

Assigning an Army Division to CENTCOM: Possibilities and Pitfalls

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

ASSIGNING AN ARMY DIVISION TO CENTCOM: POSSIBILITIES AND PITFALLS by Major Joseph C. Holland, United States Army, 53 pages.

The CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) contains many aspects that are strategically vital to the United States, but before the abhorrent attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States military had not permanently assigned a significant land-component force to the region. The United States now has a National Security Strategy (NSS) that requires, among other things, U.S. military involvement in the region to defeat terrorism and those entities who may intend to use terror against the United States.

Because of the terrorist threat to U.S. national security, for the foreseeable future, the U.S. military may find it necessary to maintain a permanent, forward-based presence of an Army division in CENTCOM. This concept of a U.S. Army division assigned to a combatant command is not without a historical precedent. U.S. Army divisions have been assigned to EUCOM and PACOM for a significant period of time, but those divisions have been assigned to those combatant commands under the auspices of a decade old Base Force model.

To understand both sides of the research question: should a U.S. Army division be assigned to CENTCOM to more effectively accomplish the intent of the 2002 NSS, this monograph used the threat-based force planning model and capabilities-based force planning model. The two methodologies were used to discover the pitfalls and possibilities of assigning a division to CENTCOM.

This monograph recommends the assignment of a division to CENTCOM in a manner that integrates both the capabilities-based and the threat-based planning methodologies. Due to the nature of the CENTCOM AOR, even after the transfer of authority in Iraq and the completion of military and civil reforms in Afghanistan, the CENTCOM commander will require a responsive land component force for the foreseeable future. This responsiveness will likely fall upon an Army division trained, organized, and equipped for operations specific to CENTCOM, and commanders and units proficient at intra-theater force projection. This division should have the capacity, given the enablers of its JTF headquarters, to generate and sustain maximum combat power at the time and place that the CENTCOM commander requires. A permanently assigned, forward-deployed division, supported by forward positioned joint capabilities, will provide the CENTCOM commander a responsive land component force in a region that is bound to challenge the national security of the United States for the foreseeable future.

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The ideas and views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Command General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, or Department of the Army.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

WHAT THIS PAPER IS ABOUT

For the foreseeable future, at least through the duration of the global war on terrorism, the United States military may find it necessary to maintain a permanent, forward-based presence of an Army division in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). This concept of an enduring¹ divisional presence, while new to CENTCOM, is not without precedence in other combatant command AORs. Prior to summer 2002, and for at least ten years previously, the United States military had four Army divisions assigned to Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs) outside the continental United States (CONUS). In that period, two of the divisions were assigned to United States European Command (EUCOM) and two divisions were assigned to United States Pacific Command (PACOM) as a part of a Base Force concept developed by General Colin Powell. The divisions were assigned to each of these commands as a matter of deterrence or the probability that they could be used to either avert hostilities within or in the proximity of a combatant commander's AOR, or if necessary to be the initial element in a decisive engagement of a communist aggressor's ground attack.²

In the current environment of conflict, seven of ten active duty U.S. Army divisions are deployed at any one time outside of CONUS. Of that number, at least four divisions, and a total complement of over 120,000 soldiers, are assigned to CENTCOM due to the ongoing operations

¹ LTG Frederic J. Brown, US Army, retired, "America's Army Expeditionary and Enduring, Foreign and Domestic" *Military Review* (November-December 2003): 69. In this article LTG Brown writes of the expeditionary and enduring concepts of force presence when he describes 'expeditionary' forces as a quick response mechanism, and 'enduring' forces as a committed long-term force.

² United States General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, *Force Structure: Issues involving the Base Force*, Report GAO/NSIAD-93-65 (Washington, D.C., 1993), 15-16

in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has found it necessary to assign these divisions on a non-permanent basis to CENTCOM in a campaign to defeat world-wide terrorism directed against the United States, American citizens, interests, and allies, and against the specter of regional authoritarian hegemonic actors equipped with weapons of mass destruction. These contemporary threats are no less insidious than their predecessor, communism; however, U.S. national and theater-level strategy still skirts the notion of permanently assigning a division to CENTCOM.³

In addition to the concerns of terrorism and the stability of many nations in CENTCOM, U.S. strategic leaders and operational commanders are limited to employing a 10 Division Army across the globe. This strategic constraint, coupled with the nearly twenty year-old requirement in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, means that Army forces will likely operate at even the division level in a joint manner with sister-service forces.⁴ In CENTCOM, the prospect of joint operations at the division level is enormous due to the nature of the constraints of the 10 division Army, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the complex nature of the AOR (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of CENTCOM).

Thus, it may be necessary to finally move away from the Base Force concept of assigning four Army divisions to counter threats in Europe and the Pacific while keeping the bulk of our ground forces CONUS-based. Instead, the Army as an institution may want to consider and debate the implications of assigning a U.S. Army division to CENTCOM in a more enduring

³ House Armed Service Committee, *Statement of General John P. Abizaid, United States Army, Commander, US Central Command, before the House Armed Services Committee*, command posture statement, 3 March 2004, PDF version: 13,15,35
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/030304abizaid.html

⁴ Mark R. Lewis and Michael P. Noonan, "Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization" *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 34. This article contains significant analysis of how an Army force will likely operate in a joint environment.

manner to protect the United States, American citizens, U.S. interests, and allies against the far more prolific threats of terrorism and regional hegemons that have become more prominently known in the post-Cold War era.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

While the current CENTCOM strategy requires a stabilizing presence of more than one Army division, eventually the security responsibilities in most areas of the AOR will be taken over by indigenous forces, and the U.S. military's ground force presence will likely be reduced significantly. In fact, there is no clear acknowledgement of how much of a force should remain in CENTCOM, nor is there a chronological mark on the wall of exactly what force will be needed over an extended time.⁵ Given the nebulous future strategic specifications of force size and implementation timelines, this paper is an investigation of whether a U.S. Army division should be assigned to CENTCOM after the Transfer of Authority (TOA) in Iraq has been completed, and after the reforms of the Afghani Ministry of Defense and General Staff are completed.⁶

The primary research question is: Should a U.S. Army division be habitually assigned to CENTCOM in order to more effectively accomplish the intent of the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS)? The secondary research question is: From a historical perspective, given a U.S. Army division assigned to a theater outside CONUS, how did that division positively or negatively impact the outcome of a post-World War II combat campaign?

The purpose of this monograph is twofold. This monograph is intended to provide the strategic and operational commander a synthesis of both threat-based and capabilities-based force

⁵ *Statement of General John P. Abizaid, before the House Armed Services Committee, 35.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 15,20.

planning methodologies when investigating whether a division should be assigned to CENTCOM. Additionally, this monograph is intended to educate leaders of the Legislative branch of the U.S. government, and provoke discussion amongst the members of Congress about whether a U.S. Army division should be assigned to CENTCOM. This paper will provide the reader with an approach that is grounded in strategic policy and doctrine, a reasonable synthesis of force planning methodologies relevant for the CENTCOM AOR, and historical perspectives about how best to employ a U.S. Army division in that part of the world.

It is important to note that while this paper is primarily concerned with the assignment of a division to CENTCOM, the question will likely arise about how to employ the division in the AOR after it is assigned to the command. The historical perspective included in this paper will provide considerations of employment, but ultimately it will be for the CENTCOM staff to recommend and for the CENTCOM commander to decide how to employ any forces in the AOR.

METHODOLOGIES

In order to achieve the purpose of this monograph and answer the primary research question about whether or not a U.S. Army division should be assigned to CENTCOM, this monograph investigates the most relevant military force planning methodologies. These two planning methodologies are summarized below.

The overarching strategic concepts found in the NSS are formulated with an understanding of the nation's security goals and objectives. These strategic concepts are then further developed into a coherent U.S. military strategy. From the U.S. military strategy, planning is conducted to consider what forces are needed to implement the strategy. Force

planning involves an evaluation of the threats to the national interests, an outline of military requirements within given constraints, and finally an assessment of the risk of failure.⁷

Therefore, if this paper is to be a real investigation about the assignment of a U.S. Army division to CENTCOM, we must understand that this monograph is based upon generally accepted force planning methodologies. The four force planning methodologies accepted by both the legislative branch and the defense department are: threat-based, capabilities-based (sometimes referred to as strategy-based), historical, and budget-constrained. Of those four methodologies, the threat-based and capabilities-based force planning methodologies are by far the most predominately used within the military in the last ten years, and will suffice for the scope of this monograph.⁸ The value of understanding the two predominant methodologies is that any decision with regard to assignment of forces is based to some extent on these force planning methodologies, and this paper would not be well-informed without a discussion of these methodologies.

The first methodology discussed in the monograph, and the one generally more followed today at the strategic and operational levels of command within the U.S. military, is known as the capabilities-based planning model. It is used principally when challenges to U.S. interests are uncertain and when there may be a great deal of asymmetry involved between U.S. and threat capabilities. With regard to this planning model, forces may be focused against generic military

⁷ COL John F. Troxell, "Force Planning and U.S. Defense Policy." In *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2001): 157. Chapter 12 of the USAWC guide is an excellent primer on meshing strategic policy to practical force planning

⁸ Senator Charles S. Robb, "Rebuilding a Consensus on Defense" *Parameters* (Winter 1996-97): 5-8. Of the four basic frameworks for congressional deliberations on defense (historical, threat-driven, budget-constrained, and strategy-based) the strategy-based is the most 'sensible' approach as it allows lawmakers to better associate costs with force requirements. See also Paul K. Davis, ed. *New Challenges*

tasks with a broader purpose than in a threat-based situation; it is less dependent on scenarios developed from threat situations than on objectives that the force must obtain as it is employed in a situation. The second planning methodology discussed in this monograph is the threat-based planning model. It is used when threats to U.S. interests are easily discerned. Military force packages are then derived and employed based on the specific threat at hand and scenarios that are developed which incorporate the threat.⁹

Threat-based planning is often times viewed as a Cold-war model, as it attempts to overwhelm known enemy forces and their doctrine with specific friendly force organizations forward-stationed in AORs around the globe. It is seen by some analysts as reactive and defensive in nature, awaiting the enemy to make the first move. Capabilities-based planning came to the fore after 1991, when the U.S. found itself without a ‘peer’ competitor in the Soviet Union, and the U.S. military was employed in various contingency situations around the globe. It intends to deal with multiple contingencies by rapidly projecting the bulk of U.S. military capabilities from CONUS-based locations, while keeping a forward presence of land-component forces in places the U.S. military had previously secured as a result of the Cold-War.¹⁰

Any decision to assign a U.S. Army division to CENTCOM should be informed by both types of planning models. A proper analysis of whether or not a division can be assigned to CENTCOM should consider the threat-based planning methodology, which will allow the U.S. to assign forces which will counter the very real and quantifiable threat against U.S. interests in certain nation-states as well as trans-national terrorist organizations in CENTCOM. That same

for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994) This concept is primarily derived from ‘Part Two: Principles for Defense Planning’: 15-132

⁹ Troxell, “Force Planning and U.S. Defense Policy.” 158.

analysis should also consider the strategic directions of the administration and laws of the U.S. that are codified in a capabilities-based planning methodology.

