C. Calhoun, Emory Upton, James A. Garfield, and Peyton C. March proposed force structure initiatives based on an expansible Regular Army manned with extra officers assigned to hollow units. The units would be filled by citizen soldiers assigned to a federally controlled militia or conscriptees in a time of war. In peacetime and wartime, the federal government not the state would control these “reserve” soldiers.

Initiatives by the Neo-Hamiltonians were all linked by the idea that in a time of war professional officers, not citizen soldiers, should lead the war effort. In Emory Upton’s introduction to his treatise, “The Military Policy of the United States,” published in 1903, he captures the essence of what many Neo-Hamiltonians and future Uptonians felt about the militia:

Our military policy, or, as many would affirm, our want of it, has now been tested during more than a century. It has been tried in foreign, domestic, and Indian wars, and while military men, from painful experience, are united as to its defects and dangers, our final success in each conflict as so [sic] blinded the popular mind, as to induce the belief that as a nation we are invincible. With the greater mass of people, who have neither the time nor the inclination to study the requirements of military science, no error is more common than to mistake military resources for military strength, and particularly is this case with ourselves. History records our triumph in the Revolution, in the War of 1812, in the Florida War, in the Mexican War, and in the Great Rebellion, and as nearly all of these wars were largely begun by militia and volunteers, the conviction has been produced that with us a regular army is not a necessity.³

The military force structure advocated by Calhoun, Upton, Garfield, March, and others always received strong support from the military community but remained isolated from the American people and unpopular in times of peace. From 1790 to 1920, Neo-Hamiltonians produced force structure plans based on sound military strategy, supported

by the military community, only to find defeat on the floor of Congress because of politics and price tag.

Proponents of the second school of thought believed that the U.S. Army should rely primarily on the state militias (National Guard) to defend the nation. Supporters of the National Guard argued not only against dependence on a large standing army but also against a federally controlled militia. The Anti-Federalists during the time of the Continental Congress became the first political supporters of the idea of the state militia. They argued against a large standing army based on a fear of despotism, excessive taxation, destruction of individual liberty, and the loss of state authority. Basically, they did not want another George III. Supporters of this school of thought later included Thomas Jefferson who told Congress in 1808, “For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed [state] militia is their best security.”⁴

Anti-Federalists also argued for a national defense embodied in the role of the state militia and the minuteman tradition. The minuteman tradition was based on the heroics and other military lore attributed to citizen soldiers who fought during the Revolutionary War. As U.S. military history evolved, critics of the state militia would point out failures during armed conflicts from 1812 to World War I (WWI), while supporters of the National Guard always countered by identifying battlefield successes and overall victory. This trend remained until the early 1900s when both groups realized the complexities of war now required more than a man and his musket and officers elected by their peers.

In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Members of Congress, the National Guard Association (NGA), and state governors joined forces several times against efforts to

decrease the role and responsibility of the National Guard. The National Guard's close ties with their local representatives in Congress gave them a distinct political advantage over the War Department. This factor helped defeat proposals by the War Department, which the National Guard opposed. It also helped convince Congress to approve counter proposals more favorable to the National Guard. Several of these proposals by the War Department would have created some form of a federally controlled militia as early as 1790.

Critics of the National Guard identified combat readiness (personnel and equipment), discipline, and the limits of the Constitution's militia clause as the primary reason to depend in a time of war on either a larger standing army or a federally controlled militia. This study will examine how these factors impacted the creation of a federally controlled militia.

Proponents of the third point of view believed the U.S. Army should depend primarily on a federally controlled militia -- a national army of the people. Like the Neo-Hamiltonians, they believed National Guard deficiencies in the areas of combat readiness, deployability, standardization, political entanglements, and leadership mandated creating a federally controlled militia. George Washington in his May 1783 letter to Alexander Hamilton entitled "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," dated May 1783, supported this concept. In his letter, Washington proposed a small standing army and a federally controlled militia with standardized organizations and training similar to the well-organized militias in Europe at the time. As far as the state militias, who fought in the Revolutionary War, Washington's writings were predominately negative. After

Washington's defeat in the Battle of Long Island in 1776, he sent a letter to Congress stating:

To place any dependence upon the [state] militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff . . . if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter.⁵

From 1792 to 1920, proponents of a federally controlled militia included Henry Knox, Elihu Root, Leonard Wood, John McAuley Palmer, and others. All of these men held views parallel with Knox's statement communicated to the Senate in 1790, "An energetic national militia is to be regarded as the capital security of a free republic, and not a standing army, forming a distinct class in the community."⁶ These individuals all believed in a time of war the United States needed to depend on a federally controlled "reserve" force not a state militia or in Washington's words a "broken staff."⁷

Most supporters of a federally controlled militia believed in some type of UMT to meet the military manpower needs of the nation. Many felt the U.S. required an easily mobilized mass army to sustain commitments overseas. UMT offered an alternative to the economic cost of a large standing army. UMT also provided a standardized, U.S. Army controlled training program to replace the antiquated, inconsistent military curriculum of the National Guard. Also, some felt it would quell the threat of socialism within the U.S. following WWI. This study will examine why Congress dropped the concept of UMT several times from 1792 to 1920 and suggest that political factors played the dominant role in the rejection of UMT and an effective federal reserve. Congressional defeat of UMT provisions led to a hollow Army Reserve, which faced significant personnel shortfalls at the onset of both World War I and II. At the start of both wars,

manpower shortages left the Army Reserve unprepared to face the fire and steel of the German Army.

Chapter two of the thesis examines the debate concerning military force structure between Federalists and Republicans during the early years of the Continental Congress. The end results of these debates resulted in the “army clause” and the “militia clause” being included in the ratified U.S. Constitution. From 1789 to 1908, the deployability limits of the Constitution’s militia clause and performance of state militia troops in battle sparked proposals by Henry Knox, John C. Calhoun, James A. Garfield, and Elihu Root. However, the political environment in Congress along with the emergence of the lobby groups supporting the state militia (National Guard) defeated these efforts. The chapter also describes how the state militia became increasingly more federalized in order to silence critics concerned with the deployability limitations of the militia clause as well as the state militia’s questionable performance in battle.

The third chapter will examine the extensive efforts of the military and civilian leaders, including General Leonard Wood, John McAuley Palmer, Henry Stimson and others, who attempted to create a federally controlled militia as an alternative to dependence on the National Guard or a large standing army. Their efforts faced strong opposition from supporters of the National Guard. Following political debates, resignations, and election year politics, Congress decided to approve a military policy increasing the role and responsibility of the National Guard. The National Defense Act of 1916 did not create a citizen army supported by UMT as proposed by Palmer. Instead, it produced only a manpower pool called the Organized Reserve Corps.

The fourth chapter will examine how the National Defense Act of 1916, which placed a heavy reliance on the National Guard, impacted the U.S. Army's preparations and performance in WWI. By making the National Guard the principle military reserve during peacetime, the U.S. Army faced challenges in the areas of manpower, training, leadership, and combat readiness. In wartime, the National Guard's performance in WWI impacted how military leaders, the American people, and politicians viewed the future role, size, and organization of the Army Reserve, National Guard, and the Regular Army. The chapter will conclude with examining the political reasons that helped defeat General Peyton C. March's controversial expandable army plan.

In the fifth chapter, the NGA, the Military Training Camps Association and various Members of Congress made efforts to establish a post-war military reorganization policy aimed at correcting the manpower shortages faced at the onset of WWI. In 1919, John McAuley Palmer returned to Washington and impressed the Senate Military Affairs Committee as an impartial expert in the concept of a citizen army and was subsequently attached to their committee. Despite challenges from both military and political fronts, Palmer spearheaded an alternative proposal to General March's post-war force structure plan. Although Palmer believed UMT was a key ingredient to the success of his reorganization plan, eastern Republicans and Democrats rallied against it and defeated the idea. Despite the loss of UMT, which eliminated the manpower needed to support the Army Reserve, the approved National Defense Act of 1920 is the foundation of the U.S. Army's current force structure of three components.

The conclusion describes how ideology and then partisan politics and lobby groups hindered the creation of a federally controlled militia from 1790 to 1916. From

1900 to 1920, numerous proposals to form an effective Army Reserve faltered under the political weight of National Guard lobby groups and election year and partisan politics. When the Army Reserve was finally established in 1916 and expanded in 1920, the political environment in Congress, more than anything else, created a stillborn Army Reserve, merely a manpower pool of individuals, an organization that contributed not one military organization to America's military efforts in both WWI and WWII.

¹Democratic National Committee, Democratic Presidential Candidates Debate, 9 October 2003, available from <http://www.democrats.org/whitehouse/debates>; (12 January 2004)

²Army Reserve Community Page, available from <http://www4.army.mil/USAR/home/index.php>; (10 January 2004).

³Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), 2.

⁴Jay M. Shafritz, *Words on War* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1990), 259.

⁵John M. Palmer, *America in Arms* (New Haven: CT, Yale University Press, 1941), 14.

⁶Henry Knox, *Organization of the Militia*: Communicate to the Senate on 21 January 1790, American State Papers Military Affairs No. 2, p. 14., available from <http://www.potomac-inc.org>; (5 January 2004).

⁷John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of George Washington*, Volume 26 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), 375.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE MILITIA

This chapter examines the debate between Federalists and Republicans concerning the proper military force structure following the Revolutionary War. The end result of these debates formed the basis for the “army clause” and the “militia clause” being included in the ratified U.S. Constitution. However, Henry Knox, John C. Calhoun, James A. Garfield, and Elihu Root felt the limits of the militia clause and battlefield performance of the state militia warranted more reliance on a professional army and the establishment of a federally controlled militia.

Early in American history, the primary factor in defeating proposals to establish a federally controlled militia was based on ideology. However, towards the end of the 18th century, political self-interest and the influence of lobby groups became more and more a force in defeating proposals that would have a negative impact on the role and responsibility of the state militia. The chapter also describes how the state militia evolved to become more of a federalized military organization.

During the early years of the Continental Congress, the Federalists and the Republicans continually debated the proper force structure for national defense. The Federalists favored a robust professional army firmly under federal control. The Republicans believed a large regular army invited despotism and warmongering. An example of what the Republicans feared occurred shortly after the revolution when the Continental Army threatened to march on Congress because of a dispute over pensions owed to soldiers. The leadership abilities of George Washington mitigated this threat,

known as the Newburgh Conspiracy. Furthermore, in June 1783, Continental troops marched on the state government of Pennsylvania over pay problems. These two events added to the distrust many colonials already felt about large standing armies based on their experiences with the British Army and knowledge of European history. The basic differences between the Federalists and the Republicans resulted in a political tug of war concerning the merits of the militia versus a large standing army. This tug of war remained relevant throughout the next 150 years as the U.S. Congress faced force structure decisions impacting whether the America's defenses would depend on a large professional army, a federal militia, or the National Guard.

During these early debates between the two prominent political parties, the Congress asked George Washington for guidance on developing a national defense policy. In May 1783, Washington included his response in a letter, entitled "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment." In his letter sent to Alexander Hamilton, Washington introduced the concept of a national militia controlled by a central government. Merriam Webster defines militia as "a part of the organized armed forces of a country liable to call only in an emergency, a body of citizens organized for military service."¹ In essence, Washington introduced the concept of a federally controlled army "reserve" for the first time in American history. Although Washington criticized the deficiencies of the militia in other writings, his essay concluded that a properly trained militia is "the fairest and best method to preserve, for a long time to come, the happiness, dignity and independence of our country."² Washington defines a "properly trained" militia officer in his letter to Hamilton:

That every Militia Officer should make himself acquainted with the plan of Discipline, within a limited time, or forfeit his Commission, for it is in vain to expect the improvement of the Men, while the Officers remain ignorant, which many of them will do, unless Government will make and enforce such a Regulation.³

The key for Washington was the enforcement of military standards controlled by the federal government rather than state authority.

Despite Washington's military experience, his letter failed to sway the Continental Congress to establish a federally controlled militia. Washington became the first in a long line of U.S. military leaders who would propose the establishment of a federally controlled militia based on military readiness issues only to have their proposals defeated by Congress. From 1790 to 1920, politicians rather than seasoned military leaders determined force structure.

In September 1786, the Continental Congress, without a federally controlled militia and an almost non-existent standing army, could only stand by and watch farmers, led by Daniel Shays, a state militia member, rebel against the government of Massachusetts. "Here is felt the imbecility, the futility, the nothingness of the federal powers," lamented Edward Carrington a Virginia delegate sitting in Congress during the rebellion. "The U.S. has no troops, nor dare they call into action, what is called the safeguard of a free government, the Militia of the State, it being composed of the very objects of the force."⁴ Shay's Rebellion, combined with other forms of political expression, including unruly mobs marching on state capitals, led to the Constitution's militia clause, giving Congress the power to call out the militia under three circumstances. The militia clause, Article 1, Section 8 states, "To provide for calling

forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”⁵

Although the militia clause adequately addressed, for the time being, concerns Congress had with incidents like Shay’s Rebellion, as well as Indian threats on the horizon, many military and government leaders would later challenge the limited effectiveness of the militia clause and seek the creation of a federally controlled reserve force unconnected with the limits of the militia clause outlined in the U.S. Constitution. In essence, the military clause still limited the military service of state militias to within the borders of the United States.

After the Pennsylvania Convention ratified the U.S. Constitution on December 12, 1787, by a vote of 46 to 23, twenty-one members of the minority signed a dissenting address that appeared in the *Pennsylvania Packet* and *Daily Advertiser* on 18 December 1787. These dissenters felt the Constitution’s militia clause gave Congress too much power over the “purse and the sword”⁶ and exclusively believed the states, not the federal government, should control the militia. In December 1787, an unknown dissenter voiced his economic and political concerns about a federally controlled militia in the *Pennsylvania Packet*,⁷

The absolute command of Congress over the militia may be destructive of public liberty; for under the guidance of an arbitrary government, they may be made unwilling instruments of tyranny...The main pillars of the constitution, which we have shown to be inconsistent with the liberty and happiness of the people, as its establishment will annihilate the state governments, and produce one consolidated government that will eventually and speedily issue in the supremacy of despotism. . . . The standing army must be numerous, and as a further support, it will be the policy of this government to multiply officers in every department: judges, collectors, tax-gatherers, excisemen and the whole host of revenue officers will swarm over the land, devouring the hard earnings of the

industrious. Like the locusts of old, impoverishing and desolating all before them.⁸

In 1788, many citizens still viewed federal control of the militia not as an additional asset to the security of the nation but a threat to the security of the state at the hands of a tyrant, who controlled the military resources of the nation. Their fear, based on historical examples from Caesar to Cromwell, was of powers within the United States not enemies abroad. Virginian Patrick Henry was one American who disagreed with the notion that more federal control of the state militia equated to peace and security:

My great objection to this Government is, that it does not leave us the means of defending our rights; or, of waging war against tyrants: It is urged by some Gentlemen, that this new plan will bring us an acquisition of strength, an army, and the militia of the States: This is an idea extremely ridiculous: Gentlemen cannot be in earnest. This acquisition will trample on your fallen liberty: Let my beloved Americans guard against that fatal lethargy that has pervaded the universe: Have we the means of resisting disciplined armies, when our only defense, the militia is put into the hands of Congress?⁹

The arguments against a federally controlled militia voiced by Anti-Federalists in the late 1780s were primarily based on excessive costs, fear of despotism, the depreciation of state sovereignty, and the imposition on individual liberties. These factors remained ingrained in the American public and influenced decision-making in Congress for the next 150 years. However, in the early 1900s these arguments were inculcated to the political rhetoric supporting National Guard self-interest. The factors outlined by Henry became the standard argument politicians used against any reorganization of the U.S. Army that decreased the role of the state militia or created a federally controlled militia. Part of the struggle to create an Army Reserve in the first half of United States history centered on military leaders convincing legislators that the greater good of the

nation would be served by more federal control over America's military forces despite the minuteman tradition and specters of Anti-Federalists.

In the late 1700s, Americans also argued against the army clause of the ratified Constitution based on their concern that Congress' authorization "To raise and support Armies"¹⁰ would obstruct the rights of individuals whose conscience forbade them from joining the war-fighting militia. Critics of the army clause felt that if military and civilian leaders during the Revolutionary War respected the rights of the citizens who opposed participation in the military, why then were these individual rights ignored by the new Constitution? Many Americans believed the Continental Congress ignored the individual liberty or the freedom of choice that every citizen should have regarding military service in both peace and war.

