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**THE GREEK-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS,
1999-2004: PARADIGM SHIFT or EPI-PHENOMENON**

by

Michael Naoum

December 2004

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Hans-Eberhard Peters

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**THE GREEK-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS, 1999-2004:
PARADIGM SHIFT or EPI-PHENOMENON**

Michael Naoum
Commander, Hellenic Navy
B.S., Hellenic Navel Academy, 1987

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2004**

Author: Michael Naoum

Approved by: Dr. Donald Abenheim
Thesis Advisor

Colonel Hans-Eberhard Peters, German Air Force
Second Reader

Dr. James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the Greek-Turkish ongoing rapprochement. This latest rapprochement effort followed closely two devastating earthquakes that hit Greece and Turkey consequently in 1999. The two nations sent official and private (NGO) relief help, including search and rescue teams, to the areas struck. This study examines whether there are tangible shifts in the policies of the two countries that could sustain the rapprochement, or whether the adjustment is superficial and could collapse as soon as any controversial issue(s) arise between the two nations. It approaches the question with the clarity provided by hindsight, employing three past case studies of similar endeavors of the two countries. By examining the three past cases as well as considering all empirical evidence for the present rapprochement, this thesis concludes that there is tangible evidence of a shift in Greek foreign policy toward Turkey, whereas with respect to Turkish policy, there exist encouraging rhetoric and gestures but no evidence of adequate reciprocity towards Greece on the political level. Finally, the thesis provides policy recommendations for both sides.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The origins of Greek-Turkish interaction can be traced back through centuries of antagonistic history, rivalry, grievance and mistrust. For the Greeks the battle of Manzikert¹ in 1071 A.D. led to the capture of Constantinople in 1453 A.D., and the consequent disintegration of the Byzantine Empire. In 1821 Greece was the first county that declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire, and is perceived by the Turks to have been expanding ever since. During the first quarter of the 20th century the Neo-Turks movement's manifestation was the creation of the modern Turkish state by Mustafa Kemal, a.k.a. Ataturk. For the Greeks the successful outcome of the Turkish War of Independence stands in stark contrast with 'the Asia Minor Catastrophe'. Hence, the conflictual and competitive relationship between the two countries has deep historical roots and is embedded in the respective cultures as "both states link their existence [as well as] an important part of their identity to experiences that are associated with negative images of the other side."² This relationship from its beginning was and remained for a long period of time a zero-sum game for both Greeks and Turks.

The present *status quo* characterizing in the Greek-Turkish relations was established at the end of the First and Second World Wars.³ The Treaty of Lausanne,⁴ signed in 1923 and reviewed in Montreux in 1936, delineated the

¹ Manzikert was a town at the eastern approaches of Asia Minor in today's Turkish-Iranian boarder where the first actual combat encounter between the Byzantines and the Ottoman Turks occurred, when the Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan defeated the Byzantine Emperor Diogenes starting the conquest of Asia Minor. See Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 5.

² Stephen F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 73.

³ The Third United Nations Conference on the Law at Sea (UNCLOS III) signed at Montego Bay in 1982 is an additional document establishing the legal principals in the Aegean, in which however Turkey is not a signatory part.

⁴ For the complete context, see *The Convention Respecting the Regime of the Straits and Other Instruments Signed at Lausanne*, July 24, 1923 available from [<http://80-www.ciaonet.org.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/mes/mes07/index.html>]; Internet, accessed on July 24, 2004.

Thrace land frontier and at the same time recognized Greek sovereignty over the islands of Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria.

After the Second World War, the Treaty of Paris,⁵ between the Allies and Italy, the Dodecanese islands ceded to Greece. Both, Greece and Turkey are part of the south-east Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula regional subsystem, where old enmities resurfaced after the end of the Cold War. The region was eloquently characterized by Winston Churchill as one “that produces more history than it can consume.” The system continues to constitute an anomaly within the security community of Europe. However, both Greece and Turkey have been Allies in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952. Both are major actors in economic, political and even military terms in the Balkan region and rivals as they interact in their own strategic realm.

Greek-Turkish relations have passed through many controversial phases as both countries have been engaged in a costly and protracted arms race in an effort to establish a “favourable balance of power.”⁶ Numerous crises over Cyprus or the Aegean, repeated roughly twice every decade since 1955, brought the two countries to the brink of war. The latest major crisis was that of 1996 over the Imia islands. The potential deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations continually surfaces as a significant threat to regional stability.⁷

Nonetheless, following the Cold War paradigm, bilateral relationships also have enjoyed infrequent and relatively short periods of relaxed tensions or *détente*. Such periods were that of the 1930's under the leadership of Venizelos and Atatürk, and that of 1952 when the two countries (as beneficiaries of the

⁵ For the complete content, see *Treaty of Peace with Italy*, February 10, 1947, available from [www.mfa.gr/greek/the_ministry/eny/1947_italy_treaty.doc]; Internet, accessed on July 25, 2004.

⁶ Theodore Couloumbis and Kostas Ifantis, "Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints - A Realist Approach," *The review of International Affaires*, Vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 2002): pp.1-25 at 1.

⁷ For scenarios and outcomes of a potential Greek-Turkish conflict see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Class of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 315; Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser ed., *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), pp. 321-322; and Wayne P. Huges Jr., Capt. USN (Ret), *Fleet Tactics and Costal Combat*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 321-347.

Truman Doctrine) joined NATO. Another attempt was initiated in 1988 between the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu, and the Turkish counterpart, Turgut Ozal which proved to be unsuccessful.

The current rapprochement, now five years old, was initiated by the Greek and Turkish governments of Simitis and Ecevit, respectively. Foreign Ministers George Papandreu and Ismail Cem explored cooperative and consultative channels between the two countries amidst the Kosovo crisis in 1999. The effort acquired further impetus following the September 1999 earthquakes that visited both countries, and thus the titled earthquake diplomacy was coined. In the context of the mutual cooperation occasioned by the earthquakes, the rapprochement process was accompanied by a spectacular and unexpected shift in the Greek policy toward Turkey's candidacy in the European Union. Interestingly enough the rhetoric used and the expectations that rose during the above periods of relaxed tension including the latest reveal surprising similarities.

B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION

The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the ongoing rapprochement by exploring the following research question: Does the current rapprochement between Greece and Turkey represent a paradigm shift for the two countries relationships, or is it just an epi-phenomenon? This main research question will be approached by addressing the following interrelated issues:

- Under what circumstances have previous efforts of reconciliation started and why they failed?
- What are the characteristics and the achieved progress of the latest rapprochement process?
- What are the theoretical foundations of the latest rapprochement process?
- Have both countries' foreign and security policies been affected and to what extent?

This thesis argues that the current rapprochement, although instrumental for both countries, indeed represents a significant strategic paradigm shift of the Greek policy vis-à-vis Turkey. On the other hand Turkish policy towards Greece is founded on and associated with the EU decision pertaining to Turkey's accession. Moreover, all empirical evidence suggests that the future of the rapprochement has a direct analogy in the EU decision and its interpretation in Turkish domestic policy level.

C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

Methodologically this thesis is a single case study of the Greek-Turkish relationships and specifically of the relatively few periods of *détente* and rapprochement. The thesis will employ a comparative historical approach, and the examination of events will be organized in chronological order. In particular, the thesis will attempt to identify possible historical generalizations derived from previous failed rapprochements between the two countries and compare them with the present attempt. In doing so it will evaluate the latter's significance, achievements and offer a comparative analysis.

Historical analysis is a useful analytical tool for interpreting both the present and the future since

- History is a diagnostic instrument that helps us to put a problem in its context and environment. It supplies a thread and helps us to create order among a mass of data; it provides patterns. No two sets of circumstances are ever entirely identical although there is often a general pattern that recurs frequently.
- It helps us to avoid reinventing the wheel.
- History does not provide solutions but a thought process, and we have to realize this and accept ambiguity and complexity.
- History can help us to change things before we have to, which actually the basic purpose of strategic thinking is: foresee changes, act before they hit us, and prepare to benefit from the new situation.⁸

⁸ Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, (Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2003), 5.

The thesis will not address the Greek-Turkish disputes *per se*; however, it will refer to them and will provide ample reference to the already abundant relevant literature. It is based on a qualitative survey of relevant literature, which engages both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include treaties as well as speeches and essays of key policymakers from both Greece and Turkey. The secondary sources include scholarly analyses as well as various media reports.