Although the current administration is leaning heavily towards a capabilities-based planning construct focused on ‘what’ future adversaries can do, and ‘what’ situations the Army may be involved in, the assignment of a division to CENTCOM can still be “grounded in the construct of the two MTW framework expressed in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).”¹¹ The two MTW framework was founded on a logical integration of threat and capabilities-based planning. The model of assigning a division to CENTCOM must adopt this two MTW framework to be a workable solution for strategic and operational leaders of CENTCOM.¹²

It is worthwhile to understand the doctrinal definitions of how forces are provided to combatant commanders. This paper considers an *assignment* of a division to CENTCOM, whereas the model that was used prior to June 2002 was an *allocation* of selected forces to CENTCOM for crisis events, such as Operation DESERT FOX, or routine Task Force or Brigade deployments to Intrinsic Action rotations in Kuwait. FM 3-0 provides definitions regarding how forces are subordinated to higher headquarters and these definitions are included in Appendix 2, *Glossary*, of this monograph.¹³

¹⁰ Ibid., 159, 167-168. See also Juan R. Alsace, “In Search of Monsters to Destroy: American Empire in the New Millennium.” *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 125.

¹¹ Lynn E. Davis, and Jeremy Shapiro ed. *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003): 16-22 Although a National Military Strategy has not been published since 2000, the editors have worked to derive a probable NMS from DOD documents such as the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2002 Defense Department’s Annual Report.

¹² Troxell, “Force Planning and U.S. Defense Policy.” 171.

¹³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, (Washington, DC, 14 June 2001): Chapter 2, page 9.

OUTLINE, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS

Chapter 1 provides the introduction of the strategic setting within which the U.S. military operates, the problem statement, force planning methodologies, relevant definitions of providing forces to combatant commands, and the outline, scope and limitations of this paper.

Chapter 2 will introduce readers to strategic policies, doctrinal material, legal material, and threat as well as environmental situations that will form the core of the discussion about whether a U.S. Army division should be assigned to CENTCOM. The preponderance of material contained in this chapter will address the research question by providing analysis of doctrine, policy, legal, and adversarial conditions as a framework for the possibility of assigning a division to CENTCOM. Chapter 2 also examines national level documents and policy that set strategic conditions, laws that govern the employment and resourcing of forces to Combatant Commanders, operational doctrine that impacts how an Army force may be employed under a Combatant Commander, and conditions in the CENTCOM AOR which may preempt or precipitate the employment of U.S. military forces in the AOR. The methodology of this chapter is to provide the reader a refined focus of literature that require us to consider use of military force in CENTCOM. This chapter begins with strategic policy and continues through operational doctrine and concludes with a short assessment of adversarial situations in the AOR.

The September 2002 version of the National Security Strategy, especially sections III, IV, VIII and, XI, provides the real impetus for capability-based planning and all of the strategic and operational doctrine that follows. These sections set specific strategic guidance about what the U.S. military should be capable of both as a force that is decisive when deterrence fails, and as a force of strategic deterrence. Of course, since the NSS was published there has been significant discourse about the implications of this strategy on the course of the future of the United States, and this paper will summarize those facets.

Title 10, United States Code, contains among other things legal authority regarding the support of US Army forces to Regional Combatant Commanders (RCCs). The analysis of this legal baseline will show the presence of explicit constraints that the US Army must operate within when resourcing CENTCOM with forces. Additionally, the analysis will determine what gaps and nebulous areas exist in Title 10 that an army force resourcing headquarters must deal with when contemplating the assignment of a division to CENTCOM.

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 04-09, and Department of Defense Directives (DODD) 5100.1, 5100.3, and 5100.73 codify strategic US policy, and Title 10, U.S. Code provides authority to combatant commands and military departments regarding how the RCCs are resourced by the military components. The Army Plan (TAP) further refines and clarifies the policy and directions of DoD. It provides Army strategic input that influence operational leaders decisions regarding resourcing and employment of Army forces for the combatant commanders. The outcome of the analysis of this document will link the NSS to Joint and Army doctrine, as well as current practice, regarding the assignment of Army divisions to and within RCCs.

No discussion of strategic or operational level requirements would be complete without including the concept of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). No longer will a division fight subordinated to a Corps headquarters as was the model employed in the Cold War. Now we can expect as the QDR directed in 2001, that each RCC will develop a SJFHQ and that component forces will be subordinated to this headquarters. This chapter will provide analysis of how a division will likely be subordinated to a SJFHQ.¹⁴

¹⁴ Bruce Pirnie, "Preparing the Army for Joint Operations." In *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, ed. Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro., (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003): 173. This section entitled 'Joint Control of Forces' in Chapter 8 of the Rand book encapsulates the requirements of the QDR and explains the techniques of the SJTFHQ development team at Joint Forces Command.

Because this paper considers both capability-based and threat-based planning methodologies for assigning a division to CENTCOM, there will be a discussion on the environment of the AOR in which a division can be expected to operate. State and non-state actors, both friendly as well as hostile will have a significant impact on the operations of the division from a force protection standpoint as well as in how the division interacts with or against those elements in the AOR.

Finally in Chapter 2 there will be a synthesis of how the division's decision makers will work within the environment of strategic goals, strategic and operational doctrine, and legal objectives (the capability-based methodology) as well as within a potential adversarial environment (the threat-based methodology).

Certainly, there are plenty of issues regarding the research question that will not be addressed in this Chapter or in the rest of this monograph. The most significant temporal concern is the matter of the new 'modular' brigade organizations that are being fielded throughout the Army. However, in order to limit the scope and length of the monograph, the new modular brigade concept will not be explored. This chapter will not be a critique of strategic documents, operational doctrine and concepts, Title 10, nor the nature of the CENTCOM AOR. It will not compare or contrast doctrine, policy or strategy of any other contemporary or historical nation-state or hegemon to United States doctrine, policy or strategy.

After an investigation of the impact of capabilities-based and threat-based planning methodologies in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will use two historical vignettes to illustrate how the assignment of U.S. Army divisions in a theater affected the outcome of a campaign. Both examples are intended to illustrate a division assigned to a theater prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and how the division influenced the larger campaign.

The first vignette describes the assignment and employment of the 24th Infantry Division in Japan and subsequently Korea, 1950. The second vignette describes the assignment and

employment of the 3rd Infantry Division in CENTCOM prior to and during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 2003. Both vignettes will describe the conditions and functions of the particular division and how those conditions and functions led to the eventual conclusion of the campaign. There may be plenty of material outside the scope of the two vignettes presented that could be used to argue whether or not a division should be assigned to CENTCOM, but these vignettes are intended to succinctly demonstrate the variables of success or failure in the employment of a division in a theater of operations. There are likely to be many more vignettes or variables, but the intent of the included vignettes is to provoke discussion and not to be inclusive of all cases of success or failure of a campaign due to the actions of not only a division, but the manner in which the divisions were resourced and then directed into combat.

Chapter 4 will be a summary and synthesis of conclusions as well as recommendations of when, how, and why a U.S. Army division may be assigned to CENTCOM. This chapter will also encapsulate rationale for the discontinuance of Army force employment in CENTCOM or conditions that may preclude the assignment of a division to CENTCOM.

CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSIS OF FORCE PLANNING MODELS AND THEIR IMPACT ON ASSIGNING A DIVISION TO CENTCOM

We were brashly reminded on September 11th, 2001, that apocalyptic violence is at our doorstep. In a time of peril when the future of the United States is at stake, there is little room for error in the manner of expressing and implementing our national foreign policy. Small trans-national networks of angry people can inflict unimaginable harm on the rest of the world. These groups of people do not form a specific nation-state nor do they operate within the previously

established conventions to which the rest of the world adheres.¹⁵ These trans-national groups likely draw explicit resources and support from nations in the CENTCOM AOR as well as from states in other areas of the world; and if not explicitly from nations in the AOR, then from organizations which operate in the geographic confines of nation-states in the AOR.

Until very recently, the U.S. has dealt largely with only nation-states in its expression of policy involving all instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). The profusion of strategic policy documents that have emanated from U.S. administrations since the founding of our Country regarding individual states and treaty organizations could be ordered into a larger context of what is known as a national strategy.

There are two U.S. national strategies that have evolved since the beginning of World War II. “One is realist in orientation, organized around containment, deterrence, and the maintenance of the global balance of power.”¹⁶ Thus in the PACOM and EUCOM AORs we have forward stationed four U.S. Army divisions, all playing some role in strategic deterrence and stability in those regions. While PACOM and EUCOM had garnered nearly all the ground force presence until late 2001, our national strategy of a lesser ground force presence in CENTCOM was somewhat of an anathema. In CENTCOM, the U.S. had relied on a strategy of ‘dual containment’, pitting Iraq and Iran against each other in order to keep their tempers toward the U.S. subdued.¹⁷

¹⁵ G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002): 50-55. Ikenberry writes of a ‘New Grand Strategy’ emerging post-September 11th. The article is certainly unapologetic of the manner in which the U.S. will have to manage global world order, but it provides cautions to U.S. strategic and operational leaders of the path the U.S. is moving along.

¹⁶ Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” 45.

¹⁷ Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002): 9-10.

“The other national strategy, forged during World War II as the United States planned the reconstruction of the world economy, is liberal in orientation. It seeks to build order around institutionalized political relations among integrated market democracies, supported by an opening of economies.”¹⁸ These definitions of U.S. national strategies can be used to explain our current deployment of divisions to EUCOM and PACOM, and as a precursor to explaining how we may conceive that the current NSS may have an impact on the stationing of military forces elsewhere in the world. Some obvious tension exists in the two strategies, and since the attacks of September 11, 2001, it has been tough to apply either strategy by itself. The factors of conflict involved in these two strategies and the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, are the reason the current administration formulated and produced the 2002 NSS.

The September 2002 NSS, largely derived from the attacks on September 11th and our national actions that immediately followed the attacks, provides direction to our Nation at this time of war. The NSS, as the basis for the capabilities-based force planning model and the genesis of a substantial amount of discussion regarding whether an Army division should be assigned to CENTCOM, accepts the worst-case future actions that may be directed against the American homeland or U.S. interests abroad. These worst-case actions could fall along categories of unknowns as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld articulated when he said, “There are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know.”¹⁹ If those unknowns are possible then many of the International rules, traditions of partnership, and

¹⁸ Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” 45-46.

¹⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary of Defense Press Conference at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium” (response given to a question to clarify what the SECDEF had said in a previous briefing about how terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are worse than previously thought on 6 June 2002), www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/t06062002_t0606sd.html

standards of legitimacy that were formed prior to September 11th will become secondary and may be reordered to ensure the survival of America.