This sentiment expressed by the American public in the late 1700s provides a historical background on why UMT, a military necessity for an effective Army Reserve in the early 1900s, failed to receive approval from Congress. Throughout U.S. history, many Members of Congress would not support any legislation forcing their voting constituents to become an active or a "reserve" member of the U.S. armed forces unless war broke out. This political sentiment provides at least one plausible reason why Congress overwhelmingly supported and still supports the concept of an all volunteer army established in 1973.

While some Americans living in the late 1700s protested that the federal government had too much control over the military, others believed the contrary. President George Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox wasted no time with challenging the effectiveness of the Constitution's militia clause as well as the combat

readiness of state militias. In January 1790, the Washington Administration attempted to bring the military under closer federal control, which Knox believed would improve their effectiveness as a military organization. The plan conceived by Knox, proposed forming a federally controlled militia of all citizen soldiers ages 21-25. Each citizen soldier would be required to undergo 30 days of training at camps intended to teach basic soldier skills. In return, the government would allow them to vote and exercise other legal rights. Following the training, these soldiers joined the federally controlled main corps, which consisted of all citizen soldiers ages 21-45. This national manpower pool, similar to today's Individual Ready Reserves, would create the necessary armies for large external threats and prolonged conflicts.¹¹

Congress crushed this proposal based on economic, political, and legal factors. The expense of Knox's plan, \$400,000 annually, shocked most Members of Congress, who felt the price tag on a peacetime army should be relatively small.¹² A number of legislators shared the opinion of Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania who exclaimed, "The first error seems to have been the appointing of a Secretary of War when we were at peace, and now we must find the troops lest his office should run out of employment."¹³ In addition, local businessmen, craftsman, farmers and other members of the voting public objected to sending young workers off to training camps for four weeks each year. Governors complained about the loss of state authority and the weakening of the state militia. Some members of the public feared that military camps would turn the U.S. into a militaristic state. Republicans saw the plan as a huge intrusion into state affairs that ran contrary to the intent of the Constitution's carefully crafted wording regarding state control over the militia.¹⁴

The feelings of many Americans at this time echoed the sentiments of the former Commander of all Massachusetts troops in the Revolutionary War, Benjamin Lincoln.

His letter to Knox, dated February 1790, stated:

Though it would make ours the Strongest militia in the world, the people will not adopt it here if I know Massachusetts. . . . The Expense . . . the burden on Masters, calling the youth indiscriminately . . . subjection to a draft for a service of three years . . . damn the bill.¹⁵

Instead of Knox's plan, which would have created the first federally controlled militia; Congress passed the Militia Act of 1792. The Militia Act required all able-bodied men ages 18-45 to serve in the state militia. Each man enrolling in the state militia had the responsibility maintain his own weapon and equipment. Congress authorized no federal dollars for this purpose. The Militia Act did not include how states were going to enforce the enrollment. Thus, many states failed to ensure these "able-bodied men" met their service obligation. In addition, "the Militia Act offered no means of assuring that citizens would comply with the requirement that they furnish their own arms and accoutrements at personal expense."¹⁶ The inadequacies of the Militia Act of 1792 continued to lend credence to the concept of a federal militia.

The proposal by Knox and the subsequent Militia Act of 1792 established a historical correlation between proposals for a federal militia and changes to the state militia (National Guard). Several times over the next 120 years in U.S. history, when a legislator or military leader proposed establishing a federal militia, the National Guard would rally behind their political supporters in Congress and lobby groups to help defeat the proposal. However, each time the political supporters of the National Guard defeated a proposal, the National Guard relinquished a portion of their state autonomy and accepted more federal control by the Regular Army, Congress, and the president. The

establishment of a federal militia (an Army Reserve) may have happened a lot earlier in U.S. history if not for the gradual concessions made by the political supporters of the National Guard.

The War of 1812 revealed several weaknesses with dependence on the state militias in a time of war. In 1812, the Regular Army numbered less than 7,000 and thus depended on additional manpower provided by the state militias to mount attacks against British troops in Canada. However, New England governors hampered the war effort because of economic, political, and constitutional reasons. Governors in Connecticut and Massachusetts refused to support military operations because they felt military engagement with British warships in the open seas did not meet the criteria of the militia clause and therefore they viewed President James Madison's use of the state militia as unconstitutional. Finally, in 1814 these two states placed their state militia under federal control only with the intent of guarding their own coasts. Other governors opposed the war because New England's economy depended on trade with the British. Future military and government leaders utilized these examples when explaining the negative consequences of a military policy dependent upon agreement between federal and state governments.¹⁷

Strained relations between senior officers in the state militias and the Regular Army also caused unity of command and cohesion problems. State militia and Regular Army officers refused to give up control of their troops. Furthermore, militia officers, who formerly served in the Continental Army and militia during the Revolution, felt every bit as capable as their Regular Army counterparts.¹⁸ The adversarial relationship combined with a failure to integrate training and doctrine during peacetime made it

difficult for the militia and Regular Army officers to work together as a team. In his book, *Battle Studies* written in 1868, Ardant du Picq captures the essence of the military consequences that result from a lack of cohesion: “Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.”¹⁹

Specific campaigns and battles also revealed weaknesses in the militia. More than once, Ohio and New York militia refused to attack British positions across the border in Canada. These militia units believed incursions beyond the United States violated the militia clause of the Constitution.²⁰ In addition, the New York militia failed to properly respond to British raids in Plattsburgh and Buffalo, New York. In 1814, numerous ill trained militia soldiers retreated unnecessarily from their position near Bladensburg, Maryland during their defense of Washington, D.C.²¹

Despite battlefield failures, after the war, Major General Andrew Jackson, leader of the Tennessee militia, became an icon for the capabilities of the militia officer when given a fair chance. Jackson’s defeat of the British at New Orleans made him a national hero and helped him win the presidency in 1829. Jackson’s military victory gave the American public and their legislators at least one example of a state militia officer’s capability to defeat a European power without the assistance of the Regular Army.

Because of the state militias’ inadequacies during the War of 1812, John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War in 1820, believed the United States’ principle reliance on national defense should be shouldered by the professional standing army. Calhoun graduated from Yale in 1804, studied law, and became a lawyer in 1807. He served as a South Carolina Congressman from 1811-1817. In Congress, Calhoun strongly supported

the war against Great Britain in 1812. The performance of the state militia remained in the forefront of his mind when he became Secretary of War in 1820.

Calhoun proposed a plan to Congress that recognized the professional standing army as the primary defense of the nation in wartime. Instead of relying on the state militia, Calhoun favored an expansible standing army based on the concept of maintaining extra professional officers in the Regular Army force structure to provide the necessary experience and leadership for expansion done by conscripting the necessary enlisted soldiers to fill the ranks. Calhoun proposed a plan that would have expanded an army of 6,315 to 11,588 in wartime without adding an additional officer.²² Calhoun based his proposal primarily on military factors, the ability to win wars, instead of political, economic, or legal concerns. Calhoun felt that the reliance on American professionals provided the only chance for the United States to win a war against the armies of Europe. Calhoun described his concerns in a letter he wrote to Congress in December 1820:

I am aware that the militia is considered, and in many respects justly, as the great national force; but to render them effective, every experienced officer must acknowledge, that they require the aid of regular troops. . . .To rely on them beyond this, to suppose our militia capable of meeting in the open field the regular troops of Europe, would be to resist the most obvious truth, and the whole of our experience as a nation.²³

Despite Calhoun's efforts to create an expansible army, Congress defeated his proposal based on the following factors: the minuteman tradition established during the American Revolution, excessive cost to the taxpayer, and the distrust many Members of Congress and the American public shared toward a large standing army as well as the professional officer corps.²⁴

Although defeated in Congress, Calhoun's expansible army policy became a historical benchmark for future military professionals who felt national defense should

primarily rely on the professional army, not citizen soldiers. The reorganization of the army based on the expansible army concept would be the primary alternative to either creating a large federally controlled militia led by “reserve” officers or strengthening the National Guard by Congress mandating more federal control.

A disciple of Calhoun’s expansible army plan was Brevet Major General Emory Upton. Upton graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1816 and served in numerous command positions during the Civil War, attaining the rank of Brevet Major General by the end of the war. After the Civil War, Upton felt that “Regular troops, engaged for the war, are the only safe reliance of a government, and are in every point of view, the best and the most economical.”²⁵ In 1880, after serving twenty years in the U.S. Army including a two-year tour of European armies from 1875 to 1877, Upton wrote an essay entitled “The Military Policy of the United States.” The document remained unpublished at the time of his death. Once published in 1903, this policy became a base document for establishing a U.S. Army with three components, a Regular Army, a federally controlled militia, and the state militia. Although Upton believed in establishing three components, he felt leadership should exclusively remain the responsibility of the Regular Army. Similar to Calhoun, Upton’s policy proposed a Regular Army of around 25,000 men with the battalion serving as the basic organizational unit. Regiments would contain two battalions but be staffed with enough officers to fill positions in three or four battalions. In an emergency, Congress would mobilize a “National Volunteer Army” of “reserve” forces led and controlled by the Regular Army. In essence, the “National Volunteer Army” would be a federally controlled militia. Upton described this concept in his military policy:

In the time of peace and war the military forces of the country to consist of . . . the National Volunteers to be officered and supported by the Government, to be organized on the expansive principle and to consist in time of peace of one battalion of two hundred men to each Congressional district.²⁶

Upton envisioned the state militia filling only their constitutional role as defined by the militia clause. The militia was to be funded “exclusively by their states.”²⁷

In essence, Upton believed the leadership of the U.S. Army must always fall into the hands of full-time professionals assigned to the Regular Army. Based on his own Civil War experience, Upton scorned the employment of militia troops led by non-professional officers utterly ignorant of the art of war. In his writings, Upton highlighted the failures of militia troops in numerous battles he fought in during the Civil War including battles at Bladensburg and Bull Run.²⁸

Upton’s concept concerning the expansible army and the reduced leadership role of the citizen soldier failed to consider political factors that influenced Congress. The limited role he gave to the state militia suggested Upton was either unaware of the political strength of the state militias or just did not care what politics had to do with the organization of the military. In his writings, Upton criticized political influence in military affairs and believed in denying politicians access into the officer corps by means of cronyism and political patronage.²⁹ Upton’s outlook on politics remained prevalent among many Regular Army officers for the next 100 years.

In 1878, James A. Garfield, a Republican Senator from Ohio who later became President in 1880, introduced a bill establishing a military policy based on Upton’s concepts of an expansible army, which included a federally controlled militia. Garfield served as a major general in the Union Army and successfully led a brigade at Middle Creek, Kentucky against Confederate troops.

Garfield's proposal was partially based on correcting the deficiencies demonstrated by the state militias during the Great Railroad Strike of 1877. Over 40,000 state militia soldiers were activated for this nationwide strike. The performance of the state militias varied throughout the strike. However, deficiencies were well noted. Historian Howard Zinn describes a scene in Altoona, Pennsylvania in 1877, "troops surrounded by rioters, immobilized by sabotaged engines, surrendered, stacked arms, fraternized with the crowd, and then were allowed to go home, to the accompaniment of singing by a quartet in an all Negro militia company."³⁰ In other parts of the country militia soldiers randomly fired on strikers while others joined their cause. The Regular Army had to be called upon to end the prolonged violence of the strike.³¹

Despite Garfield's Civil War heroics, legislators defeated his proposal. Congress turned down the bill based on three reasons. First, Congress and their constituents still believed in the minuteman tradition. In other words, the Members of Congress representing each state were not going to approve any bill that would have decreased the power and significance of their state militias. Secondly, the bill was defeated because of economics. Members of Congress wanted to limit costs during peacetime. Finally, Congress defeated the bill because they felt only a limited amount of trained specialists were necessary to conduct war. In addition, Garfield's proposal for a federal militia was the first one to meet opposition from the newly formed National Guard Association (NGA).³²

The NGA, created in 1877, provided united state militia (National Guard) representation before Congress. Their purpose was to promote efficiency in the National Guard, which included asking Congress for more funding.³³ Unlike Regular Army

officers, National Guard officers' status as citizen and soldier gave them opportunities to discuss military policy openly with their elected representatives in Congress. The NGA became a conduit for this discussion. In the NGA's first year, they convinced Congress to double the allotment of funds to the National Guard increasing the amount from \$200,000 to \$400,000.³⁴ Henceforth, the NGA played a significant role in military policy governing force structure. In 1881, the NGA annual convention statement to Congress explained the intent of their organization: "We are opposed to any change in the relative authority now exercised by the Federal and State governments over the militia, and we are opposed to any interference in the existing militia organization of the States or the creation of a new force."³⁵

In addition to NGA opposition to an expanded army and a federalized militia, the Democratic Party remained steadfast against increasing the size of the military. The Democratic Platform of 1880 stated, "We are opposed to an increase of the standing army in times of peace, and the insidious scheme to establish an enormous military power under the guise of the militia laws."³⁶

When Congress declared war against Spain on 22 April 1898, the combat readiness of the National Guard was once again put to the test. To bypass possible constraints of the militia clause, President William McKinley's call-up stipulated that National Guard soldiers would not be sent outside the continental U.S. unless they volunteered for overseas service.

As in the past American wars, many National Guard officers lacked the ability to properly train their troops.³⁷ Equipment shortages such as wearing wool clothing in Cuba and Civil War era rifles hindered the National Guard in training and combat. However,

military historians agree that National Guard troops performed adequately against Spanish troops as well as local insurgents in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba.

In 1903, over twenty years after Upton's death, military officers brought Upton's unpublished manuscript to the attention of Secretary of War, Elihu Root. Root had no military background. He had practiced law in New York from 1867 until President McKinley appointed him as the Secretary of War in 1899. Root, known for his impressive power of analysis and problem solving ability, admired the insightful military theories of the former Civil War general. However, Root felt Upton was naïve when it came to the realities of national politics and the formulation of policy.³⁸ Root thought Upton only looked at the military through the field glasses of a soldier and failed to measure the impact of public will and the democratic process utilized by the government of the United States.

Secretary Root did incorporate Upton's idea of a general staff, modeled after the German general staff, which Upton studied after the civil war. The "Root Reforms" established a General Staff Corps and an Army War College to provide the necessary schooling and planning platform that would enable officers like John McAuley Palmer to analyze and discuss the merits of a federal militia.

After reading Upton's manuscript, Root recognized how Upton viewed the difficulties that arise when politics interfere with the War Department's ability to establish a national military strategy based on the security of the United States. Upton's views concerning politics as well as an expansible professional army continued to have a far-reaching effect on future professional soldiers despite congressional and public opposition. These professional officers, called "Uptonians," felt professional soldiers

should determine the organization of the U.S. Army and Members of Congress should only approve or deny the necessary funding.

Root realized the Militia Act of 1792 demonstrated fundamental flaws beginning with the War of 1812 to the more recent Spanish American War in 1898. Root's frustration with the Militia Act of 1792 is evident in his description on America's reliance on the National Guard:

It is really absurd that a nation which maintains but a small Regular Army and depends upon unprofessional citizen soldiery for its defense should run along as we have done for one hundred and ten years under a militia law which never worked satisfactorily in the beginning, and which was perfectly obsolete before any man now fit for military duty was born. The result is that we have practically no militia system, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution makes it the duty of the federal Congress "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," and "for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."³⁹

When Secretary Root considered reducing the role of the National Guard and creating a National Reserve (federally controlled militia), he sparked a heated debate among Members of Congress, the War Department, and the NGA. At this time, Root learned first hand what Upton felt was the detrimental entanglement of politics and military decision-making. The NGA wasted no time rallying their political supporters against Root and the War Department's plan. Root realized too late the huge political weight of the NGA as well as the state adjutant generals who were political appointees of the governor. Whether the NGA persuaded Members of Congress or they were swayed by the collective "no" of their constituents, Congress substantially defeated Root's plan to reduce the role of the National Guard and establish a federal militia.⁴⁰

Instead of establishing a federally controlled militia advocated by the Secretary of War and the War Department, Congress approved a compromise proposal that gave the

Regular Army and Congress more control of the National Guard. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Senator Charles Dick of Ohio, a former general in the National Guard and President of the NGA, introduced this compromise. Dick sponsored the 1903 Militia Act, which provided federal equipment and additional training support for all National Guard units. In return, the National Guard was subject to federal call-ups for nine months (restricted to within U.S. borders), and adherence to minimum training standards established by the Regular Army. In addition, National Guard soldiers would be disciplined according to federal military law if they failed to report to duty.

