

Expanding the United States Army for 21st Century Roles and Missions: Foreign Legion or Foreign Augmentation?

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Expanding the United States Army for 21st Century Roles and Missions: Foreign Legion or Foreign Augmentation? Major John M. Cyrulik, United States Army, 60 pages.

This monograph considers expanding the United States Army using non-citizens to man new units. Both the French Foreign Legion and British Brigade of Gurkhas provide useful examples of the types of forces needed by the United States to preserve American hegemony and win the Global War on Terrorism. This monograph examines American grand strategy and the role of the United States Army, the contemporary and future operating environments, and the consequences of an overstretched army. In addition, this paper provides an overview of legislation concerning non-citizens and U.S. military service. This monograph presents models for an American foreign legion and indigenous units using the Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, Material, and Soldier (DTLOMS) force development framework. This monograph concludes that the United States Army requires a significant expansion to meet growing homeland security and overseas requirements and that any permanent increase in end-strength must include forces that provide imperial policing capabilities. This conclusion does not advocate transforming war fighting units into full-spectrum capable ones, but rather increasing end strength through the creation of a force tailored for Military Operations Other Than War. While both concepts presented in this work would provide the United States Army with sorely needed additional manpower, the foreign legion model is the most feasible. In addition, a decision to create an American foreign legion or formations of regional indigenous troops notwithstanding, the United States Army should take maximum advantage of Executive Order 13269 and the provisions of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act to actively recruit skilled non-citizens overseas. This recommendation requires the development and implementation of an overseas recruiting campaign focused on filling certain low-density/high-demand positions with able non-citizens through the promise of American citizenship as a reward for their service. This strategy could be especially useful in providing much needed linguists, medical personnel, civil engineers, experienced police officers, and other low-density/high-demand specialties. Most importantly, neither an American foreign legion based on the French model nor units of indigenous forces based on the British Gurkha model should be formed at this time. Two rationales led to this primary conclusion. First, the increasing militarization of American foreign affairs has had several unfortunate consequences, and this trend would be furthered by the creation of the two types of units presented in this monograph. Second, the creation of an American foreign legion or battalions of foreign troops would continue to allow the youngest generations of Americans to forgo one of the primary obligations of citizenship - compulsory military service, thus indirectly exacerbating the "Civil-Military Gap" and further eroding the trust and understanding between civilian and military leaders, possibly with dire consequences.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

*We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result will be a more relevant and ready force – a campaign quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.*¹

The sun never sets on the United States Army – and probably will not for the foreseeable future. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of deployments and operational tempo of the Army has dramatically increased, while simultaneously, the size of the force decreased, challenging the service to maintain readiness. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the initial campaigns of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have further stretched the Army to the point where additional commitments may result in a lasting degradation of readiness or battlefield defeat. There are already telltale signs that the Army may be breaking under the strain of too few personnel. These symptoms include the augmentation of warfighting units with personnel from the Combat Training Centers, who instead of training the next wave of troops stateside, were attached to forward deployed headquarters for extended periods during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.² Various types of individual augmentation have become relatively commonplace and the requirements so extensive that the Department of the Army established a web-based Worldwide Individual Augmentation System that, in reality, is a formal system of

¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2006-2023*. (Washington: GPO, 2003), 1.

² For example, fifteen members of the Battle Command training Program Operations Team - Delta served with Coalition Forces Land Component Command/Third U.S. Army for five months at Camp Doha, Kuwait, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. See online article, <http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/articles/2003/05/23/news/export1690.txt> 23 May 2003.

robbing Peter to pay Paul and an indication of widespread personnel shortages.³ Even more indicative of the problems facing the Army is the implementation of “Stop Loss” policies that prevent certain soldiers from leaving the service in an attempt to “buy time to prevent further losses until our personnel enablers could improve inventory health.”⁴ In addition, due to extended deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, as many as four of the Army’s ten active divisions will soon report the lowest levels of wartime readiness prescribed under the current readiness reporting system.⁵ Finally, a recent study by the Congressional Budget Office concluded that a long-term occupation of Iraq will endanger training and readiness, and may result in the loss of high-quality personnel due to lengthy family separations and involuntary mobilization.⁶

The Army’s vast scope of missions – from homeland security, deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, and operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans, has fueled considerable debate on the appropriate size of the force. Think tanks, pundits, retired general officers, and the influential Association of the United States Army have called for a permanent increase in Army

³ For information on the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System review Department of the Army Pamphlet 500-5-1, *Individual Augmentation Management*, 28 December 2001 and memorandum from Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 entitled *Worldwide Individual Augmentation System*, available online at http://cpol.army.mil/library/mobil/mob_090402.html 04 September 2002

⁴ See the United States Army Human Resources Command website at <https://www.perscomonline.army.mil/EPdd/ipstoploss.htm> 01 December 2003, which also states that “In order to ensure the retention of trained and experienced enlisted soldiers holding certain specialties in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom, the Army leadership implemented Stop Loss for many Military Occupational Specialties (MOSSs).”

⁵ Vernon Loeb, “Army Will Face Dip in Readiness,” *Washington Post*, 6 December 2003, 1. The Washington Post, citing a senior army official, reported that the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 1st Armored Division would be rated either C-3 or C-4, the army’s two lowest readiness categories, for 120 to 180 days following redeployment from Iraq.

⁶ Congressional Budget Office. *An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003), 1.

endstrength to meet global requirements.⁷ More importantly, momentum is building in Congress for a significant increase in the size of the active-duty Army. Fifty-four of the sixty-one members of the House Armed Services Committee signed a letter urging President Bush to expand the United States military, and Representative Ellen Tauscher (Democrat – California) has introduced a bill increasing the size of the Army by 40,000 soldiers over five years.⁸ While the Secretary of Defense has authorized the Army a temporary increase of 30,000 troops, the debate on appropriate endstrength will likely continue over the coming months, and it is prudent to consider the type of force that should be fielded in the event a permanent increase in the Army is authorized.⁹ In a recent memorandum to his inner circle of advisers, the Secretary of Defense alludes to a “long hard slog” in Iraq and Afghanistan and challenges his senior advisors to think through new ways to organize, train, and equip forces for the GWOT.¹⁰ This monograph attempts to do just that – present an American model of two proven concepts for fielding forces required for the GWOT and sustaining the United States’ position as the global power of the twenty-first century.

Although several options for expanding the Army are feasible, including adding troops to currently existing Cold-War force structure, increasing the use of Private Military Companies, or relying on proxy forces as a substitute for American units, an informed decision should consider the two types of auxiliary forces examined in this monograph. Both a foreign legion of motivated volunteers seeking United States citizenship based on the French model, or the long-term

⁷ Gordon R. Sullivan, “End Strength,” *Army*, September 2003. The Association of the United States Army President has addressed the issue of end strength on several occasions. His editorial “End Strength,” available online at <http://www.ausa.org/www/ausanews.nsf/>, advocates an increase of 40,000 soldiers over the next two to three years.

⁸ Tom Squitieri, “Push Is On for Larger Military,” *USA Today*, 12 December 2003, p. 1.

⁹ For a justification of the temporary increase in Army endstrength see the Army New Service article entitled “30K boost temporary, redesign long term fix” by Jim Garamone, 29 January 2004 online at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5620

enlistment of groups of foreign nationals for use in military operations, similar to the British Brigade of Gurkhas, deserve serious consideration.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY

Who can doubt that there is an American Empire? – an ‘informal’ empire, not colonial in polity, but still richly equipped with imperial paraphernalia: troops, ships, planes, bases, proconsuls, local collaborators, all spread around the luckless planet.¹¹

The United States military, and most importantly the Army, is the primary instrument of American foreign policy as the nation enters the twenty-first century. To the casual observer it may seem ironic that the increased involvement of the military in international affairs began following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. However, the Army found itself busier after the Cold War than many people imagined. Since the disintegration of the USSR, army operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (among many other locations), coupled with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s “Partnership for Peace” program and similar endeavors have largely shaped the international environment and been most responsible for advancing U.S. strategic goals and interests.

In her book *The Mission*, journalist Dana Priest describes the United States’ growing dependence on the military to manage foreign affairs. At the strategic level, Priest portrays an environment where the unified combatant commanders are best described as “Proconsuls to the Empire,” men who wield American power over their vast areas of responsibility with tremendous resources that dwarf what their counterparts in the Department of State and other government agencies can muster. At the operational and tactical level, she provides numerous examples of

¹⁰ Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Global War on Terrorism, 16 October 2003.

soldiers conducting civil affairs tasks that would have been unimaginable several years earlier. Perhaps the most illuminating is her account of the actions of paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division in Kosovo. These paratroopers, trained for forced entry operations and airfield seizure missions, found themselves largely responsible for formulating and implementing the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic policy and programs in the region.¹² These soldiers, and ten of thousands like them, are the backbone of U.S. engagement and foreign policy. In military headquarters all over the world officers are translating broad themes from the president and other officials into operational plans, oftentimes with little input from other government agencies ostensibly responsible for many of the functions performed by today's American Army. Priest also accurately observes that since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the reliance on the U.S. military to solve complex international problems has only increased. For example, the United States Agency for International Development, who is seemingly responsible for many of the types of tasks currently performed by Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proven to be largely ineffective; thus requiring the military to shoulder the burden in many non-traditional areas. While *The Mission* chronicles the most recent chapter of a paramount military role in the international affairs of the nation, this is not the first period in history in which the U.S. military has found itself essentially responsible for the direction of American foreign affairs.

In his work, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, author and Council of Foreign Relations senior fellow Max Boot provides a longer-term examination of the American military's conduct of small wars and their relation to the ascension of the U.S. as a world power. Boot states bluntly "These conflicts might as well be called 'imperial wars' – a term that, American sensitivities notwithstanding, seems apt to describe many

¹¹ Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 141.

U.S. adventures abroad.” He adds, “Indeed, having set out to write a purely military history, I found myself of necessity also chronicling the political course of American empire.”¹³ Boot’s book details numerous cases where the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army operated with minimal strategic guidance from civilian authorities or oversight in Washington. In many cases, the actions of these expeditionary forces profoundly shaped the strategic environment in ways that are still relevant today. The latest chapter of American international relations, from the end of the Cold War onward, seems to be little different from earlier periods in which the military in large measure held the reigns of U.S. diplomacy.

The end of the Cold War and the onset of the GWOT have reignited a spirited debate concerning the nature and direction of American grand strategy. Among the numerous scholars and practitioners of grand strategy who have recently written on the subject, one merits special attention for this monograph. In his book, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, Professor Andrew Bacevich provides a comprehensive examination of post-Cold War American grand strategy. He contends that American grand strategy, as practiced by the George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush Administrations, has followed a common course “to preserve and, where both feasible and conducive to U.S. interests, to expand an American imperium.”¹⁴ This strategy relies on “a commitment to global openness – removing barriers that inhibit the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people. Its ultimate objective is the creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms.”¹⁵

¹² Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping the Peace with America’s Military* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2003), 61-78.