The NSS as the font of the capabilities-based planning methodology and this monograph's discussion about whether an Army division should be assigned to CENTCOM "may be seen by some foreign nations as contemptuous of the treaties, friendships, and mutual respect that the prior environment and its U.S. policies had provided. But, we are a nation at war,"²⁰ and the previous operational environment of the Cold-War now hardly applies to our current situation. The U.S. has been thrust into a new operational environment of a war of trans-national terror. Any war is the realm of danger, but this war against a shadowy sinister foe is even more so; we must have the courage that our fortitude of mind and character are needed to make progress in securing the success of our endeavors. We must ensure that whatever methods we choose with our friends and against our adversaries will not be halted until all hostilities have ceased on the part of our aggressors, and we have no fear of those hostilities being renewed.²¹

ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

As the NSS states, America has three goals: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.²² The NSS articulates eight methods the U.S. will pursue to achieve its goals: Champion aspirations for human dignity, Promote global economic growth through free markets and free trade, Expand the circle of development by working to open societies and building democratic infrastructures, Develop agenda for

²⁰ Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," 50-55.

²¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984): 100-107. A synthesis of sentiments in Chapter Three, Book One: 'Military Genius'. See also Thomas Jefferson, "Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms," July 6, 1775

cooperative action, and the most important ones to this paper: Transform America's national security institutions, Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism, Work with others to defuse regional conflicts, and Prevent our enemies from threatening us with WMD.²³ These goals and methods outline what the DoD, and therefore the Army, must accomplish to protect national interests and achieve U.S. objectives. They form the basis of further DoD and Army strategic documents such as DPG 04-09, DoD Directives 5100.1, 5100.3, 5100.73, and the TAP. This paper will discuss the impact of DoD and Army Strategic documents on the primary research question after an analysis of Title 10, which follows this section.

The 2002 NSS describes succinct strategic goals but is vague with regard to how these will be achieved. It emphasizes expeditionary forces and joint operations, but is not prescriptive in how to implement the joint and expeditionary concepts. It calls for military forces capable of responding to multiple, diverse contingencies, in unforeseen and largely unprepared locales, and the U.S. Army apparently will remain the component to achieve dominance on the ground and thereby contribute to deterring the use and even the creation of large-scale land forces on the part of adversaries.²⁴ However, the NSS leaves it to the DoD, Combatant Commanders, and service components to determine strategically and operationally quantifiable objectives within the national goals.

The NSS places significantly less emphasis on deterrence, but rather values preemption and active engagement to counter the predominant enemy. This enemy will have to be disarmed or be killed in order to ensure the security of the Nation. "It specifies that military forces [and the

²² President George Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002): 1.

²³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, Army Initiatives Group, DAMO-ZXG, *The Army Plan, Part I: Strategic Planning Guidance*, (Washington, DC, 2003): 13.

implication is of ground force implementation] will carry out missions of active and passive defenses, and preemptive counterforce in order to carry out ‘proactive counterproliferation efforts.’”²⁵ The inference from the NSS is that there may need to be an enduring ground force presence in CENTCOM to accomplish the tasks laid out in the NSS.

ANALYSIS OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

It would be impossible to simply attempt to link the NSS directly to DoD and Army strategic literature without including an analysis of Federal Laws regarding the implementation of the NSS methods. While the President commands the U.S. Armed Forces through the Secretary of Defense in a chain-of-command arrangement, it is the Legislative Branch that holds the Armed Forces’ purse strings, and thus the military is obligated to respond to the Congress as a matter of law. The most direct source of jurisdictional material regarding the resourcing of the Armed Forces is Title 10, U.S. Code.

United States Code, Title 10 – *Armed Forces*, is the principal legal regulating document supplied by the U.S. Congress that authorizes DoD the regulation, administration, and resourcing of the United States Armed Forces. The most important portions of this document that pertain to the subject of this paper are: Subtitle A – *General military Law*, Part I – *Organization and general military powers*, Chapter 3 – *General powers and functions*, Chapter 6 – *Combatant Commands*, and Subtitle B – *Army*, Part I – *Organization*, Chapter 307 – *The Army*. It is important to understand these portions of the law more than any other aspects of Title 10 in relation to the research question described in Chapter 1. These sections of Title 10 are most

²⁴ Davis and Shapiro, *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, 1.

²⁵ Bush, *National Security Strategy*, 13-16. See also Davis and Shapiro, *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, 13-14.

important to the research question because they describe how much military force can be applied abroad, how the Army will provide and resource forces for RCCs, and what authority a Combatant Commander will have over forces assigned to the command.

Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 123 b. - *Forces stationed abroad: limitation on number*, provides that the U.S. Armed Forces will not have a military personnel strength of more than 203,000 members permanently stationed outside the U.S. This section of the law makes an exception to the rule when war is declared upon a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member or any ally of the U.S., or when those countries are attacked; or when the President declares an emergency. This section of the law may become important to whether or not a division can be assigned to CENTCOM when the current emergency in both Afghanistan and Iraq has passed as opponents to the proposal may look to this section to prohibit the permanent stationing of a division in CENTCOM.²⁶

Chapter 6 of Subtitle A, Part I contains four noteworthy sections. These four sections give direction to DoD about how a Combatant Commander can exercise command in the AOR, as well as how the forces in the command will be supported. Section 162 - *Combatant commands: assigned forces; chain of command*, tells the Secretaries of the Military Departments that they are responsible to assign military forces to perform missions in the RCCs, and those forces may only be transferred from that gaining RCC at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, it specifies that Forces that operate in the RCC's AOR will be assigned to that Combatant Commander.²⁷ Section 164 - *Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and*

²⁶ United States House of Representatives, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. Code Library, U.S. Code Title 10, Armed Forces, Sect 123b. found in <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/123b.html>

²⁷ Ibid., Sect 162, <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/162.html>

duties, gives Combatant Commanders the authority to organize forces, commands, and a chain of command within the command in the most effective manner for the command; inherent to the Commander's authority is the ability to task subordinate commands to conduct specific military operations, joint training, and logistics.²⁸ Section 165 - *Combatant commands: administration and support*, directs that the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of their component forces assigned to RCCs, unless the Secretary of Defense assigns authority of administration and support to other components of the DOD.²⁹ Section 166 a. - *Combatant commands: funding through the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff*, describes the availability of funds to Combatant Commanders for reducing the threat to the national security of the United States in a "CINC initiative fund." As long as Congress approves, these funds can be used to assist in the annual outlay of some non-recurring expenses such as force protection, joint training, contingencies, humanitarian and civil assistance to name but a few.³⁰

The sections of the law in Chapter 6 are important to whether or not a division can be assigned to CENTCOM because of a likely struggle between service components about how forces are properly resourced in the CENTCOM AOR, especially if the subordinate headquarters of a JTF are distributed throughout the AOR, and because startup costs to station a division permanently to CENTCOM may be borne out of special funding as described in Section 166a.

²⁸ Ibid., Sect 164, <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/164.html>

²⁹ Ibid., Sect 165, <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/165.html> See also Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, *DoD Directive 5100.3, Support of the Headquarters of Combatant Commands and Subordinate Joint Commands*. Washington, DC: Washington Headquarters Service, November 15, 1999 (Incorporating through change 2, December 5, 2003). http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d51003wch2_111599/d51003p.pdf This document assigns the Secretary of the Air Force the support responsibility for CENTCOM. The concept of assigning an Army division to CENTCOM may have a significant impact on this support responsibility

³⁰ U.S. Code Title 10, Armed Forces, Sect 166a <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/166a.html>

For example, CENTCOM's strategic plan for basing forces in the AOR identifies specific ports, airfields, and other infrastructure that can either now be used or must be further developed in order to support operations in the AOR.³¹ The further development of these locations and infrastructures may require resources to be drawn from funds set aside to specifically reduce the threat to the U.S.

Subtitle B, Part I, Chapter 307, Section 3062 - *Policy; composition; organized peace establishment*, specifies that the U.S. Congress provides an Army to accomplish the goals as stated in the NSS, specifically assuring our allies and friends, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.³² It legislates the need for our Army to be ready for 'prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land'. This section also makes the Secretary of the Army responsible to Combatant Commanders to properly arrange Army force capabilities to support the Combatant Commander's Theater Engagement Plans (TEP); and additionally for the Army to expand the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.³³

This section of the law is important to whether or not a division can be assigned to CENTCOM because, despite the temporary Army force structure increase directed by the Secretary of Defense, ultimately there will be a strategic opportunity cost in assigning a division to CENTCOM. If a division is permanently assigned to CENTCOM, it will mean that the

³¹ *Statement of General John P. Abizaid, before the House Armed Services Committee*, 34.

³² Bush, *National Security Strategy*, 29.

³³ U.S. Code Title 10, Armed Forces, Sect 3062 <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/3062.html>

capability resonant in the division is not assigned elsewhere, and “there may be a danger not so much in what an enemy can do against us, but rather in what the U.S. does or does not.”³⁴

ANALYSIS OF DoD POLICY, AND U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE

The strategic framework of goals and methods as articulated in the NSS, and outlined in the preceding analysis of the NSS, is further promulgated in four Defense Policy Goals, as specified in DPG 04-09. The DoD goals are intended to be nested in a subordinated manner to the goals and methods of the NSS. In short, the Defense goals are as follows: Assure allies and friends, Dissuade adversaries, Deter aggression, and Decisively defeat any adversary at our choice of time and place. These goals are supported by seven interconnected strategic tenets as outlined in DPG 04-09: Manage risk, Adopt a capabilities-based approach, Defend the U.S. and project military power, Strengthen alliances and partnerships, Reorient U.S. global military posture, Develop and maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities, and Transform America’s Defense.³⁵

From the DoD strategic documents, the Army further identifies, and refines six essential and enduring capabilities. These capabilities are again intended to be subordinately nested to the DoD goals and tenets. The capabilities can be found in The Army Plan (TAP). They are: Mobilize the Army, Conduct forcible entry, Sustain land dominance, and the two most relevant to this study: Shape the security environment, and Execute prompt response. Each of these capabilities have supporting objectives and initiatives which will allow the Army to provide an Army division to the CENTCOM AOR. The most specific supporting objectives from these two more relevant capabilities which support assigning a division in CENTCOM are: Maintain

³⁴ Alsace, “In Search of Monsters to Destroy” 128.

forward presence forces in critical regions to provide responsive support to Regional Combatant Commanders, Forward station Army forces and capabilities that enhance regional deterrence and provide responsive support to combatant commanders, Provide U.S. forces with peacetime or contingency access and en route infrastructure, Develop and enhance allied and friendly military capabilities, and Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. interests.³⁶

This nested series of NSS goals and methods, DoD policy goals and strategic tenets, and Army capabilities, objectives and initiatives form the basis of the capabilities-based force planning methodology at the strategic and operational levels of command. As a group, these strategic concepts and policies forms the basis for operational doctrine and policies within each of the RCCs. In order to understand the capabilities-based planning model and how it affects the assignment of a division to CENTCOM, the reader must first acknowledge then understand how the Army and DoD concepts follow from the NSS as described above.