One of the provisions of the Militia Act of 1903, which Root and the War Department supported, would have created a federally controlled reserve force disconnected from the National Guard. Although initially included by Senator Dick, Congress dropped this provision without much debate. The idea of the federally controlled militia still had little congressional support at the turn of the twentieth century.

Once again, the lobbying effort of the NGA helped defeat another initiative for a federally controlled militia supported by the Secretary of War and the War Department. When Senator Dick, the NGA President in 1903, introduces a bill regarding the force structure of the U.S. Army, one might suppose, the idea of a federally controlled militia may not receive objective consideration. In addition, Senator Dick, a Republican, also met the political desires of the Democratic Party, which assured the bill's success. The Democratic Platform of 1900, showed not only their support of the National Guard but their inherent opposition of any additional militia forces controlled by the federal government:

We oppose militarism. It means conquest abroad and intimidation at home. . . . It will impose upon our peace loving people a large standing army and unnecessary burden of taxation, and will be a constant menace to their liberties. . . . A small standing army and a well-disciplined state militia are amply sufficient in time of peace. This republic has no place for a vast military establishment, a sure forerunner of compulsory military service and conscription. When the nation is in danger, the volunteer soldier is his country's best defender. The National Guard of the United States should ever be cherished in the patriotic hearts of a free people.⁴¹

Despite the signing of the Militia Act of 1903, the War Department continued to be concerned about the limits of the National Guard's overseas deployment capability. With expanding international trade and the recent acquisition of overseas territories, the War Department felt the lion's share of national security could no longer depend exclusively on the National Guard. The War Department continued to press the idea of a federally controlled militia rather than dependence on an improved National Guard. However, the NGA President, Senator Dick, once again responded to War Department critics. Dick introduced new legislation in April of 1908 designed to expand the overseas capability of the National Guard.

The Militia Act of 1908, attempted to negate criticism by the War Department concerning the overseas deployment limits of the National Guard. Under the provisions of the Militia Act, the President was given full authority to activate National Guard members in an emergency and removed geographical and time constraints on activated guardsmen. It also required that National Guard units adhere to the same organization and discipline standards of the Regular Army. However, this legislation did not satisfy the needs of several military leaders who still felt the U.S. Army needed a "reserve" force directly under the control of the War Department. These military leaders felt U.S. Army

mobilization plans could not estimate how many members of the National Guard would volunteer in the event of a national emergency.⁴²

Despite opposition in Congress to establish a large federally controlled militia, the Medical Reserve Corps was established when Senate Bill 1424 passed in 23 April 1908. This bill established a manpower pool of medical officers. The Secretary of War was authorized to activate these medical officers in case of a national emergency. Congress passed the act by a margin of 126 to 15, establishing the first federally controlled reserve force in the United States. Undoubtedly, the bill passed because it did not challenge the power of the state militia, cost very little and actually added to the military effectiveness of the U.S. Army. Although Senate Bill 1424 only established the Medical Reserve Corps, 23 April 1908 is viewed as the official birth date of the Army Reserve.

In a letter, dated 22 March 1967, Brigadier General Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History wrote Major General William J. Sutton, Chief, Army Reserve establishing this date as the official beginning of the Army Reserve:

Although the National Defense Act of 1916 is viewed as providing for the immediate ancestor of our Reserve system in its present form, it is considered appropriate that 23 April 1908 be established as the official birth date of the United States Army Reserve. The Act of Congress on that date which created the Medical Reserve Corp, for the first time in Army history, provided for the establishment of a reservoir of trained officer personnel in a reserve status.⁴³

From 1790 to 1908, the failed efforts of military and political leaders to establish a federally controlled militia began with opposition based on concern about large standing armies, cost, and despotism. However, with the emergence of unified political supporters of the National Guard, the defeat of initiatives creating a federally controlled militia became more and more political in nature. According to historian, John K. McMahon, "Support for the NGA position could always be found in Congress. There

were devoted states' rights legislators who would not agree to anything that might tend to obliterate state lines and state authority.”⁴⁴

Contrary to the political supporters of the National Guard, proposals supporting a federal militia did not have a political lobby group supporting them, no political party endorsement, and before the early 1900s never established a foothold with the American public. During this time in American history, the majority of the public still shunned an undue prevalence to a military ethos and looked down upon those who did. The only supporters were political and military leaders who had witnessed the inadequacies of the National Guard and wanted change. In addition, the War Department failed to adequately consider the American public as well as their elected representatives when developing federal militia and expansible army proposals. Therefore, none of the proposals from 1790 to 1908 had a notable chance to succeed.

¹Merriam Webster's *Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed. (Springfield: Merriam Webster, 1996), 738.

²Russel F. Weigley, *Towards an American Army* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 7.

³John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of George Washington*, vol. 26 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), 375.

⁴Richard H. Kohn, ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 70

⁵R. B. Bernstein, ed., *The Constitution of the United States* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2002), 45.

⁶Ralph Ketchan, ed., *The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates* (New York: Signet Classic, 1986), 243.

⁷Established 1771 in Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania Packet in 1784 became the United States' first daily paper. The Pennsylvania Packet contained articles containing all political views during the time of the Continental Congress.

- ⁸Ketchan, 254-256.
- ⁹*Ibid.*, 332.
- ¹⁰Bernstein, ed., *The Constitution of the United States*, 44.
- ¹¹Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 67.
- ¹²*Ibid.*
- ¹³Russel F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), 89.
- ¹⁴Doubler, 67.
- ¹⁵John M. Palmer, *America in Arms*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 141), 44.
- ¹⁶Weigley, *Towards an American Army*, 21.
- ¹⁷Doubler, 83.
- ¹⁸*Ibid.*, 86.
- ¹⁹Jay M. Shafritz, *Words on War* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1990), 420.
- ²⁰Jeffrey J. Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 29.
- ²¹Doubler, 83.
- ²²*Ibid.*, 67.
- ²³Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 140.
- ²⁴Weigley, *Towards an American Army*, 34.
- ²⁵Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 100.
- ²⁶Emory Upton, *Military Policy of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), 14.
- ²⁷*Ibid.*
- ²⁸Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 140.
- ²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰Howard Zinn, *A Peoples History of the United States* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 247-248.

³¹Doubler, 114.

³²*Ibid.*, 115.

³³*Ibid.*, 146.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 282.

³⁵Jerry Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 93.

³⁶Donald B. Johnson, ed., *National Party Platforms*, vol. 1, 1840-1956 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press), 58.

³⁷Doubler, 130.

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹Jacobs, 29.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 30.

⁴¹Johnson, 113.

⁴²John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and National Guard* (New York: Macmillan 1983), 100.

⁴³Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen* (Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 17.

⁴⁴Mahon, 124.

CHAPTER 3

DEFEAT OF THE ARMY OF THE PEOPLE: 1908-1916

Although the Militia Act of 1908 silenced some critics concerned with America's extensive dependence on the National Guard for the security of the nation, some Regular Army officers remained skeptical about the National Guard's current readiness, discipline, constitutional limits, past performance, and command and control. This chapter will examine the efforts of military and civilian leaders who attempted to create a federally controlled militia as an alternative to dependence on the National Guard or a large standing army. Their efforts ultimately led to a federally controlled manpower pool (Organized Reserve Corps) being established as a provision in the National Defense Act of 1916. However, the political supporters of the National Guard did not allow the creation of a federal militia without first increasing their own role and responsibility regarding national defense. In the end, the Organized Reserve Corps was a far cry from what military leaders hoped for.

In July 1910, Republican President William Howard Taft selected Major General Leonard Wood to serve as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. Wood's background included experiences both as a citizen and as a soldier. After graduating from the Harvard Medical School, he became an Army surgeon. Later, he became the first colonel of the Rough Riders during the Spanish American War in 1898. Wood, a lifelong friend of former President Theodore Roosevelt, also performed military duties as the governor of Cuba and later commanding general in the Philippines. Wood's diverse background may have given him the capability to think outside the Uptonian mind-set many professional Army officers held at this time. General Peyton C. March, future Chief of Staff wrote:

A great deal of [General Wood's success] was due to the fact that he was not a trained soldier and had none of the inhibitions of that ilk. The regular army man is trained to keep his mouth shut and play the game loyally for the best interests of the country, no matter what political party may be in power.¹

Because Wood was a military outsider and a Republican insider, he faced challenges from both contemporary Regular Army officers as well as Democrats.

Founded on his belief that the U.S. Army would not be able to fight a war of the magnitude of the recently ended Russo-Japanese conflict, Wood's quest for a federally controlled citizen army began in 1911.² He believed the U.S. Army needed to find an alternative reserve force rather than rely on the National Guard, feeling the state militia system had become ineffective because of poor management, low quality of training, state control, and political entrenchment based on the National Guard's political influence in Congress. President Taft thought Wood was too forceful in his plans to reorganize the Army and advised him to work within the resources already established.³ However, Wood was not a man easily denied.

To establish the necessary personnel for his citizen reserve, Wood recommended a universal military training (UMT) obligation for men between the ages of 18 and 25. Similar to the German system used in 1911, citizen soldiers would return home to their civilian occupation after a short period of training. The Army would call upon these citizen soldiers only in a national emergency. Wood's scheme would create a manpower pool of reserve officers and enlisted soldiers. General Wood describes his viewpoint on the creation of a citizen army:

We must also build up a system under which officers and men for our citizen soldiery can be trained with the minimum of interference with their educational or industrial careers, under conditions which will permit the accomplishment of their training during the period of youth, and once this is accomplished will permit their return to their normal occupation with the minimum delay.⁴

General Wood also felt that establishing a federally controlled reserve force made economic sense. Wood believed the U.S. government could maintain ten reservists for the cost of one Regular Army soldier. In the early 1900s, other members of the General Staff wrote articles recognizing the affordability of a federally controlled reserve force. These officers explained how the Swiss Confederation formed a cost effective template, which offered an alternative to a costly large standing army. After returning from a visit to Switzerland, Captain T. Bentley Mott of the U.S. Army Artillery Corps wrote several articles about how a country of 3,500,000 could mobilize a citizen army of 200,000 in three days with an additional 300,000 waiting in the wings at an annual cost of only \$5,500,000. While economic factors always inhibited enlarging the professional army, Wood felt the cost effectiveness of the citizen army would have a positive effect in the cost-conscious minds of Members of Congress.

One of the officers familiar with the Swiss model at this time was Captain John McAuley Palmer. In 1911, General Wood gave Palmer a task to prepare a staff paper exploring a major reorganization of the land forces of the United States, which included incorporating Wood's concept of a federally controlled militia. Palmer would not only use the aforementioned Swiss model in his staff paper recommending a federally controlled militia but would try to base his recommendation on American ideology.

Like Wood, Palmer also had a diverse background along with an understanding of politics he attributed to lessons taught to him by his grandfather. Palmer graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1892. As one of the first graduates of the training system created by Secretary of War Elihu Root for General Staff officers at Fort Leavenworth, Palmer was certainly aware of the military gospel according to Upton. After graduating

from West Point, Palmer voiced his support of Upton's expansible army plan to his grandfather, a former major general in the Civil War and U.S. Senator from Illinois.

Palmer's grandfather gave him some valuable political advice:

Well, my boy, I am not an educated military expert as you are, but my worst enemies will admit that I am something of a political expert. And I can assure you, positively, that the American people will never accept the expansible standing Army scheme of yours. If that is your best solution, you had better forget it and work up a second best that will have a chance of getting through Congress.⁵

Based on the merits of his grandfather's political wisdom, Palmer realized any reorganization of the military needed to include the economic and political realities of the time. Palmer describes his epiphany concerning military reorganization:

Of one thing I was certain: Whatever the particulars of that policy, in principle it must be in complete harmony with the social and political institutions of a democratic people. With this in mind, it had been apparent to me for some time that the old army doctrine of an expansible standing army could have no congenial place on the American scene. It was my grandfather, the "politician general" of Civil War days, who had first opened my eyes to this realization.⁶

Unlike Calhoun and Upton before him, Palmer emphasized more than just military factors in his ideas for a new military reorganization policy.

In the autumn of 1911, Palmer had an opportunity to test his "second best" solution. Palmer accompanied Wood and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on a train ride from Washington, D.C. to Fort Leavenworth. Shortly after the train left, Wood took Palmer to see the Secretary of War. In his recollection of the conversation with Stimson, Palmer explains the basic premise of his argument that the U.S. Army should depend on citizen soldiers not a large standing army:

If American citizen armies extemporized after the outbreak of war, could do as well as the citizen armies of Grant and Lee, what might they not do if organized and trained in time of peace? This then should be the basis for our wartime military force. Instead of expanding a standing army we should simply mobilize a preexisting citizen reserve and give it further training after mobilization. The

traditional policy of the United States, I pointed out, has been to rely upon a small Regular Army in time of peace and upon a great army of citizen soldiers in time of war. Such a policy has been and will be in harmony with the national spirit.⁷

After Palmer's exposition on the train, Wood and Stimson accepted Palmer's idea as the cornerstone for a new military policy for the United States. Shortly thereafter, Palmer, with assistance from officers assigned to the War College Division of the General Staff, wrote a 200 page document entitled "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States." This document included a section dedicated to explaining the necessity of a new federal militia system. In addition, Palmer's study made a clear departure from the Uptonian supported expansible army plan.

Palmer's plan was not without critics in the War Department. His departure from the expansible army plan led to harsh criticism by senior officers in the Army. Some arguments centered on Palmer's relative inexperience and credibility. In his memoirs, Palmer recalled the narrow mindedness of Major General Arthur Murray who told him: "you are a captain and I a major general. . . . There are two stars on my shoulder and only two bars on yours."⁸

In addition to Palmer's rank, aspects of his reorganization policy also threatened the established power and influence of several senior military leaders. Although their complaints were not specifically directed against Palmer's federally controlled militia plan, other aspects of Palmer's "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" eliminated positions of senior leaders in the Army. These leaders were not ready to relinquish their position or power eliminated by Palmer's reorganization plan and spoke out against it during committee hearings.

When Palmer turned in the policy to Stimson, the Secretary of War held an open forum, which included both military and political leaders. Unlike previous Secretaries of War, Stimson realized he needed input from Members of Congress before submitting any reorganization policy. Stimson's open forum provided a litmus test on how close the basic framework of Palmer's plan met the current will of Congress. After initial approval from key Members of Congress, Stimson sent "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" back to the General Staff to secure specific recommendations for the executive and legislative action necessary to carry the policy into effect.

The revised staff study, "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" was included as an annex to Stimson's annual report for 1912. The study, which became known as the Stimson Plan, included four categories of land forces: the Regular Army, a federally controlled reserve, the National Guard, and a volunteer army. Although vague in detail, the Stimson Plan laid the foundation for the concept of two reserve components found in today's U.S. Army. The Stimson Plan describes the reserve army as follows:

A reserve army of citizen soldiers organized during peace into complete divisions and prepared to reinforce the Regular Army in time of war. The first line of this reserve army already existed in the National Guard, but to make it fully available Congress would have to pass legislation to permit the Guard to be absorbed into the Regular Army with the coming of war. So long as the state troops continued to be organized under the militia clause of the Constitution, they could never be employed to maximum effectiveness by the federal government.⁹

Shortly after Palmer gave the plan to Wood and Stimson, he left the General Staff in accordance with a policy that tried to ensure adequate troop time for all General Staff officers. The policy known as the "Manchu Law" required all officers who had not been with troops during the past six years to go back to their regiments. Palmer was one of the

officers who fell under this provision. Shortly after Palmer left for China, Stimson was ousted by the election of 1912 and the Stimson Plan never made it to Congress.

Out of the three major draftsmen of the reorganization plan known as the Stimson Plan, only Wood remained after the election of 1912. After 1912, the Stimson Plan, still supported by Wood, met increased opposition from Members of Congress especially Southern Democrats who strongly supported the National Guard. Unlike the majority of Congress, Wood believed the National Guard should be primarily used as a domestic security force, however, the NGA did not want to relinquish the National Guard's role as the primary reserve military force in the U.S.

Regardless of congressional opposition, legal factors emerged to help Wood's goal of creating a federal militia. In February 1912, Attorney General George W. Wickersham ruled that "the militia while in U.S. service might pursue an invading force beyond the U.S. boundary as part of a repelling an invasion, but in general the militia cannot be employed outside the United States."¹⁰ This interpretation, which limited the overseas deployability of guardsmen, strengthened Wood's cause for a federally controlled reserve. The added territories from the war with Spain in 1898 continued to strain the resources of the Regular Army. Wood felt a civilian uprising within these territories or other overseas conflicts would cause a considerable manpower challenge for the Regular Army.