D. SIGNIFICANCE

The significance of the viability of the current Greek-Turkish rapprochement is self evident. The two countries are located in the eastern Mediterranean in great proximity with regions of strategic importance for the EU and the U.S., such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Vital Sea Lines of Communication cross the area, and the security of major energy transit routes are critical to the West. Possible long term settlement will allow both countries to enjoy the benefits of the potential peace dividend and focus their resources on the new century's asymmetrical threats. Furthermore, it will help stabilize the volatile Balkan region and in general terms will benefit Europe, NATO and the West. By and large, a potential long lasting, peaceful settlement between Greece and Turkey could provide a test case that disproves the clash of civilizations (or clash of religions) thesis and substitutes it with a plausible cooperation of civilizations argument.

E. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis is structured in five chapters including introduction and conclusion. Chapter II provides an analysis on the theoretical context. The Greek-Turkish relations are examined in the context of the international relations theories by reference to the pertinent paradigms.

Chapter III reviews three case studies of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The first period is between 1930 and 1942, which followed the devastating war of

1919-1922 between the two countries. In the period in question dramatic improvement in the bilateral relations led to the conclusion between Venizelos and Inonu of a Treaty of Neutrality, Arbitration and Reconciliation. The second period is that between 1947 and 1955 in which events of the early Cold War period are analyzed. Once again the two countries enjoyed close political cooperation that resulted to the simultaneous entry in NATO in 1952. Finally, the last case examines the period of the late Cold War, between 1988 and 1992, wherein disputes between the two countries had already developed.

Chapter IV analyzes the period between 1999 and 2004. During this time great expectations arose as both countries suffered from devastating earthquakes that spurred Greek-Turkish cooperation. These events were the precursor of the present political rapprochement. The analysis of this period will include the origins of the process as well as the achieved results and their corollaries in the overall Greek-Turkish strategic interaction.

Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis by summarizing its findings. The main focus is on the viability of the rapprochement process. Moreover, the conclusion attempts to offer policy recommendations for the future.

II. STATES' INTERACTION AND COOPERATION: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. INTRODUCTION

The international political environment is often described as anarchic. This by no means implies that the international environment exists in a state of chaos. Anarchy is conceptualized as the mere absence of a supra-national government. In view of this characteristic how do states influence each other's behavior as they interact, and moreover, what are the incentives and "under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?"⁹

In order for this thesis to provide a complete picture, of the Greek-Turkish interaction it is imperative to reference a survey of the pertinent international relations' theoretical context. Therefore, this chapter will answer the aforementioned questions by identifying and analyzing the available "state conflict management strategies," the predominant paradigms of strategies to initiate cooperation and the cooperation forms as well as expectations once such cooperation is achieved. In other words this chapter will provide an analysis of the relevant theoretical propositions that will serve as the theoretical foundations in which the Greek-Turkish rapprochement will be analyzed in the next chapters.

B. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OR INFLUENCE STRATEGIES.¹⁰

Conflictual relationships among states, as in the Greek-Turkish interaction, are in reality bargaining situations and as Thomas Shelling has observed, "a conflict is a kind of contest, in which the participants are trying to win."¹¹ By characterizing conflict as a bargaining process it is of outmost importance to note

⁹ Robert M. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 3 also 4, 6.

¹⁰ The codification is attributed to Alexander George, see Alexander L. George, "The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 22 (2003): 463.

¹¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 5.

that the main working assumption is that “in addition to the divergence of interest over the variables in dispute, there is a powerful common interest in reaching an outcome that is not enormously destructive of values of both sides.”¹² However, to maximize gains from bargaining situations, an appropriate strategy must be employed. The purpose of this strategy is to ultimately offer the prospect of influencing the adversary in a favorable manner. These strategies include inter alia, the deterrence strategy, the reassurance strategy, and the initiation and sustainment of cooperation. At this point it is essential to note that in order to furnish the most appropriate influence strategy a state must be classified in a qualitative manner reflecting its external attitudes, apart from the well known classification as “status-quo” or “revisionist.” Charles Glaser has elaborated further on states’ categorization and as he points out

...states, according to their motives for expansion, can be divided into two categories: security driven (or not-greedy) and non-security-driven (or greedy). Greedy states are willing to incur costs or risks for “non security expansion,” while a non-greedy state is unwilling to run such risks. Potentially insecure states are inclined to be insecure in the face of military capabilities that they believe threaten their ability to defend themselves. By contrast, “always-secure” states recognize that the defender is interested in its security and would use force only in response to aggression.¹³

1. Deterrence Strategy

Deterrence strategy is conceived as a competitive strategy emphasizing in the manipulation of threats associated with the use of force. Morgan defines it as “... an attempt by one actor to convince another not to attack by using threats of forceful response to alter the other’s cost-benefit calculations.”¹⁴ According to Mearsheimer the strategy “in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the

¹² Ibid., 5-6.

¹³ Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” *World Politics*, Vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1992), 501-502.

¹⁴ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44.

estimated costs and risks.”¹⁵ Consequently, the core assumptions on which the theory rests upon are the following:

- First, the pre-existence of an adversary posing security threats
- Second the actors involved are rational, and
- Second, the unwishful action has not yet occurred.

Deterrence theory distinguishes between two types of deterrence strategies, namely general and immediate ones. According to Morgan,

[i]n general deterrence an actor maintains a broad military capability and issues broad threats of a punitive response to an attack to keep anyone from seriously thinking about attacking. In immediate deterrence the actor has a military capability and issues threats to a specific opponent when the opponent is already contemplating and preparing an attack. Thus an immediate deterrence situation is a crisis or close to it, with war distinctly possible, while general deterrence is far less intense and anxious because the attack to be forestalled is still hypothetical.¹⁶

Moreover, deterrence is a challenging strategy to employ. In view of the fact that the strategy is associated with the potential use of force if deterrence strategy is to be successful, attention should be paid in the prescriptions of the relevant theoretical framework set by the deterrence theory. That is the strategy should be based on the theoretical notions of credibility and stability, and their balance.

Elaborating further on the theoretical notion of the strategy’s credibility, Stein asserts that “if deterrence is to work, the defender must carefully define the unacceptable action, communicate the commitment to punish transgressors or to deny them their objectives, possess the capability to carry out this threat, and demonstrate resolve to do so.”¹⁷

The next critical aspect of deterrence theory is the maintenance of stability. A deterrent strategy could be much more successful when it makes the most credible threats without escalating a conflict. However, such an endeavor is

¹⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14.

¹⁶ Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, 9.

¹⁷ Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Philip Tetlock, *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear war*, 3 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10.

not an easy achievable task, since pertinent threats could be easily misinterpreted and exacerbate a crisis. Thus instead of crisis prevention the system enters a destabilizing crisis escalation spiral. To elaborate further, “the deterrer might take steps that looked to the opponent like plans not to retaliate but to attack and, concluding that war was unavoidable; the opponent could conclude it had better launch the planned attack. Then deterrence would really be unstable because it would make both sides strongly predisposed to attack.”¹⁸ War may occur, then, inadvertently as a result of the escalation spiral in an “action-reaction” sequence in situations where states concerned about their security are made insecure by the actions of an adversary. States’ insecurity emanates from the difficulty of ascertaining intention, and therefore each side overestimates the magnitude of the threat. To overcome the inherent limitations of deterrence as an influence strategy, the cooperative strategy of reassurance has been conceived and will be analyzed in the section that follows.

2. Reassurance Strategy

The cooperative strategies broadly described in the literature as strategies of reassurance, “are conceived as a set of strategies that adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of a threat or use of force.”¹⁹ The essence of the reassurance strategies is to communicate to the adversary that an alternative exists on the diplomatic field, or more generally that “one is not contemplating actions harmful to [the adversary’s] interests.”²⁰ The provided alternative will eventually alleviate some of the adversary’s needs or weaknesses with the ultimate intention of reducing the likelihood of resorting to armed confrontation. “They include a combination of actions that minimize the risks of associated with deterrence and promote cooperation among states in conflictual relationship. The test of the effectiveness of strategies of reassurance is their contribution to the avoidance of war, the reduction of tension, and, ultimately, the creation of

¹⁸ Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, 20.