Before transitioning to how Joint and Army operational military doctrine further refines the strategic policy at the DoD and Department of the Army level and authorizes control of a division assigned to a combatant commander, it is necessary to include a short segment outlining some of the regulatory guidance regarding the stationing of forces in an AOR. Understanding the complex mechanisms of planning stationing actions will better enable strategic and operational leaders to make decisions regarding the assignment of a division to CENTCOM. Stationing is the process of activations, inactivations, realignments, and relocations. Stationing activities must be considered because an assignment of an Army force will require spending resources to enable that

³⁵ *The Army Plan*, 15.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

force to operate effectively in the AOR.³⁷ Additionally, stationing issues will be shaped by social, economic, and political trends in both the U.S. and in the host nation.

Significant changes in social, economic, and political trends affect the NMS and can have serious implications on stationing. Stationing considerations must become part of the planning process at the earliest opportunity. The requirement for integrating stationing actions as early as possible in Army planning documents is largely because of the linkages between force structure and the basing structure that must support the force. Basing structure involves study of new construction and training land to support the force structure and is particularly resource intensive.³⁸ Outside of cultural, diplomatic, and force protection concerns, new construction is likely to be the bureaucratic long-pole in the tent with regard to the prospect of stationing forces in CENTCOM. Military construction authority (MCA) must be approved congressionally with up to a five-year lead-time if new construction is involved. Even if substantial construction is not involved, planners must address 22 stationing planning factors that most importantly include operational considerations, joint service obligations, training, range availability, local community impact, housing, and quality of life.³⁹ Altogether the stationing process of a division in CENTCOM may amount to over a year of planning, preparation, and implementation.

Forces stationed in the CENTCOM AOR operating in a joint context, as well as a reliance on economies of scale, may require the division's subordinate commands to be stationed with other U.S. service components on the same installation. The service components which have forces stationed together on the installation will have to go to the trouble of creating an

³⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, DAMO-FMP, Army Regulation 5-10 *Stationing* (Washington, DC, 2001): 5.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

inter-service support agreement as per DoD Instruction 4000.19. This agreement is necessary due to the specific support requirements of different organizations within the command of the installation. Most importantly, the service which owns the organization will bear most of the responsibility of resourcing the realignment of functions which have been externally mandated for the installation.⁴⁰

Gone are the days of the operational organizational constructs of World War II through Operation Desert Storm when Divisions were assigned to Corps, Corps were assigned to Armies, etc. These organizations were land-component forces that used an attrition style of warfare to overcome opponents by sheer mass and brute firepower. They were dominant on land due to overwhelming numbers of men and materiel guided by the force of senior leaders. Today, when a direct military response is required, a Combatant Commander has the option of delegating the authority necessary to a subordinate joint commander. These subordinate organizations are Subunified commands, or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), and their commanders are Joint Force Commanders (JFCs). Each U.S. military component organization within the JTF then forms a component command through which it fulfills its responsibilities under US Code Title 10 by providing trained and ready forces to the JFC.⁴¹

In CENTCOM, because of the constraints placed upon it by DoD, and the cultural-political environment, the command has habitually waited until a crisis emerged before it formed an ad hoc joint organization to plan, prepare and execute an operation. “Unfortunately, by using this model, tactical and operational-level commanders rarely have had the opportunity to develop

⁴⁰ Ibid., 5-6.

⁴¹ Lewis and Noonan, “Conquering the Elements,” 35.

the deep expertise in joint operations that those modern contingencies require.”⁴² Clearly, a standing joint task force (SJTF) in CENTCOM under which a division will train and develop habitual relationships with maritime and air component forces during peacetime will benefit not only the operational command, but the strategic situation in favor of the U.S. as well.

In CENTCOM a division assigned there would likely be organized under the auspices of a joint task force (JTF). It would act not as the Army force (ARFOR) for the RCC, but rather be the ARFOR for the JTF. The responsibility for the ARFOR of the CENTCOM commander would still lie with 3rd Army, the headquarters that has habitually been associated as the Army Component for CENTCOM (ARCENT).⁴³ As an ARFOR for a JTF, the division would be the senior Army headquarters for all Army forces assigned to the JTF. A division in CENTCOM would likely be the lowest level Army organization that is adequately staffed, and resourced to successfully plan, prepare, and execute missions across the full spectrum of operations. In fact, it may require augmentation to adequately perform liaison with the joint force commander, adjacent joint forces, host-nation forces, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).⁴⁴

U.S. Army and Joint doctrine specifies that large units are most likely to conduct simultaneous operations across the full spectrum of operations, and that units at progressively lower echelons may receive missions that require fewer combinations. “For example, an Army

⁴² Ibid., 39-40.

⁴³ Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, *DoD Directive 5100.73, Major Department of Defense Headquarters Activities*, Washington, DC: Washington Headquarters Service, May 13, 1999 (Reprint Incorporating change 1, June 5, 2003).
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d510073wch1_051399/d510073p.pdf

⁴⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, *Field Manual 3-71 (initial draft), Division Operations*, (Washington, DC, 2001): Appendix F, Division as an ARFOR.

corps acting as the joint force land component may allocate two divisions to attack (offense) while a 3rd division secures a port and airfield complex (defense).”⁴⁵ While this illustration highlights an important doctrinal precept of combinations, it is well known from the experience of 3rd Infantry Division (ID) in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM that a division can successfully implement a combination of effects.⁴⁶

Due to the nature of the CENTCOM AOR, the CENTCOM commander will require a responsive land component force for the foreseeable future. This responsiveness will fall upon Army forces trained, organized, and equipped for operations specific to the AOR, and commanders and units proficient at force projection. This Army force will have the capacity, given the enablers of its JTF headquarters, to generate and sustain maximum combat power at the time and place the CENTCOM commander requires. Army force responsiveness for the CENTCOM commander will be most attributable to a forward deployed division, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and intra-theater force projection from anywhere the needed capabilities reside.⁴⁷

The literature outlined above forms the basis of DoD and the Army’s capabilities-based force planning model. There are distinct policy goals and objectives in the DoD documents which link the NSS to Army strategic and operational doctrine. Moreover, there are items of the NSS, DoD strategy, and TAP previously discussed in the monograph that may be more relevant to the question of whether a U.S. Army division should be assigned to CENTCOM. These sections have been highlighted in order to provide greater clarity to strategic and operational

⁴⁵ *Field Manual 3-0*, Chapter 1, page 17.

⁴⁶ Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), *After Action Report, Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Stewart, GA: locally produced, electronically disseminated, 2003).

⁴⁷ *Field Manual 3-0*, Chapter 3, pages 1-2.

decision-makers about the continuity of policies that will affect the assignment of a division to CENTCOM.

THREATS AND SITUATIONS THAT MAY PRECIPITATE OR PREEMPT THE EMPLOYMENT OF A DIVISION TO CENTCOM

For those who simply advocate the capabilities-based force planning methodology, it may be enough just to follow the linkages from the NSS through DoD policy to Army doctrine when considering assigning a division to CENTCOM. However, we must remember that “force planning involves an evaluation of the threats to national interests, the establishment of military requirements within given constraining capabilities, and finally an assessment of the risk of failure.”⁴⁸ Therefore any decision to assign a division to CENTCOM must be informed by requirements derived from the capabilities-based force planning construct, as previously described, and by the facets of an adversarial environment in the AOR. These facets of the adversarial environment form the basis of the threat-based planning methodology.

It is not enough for us to consider just an adversarial physical threat, their actions that may be used against us, and our defensive or offensive actions to counter or overwhelm the threat. We must also realize that an Army division will continue to capitalize on the successes of its savage wars of peace⁴⁹ in places like Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Iraq and is likely to be employed in future stability and support operations in the CENTCOM AOR. We have been forewarned in our previous operations in these wars of peace that “conflict on the periphery, just

⁴⁸ Troxell, “Force Planning and U.S. Defense Policy,” 157-158.

⁴⁹ Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002)

as at the core, is controlled by political objective.”⁵⁰ Our new national strategy demands we move to a way of war in which we have capabilities that turn successes of all military operations into favorable strategic outcomes.⁵¹

Most analysts will agree that there are generally three or four main problems likely to bedevil security in the CENTCOM AOR over the next several years. These security problems include: Iraq’s security dilemma, trans-national threats, WMD programs of Iran and Pakistan, and potential internal unrest throughout the AOR, but especially in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).⁵² In the CENTCOM AOR, due to the nature of the U.S. military’s operations in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and in the ‘Stans’, the threats and situations that the U.S. will likely encounter are sure to be more complex than the threats it encountered in the AOR before September 11, 2001.⁵³ This paper will briefly address each of these threats or situations.

Iraq

The most serious threat to stability in the CENTCOM AOR for some time to come, bar none, is the likelihood that Iraq could become a failed state. “Iraq remains a brutally dangerous place. Progress will be imperfect. Success will be inconsistent. Disappointments will intoxicate the media. But, when all is said and done, Iraq is now the only major country [in the CENTCOM

⁵⁰ David Jablonsky, “The Persistence of Credibility: Interests, threats and planning for the use of American military power.” In *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2001): 50.

⁵¹ Antulio J. Echevarria, *An American Way of War or Way of Battle* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004) <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/about/2004/jan/Janoped.pdf>. See also Max Boot “The New American Way of War” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 41-58. and G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002): 50-55.

⁵² Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf*, 29. See also Kenneth M. Pollack, “Securing the Gulf” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 4. This notion of the threat environment is a synthesis of both these perspectives extrapolated to include all of the CENTCOM AOR

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 3.

AOR] with hope for a better future.”⁵⁴ The success of a democratic Iraq threatens many of the autocracies that surround Iraq. Democracy in Iraq will bring private enterprise, a government chosen by the people, and the right of individuals to determine their own outcomes. It would mean that people in neighboring countries would likely ask why those liberties were only contained in Iraq.⁵⁵ A democratic Iraq will still have to find a way of protecting itself from its next door neighbor, Iran. It will have to obtain some kind of credible external security guarantee or maintain substantial-and threatening-conventional military capabilities.⁵⁶ However, the risk is not so much conventional military invasion of Iraq as much as the risk is that Iran attempts to shut down tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz as a method of blackmail or foment insurrections in neighboring countries.⁵⁷

The primary concern for our operational forces in Iraq is the stability operation to literally protect Iraq from a civil war. “Iraqi society is filled with more cleavages, and more connections, than simple typology of Sunni, Shia, and Kurds... We tend to identify, and stress, the tensions that rend [these] communities apart, but opportunities exist for these group[s] to work together for common ends.”⁵⁸ The prevention of civil war could draw substantial ground forces into regular rotational deployments for multiple years. A land-component force is unlikely to be withdrawn in the near future, in part to ensure that this portion of the AOR does not become a future terrorist

⁵⁴ Ralph Peters, “The Best We’ve Got,” *New York Post*, (New York), February 24, 2004. <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Feb2004/e20040224260844.html>

⁵⁵ David Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil: How to win the war on terror*, (New York: Random House, 2003): 166-167.

