"The Enemy We Were Fighting Was Not What We Had Predicted." What is Wrong With IPB at the Dawn of the 21st Century
Abstract
Why has a S2 never won a war game when playing predicted enemy courses of action against a friendly course of action during the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)? Why did the V Corps commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) respond to a question about the threat by saying "the enemy we're fighting is different from the one we'd war gamed against"? Both these questions are troubling and lead to deeper questions about the process in developing enemy courses of action. This monograph will identify theoretical and analytical difficulties within current IPB doctrine. In addition, this document will show how these difficulties became institutionalized through Cold War realities within the Army intelligence estimate process. Historical evidence will be presented to support the claim that the identified difficulties are detrimental to Army operations in ambiguous and uncertain environments. Finally, this paper will present alternative theoretical constructs to the current IPB process for consideration in future IPB doctrine. The aim of this paper is to widen the scope of IPB doctrine to include other theoretical frameworks as tools for the Army intelligence officer and analyst as they consider the 21st Century threat facing them.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 26, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA428983
Entities
People
- Lawrence T. Brown
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College