¹⁹ Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 9.

²⁰ George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries,” 466.

alternatives to the threat or use of force among adversarial leaders who are hostile and suspicious of one another.”²¹

Stein identifies the following five prominent types or techniques of implementing reassurance strategies:

- First, reassurance through restraint.
- Second, reassurance through norms of competition.
- Third, the strategy of reassurance through irrevocable commitment.
- Fourth, reassurance through limited security regimes.
- And finally reassurance through reciprocity.²²

From the aforementioned five strategies one should note that “the strategy of reassurance through irrevocable commitment,” “reassurance through limited security regimes” and “reassurance through reciprocity” are pertinent to the Greek –Turkish interaction and this thesis will provide further analysis in the following chapters.

One of the most ambitious techniques or strategies for tension reduction identified by Stein is the “reassurance through irrevocable commitment.” The essence of this technique is to undertake a largely symbolic gesture in an effort to fundamentally alter the belief that adversaries hold for each other and eventually change the nature of the whole relationship. As Stein observes this commitment is useful “... to a defender in a deterrence relationship to signal its intention to negotiate and thereby reduce the cost to a would-be challenger of the status quo.” This strategy should be employed “when leaders recognize that misperception and stereotyping govern their adversary’s judgment as well as their own [...] to reassure their adversary of their benign intentions and create

²¹ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 35.

²² For an elaborate analysis on all five reassurance strategies see Ibid., 35-56.

incentives for negotiation.”²³ The attempt to make this kind of gestures however, is not simplistic. Implementing such a technique contains intrinsic impediments. Such difficulties are associated first, with constraints set by the domestic politics of each of the adversaries, and second, with the relative significance of the presented offer. That is, leaders often start the process by making reversible offers that are associated with less significant issues and represent low political cost, which in turn makes them less credible.²⁴

“Reassurance through limited security regimes” refers to the establishment of technical arrangements among adversaries, such as limited arms control provisions, the creation of buffer zones, or the sharing of intelligence information that could diminish the accidental or miscalculated precipitation to violence.²⁵ The basic preconditions for those agreements are a mutual aversion to war and the maintenance of an unchallenged general deterrence status. The whole process could collapse, however, if one adversary defects, especially when the main issues at stake concern security.²⁶ As a final point “reassurance through reciprocity” in itself represents a family of two strategies based on reciprocity that will be analyzed in the section that follows.

3. Strategies of Reciprocity

The anarchic nature of the international environment makes cooperation among states difficult to attain. In order for cooperation to be achieved “since no best [and universal] strategy to use”²⁷ exists, two strategies based on reciprocity have been developed aiming to reduce tensions and ameliorate the “prisoners’ dilemma”²⁸ which is the transformation of cooperation in such an environment.

²³ The most prominent example of implementing this strategy is referred as President Saddat’s visit to Tel-Aviv and his address to the Israeli political leadership and public during the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement of the mid 1970’s. Ibid, 42-43.

²⁴ Ibid., 44-45.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid, 50-51.

²⁷ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 27.

²⁸ Ibid., 3-12.

These strategies constitute cooperation a tangible alternative for states to opt, and are the strategy of “tit-for-tat”²⁹ and the “gradual reciprocation in tension reduction.”

a. *Tit for Tat*

This strategy was developed by Axelrod as the product of a series of computer tournaments. “Tit-for-tat is the strategy of starting with cooperation, and thereafter doing what the other player did on the previous move.”³⁰ In other words, it calls for the first move in the diplomatic arena to be a cooperative one, while consequent moves follow the rule of strict reciprocity to the adversary’s moves. The underlying assumption of the “Tit-for-tat” is that the adversary is a rational unitary actor and as such calculates cost and benefits.³¹ The purpose of manipulating costs and benefits is to make the benefits of not initiating the planned action greater than the costs of resorting to the use of force. In other words, during the implementation of this strategy the aim is to provide to the adversary tangible evidence that cooperation is a more attractive option than defection.

If this strategy is exercised successfully for a long period of time, it could create a model of cooperation which overcomes deep-rooted mistrust. In any case it requires beginning with an impressive move on a highly risky issue, in order to draw the other side’s attention.³² According to Axelrod, the robust success of “tit-for-tat” as a cooperative strategy is attributed to the “combination

²⁹ George labels this strategy as “Eye-for-an-Eye,” see George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries,” 472.

³⁰ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, viii.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

³² Critics observe three potential shortcomings: first, it overlooks the fact that in enduring conflictual; trust is absolutely necessary to elicit cooperation; second, it focuses on states that behave as self-interested egoists and not competitors who are likely to defect in order to pursue higher relative gains; and third, it cannot reduce the risks of escalation if one actor does not behave as prescribed. See Deborah W. Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” *International Organization*, Vol. 41, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 30-31, and Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 54. Moreover, since tit-for-tat is a product of computer tournament, it bases its findings on repeated interaction of the same game thus assuming that states will indefinitely repeat the same interaction.

of being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear. Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried. Its forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation. And its clarity makes it intelligible to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation.”³³

b. Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction

Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction or GRIT is based upon the premises that a set of initial cooperative gestures independent of the adversary’s actions will gradually lead him to reciprocate in the effort to “create gradually an atmosphere of mutual trust within which negotiations on critical political and military issues will have a better chance of succeeding.”³⁴ Once the adversary reciprocates, his action should be rewarded with a more conciliatory action. This technique is based on the fundamental assumption that the dynamics of the relationship between the two adversaries is based upon their mutual misperception. In order to alter the misperception a cognitive change is necessary and consequently GRIT gestures are designed and executed in an effort to overwhelm the psychological resistance at the cognitive level instead of the rational decision maker level, thus “removing distrust between states and thereby paving the way for relaxation of tensions.”³⁵ After all, since tension reduction and the consequent cooperation is associated with the adversary’s will to reciprocate, as Stein observes “[a] cooperative move is unlikely to be reciprocated if an adversary has a long-standing and deeply held negative images that have been reinforced over time.”³⁶ The recommendations of this cooperative strategy, summarized by Larson propose *inter alia* that:

³³ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 54.

³⁴ Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, ILL: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 88.

³⁵ George, "The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries," 471.

³⁶ Stein, *Deterrence and Reassurance*, 54.

- The series of actions should be publicly announced in advance and described as part of a deliberate policy of reducing tensions.
- Each action must be carried out on schedule, regardless of whether the other state reciprocates.
- Along with the announcement of each unilateral action, the initiator should include an explicit, invitation for the other party to reciprocate in some way, but no quid pro quo should be, demanded in advance.
- The series of actions should be carried out over a period of time, *even without reciprocation*.
- The unilateral initiatives should be unambiguous in intent and capable of being verified.
- The strategist should not make unilateral initiatives that would reduce the state's capacity to retaliate, [...], should the target state view unconditional concessions as a sign of weakness that could be exploited.
- The strategist should retaliate immediately against any aggressive or exploitative actions by the target, but only enough to restore the status quo.[...]
- Any act of reciprocation by the adversary should be rewarded with an incremental increase in cooperation. GRIT is designed to reverse the arms race and lead to spiraling tension reduction ³⁷

Although GRIT resembles the tit-for-tat strategy in cooperating on the first move and retaliating against exploitation, it differs in four important ways: First, it does not presuppose immediate reciprocation from the other side and therefore it insists on taking unilateral initiatives; second, it relies on public statements of intentions, whereas tit-for-tat is more a tacit process; Third, it refers to a wider area of activities than tit-for-tat, which is limited to specific actions; Last but not least, it must make moderately risky concessions to build trust.³⁸

C. STATES' COOPERATION AND EXPECTATIONS

In the anarchic international environment, theorists are divided between three overarching paradigms to explain states' cooperation. Each of these paradigms, which are well known as realism, liberalism and finally functionalism,

³⁷ Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," 32, [emphasis mine].

³⁸ Ibid.

has different set of starting assumptions which will be further analyzed in the sections that follow.