⁵⁶ Pollack, “Securing the Gulf,” 5.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 5-7.

⁵⁸ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context*, testimony prepared for George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, 24 February 2004, PDF version. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/022404tenet.html

breeding ground.⁵⁹ So, the concern is not an immediate one, but rather an enduring one that will require our persistence over the next decade or more. Indeed, there is growing advocacy to gather basing rights in Iraq now for future contingency operations that are bound to occur in the immediate area of Iraq.⁶⁰

Trans-national threats

The NSS views the primary threat to the US to be the exposure of the US homeland to attack by shadowy terrorist networks, and this view remains today the most critical concern of over 80 percent of Americans.⁶¹ These terror networks have been recently characterized as “learning organizations that remain committed to attacking the United States, its friends and allies.”⁶² The sophistication and reach of terrorist organizations has grown to the point where our response involves military forces, “but military force must be carefully calibrated in the AOR as not to further fuel anger towards the United States, thus increasing overall support for the terrorist cause.”⁶³

In the case of the military, even when limited geographic areas are identified as chronic terrorist havens, substantial U.S. forces may have to be forward-positioned and sustained to provide the necessary capabilities to destroy the terrorist organization and infrastructure. The

⁵⁹ Davis and Shapiro, *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, 36.

⁶⁰ LTG Jay Garner, US Army, retired, interview by Amy Svitak Klamper, in “Garner Sees Iraq as Long-term Military Outpost in Middle East”, *National Journal’s Congress Daily AM*, (February 6, 2004) <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Feb2004/e20040206255350.html> See also Kenneth M. Pollack, “Securing the Gulf” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 10.

⁶¹ Stephen Dinan, “Terrorism Ranks Highest as ‘Critical Threat’ to U.S.” *Washington Times* (Washington), 9 March 2004. <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlybird/Mar2004/e20040309264742.html>

⁶² Tenet testimony before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/022404tenet.html

⁶³ Davis and Shapiro, *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, 10.

U.S. military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti are the most obvious of our efforts in the AOR.⁶⁴

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-Horn of Africa is primarily a Marine organization positioned in Djibouti. It has been positioned there in order to defeat al Qaeda elements and their supporters in Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Its organization is currently a brigade-sized Marine force. In Afghanistan, CFC-A is a multi-national force which ensures a unity of effort between the diplomatic and military aspects of the operation, to include the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It includes CJTF-180, an Army led organization positioned in Afghanistan to destroy remaining Taliban and al Qaeda elements that are holed-up in the rugged confines of the foothills of the Hindu-Kush mountain range between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And, CJTF-7 is the force involved in Iraq combating the insurgent elements of the former regime of Saddam Hussein. It additionally has the task of destroying the combined network of al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam which threatens the security of Iraq. It currently includes elements of three divisions. The expectation is that the U.S. forces in each of these CENTCOM regions will be involved in these operations for several years, with most personnel rotating on long tours of duty.⁶⁵

Dependent on the type of division assigned to CENTCOM, the JTF commanders in the AOR may be able to perform multiple tasks in the full spectrum of operations against these transnational threats. As divisions in Iraq and Afghanistan have already proven, rebuilding schools, conducting tactical missions against insurgent groups, and logistically supporting coalition and sister-service organizations are equally important tasks that can achieve the same

⁶⁴ Davis and Shapiro, *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, 38-39.

⁶⁵ *Statement of General John P. Abizaid, before the House Armed Services Committee*, 17,35.

operational objectives. Similar tasks, performed to the same standard by the same organization, in differing conditions at many places in the AOR may enable the joint commander to accomplish his operational objectives more effectively and efficiently than relying on an ad hoc organization to enable those objectives. An Army division, as a holistic, integrated force, trained in the varied nature of the AOR, gives the operational commander the wherewithal to produce a more synergistic and cohesive effect against transnational threats in the AOR.

WMD

In the CENTCOM AOR, the greatest concern of WMD involves two states, Pakistan and Iran. As the February 24, 2004 edition of the Wall Street Journal states, “The Iranian nuclear revelations are the latest fruit of the exercise in non-proliferation known as the Iraq war. Saddam’s fate convinced Libyan leader Moammar Gahhafi that WMD production was a bad career move, which in turn led to the unraveling of a nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.”⁶⁶ This nuclear network has allowed the mullahs of Iran to begin developing simultaneous enrichment programs that may produce weapons of significant yield if not curtailed by either Iran’s or international action. Worse yet, the concern is that this uncontrolled network may give trans-national terrorists access to WMD.

As for Iran, according to U.S. intelligence and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates, the Iranian nuclear program is capable of producing at least one nuclear weapon within 5 years. “We must assume that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons while its hard-

⁶⁶ Wall Street Journal, “The Iranian Deception”, February 24, 2004.
<https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Feb2004/e20040224260564.html>

line clerics are still in power.”⁶⁷ But, it is also likely that Iran wants a lot more than to blackmail the U.S. With WMD, Iran poses an offensive capability not only within the CENTCOM AOR, but stretching as far as Israel. Its religious leaders have gone to great lengths to goad Israel in a manner that could blow-up into larger regional nuclear violence. The mullahs of Iran realize that one single nuclear device the throwweight of a Hiroshima or Nagasaki device could devastate Israel, and that the Jewish state has a response capacity that would only partially damage the Islamic world.⁶⁸ A U.S. Army presence in CENTCOM, such as a division, would have the effect of dissuading adversaries in the AOR due to its ability to be employed more rapidly than if it was brought forward to the AOR from over the horizon. Additionally, a division in CENTCOM may have a positive effect of making the export of violence outside the AOR less likely for the same reasons.

In Pakistan, despite the current regime that is friendly to the U.S., it is all too easy to notice that the state is perpetually unstable. Unfortunately, with control of Pakistan, comes control of Pakistan’s stockpile of nuclear warheads. “President Musharraf has proven himself to be an able and realistic leader who has successively jettisoned the Taliban, avoided war with India, and curtailed the Kashmiri terrorists. But will he last? And who will succeed him?”⁶⁹ Pakistan is a troubled society, one that we need on our side, but one that also needs significant moderation in both its foreign and domestic affairs. Here an Army division may have the same effect as discussed in the scenario involving Iran, but it is also acknowledged that the solutions to

⁶⁷ Pollack, “Securing the Gulf,” 5-7.

⁶⁸ Frum and Perle, *An End to Evil*, 105-106.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 259-263.

the problems of Pakistan will likely require more of a diplomatic or economic solution than a purely military one.⁷⁰

Internal unrest

In the Persian Gulf region of the AOR, the autocratic rulers of GCC states tread a fine line between support for the U.S. in its war on terror and the conflict in Iraq, and the sentiments of their citizens who, more often than not, are critical of their leader's U.S. sympathies.⁷¹ The cohesive bond of these states' citizens supporting their governments against an aggressive Iraq has loosened to some extent since April, 2003. We are right to expect that internal struggles along ethnic, and inter-religious lines that are found in Iraq could be compounded if those tensions are exported to the neighboring states.

In the central Asia region of the 'Stans' we have found many of the fledgling governments receptive to our influence. Uzbekistan continues to provide significant support for our operations in Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan has been willing to conduct multi-national training events with U.S. forces. But, the Russians have a lingering legacy of support in the region with an overt military-security presence in some of the countries that guarantees a certain stability for Moscow. Moscow has recently become active both economically and militarily in its approach to states in the Caucasus region, and may do the same in the 'Stans' because Prime Minister Putin has a definite stake in the stability of his borders. Although Russia has remained supportive of our deployments into those countries, this could change if unrest in the 'Stans' spikes. Our transactions with the Russians in this region should prohibit any illusion that they

⁷⁰ Ibid., 263.

⁷¹ Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf*, 33-37.

can sell deadly weapons to our enemies and preserve any kind of relationship with us.⁷²

Meanwhile, Pakistani President Musharraf treads the same fine line as the GCC leaders between supporting the U.S. in its global war on terror and acquiescing to his people.

In the African region of the AOR, there are two main internal conflicts which are fueled by contrasts in religion, language, ethnicity, and the flow of resources. In Sudan, there is an ongoing civil war between the Muslim peoples of the northern portion of the country and people of the southern portion of the country who are a mixed bag of Christian and indigenous faith practices. The imposition of the Muslim Shari'a law by the state government of Sudan has been the main issue to exacerbate the violence. The southern peoples have organized themselves into multiple military-insurgent groups to oppose the armed intervention of the government forces of Khartoum. In the past the U.S. has provided limited funding of the southern insurgent groups to repel and even overthrow the government of Sudan.⁷³

The second flashpoint in the African region involved Ethiopia and Eritrea. This area has long been marked by civil war. Even after Eritrea gained independence in 1993, the fighting has continued over small portions of territory on the countries common border. The U.S. official position has been to embargo both countries and thus force them to the negotiating table, but this has appeared to have little effect on the conflict. The importance of this conflict is the proximity to U.S. forces operating in Djibouti, and the market for weapons and munitions that may impact the CJTF-Horn of Africa mission.⁷⁴

⁷² Frum and Perle, *An End to Evil*, 265. See also Tenet testimony, 15.

⁷³ John Pike, "Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)" *Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program*, online resource (last accessed 3 March 2004). <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/spla.htm>

⁷⁴ Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis Network, "Ethiopia/Eritrea War." online resource (last accessed 3 March 2004). <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/eritrea.htm>

These points of internal tension or outright conflict may not necessarily directly involve a U.S. Army division, but if allied or coalition forces or even U.S. Special Forces require assistance in and around these internal conflicts, the Army force on the ground may need to provide logistical or other support like combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations.