The political supporters of the National Guard, as it had done in the past when its monopoly on the citizen army was threatened, pushed through Congress the Volunteer Act of 1914. This allowed National Guard soldiers to volunteer for service overseas.

Many military planners still questioned how many guardsmen would volunteer for overseas duty in a time of war.

Another factor that negated General Wood's ability to push his concept through Congress was his political affiliation with the Republican Party. Overtly mixing politics with the military alienated many contemporary senior professional officers, who believed in Upton's disdain for political entanglement. The support of these professionals undoubtedly would have increased congressional acceptance of Wood's proposal for a federally controlled reserve force. In addition, his political affiliation with the Republican Party and military record provided at least one incentive for members of the Democratic Party to oppose his views. In 1912, the Democrats adopted a party policy against imperialism and colonial exploitation in the Philippines and elsewhere.¹¹ The 1912 split of Wood's own Republican Party also diminished the political support for his federal militia initiative.

These political factors not only delayed the success of Wood's campaign for a federally controlled reserve force and UMT but also probably caused his most prominent career setback, which occurred at the onset of WWI. President Woodrow Wilson's explanation of why he did not send Wood to France as the commander of the American Expeditionary Force provides insight into why Wood's personality, previous difficulties with Wilson, and unwillingness to conform to contemporary professionals, certainly hindered his campaign for a federally controlled militia. Wilson's letter to the *Springfield Republican* dated 5 June 1918, states:

In the first place, I am not sending [Wood] because General Pershing has said he does not want him, and in the second place, General Pershing's disinclination to have General Wood is only to [sic] well founded. Wherever General Wood goes

there is controversy and conflict of judgment. . . . I have had a great deal of experience with General Wood. He is a man of unusual ability, but apparently absolutely unable to submit his judgment to those who are superior to him in command.¹²

General Wood's term as Chief of Staff ended in April 1914. Wood's departure finished, for the time being, any hope for a citizen army based on Palmer's plan. As an active member of the Republican Party, Wood had little success with President Wilson's Democratic Administration. However, Wood, limited more by partisan politics than by the strengths of his arguments, never gave up on his idea of a citizen army. After leaving the Chief of Staff position, Wood took his ideas regarding a citizen army to the American public through speeches, magazine articles, and books. Wood, along with Theodore Roosevelt and other political leaders, soon became involved in a military preparedness movement aimed at pushing President Wilson into strengthening the national defense. The military threat Germany represented substantially strengthened the resolve and public support of the preparedness movement.

During the early 1900s, the National Guard became less favorable in the eyes of many Americans, especially citizens involved in current labor strikes across the country. Actions taken against strikers by undisciplined National Guard troops under questionable command and control gave military planners at the War Department increased doubt about the National Guard's wartime credentials. In Howard Zinn's, *A People's History of the United States*, he describes the Colorado National Guard's conduct during a labor strike in Colorado, which came to be known as the Ludlow Massacre:

In April 1914, two National Guard companies were stationed in the hills overlooking the largest tent colony of strikers, the one at Ludlow, housing a thousand men, women, children. On the morning of April 20, a machine gun attack began on the tents. The miners fired back. . . . The women and children dug pits beneath the tents to escape the gunfire. At dusk, the Guard moved down from

the hills with torches, set fire to the tents, and the families fled into the hills, thirteen people were killed by the gunfire.¹³

Eventually President Wilson sent federal troops to restore order in the region. In the battle between miners and Colorado guardsmen, sixty-six civilian men, women, and children had been killed. Some guardsmen refused to participate. Thousands of citizens demonstrated in front of the state capital and demanded the trial of National Guard officers involved in the Ludlow Massacre.

Despite growing complaints about the National Guard, personal disagreements with Wood and members of the preparedness movement, as well as a political reputation as a pacifist, President Wilson's first message to Congress after the outbreak of WWI in 1914 included an idea for a federally controlled militia of volunteers and an improved National Guard. In his speech, Wilson stated his military policy as follows:

We must depend in every time at national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms. It will be right enough, right American policy based upon our accustomed principles and practices, to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuver, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. . . . Every means by which such things can be stimulated is legitimate, and such a method smacks of true American ideas. It is right too that the National Guard of the United States should be developed and strengthened by every means, which is not inconsistent with our obligation to our own people or with the established policy of the Government.¹⁴

Preparedness at a time of national peril was the overall theme of Wilson's speech. Historians believe Wilson's motives were based on a concern for the defense of a nation in the face of a Germany he did not entirely trust and political respect for the strength of the preparedness movement led by prominent Republicans like Wood and former President Roosevelt.

Wilson, like Wood, rejected Upton's expansible standing army concept but had the political "know-how" to include strengthening the National Guard in his plan. Wilson felt the creation of a citizen army of volunteers, created not at the expense of the National Guard, would not meet extensive political opposition from Congress. In addition, Wilson avoided any mention of a draft in case there were not enough volunteers.

Wilson's plan attempted to appeal to the National Guard, the military preparedness movement, and his own political party's skepticism of a large standing army. Everybody received something in Wilson's plan except the military planners at the War Department who were left with vague guidance on how the President wanted to prepare for the possibility of war.

Although Wilson was holding onto his neutrality position regarding WWI, he promptly assigned the development of a preparedness program to the Secretary of War. Following Wilson's tasking, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison assigned the General Staff with the task of creating an organization to fit the guidance of the President. When Secretary Garrison assigned this responsibility to the General Staff, he instructed them to use the contents of Palmer's report entitled "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" as a guideline."¹⁵

The officers of the General Staff led by Brigadier General Hugh L. Scott, who replaced Wood as Chief of Staff, did not exclusively follow the military guidance laid down by President Wilson nor the policy prescribed by Palmer's report. Instead, the War Department's General Staff returned to the Uptonian view of a large standing army. General Scott's staff proposed a standing army of 281,000 to be filled, if necessary, by veteran regular army reserves with a proposed strength of over 200,000. In addition, they

increased funding for the National Guard but relegated it to quelling domestic disturbances. The federally controlled volunteer army, called the Continental Army, inherited most of the overseas wartime responsibilities previously held by the National Guard.

Although President Wilson initially supported the Continental Army Plan and spoke on the plan's behalf, he soon felt political pressure from Congress and the preparedness movement. The NGA adamantly opposed the Continental Army Plan and quickly took political steps to stop it.¹⁶ Wilson also heard complaints within his own political party. Avid supporters of the President's policies felt the General Staff's development of a million-man army contradicted Wilson's neutrality stance. Wilson's opponents felt the Continental Army Plan only served Wilson's true intentions of getting the United States into the war.

Southern Democrats in Congress, crucial to Wilson's reelection in 1916, objected to the Continental Army Plan. Representative James Hay, Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, and other Democrats believed the General Staff's Continental Army Plan awarded too much military power to the federal government, cost taxpayers too much money, and felt the recruitment of 500,000 volunteers improbable. These factors made the Continental Army Plan politically and economically unfeasible. The Continental Army Plan's reduced role for the National Guard assured political defeat. As in the past, political supports of the National Guard, including the NGA, persuaded Members of Congress to protect the National Guard from any downsizing or reduction in role.¹⁷

Representative Hay and Members of the House Military Affairs Committee proposed an alternative plan, supported by the politically powerful NGA. The plan essentially eliminated the concept of the Continental Army previously endorsed by the General Staff, Garrison, and former Secretaries of War Stimson and Root. Their plan made the National Guard the principle military reserve in peace and war. In return, the National Guard agreed to come closer to becoming a federally controlled militia. In a national emergency, guardsmen and their units would serve as part of the Regular Army, eliminating any overseas deployment issues. In addition, guardsmen would take an enlistment oath to obey the President and defend the U.S. Constitution.

After Chairman Hay informed President Wilson that there was not enough support in Congress to approve the Continental Army Plan followed by the Attorney General's statement that Hay's plan did not violate the Constitution, President Wilson withdrew his support for the Continental Army Plan and approved Hay's plan. In protest, Garrison resigned as Secretary of War. Once again, the legislative branch defeated the War Department's plan and approved a NGA supported politician's plan.

The defeat of the Continental Army Plan, endorsed by almost every current senior military officer, served as an example of why Upton and his followers felt civilian control of military affairs formed the essential defect in how the U.S. Army runs. In essence, military expertise became secondary to the political concerns of Congress. Uptonians followed Upton's notion that military policies should be created by military leaders not politicians:

In foreign armies, it is the duty of the General Staff to draw up the bills related to military organizations, which, after approval by the War Minister, are presented to

the representatives of the people. The latter may refuse to incur the expenses of reforms, but do not question the wisdom of the details.¹⁸

Regardless of the protest of Uptonians and other military leaders, on 3 June 1916, President Wilson signed the National Defense (Hay) Act of 1916. The Hay Act established that the U.S. Army would consist of the Regular Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps (ORC), the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC), and the National Guard. The ORC, ERC, and the Medical Reserve Corps, established in 1908, would be later merged under the name "Army Reserve" in accordance with the Armed Force Reserve Act of 1952. The remainder of the thesis will use the term Army Reserve as inclusive of these three elements.

Despite Garrison's resignation and the frustrations of other senior military leaders, the National Defense Act of 1916 maintained certain elements of the General Staff's recommendations as well as ideas advocated by Wood, Palmer, Stimson and Garrison. The Hay Act set up the National Guard as a quasi-federal militia advocated by Garrison. The National Guard's strength would increase from 100,000 to 400,000 and guardsmen would now be required to take a dual oath to obey the President and defend the U.S. Constitution in addition to their state requirements. The Hay Act also established the federal government as the major source of funds for the National Guard and stipulated that National Guard units could serve abroad during a national emergency.

The National Defense Act of 1916 provided the Army Reserve with the resources and means for manning the Officer Reserve Corps through direct commissioning, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The Act also established the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) to serve as a human resource pool for specialists with military experience in the following areas: engineer, signal, quartermaster, ordnance, and medical.

The Army Reserve would serve merely as manpower pools for the National Guard and Regular Army. The National Defense Act of 1916 did not provide for any military units assigned to the Army Reserve or additional training opportunities for Army Reserve officers outside their initial training conducted as part of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program or Military Training Camps (MTC) program. The “Analysis of the Army Reorganization Bill” written by the Senate Military Affairs Committee explains the limited scope of the ORC:

An officers’ reserve corps is provided which will authorize the commissioning of civilians up to and including the grade of major in the various branches of the Army. These men can be selected and trained in time of peace, and officers so obtained will be far better prepared than any volunteers that could be raised hurriedly at the out break of war. In order to obtain these reserve officers, a reserve officers training corps is authorized, which will consist of units at the various colleges, academies and universities throughout the country where military education and training will be given which, in connection with six weeks field training each summer, will give personnel for the officers’ reserve corps that is far better equipped for the duties of an officer, than any heretofore available.¹⁹

Another provision in the National Defense Act of 1916 that helped bring officers into the Army Reserve was the federal support provided to the MTCs. While still serving as the Chief of Staff, General Wood had initiated the MTC concept in 1913. With the support of prominent citizens concerned about military readiness, Wood later helped authorize summer camps for adults that Wood included under the War Department General Order No. 38, June 22, 1915. The concept of these camps was essentially the brainchild of former government and military leaders along with politically influential citizens who believed in military preparedness.

The early success of the adult summer camps, also known as businessmen’s camps, inspired Theodore Roosevelt, Wood, and law partners Grenville Clark, heir to a banking and railroad fortune, and Elihu Root, Jr., son of the former Secretary of War, to

form the Military Training Camps Association of the United States (MTCA). The MTCA became the Army Reserve's first political lobby group and helped to ensure expanded provisions for the camps in the National Defense Act of 1916. The lobbying of Grenville Clark, and other prominent members of the MTCA, along with support from Delaware Senator Henry A. DuPont, resulted in federal recognition of the 16,000 men who attended "businessman's camps" in the summer of 1916.²⁰ In addition, provisions in the Act assured greater participation in future camps by providing federal funds for the training. The National Defense Act of 1916 took the "businessmen" or "millionaires" out of the training camp and inserted citizen instead:

The new law provides that all expenses in connection with attendance at such camps shall be borne by the Federal Government. Heretofore individuals attending the camps for [sic] their own transportation, uniform, food, clothing, etc., the total expenses of which probably averaged about \$65.00 per member. This limited the personnel attending said camps to the more or less affluent, but under the new law any citizen who desires to take such training can obtain it without personnel pecuniary sacrifice.²¹

The lobbying success of the MTCA continued the following year when their efforts ensured full appropriation from Congress for the 1917 camps. After the nation declared war on Germany, the MTCA convinced Congress to convert the civilian camps to the role of Officer Candidate Schools, which commissioned officers in the ORC after the completion of 90 days of training. These officers, called 90-day wonders, filled a crucial officer shortage during America's preparation for WWI.

The accomplishments of the MTCA regarding the ORC served as a benchmark for how lobby groups outside the War Department would soon shape the force structure of the future Army Reserve. Although the War Department generally supported the ideas of the MTCA and resourced requirements, it was ultimately the lobby group and their

political affiliation that produced legislation favorable to the newly formed Army Reserve. The MTCA continued to serve as the Army Reserves' primary lobby group until the founding of the Reserve Officer Association (ROA) following WWI.

In the view of some historians, Francisco Pancho Villa and his Mexican Rebels' attack on Columbus, New Mexico on 9 March 1916 was the event that eventually led Wilson and Congress to finally approve the legislative initiatives found in the National Defense Act 1916. At the time of Villa's attack in New Mexico, the Regular Army did not have enough manpower to control the extensive U.S. and Mexican border.

Despite the attacks on the U.S. and Mexican border, the directives of President Wilson, and the political outcry of the preparedness movement, most Americans saw no reason to join a struggle 3,000 miles away. The war in Europe did not threaten American lives or property. Many Americans still considered job rights and pay at the workplace as their battleground. In addition, Americans chose different sides in the war based on their ethnicity. These factors undoubtedly led to the length of time the President, the War Department, and Congress took to finalize the National Defense Act of 1916, which created the Army Reserve.

No matter what combination of factors eventually resulted in the National Defense Act of 1916, critics blamed politics for the ineffective policies that placed the primary reliance in wartime on the National Guard. Brigadier General Hugh Scott, Chief of Staff in 1916, felt the influence of the National Guard convinced Congress to create a plan equivalent to a Constitutional house of cards. In a letter dated shortly after the signing of the Act, Scott wrote:

We would be worse off than we are now, because we would be saddled with an impossible system. They talk of the States agreeing to do these things, that is, to obey the orders of the national government; but Constitutional jurisdiction can not be given away, or bought or sold, and the first time it came to a legal decision the system would break down.²²

Other critics of the National Defense Act complained that political reasons outweighed the opinion of the nation's military experts including five former Secretaries of War. Former Secretary of War Henry Breckinridge called the bill "a comedy if only a passing ridiculous phase of the progress toward real national defense. A tragedy, if it is an accurate presage of what is to be the final result of the labors of this Congress on the great problem of national security."²³

Dr. Herbert Johnson, Professor of History and Law at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, and a mobilization assistant to the Deputy Chief of Air Force History, explains the National Guard's inherent political nature during the early 1900s:

The Guard was a reserve force subject to direction by Army Regulars in time of war, but it was also a state-oriented organization that had a life of its own, quite independent of the Army. In many ways the National Guard played the same role in national politics as volunteer fire companies did in local politics. A meeting place for men from all walks of life, the Guard was a valuable place to garner votes and recruit new political allies. Appealing to civilians with military interests, the Guard nurtured the ideal of the citizen-soldier among men who were sincerely interested in preparing themselves for service in the event of war. As a communication center for such men, the Guard also had the potential for launching creditable and damaging criticism of the Regular Army for national defense purposes.²⁴

Two weeks after Wilson signed the National Defense Act of 1916, the War Department ordered the first mobilization of the Army Reserve. The first mobilization of the Army Reserve on 28 June 1916 activated approximately 3000 members of the Army Reserve to fill Regular Army and National Guard manpower shortages in the defense of the Mexican border. The mobilization of the Army Reserve followed President Wilson's

call-up of the National Guard on 18 June 1916 to support the Mexican border crisis. As foreseen by military leaders since Washington, the National Guard faced many challenges following Wilson's call-up. Out of 158,000 guardsmen mobilized to assist in the defense of the Mexican border, the states involved discharged over 10,000 for failing physical fitness requirements. The states involved in the mobilization also gave hardship discharges to over 6,000 guardsmen who, for whatever reason, did not mobilize. Shortly after the mobilization, the War Department halted the states' authority to release soldiers, who sought hardship discharges. Some of the problems with the National Guard validated the National Defense Act's increased federal control of the National Guard and lent credence to future initiatives concerning more reliance on the Regular Army and Army Reserve.