1. Realism

Realism has been the predominant paradigm in explaining states' interaction especially since World War II. To theorists espousing realism, the essential assumptions about the characteristics of world affairs are explicitly that "states are the dominant and unitary actors in international relations calculating ends and means rationally; the international system is anarchic, constituting a self-help system; and rationale states calculate their interests in response to the power structure of the international system."³⁹ Additionally, states operating in the anarchic international environment "are preoccupied with power and security, are pre-disposed toward conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests."⁴⁰

The preoccupation of states with the maximization of their power and security as well as their relative gains, combined with the nature of the international system and the inherent difficulty to easily distinguish between defensive and offensive armaments creates the "security dilemma." The security dilemma refers to the notion that the efforts of a particular state to increase its own security, ironically enough erode the first state's security. As Posen indicates, "what seems sufficient to one state's defense will seem, and will often be, offensive to its neighbors. Because neighbors wish to remain autonomous and secure, they react by trying to strengthen their own position. States can trigger these reactions even if they have no expansionist inclinations."⁴¹ Consequently, states find themselves unintentionally locked in a spiral of

³⁹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 14-15.

⁴⁰ Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 488.

⁴¹ Barry Posen, "The security dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 104.

escalating antagonism and further employing de-stabilizing arms build-up.⁴² An operating security dilemma, according to the theory cannot be abolished but only ameliorated, because most often states perceive other states as “either harboring aggressive designs, or that they may become aggressive in the future.”⁴³

This said, in this realist anarchic and self-help system, states’ cooperation primarily takes the form of alliance formation. Alliances in turn are formed as a response mechanism, to balance the power of the dominant state in the system, or to balance the perceived threat⁴⁴ which a particular actor – not necessarily the most powerful one – is presenting to the other states. Cooperation between adversaries, due to the starting assumptions of realism is not an effortless achievable task.

In principal, the incentive for two states in an adversarial relationship to cooperate is provided “when risks of competition exceed the risk of cooperation, rational state-actors could and should direct their self help efforts towards achieving cooperation. The strong assumption is that normalization of the bilateral relations would provide both countries with greater security than conflictual alternatives.”⁴⁵ As Jervis points out

... if each state pursues its narrow self-interest with a narrow conception of rationality, all states will be worse off than they would be if they cooperated. Not only would cooperation lead to a higher level of total benefits...but it would lead to each individual actor’s being better off than he would be if the relations were more conflictual. States are then seen as interdependent in a different way than is stressed by the theorists of deterrence; either they cooperate with each other, in which case they all make significant gains, or they enter into a conflict and all suffer losses.⁴⁶

⁴²Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62-67.

⁴³ Mustafa Aydin and Kostas Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 4.

⁴⁴ The Alliance formation takes the form of balancing or bandwagoning and the perceived threat stems from the aggregate power, the proximity, the offensive capabilities and the offensive intentions of a specific state. See Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security*, Vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring, 1985): pp.3-43 at 9., see also Stephen Walt, *The Origins of the Alliances*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), ch. 2.

⁴⁵ Couloumbis and Ifantis, "Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints - A Realist Approach," 3.

⁴⁶Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 67.

Once cooperation is achieved, the consequent decrease of the military uncertainties allows states to refocus on their technological as well as economic successes and shortcomings and replace military competition; hence the increased possibility to resort to the use of force, with economic competition.⁴⁷ However, and in order for cooperation to be achieved “states must employ and develop ingenuity, trust, and institutions if they are to develop their common interests without undue risks to their security.”⁴⁸

2. Functionalism

The functionalist approach to states’ cooperation and integration was first developed in the 1940s by David Mitrany.⁴⁹ This method for resolving and maintaining peace between countries claims that cooperation in non-political areas will increase the possibility of political integration between two different systems. Mitrany argued that in the 20th century international system, the manifestation of a web of interdependent technical issues “could be best addressed by highly trained professionals rather than politicians,” in a de-politicized environment.⁵⁰

Establishing functional cooperation between states and political systems based on their mutual needs would eventually create an expanding network of structures and procedures that would evolve to other areas of cooperation in the form of institutions. According to the underlying logic of the functionalist process of integration, cooperation between two systems at a unit level will gradually have a “ramification” effect and ultimately lead to integration of the systems. The direct effect of the functionalistic concept of states’ relations when expanded is

⁴⁷Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18 (Autumn 1993), 59-61.

⁴⁸Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 67.

⁴⁹ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943).

⁵⁰ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1996), 422.

the gradual reduction and ultimately the eradication of “war by transformation of behavioural patterns from conflictual to cooperative.”⁵¹

3. Liberalism

Liberalism presents a major challenge to the realist approach on the international relations theory domain. The liberalist theoretical paradigm does not challenge the nature of the international system, which remains anarchic; however, it does differentiate from the realist notion that the state is the primary – billiard ball type - rational actor in the international domain,⁵² in the context of state’s interactions. Where realism bases its premises on power liberalism is based on exogenous democratic ideals. Theorists espousing liberal theories of international relations are emphasizing on the domestic and transnational groups of individuals that influence the state’s interests, preferences and associated decisions. “... Liberals believe democratic society, in which civil liberties are protected and market relations prevail”⁵³ Liberal theorists in a broader sense argue that

- [T]he fundamental agents in international politics are not states but individuals acting in a social context –whether governments, domestic society, or international institutions.
- [T]he interests and preference of governments have to be analyzed as a result of domestic structures and coalition-building processes responding to social demands as well as to external factors]
- [I]nternational institutions, that is, “persistent and connected set of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations and opportunities to state actors in a similar way as the international distribution of power.”⁵⁴

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² One of best known works that challenges the rationality as well as the unity of the state’s decision making apparatus is presented in the bureaucratic models concept of Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *American Political Science Review* (September 1969), as reprinted in John J. Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, 2nd ed., (Harper Collins, 1966).

⁵³ Scott Burchill, *Theories of international relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 63.

⁵⁴ Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, 25.

By and large, cooperation is based on the assertion “that states seek to maximize their *absolute gains* [in the long run] and are indifferent of the gains achieved by others.”⁵⁵ Liberalism asserts that externalizing the politics based on democratic principals and applying them to the international relations realm leads nations to “gain something even if all do not gain equally.”⁵⁶ Moreover, since states continue to interact in the international environment “without a central authority to force them to cooperate with each other,” membership in institutions provides a further incentive, a mechanism, to ameliorate the “prisoner’s dilemma,” in which cooperation is transformed as already mentioned.

The liberal school of thought, although there is no agreement among theorists on the naming convention provides three approaches for explaining states interaction. Risse-Kappen names them as “republicanism, institutionalism, and transnationalism.”⁵⁷ Liberal republicanism based on Russett’s “democratic peace theory,” asserts that democracies do not wage war against other democracies, since first the norms that govern the decision making process are oriented toward establishing nonviolent, compromise oriented solution, and mutually accepted solutions; And second, reciprocal institutional constraints imposed by the existing check and balances embedded in the democratic form of government further argue against resorting to state-sponsored violence.⁵⁸

Institutionalism further developed the 1940s functionalistic approach into the principal of “Complex Interdependence.” According to Keohane and Nye, membership in international institutions leads states to significantly broaden their respective conception of national interest. In turn, this fact further widens the scope of cooperation. In addition, the interdependence concept emphasizes the existence of multiple channels of communications among states, and the

⁵⁵ Grieco, *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation*, 3, [emphasis mine].

⁵⁶ Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-Cold War World*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 24.

⁵⁷ Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, 26.

⁵⁸ For further analysis of the terms by which cooperation among nations is governed in the Democratic Peace concept see Russett, *Grasping The Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-Cold War World*, 25-30.

predominance of issues other than security.⁵⁹ Institutions thus become means of facilitating cooperation as states accessing the provided multilateral forums set their agendas, form coalitions and to seek non-conflictual solutions to the existing problems.⁶⁰

D. CONCLUSION

The two main schools of international relations theory are the realist and liberal schools. The power of the realists lies in the parsimony of their arguments and the generic notions of power and anarchy that they invoke. However, realism has failed to provide an adequate explanation of milestone events in the international relations realm.⁶¹ The liberal school on the other hand has focused on the interdependence and the interaction among states based on international institutions, behavioral norms and cooperation. Moreover, both schools have concluded that cooperation is neither automatic nor self generating. Instead it emanates from manifold processes which include common interests, shared perceptions, customs and “the machinery of diplomacy” and so on.