JUSTIFICATION: MAKING SENSE OF THE 4 CORNERSTONES OF DIRECTION FOR A DIVISION IN CENTCOM

Assigning a division to CENTCOM would have an impact in achieving each of the DPG goals, would provide DoD with a means of supporting each of the seven defense strategic tenets, and would fulfill the Army identified capabilities required not only worldwide, but especially for the CENTCOM AOR. Our long-term national objectives, as outlined in the 2002 NSS, coupled with DoD strategic tenets and Army identified capabilities, will likely require a sustained land force presence in the CENTCOM AOR. And, it is an Army-based force, outlined in Title 10 that can enable those objectives as Army forces can conduct sustained, large-scale full spectrum operations throughout the theater of operations. Army forces are inherently durable, self-sustaining, and self-replenishing. This endurance allows them to remain in a theater of operations as long as the NCA requires.⁷⁵

Advocates of a reduced presence assert that the best way for the United States to address the rise of terrorism and the threat of internal instability would be to reduce its military presence in the region to the absolute minimum. Some theorists even prescribe a complete withdrawal from certain areas of the AOR entirely. These theorists proclaim that a strategic retrograde would diminish the internal political pressures in the CENTCOM AOR, specifically the Persian Gulf

⁷⁵ *Field Manual 3-0*, Chapter 1, page 6.

region, and give the autocratic regimes there the political space they need to enact the painful reforms that are vital to their long-term stability. However, they are also quick to acknowledge that such a withdrawal, in turn, would be the worst move from the perspective of deterring and dissuading Iran, or damping civil conflicts that might threaten the flow of oil.⁷⁶

As our actions in Iraq and against the terrorist threat elsewhere have demonstrated, the responsible thing to do when confronted by an adversary is to act when we can, and the earlier the better. We forfeit the initiative by keeping the CENTCOM AOR at arms reach to land component forces, often waiting until the last strategic minute to act. With an over-the-horizon strategy, we cast away the opportunity to act at a time and place of our choosing and gamble our national security on future circumstances that may or may not be favorable to us, and we tempt a presence of outside powers to introduce themselves into the region at our absence.⁷⁷

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL VIGNETTES

There are two historical vignettes in this chapter. Each vignette is intended to provide part of the answer to the secondary research question: Given a U.S. Army division assigned to a theater outside the continental U.S. (CONUS), how did that division positively or negatively impact the outcome of a post-World War II combat campaign? Through the answer to the secondary research question, the vignettes should assist in answering the primary research question: Should a U.S. Army division be habitually assigned to CENTCOM in order to more

⁷⁶ Pollack, "Securing the Gulf," 5-9. See also Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf*, 30. Both Pollack and Hajjar have no definitive solution to the problems in the AOR, but rather suggest the need to consider the U.S. military's deterrent effect, as well as force protection measures against trans-national threats if we maintain a presence of ground forces in the AOR.

⁷⁷ Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf*, 30-39. Hajjar speaks of the problems that an 'over the horizon' strategy presented to forces when they were needed in Afghanistan. See also Pollack, "Securing the Gulf," 11. Both Pollack and Hajjar advocate a regional defense alliance, similar to the Baghdad Pact of 1954, that would include the U.S., to dissuade actions by other outside powers and

effectively accomplish the intent of the 2002 NSS? Additionally, the vignettes are intended to illustrate positive outcomes and pitfalls of a U.S. Army division assigned in a theater outside of the continental United States immediately prior to and in the opening phase of a modern combat campaign. In both cases, the divisions did not act as a deterrent force, but rather they were applied in the context of part of a decisive force to defeat the adversary when the strategic deterrence of the United States failed.

The first case-study involves the 24th Infantry Division as it was assigned to the United States Far East Command (FECOM) in the lead-up to and in the opening weeks of the Korean War, 1950. Although it would be historically disingenuous to say that the 24th ID was successful by itself in the opening battles of the Korean campaign, it should be remembered that “the Eighth Army subsequently held Pusan, largely because of the time bought so dearly by the 24th Division,”⁷⁸ and ultimately the North Korean Army was defeated through a combination of effects against its frontline units and its overextended lines of communication. The stalemate that resulted in 1952 and continues to this day was not directly resultant of the actions of the 24th ID and its sister divisions around Pusan, but rather that stalemate was brought on by the decision to retake the entire Korean peninsula.⁷⁹ The scope of the 24th ID vignette is limited to the employment in FECOM prior to the opening of the Korean conflict and its subsequent bloody retrograde to the Pusan perimeter. It is intended to demonstrate to the reader the utility of assigning a division to a theater prior to hostilities regardless of its readiness condition. However,

legitimize the U.S. presence in the region. In effect this alliance would ‘keep the Americans in, the Iranians out and the Iraqis down.’ See also Frum and Perle, *An End to Evil*, 35.

⁷⁸ Roy K. Flint, *Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal 5-19 July 1950*, in *America’s First Battles 1776-1965*, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 297.

⁷⁹ D. Clayton James and Anne S. Wells, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953*, (New York: The Free Press, 1993): 148.

the more important object of this vignette is to create discussion about how a division should not be employed in CENTCOM, or the price that a division may be expected to pay if it is relegated only to constabulary or policing duties instead of having warfighting tasks as its primary focus, even in a semi-permissive environment.

The second case-study involves the 3rd Infantry Division as it was deployed to CENTCOM, specifically Kuwait, prior to and for the duration of its offensive actions against the Iraqi Army, 2003. This vignette is intended to convey the strategic and operational importance of having a division assigned to CENTCOM well ahead of the outbreak of combat. It should be noted that the decisive effect of 3rd ID in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was primarily attributable to its deployment in theater well ahead of the March 2003 offensive. Additionally, this vignette is intended to convey some of the problems the division had in preparation for and execution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM that are likely the result of a hasty deployment to the CENTCOM AOR and working in a command and control arrangement for which it was not accustomed.

JAPAN & KOREA 1950: THE TWENTY-FOURTH INFANTRY DIVISION'S ROLE IN THE DEFEAT OF THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY

The relevance of this vignette to the primary research question is more indirect than the example of 3rd ID in CENTCOM in 2003, but the significant lessons learned by the 24th ID in Korea in the summer of 1950 should not be lost on any leader, especially those who will control or lead a division or its subordinate units in CENTCOM. Through an exposition of the myriad of challenges the 24th ID underwent during the summer of 1950, this case-study answers how the 1950 defeat of the North Korean Army was impacted by the 24th ID, and what lessons should be brought forward to the primary research question concerning a U.S. Army division assigned to CENTCOM.

Thanks to General Gordon Sullivan's mantra of "No more Task Force Smiths," which he coined after he became U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 1991,⁸⁰ the 1st battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (also known as Task Force Smith), and subsequently the entire 24th Infantry Division have been ascribed as abject failures in attempting to defend against an aggressor North Korean force in July, 1950. This yoke of failure is part revisionist history and part truth. The real outcome of the 24th ID's actions is not entirely well understood except in an operational or strategic sense. Tactically, the Division failed to accomplish its ill-defined mission, but operationally its delay, in concert with South Korean forces, to the Pusan perimeter allowed the 25th ID and 1st Cavalry Division to be employed on the Korean peninsula without a forcible entry operation. Additionally, the retrograde to the Naktong River line by the 24th ID bought time for FECOM to plan and prepare for Operation CHROMITE, the subsequent Inchon envelopment. This time was indispensable for FECOM planners as General MacArthur revised the Inchon landing plan many times in order to satisfy political conditions.⁸¹

The 24th ID's tactical failure can be attributed to two primary factors. The first factor is strategic and environmental in nature and the second factor relates to the implementation of tactical training on Japan and the result of the lack of quality training as the Division was initially employed in Korea.⁸² These two factors are significantly interrelated, and in fact there are many

⁸⁰ GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, "No More Task Force Smiths," interview by James L. Binder, *ARMY* (January 1992): 21. General Sullivan used this cliché as a rallying point to prevent a hollowing of the Army following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 when many in Congress and the Presidential administration were convinced that a 'peace dividend' was possible from the DoD budget, and thus could decrement the Army's share of the budget to the betterment of non-DoD programs.

⁸¹ James and Wells, *Refighting the Last War*, 160-172.

⁸² Joseph G. D. Babb, "Task Force Smith Revisited" *Military Review* (January-February 2000): 9. See also James and Wells, *Refighting the Last War*, 133-138. These two documents form the basis of the synthesis that the problems of 24th ID in 1950 cannot be attributed solely to either the strategic level or at the tactical implementation of those strategic ends, but rather there must be an understanding of the broader system of strategic ends and tactical ways.

causal links from the strategic/environmental factors to the tactical factors that affect the way the 24th ID was employed on Japan before the onset of combat.

By early 1950, the Truman administration had shown an obvious ambiguity in its regard to the political and military situation on the Korean peninsula. On the one hand the President had approved policies from 1947-1949 that would restrict U.S. military involvement in Korea if civil war erupted or a foreign power sought a military presence there. Conversely, the administration, principally through the State Department, created the impression that the U.S. might send forces under the auspices of an international force if South Korea was attacked. In FECOM, GEN MacArthur mirrored this ambiguity by “pointedly excluding Korea and Formosa from his FECOM theater,”⁸³ but maintained an open channel of communication from an Advance Command and Liaison Group (ADCOM) in Seoul. To the leaders of Communist North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union, the shifting policy apparently indicated that the U.S. was minimally interested in protecting Korea.⁸⁴

Environmentally, the 24th ID was constrained to training on small parcels of land that would not physically allow maneuver any greater than battalion-level operations. Due to the lack of land available for training it had modified its table of equipment and had deleted the tank companies assigned to each of the Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), but more importantly it deleted the 3rd infantry battalion from each of its RCTs and the supporting artillery for that 3rd battalion. Moreover, the road infrastructure in Japan would allow only M-24 light tanks to be used, so the medium M-4 Shermans were all returned to CONUS.⁸⁵

⁸³ James and Wells, *Refighting the Last War*, 134.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 133-134. See also Flint, *Task Force Smith and the 24th Division*, 277.

⁸⁵ Flint, *Task Force Smith and the 24th Division*, 269,273. See also Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, Enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984): 507

The strategic ambiguity and environmental restraints had a significant psychological effect on the division. The officers largely believed that they would not be used in combat in the near future. Collective training was seldom conducted above the platoon level, severe personnel shortages arose as the post-World War II drawdown continued, and the theater became more neglected by Department of the Army.⁸⁶ By summer 1949, the stripped-down 24th ID was truly a constabulary force which was not ready for more than the mission it had become accustomed to on Japan, but its not all apparent that the FECOM staff or GEN MacArthur were aware of the poor state of readiness of any of the divisions stationed on Japan.⁸⁷

When LTG Walton Walker assumed command of the Eighth Army in the summer of 1949, he immediately sought and received an influx of personnel. He changed the priority of the divisions to training rather than acting as a constabulary force, and he instituted a training assessment program in which the collective training proficiency was raised to the RCT level. Particularly noteworthy was the fact that at least two of the 24th ID's RCTs scored higher in the assessment than any other RCTs of the sister divisions stationed in Japan. By the time the North Koreans invaded in late June, the 24th ID was significantly more ready to fight than a year previous. Despite this good news, resources were still not available to properly maintain or equip the RCTs, and the environmental issue of lack of training ranges still befuddled the proper conduct of artillery and tank support to the RCTs.⁸⁸ However, thanks to LTG Walker's leadership, the 24th ID was better fortified to delay to the Pusan perimeter.

The assignment of 24th ID to Eighth Army and FECOM provided significant strategic and operational utility for the eventual conflict in Korea. However, despite General MacArthur's lack

⁸⁶ Flint, *Task Force Smith and the 24th Division*, 269.

⁸⁷ James and Wells, *Refighting the Last War*, 138-146.

of realization of the division's unreadiness for combat, its proximity to the North Korean invasion and relative superior readiness to other Army divisions in FECOM, it was still a first choice to be employed to stop the southward offensive movement of the North Korean Army.