No act of Congress passed in 1916 could have solved the manpower problems faced by the U.S. Army before WWI and there was not enough time available to rely on volunteers to raise an army before WWI. Therefore, to fulfill the manpower goals of the U.S. Army, Congress passed on 18 May 1917, the Selective Service Act of 1917. The Selective Service Act provided the bulk of the manpower for WWI. The draft brought 2.8 million citizens into the military and contributed to more than three-quarters of the total military strength.

In summary, numerous factors, including historical events, economics, military strategy and theory, preparedness, political, and legal, led to the affirmation of the National Defense Act of 1916. However, political supporters of the National Guard ultimately won the day when they ignored the Stimson Plan, trumped Garrison's Continental Army Plan and sponsored and passed the National Defense Act of 1916. This

NGA supported legislation, supported the National Guard significantly more than the other two components. In essence, politicians supported by the NGA, not Regular Army officers or the War Department, designed the force structure of the U.S. Army in 1916.

¹Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970), 58.

²Russel F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), 140.

³Herbert A. Johnson, *Seed of Separation: the General Staff Corps and Military Aviation Before World War I*, 3 Accessed from www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil (10 January 2004).

⁴Russell F. Weigley, *Towards an American Army* (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1974), 199.

⁵John M. Palmer, *America in Arms* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 135-136.

⁶I.B. Holley, Jr., *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 203.

⁷*Ibid.*, 203.

⁸*Ibid.*, 205.

⁹*Ibid.*, 210.

¹⁰Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen* (Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 23.

¹¹Donald B. Johnson, ed., *National Party Platforms vol. 1 1840-1956* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press), 174.

¹²Crossland and Currie, 68.

¹³Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (New York, 1999) 355.

¹⁴Palmer, 154-155.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Mahon, 147.

¹⁷Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 157.

¹⁸Weigley, *Towards an American Army*, 112.

¹⁹*Analysis of the Army Reorganization Bill* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916), 9.

²⁰Crossland and Currie, 29.

²¹*Ibid.*, 9.

²²C. J. Bernardo and E. H. Bacon, *American Military Policy* (Harrisburg: The Telegraph Press, 1955), 345.

²³*Ibid.*, 346.

²⁴Johnson, 5.

CHAPTER 4

IMPACT OF WWI ON THE RESERVE COMPONENT

In order to understand the criticisms of the National Defense Act of 1916 and subsequent political debate following WWI, an examination of the performance of citizen soldiers during WWI is necessary. Legislators, lobby groups, and military leaders, who attempted to create a post-war Army reorganization plan, cited both successes and failures of the National Guard in their arguments to change the force structure of the U.S. Army. Post-war reorganization plans also faced a public weary of the sacrifice of military endeavors. In addition, politically powerful citizen organizations directly opposed any efforts to expand the U.S. Army or increase the military responsibility of American citizens. General Peyton C. March's controversial expansible army plan, based on lessons learned from WWI, was the first plan to face this political whirlwind.

The U.S. Army's participation in WWI tested the military effectiveness of the force structure outlined by the National Defense Act of 1916. After the war, most military leaders and politicians realized the Act failed to provide the necessary manpower, equipment, and training necessary at the onset of WWI. Under the provisions of the National Defense Act and the Selective Service Act of 1917, it took the U.S. Army more than a year to activate, train, and deploy the necessary combat troops needed for WWI. In essence, the National Defense Act's dependence on the National Guard and a citizen army of volunteers failed to provide the necessary troops to the European theater in a timely manner. The legislation's weakness in massing manpower (only 73,000 citizens volunteered before the draft)¹ was rectified by the Selective Service Act of 1917.

When the “Great War” ended on 11 November 1918, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Brigadier General Fox Connor stated in his final report:

Our experience taught one great lesson that, while it stood out so prominently to the General Headquarters, is likely to be soon forgotten. That lesson is: The unprepared nation is helpless in a great war unless it can depend upon other nations to shield it while it prepares. Every scrap of history of the American Expeditionary Forces bears this lesson.²

Many military leaders agreed with General Fox. They felt the country needed to amend or completely discard a military policy dependent on being “shielded” by another nation for more than a year while the U.S. Army’s sluggish war machine brought troops to the battlefield in France. Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Fletcher’s article published in the *Infantry Journal* in July 1919 echoed these sentiments:

To those who believed a soldier to be a man in a uniform with a gun in his hand, who believed the loose assertions made before the war that we could put an army of a million men in the field over night, it [World War I] must have been a revelation, an unforgettable object lesson.³

One of the objectives of the National Defense Act of 1916 included the concept that in a time of war the U.S. Army would primarily rely on citizen soldiers assigned to the National Guard. Under the provisions of the Act, the National Guard’s peacetime personnel strength would be 400,000 and they would provide the bulk of the manpower for the U.S. Army in wartime.

In theory, the National Defense Act of 1916 was meant to fill the 400,000 National Guard positions over a four to five year period. However, German U-boats and the Kaiser mandated a different personnel timeline. When Congress declared war on 6 April 1917, the National Guard stood at only 177,000. Despite initial shortcomings in personnel strength, the National Guard recruited another 200,000 volunteers within four months.⁴ Many of the 200,000 volunteers preferred to serve in their local National Guard

unit rather than being drafted into the Regular Army under the Selective Service Act. These 200,000 volunteers needed training before being sent off to war.

Despite manpower challenges of the National Guard at the onset of WWI, the Hay Act did effectively address previous criticism concerned with the overseas deployability of the National Guard. The Militia Act of 1908 provided President Wilson the full authority to activate and federalize as many National Guardsmen as the country needed. During WWI, guardsmen and their units served as part of the Regular Army, thereby eliminating any legal or constitutional restraints as well as command and control problems experienced in the past. Throughout WWI, no governor challenged President Wilson's National Guard call-up based on the militia clause of the Constitution.

The Army Reserve also had manpower challenges at the onset of WWI. The National Defense Act of 1916 did not envision the Army Reserve to be filled with officers overnight. In February 1917, the Army Reserve's Officer Reserve Corps consisted of only 500 officers, in addition to nearly 2000 medical personnel still in the separate Medical Reserve Corps. However, after the declaration of war, the Officer Reserve Corps continued to recruit, train, and commission officers through ROTC and Military Training Camps, which converted to 90-day Officer's Training Camps. On 30 June 1917, the Officer Reserve Corps had increased to 21,543 officers including officers from the Medical Reserve Corps, which merged with the Officers' Reserve Corps on 3 June 1917.⁵ By the end of the war, the Officer Reserve Corps provided 89,476 officers to Regular Army and National Guard divisions. In addition, approximately 80,000 enlisted reservists served in WWI. In all, more than 160,000 Army Reservists served on active duty during the United States' involvement in WWI.⁶

Despite the speed that both the National Guard and Army Reserve filled personnel shortages, most military leaders recognized the National Defense Act of 1916 failed to provide the necessary capability to rapidly mobilize mass armies for overseas duty. After the war, this force structure problem lent credence to arguments voiced by both military and civilian leaders who favored a larger standing army immediately available in a time of war. These leaders felt the slow build-up of a numerically superior U.S. Army prior to combat operations in WWI could not always be relied upon in the future.

Besides personnel shortages, provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916 failed to provide the necessary training resources for the National Guard and Army Reserve. The 33d Artillery Division, Illinois National Guard, for example, trained with dummy, wooden guns. Two months passed before machine gunners in the 33d received their weapons.⁷ The 33d's training began on 3 August 1917 at Camp Logan, Illinois. Their deployment overseas commenced on 23 April 1918. Other National Guard units retained similar timelines.

Once deployed overseas, General Pershing felt both Regular Army and National Guard divisions needed additional training when they arrived in France. The conduct of war had become increasingly complex at the turn of the twentieth century and therefore no longer an occupation of citizens or Regular Army soldiers with limited training. WWI proved that the citizen soldier could no longer just show up with his musket.

Another aspect of the National Defense Act of 1916 was the implied reliance on the leadership of officers assigned to the Army Reserve and National Guard. The Act never mentioned reduced roles for senior Army Reserve and National Guard officers in a time of war. Therefore, the performance of National Guard and Army Reserve officers

during WWI became another litmus test for the effectiveness of the Act. The performance of reserve officers during WWI was also a significant factor in shaping the contents of the National Defense Act of 1920.

Viewpoints of historians, military records, and the opinions of soldiers who served during WWI vary with their descriptions regarding the quality of leadership provided by National Guard and Army Reserve officers. However, certain historical details are clear. Many officers were physically unfit when called upon to serve. For example, eleven National Guard generals were immediately declared physically unfit for overseas service.⁸ In 1917, 12,115 National Guard officers entered active duty, and within one year 1,480 were sent home for fitness and other problems.⁹

In WWI, the battle command ability of National Guard and Army Reserve generals was not tested on the battlefields of France. There were no Army Reserve officers assigned to division command and only one National Guard division commander remained in command for the entire war. Before major operations during the war, the Army continually replaced officers from the National Guard in key positions with Regular Army officers. Therefore, whether or not National Guard and Army Reserve officers possessed the qualities Carl Von Clausewitz describes as “the blend of brains and temperament . . . the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character”¹⁰ to become successful division commanders remained unclear by the end of the war. In addition, Regular Army officers usually filled the majority of the key senior level staff positions in a division. This left operational planning predominately in the hands of Regular Army officers.

During the reorganization hearings in Congress after the war, nobody could testify about the failures of guardsmen serving as division commanders. The political supporters of the National Guard as well as the Army Reserve could honestly say they were not given a chance to succeed at the general officer level and were prejudiced against by the Regular Army.

Specific examples of National Guard leaders being possibly slighted are prevalent in numerous writings of National Guard historians. Brigadier General Charles Martin lost his position as commander of the 70th Brigade, 35th Division on the eve of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Afterwards the 35th Division historian lamented that “more of us would have come out of the Argonne with Martin in command of the 70th Brigade.”¹¹ In another example, Major General Clarence E. Edwards, commanding the 26th New England Division, and several senior officers in the 26th Division were relieved before the Meuse-Argonne offensive despite Edwards’ previous accomplishments commanding the 26th Division and the established confidence his soldiers held in him. The 26th Division historian wrote: “Once more one witnessed the apparent blindness of those who conducting the game of war, neglect to consider the psychology of the pawns on the chessboard.”¹² National Guard historians also made the assertion that senior Regular Army officers were still under the spell of Upton’s *Military Policy of the United States* circulated in the early 1900s, which stated that one of the weaknesses of the U.S. Army is the “the employment of militia and undisciplined troops commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of the military.”¹³

Some National Guard officers felt the prejudices started at the War Department. According to John K. Mahon, a distinguished historian for the U.S. Army, “militant

guardsmen have maintained through the years that the Army General Staff set out purposely during the war to destroy the identity of the National Guard units and in other ways to discredit the Guard.”¹⁴ Mahon cites other examples of National Guard historians writing about the contempt Regular Army officers felt towards National Guard officers.

General John J. Pershing, AEF Commander, made clear his views on senior leadership at the onset of WWI by relieving numerous officers from all three components. Pershing wanted competent, experienced, and ambitious officers to fill senior positions in the Army.¹⁵ “Experienced” for Pershing meant the appropriate education, training, and previous command assignments. In Pershing’s memoirs, *My Experiences in the World War*, Pershing specifically criticizes the system of promotion by seniority in the Regular Army and its increased negative impact on the more political National Guard:

In our Regular Army in time of peace, the system of promotion by seniority, instead of by selection, deprives many capable and energetic officers of the opportunity to command the larger units, which would help to prepare them for higher places in time of war. The same comment applies with equal or greater force to our National Guard, in which politics adds another factor often adverse to efficiency in the higher grades.¹⁶

Pershing did acknowledge during the Army reorganization hearings in 1919, “the National Guard never received the whole-hearted support of the Regular Army during the World War. There was always more or less prejudice against them.”¹⁷

The perception of many National Guard officers was that their relief of command and assignment to secondary positions of responsibility were based on the prejudices of Regular Army officers. National Guard officers and the NGA would later recall these incidents during congressional hearings regarding the reorganization of the Army in 1919. During the political debates surrounding the National Defense Act of 1920,

National Guard generals, the NGA, and their political supporters would voice these perceptions to Members of Congress during debate over the most effective post-war reorganization plan.

Despite the concerns of members of the National Guard who served during WWI, Mahon states “It was not discrimination against the National Guard that placed regulars in most of the general officer posts. The American military system was built on the premise that the military academies existed to provide the highest leadership during war.”¹⁸

The enlisted ranks of the Army Reserve, who served in both National Guard and Regular Army units, finished the war in good standing with Regular Army officers. Colonel John “Gatling Gun” Parker, a Regular Army officer who commanded the 102d Infantry Regiment, captured a popular sentiment regarding Regular Army officer’s confidence in the enlisted “reserves” and at the same time doubt in the “reserves” senior leadership: “The American militiaman, when he is properly led, is the finest soldier who ever wore shoe leather.”¹⁹

Regardless of the inexperience and limited training of Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers, most military leaders, including Pershing, felt citizen soldiers such as those found in the 369th Infantry Regiment proved their worth on the fields of France. The 369th, a National Guard organization assigned to the French 16th Division, became the first Allied troops to reach the Rhine River and the French government recognized the 369th with the award of the coveted Croix de Guerre.²⁰ In general, WWI leaders and future historians felt the citizen soldier proved capable during WWI despite frequent

firings of general officer leadership and other problems. Most share the sentiment of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Brigadier General Fox Connor:

Without doubt many mistakes were made and many units might have accomplished more. But, in a large sense, only a brief statement of fact is necessary to establish for the American soldier a record to which no other nation can lay claim; In the defense no American division lost ground entrusted to it, except locally, and then only for a few hours, and no American division failed in attack.²¹

Regardless of victory, many senior military leaders felt the war did not truly test the competencies of Army Reserve and National Guard officers. Military planners seeking to improve training provisions provided by the National Defense Act of 1916 were well aware that the next war may pose greater technical and tactical challenges for the U.S. Army. Shortly after WWI, General George C. Marshall articulated this concern in a speech to Illinois National Guard leaders:

In another national emergency involving war, America will have to depend strictly on herself and will not be free to prepare behind the skirts of an ally . . . you must in turn accept the prospect of having our State troops sent to the theater of operations in the first few days of war, and there immediately committed to action. This would be in decided contrast to the last war. . . . The last war while the greatest war, had become a highly stabilized war when we entered. Such warfare is far simpler in its requirements of troop training than warfare of movement, such as occurred in August and September of 1914 . . . [In 1918 American] units fought in what amounted to a slot or carefully defined section of the great front. Extended reconnaissance, preliminary engagements, uncertainties regarding the enemy-- these complications were not inflicted on the troops.²²

Similar to the problems faced before the war, manpower shortages plagued the newly formed Army Reserve shortly after WWI. Soldiers drafted under the Selective Service Act of 1917 returned home after the war without having any further obligation to serve in either the National Guard or Army Reserve. The Army Reserve picked up a small percentage of soldiers who still wanted to serve in the military, but for the most

part soldiers wanted out. If another national emergency occurred in 1921, under the organizational provisions governed by the National Defense Act of 1916, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve would undoubtedly face the same manpower challenges that appeared prior to WWI.

The Regular Army also felt the manpower crunch following WWI. By 1 January 1920, Congress had reduced the Army to 130,000 soldiers, a size not too much greater than the military strength of 100,000 imposed on Germany following the Treaty of Versailles. After the war, the majority of Congress equated peace with disarmament and cost savings, not preparedness.