However, both paradigms agree on at least one basic premise. Both concur that cooperation potential exists and can be achieved with the ultimate goal to eradicate or at least ameliorate the conflictual relations among states. While the theory prescribes cooperative and competitive strategies, the ultimate decision of the rational state actor as to which strategy to implement is based on the criteria of states’ categorization which provide the necessary theoretical context to classify states based on the perceptions each actor holds regarding his competitors’ or cooperatives’ intentions and motivations.

⁵⁹ For an elaborate analysis of the characteristics of interdependence see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), 24-35.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 36.

⁶¹ For example according to realism the end of the cold war was to come not through a peaceful collapse but through a hot interaction between the two adversarial blocks. Moreover, realism had predicted that NATO would be dissolved since its main threat providing the cohesion among the allied nations was dissolved. However, NATO is present long after such prediction was made and will remain an actor in the international relations plane for the foreseeable future.

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III. GREEK-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines three distinct case studies of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. These cases constitute separate studies in their own right; however, the thesis will employ an analytic review of all three of them. These cases are the Venizelos initiative of the early 1930s; the early Cold War attempts in the context of the accession of the two countries in the Atlantic Pact (1949-1952) and last but not least the attempt of the late 1980s between Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Ozal a.k.a. the “Davos spirit.” The chapter will address the following questions:

- The incentives behind these policy shifts and the procedures under which they were initiated.
- How extensive were the bilateral relations that were reached?
- What were the achievements of these efforts in the political sphere?
- What were the reasons that led all three efforts to fail and finally collapse?

B. THE VENIZELOS – ATATURK LEGACY: 1930-1942

[T]he History of Turkish-Greek relations since 1930 ought to be read, marked and inwardly digested by all nations of Europe. For if the hatchet can be buried by two peoples who have been burdened by the terrible Greek-Turkish heritage of mutual injury and mutual hatred, there is no excuse left for any of the rest of us to confess ourselves morally incapable of performing the same feat.⁶²

Having a general understanding of the Greek-Turkish relationships the above quoted Economist extract makes one wonder when it was really written

⁶² “Sound Sense in the Near East,” *The Economist*, May 20, 1933, as cited in Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, 189.

and to what specific period it refers to. Moreover, if two countries have formed a paradigm of relations that could have served as a model for the war torn European Continent, what occurred especially and this period ended deserves to be addressed.

While the Lausanne Treaty⁶³ established the *status quo* and the border arrangement between Greece and Turkey,⁶⁴ bilateral relations were not formally settled. Bilateral relations were inhibited to grow further by the issue of financial compensation. This issue was as an immediate corollary of compulsory exchange of populations⁶⁵ between the two former belligerents. Established by Article 11 of the Lausanne Treaty, a joint committee was unable to reach a settlement after five years of extensive deliberations. The refugees, one million Greeks and 400,000 Turks who expected to receive compensation for their respective property losses, were largely influential in the respective domestic policies and presented a further obstacle for a final settlement. Moreover, the Turkish government initiated a discriminatory policy against the Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey (the Greek orthodox population of Istanbul, Gokceada and Bozcaada as well as the Muslims of Western Thrace were exempted from the

⁶³ For the negotiation process as perceived by the Turkish delegation and especially Inonu who would later become prime minister as well as President of the Turkey see Metin Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey*, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), 175-178.

⁶⁴ Bahcheli, however, argues that although for Turkey, the Lausanne settlement was considered an overall success, "many Turks believed that, in spite of their nation's victory over the invading Greeks, Turkey had made significant territorial sacrifices by consenting Greek sovereignty over Western Thrace (with its Turkish majority) and, especially the Islands that ring her Aegean coast." See Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, 31; in a similar manner Celic notes that although the Treaty was considered a success, all the islands that Turkey had claimed remained with Greece and Italy with the exception of Gokceada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), see, Yasemin Celic, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Westport:: Praeger, 1999), 29; for similar argumentation see also Frank G. Weber, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain, and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979), 61; according to Wilson however, "Turkey would never have signed the Treaty of Lausanne if the Ataturk government had been able to foresee the developments that were to take place in regard to the Law of the Sea in the latter part of this century." See Andrew Wilson, *The Aegean Dispute*, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), 4.

⁶⁵ During the period under review "the assumption that ethnically homogeneous states were the best vehicles for the protection of citizen's rights was widely held. Following this assumption, there was greater willingness to consider redrawing of borders and exchanging populations as ways of creating more homogenous states." The provisions of the Lausanne settlement were the best example of this prevailing school of thought. See Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, 154.

exchange) and the Ecumenical Patriarchate setting limits to civil, political and religious rights. Such a policy was contrary to article 39 of the Lausanne Treaty.⁶⁶ Finally relations were further strained during the 1925-1926 period by the irredentist claims against Eastern Thrace by the dictator Pangalos who threatened a Greek-Turkish war.⁶⁷

By 1928 and due to the aforementioned strains the Greco-Turkish dialogue was completely canceled, and the naval arms race in the Aegean was revived.⁶⁸ During the next year it appeared that the two countries might resort to the use of military force. According to the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* that historically resonates, by and large, the official position of the Turkish government, a Greek-Turkish war was “inevitable.”⁶⁹

Amidst these rather pessimistic predictions about the future, Eleftherios Venizelos, who negotiated the Lausanne settlement for Greece, in his 1928 electoral campaign introduced a revolutionary approach for the Greek foreign relations. Venizelos sought to put an end in the international isolationism of

⁶⁶ Perhaps the most irritating event occurred in January 1925 when the Greek-orthodox Patriarch, Constantine VI was expelled from Turkey claiming that he was an exchangeable person. The matter was settled after an acrimonious debate and appeals to foreign governments as well as the League of Nations, in July 1925 when a newly elected Ecumenical Patriarch was settled in Istanbul. See Theodore A. Couloubis, John Anthony Petropoulos, and Harry J. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective*, Modern Greek research series ; 2 (New York: Pella Pub. Co., 1976), 85-86.

⁶⁷ Pangalos took advantage of the opportunity provided by the 1925 Anglo-Turkish dispute over the border settlement between Iraq and Turkey. The border was left undecided during the Lausanne conference, reflecting on the future of the oil-rich Mosul province. For further analysis of all aspects of the Greek foreign policy under the brief Pangalos regime, see Harry Psomiades, “The Diplomacy of Theodore Pangalos,” *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1, (Thessalonica, 1972), pp.7-12, see also *Ibid.*, 87-88.

⁶⁸ Alexis Alexandris, “To Istoriko Plaisio Ton Ellino-Tourkikon Sxeseon 1923-1954 [The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954],” in *Oi Ellino-Tourkikes Sxeseis 1923-1987 [Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987]*, (Athens: Gnosi, 1991), 34-68; see also Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, 10-13.

⁶⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, March 5, 1929 as quoted in Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” 38. Along the same lines, the Greek Foreign Minister Michalakopoulos revealed at the British Ambassador that “a Greek-Turkish war could not be considered inconceivable any more”, see Lorraine to Chamberlain, Athens May 17, 1929, *Foreign Office* 371/13811/E2514 as referenced in Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” 38.

Greece stemming as the immediate effect of the 1919-1922 Anatolia campaign.⁷⁰

The principals of the new foreign policy approach included:

- First, respect of the territorial status quo, opposition to revisionism targeting the established status and abandonment of irredentist claims.⁷¹
- Second, reciprocal avoidance of foreign entanglements and reliance on any particular great power.
- Third, establishment of friendly relations with the neighboring countries as well as with the great powers.
- And finally and perhaps most importantly reconciliation with Turkey.⁷²

In a speech delivered in Thessalonica on July 22, 1928 Venizelos outlined the proposed his revolutionary new approach stating:

We wish to establish with Turkey not only good neighborly relations but also cordially friendly relations. We know that Turkey respects the territorial status quo [as established by the Lausanne Treaty] and must be assured that we do too.⁷³

⁷⁰ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Venizelos Again Supreme in Greece," *Foreign Affairs* (pre-1986) New York, October 1929, 120-121.