Upon employment in Korea, the 24th ID suffered significant losses and was ultimately unable to accomplish its initial mission of blocking the North Korea advance north of Taejon. When the 19th and 34th RCTs augmented Task Force Smith between July 6th and July 12th at a bridgehead line on the Kum River the division was finally able to conduct a delay, albeit at a rather uncontrolled rate. For two weeks, the division delayed the western advance of the North Korean Army and had "carried the burden of American efforts."⁸⁹ However, it was not able to perform in a manner in which it was expected to perform, and much of the cause of this poor performance is based on both "the failure at the strategic level to get the tactical requirements about right,"⁹⁰ and the lack of a wartime focus at the tactical level before the summer of 1949.

Notwithstanding the significant tactical challenges of 24th ID on the Korean peninsula in July, 1950, the delay of the 24th ID to the Pusan perimeter prevented FECOM from having to cede the entire Korean peninsula to the North Korean Army and then conduct an entry operation to liberate South Korea. 24th ID's delay saved thousands of South Koreans lives and caused the untold attrition of a significant portion of the North Korean Army.

⁸⁸ Flint, *Task Force Smith and the 24th Division*, 270-273.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 297.

⁹⁰ Babb, "Task Force Smith Revisited," 9.

KUWAIT & IRAQ 2003: THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION BENEFITS CENTCOM

The relevance of this vignette to the primary research question is more apparent and significantly more direct in this case-study than the previous historical example. The ink is still most certainly wet regarding 3rd ID's contribution in CENTCOM to the success of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, but there are significant lessons of the 3rd ID's assignment to and employment in CENTCOM that should be amplified. This case-study will highlight some of the issues regarding the assignment of the division to CENTCOM in the preparation phase and employment of the division in the execution phase of the 2003 campaign.

There would have been great adulation had the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein capitulated as a result of the presence of U.S. Armed forces, including the 3rd ID, massed in Kuwait. However, we know that Saddam's capitulation did not happen as a result of any simple deterrent presence, but rather it was through the defeat of the Iraqi Armed Forces that Saddam Hussein's regime fell from power in Iraq. This vignette will illustrate that the defeat of Saddam Hussein's military happened in large part because of the extensive preparations in the CENTCOM AOR over a period of many months by the 3rd ID.

There has been significant material from contemporary sources that highlight the success of the offensive campaign in Iraq. Many of these sources attribute this success to the manner in which the U.S. military controls its forces. These mechanisms of control were largely implemented in the mid to late 1990s. When the U.S. Army took the initiative in adopting a new style of warfare, it began to rely significantly on computer technologies that coalesced in what is commonly regarded as network centric warfare (NCW). In short, this is a concept that links

battlefield sensors in a surveillance and reconnaissance system to maneuver and firepower assets that will have some effect on an adversary, thus giving U.S. forces a significant advantage.⁹¹

This new style of warfare was a long time in the making; its roots trace back at least to defense reforms of the 1980s. In recent years the mechanisms and effects of NCW have been promulgated in various Army and Joint concepts beginning with military experimentation efforts in the mid- 1990s called Operation Desert Hammer VI⁹², and the advanced warfighting experiments of Task Force XXI, and ultimately culminating just prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in a joint exercise called Millennium Challenge 02. The nature of this advantage over the enemy was most explicit in the train-up to and actual conduct of OIF, as it proved to be a truly combined-arms operation.⁹³ It should be noted here that the 3rd ID was enabled with NCW to a limited extent, but that the bulk of the Army's tactical experimentation with NCW, and thus the digital equipment resided with the 4th ID, the follow-on force to 3rd ID.

Notwithstanding the enabling capability that NCW provided to 3rd ID in its part of removing the regime of Saddam Hussein, the real matter of the division's success was the focused nature of its training cycle in Kuwait immediately prior to crossing into Iraq. The division became a focused force in Kuwait, after it was assigned to CENTCOM, as every unit trained on the exact missions soldiers would execute weeks later against Iraqi regular Army and Fedayeen death squads.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," *Policy Review* (August 2003, available online). <http://www.policyreview.org/aug03/kagan.html>

⁹² *Field Manual 3-0*, For a focused discussion of how this 1994 experimentation in technology improved the performance of the Task Force 1-70 soldiers see Chapter 1, page 13.

⁹³ Max Boot "The New American Way of War" *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 43

⁹⁴ 3rd ID, *After Action Report, Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 1-2.

The success of the division in OIF is primarily attributed to the manner of training, and flexibility of execution in the environment that the Division would fight. This means everything from acclimatization of soldiers to training of the division command post to operate under the auspices of V Corps and subsequently CJTF-7.

Combat operations involving the 3rd ID began in a near simultaneous manner with that of air operations on March 20, 2003. The bulk of the combat punch was provided by the 3rd ID, which had about 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks and 250 M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), which had about 120 Abrams tanks. The 3rd ID took to the largely empty deserts west of the Euphrates River, while the First MEF attacked east of 3rd ID's zone. The initial speed of the advance was like no other attack in military history, with the 3rd ID sprinting some 200 miles in three days. U.S. forces approached the capital with caution, but they became progressively bolder as their probing attacks revealed the weakness of Iraqi defenses. Seeing that the defense of Baghdad was crumbling, U.S. commanders ordered a final push, with the 3rd ID charging in from the east and the First MEF on the east. The occupation of the entire country was completed on April 14, when Marines rolled into Saddam's hometown of Tikrit.⁹⁵

But, for the very rapid execution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and all of the effective training that the division conducted internally prior to moving into Iraq, we must recognize that there existed serious problems that 3rd ID faced in its deployment and actual conduct of operations. These problems arose mainly in the logistical support of the division, clearance of joint fires, communications, and deployment and readiness of equipment.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Boot "The New American Way of War," 45-50.

⁹⁶ 3rd ID, *After Action Report, Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 1-2.

After Operation Desert Storm, two sets of Army heavy brigade equipment, also known as Army prepositioned stocks (APS) were put ashore in Kuwait and Qatar. By 2002 there was a brigade set each in Kuwait and Qatar. This prepositioned equipment was to allow for the most rapid employment of the gear because ships did not have to be unloaded at a port. The presence of the APS was supposed to have sent a signal to the Iraqi government that the U.S. intended to conduct operations in the northwestern Persian Gulf region. But, unfortunately the deployment of APS, and other prepositioned equipment afloat in the Indian Ocean are generally seen as a panacea for rapidly moving and countering a traditional nation-state adversary with an armored ground-based force.⁹⁷ However, we know that 3rd ID's success was not as a deterrent force which gathered the APS stocks and then had the Iraqi regime acquiesce to it without force. Rather, 3rd ID was part of a broader force that quickly defeated the Iraqi regime when the deterrent effort failed.

When the majority of the 3rd ID was deployed to Kuwait in October 2002, it drew materiel from the stocks of the APS in Kuwait and Qatar. The Division's soldiers found that the equipment needed significant preventative maintenance due to the storage conditions of the equipment in theater, and from lack of care of units that had used the equipment on previous Intrinsic Action rotations. Because the APS is configured as a Brigade set, the division required 21 days to receive all of its other equipment from homestation. This included the bulk of its combat support and combat service support equipment normally found outside of the brigade's organizations. Additionally, the closure of the division in its forward staging areas was prolonged

⁹⁷ David Orletsky and John Gordon, "Moving Rapidly to the Fight." In *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, ed. Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro., (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003): 199. Chapter 8 of the Rand book describes the parameters and criteria of deploying U.S. Army units; it also provides reasonable models of improvements to the way the Army currently resources the Combatant Commanders with forces and equipment for their wartime roles.

due to problems matching units to specific equipment type at the APS storage sites, and a lack of transportation assets to move the equipment to forward staging areas.⁹⁸

As a CONUS-based force, the 3rd ID is normally headquartered under XVIII Airborne Corps and it is accustomed to that particular Corps methods of operating. Upon arrival in Kuwait, the 3rd ID had to get accustomed to operating under V Corps, a headquarters that usually operates in EUCOM. Although the two organizations worked out many of the problems associated with this unusual command and control arrangement in the intervening six months prior to the start of hostilities, there remained at least two serious issues that may not have been adequately addressed prior to the opening of the offensive in March, 2002. The two serious issues involved integrating the Division area of Operation (AO) and the Corps AO, and communications between the Division and external adjacent, and higher level units.

There were significant problems integrating Division and Corps AO. Procedural controls of, among other things, target identification by assets not under the division's control in its AO, and close air support, resulted in lags in intelligence from Corps to Division. This was exacerbated by serious communications problems. The Division commander and primary staff elements were relegated to using communications capabilities in mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) and less robust satellite bandwidth that did not adequately support fast-moving operations over extended distances from the Kuwaiti border to Baghdad.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ 3rd ID, *After Action Report, Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 46.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 188.

Confusion about the division's forward boundary, the Corps fire support coordination line (FSCL), and identification of dynamic¹⁰⁰ targets in the Division's AO resulted in at least 15 incidents where the air component aircraft misidentified friendly targets in the Division's AO, believing those targets to be outside the Division's AO and in the Corps AO. Fourteen incidents were resolved through diligent communication of tactical air control parties (TACP) with the pilots, but one incident resulted in a fratricide of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) crew.¹⁰¹

Certainly problems such as these can occur in any circumstance that involves combat. And, although the Division's and Corps' leaders and staff surely acted to mitigate the detrimental effects of their unusual lash-up, the problems described here are simply illustrative of deploying any large U.S. Army organization over extended distances and then conducting operations well outside the normal doctrinal confines.

It is therefore a significant credit to both 3rd ID and 5th Corps that the Division's soldiers were able to successfully conclude offensive land operations in Iraq in 3 weeks time. The true genius of the division was in the soldier's and the organization's ability to improvise on-the-spot rather than stick to a rigid blueprint of doctrinal solutions. The troops' fighting edge, and ultimately their success against Saddam's military was honed by realistic in-theater training programs and nonstop overseas operations since the end of the Cold War. In-theater mechanisms and adaptations by 3rd ID after deployment to CENTCOM and during the conduct of the offensive

¹⁰⁰ Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, U.S. Central Air Forces, (CENTAF-PSAB), *Operation Iraqi Freedom-By the Numbers* (Saudi Arabia: locally produced, electronically disseminated, 2003): 9

¹⁰¹ 3rd ID, *After Action Report, Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 141

operation, coupled with the benefits of superior technology, created the conditions for the defeat of the Iraqi military.¹⁰²

The discussion of the employment of 3rd ID and 24th ID in these two vignettes draws out significant lessons for assigning a division to CENTCOM. First, we must consider the external requirements that these vignettes make obvious. If we are to assign a division to CENTCOM, then it must be resourced appropriately with materiel, personnel, training space, and time to accomplish its mission, and there must be a willingness to employ the division within the scope of its capabilities. There must also be joint operational mechanisms which rapidly transport the division within theater and sustain it wherever it may be employed in the AOR, allow the division to control itself over extended distances, and shape or support the ground maneuver. Second, there are those internal requirements that the division must fulfill. In CENTCOM, we must not fall prey to the constabulary methods of Japan in the late 1940s. While stability operations and/or reconstruction will continue in parts of the AOR, units must devote time to train at all levels of collective training proficiency in live, constructive, and simulated environments. Additionally, in order to mitigate the negative effects that 3rd ID encountered at the commencement of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, division-level training should be nested into whatever training is being performed at the next higher level.