¹³ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), xvi.

¹⁴ Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 3.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Assuming the United States is now the world's "ultimate guarantor of order," or "indispensable nation" (a term coined by Secretary of State Madeline Albright), the country has placed incredible responsibilities upon its armed forces. A debate over the reality of increasing military influence in American foreign affairs and the course of American grand strategy is appropriate and undoubtedly important; however, it is outside the parameters of this monograph. Regardless of where individuals might align themselves on the appropriate level of the Army's role in overseas affairs, one fact remains clear – the United States military will continue to play a major role in foreign affairs and international relations for the foreseeable future, requiring enormous energies and resources to support and advance national goals and interests.

THE CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

*If you want to see what lies in store for the armed forces in the future,
you could do worse than cast your gaze back to the past.¹⁶*

Few, if any, of the latest buzzwords to permeate the American military lexicon in recent years have been used more frequently, or with more fervor and passion, than that of Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). In fact, reading the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) White Paper which describes the COE, one would think from all the hype that the Army had suddenly discovered a hidden truth about the conduct of modern warfare and the milieu in which it takes place.¹⁷ This assertion is incorrect, since concerning the types of warfare practiced, the enemy faced, or the physical environment in which operations are conducted, the United States, or our British and French allies, have been there many times before. The COE describes an adaptive enemy, seeking an asymmetric advantage, and

¹⁶ Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, xx.

¹⁷ TRADOC White Paper, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, *Capturing the Operational Environment*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2 February 2000.

using urban and built-up areas in an attempt to prevent U.S. forces from achieving victory, often times relying on protracted war and avoiding decisive engagement with superior conventional U.S. forces.¹⁸

For all the techno jargon and acronym soup used to describe the COE, it might be best to refer to the writings of British Major General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, whose 1934 work entitled *Imperial Policing* describes the noticeably similar environment in which he operated. His discussion of the “Nature of the Army’s Police Duties” offers valuable insight into our current operational environment and likely foreshadows the future operating environment as well. Akin to the state of affairs faced by today’s U.S. Army, Gwynn described an operating environment where the British Army was increasingly relied upon to perform three main types of activities, which he collectively terms Imperial Policing. The first category of Imperial Policing operations is small wars. These are “deliberate campaigns with a definitive military objective and an ultimate goal of establishing civilian control.” The second category consists of instances “where normal civilian control does not exist, or has broken down to such an extent that the Army becomes the main agent for the maintenance of or restoration of order.” The third grouping of Imperial Policing involves Army employment “in aid of the civil power” when “the civil power continues to exercise undivided control but finds the police forces on which it relies insufficient.”¹⁹ Interestingly, Gwynn’s Imperial Policing framework is somewhat analogous to the “three block war” theory often used by Marine Corps and Army leaders to put in plain words the realities of the contemporary operating environment.²⁰ In the three block war - imperial

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Charles W. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1934), 1-9.

²⁰ For additional information concerning the three block war visit the Marine Corps Small Wars Center of Excellence at <http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/> The term three block war was first coined by General Charles Krulak, United States Marine Corps Commandant from 1995-1999, to describe scenarios where troops are engaged in the full spectrum of operations,

policing analogy, troops conduct combat operations on one city block with a “definitive military objective,” while other soldiers are the “main agent for the maintenance of or restoration of order” (using non-lethal force to prevent looting for example), while simultaneously a third group of soldiers conducts routine patrols with local police and security forces on another city block in an effort to “aid civil powers.”

As objectionable as the term Imperial Policing may be to many Americans, let there be no mistaking the applicability of Gywnn’s work. If it makes the U.S. reader more comfortable, he or she could replace Imperial Policing with Stability and Support Operations, Operations Other Than War, Low-Intensity Conflict, Foreign Internal Defense, or a myriad of doctrinal terms apt to describe current U.S. Army operations. However, it does not require a leap of faith to imagine a recently retired American general officer writing a treatise very similar to Gywnn’s based on their experience in Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Iraq, or Afghanistan.

Future operating environments will look much the same as Gywnn’s 1930 Peshawar District campaign or the contemporary operations of the Coalition Joint Task Force in Afghanistan. The success of campaigns in such places as Afghanistan and Iraq will be measured over the course of decades, requiring the commitment of generations of soldiers, similar to our efforts in Germany, Japan, and Korea. Of course, technologies will change tactics and operations, and the Army will face unexpected adversaries in unfamiliar conditions. However, as Max Boot emphasizes in *The Savage Wars of Peace*, the U.S. military should not discount the collective experience of its small wars, which accounts for most of its operational activities over the past two-hundred and twenty-eight years.²¹

from humanitarian assistance missions, through peacekeeping and peace enforcement-type actions, to combat, possibly within the space of three city blocks.

²¹ Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace*, xix.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN OVERSTRETCHED AMERICAN ARMY

*In tactics, as in strategy, superiority of numbers is the most common element in victory.*²²

Although the conditions surrounding specific operations, campaigns, and wars change with the technology and strategic context, one fact remains unchanged – although superiority in numbers in itself cannot assure victory, insufficient manpower is an important ingredient in the recipe of defeat. Consider the last two global wars the United States has fought and won. Winning the Second World War and the Cold War both required enormous manpower. If the word of our senior leaders is to be believed, the current threat posed to the United States is no less dangerous than the Axis or Soviets, and in some ways our GWOT enemies are even more so. The Secretary of Defense recently stated, “We have truly entered a new age – one that may well be the most dangerous to America, and the democracies of the world, have ever faced.”²³

In the 2004 State of the Union Address, President Bush reemphasized the dangers facing the United States, reminding citizens that the nation remains embroiled in war and that despite operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, terrorists are “still training and plotting in other nations, and drawing up more ambitious plans.” The president is determined to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, using military force when required to keep “the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous regimes.”²⁴ In addition, six countries (Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Libya, Syria, and Sudan) remain on the U.S. State Department’s list of

²² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1993), 228.

²³ “Rumsfeld tells AUSA how space remains critical,” *AUSA News*, February 2004, 2.

²⁴ George W. Bush. *2004 State of the Union*. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html> 20 January 2004.

state sponsors of terrorism.²⁵ The strategic realities of the GWOT, coupled with America's role as world power, pose enormous challenges to the United States military.

The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), in the forward of his institutional vision entitled *The Way Ahead*, describes the current state of affairs. He states, "Our Army is serving a Nation at war," and "this campaign will not be short; it will require deep and enduring commitments."²⁶ In his 2003 Status Report to the Association of the United States Army, Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee summarizes the enormity of the enterprise:

Around the globe, our Army is active. There are more than 360,000 soldiers deployed in 120 countries around the world -- with over 157,000 soldiers in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait. Of the total deployed worldwide, approximately 230,000 soldiers are active duty, 60,000 are Army Reserve and 75,000 are National Guard. During fiscal year 2003, 24 of the 33 active component brigade combat teams (73 percent) were deployed overseas. Of the battalions in the National Guard enhanced brigades, 15 of the 45 (33 percent) were also deployed. With this level of engagement, operational tempo is stressing the volunteer force in ways not previously seen.²⁷

Secretary Brownlee's status report acknowledges the strain placed on Army forces, and other defense leaders readily acknowledge the near term manpower requirements for the Army. The Army's overextension is referred to by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as an operational "spike," alluding to a short-term problem that he hopes will not require a permanent increase in endstrength. Unfortunately, hope is not a method or a logical basis for establishing manpower requirements. The Secretary of Defense's assertion that the Army only faces a temporary condition because "Very simply, we do not expect to have 100,000 (or) 120,000 troops

²⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2003), 76. At the time of publication of the 2002 report, Iraq was also on the list but has since been removed because of the U.S. led invasion that toppled the Hussein regime.

²⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army. *The Way Ahead*, available online at <http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/foreword.html> 26 January 2004.

²⁷ Brownlee, Les. "A Brave and Determined Army is Destroying Terrorism Worldwide," *The Army Magazine 2003 Green Book* available online <http://www.ausa.org/www/greenbook.nsf/> October 2003.

in a single country permanently deployed" is contrary to historical experience.²⁸ While the American presence in Iraq may be scaled down considerably, the simple fact is that the United States Army often remains garrisoned overseas in considerable numbers for extended periods following major operations. The *2003 United States Army Posture Statement* lists several recent cases: "Soldiers from both the Active and the Reserve Component have remained . . . in the Balkans for seven years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for 12 years, in the Sinai for 21 years, and in Korea and Europe for over 50 years."²⁹ These examples suggest the exit strategy of some American military interventions may be not to exit at all.

With this in mind, there are three potentially disastrous consequences of an overstretched American Army. First, in the near term, even if the troop requirements for operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM are an operational spike, and the security situation deteriorates in either Afghanistan or Iraq, there may not be the necessary reinforcing units available to react to any crises. Therefore, the lack of a major theater reserve ground force located in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility jeopardizes the ultimate success of U.S. efforts in the region. Second, at stake is the risk that America's hegemony will be successfully challenged, not from a peer competitor, but by aggressive regional powers emboldened to take advantage of the Army's overstretch. Most important is the grave risk that the Army could find itself unable "to fight and win the Nation's war."³⁰ The balance between victory and defeat in the GWOT largely hinges on the abilities of the United States Army.

²⁸ United States Department of Defense Armed Forces Information Service. "Rumsfeld Says Increase in End Strength Not Likely For Now," 13 January 2004. Online at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2004/n01132004_200401134.html

²⁹ Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. *The 2003 United States Army Posture Statement*, available online at <http://www.army.mil/aps/default.htm>

³⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Field Manual No. 1, The Army* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001), Page 1 emphasizes "But above all, we are ready to fight and win the Nation's wars—our nonnegotiable contract with the American people. The Army is, and

Singularly, any one of these three risks is enough to justify an expansion of the Army. Taken together and considering what is at stake – success in Iraq and Afghanistan, preserving American hegemony, and winning the GWOT, a permanent increase in end strength should be authorized without delay.

In summary, the preceding chapter conveys three main points. First, post-Cold War American grand strategy is generally imperial in nature and relies heavily on the United States' armed forces to preserve and advance its hegemony. The importance of the military's role in American foreign policy has increased in recent years, which is evidenced by the enormous power wielded by the geographic combatant commanders whose duties resemble that of imperial proconsuls. Second, the contemporary and future operating environments will resemble situations not unlike most of the Army's operational historical experience, commonly referred to today as Military Operations Other Than War or Stability and Support Operations, which Gywnn termed Imperial Policing. Third, the Army is stretched too thin and the potential consequences of an insufficient army are of such magnitude that the prudent course is to expand the U.S. Army to meet the dual requirements for maintaining America's empire and winning the GWOT.

will remain, the preeminent land warfighting force in the world. We serve as the ultimate guarantor of our way of life."