After the war, political leaders, including Republican presidential candidate Leonard Wood, used the manpower mobilization problem during WWI as a battle cry for political change. During Wood's campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920, He spoke adamantly about the value and necessity of universal military training (UMT), a concept Wood and the preparedness movement had advocated since his days as Chief of Staff. In a 1919 speech, Wood told his audience:

Never again must we permit America to be caught so utterly unprepared and unready as we were in the Great World War. We paid for this lack of preparation in blood and treasure. We grant universal suffrage; we must demand universal obligation for service in peace and war whenever the nation calls.²³

Members of the Military Training Camps Association (MTCA) supported UMT following the war and felt it was the key ingredient to formulating an effective post-war military reorganization policy. The MTCA, Secretary Report, January, 1920, states, "The war had demonstrated clearly our unpreparedness and that now was the time, in connection with the necessary reorganization of the Army, to push the adoption of the principle of UMT."²⁴ Similar to the majority of the Army's military leadership, the

MTCA felt one year to mobilize, draft, and recruit the necessary troops in a time of war did not meet the nation's security needs. The sentiments of the MTCA echoed the Republican Platform of 1920, which stated, "Peace found the [Wilson] administration as unprepared for peace as war found it unprepared for war."²⁵

Critics of the MTCA and other organizations like the Universal Military Training League felt these organizations supported UMT only as a means to combat labor militancy and socialism, as well as protecting the economic interests of the wealthy. Many people felt the MTCA represented Wall Street not Main Street. Anti-UMT groups such as the American Union Against Militarism, Women's Peace Party, and other organizations would continue to exert substantial political pressure on Congress in 1919 and 1920 to vote against any military reorganization plan supporting UMT.²⁶

President Wilson's view of the post-war world would also impact the process of restructuring the U.S. Army after WWI. After the end of the war "to end all wars," President Wilson focused his efforts on establishing a new world order whereby collective security among nations, not massive armies, would deter aggression. He believed the new world order implemented by a League of Nations would lead to worldwide disarmament. Thus, his efforts were geared indirectly towards decreasing the size of the U.S. Army, not increasing it. For Wilson, the League of Nations meant peace through disarmament. Some members of Congress, who opposed Wilson's League of Nations, believed diplomacy not backed by military force was an ideological pipe dream.

The experiences of WWI also led many Americans to turn away from any involvement in foreign affairs and they felt the government should do the same in order to give the country a better chance for peace. Many citizen organizations campaigned to

limit military influence in American society and favored the isolationism of the past. Some Americans wanted the government to close their eyes on European affairs and open them to the unemployment, working conditions, and poverty found inside the United States after the war. In addition, American soldiers carried the horrors of WWI back home and this created anti-war sentiments across the country. King Swope, a WWI veteran elected to the House of Representatives, commented on the prevailing attitude of his constituents when he remarked, “Everybody had a bellyful of the damn Army.”²⁷

Warren G. Harding’s election as President in 1920 exemplified most American’s desire to reject any future entanglements in European affairs, thus, eliminating, in the eyes of the public, the need for a large standing army and increased congressional expenditures on national defense. Harding won the Republican nomination for the presidency on the tenth ballot at the Republican National Convention over prominent Republicans such as Leonard Wood, who led after the first round of ballots. Harding’s defeat of Wood at the 1920 Republican Convention undoubtedly proved that Harding’s theme of normalcy won over Wood’s theme of military preparedness.

Warren G. Harding began his presidential campaign under the theme of “normalcy” at home. “America’s present need,” said Harding during his campaign, “is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums but normalcy; not revolution but restoration . . . not surgery but serenity.”²⁸ The theme of normalcy carried Harding to victory. Harding easily defeated Democrat, James Cox, 16,133,314 popular votes to 9,140,884 (404 to 127 electoral).²⁹

The first leader to propose a post-war reorganization plan was General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff of the Army since March 1918. After the war, March tasked the

War Plans Division of the General Staff to reorganize the Regular Army based on maintaining a Regular Army strength of 500,000. The War Plans Division produced a personnel plan based on a Regular Army of 500,000 and 11 months of universal military training for all citizens followed by extended service in the Army Reserve.

When March received the reorganization plan from the War Plans Division, he rejected it. March felt a year of UMT was unnecessary and un-American. March describes his reaction to their plan in his book *The Nation at War*:

The [War Plans] Division had gone far beyond the principles outlined to them and produced a reorganization founded on universal military service which I did not approve for a minute. . . . I do not believe, in such a system for the United States in peace time. It does not conform to the fundamental principles set forth in our Constitution and it is repugnant to American ideals to militarize the country.³⁰

March felt that enlisted soldiers conscripted during WWI performed adequately with only three months of training. In addition, the cost for taxpayers and the long disruption of someone's civilian profession also impacted March's views on UMT. Under the political pressure from organized civilian supporters of UMT, March would include three months of UMT in his own plan.

The concept of filling the Army Reserve with citizens who had completed UMT consistently reappeared in military publications at this time. Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher's *Infantry Journal* article published in July 1919 echoes the advocacy felt by many Regular Army officers towards UMT:

It may thus be seen that any plan for universal military training becomes now, not a series of difficult problems involving ways and means and great initial expense, but rather the passage of laws with provisions whereby we may utilize to the best advantage the wonderful resources which have thus been placed within the nation's reach.³¹

Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher's article suggested a new military policy, whereby the U.S. Army would fill Army Reserve units with experienced WWI soldiers and participants of UMT while the resources from WWI were still available: The excess military equipment, weaponry, and training bases from WWI provided a cost effective way to train and equip a citizen army. In the past, Congress had negated these resources based on cost. In addition, many military planners felt that the Army Reserve, as defined by the National Defense Act of 1916, would never get enough volunteers to be effective.

In January 1919, March, with the aid of his Assistant Chief of Staff, and Chief of Operations, prepared his own plan based on a permanent Army of 500,000 men organized as an expansible army. Like Upton and Calhoun, March wanted the organization of the Army to include additional professional officers to man skeleton units, filled by enlisted soldiers during a national emergency. March's plan received the approval of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker who introduced the bill on 16 January 1919 to the House Military Affairs Committee. Thus, March's plan became the Baker-March bill.

March based his plan primarily on improving military readiness. March, like Upton, believed military leaders should make policy void of political influences, cronyism, and the whims of the people. In his book, March described the intent of the bill, "We all wanted to do what was best for the country, and none of us was influenced by any other motive . . . it was based on the experiences of the war and was sound military policy"³² Although senior members of the General Staff as well as the Secretary of War felt this plan met the security needs of the nation, the Baker-March bill failed to

achieve much support during preliminary hearings in front of the House Military Affairs Committee.

Members of the committee did not want a large standing army. Representative John C. McKenzie summed up the view of the committee when he stated, “I do not believe that any bill providing for an army of 500,000 men in time of peace will ever get through the House of Representatives.” In addition, March’s bill hardly mentioned the politically powerful National Guard. Also, March did not consider the anti-war and anti-military sentiment of the American public following the war. Many citizen groups wanted reduced government spending and therefore wanted a smaller army.³³ March’s basic plan for an expansible army would be revised a number of times and presented again in August 1919 to the Senate Military Affairs Committee.

The president of the MTCA, Tompkins McIlvaine, a reserve officer and wealthy corporate lawyer, had a similar opinion of March’s plan. His letter to the Secretary of War stated: “A large standing army is not only the most expensive system but it is uneconomic, undemocratic, and un-American.”³⁴ The MTCA would later turn to Members of Congress and Palmer to support a reorganization policy based on UMT.

March also faced difficulties in submitting any bill with his name on it based on previous dealings with Members of Congress during the war. Legislators complained that during the war March did not personally answer their letters, rudely refused to give explanations on military affairs, and exceeded his authority as Chief of Staff. March believed “you cannot run a war on tact.”³⁵

During preliminary debates over March's expansible army, Representative Fiorella La Guardia summed up the feelings of many Members of Congress when he stated:

He [March] has no consideration for the desires of Congress. He has all the despotic will and autocratic characteristics of a Ludendorff and the military genius of the Crown Prince. . . . When I was a soldier I soldiered . . . when I legislate I want to legislate, and I do not want Peyton C. March to tell me what I have to legislate.³⁶

March's performance during WWI varies among military and political leaders. General Marshall's letter to General Pershing, concerning Pershing's memoirs, indicates not only how Pershing and Marshall felt about March's performance but also indicates why Pershing, who had considerable influence over Members of Congress, might hesitate to support any reorganization plans initiated by March following the War. Marshall writes:

Everyone of importance concerned with the war knows of your hostility to General March. . . . I think General March displayed picayunish qualities and personal animosity distressing to find in a man of his outstanding ability. But, to me, the fact remains that there was not another man, saving yourself, and possibly General Wood, who could have filled the terribly difficult position of Chief of Staff in Washington. Wood's personal ambition would probably have been fatal; March's were not absent, but he did a remarkable job, in my opinion, which you should in no way belittle.³⁷

March also had additional problems with the National Guard based on decisions he made during the war. Supporters of the National Guard did not forget March's issuance of General Orders 73 on 31 July 1918, which stated, "This country has but one army."³⁸ After this order, guardsmen had to strip off any state affiliated insignias. National Guard historian, John K. Mahon states "for this and other reasons, partisans of the National Guard place March at the top of the list of regulars whom they considered to be hostile."³⁹

Whether March's concept of the expansible army met the security needs of the nation at a reasonable cost is certainly debatable. It is clear, however, that any bill concerning the reorganization of the army needed support from Members of Congress and any attempt to shut them out meant increasing the chance of the bill's ultimate failure. March's inability to garner a military plan that was both economically and politically feasible kept the debate over the proper reorganization of the military open for months. Regardless of how brilliant the plan and how many military leaders supported it, any plan for the reorganization of the army had to be synchronized with the desires of Congress and the will of the American people.

In addition to the political front, March's plan would eventually fall under economic criticism. In the view of many Members of Congress a standing army of 500,000 was not worth the cost at a time when most Americans were more concerned about their own employment. For the most part, March's plan focused exclusively on military factors, not the economic impact of the plan. In addition, Congress still had a considerable debt from WWI that needed to be paid. The total outlay of the government from April 1917 until the end of demobilization in October 1919 was 34.4 billion dollars. This sum was double the total federal expenditures from 1789 to 1900.⁴⁰

The nature of Congress' attitude towards military funding has been evident since the early days of the Continental Congress when Members of Congress sought an appropriate national defense at the lowest possible cost. The influence of economist, Adam Smith, who wrote *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776, influenced the Continental Congress and remained prevalent in 1919. Members of Congress continued to heed the warnings of Adam Smith regarding the dangers of a government continuously imposing

excessive taxes. Senator Joseph S. Frelinghaysen, Republican from New Jersey, voiced the predominate opinion that March's expansible army plan would impose too much taxation on the American people.

We want, at this time to do what is practical, to avoid what occurred in the past few years . . . the cost, the tremendous sacrifice, the tremendous burden of taxation . . . and arrive at some simple plan of national defense which will be effective should an emergency arise.⁴¹

As for as the future of the Army Reserve, March's plan gave no intention to expanding a federal reserve force whereby citizens, who had completed mandatory universal military training or a tour with the Regular Army, would be assigned to Army Reserve units led by Army Reserve officers. The provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916 never did establish a mechanism for creating Army Reserve units manned by Army Reserve officers and enlisted soldiers. March's plan required no further military service or training for citizens who completed universal military training, lasting three months, unless a national emergency occurred or a declaration of war. If approved by Congress, March's plan eliminated the possibility of forming Army Reserve units manned by participants of universal military training.

After numerous appearances before Congress campaigning for his plan, March won little support in Congress. In his book, March comments on how his reorganization plan later lost out to one influenced by George Washington:

It has been said that the Act reorganizing the Army passed by Congress after the war embodied the ideas of George Washington before the organization of the first American Army. . . . The United States of America, emerging from the greatest war in history of the world, should no more go back to Washington for an organization of its Army, discarding what it had learned during the war, that it should go back to the tallow dips he used for light, discarding all the products of the genius of Edison.⁴²

¹Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 364.

²Department of the Army, *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), 60.

³R. H. Fletcher, "Universal Military Training," *Infantry Journal* vol. 16 (July 1919): 4.

⁴John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and National Guard* (New York, Macmillan, 1983), 156.

⁵Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen* (Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 30.

⁶*Ibid.*, 17.

⁷Michael C. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace Soldier in War* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003), 180.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Everyman Press, 1993), 130-131.

¹¹Mahon, 163.

¹²*Ibid.*, 162.

¹³Emory Upton, *Military Policy of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912), 3.

¹⁴Mahon, 163.

¹⁵John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War* (New York: Fredrick A. Stokes, 1931), 122-124.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁷Gary Hart, *The Minuteman* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 137.

¹⁸Upton, 13.

¹⁹Doubler, 190.

- ²⁰Ibid., 178.
- ²¹Department of the Army, 60.
- ²²Larry I. Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Volume I (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 420-421.
- ²³Evan J. David, ed., *Leonard Wood on National Issues* (New York: Doubleday, 1920), 71-72.
- ²⁴John W. Chambers, *To Raise an Army* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 242.
- ²⁵Donald B. Johnson, *National Party Platforms* vol. 1 1840-1956 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1956), 229.
- ²⁶Chambers, 244.
- ²⁷Edward M. Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 188.
- ²⁸Dumas Malone and Basil Rauch, *War and Troubled Peace 1917-1939* (New York: Meredith, 1960), 76.
- ²⁹Johnson, 213.
- ³⁰March, 331-332.
- ³¹Fletcher, 10.
- ³²March, 333.
- ³³Chambers, 241.
- ³⁴Ibid.
- ³⁵March, 345.
- ³⁶Coffman, 192.
- ³⁷Bland, 364.
- ³⁸Mahon, 161.
- ³⁹Ibid.
- ⁴⁰Chester W. Wright, *Economic History of the United States* (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1941), 740.

⁴¹Ann Fisher, *Toward A Post World War One Policy* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1973) 26.

⁴²March, 342-343.

CHAPTER 5

POST-WAR POLITICAL DEBATE: HOLLOW VICTORY

While General March continued to advocate his expansible army plan in 1919, alternative reorganization plans emerged from different factions. This chapter will focus on the political environment surrounding various plans presented before Members of Congress in 1919 and how these plans merged to shape the National Defense Act of 1920. Politicians, the War Department, senior military leaders, and lobby groups all proposed reorganization plans to Congress during 1919. However, the political environment in Congress combined with conflicting desires of various citizen organizations as well as election year politics made the establishment of a post-war reorganization plan for the U.S. Army a formidable challenge.

In 1919 various factions supporting a particular reorganization plan formed a congressional Rubik's Cube whereby each faction's political support represented a different color on the cube. The plan's political backers would get political support for red then white then blue but none at the same time. In other words, Members of Congress participating in the Reorganization of the Army hearings from 1918 to 1920 struggled to find one plan, which garnered enough political support to receive a majority vote in Congress. The Senate Military Affairs Committee finally found someone, John McAuley Palmer, who they felt might be able to pull the factions together and solve the Rubik's Cube of post-war reorganization.

While March and the War Department remained detached from partisan politics and the American public, other Regular Army officers, supporting March's plan, took the political offensive and voiced their opinions in the halls of Congress. At the same time,

some Regular Army officers made public their concerns about the nation relying on the National Guard as its primary means of combat power in a time of war. In November 1918, Brigadier General John S. Heavy, a Regular Army officer and Chief of the Militia Bureau, told attendees at the annual NGA convention that the Army would be better served by a federal reserve without state ties.¹ The NGA audience was first shocked then angered. Undoubtedly, Heavy's speech contributed to the NGA reorganization plan proposed later in 1919, which basically stated that a National Guard without federal ties would better serve the United States.

Despite the criticism of Regular Army officers, political supporters of the National Guard continued to rally around post-war reorganization initiatives they found favorable to the National Guard and fought those plans viewed as unfavorable, including March's plan. Furthermore, the National Guard's resentment for the treatment they received during WWI eventually spilled onto the floors of the Senate. In early 1919, Louis L. Babcock, a Buffalo lawyer and guardsman, wrote a letter to John McAuley Palmer regarding the political implications of the current friction between the National Guard and Regular Army:

I look to see the Army and the National Guard line up for an old fashioned fight as soon as Congress convenes for all New York Officers seem to be especially sore on the treatment accorded the National Guard by the Regulars. The National Guard has a tremendous advantage in such a fight for it has the backing of the locality. Take, for instance, the 27th Division [a National Guard division]. The papers have been full of news pertaining to it for months and most people believe it practically broke the German lines. . . . Now, when it comes down to a fight in Congress the National Guard has the upper hand and believe me there will be some stirring times over the question of reorganization if the two elements line up. If I were the Regulars, I should say, compromise.²

Although the NGA, with its forty years of lobbying experience and the "backing of the locality," was as strong as ever, many National Guard officers felt the NGA had

become overly zealous and unrealistic with their reorganization proposals. In 1919, Lieutenant Colonel Bennet Clark exemplified this over-zealousness by his opening remarks as the newly elected president of the NGA. Clark declared that the goal of the NGA was “to build up the National Guard and smash the Regular Army.”³

The NGA would eventually support a reorganization plan sponsored by New Jersey Republican Joseph S. Frelinghuysen, known for his harsh criticisms of March. The Frelinghuysen bill advocated increased autonomy for the National Guard, which included assigning command and control of National Guard units firmly in the hands of National Guard officers. The Frelinghuysen bill never gained any positive momentum in Congress and was quickly set aside.