¹⁰² Boot “The New American Way of War,” 55.

CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The abhorrent terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, signaled the end of the post-Cold War era, and ushered in a new era of uncertainty. In this era of uncertainty Americans should expect continued acts of terrorist violence both at home and abroad, further challenges from regional powers in the CENTCOM AOR, as well as the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction emanating from the same region. When these issues are coupled with the United States' continued reliance on natural resources from the AOR we can quickly realize a new operational environment.¹⁰³ This new operational environment requires that the U.S. military possess the capability to respond rapidly and decisively to multiple and different kinds of contingencies, in unforeseen and largely unprepared locales in the CENTCOM AOR, in order to achieve the strategic goals of the National Security Strategy.¹⁰⁴

Currently, the U.S. has a large presence of ground forces in the CENTCOM AOR, but this large presence is not now intended as a permanent measure.¹⁰⁵ In CENTCOM, the U.S. military can no longer afford to let crisis situations develop, expand, and explode into violence directed against the United States, its national interests, or its allies, as has happened previously. In the past, the U.S. military's system of assigning ground forces on an ad hoc or rotational basis to CENTCOM could have been interpreted as a signal to potential adversaries that the U.S. remains unprepared to counter crisis situations when they occur. On our contemporary strategic

¹⁰³ Major Edward T. Bohnemann, *Rapid Decisive Operations: The execution of operational art by a standing joint task force*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2001): 43.

¹⁰⁴ Bush, *National Security Strategy*, 1-2, 29-31. See also Davis and Shapiro *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, 1.

¹⁰⁵ *Statement of General John P. Abizaid, United States Army*, 13,34-35.

azimuth, after the transfer of authority in Iraq and the military and political reforms in Afghanistan are complete, this signal may continue to be transmitted if the U.S. does not have a division habitually assigned to CENTCOM.

As this monograph shows, the capabilities-based force planning methodology certainly suggests that the U.S. military should have a land-component force permanently stationed in the CENTCOM AOR. However, the threat-based force planning methodology advises particular caution about the assignment of a division to CENTCOM due to the concerns of politics, culture, and force protection. The U.S. military's previous synthesis of threat and capabilities-based planning methodologies for the 2-MTW concept demonstrates that these planning models can be again integrated to create a workable solution for permanently assigning a U.S. Army division to CENTCOM. While the assignment of a division to CENTCOM would primarily conform to a threat-based methodology, a division assigned to CENTCOM also can have its organizational structure and distribution of capabilities altered to fit within the capabilities-based planning methodology.

Assigning a division to CENTCOM would have a positive effect in achieving each of the goals outlined throughout the documents used for the capabilities-based force planning methodology. This concept will provide DoD with a means of supporting each of the seven defense strategic tenets, and would fulfill the Army identified capabilities required for the CENTCOM AOR. Our long-term national objectives, as outlined in the 2002 NSS, coupled with DoD strategic tenets and Army identified capabilities, will likely require a sustained land force presence in the CENTCOM AOR. And, it is an Army-based divisional force, as outlined in Title 10 and Field Manual 3-0 that can enable those objectives as Army forces can conduct sustained, large-scale full spectrum operations throughout the theater of operations. Moreover, a division assigned to CENTCOM would significantly mitigate the costs and time of deploying forces from

CONUS, getting it organized under a possibly unfamiliar headquarters, and then expecting it to fight on uncertain terrain.

To some national leaders and well-intentioned scholars, a reduced U.S. military presence or withdrawal altogether from the AOR might be the best way for the United States to address the rise of terrorism and the threat of internal instability in the countries of the CENTCOM AOR. These theorists proclaim that a strategic retrograde would diminish the internal political pressures in the CENTCOM AOR, specifically the Persian Gulf region, and give the autocratic regimes there the political space they need to enact the reforms that are vital to their long-term stability. However, these same leaders and scholars are also quick to acknowledge that such a withdrawal, in turn, would be the worst move from the perspective of deterring and dissuading Iran, or damping civil conflicts that might threaten the flow of oil.

As demonstrated by U.S. actions in Iraq, and against the terrorist threat elsewhere in CENTCOM, the responsible thing to do when confronted by an adversary is to act when we can, and the earlier the better. We forfeit the initiative by keeping the CENTCOM AOR at arms reach to land component forces, often waiting until the last strategic minute to act. With an over-the-horizon strategy, we cast away the opportunity to act at a time and place of our choosing and gamble our national security on future circumstances that may or may not be favorable to us, and we tempt a presence of outside powers to introduce themselves into the region at our absence.

If the U.S. military is to assign a division to CENTCOM, then the division must be resourced appropriately with materiel, personnel, training space & time to accomplish its wartime mission. This must be done in order not to repeat the lessons of 24th ID in Korea, 1950. Additionally, the division must have access to joint operational mechanisms which rapidly transport the division within theater, sustain it wherever it may be employed in the AOR, allow the division to control itself over extended distances, and shape or support the ground maneuver. These joint and operational mechanisms must be emplaced in order that future divisions in

CENTCOM will not be constrained as 3rd ID was in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Additionally, there must be a willingness to employ the division within the scope of its capabilities. In CENTCOM, the U.S. military must not fall prey to the constabulary methods used by the U.S. Army in Japan in the late 1940s. While stability operations and/or reconstruction will continue in parts of the AOR, the division must devote time to train at all levels of collective training proficiency in live, constructive, and simulated environments.

This monograph recommends the assignment of a division to CENTCOM in a manner that integrates both the capabilities-based and the threat-based planning methodologies. Due to the nature of the CENTCOM AOR, even after the transfer of authority in Iraq and the completion of military and civil reforms in Afghanistan, the CENTCOM commander will require a responsive land component force for the foreseeable future. This responsiveness will likely fall upon an Army division trained, organized, and equipped for operations specific to CENTCOM, and commanders and units proficient at intra-theater force projection. This division should have the capacity, given the enablers of its JTF headquarters, to generate and sustain maximum combat power at the time and place that the CENTCOM commander requires. A permanently assigned, forward-deployed division, supported by forward positioned joint capabilities, will provide the CENTCOM commander a responsive land component force in a region that is bound to challenge the national security of the United States for the foreseeable future.

APPENDIX 1: MAP & DESCRIPTION OF CENTCOM AOR



U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Statement of General John P. Abizaid, United States Army, 3-4. Map of CENTCOM is copied from CENTCOM homepage, <http://www.CENTCOM.mil>.

The CENTCOM AOR includes land and sea features encompassing aspects of 2 continents; all told there are 27 countries in the AOR. In Africa, the AOR includes Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. On the Arabian Peninsula, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates are part of CENTCOM. In Central and South Asia, the AOR holds Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The AOR additionally includes the Seychelles, an island nation in the Indian Ocean. It covers some 6.4 million square miles of the Earth's surface, and includes the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, the Arabian [Persian] Gulf, and decisive maritime defiles of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Maneb, and the Strait of Hormuz. Over a half-billion people live within the AOR including at least 18 ethnic groups, and adherents to the world's major religions. The predominant faith of people in the AOR is Islam.

The resources of strategic interest in the AOR are oil and natural gas. The two largest regions that produce these resources are the Persian Gulf, and the 'Stans'. Over two-thirds of the world's crude oil reserves, a quarter of the world's oil production, and over one-third of the world's natural gas reserves can be found within the AOR, particularly in these two regions. Most of the oil and gas resources are exported to the industrialized nations in Europe, the Western Pacific, and North America.

This transfer of resources has an impact on an upwelling of social and economic discontent in the AOR. This discontent makes many of the ethnic populations vulnerable to conservative, even extremist, ideology and anti-American sentiment. No nation in the AOR is

free from this discontent, but the nations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula are the most susceptible to extreme sentiments of trans-national terror organizations.

APPENDIX 2: GLOSSARY

The glossary lists acronyms and selected terms found in this monograph. This monograph has used U.S. Army publications, Joint publications, and terms from private, non-governmental publications. In the case of a conflict in definitions, the definitions found in Joint Publication 1-02 are used. Where terms are defined in this glossary, the reference is cited in parenthesis. This glossary is intended to standardize definitions and acronyms for this monograph only.

ADCOM	advance command
allocated forces	Those forces and resources are those provided by the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation. (FM 3-0)
AO	area of operation
AOR	area of responsibility
apportioned forces	Those forces or resources are those made available for deliberate planning as of a certain date. They may include assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. (FM 3-0)
APS	Army prepositioned ships
ARFOR	Army force
assigned forces	Those forces that have been placed under the combatant (command authority) of a unified commander by the secretary of defense. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command. (FM 3-0)

augmentation forces	Forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the NCA. (FM 3-0)
CENTCOM	United States central command
CFC	combined forces command
CJTF	combined joint task force
DIME	Elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, economic
Division	The largest, predominately self-sustaining fixed Army organization. It is structured around a composite of types of units with varying degrees of modernization that the division commander organizes for specific mission requirements. The Army's division organizational concept embraces six types of divisions (armored, mechanized infantry, medium, light infantry, airborne and air assault) with each having specific capabilities and resources for conducting military operations. (FM 3-71)
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense directive
DPG	defense planning guidance
enduring	Capable of providing long-term domination while rebuilding multiple failed states and defending the homeland. (LTG Ric Brown)
EUCOM	United States European command
expeditionary	<i>Derived from 'expedition'</i> . A military operation conducted by armed forces to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (JP 1-02)

GCC	Gulf cooperation council
GEN	General <i>or</i> General of the Armies
FECOM	far east command
FSCL	fire support coordination line
GAO	government accounting office
IAEA	international atomic energy agency
ID	infantry division
ISAF	international security assistance force
JFC	joint force commander
JTF	joint task force
LTG	Lieutenant general
MCA	military construction authority
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MLRS	multiple launch rocket system
MSE	mobile subscriber equipment
MTW	major theater of war
NCW	network centric warfare
B-3	

NGO	non-governmental organization
NSS	National security strategy
PACOM	United States Pacific command
PVO	private voluntary organizations
QDR	quadrennial defense review
RCC	regional combatant command (Commander)
RCT	regimental combat team
Stans	The south-central Asia area encompassing the countries ending in 'stan'
SJTF	standing joint task force
TACP	tactical air control party
TAP	the Army plan
TEP	theater engagement plan
TOA	transfer of authority: the occasion of the reinitiation of Iraqi sovereignty
US Code	Federal law enacted by the United States Congress
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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