CHAPTER TWO

TO THE CONTRARY

In considering an expansion of the United States Army using large numbers of non-citizens to man new units, two arguments (one on moral grounds and the other more practical) emerge in opposition to the concepts presented in this monograph. This chapter will refute these differing positions by debunking the myth of the modern American citizen-soldier, reviewing the precedent of awarding American citizenship in exchange for military service, scrutinizing the dangers of private military companies, and illustrating the shortcomings of utilizing proxy forces.

The first main line of argument opposed to enlisting non-citizens to create new units is a traditional belief that the moral strength of the United States Army, supposedly superior to foreign armies, evolves from its composition of "citizen-soldiers." This idea is often reflected in the vain attempts to make a philosophical link between modern U.S. servicemen and figures such as the New England minutemen or the draftees that assaulted Normandy during World War II.³¹ While the effectiveness of the American Revolution and World War II armies may be partly attributed to their make-up of citizen-soldiers, the contemporary All Volunteer Force is a very different organization, thus opposition to the enlistment of non-citizens based on this rationale is faulty. In addition, tens of thousands of non-citizens are currently serving in the U.S. military, and there is no indication that the Army is a less capable force due to their service.

While creating new units of non-citizens in the Army may be opposed on moral grounds, a more practical argument against a foreign legion or other type force can be made. The Army could be expanded not by adding more uniformed personnel (regardless of citizenship or national origin), but by using private military companies (PMC) or proxy forces as a substitute for U.S.

soldiers.³² Increasing the role of modern-day *condottieri* and proxies, who essentially operate as mercenaries on behalf of the United States, is risky business. The privatization of military conflict has serious implications and senior defense leaders would do well to avoid advancing this trend. Employing indigenous proxy forces is also an unacceptable solution to manpower shortages facing the U.S. Army. As operations in Afghanistan have proven (to be discussed later in this chapter), proxies are poor substitutes for American soldiers.

DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN-SOLDIER

*Viewed legally, we have an army of citizen-soldiers; viewed historically and philosophically, we do not.*³³

Although the majority of United States Army personnel are, in strict interpretation, United States citizens *and* soldiers, the term citizen-soldier, as understood by previous generations of Americans, does not accurately describe the men and women who make up the current Army. The term citizen-soldier, in its historical context, describes Americans who served in the military for a limited period either out of a sense of duty or to fulfill an obligation of citizenship. These citizen-soldiers were most often, but not always, volunteers who served under various terms of enlistment. Even during major wars where the government resorted to acts of conscription, thousands of citizens volunteered for wartime duty. For many soldiers, military

³¹ For a recent example of the continued insistence that the modern U.S. Army is “literally a citizen’s army” see Gordon Sullivan and Frederic J. Brown, “America’s Army,” *Military Review* 82 (March-April 2002): 3-8.

³² See Eugene B. Smith “The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its Implications,” *Parameters*, 32 (Winter 2002-03): 104-119 which recommends the increased use of private military companies.

³³ Eliot A. Cohen, “Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier” *Parameters*, 31 (Summer 2001): 23.

service paved the way for greater opportunities including civilian employment, participation in local and national politics, and respected status in communities across the country.³⁴

The end of the draft and the establishment of an All-Volunteer Armed Force in 1974 marked “a drastic break in traditional reliance on the citizen soldier.”³⁵ In his essay “Twilight of the Citizen Soldier,” Professor Elliot Cohen suggests three reasons why members of today’s army are not citizen-soldiers. The first reason is the motivation behind an individual’s military service. As Cohen explains, “In the case of the true citizen-soldiers, military service is either an obligation imposed by the state or the result of mobilization from some pressing cause.”³⁶ Although patriotism may be a contributing factor for service, the today’s soldier joins the force primarily for very different reasons, including substantial monetary bonuses and college benefits, to learn a specific skill or trade, begin a new career, or to experience challenging and dangerous situations. The second reason why the U.S. Army is not a citizen-soldier army is its disproportionate representation of American society. While the Army has attempted to maintain a balance among ethnic groups during the recruiting process, “Recruiters pay no heed, however, to socioeconomic, religious, or other kinds of ethnic diversity in the ranks.”³⁷ An army of citizen-soldiers would mirror American society and truthfully represent the state, regardless of race, religion, or wealth. The third and most important reason to explain why the U.S. Army is no longer an institution of citizen-soldiers is philosophical. Citizen-soldiers (including the officer ranks) are first and foremost citizens in their mind’s-eye, with military obligations only a temporary, but necessary, diversion from civilian enterprise. Perhaps it is useful to again quote Cohen:

³⁴ Peter Karsten, “The US Citizen-Soldier’s Past, Present, and Likely Future,” *Parameters* 31(Summer 2001): 61-73.

³⁵ Morris Janowitz, “The Citizen Soldier and National Service,” *Air University Review* 31 (November-December 1979): 2.

³⁶ Cohen, “Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier,” 23-24.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

the true citizen-soldier's identity is fundamentally civilian. However much he may yield to the exigencies of military life, however much he may even come to enjoy it and become proficient in military skills, he is always, in the core of his being, a member of civil society. His participation in military life is temporary and provisional. For the volunteer, and certainly for the multiterm soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, the military identity coexists with that of the citizen. The issue is one of identity, and not solely length of service.³⁸

In the same vein, although many soldiers carry the legal status of American citizen, they spend much of their time living abroad, stationed outside of the United States for years at a time. With the frequency and length of deployments increasing, those soldiers who decide to remain in service for twenty or thirty-year careers will undoubtedly spend much of their adult lives garrisoned overseas and divorced from American society. If citizenship is measured by the role an individual plays in their local and national community, then by the virtue of the nature of modern service, American soldiers fall far short of being model citizen-soldiers.

If the contemporary United States Army is not an organization of citizen-soldiers, there should be no objection to a force made up of willing volunteers who happen to be non-citizens. Senior defense officials, speaking on the occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the All-Volunteer Armed Force, staunchly defend the ideal that volunteers make the best troops, far more so than draftees of earlier generations, and it is not likely the United States returning to a conscript force in the near future.³⁹ Perhaps the best soldiers are those volunteers whose citizenship is contingent on honorable military service. The next section examines the magnitude of non-citizens serving in the U.S. military and the precedent for granting citizenship as a reward for honorable service.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ See *Conscription Threatens Hard-Won Achievements and Military Readiness*, Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel and Readiness) online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/d20030114avf.pdf> 09 January 2003 and the Department of Defense's *Background Briefing on the All Volunteer Force* online at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01132003_t113bkgd.html 13 January 2003

NON-CITIZENS IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

As of September 2003, at least 35,000 non-citizens were serving in the United States military. In addition, the citizenship of over 16,000 other service members is “unknown.”⁴⁰ In the course of their service, many of these personnel will become naturalized citizens. The reward of American citizenship for military service is a long established practice during both peace and wartime. Although expedited citizenship is available for military members during either circumstance, the length of honorable service required before granting citizenship is different in peace and war. During periods of hostilities, the president can authorize non-citizens eligible for immediate naturalization with the enactment of an executive order. Approximately 272,000 military service members have become American citizens using this provision since World War I.⁴¹ On 3 July 2002, President Bush signed the *Executive Order 13269 -- Expedited Naturalization of Aliens and Noncitizen Nationals Serving in An Active-Duty Status During the War on Terrorism*, waiving time of service requirements and making up to 15,000 of the non-citizens in the military immediately eligible for citizenship.⁴² Although the Executive Order signed by the President is far-reaching, it is a temporary measure with an end-date to be determined based on the progress of the GWOT. The Executive Order is also primarily a reward to those resident aliens already serving in the U.S. armed forces and thus not a direct effort to recruit additional non-citizens into the military. In a remarkable piece of legislation, the United States Congress recently relaxed the criteria used to grant American citizenship to military personnel. These changes are undoubtedly important to non-citizens seeking to become

⁴⁰ Bruce Finley, “Military Eyeing Unknowns,” *Denver Post*, 24 February 2004.

⁴¹ Office of the White House Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet: Honoring Members of American's Armed Services*, available online <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020704.html> 4 July 2002.

Americans, and will likely result in more foreigners joining the military as a way to gain citizenship.

The new laws were incorporated into Title XVII, Sections 1710-1705 of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, under the title *Naturalization and Other Immigrant Benefits for Military Personnel and Families*. Section 1701 drastically reduces the length of peacetime military service required for citizenship from three years to one year, as compared to five years of resident alien status required for non-citizens who do not serve in the military. Section 1702 expands eligibility for expedited citizenship including troops of the Selected Reserve and Ready Reserve in addition to active duty personnel. Section 1703 grants certain benefits to alien family members (including spouses, children, and parents) of those troops awarded posthumous citizenship who “died as a result of injury or disease incurred in or aggravated in combat.” Most importantly to the concepts presented in this monograph, Section 1701 directs that “any applications, interviews, filings, oaths, ceremonies, or other proceedings . . . relating to the naturalization of members of the Armed Forces” be available at embassies, consulates, and military bases overseas.⁴³

Due to Executive Order 13269 and the provisions of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, it is now arguably easier than ever to obtain U.S. citizenship through military service. The legal framework is currently in place to expand the Army using non-citizens to form new units. In theory, new soldiers can now be recruited, trained, employed, and processed as American citizens entirely overseas – without ever having to set foot in the United States. The entire process of obtaining U.S. citizenship for military volunteers now varies in length from as

⁴² George W. Bush, *Executive Order Expedited Naturalization of Aliens and Noncitizen Nationals Serving in An Active-Duty Status During the War on Terrorism*, available online <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020703-24.html> 3 July 2002.

⁴³ To read the entire text of the final bill online, visit the THOMAS government website at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c108:7:./temp/~c108IXCS9t::>

few as 90 days during wartime and up to one year during peacetime, thereby making service in the American armed forces extremely attractive for foreign volunteers.

THE DANGERS OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES AND PROXIES

*Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. Any man who founds his state on mercenaries can never be safe or secure, because they are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined and untrustworthy - bold among their friends, but cowardly in the face of the enemy; they fear no God, nor loyalty to men.*⁴⁴

An enticing option for adding needed capabilities to the United States military, without sanctioning a permanent increase in endstrength, is the employment of Private Military Companies (PMC) or indigenous proxy forces. For the purposes of this monograph, PMC are defined as “organizations [that] sell their military skills outside their country of origin and as an entrepreneur rather than as a member of a recognized national military force.”⁴⁵ These “new *condottieri*” or modern mercenary companies, can provide trained personnel with a gamut of skills from combat aviators to general staff officers, and a array of services including force development, strategic planning, and combined arms and joint training programs for tactical and operational units. Examples of PMC include the now defunct Executive Outcomes, which specialized in combat and combat support personnel and functions, and Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), which can provide a bevy of recently retired senior officers and non-commissioned officers to fill a variety of key positions.⁴⁶ Proxy forces recently utilized by

⁴⁴ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, translated and edited by Robert M. Adams (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1977), 35.

⁴⁵ The definition of PMC is from Thomas K. Adams, “The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict,” *Parameters* 29 (Summer 1999): 104.