⁷¹ This marked the end of the 'Great Idea' which was the ambition to unite all Greek speaking areas into a central state, the Greater Greece, at the expense of the declining Ottoman Empire, which like the Byzantine Empire would have its capital in Constantinople. This revival of the Byzantine Empire, often referred as "Greece of the two Continents and the five Seas," was used since 1844 to describe the country's post independence irredentist aspirations and would have included the population along the Aegean coast of Anatolia, the Black Sea coast and parts of the inner Anatolia namely Cappadokia; for further discussion of the concept see Haralambos Athanasopoulos, *Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International Law*, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2001), 85-87; see also, Ferenc A. Váli, *Bridge Across The Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, (Baltimore.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 220-224.

⁷² Couloubis, Petropoulos, and Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective*, 89.

⁷³ Iphigenia Anastasiadou, "Ho Venizelos Kai To Hellino-Tourkiko Symphono Philiis Tou 1930," [Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1930] in *Odysseus Dimitrakopoulos Thanos Veremis, eds., Meletimata Gyro Apo Ton Venizelo Kai Tin Epochi Tou [Studies on Venizelos and his Time]*, (Athens: Phillipotes, 1982), 314.

After winning the elections, Venizelos returned to premiership and his party became the dominant political power in Greek domestic affairs.⁷⁴ On August 30th 1928, days after his election he dispatched a letter to the Turkish Foreign Minister Aras Tevfik Rousdi, addressed simultaneously to his Turkish counterpart, Ismet Inonu.⁷⁵ In his letter Venizelos stated *inter alia* that:

... you will fully understand my views as to the mutual advantages to be gained by regularising the relationship between our two countries on the basis of reciprocal trust and close friendship that will lead us to a warm understanding. If, as I feel sure, you share in these views, I trust that you will wish to take part in a final settlement of the differences caused by the exchange of populations and the treaties which followed. So we will establish conditions in which an agreement of friendship, as wide as possible in its conception, will constitute the firm foundation of a close friendship and a warm understanding between our countries ...⁷⁶

The Turkish Prime Minister replied to Venizelos emphasizing the Turkish will to improve bilateral relations. However, at the same time Inonu reiterated the necessity to resolve a longstanding claim of the Turkish side pertinent to the existing economic differences. In his letter he articulated this claim in the following manner:

... with our reciprocal desire to consolidate the relations between our two countries, neither having any designs on the other's territory, on this firm basis, we have created a new, favorable climate for the establishment of a permanent friendship and for the concluding of an agreement which I steadfastly hope will be the happy result of this friendship, [...]. *I hope to see us finding solution for those unresolved problems of communication through the good will developed between us on both sides. When those problems*

⁷⁴ Venizelos' liberal party won 61% of the votes and 223 out of 250 parliament seats, and 72 out of the 92 of the newly created Senate while his power was undisputed between 1928 and 1930. The stability and strength of the Greek government was novel in the Greek-Turkish interaction since Turkey constantly complaint that absence of a stable government in Greece was a serious impediment towards the settlement of disputes. See Couloumbis, Petropoulos, and Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective*, p. 158, footnote 8 and p. 159, footnote 2.

⁷⁵ Inonu was the head of the Turkish delegation during the negotiations of the Lausanne settlement, counterpart of Venizelos who led the Greek delegation.

⁷⁶ A complete version of the exchanged letters is available at the *National Research Foundation, Eleftherios Venizelos*, available from [http://www.venizelos-foundation.gr/endocs/bio28-32_7.jsp]; Internet, accessed on July 30, 2004.

*have been properly resolved, the treaty of friendship, neutrality and arbitration which will be concluded in a spirit of common understanding will certainly be a precious guarantee of the holy aim of peace. This result will certainly have a positive impact [...] will be able to protect and to realize our common interests with so much greater effectiveness that our mutual friendship will be genuine and stable.*⁷⁷

Venizelos immediately recognized the political precedence of the aforementioned discussions for the economic agreement. During autumn 1928, the Greek government accepted in principal to pay the amount claimed by Turkey.⁷⁸ One can plausibly argue that this motion was a political maneuver of the Greek side in order to sustain the ongoing negotiations. However, during the next year Ankara put forward even greater financial claims, which once again brought negotiations to a stalemate. Moreover, the Turkish side once more started using the Istanbul Greek-orthodox minority as leverage to achieve the desired outcome. At that point and in an effort to break the deadlock Venizelos relieved the head of his negotiation's team and dispatched instead a respectful figure of the Greek Diplomatic corps, Spiridon Polychroniades.⁷⁹ After seven months of intense negotiations on June 10, 1930, the Economic Pact was finally signed. Among its provisions the Pact recognized the necessity for Greece to compensate Turkey 425,000 pounds sterling marking a major Greek concession. Such a concession was clearly aiming at the greater cause of full restorations of bilateral relations.⁸⁰

Domestic reactions in Greece were strong, especially among the refugees that constituted a substantial portion of the electoral base of Venizelos' party.

⁷⁷ Ibid., [emphasis mine].

⁷⁸ Indeed, it is peculiar at least in principal, how the value of the abandoned properties of more than one million Greek refugees could have been less than that of 400,000 Turks refugees so that it would require compensation.

⁷⁹ Evanthis Hantzivassiliou, 32, *Ho Venizelos, Ellinotourkiki Prossegisi Kai To Provlima Asfaleias Sta Valkania 1928-1931* [*Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement and the Problem of Security in the Balkans 1928-1931*], (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1999), 65.; The instructions of the new head of the negotiation team were to achieve the desired outcome at 'all costs' even if that meant accepting important concessions. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Record 1930, B/68/I "Instructions to Polychroniades" as referenced in Hantzivassiliou, 66.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 74-75.

However, albeit the fact that some members of the parliament as well as the opposition leader Tsaldaris made a strong argument against rapprochement, Venizelos opted to ignore them. Indicative is the fact that in his speech for the ratification of the Economic pact at the parliament in relation to the public reactions Venizelos argued that '[...] public opinion when not favorable, I tend to educate it and not to be influenced by it.'⁸¹ In addition Venizelos was approached by various pro-Ottoman groups⁸² which sought his support to topple the Ataturk regime conspiring against the latter. However, Venizelos disregarded their appeals, and his opinion was solidified that the Ataturk regime offered a stable and reliable interlocutor, powerful enough to reach consensus and settle once and for all the Greek-Turkish disputes. As a result Venizelos on October 1930 traveled to Ankara in a symbolic gesture. His trip aimed to conclude a web of accords that not only settled all outstanding issues but were enriching the context of bilateral cooperation.

The accords included *inter alia* a Pact of Friendship, Arbitration and Reconciliation, a Commercial Convention; and a Naval Armaments Protocol which established naval parity in the Aegean,⁸³ and ameliorated the bilateral naval arms race. Moreover, the two parts concluded on a Settlement Pact which gave relocation, settlement and freedom of movement rights to those who were

⁸¹ As quoted in Anastasiadou, "Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1930," 384.

⁸² Such groups were motivated by the pro-Ottoman former aid to the Sultan Resit Bey as well as various Armenian and Kurdish nationalistic elements. For further details see *ibid.*, 331-338.

⁸³ The protocol was strongly influenced and intended to be operationalized along the lines of the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference which 'provided for ceilings in naval armaments for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.' For an assessment of the Washington Naval Conference see Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 377-380. A naval arms race operating between the countries was the direct corollary of the general strains in bilateral relation as well as the Turkish decision to reconstruct battleship *Goeben* 22,500 tn (provided in 1915 to the Turkish government by Imperial Germany as an inducement for participating in the war) that was non operational since 1919. This revived thoughts within the bureaucracy of constructing at German shipyards of an analogous ship referred as *Salamis*. Venizelos reversed the dilemma, as he intended to build the new Greek Navy around lighter ships namely destroyers and strong air force. For further analysis see Hantzivassiliou, *Ho Venizelos, Ellinotourkiki Prossegisi Kai To Provlima Asfaleias Sta Valkania 1928-1931* [Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement and the Problem of Security in the Balkans 1928-1931], 86-98.

expelled during the clashes of earlier years, namely the 1919-1922 war. Bilateral relations were strengthened furthermore after the October 1931 official visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Inonu in Athens. Over the next two years the mutual consultation process was extended in the Balkan affairs. In 1933 the rapprochement was transformed in what became thereafter known as '*Entente Cordial*' under which both countries mutually guaranteed their common frontier in Thrace and agreed on mutual consultation on all questions of common interest.⁸⁴

After four conferences⁸⁵ the Balkan Pact between Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia was formalized in 1934. Under the Pact the member nations agreed that in an event of aggression by a third party, directed against any of the signatories, they (Pact signatories) would collectively guarantee the frontiers of the encroached nation. Moreover, the four member countries agreed on a mutual consultation clause in the event of an emerging threat in the region.⁸⁶

The provisions of the Balkan Pact proved their significance in 1935, when a coup in Greece threw the country into turmoil with revisionist Bulgaria. During the crisis both Yugoslavia and Rumania announced their support for the Greek government. Turkey for her part and in an effort to dissuade Bulgaria initiated a noteworthy troop movement in the Turkish-Bulgarian boarder. Moreover, Turkey made an equivocal verbal announcement that any Bulgarian strike against Greece would be met with a Turkish invasion of Bulgaria.⁸⁷

The same conciliatory policy was further pursued by the Tsaldaris government, which succeeded Venizelos after his defeat in the 1933 elections. In

⁸⁴ William M. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 61.