Many Members of Congress including Senator James W. Wadsworth of New York, the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, felt that self-interest, not military readiness guided the NGA. Wadsworth, a former guardsman, regarded the National Guard’s leadership as “fifty percent political and about ninety percent selfish.”⁴ Despite alienating Members of Congress, the War Department, and prominent National Guard officers, the NGA remained actively engaged in campaigning for their proposals all the way to the signing of the National Defense Act of 1920.

Major General John F. O’Ryan, the Commanding General of the 27th National Guard Division of New York, emerged as an individual who held alternative, and less radical reorganization ideas to those held by the NGA. In 1919, O’Ryan carried with him a favorable reputation in Congress and the War Department and was the only National Guard division commander who remained in his position throughout WWI. Thus, his opinion held considerable weight among Members of Congress.

O’Ryan proposed a reorganization plan that would place the National Guard primarily under federal control and make it the nation’s principle source of manpower in a time of war. In essence, O’Ryan proposed to place the National Guard under the army clause, which authorizes Congress to “raise and support Armies”⁵ rather than the militia clause of the Constitution. O’Ryan accepted March’s notion of a three month UMT but he wanted UMT to be followed by a three year commitment to the National Guard. As far as the Regular Army, O’Ryan believed it should retain a strength of 120,000 and would share decision making with the National Guard.⁶

O’Ryan attempted to reach out to the War Department by federalizing the National Guard and appease the supporters of UMT by incorporating three-months of UMT as part of his plan. However, O’Ryan’s proposal, absent of political support from National Guard lobby organizations, became yet another vanquished reorganization plan. In essence, O’Ryan, a successful New York attorney as a civilian, failed to realize the NGA and political supporters of the National Guard sat on the jury of military policy making. Furthermore, the MTCA rallied against O’Ryan’s proposal and postulated that it was unconstitutional because it placed the National Guard under the army clause.⁷

While O’Ryans and the NGA’s plans were being defeated in the political trenches of Congress, the MTCA was promoting their own ideas for the reorganization of the post-war Army. The MTCA, led by their President Tompkins McIlvaine, finally convinced George E. Chamberlain, Democratic Senator from Oregon, and Julius Kahn, Republican Representative from California, to sponsor a UMT bill. In July 1919, Chamberlain and Kahn proposed a plan that included a regular army of between 200,000 and 300,000 supported by a national citizen reserve. The plan required all able-bodied, male citizens

ages 18-21 to complete six months of UMT followed by ten years of service in the reserves. The bill relegated the National Guard to state functions.

Support for the Chamberlain-Kahn bill included Wadsworth, the chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and other Members of Congress who inherently supported UMT. Furthermore, the Chamberlain-Kahn bill received support from a new, but politically powerful organization called the American Legion whose mission included promoting a sense of individual obligation to the community, state, and nation. The bill also received support from many corporations, businesses, and professional groups who viewed UMT as a stabilizing factor in both society and the economy. In addition, politically influential supporters of the plan included former President Howard Taft and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Supporters of the Chamberlain-Kahn bill agreed with March's viewpoint that Wilson's League of Nations and the concept of disarmament would not prevent future wars. They felt the world needed Teddy Roosevelt's "big stick" not Wilsonian ideology. The MTCA supported magazine, *National Service*, declared in an editorial supporting the bill, "Our duty in the future is to guard ourselves against unreasonable idealism."⁸

Many supporters of the Chamberlain-Kahn bill not only looked at correcting the manpower shortfalls of WWI but saw potential domestic advantages as well. They felt UMT, with its emphasis on a sense of citizenship and American nationalism, would counter the labor militancy and influence of communism they witnessed in labor demonstrations, strikes⁹ and bombings¹⁰ occurring in 1919. The Universal Military Training League supported UMT in order to "unify our citizenship and wipe out the red

flag.”¹¹ In a memo addressed to Grenville Clark, Arthur F. Cosby, executive secretary of the MTCA, stressed the social value of UMT:

The educational and Americanizing features of the [UMT] plan are alone worth far more than its total cost, to say nothing of the increased health, industrial efficiency and social discipline of the men trained. Apart from these social benefits, the plan provides for an adequate system of national defense.¹²

In addition to promoting the positive aspects of UMT, the MTCA and other organizations openly criticized March’s large standing army plan. Supporters of UMT felt a large standing army negated the duties and responsibilities of American citizens. They believed March’s plan would remove the “citizen” from the “soldier,” leading to conquest and tyranny and separate the “soldier” from the “citizen,” leading to apathy and neglect. In Machiavelli’s *Art of War*, he likewise advises Lorenzo Di Filippo Strozzi on the advantages of an army dependent on the military duties obliged by citizenship:

And, if in any other institutions of a City and of a Republic every diligence is employed in keeping men loyal, peaceful, and full of the fear of God, it is doubled in the military; for in what man ought the country look for greater loyalty than in that man who has to promise to die for her? In whom ought there to be a greater love of peace, than in him who can only be injured by war?¹³

In 1919, opposition to UMT still remained strong in certain demographics within the United States. Along with individual protestors against militarism, several organizations began pressuring Members of Congress to denounce UMT. During the annual convention of the National Grange, an organization of nearly one million farmers, attendees clearly expressed opposition to UMT as well as a large standing army. The National Grange’s political platform advocated the minuteman tradition whereby in time of danger a citizen army would spring into action equipped with justice as their sword and morality as their shield. The Grange stood steadfastly against “any effort to develop in America a caste of authority which has its sole excuse in a shoulder strap, and any

tendency in thought which would substitute armed force for moral ideas.”¹⁴ In a statement corresponding with Wilson’s idealism after the war, the National Grange declared, “We favor the preparedness of the right, rather than the preparedness of might.”¹⁵

The NGA also denounced the Chamberlain-Kahn bill, because the bill promoted militarism and took responsibility away from the National Guard. According to historian John K. Mahon, “Pershing’s testimony and NGA lobbying in the end brought about a coalition of legislators from the Southwest and the rural Midwest that defeated both UMT and the Baker-March bill.”¹⁶

Palmer’s involvement in the reorganization plan began with General March’s request to Pershing that he send officers to represent the AEF Commander in planning the post-war Army. Palmer was one of the officers sent by Pershing. When Palmer arrived at the War Department in early 1919, March’s plan had already been sent to Congress. In his book, *America in Arms*, Palmer states how dismayed he was with March’s plan:

This measure proposed a standing army of more than half a million men. It frankly discarded our traditional citizen army as an element in our national defense. Hereafter, military leadership was to be a monopoly of the professional soldier. At the close of a war against German militarism we were to have a militaristic system in the United States.¹⁷

Palmer, serving as the Chief of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, was given an opportunity to write an alternative War Department plan when the House Military Affairs Committee requested from Secretary of War Baker alternatives to March’s large standing army. While March was gone from Washington, Palmer put together a committee of twenty officers and created a policy outlined in a paper entitled “Outline of a National Military Policy Based on Universal Military Training.” As Palmer

worked with the different bureaus in the War Department, he realized General March's testimony to Congress regarding the universal approval of March's expansible army plan in the War Department was incorrect. Many Regular Army officers had views similar to Palmer's.

When March received Palmer's paper on military policy, he quickly discarded it. Palmer's attempts to discuss the policy with March failed repeatedly. In the end, March directed the staff to refrain from developing any military policy inconsistent with his large standing army plan.

In the summer of 1919, Palmer finally found an opportunity to present his views in front of Congress. At this time, Congress was still bogged down debating numerous proposals regarding the reorganization of the post-war Army. During a MTCA dinner promoting the Chamberlain-Kahn bill, Senator Wadsworth told the audience that a special sub-committee had been formed to hear the views of enlisted men and officers, regular and reserve, from the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the National Army. Palmer realized this was his chance to present his reorganization ideas freely.

Shortly thereafter, on 9 October 1919, Palmer stood before the subcommittee on reorganization. In addition to Wadsworth, the subcommittee included three Republicans and three Democrats. Two of the members, Frelinghuysen and Chamberlain had sponsored previous bills concerning reorganization. Unlike previous sessions, word had spread around the War Department and Congress about Palmer's testimony and supporters of Palmer from the military packed the empty seats. From the start of his presentation until the end three hours later, Palmer impressed the members of the

subcommittee with not only his grasp of military policy but also how he articulated his own ideas regarding a post-war policy for the Army.

Palmer studied the previous proposal ideas submitted by General O’Ryan as well as the MTCA bill sponsored by Chamberlain and Kahn. Palmer realized his presentation needed to include some aspects of both plans to garner the necessary support in Congress. Furthermore, Palmer felt he could not eliminate a significant role for the National Guard in any proposed military policy.

Palmer began his testimony by equating a large standing army with militarism whereby citizens have “limited intelligent influence on the issues of war and peace.”¹⁸

Palmer then describes an alternative system he recommends:

The second type of military institution is a citizen army formed and organized in peace, with full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to rise by successive to any rank. . . . Military leadership is not exclusively concentrated in the professional soldier class. All citizen soldiers after their initial training are encouraged to develop their capacity for leadership to such an extent as may be consistent with their abilities, their tastes, and their civil obligations . . . the war army in this system is identical with the organized citizen army in time of peace. . . . As the bulk of the leadership of the citizen army are included in the civil population as a whole, an intelligent and widespread public opinion is provided as the basis for the determination of all public questions relating to military affairs Again with an organized army, the minimum number of soldiers is maintained on active service in time of peace, the cost of an effective war establishment under such a system is necessarily reduced to a minimum. . . . And finally, as our great wars have been fought in the main by citizen armies, the proposal for an organized citizen army in time of peace is merely a proposal for perfecting a traditional national institution to meet modern requirements which no longer permit extemporization after the outbreak of war. . . . In my opinion, the War Department bill proposes incomplete preparedness at excessive cost and under forms that are not in harmony with the genius of American institutions.¹⁹

Because of the controversy exhibited during WWI regarding the competence of National Guard and Army Reserve officers, Palmer made it clear to the subcommittee that reserve officers, if properly trained, could be relied upon in a time of war.

Whether a man is a regular officer or a citizen officer he should not be assigned to command any unit until his capacity to command it has been demonstrated, then he should be restricted to any particular rank merely because he is a reserve officer or a citizen officer. . . . There is nothing in our history that justifies the presumption that no citizen officers are capable of rising to high command. . . . With the organized citizen army you would discover such men in a time of peace, and put them in their proper places.²⁰

Like the supporters of the Chamberlain-Kahn bill, Palmer advocated UMT for the purpose of providing the necessary manpower to support the citizen army. Palmer proposed that the concept of UMT should be based on establishing civilian trainees in local reserve units. These civilian trainees would not be piecemealed into the Regular Army in a time of war but would mobilize as part of a citizen army only as a result of an act of Congress.

The senators comprising the subcommittee were not only impressed by Palmer's insightfulness concerning military organization but they also acknowledged the unbiased approach he took in his views of both the professional and the citizen soldier. In essence, the subcommittee found a military officer without a dog in the fight. After his testimony, Palmer was also recognized in the media as someone who brought new hope to the shaping of the post-war army. An editorial published in the New York Times stated, "No one else has given the subject so much study or has been so tremendously earnest."²¹ Palmer also received congratulatory letters from members of the MTCA and colleagues in the Regular Army. Also, when Palmer explained to the subcommittee how a trained citizen army would mobilize twice the personnel at half the cost of March's expensible army plan, he spoke the universal language of Congress--cost effectiveness. After WWI, most Members of Congress hesitated to drain additional money from the pockets of their constituents for military matters especially during an election year.

Shortly after Palmer testified before the subcommittee, Wadsworth called Palmer into his office and told him:

Colonel Palmer, a very remarkable thing has happened. Night before last, the subcommittee met at my house where we finally disposed of the War Department bill by throwing it in the waste paper basket. We then decided to write a bill of our own. We wrote down a few paragraphs outlining what we considered to be the basis of a sound military organization for the United States. And there we stopped. We didn't know how to expand those principles into a complete bill, and we didn't think we were likely to get much help from the War Department. And now, to our amazement, you have been before us two afternoons and have given us all the details of our won plan. The Committee has therefore instructed me unanimously, to write to the Secretary of War to ask for your assignment as our military advisor. We are going to write our own bill, and we want you to help us.²²

A few days following Palmer's visit with Senator Wadsworth, the Secretary of War approved Palmer's assignment to the subcommittee but also stated Palmer's views should not be confused with those held by the War Department. During the next eight months, Palmer began working jointly on the specifics of the reorganization plan with a friend Colonel John W. Gulick, the Senate subcommittee, as well as advisors from the War Department. Palmer also reached out and met with National Guard officers, the MTCA, and citizen organizations such as the American Legion. Palmer worked diligently to appease all factions.

Palmer and Wadsworth agreed with General O'Ryan that the National Guard should be freed from their complicated dual status. Palmer's initial reorganization plan called for one citizen army comprised of both National Guard and National Army officers under the army clause of the constitution as well as universal military training. Senator Wadsworth along with Senator Kahn submitted to the Senate Military Affairs Committee in January 1920 a UMT bill to replace the Wadsworth-Kahn bill. The Chamberlain-Kahn bill included many of Palmer's suggestions as well as those Pershing supported in his

testimony before the Senate subcommittee. The bill proposed a regular army of 300,000 and UMT of four months. According to Senate Report No. 400 entitled *Reorganization of the Army* submitted by Senator Wadsworth on 28 January 1920, the bill was the result of “exhaustive hearings and weighing the views of many persons both within and without the Army.” The report states:

There will be but one Army of the United States. This force will include ...a training establishment, including a sufficient number of trained [Regular Army] officers and men to conduct the annual training. A Citizen Army including the organized reserves subject to military service only in an emergency declared by Congress. . . . The National Guard of the United States composed of volunteers . . . and will be organized under the constitutional power to raise and support armies. . . . It will provide for universal military training in time of peace.²³

Approval of the Wadsworth-Kahn bill was 8-5 in the Senate Military Affairs Committee and 11-9 in the House Military Affairs Committee. However, harsh criticism from the minority of the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate echoed throughout Congress. Senate Report No. 400, Part 2, entitled *Reorganization of the Army, Views of the Minority*, submitted on 31 January 1920 by Senator Kenneth McKellar, a Democrat from Tennessee, attacked both the concept of a federalized National Guard and UMT:

The minority believes that the National Guard in the various States should be fostered and built up. They furnished one of our main reliances [*sic*] in the last war. They did splendid work, and ought not to be struck down. In addition, we believe that the provisions in this bill on the subject of a United States National Guard are unconstitutional. . . . The minority of the committee submit that the passage of this bill . . . will be militarism run mad . . . a militarism never dreamed of by our forefathers . . . subversive to our democratic institutions . . . that can not be defended. . . . To impose a financial burden of this kind upon the American people, already weighed down by a war debt of something like thirty billion dollars²⁴

Although Wadsworth gained support from Secretary of War Baker and many eastern Republicans before the bill was submitted before Congress, House Republicans, led by Majority Leader Frank Modell, Representative from Wyoming, publicly

denounced the bill as too extreme and attacked eastern Republicans and the Democratic Administration represented by Baker.²⁵ In addition to the GOP split, Democrats suddenly decided to oppose UMT as a party issue. According to historian John W. Chambers, the House Democrats “fearing that the western Republicans planned to blame the Democratic party for the UMT proposal in the 1920 election, bolted.”²⁶ Although approved by both Military Affairs Committee and supported by the Secretary of War, AEF Commander General Pershing, and other military leaders, the Wadsworth-Kahn bill never made it to the House floor. For both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, the bill had become political dynamite in an election year. Senator Wadsworth, wrote later, “The prominent Senatorial leaders of both political parties kept insisting that, 1920 being a presidential election year, it would be political folly to permit such an issue [universal military training] to enter the campaign.”²⁷

Wadsworth advised Palmer and Gulick that the UMT provision in the bill had to be eliminated. In an attempt to appease the eastern Republicans, the primary supporters of UMT and also major financial contributors during an election year, Palmer included in the revised bill a plan for volunteer training to fill the ranks of the of the Organized Reserves instead of the citizen army proposed by Palmer and Wadsworth. The Senate approved the bill with UMT excluded, however, the House would not support placing the National Guard under the army clause. As this debate continued the adjournment of the 66th Congress drew near. Finally, both the House and the Senate agreed to support an amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916. Thus, the National Guard remained under the militia clause and received increased federal support and oversight.