⁴⁶ See Adams, “The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict” and Eugene B. Smith, “The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications,”

the United States include various Afghan Northern Alliance factions during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and units from a variety of poorer countries which have joined the American occupation of Iraq, with the U.S. paying much, if not all, of the costs of their troop deployments for services provided. In addition, nations providing troop contingents during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM can bid on millions of dollars worth of Iraqi reconstruction contracts as a reward for their commitment. For those nations still considering sending military forces, the Department of Defense is not shy about using these multi-million dollar contracts as incentives.⁴⁷

However seductive PMC and proxies may appear to senior leaders, they should be avoided as a matter of policy. While each of these two types of force have unique shortcomings, a series of troubling commonalities plague both groups. First, neither PMC nor proxies are accountable to the American people or their elected representatives. Whereas the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army are required by law to report to Congress at least annually on operations and expenditures, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a PMC or the commander of an indigenous proxy force has no such obligation, and this lack of oversight makes potential fraud, waste and abuse difficult to detect. While the American officer and soldier have an essential duty to serve as responsible stewards of the taxpayers' resources, the CEO of corporation like MPRI has the duty to fill the company's coffers with government money – the more the better.

Besides fiduciary and constitutional accountability, the ultimate allegiance of PMC and proxies must be suspect, as both will ultimately strive to advance their particular interests, not

Parameters 32 (Winter 2002-03): 104-117 for two descriptions of PMC, their types and services provided.

⁴⁷ Jim Garamone, "Only Coalition Countries Allowed to Bid on Iraqi Contracts," Armed Forces Information Service online at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2003/n12102003_200312109.html 10 December 2003.

necessarily United States policy. Neither group has inherent loyalty nor sworn allegiance to the United States and the potentially disastrous consequences from such feeble relationships must be considered before broadening their roles. Take for example the performance of Afghan militia troops during Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan during March 2002. In preparation for the operation, Afghans from two ethnic groups “had been recruited to become U.S. proxy soldiers, and the pay for each man was \$200 per month.”⁴⁸ During the opening stages of the battle, these Afghan proxies failed to accomplish several key missions, retreating due to Taliban and Al-Qaeda machine gun and mortar fire and leaving American forces from the 10th Mountain Division and other units to fend for themselves. Later in the battle, Afghan fighters (who were eventually prodded back into action by U.S. Special Forces) prolonged the operation by insisting on detailed surrender negotiations with enemy forces instead of destroying them in close combat, which allowed many of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (and possibly Usama Bin Laden) to escape from the battlefield.⁴⁹ The action of these Afghan proxies during Operation ANACONDA serves as a poignant example of why relying on these types of forces during the heat of battle is unwise.

In summary, this chapter addresses possible arguments that could be used in opposition to the types of forces examined in this monograph. The first main contention is that the United States Army derives its moral strength from being a citizen army, and that altering this framework would be detrimental. However, an unbiased look at the current All Volunteer Force reveals a contemporary American Army that is not a citizen-soldier army in the historical or philosophical

⁴⁸ Robin Moore, *The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger* (New York: Random House, 2003), 272.

⁴⁹ Several accounts of the battle detail the failures of the Afghan troops. These include coverage by Ann Scott Tyson, “US Finds Building Afghan Army isn’t Easy,” *Christian Science Monitor*, online at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0313/p02s02-usmi.html> 13 March 2002, and analysis by the global intelligence company STRATFOR “Operation Anaconda: Questionable Outcomes for United States” 11 March 2002. In addition, see Moore, *The Hunt for Bin Laden*, 271-295, which describes the initial retreat of Afghan proxies and their penchant for negotiations and amnesty.

sense. Therefore, opposition to an American foreign legion or other unit of non-citizens based on this rationale is flawed. In addition, tens of thousands of non-citizens are currently serving in the United States military, and legislation passed since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the onset of the GWOT has made military service an extremely attractive option for foreigners seeking American citizenship. A second argument opposed to the types of forces presented in this monograph revolves around the use of PMC or proxies as a substitute for a permanent increase of Army endstrength. However, a combination of critical inadequacies, including the lack of political and fiscal accountability, suspect allegiance, and unsatisfactory performance of these alternatives discount their widespread use.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND EXAMPLES

This monograph asserts that maintaining American hegemony and winning the GWOT will require a larger United States Army and the nature of the contemporary and future operating environments demand that an expansion of the Army include units adept in imperial policing type tasks. The second chapter dismisses the ideas of relying on private military companies and proxy forces to add capabilities to the Army without increasing endstrength and examines the legislation in place that offers American citizenship to those foreigners who join the U.S. military. Accepting the notions of the preceding chapters, the question now becomes what historical perspectives and examples are most useful in developing a solution for Army expansion using non-citizens as the manpower to form new units?

This chapter examines the historical models that most influence the alternatives for expanding the United States Army presented in this monograph. The French Foreign Legion and the British Brigade of Gurkhas provide practical examples of the type of forces likely needed by the twenty-first century American Army. This chapter provides a brief historical overview and examines the recruiting and compensation systems of the French Foreign Legion and the British Brigade of Gurkhas. In addition, an assessment of the general strengths and weaknesses of the both forces is included to provided the background necessary to develop an American model for similar organizations.

THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION

They are volunteers of any nationality, race or creed, always ready to serve France.

Men of action and elite soldiers with a young and dynamic spirit, they are capable of doing their duty anywhere anytime.⁵⁰

One of the best well-known examples of enlisting foreigners for military service is the French Foreign Legion. The Legion has provided a variety of military capabilities to France for over 170 years. The combat record of the Legion is impressive and they are responsible for hundreds of public works and construction projects completed in French colonies. The Legion played an important role in the policing and development of the French empire, and since the 1960's have provided France with an elite combined arms capability.

King Louis Philippe, primarily as a means to deal with the corps of foreign soldiers that had been serving in the French army and were no longer necessary, formed the Legion on 10 March 1831. By 1831, France had already established a tradition of enlisting foreign soldiers to fight the nation's wars. When the French Revolution began in 1789, perhaps a quarter of the French army was foreign-borne, including eleven Swiss and twelve other foreign regiments. These regiments were disbanded during the Revolution by the Constituent Assembly, which abolished all foreign units in the French army on 20 August 1792. The opposition to foreigners was short-lived and Napoleon made extensive use of foreign troops during the Italian campaign and the invasion of Egypt. After 1805, the number of foreign troops in the *Grand Armée* increased significantly, and between one-third and one-half of Napoleon's force that invaded Russia in 1812 consisted of foreigners. Many surviving foreign soldiers of these campaigns settled in France, and their eventual involvement in French internal politics was a threat to the

ruling elites. In July 1830, political and social unrest once again beset France, resulting in a series of violent protests and riots across the country, some of which were led by foreign troops.⁵¹

The actions of foreign troops garrisoned within France during the Revolution of 1830 led to a constitutional ban on any new foreign soldiers. However, this legislation did not solve all the problems at hand. King Louis Philippe still had to find a way to remove the foreign troops and refugees that were now partly plaguing the country and threatening stability. His answer was an ordinance that established the French Foreign Legion.⁵² This decree directed that a legion of foreigners be created for service in the French army, with a caveat that these soldiers “should not be employed in the continental territory of the kingdom.”⁵³ The King now had an outlet for the troublesome foreign troops and refugees.

From its beginnings as “an asylum for misfortune,” the Legion became a dumping ground for troublesome foreigners and provided a source of manpower “whose meager patrimony was to be the right to die for France in the wastes of her empire.”⁵⁴ During the first years of its existence, the Legion more resembled a mobile penal colony than an elite military force, but by 1848, the Legion was already evolving into something extraordinary. The Legion was acquiring a reputation as a capable and determined military force, proving itself in the Algerian Conquest, Crimea, Northern Italy, and Mexico. In 1871, the French conscript army expanded to meet the challenges of a unified Germany and the Legion became a protector of France’s overseas colonies. Like the British and other European powers, the French embraced a “two-army” tradition, where regulars trained and fought on the continent, and auxiliary forces like the French

⁵⁰ Embassy of France in the United States website, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/legion/what.asp> 26 February 2001.

⁵¹ Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force* (New York: Random House, 1991), xvi – xvii.

⁵² Ibid., 1-5.

⁵³ Tony Geraghty, *March or Die: A New History of the French Foreign Legion* (New York: Facts on File, 1986), 31.

Foreign Legion and British colonial regiments had the responsibility for imperial policing.⁵⁵ Between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I, the Legion conducted operations in Saharan Morocco, Tonkin and Indo-China, Formosa, Dahomey, Sudan, and Madagascar. These campaigns continued to build upon the lore of the Legion with reports that “They Fought Like Unchained Demons” and tales of pursuit and combat which included orders to “March or Die.”⁵⁶ While the combat actions of the Legion during this period has been the glorified focus of motion pictures and paperback novels, from the early nineteenth century until the World War II a legionnaire “typically spent as much time carrying a pick and shovel as a rifle.”⁵⁷ After pacifying new colonial possessions, the Legion often remained to police and develop newly occupied territories. This included building not only roads and forts to support their garrison, but also public infrastructure and civic works projects.

The two-army structure continued until the outbreak of World War I. The French government, bordering on despair, authorized the employment of the Legion on the continent in an effort to stop German advances in 1914. The Legion suffered heavy casualties during the war, with units serving on the Western and Eastern Fronts. The inter-war years found the Legion campaigning in Northern Russia, Morocco, and Syria.⁵⁸ During World War II, legionnaires served both the Vichy and Free French governments. The Franco-German Armistice of 1940 resulted in many garrisons under Vichy control, while other legion units fought the Germans in Norway and France. Once the Vichy government surrendered, legion units fought alongside the British in the Western Desert and with the Americans through Alsace-Lorraine and into Austria.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 5.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, xix.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 245, 268.

⁵⁷ Yves Debay, *French Foreign Legion Operations, 1990-2000* (Ramsbury: Crowood, 2000), 3-4, 76.

⁵⁸ Geraghty, *March or Die*, 331-333.

⁵⁹ Debay, *Legion Operations*, 4-5.

Following World War II, most of the Legion deployed to Indochina, where they fought the Viet Minh from 1946-1954, at the cost of 314 officers and 10,168 killed in action.⁶⁰ With the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 8 May 1954, the legionnaires returned to their bases in Algeria, where they fought the War of Algerian Independence until 1962. The fighting in Algeria was particularly savage and the Legion vacated its major base in the country at the end of the war. The bitter defeats in Indochina and Algeria, coupled with widespread implications that legionnaires were resorting to torture and targeted killings of Algerians, contributed to major reforms within the Legion.⁶¹

The creation of the modern Legion, as characterized by its current structure and capabilities, followed the disastrous mutiny of 1961. During the latter stages of the war in Algeria, the French government decided to end the conflict by offering a political framework that would eventually result in Algerian independence, which is precisely what the Legion was fighting and dying to prevent. The idea of a political settlement infuriated Legion (and numerous regular army) officers, and many units simply refused to obey orders from Paris that alluded to Algerian independence. Other Legion officers went public with harsh criticisms of the French government and its policies. Even more disturbing were rumored plans to kidnap or kill French President de Gaulle by legionnaires and paratroops in order to overthrow his government and thwart Algerian independence. The French government eventually contained the mutiny, imprisoning hundreds of mutineers and effectively dismantling the rebellious units. The Legion officer corps was purged, and many were forced out of the service and replaced with pro-French government officers.⁶² The organizational culture that led to the Legion's mutiny of 1961 is the

⁶⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁶¹ Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 588-89.