⁸⁵ Athens (1930), Istanbul (1931) Bucharest (1932), Thessalonica (1933), see Alexandris, "The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954," 156.

⁸⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 61-62.

⁸⁷ Couloumbis, Petropoulos, and Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective*, 94. The Balkan pact was finally proved highly ineffective in deterring the Axis powers from expanding in the region. As the Second World War approached in the late 1930s the pact was significantly weakened as both "Rumania and Yugoslavia gradually drifted to the German orbit," see Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 62.

September 1933 the two governments renewed their economic agreements and signed the Ankara Friendship Pact. This was a military agreement, aiming at the mutual defense of both the Turkish and the Greek Thrace.⁸⁸ Finally in 1938, under the personal overlook of Ataturk and Metaxas, who in the mean time had established a dictatorship in Greece, the chiefs of the Greek and Turkish General Staffs, General Papagos and Field Marshal Cakmak, reaffirmed and extended the Ankara Pact.⁸⁹

Tracing the reasons that led Venizelos to initiate the Greek policy reorientation vis-à-vis Turkey one can argue the following: First the necessity to guarantee the status and the rights of the Greek-orthodox minority; Second to establish a Greek-Turkish coalition to counter revisionist Bulgaria who sought to revise the established status quo.⁹⁰

On the other hand Turkey had no reason not to respond positively at the Greek “friendship attack.” The country under the Ataturk leadership, once the goal of survival of the newly founded republic was attained, had become a status quo state abolishing at the same time any irredentist claims. Moreover, given the deteriorating financial situation as a result of years of conflict, internal reconstruction and reform became the government’s first priority. As Bernard Lewis points out “Renouncing all foreign ambitions and all pan-Islamic ideologies, [Ataturk] deliberately limited his actions and aspirations to the national territory of Turkey as defined by the [Lausanne] Treaty, and devoted the rest of his life to the grim, and unglamorous task of reconstruction.”⁹¹ The rapprochement with Greece was facilitating this task; moreover it was considered part of the general shift in the Turkish foreign policy, the basic premise of which was the country to “...

⁸⁸ Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” 78-79; see also Váli, *Bridge Across The Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 226.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 83.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 77 and Hantzivassiliou, *Ho Venizelos, Ellinotourkiki Prossegisi Kai To Provlima Asfaleias Sta Valkania 1928-1931* [Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement and the Problem of Security in the Balkans 1928-1931], 107-109.

⁹¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (New York,: Oxford University Press, 1961), 250; see also Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 71.

sought to steer itself back into a position of equality and cooperation with the main western powers without breaking links with Moscow.”⁹² The profound inspirers and supporters of this shift from isolationism towards engagement were Kemal Ataturk himself and his Foreign Minister Rustu Aras.⁹³

By and large the rapprochement and the consequent détente, between Greece and Turkey, initiated in 1930, thrived throughout the interwar period. In a further analysis and taking into account the empirical evidence as presented above, the policy was successful for four major reasons. First, in a remarkable historic coincidence both countries had strong governments, headed by undisputable and charismatic personalities. Venizelos and Ataturk were able to isolate themselves from domestic policies and opposition, exerting immense political pressure stemming from the perceptions of public opinion. This was especially true for Venizelos, since Turkey at the time was a “highly authoritarian single-party state.”⁹⁴ Consequently, both political leaders were decisive in carrying out the burdens of the signed accords. Second, both countries needed to concentrate on domestic reconstruction after a protracted conflict. That dictated the use of the peace dividend provided by the rapprochement. Both sides reached an accord reflecting that point by utilizing policies of arms control. Limitation of the costly and at the same time destabilizing naval arms race reincarnated in this notion. Third, the international environment and specifically the expectations that arose in Locarno and Geneva provided a favorable overarching principle for the Greek-Turkish peace efforts.⁹⁵ Last but not least, the rapprochement was required by common security and defense interests of the

⁹² It must be emphasized that as part of this policy shift, Turkey in 1932 became a member of the League of Nations; see Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 59.

⁹³ Indicative of Attaturk’s attitude towards Greece is that as early as November 1922 in an interview he claimed that ‘I could never hate myself keep on hating a nation for the mistakes of their government [...] and towards the Greeks I feel the same. I am confident that soon we shall soon be great friends.’ Quoted by Turkaya Ataov, “Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1938,” *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 1961, p. 121 as referenced in Váli, *Bridge Across The Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, p. 225 footnote 14; moreover, Foreign Minister Aras in 1935 claimed that ‘the integral maintenance of the covenant of the League’ was the foundation of Turkey’s foreign policy,’ as cited in Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 59.

⁹⁴ Celic, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 34.

⁹⁵ Anastasiadou, “Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1930,” 338-339.

two countries.⁹⁶ As Hantzivasilliou points out for the period under examination “[f]or the first time in history the two nations came so close in creating a community of interests in the southern Balkan and eastern Mediterranean region.”⁹⁷

After the death of Atatürk in 1938 and with the Second World War *ante portas*, the trend of the Greek-Turkish bilateral relations was slowly but steadily beginning to reverse. There was a shift pertinent to the treatment of the Greek-orthodox minority. Additionally, Kemal’s successor İnönü fostered a general foreign policy towards neutrality and the reversal of the territorial *status quo*, settled by the Lausanne Treaty. In other words İnönü was aiming to gain territorial increments at the expense of Greece, which was occupied by the Axis Powers in 1941.⁹⁸

The first significant sign of policy shift occurred in November 1939, when the new Turkish government tangibly changed its attitude towards the minority. The anti-minority sentiment that was spread primarily in Istanbul reflected the Axis racist ideology. It was embraced and supported by the Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu, as well as the Chief of the Turkish General Staff Field

⁹⁶ Harry J. Psomiades, “The Diplomacy of Eleftherios Venizelos: 1928-1930,” *Essays in Memory of Basil Lourdas*, (Thessalonica, 1975), pp. 555-568 as referenced in Hantzivasilliou, “Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement and the Problem of Security in the Balkans 1928-1931,” 32.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Turkish foreign policy during this period and especially after the death of Atatürk is characterized in converging ways. Celic describes it as “cautious, realistic, and generally aimed at the preservation of the status-quo and the hard won victory of 1923.” See Celic, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 30. Tamkoc characterizes it as ‘belligerent neutrality or ‘non belligerency’, defined as the will to maintain neutrality unless attacked by one of the belligerents, namely, the Soviet Union or the Axis Powers. See Metin Tamkoc, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey*, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), 205-206 and 303; Weber characterizes it as dynamic, opportunistic, based on pragmatism and not principles. İnönü pursued this policy as “he wanted to redeem himself [from the burden bestowed upon him, from the negotiations of the Lausanne Treaty], and he attempted to do so by gaining territory for Turkey.” See Weber, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain, and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*, 214.

Marshal Tasvir Cakmak.⁹⁹ This policy was confirmed in November 1942 when the Turkish authorities conceived and implemented the tax on wealth known thereafter as *Varlik Vergisi*. This was a largely discriminatory measure directed against the minorities that included the Greek-orthodox,¹⁰⁰ and it resulted in economic stagnation as well as physical maltreatment of its members. It is important to note at this point that although Prime Minister Inonu was preoccupied with foreign policy decisions and allowed the government to take care of itself, he personally directed and overlooked the implementation of this measure.¹⁰¹ The tax of *Varlik Vergisi* was finally repelled on March 1944, an action attributed primarily “to the desire on the part of the Turkish statesmen to appeal to the United States,”¹⁰² and in a broader sense to the desire of the Turkish officials to improve relations with the Western allies.