Wadsworth, Palmer, and Gulick, and a member of the War Department, Colonel Thomas

M. Spaulding managed to include the general idea of the citizen army along with other initiatives in the amendment National Defense Act of 1916, which became the National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920.

Thus, the NDA of 1920 became a curtailed version of Palmer's original plan. The force structure remained the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserve (Army Reserve). However, the NDA of 1920 provided units for the Army Reserve. The two Reserve Components (RC) were to be formed in complete brigades and divisions within nine geographical corps areas. A committee of Regular Army and RC officers would formulate the particulars of this force structure. The NDA of 1920 increased support of ROTC and established the Civilian Military Training Camps (CMTC) a federally funded version of the Plattsburg and Military Training Camps emplaced before WWI. The Act also provided multiple provisions for Regular Army support, including corps training centers, but did provide for Regular Army command of National Guard units. The National Guard would deploy in their peacetime formations.

Aftermath

When the Senate dropped UMT as part of the NDA of 1920, the 26 Army Reserve divisions the Act created became a force structure dream void of enough resources to fill the ranks. The few monetary resources provided to the Army Reserve were directed almost exclusively to the training of officers. The Regular Army did not fare any better with congressional appropriations. According to historian Russell F. Weigley, "the goals of the National Defense Act of 1920 broke down because Congress and the executive gave them lip service but little practical support." ²⁸

During the interwar period, new officers were commissioned into the Army Reserve through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and the CMTCs. The CMTC provided summer training to volunteers at Army installations. Young men who successfully completed four summers of CMTC training could apply for Reserve commissions. However, the lack of training resources at the CMTC limited the effectiveness of training and preparation for future wars. Cadet Private Wheeler Q Newton, Cavalry, Troop A wrote a poem about the surprising lack of any horses during cavalry training:

It' not so bad as it might be
The Cavalry of the C.M.T.C.
No horses to groom or saddles to clean
It's the laziest life I've ever seen.²⁹

General George C. Marshall, who commanded the Vancouver Barracks CMTC Camp, wrote about his similar frustrations with CMTC and proposed changes to what he felt was the “undue wastage of time in training CMTC boys in our archaic regulations.”³⁰

Once commissioned from the CMTC or ROTC, Army Reserve officers found additional training opportunities scarce. Members of the Army Reserve were lucky if they received a two-week active duty training tour every four or five years during the 1920s and 1930s. Almost 150 years earlier, George Washington had recommended at least 12 to 25 days of training for the minutemen following the Revolutionary War.³¹ During Palmer's testimony before the Senate subcommittee, he insisted the “reliance upon citizen-soldiers is subject to the limitation that they cannot meet a trained enemy until they, too, have been trained.”³² However, Congress, during the 1920's and 1930s failed to provide the necessary funding for training.

According to historian, Ronald Spector the entire “U.S. Armed Forces in the 1920s and 1930s were obliged to function in a political environment which made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for those organizations to secure the financial, industrial, and human resources they needed to attain even the minimal level of military capability to carry out their anticipated wartime mission.”³³ In other words, the National Defense Act of 1920 was never appropriately resourced.

During the first National Convention of the Reserve Officers Association, General Pershing told the attendees they needed to convince the American people who in turn would convince their legislators to support the Army Reserve. Pershing stated, “Just as far as the people become interested in this matter, just that far will Congress stand ready to make the necessary appropriations.”³⁴ America, preoccupied with the Roaring Twenties, the Great Depression, and the New Deal among other distractions throughout the 1920s and 1930s became uninterested in this matter. In 1939, General Marshall took over a Regular Army that threatened nobody and an Army Reserve of 26 Divisions manned with officers void of appropriate training and enlisted soldiers to lead -- in essence a paper lion.

¹Michael D. Doubler, *I Am The Guard* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001), 186.

²I. B. Holley Jr., *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 423.

³*Ibid.*, 424.

⁴*Ibid.*, 454.

⁵R. B. Bernstein, ed., *The Constitution of the United States* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2002), 44.

⁶Holley, 424.

⁷Ibid., 425.

⁸John W. Chambers, *To Raise an Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 242.

⁹In 1919, 350,000 steelworkers went on strike.

¹⁰In the spring of 1919 a bomb exploded in front of the house of President Wilson's Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. This bombing and others were attributed to the socialist movement within the United States. Steel and coal strikes were also attributed to radicalism and the socialist movement.

¹¹Chambers, 243.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, ed., *The Portable Machiavelli* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), 483.

¹⁴C. J. Bernardo and E. H. Bacon, *American Military Policy* (Harrisburg: The Telegraph Press, 1961), 384.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and National Guard* (New York: Macmillan 1983), 171.

¹⁷John M. Palmer, *America in Arms*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 166.

¹⁸Holley, 437.

¹⁹Ibid., 438.

²⁰Ibid., 440.

²¹Ibid., 445.

²²Ibid.

²³*Reorganization of the Army*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Report 400, No. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 3-4.

²⁴*Reorganization of the Army*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Report 400 No. 2. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1920), 19.

²⁵Chambers, 246.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ann Fisher, *Toward A Post World War I Military Policy* (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College), 31.

²⁸Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 400.

²⁹Donald M. Kington, *Forgotten Summers* (San Francisco: Two Decades Publishing, 1955), 98.

³⁰Ibid., 177.

³¹John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of George Washington*, vol. 26 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), 375.

³²Holley, 440.

³³Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, ed., *Military Effectiveness: The Interwar Period*, Ronald Spector "The Military Effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1919-39," (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 70.

³⁴John T. Carlton and John F. Slinkman, *The ROA Story* (Washington: Reserve Officers Association, 1982), 21.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study looked at seven initiatives seeking the establishment of an effective federally controlled militia (Army Reserve) from 1790 to 1920. These initiatives were Secretary of War Henry Knox's plan in 1790, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun's plan, Senator James A. Garfield's bill initiated in 1878, Secretary of War Elihu Root's initiatives in the early 1900s, the Stimson Plan in 1912, the Continental Army Plan in 1914, and finally the Wadsworth-Kahn bill in 1920. All these initiatives shared one thing in common. Their defeat involved the efforts of political supporters of the state militia (National Guard). Although these plans sought to decrease the role of the National Guard, political supporters of the National Guard rallied against them and helped pass legislation that expanded the National Guard.

Out of the seven initiatives, this study focused primarily on the Stimson Plan and the Wadsworth-Kahn bill because these proposals, influenced by John McAuley Palmer, placed primary reliance on the citizen army not the professional army as the nation's primary defense in a time of war. Thus, the defeat of these proposals had nothing to with voting Members of Congress' attitude towards a larger standing army included in Knox, Calhoun, and Garfield's plan. These plans sought to establish a federally controlled militia only as a supplement to a larger standing army. Therefore, the study has placed more emphasis and examined in more detail the plans involving John McAuley Palmer.

These seven plans are different in many ways. Each plan was formulated at a particular time in American history. Each plan was impacted by different economic and social conditions prevalent at that particular time in American history. However, each

plan found common ground when examining the inadequacies of the National Guard. Each plan was partially based on the National Guard's performance in a recently completed war beginning with George Washington and Henry Knox's examination of the performance of the state militias during the Revolutionary War.

In 1790, President George Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox, concerned with the military effectiveness of the U.S. Constitution's militia clause and the performance of the minutemen during the Revolutionary War, attempted to create a federally controlled militia under the Constitution's army clause. Washington had been unsuccessful in convincing the Continental Congress in this matter in 1783.¹ Seven years later, policy makers defeated Knox's proposal because of high cost, intrusion into state affairs, and the plan's affront to individual liberties. Republicans as well as state governors attacked it on the grounds of decreasing state sovereignty. Federalists attacked the plan as an infringement on individual liberties. Both political parties complained about a large standing army.

The defeat of Knox's plan was more because of political ideologies and partisan politics than lobby groups. However, it set a historical precedent of Congress defeating the War Department's plan first and then creating a military policy written by politicians, not the military. In other words, the defeat of Knox's plan and subsequent passing of the Militia Act of 1792 began a long trend of politicians, not military leaders, creating the force structure of the United States Army.

Because of the state militia's battlefield deficiencies and interoperability with the Regular Army during the War of 1812, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun proposed an expansible army plan, which included a federally controlled militia. Following the Civil

War, Republican James A. Garfield proposed a similar plan in 1878, the same year the NGA was created. Both these plans were defeated along the same reasons; Members of Congress did not want to decrease the power of their state's militia. Legislators also disagreed with Calhoun and Garfield's assertion regarding the state militia's deficiencies during previous wars. At this time, the birth and subsequent political strength of the NGA, mostly based on persuading legislators to increase the military significance of the National Guard, began to emerge in Congress while the War Department and Regular Army had no lobby group to oppose it.

The NGA emerged in full force during the Root Reforms between 1899 and 1903. Root felt "It is really absurd that a nation which maintains but a small Regular Army and depends upon unprofessional citizen soldiery for its defense"² and sought to establish a National Reserve (federal militia) to replace the National Guard. In both 1903 and 1908, Senator Charles Dick of Ohio, the chair of the House Military Affairs Committee and President of the NGA along with the support of the Democratic Party convinced Congress to dismiss Root's plan and instead reform the National Guard to allow more federal oversight. Partisan politics also played a part in the defeat of Root's initiative. Partisan politics is defined as a strong, unreasoning supporter of a party or cause.³ The Democrats in Congress stood by their Democratic Platform of 1900 that showed overwhelming support for the National Guard:

We oppose militarism. It means conquest abroad and intimidation at home. . . .It will impose upon our peace loving people a large standing army and unnecessary burden of taxation, and will be a constant menace to their liberties. . . . A small standing army and a well-disciplined state militia are amply sufficient in time of peace. The National Guard of the United States should ever be cherished in the patriotic hearts of a free people.⁴

From 1903 to 1920, the same ideological rhetoric (anti-militarism, fear of large federally controlled military, state sovereignty, and the minuteman tradition) used in colonial times was voiced by politicians seeking to defeat proposals for a robust federal militia. However, according to the research conducted in this study, the defeat of these proposals was strongly influenced by upcoming elections, partisan politics, and politically powerful lobby groups.

When General Leonard Wood, John McAuley Palmer, and Secretary of War Stimson proposed what became known as the Stimson Plan, based on Palmer's staff study advocating the establishment of a federalized "citizen army," political support for the concept was on the upswing. Criticisms over the National Guard's effort as strike breakers in the early 1900s as well as the political pressure brought on by the preparedness movement led by former President Theodore Roosevelt set a more amiable political environment for the acceptance of a federal militia. However, the Stimson Plan faded in 1912 as Southern Democrats and the NGA rallied against it and Wood's own Republican Party splintered in the 1912 election year.

In 1914, Secretary of War Garrison picked up the ball where Wood and Stimson left off and used Palmer's citizen army concept to create the Continental Army Plan. The federally controlled volunteer army, called the Continental Army, inherited most of the overseas wartime responsibilities previously held by the National Guard. Despite the backing of President Wilson, Garrison, former Secretaries of War, and senior military leaders, Southern Democrats rallied around an alternative plan supported by the NGA and sponsored by Representative James Hay and defeated the Continental Army Plan causing Garrison's resignation as Secretary of War.

Despite Garrison's resignation and a severely watered down version of Palmer's citizen army, Hay's initiative, which became known as the National Defense Act of 1916 did establish the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Military Training Camps (MTC) and the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC) and Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC). However, the ORC and ERC were just manpower pools, not a unique federally controlled military organization of citizen soldiers advocated by Palmer and others. Reservists only served as fillers for Regular Army and National Guard divisions during World War I.

After World War I, military planners such as Chief of Staff, Peyton C. March and others realized that a U.S. military policy that placed primary dependence on the National Guard for any large-scale war needed to be changed. Advocates of an expansible army, a federally controlled citizen army supported by universal military training, or a federally controlled National Guard under the army clause emerged again at this time.

Two reorganization plans emerged out of the pack during Senate Military Affairs Committee hearings after the war. A plan which Palmer drafted on behalf of members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, which supported a large Army Reserve supported by manpower provided by universal military training (UMT). The other plan, initiated by Peyton C. March, proposed placing dependence on an expansible professional army. March's plan, based on Emory Upton's model, overwhelmingly failed to gain support from Congress for the same reasons that defeated Calhoun and Garfield's plan. The Wadsworth-Kahn bill that Palmer worked on met its defeat more on the basis of partisan politics and the strength of the NGA.

The Wadsworth-Kahn bill gained support from Secretary of War Baker and many eastern Republicans before the bill was submitted before Congress. However, House

Republicans, led by Majority Leader Frank Modell, Representative from Wyoming, publicly denounced the bill as too extreme and attacked eastern Republicans and the Democratic Administration represented by Baker.⁵ In addition to the GOP split, Democrats suddenly decided to oppose universal military training as a party issue. According to historian John W. Chambers, the House Democrats “feared that the western Republicans planned to blame the Democratic Party for the UMT proposal in the 1920 election, bolted.”⁶ In addition to the NGA, citizen organizations across the country rallied against UMT. Senator Wadsworth wrote later, “The prominent Senatorial leaders of both political parties kept insisting that, 1920 being a presidential election year, it would be political folly to permit such an issue (universal military training) to enter the campaign.”⁷ These events shed light on why the Republicans supported Harding instead of Wood during the 1920 presidential election.

The Senate approved the bill with UMT excluded, however, the House would not support placing the National Guard under the army clause. As this debate continued, the adjournment of the 66th Congress drew near. Finally, Southern Democrats supported by the NGA agreed to support an amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916. Therefore, the National Guard was strengthened instead of reduced. Palmer and his staff only managed to include the general idea of the citizen army along with other initiatives in the amendment National Defense Act of 1916, which became the National Defense Act of 1920. However, under the National Defense Act of 1920, the Army Reserve became a hollow army, unmanned, except for officers, under funded, and inadequately trained.

The significance of the political defeats of a fully functional Army Reserve from 1790 to 1920 is that military strategy, military expertise, and external threats took such a noticeable back seat to political support for the National Guard. Despite the backing of secretaries of war, senior Regular Army officers, military theorists, and political leaders serving on military related committees, proposals advocating a federal militia were consistently defeated or watered down by Congress.

Congress also subjugated other proposals by the War Department, senior Regular Army officers, and military theorist supporting an expansible army plan with a less robust federal militia. Instead of these two schools of thought, proposals favoring the National Guard, despite little support from the War Department or senior Regular Army officers, became the nation's military policy.

From 1790 to 1920, this study did not find one Secretary of War, one Chief of Staff, or one senior Regular Army officer, who proposed initiatives to increase America's reliance on the state militia (National Guard). From General Washington to General Pershing, senior Regular Army commanders wanted to reduce the role of the National Guard not increase it. Furthermore, from 1790 to 1920, this study found no Secretary of War or Chief of Staff whose force structure initiatives were approved by Congress. All of their proposals decreased the U.S. Army's reliance on the National Guard. Yet, at the end of the day, the National Guard emerged with military policies that provided increased funding and expanded their role and responsibility regarding national defense. In essence, political supporters of the National Guard never lost ground despite the efforts of the War Department. Of the many factors, including economics, public opinion, and military strategy, that influenced the force structure policy of the U.S. Army from 1790 to 1920,

partisan politics and lobby groups supporting the National Guard, more than anything else, hindered the establishment of an effective Army Reserve.

¹John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of George Washington*, vol. 26 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), 375.

²Jeffrey A. Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1994), 29.

³*Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed. (Springfield: Merriam Webster, 1996), 738.

⁴Donald B. Johnson, ed., *National Party Platforms* vol. 1 1840-1956 (Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1956), 113.

⁵John W. Chambers, *To Raise an Army* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 246.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Ann Fisher, *Toward A Post World War I Military Policy* (Carlisle Barracks, U.S, Army War College), 31.

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