⁶² Ibid., 598-616.

salient concern when considering the creation of a similar force for the United States and is addressed again later in this chapter.

As a result of the 1961 mutiny the strength of the Legion was drastically reduced from 20,000 to 8,000 legionnaires and steps were taken to eliminate any rebellious spirit from its culture. Strict obedience to the French government is now necessary. A major base was established near Marseilles to ensure that legionnaires periodically rotate back to France to further discourage renegades. In addition, an increasing number of Frenchmen are reportedly included in Legion units (possibly as many as 50%) in a further attempt to ensure national loyalty.⁶³

The Legion has remained active since the major reforms of the 1960's. Legion units deployed to Chad in 1969-70, 78-80, and 83-84, maintained a significant presence in Djibouti and Somalia from 1978-88, spearheaded the Kolwezi, Zaire rescue mission in 1978, and participated in the United Nations Multinational Force in Beirut from 1982-83. During the 1990's, the Legion returned to Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Congo, fought alongside the United States and its allies during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, and participated in United Nations operations in Rwanda in 1994. In addition, Legion units have served with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Implementation Force (IFOR), and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia since April 1992.⁶⁴

Today's French Foreign Legion consists of 7,662 officers and legionnaires from 162 countries.⁶⁵ They comprise roughly seven and one-half regiments, with between 800-1300 legionnaires per regiment. This includes three infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment, a parachute regiment, an engineer regiment, and an instructional regiment. The modern Legion is equipped

⁶³ Geraghty, *March or Die*, 308-310.

⁶⁴ Debay, *Foreign Legion Operations*, 5, 14-17, 24-27, 38-41, 52-55, 68-70, 82-86.

with armored infantry carriers, AMX-10 armored platforms with 105mm main guns, 120 mm heavy mortars, and a variety of shoulder fired weapons. The Legion is special operations capable and trains for insertion by air, land, or sea.

The qualifications and enlistment procedures for joining the French Foreign Legion have remained relatively unchanged since the 1960's. The only recruiting stations are located in France, and prospective legionnaires must travel to one of the sixteen recruitment offices within the country to begin the selection process. A candidate must be male, between the ages of seventeen and forty years old, hold a valid identity card, and be in suitable physical condition. There is no language requirement. After initial screening, the recruit is transferred to the Legion Headquarters near Marseille, where extensive physiological, medical, and physical fitness exams are administered. Once all the preliminary exams are passed, the recruit is offered an initial five-year unconditional contract to serve in the Legion.⁶⁶ On average, approximately 8,500 men apply for enlistment per year, and only about 1,200 complete the selection process.⁶⁷ When offered the enlistment contract, under the long-standing *anonymat* policy the recruit may permanently change his name or choose to remain anonymous for the duration of his service in the Legion.

Legionnaires receive compensation for their service in several ways. The initial salary is 975.67 euros per month, and legionnaires are eligible for promotion after two years of service. One in four legionnaires will eventually serve as non-commissioned officers. Special pay and bonuses for unique skills or hazardous postings can potentially double a legionnaires monthly pay.⁶⁸ In addition to monthly earnings, all legionnaires receive room, board, and medical care.

⁶⁵ The Foreign Legion Recruitment Office's Website, <http://www.br-legion.com/ang/accueil.htm> 25 March 2004.

⁶⁶ Embassy of France in the United States website, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/legion/enlist.asp> 26 February 2001.

⁶⁷ Debay, *Foreign Legion Operations*, 5.

⁶⁸ Embassy of France in the United States website, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/legion/pay.asp> 26 February 2001

At the end of the initial enlistment, the legionnaire can extend his career by signing successive contracts of between six months and three years, until he reaches fifteen or more years service.⁶⁹ After fifteen years, the legionnaire is entitled to a pension, and after twenty years of service he is eligible for a pension and entry to the *Institution de Invalides*, which is the Legion's old soldiers home located in France.⁷⁰ After three years of satisfactory service, a legionnaire can apply for French citizenship and is entitled to a ten-year renewable French residency permit.⁷¹ The pay and benefits of legion service, as compared to many of the world's militaries, are substantial and likely aid in recruiting motivated volunteers.

The general strengths and weaknesses of the Legion are best described in Professor Douglas Porch's book *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force*. Porch concludes that, while the Legion is overall an efficient military organization, its commendable record can be attributed to practices that emphasize inherent strengths while simultaneously concealing substantial weaknesses. For combat operations, the Legion often selects its best troops to create *ad hoc* fighting units on short notice, which masks personnel and training deficiencies of the overall force. The practice of stripping the best combatants from Legion units would seemingly shatter morale and unit cohesion among the regiments, but the adverse effects on the organization have been mitigated by the fact that the majority of operations were relatively short duration small-scale contingencies, and did not require the employment of large numbers of legionnaires. However, performance ebbed when nearly everyone was operationally employed, as was the case in Mexico and Indochina.⁷²

⁶⁹ Embassy of France in the United States website, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/legion/career.asp> 26 February 2001

⁷⁰ Debay, *Foreign Legion Operations*, 6.

⁷¹ Embassy of France in the United States website, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/legion/misc.asp> 26 February 2001

⁷² Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 618-619.

The mutinous action of many veteran legionnaires in 1961 illustrates the primary weakness when considering a similar model for expanding the United States Army. While the French army has taken steps to curb any future rebellions, the inherent nature of a force comprised of foreigners whose motto is *Legio Pastia Nostra* (The Legion is My Home) is a serious concern for anyone who might advocate the creation of a comparable type force. Without proper precautions, it is possible that the same dynamics that culminated in the mutiny of 1961 could surface in an American model. Throughout the years, the Legion developed a separate identity from the French Army. The different uniforms, traditions, disciplinary system, and a host of other characteristics ensured that the Legion and French Army diverged over the decades. The result was a legion officer corps who ultimately acted “in the interests of the Foreign Legion” regardless of the consequences.⁷³ In the end, many legionnaires remained slavishly loyal only to each other – not the French army, French policy, or the French government.

The practice of handpicking troops for the most difficult operations also conceals the Legion’s second greatest weakness – that of substandard recruitment and generally second-rate quality of enlisted men. While the overall quality of legionnaires today is of such caliber to sustain an elite fighting force of approximately 8,000 men, the opposite case was true for most the Legion’s existence. The martial quality of Legion recruits tended to wax and wane over the years, in part due to worldwide economic and political conditions. Porch concludes that the “erratic and unstable nature of its recruitment” often resulted in large influxes of particular nationalities into the Legion (Germans after World War I or Spaniards in 1939, for example) and these groups often developed parallel hierarchies that undermined discipline and order.⁷⁴ Throughout its history, the Legion has struggled with the addition of large numbers of men from former French adversaries. This practice often introduced strong anti-French sentiments and

⁷³ Ibid., 606.

disparagement of France's army and political system into the ranks and culminated with the mutiny of 1961.

The suspect quality of many recruits has plagued the Legion with another major problem – a significant rate of desertion. According to Porch, desertion is an inherent characteristic of mercenary forces, often resulting from a lack of loyalty to the unit. He concludes that desertion from the Legion evolved from a complicated set of motivations and has become part of the organizational culture. While desertion only occasionally undermined operational performance, the patterns of Legion recruiting pose the risk that men from a particular nationality could unite and desert out of political objections to French policy unforeseen when they initially enlisted.⁷⁵

The major strength of the Legion is *esprit de corps*. Paradoxically, while large numbers of any particular ethnic group has potentially detrimental effects on the organization, competition among the nationalities largely maintains morale and motivation.⁷⁶ Each group constantly strives to be the best, often resulting in extraordinary acts of physical endurance and courage under fire. In addition, a highly structured set of rituals and traditions, primarily focused at the regimental level, have developed outstanding *esprit de corps*. The Legion is famous for its elaborate uniforms, slow marching pace, and singing, all of which to some degree can be credited with building organizational *esprit*.

The French Foreign legion has developed from a disregarded foreign labor corps to a colonial caretaker and enforcer, and most recently an elite fighting force. While the United States Army possess a variety of elite and special operating forces, we lack substantial forces that resemble those from the Legion's colonial expansion and policing era, when it was frequently

⁷⁴ Ibid., 619.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 622-23.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 619.

used to build roads and other civic works a part of the “*mission civilisatrice*.”⁷⁷ This type of imperial auxiliary force will be the focus of the American model presented later in this monograph.

THE BRITISH BRIGADE OF GURKHAS

Gurkha: *n* a soldier from Nepal in the British and Indian armies⁷⁸

Another successful example of enlisting foreigners for military service is the British Brigade of Gurkhas. For nearly two hundred years men from the mountain tribes of Nepal have willingly enlisted for duty in the Gurkha regiments to serve the British government. The Gurkhas are indigenous troops from various Nepalese tribes and clans who were co-opted to fight for the British in the early nineteenth century. The Gurkhas have a reputation as courageous and disciplined fighters, and their exceptional stamina and tracking skills are legendary.

The comrade in arms relationship between the Gurkhas and the British began following the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-16. After a number of boundary disputes and repeated raids by the Nepalese into Bengal and Bahir, Governor-General Lord Moria of the Honourable East India Company declared war on Nepal in 1814. In the course of the campaign, the British deployed between 30,000 and 50,000 troops of the Bengal army against a 12,000 strong Nepalese army compromised mainly of Gurkhas. After some initial victories over British forces, the outnumbered Nepalese were defeated and forced to sign the Treaty of Saguali that ended the war.⁷⁹ During the fighting the British were astounded by the tenacity and bravery exhibited by

⁷⁷ Ibid., 628.

⁷⁸ Webster Third New International Dictionary (Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 1981), 1013.

⁷⁹ Lionel Caplan, *Warrior Gentlemen. “Gurkhas” in the Western Imagination* (Providence: Berghan, 1995), 15-16.

the Gurkhas. In one instance, during the siege of Kalunga, six hundred Gurkhas held 4,000 British and native troops at bay for thirty-three days.⁸⁰ The British officers who faced the Gurkhas during the war were so impressed by their combat performance that they dictated terms of the peace treaty that allowed the British to recruit Gurkha troops for the East Indian Company. In an atmosphere of mutual respect between the two former adversaries, recruitment and organization began almost immediately and the Gurkha Corps was established on 24 April 1815.⁸¹

The first real test of the British-Gurkha relationship occurred during the Indian mutiny against East Indian Company rule in 1857. While the Bengal Presidency Army mutinied, the Gurkhas exhibited steadfast loyalty to the British, and they were instrumental in ending the revolt.⁸² Following the rebellion, the British incorporated the Gurkhas into the new Indian Army along with surviving company members. Over the next fifty years, Gurkha regiments served in Burma, Afghanistan, the North-East and the North-West Frontiers of India, Malta, Cyprus, Malaya, the Chinese Boxer Rebellion, and the Tibet Expedition.⁸³ The number of Gurkhas units grew steadily during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and by 1902 there were ten regiments of Gurkhas troops.⁸⁴ During World War I, over 100,000 Gurkhas enlisted in the Gurkha regiments. Initially these new troops manned the British garrison battalions in India, which allowed units of the Indian Army Corps to deploy and fight elsewhere. However, as casualties in the British Expeditionary Force continued to mount, the Gurkha regiments were

⁸⁰ Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, *The Gurkhas* (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1965), 15-16.

⁸¹ James and Small, *The Gurkhas*, 17.

⁸² The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/index.htm 14 January 2004.

⁸³ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/history.htm 29 October 2002.

⁸⁴ James and Small, *The Gurkhas*, 36-49.

called on to fight on several fronts, including France and Flanders, Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt, Gallipoli, Palestine, and Salonika. After World War I, the Gurkhas fought in the Third Afghan War of 1919 and participated in numerous policing campaigns in Waziristan and along the North-West Frontier. At least 120,000 Gurkhas served during World War II. They comprised approximately forty battalions and fought in Syria, the Western Desert, Italy and Greece, North Malaya, Singapore, and Burma.⁸⁵

The end of World War II and Indian independence in 1947 resulted in the formal integration of four Gurkha regiments into the British Army. During the negotiations that would frame Indian independence, it was agreed by British, Nepalese, and Indian officials that the Gurkha regiments would be divided between the British and new Indian armies. Four Gurkha regiments would transfer to the regular British Army, while the remaining six became part of the Indian Army. The Tripartite agreement concerning Indian independence also permitted both the British and Indian armies to continue recruiting Gurkha men.⁸⁶ On 1 January 1948, the British Brigade of Gurkhas was officially established. Additional units created to support the four infantry regiments of the brigade included Gurkha engineers, signals, logistics, military police, and an independent parachute company. These new units raised the strength of the Gurkha brigade to approximately 15,000 men.

The British Brigade of Gurkhas has been in near continuous action since its formation in 1948. From 1948 until 1962, the brigade conducted counterinsurgency operations in Malaya. A communist opposition movement took root in Malaya following World War II, and the British government decided to intervene to counter the communists. The mission of the Gurkhas deployed to Malaya was to ferret out Communist Terrorists (CT) who used remote jungle bases

⁸⁵ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/history.htm 29 October 2002.

for their activities. The incredible stamina and discipline of the Gurkhas, who would spend days and weeks at a time tracking and hunting down the terrorists eventually proved decisive.⁸⁷ Importantly, the Gurkhas provided the majority of British forces in addition to tactical continuity during the Malayan Emergency. While other British units rotated in and out of theater for a variety of reasons, the Gurkhas maintained a continual experienced presence in the theater.⁸⁸ Following the successful counterinsurgency in Malaya, the Gurkhas deployed to Borneo for another four years of continuous combat operations. From December 1962 until May 1966, the Gurkhas fought both Indonesian regular army units and rebels opposed to the Sultan of Brunei. These campaigns, known as the Brunei Revolt and the Confrontation with Indonesia, took place in a vast expanse of jungles and mountains. Most of the combat actions were small unit patrols, ambushes, and raids. The legendary endurance and tracking skills of the Gurkhas were frequently tested, with pursuits lasting as long as two weeks before the enemy was found and “eliminated.”⁸⁹

A significant downsizing followed the Borneo campaigns. The Brigade of Gurkhas was reduced from 15,000 in 1967 to 8,000 troops by 1972. Three infantry battalions were cut, along with the parachute company and military police units. In addition, the number of engineer, signal, and transport troops were also reduced.⁹⁰ In 1971, the Gurkhas began garrisoning Hong Kong, duty that lasted until the end of British rule in 1997. A Gurkha battalion deployed to Cyprus to protect British interests after the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974. Gurkhas have been stationed in Belize since 1982. A battalion of Gurkhas fought in the Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982. In 1991, other Gurkha units participated in Operation DESERT STORM in

⁸⁶ Caplan, *Warrior Gentlemen*, 22-23.

⁸⁷ J.P. Cross, *In Gurkha Company: The British Army Gurkhas, 1948 to the Present* (New York: Arms and Armour, 1986), 2-80.

⁸⁸ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/history.htm 29 October 2002.

⁸⁹ Cross, *In Gurkha Company*, 128-130.

Southwest Asia. Another major force reduction of Gurkhas began in 1998, from the 8,000-troop level to 3,443 by July 2003.⁹¹ In 1999, the Gurkhas deployed to Kosovo and East Timor. The Gurkhas have deployed several times to Bosnia, most recently in late 2001 with a battalion contingent. Gurkhas have also taken part in the most recent operations in Macedonia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The process of recruiting Gurkhas for army service is remarkable. The Ministry of Defense in London establishes the required number of new troops each year before the annual recruiting season. The British army maintains a cadre of recruiters in Nepal at a camp in Pokhara, approximately 125 miles west of Katmandu. Gurkha recruiting takes place once a year in Nepal and begins in early September. During this season, British officers direct local recruiters, known as Galla Wallahs, into the hills to find their quota of volunteers. The traditional recruiting areas have remained largely unchanged for over 175 years. The arrival of the recruiting parties in these areas is a much-celebrated event, as local tribes parade out their best young men in hope they will be selected for service. Those chosen for further screening then leave with the Galla Wallahs and travel back down the hills to a number of initial consolidation sites. Senior retired Gurkha officers are empowered at these sites to decide on which recruits remain for additional evaluation. Those remaining recruits are then marched from the hill selection sites to the main recruitment depots in east and west Nepal for the next stage of the process. British and Gurkha officers conduct the final selections at the main depots, relying on the results of physical and mental aptitude tests given to the recruits. Once finally selected, these men are flown to the United Kingdom for training and induction in the British Brigade of Gurkhas. The entire process takes approximately six months. The competition among the

⁹⁰ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/history.htm 29 October 2002.

tribesmen for the limited number of available Gurkha slots is intense. For example, during the 2002 recruiting season there were 28,000 applicants for 230 positions.⁹²

A variety of means are used to compensate Gurkhas for their time in the army. The Tripartite Agreement of 1947 (TPA) establishes the terms and conditions of Gurkha service and compensation.⁹³ The TPA requires that Gurkha soldiers in both the Indian and British armies receive the same basic pay, although Gurkha soldiers stationed outside Nepal receive substantial cost of living allowances. The Indian Army Pay and Pension Codes, which are reviewed every ten years, dictates pay and allowances for the Gurkhas.⁹⁴ Gurkhas and their families receive free medical and dental treatment, an education allowance for their children to attend boarding school when stationed overseas, and a special leave allowance if visiting Nepal.⁹⁵ The majority of Gurkhas serve for at least 15 years, which qualifies them for an immediate pension. Depending on rank, Gurkhas may serve a maximum of 30 years. Gurkhas initially enlist for four years and then are extended at the fourth, eighth and twelfth year depending on their rank, performance, and conduct. Gurkhas remain Nepalese citizens throughout their service.⁹⁶ Upon completion of service, Gurkha soldiers are entitled to a substantial resettlement package. Before making the transition back to civilian life, all Gurkhas attend a six-day reorientation brief in Katmandu designed to update them on the current social, political, and economic situation in Nepal. A

⁹¹ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/history/Brigade_background.htm 14 July 2003.

⁹² Information presented on recruiting Gurkhas is consolidated from two sources. See Cross, *In Gurkha Company*, 136-144 and The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/history/Brigade_background.htm 14 July 2003.

⁹³ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/gurkha_employment/tpa/index.htm 8 July 2003.

⁹⁴ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/gurkha_employment/tacos/index.htm 8 July 2003.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/history/Brigade_background.htm 14 July 2003

Gurkha completing 15 years service is entitled to a seven-week long transition that includes second career workshops, new job training, and employment placement services.⁹⁷

There are two major strengths of the Gurkha model. First, young men from martial societies, like those from the hills of Nepal, make outstanding soldiers. Whether this is a natural disposition or a characteristic developed over time, the fact remains that the Gurkhas are exceptional fighters. In addition, these men can be deployed without the considerations required for today's American family-friendly army. Lengthy, uninterrupted operations have become a Gurkha hallmark. Their continuity and experience resulted in important counterinsurgency and anti-terrorist victories in Malaysia and Borneo. This quality should not be underestimated in today's environment, where the United States is establishing a long-term military presence in places like Afghanistan and Iraq while simultaneously trying to sustain the All Volunteer Force. The Gurkha concept provides the British Army an excellent source of manpower augmentation. The extent of Gurkha service in World Wars I and II was significant and they provided a desperately needed source of human capital for an overstretched British Army. Even as late as 1995 approximately fifteen percent of all British infantrymen were Gurkhas.⁹⁸

The second major strength of the Gurkha model is the significant economic benefits to the region from where the Gurkhas originate. The pay and pensions of Gurkhas are the major source of income in many tribal areas. Until the recent development of tourism, the Gurkhas were Nepal's largest source of foreign currency. This influx of capital has had positive effects of the health and education standards of the region.⁹⁹ In addition, the Gurkha Welfare Trust (GWT), a United Kingdom based private charity, was established in 1969 to provide financial, medical,

⁹⁷ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas
http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/gurkha_employment/tacos/index.htm 8 July 2003.

⁹⁸ Caplan, *Warrior Gentlemen*, 24.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 36-37.

and community aid to alleviate hardship and distress among Gurkha ex-servicemen and their dependants after they have returned to Nepal. The GWT operates twenty-three welfare centers in Nepal that distributes approximately £3 million annually in aid to ex-soldiers and their families. Under the charity's auspices approximately 11,000 ex-soldiers who do not qualify for a pension receive £20 per month to buy food. The GWT also provides medical treatment for ex-soldiers and their dependants and awards hardship grants to alleviate suffering following fire, flood, and other natural disasters. In addition, the Trust helps fund the education of some 1,500 Nepalese children each year. It is important to emphasize that while the GWT is a private charity, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense pays substantial administrative costs to ensure the operation of the Trust.¹⁰⁰

Ironically, the major weakness of the Gurkha model is the growing costs of long-term payment for ex-soldiers or their beneficiaries. While the local regions from where the Gurkhas are recruited benefit from the generous compensation packages and the Gurkha Welfare Trust, the British government is finding it increasingly expensive to maintain this auxiliary force. There are currently over 26,000 pensioners or eligible survivors in Nepal and this costs the British government over £30 million annually.¹⁰¹ Several court cases are pending that may alter the Terms and Conditions of Service. The Gurkha Army Ex-servicemen's Organization has filed suit in British and Nepalese courts demanding that Gurkha pensions and benefits equal British Army rates and this judicial review may eventually favor the Gurkhas over the British government. If so, the additional costs incurred by the British government may make the Gurkhas too costly for future service.

¹⁰⁰ The Gurkha Welfare Trust website <http://www.gwt.org.uk/index.html> 2003.

¹⁰¹ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas, http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/british_gurkhas_nepal/index.htm 7 January 2004.

The second major weakness of the Gurkha concept is a limited technical aptitude of Gurkha soldiers and the requirement for comprehensive English language training. The tribal areas of Nepal from where Gurkhas are recruited possess few of the modern technologies common to many other societies. While this phenomenon is less apparent today than it was only several years ago, it is important to recognize that many of the appliances and skills taken for granted by western societies do not exist in the remote areas of Nepal. For example, basic motor vehicle driving certification requires a much longer training period for Gurkhas than the average British recruit.¹⁰² The initial entry training routine for every Gurkha also contains a comprehensive English language course that extends the length of basic combat and infantry training to thirty-nine weeks, not including any additional technical or trade skills training.¹⁰³ In contrast, a United States Army infantryman requires only fourteen weeks of training.

¹⁰² James and Small, *The Gurkhas*, 267-269.

¹⁰³ The Official Website of the Brigade of Gurkhas
http://www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/brigade_units/language_wing/index.htm 25
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CHAPTER FOUR

TWO OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Based on the United States' role in the world, the likely operating environments, and historical examples, this chapter presents two possible options for expanding the United States Army to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Each concept is explained in broad terms, highlighting the significant differences between the historical example and proposed models. A framework for each concept using the DTLOMS (Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Material, and Soldier) domains of the Army's force development and requirements determination process is also presented.¹⁰⁴

AN AMERICAN FOREIGN LEGION

foreign legion: *n* a volunteer corps of foreign citizens in the military service of the state¹⁰⁵

The first concept is an American foreign legion. Foreign volunteers of any nationality, primarily seeking American citizenship as a reward for their service, would form the legion. If security checks prove satisfactory, the legionnaire may change legal names and remain anonymous. This practice will aid in recruiting efforts, allowing willing volunteers to join the legion without fear of retribution from countries where few sympathize with the United States. After completion of an initial term of service, the American legionnaire may choose to resettle in the United States with new identities and government credentials. The American legionnaire is stationed and employed only overseas, serving in remote locations where U.S. interests necessitate a military presence. Possible garrison locations include countries where U.S. forces

¹⁰⁴ See *U.S. Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 71-9 Requirements Determination*, 5 November 1999, for further information on the DTLOMS framework and its role in Army force development.

¹⁰⁵ Webster Third New International Dictionary, 889.

are operational deployed or regions where stationing agreements are in place. These include Liberia, Eritrea and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, Honduras, Haiti, Bosnia, Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Thailand.

The American foreign legion concept differs from the French model in two significant ways. The first major difference is the primary role of the two organizations. The modern French Foreign Legion is a “professional fighting unit using the same equipment and with the same missions as any other infantry, tank, or engineer unit of the French army.”¹⁰⁶ The French Legion is also rapidly deployable and capable of limited forced entry capabilities, including airborne and frogmen operations. The proposed American legion is primarily a forward deployed stability and support operations force and does not contain an inherent forced-entry or rapid deployment capability. The American legion concept more closely resembles the late 19th and early 20th century French Foreign Legion that was responsible for maintaining order and developing the infrastructure of French colonies.

The second significant difference between the French Foreign Legion and the American concept is in recruiting personnel to man these new units. The American foreign legion, reflecting its focus on stability and support operations and not a direct combat role, stresses the skills required for civil-military operations, whereas the French process emphasizes physical fitness and athletic abilities to develop combat skills such as a sniper, diver, or paratrooper.”¹⁰⁷

Army Field Manual 7-15 *The Army Universal Task List* (AUTL) serves as the doctrinal foundation and catalogue for developing the legion’s Mission Essential Task List (METL). The essential tasks for legion units derive from three main categories: Conduct Civil-Military

¹⁰⁶ Embassy of France in the United States website, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/legion/what.asp> 26 February 2001.

¹⁰⁷ Embassy of France in the United States website, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/legion/what.asp> 26 February 2001. There are positions in the legion requiring

Operations, Conduct Stability Operations, and Conduct Support Operations. Specific examples of subordinate tactical tasks might include (depending on the area of operations): Resettle Refugees and Displaced Persons, Conduct Peace Operations, and Conduct Foreign Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.¹⁰⁸ These essential tasks lead to the development of the individual and collective training strategies for the organization.

The initial entry training (IET) plan is based largely on the Task Force Warrior model. Task Force Warrior trained Free Iraqi Forces for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM at the U.S. base in Tazsar, Hungary, and a similar organization would be ideally suited to train legion recruits. Task Force Warrior's training model was approximately one month long and occurred in two phases. The first phase included basic military skills, the laws of armed conflict, and ethical decision-making. The second phase focused on civil-military operations and such tasks as "how to coordinate humanitarian aid between the U.S. military and such relief groups as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees."¹⁰⁹ If required, advanced individual training (AIT) for specific Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) will occur at a stateside training location with regular army recruits. The legion's collective training occurs overseas on designated military installations using range complexes and maneuver areas accessible to U.S. Army forces. Established training areas in the Horn of Africa, Kuwait, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe are potential collective training locations. These collective training events are similar to pre-deployment Mission Rehearsal Exercises for units

personnel to specialize in fields such as administration, signals, and transportation but the emphasis is physical abilities and combat skills.

¹⁰⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003), v-vi.

¹⁰⁹ See the transcript of Major General David Barno's "Briefing on Iraqi Forces," United States European Command, available online at <http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/News/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/directorates/ecpa/news/release/20030320fifbriefing.htm&2> 20 March 2003 and Henry Kwan, "Training a Force for Freedom," *Soldiers Magazine* 58 (June 2003), 18-19.

deploying to Bosnia and Kosovo. Convoy operations, mass casualty exercises, non-combatant evacuation operations, and civil disturbance scenarios are typical during collective training.

Leader development occurs along two distinct tracks, one for officers and another for Noncommissioned Officers (NCO). Regular American Army officers will command and staff legion units. Requiring regulars to command and staff key positions within the legion helps mitigate the primary shortcoming of the French historical model, which is the ultimate loyalty of the unit to the national government. These officers require a special pre-command or staff assignment course focusing on duties with the legion. The curriculum of this course includes a combination of historical perspective, small war theory, and doctrinal principles and procedures. The initial cadre of NCOs will come from regular army volunteers, with a preference given to Special Forces and drill instructor qualified sergeants. Legionnaires with leadership potential and who reenlist for a second term of service are eligible for promotion into the NCO ranks and eventually replace the cadre. NCO professional development requirements are the same as the rest of the army including attendance at an approved NCO academy.

The American legion organizational structure consists of several battalions uniquely modified for their forward deployed garrisons. The battalion is the typical size of unit of action, and the theater-level army force headquarters exercises command and control of attached legion battalions. These units are not modular, and significant differences between the various units will exist based on the theater situation. For example, the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) of a legion battalion stationed in Honduras as part of Joint Task Force Bravo will likely be considerably different than a battalion stationed in Khandahar, Afghanistan with Coalition Joint Task Force 180 due to the assigned mission, state of local infrastructure, or security situation. The exact composition of legion battalions requires additional study and development; however, the concept results in an organization more closely resembling a civil affairs battalion as opposed to a light infantry battalion.

The American legion concept requires no new material development solutions. The legion uses equipment currently in use or under development by the Army. Although no new types of equipment are necessary, several items reportedly in short supply are also required for the legion. These include armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles , advanced personal body armor, and some engineering assets.

Forming an American foreign legion requires the creation of at least one new occupational specialty to accomplish assigned legion missions. While the skills of a legionnaire somewhat resemble a civil affairs specialist, there are sufficient differences requiring change to the Army's Military Occupational Classification Structure (MOCS). The new MOS requires qualification in not only civil-military operations, but conflict resolution, negotiations, peacekeeping, and military governance. This new MOS could be called civil-military operations specialist, constabulary officer, or just simply legionnaire. Regardless of the title, the new MOS identifies a soldier specifically trained and qualified for stability and support operations and not combat. Pay scales for legion troops will be the same as the rest of the Army, including hazardous duty and other special and incentive pays. The initial term of service is five years, with additional terms offered based on individual performance. During the first term of service, the maximum grade possible is E-4, making promotion to the NCO corps possible only after reenlistment. Promotions are based entirely on merit, eliminating the time in service and the time in grade requirements of the Regular Army.

In summary, the American foreign legion is a forward stationed force manned by non-citizen volunteers granted U.S. citizenship as the primary reward for their service. This force establishes long-term U.S. military presence in areas where the primary mission is to conduct stability and support operations. The legion is comprised of battalion size units that serve as a theater-level asset for the regional combatant commander. Regular Army officers command and form the staffs of legion battalions. The initial training for legionnaires will occur at overseas

bases using the Task Force Warrior model. This concept will be most useful in locations where long-term troop commitments are sapping Army combat capability.

AN AMERICAN “GURKHA” BRIGADE

Whereas the American foreign legion concept is a stability and support operations force, the concept of an American “Gurkha” Brigade creates units of foreign troops for combat operations. This concept calls for the co-opting of indigenous groups by the United States to augment combat power, specifically for counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations. The American concept outlined in this monograph is strikingly similar to the historical model of the British Brigade of Gurkhas. The primary use of these units of foreign troops will be as a light infantry force. Troops for these new units are recruited from several locations, at the discretion of the geographic combatant commander. Potential areas include Afghanistan, Iraq, Western Africa, and Fiji. Various armed groups in these regions are somewhat sympathetic to the United States, and it is possible that some could be co-opted for integration into the United States Army on a permanent basis. For example, the several Kurdish tribes in Northern Iraq could provide manpower for a U.S. battalions in the region. In the West African country of Liberia, men from pro-U.S. groups also are potential recruits for an indigenous unit. Some Pashtun tribesmen currently conduct joint operations with U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and these groups could also be integrated into the United States Army. In the South Pacific, groups of ex-Fijian soldiers are prime candidates to form an indigenous unit for use by the Pacific Command. Private security firms have reportedly recruited hundreds of ex-Fijian army personnel for duty in Iraq and it is possible these men could be recruited for the U.S. Army.¹¹⁰ However, this recruiting model would not work everywhere. Given the current state of world affairs, it is difficult to envision a

situation where governments of many nations would allow the United States to openly recruit large bodies of men for American military duty.

Similar to the foreign legion concept the AUTL serves as the doctrinal foundation and catalogue for developing the units METL. The essential tasks for these foreign units would mirror many light infantry battalions and are tailored based on the battle focus of the particular organization. Likely tasks include attacking, defending, pursuit, and combating terrorism. These units serve as theater level force, and the regional combatant commander delineates the specific force requirements.¹¹¹

Initial entry training occurs overseas on designated U.S. or foreign military installations using the Special Forces training model. Cadres of American trainers initially provide the basic combat skills and weapons training for the foreign troops. A useful model in this regard is the training of the Afghan National Army. This concept originally began as a Special Forces mission and then transitioned to conventional training cadres.¹¹² Eventually the responsibility for training will be transferred to the Afghan Army. The training curriculum is very similar to the One Station Unit Training plan for infantrymen currently in use at Fort Benning, Georgia. Collective training opportunities will use the Battle Focused Training doctrine common to U.S. Army infantry units and include rotations at the Combat Training Centers.

Similar to the British Brigade of Gurkhas, a combination of Regular American Army officers and indigenous officers will staff and command the auxiliary units. Depending on the tribal structure of the recruits, ranks will be created that will mirror the familiar social structure to

¹¹⁰ Singer, P.W. "Warriors for hire in Iraq," *Salon*, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/04/15/warriors/index_np.html 15 April 2004.

¹¹¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003), v-vi.

¹¹² U.S. Department of State, *Coalition to Begin Training New Afghan National Army* <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02032501.htm> 25 March 2002. Also, see Wayne Marotto,

ease command and control of indigenous troops. The initial cadre of Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) will come from Regular Army volunteers, but are replaced by soldiers promoted from the ranks of the foreign troops. Officer commissioning sources will include Reserve Officer Training Corps programs and attendance at the United States Military Academy. NCO professional development requirements are the same as the active force including attendance at an approved NCO academy.

These foreign auxiliary units consist of light infantry battalions forward deployed at overseas garrisons. The battalion is the typical size of unit of action, and the theater-level army force headquarters exercises command and control of assigned units. These units are modular, not only with each other, but also fully compatible with other American-manned infantry units. If necessary, an air assault or airborne capable unit of action can be formed to provide additional capabilities to the combatant commander.

The American “Gurkha” concept requires no new material development solutions. The battalions use equipment currently in use or under development. However, the rapid development and fielding of a personal language-translating device would help mitigate the language interoperability drawback of this model. In addition, this concept requires no new occupational specialties. These troops train exclusively as infantrymen, with the more technical positions in the battalions filled by American troops. For example, Americans would be assigned as military intelligence analysts and medical personnel, both specialties that require significant technical aptitude and lengthy training. Assigning a handful of American soldiers to each battalion to fill the most technical positions mitigates another drawback of this model, which is the limited technical aptitude of potential recruits.

Training the Afghan National Army, http://www4.army.mil/USAR/news/2004-01-16_001.php 8 January 2004.

The pay scales for these troops will be the same as the rest of the active Army, including hazardous duty and other special and incentive pays. This compensation scheme would help moderate the criticism Great Britain is receiving concerning different pay and benefits between British and Gurkha soldiers. Recently, the Gurkha Army Ex-Servicemen's Organization, supported by human rights advocates, filed several formal grievances and a lawsuit alleging serious racial discrimination and violation of human rights based partly on the difference in pay and benefits between Gurkha and regular British Army soldiers.¹¹³ The initial term of service for is six years, with additional terms offered based on individual performance. The retirement system is also identical to the Regular Army's. In keeping with the current U.S. restriction of prohibiting women in direct combat roles, this force is comprised of men only.

In summary, the American "Gurkha" concept co-opts indigenous troops for long-term commitments and integration into the United States Army, very similar to the British Brigade of Gurkhas. This concept recruits and trains battalions of light infantrymen for use by the regional combatant commander for combat operations. These units are trained using standard infantry training plans and are modular in design. This model would provide trained and capable forces for use in the GWOT counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency campaigns.

¹¹³ British Broadcasting Corporation, *Ex-Gurkhas take MoD to Court* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2775737.stm> 18 February 2003.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This monograph offers four conclusions and recommendations related to the initial proposition – that an informed decision on how best to expand the United States Army to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century should seriously consider using large numbers of non-citizens to fill new units, similar to the French Foreign Legion or British Brigade of Gurkhas.

*"Beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division Army."*¹¹⁴

First, the United States Army requires a significant expansion to meet growing homeland security and overseas requirements. As it becomes clearer that roughly 100,000 troops will be required in Iraq through 2005 and significant numbers in Afghanistan and Iraq for years to come, the need for Army expansion is increasingly apparent. While this paper proposes no exact magnitude of expansion, an increase of at least 150,000 active duty soldiers is recommended. This figure roughly corresponds with the number of currently mobilized Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.¹¹⁵ This is important for two reasons. First, it will allow guard and reserve units to gradually resume their role as strategic reserve and be available for duty in any unforeseen major theater of war or other crisis. Second, it will provide Northern Command with the forces necessary to respond to terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland resulting in widespread chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear effects.

¹¹⁴ Eric K. Shinseki, 34th Chief of Staff of the Army Retirement Ceremony, June 11, 2003, Farewell Ceremony Remarks (as prepared), online at <http://www.army.mil/features/ShinsekiFarewell/farewellremarks.htm> 11 June 2003.

¹¹⁵ There were 151,745 Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers mobilized with units as of 31 March 2004. An additional 2,161 Individual Mobilization Augmentees were also mobilized. A detailed report is available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2004/d20040331ngr1.pdf>.

*"The United States is an empire in every sense but one, and that one sense is that it doesn't recognize itself as such."*¹¹⁶

Second, an expansion of the United States Army must include forces that provide the imperial policing capabilities outlined in this monograph. This does not advocate transforming war fighting units into full-spectrum capable ones, but rather increasing end strength through the creation of a force tailored for stability and support operations. This idea is not original, and it is time to create new army units specifically designed for conducting Military Operations Other Than War.¹¹⁷ Both concepts presented in this monograph would add sorely needed capability to the existing faulty Army force structure. No matter the intention, just adding additional soldiers to the current force structure is unwise and will still leave the Army without the means required for the GWOT and sustaining the United States' position as the global power of the twenty-first century.

Of the two auxiliary forces presented in this monograph, the American foreign legion is the most desirable. While both concepts would provide the United States Army with additional manpower, the foreign legion model is the most feasible. The major drawback of an American foreign legion – the ultimate loyalty of the legionnaires to the United States – is effectively mitigated using the DTLOMS model presented in this monograph. As the British Brigade of Gurkhas model illustrates, the long-term costs of this type of special relationship can be unreasonable. While the original rationale of recruiting Gurkhas into British service is a sterling example of "keeping your friends closer and your enemies even closer," (an idea that the United States military would be wise to occasionally adopt) the costs of such an endeavor prohibits the

¹¹⁶ Niall Ferguson, quoted in the British Broadcasting Corporation's program *Age of Empire* episode entitled "America: An Empire to Rival Rome?" online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3430199.stm> 26 January 2004.

¹¹⁷ For an example see Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, "Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice," *Parameters* 32 (Winter 2002-03): 77-87.

formation of a similar American indigenous force barring the apparent failure of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Third, a decision to create an American foreign legion or formations of regional indigenous troops notwithstanding, the United States Army should take maximum advantage of Executive Order 13269 and the provisions of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act to actively recruit skilled non-citizens overseas. This recommendation requires the development and implementation of an overseas recruiting campaign focused on filling certain low-density/high-demand positions with able non-citizens through the promise of American citizenship as a reward for their service. This strategy could be especially useful in providing much needed linguists, medical personnel, civil engineers, experienced police officers, and other low-density/high-demand specialties.

“Since it is absurd for a person to die for the interests of somebody or something else, the entire modern ‘professional’ model of armed forces fighting for their ‘clients’ is little better than a prescription for defeat.”¹¹⁸

Fourth, and most importantly, neither an American foreign legion based on the French model nor units of indigenous forces based on the British Gurkha model should be formed at this time. Two main rationales led to this conclusion. First, the increasing militarization of American foreign affairs, as described in the introduction of this monograph and by authors such as Chalmers Johnson of The American Empire Project would be furthered by the creation of the two types of units presented in this monograph.¹¹⁹ This unfortunate course should be reversed, and the formation of an American foreign legion or co-opting battalions of indigenous troops conflicts with this end. Based on the recent widespread employment of Private Military Companies and

¹¹⁸ Martin L. Van Creveld, *Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 191.

proxies during the upsurge of violence in Iraq it is likely that the United States government would be all too willing to employ the types of forces presented in this monograph without regard for the second and third order effects.¹²⁰

Also regrettably, the AVF has degraded the societal value of military service and allowed the youngest generations of Americans to forgo one of the primary obligations of citizenship - compulsory military service. Fewer American young people are now willing to serve in the military and “do something for their country.” This can be partially attributed to the fact that parents who have no direct military experience increasingly raise American children. The result is a widening gap between the U.S. military and the citizenry.¹²¹ In addition, less than thirty percent of the current members of Congress are military veterans as compared to more than seventy percent in the early 1970’s.¹²² For the first time in nearly a century, veterans are underrepresented in Congress compared to their numbers in the general population, which has resulted in a gap between the U.S. military and its political masters.¹²³ The creation of an American foreign legion or battalions of foreign troops would indirectly exacerbate the “Civil-

¹¹⁹ Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan, 2004). See also, Brian Urquhart, “World Order & Mr. Bush,” *The New York Review of Books*, 50, 9 October 2003.

¹²⁰ Michael Duffy, “When Private Armies take to the Front Lines” *Time*, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040412-607775,00.html> 12 April 2004.

¹²¹ Paul Sackett and Anne Mavor eds., *Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth: Implications for Military Recruitment* (Washington: The National Academies Press: 2003), executive summary online at http://books.nap.edu/execsumm_pdf/10478.pdf 18 April 2004.

¹²² See “Sharp Decline of Veterans in Congress Had Little Effect on Voting Patterns,” *Penn States News*, <http://www.psu.edu/ur/2002/veteransincongress.html> 25 January 2002.

¹²³ William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham, *Vanishing Veteran’s: The Decline in Military Experience in the U.S. Congress*. Paper prepared for presentation at the 1999 Cantigny Conference on Bridging the Gap.

Military Gap” and further erode the trust and understanding between civilian and military leaders, possibly with dire consequences.¹²⁴

While the AVF may have been a necessary step for national reconciliation following the Vietnam War, it has outlived its usefulness and resulted in an Army that is undersized and unable to meet the vast array of missions it faces. Rather than permanently employing large numbers of non-citizens to conduct American military operations, a way should be found to increase the endstrength of the Army using citizens as the backbone of an expanded force. A recommendation on how this critical task is accomplished is beyond the scope of this monograph; however, no less than the protection of the homeland and America’s position in the world may be at stake.

¹²⁴ For the most recent and comprehensive examination of the civil-military gap and its potential consequences, see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).

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