Inonu, contrary to all agreements signed between Greece and Turkey such as the Balkan pact of 1934, and the bilateral agreements of 1933 and 1938 failed to declare war against Germany, when the latter invaded Greece through Bulgaria in April 1941.¹⁰³ In other words Turkey breeched the fundamental principal of *pacta sunt servanda*, which is the heart of international law and states’ relations, in the frame of the Balkan Pact and all relevant bilateral accords. Moreover, during the deliberations with Great Britain, pressing for the

⁹⁹ Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” 102; While Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu was known for his pro-Axis beliefs, along with Marshal Cakmak, was forced to resign in June 1944. The resignation occurred “due to the fact that the Council of Ministers had disapproved the conduct of the foreign relations of Turkey by [him],” as part of the general pro-allied foreign policy shift that occurred at the wake of the Cairo Summit conference, see Tamkoc, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey*, 215; However Menemencioglu was probably the government’s escape goat as President Inonu was ‘his own prime Minister and foreign Minister. He was in absolute control of the foreign relations of Turkey from 1938 to the middle 1950,” see *ibid.*, 221-222.

¹⁰⁰ According to Alexandris, 100,000 members of the Istanbul Greek-orthodox minority that represented 0.5% of the Turkish population contributed 20% of the total revenue collected from this tax, see *ibid.*, p.107; for further discussion of this ill conceived discriminatory measure see Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), 231-236.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁰² Ambassador in Ankara (von Papen) to Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Ankara, June 16, 1943 as referenced in *ibid.*, 236.

¹⁰³ Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” 88-89.

Turkish entry into the war on the Allied side Foreign Minister Menemenecioglu "... raised [the] old demand for territorial compensation in the Dodecanese Islands, Bulgarian Thrace, and Albania. They [the politico-military establishment] even evinced a new interest in controlling the Greek port of Salonika, which [...] would have given [to Turkey] the predominant position in the Aegean."¹⁰⁴ At the same time, as an evidence of a "flip-flop" policy, Turkey was negotiating with the Nazi regime, advancing by and large similar demands. The suggestion was that Turkish units were to guard the occupied Greek Islands of Chios, Samos and Lesbos, thus relieving the burden from the German High Command.¹⁰⁵ Finally, a further proof of the Turkish decision to undermine Greek-Turkish relations is that the Turkish authorities failed to appoint an ambassadorial delegation to the exile Greek government. The deterioration of the bilateral relations was so sharp that the 1943 official visit, of the Greek Prime Minister, Tsouderos, to Ankara never occurred.¹⁰⁶

C. THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD: 1947-1955

The end of WW II brought even more confusing days than those preceding it. Greece was struggling in a guerrilla war against communist territorial demands, with insurgents operating from bases of Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia. Turkey, on the other hand, although unaffected by the devastation of war was facing Soviet advances to revise the Status of the Turkish Straits.¹⁰⁷ The British government, which was supporting the effort in Greece and Turkey

¹⁰⁴ Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 30 October 1940, P.R.O., F.O. 371/R8130/316/44, as referenced in Weber, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain, and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*, 60; furthermore, Weber indicates that the primary intention of the Turkish Foreign Minister was "to bring the Dodecanese Islands and the Bulgarian Trace under Turkish jurisdiction," see *ibid.*, 208.

¹⁰⁵ Kroll to Papen, 29 April 1941, A.A. 1303/1314 as referenced in *Ibid.*, 82; while the issue was dismissed Weber argues that it was not raised again as Turkey was aiming at the greater prize of the Iraqi province of Mosul, see *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Greece after the Nazi invasion and occupation established an exile government in Alexandria Egypt. Alexandris, "The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954," 89 and 108.

¹⁰⁷ William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 257-258.

both militarily and economically, in February 1947 announced that “British aid to Greece and Turkey would end in six weeks.”¹⁰⁸ In other words the British, due to the financial devastation suffered as a corollary of the Second World War, contemplated withdrawing their support by March 1947 and thus creating a power vacuum.

On the other hand the Soviet advances and encroachment policies mobilized the U.S. to devise in March 1947 and implement in the following years a set of policies to counter Communist infiltration in Europe. President Truman enunciated his doctrine making “... the policy of the United States to support the free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”¹⁰⁹

Two months after the proclamation of the Truman doctrine, under the auspices of the Greek Vice President, Sophocles Venizelos, a joint committee was created in Athens with the task to promote the Greek-Turkish cooperation as part of a regeneration process of the former rapprochement. As early as the summer of 1947 the military cooperation for mutual defense consultation between the two Greek and Turkish General Staffs was revived. The newly established cooperation was endorsed, closely monitored and at a certain degree instigated by the U.S. as well as by Great Britain.¹¹⁰ During the next year the bilateral cooperation was enriched with economic as well as cultural agreements.¹¹¹ Throughout the initial steps of this process the Greek side was keeping a precautionary stance. The reason was due to the Turkish policies towards the Greek-orthodox minority of Istanbul and the aforementioned taxation. Moreover, there is plausible evidence that the Turkish side was considering using

¹⁰⁸ Dean Acheson, *Present at the creation: My years in the State Department*, 1st ed. (New York,: Norton, 1969), 217.

¹⁰⁹ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry Truman, 1947* vol. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 178 as cited in Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 453.

¹¹⁰ Stephen Xydis, “New Light on the Big Three Crisis over Turkey in 1945,” *Middle Eastern Journal* 14 (1960) 416-418, as referenced in Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” p. 165 endnote 294.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 119-121.

the Ecumenical Patriarchate as further leverage towards the Greek government, cognizant of the Greek sentiment on that issue. In addition, the territory of the Dodecanese islands was also another thorny issue since the Turkish side was utilizing backdoor policies to gain territorial increments. As mentioned above the final disposition of the islands was pending; moreover the Soviets were "... probing in the Dodecanese islands ..."¹¹² Finally the islands were ceded to Greece in the context of the 1947 Treaty of Paris and as reparations of the Greek-Italian War of 1940-1941.¹¹³

The two final episodes of this era of the Greek Turkish relations can be summarized as the efforts of both countries to become members of the Atlantic Alliance and join the UN forces in the Korean War. The question of the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Alliance, which had already been considered by the North Atlantic Council in 1950, became a subject of prolonged consultation inside the Atlantic Alliance in 1951. In May 1951 the Greek and Turkish Governments, renewed their claim for membership. On the strategic plane it was common knowledge that the addition of the two countries would reinforce the southern flank of the Alliance, thus providing credible defense to the approaches of the Near and Middle East as well as Eastern Mediterranean. Just as vital were the transatlantic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), securing the SLOCs of Eastern Mediterranean passing through the Suez Canal.¹¹⁴ On the

¹¹² Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East : Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 404.

¹¹³ The Turkish straits, the Lausanne treaty, the Montreux Declaration and the Dodecanese Islands are intertwined in a complicated nexus of the international relations context during the early Cold War. Turkey was inhibited to advance any territorial claims in the Aegean since such a motion could provide the pretext for further Soviet demands pertinent to the revision, in particular the territorial and legal status, of the Turkish Straits. Alexandris, "The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954," 118. Moreover, and confirming the aforementioned assertion, Vali points out the "... Turkish government considered it unwise to oppose the merger of the islands [the Dodecanese] with Greece despite some popular and military pressures," see Váli, *Bridge Across The Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 227. On the British Foreign Minister Bevin's advice to the Turkish government not to raise the subject, see Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, Washington 1974, 173.

¹¹⁴ Gustav Schmidt, ed., *A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years*, 3 vols., vol. 3 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 359-361.

political plane however, some member governments feared that the admission of Turkey, which had a common frontier with Soviet Russia and Bulgaria, might aggravate international tension.

Moreover Turkey in an effort to curb the opposition of some of the members of the Atlantic Alliance opposing her accession in the North Atlantic Pact decided to send a contingent under the UN flag in Korea. This provided an incentive to Greece to send her own expeditionary force in the Far East Peninsula.¹¹⁵ In other words both countries exploited the opportunity provided by the Korean War and their participation in the UN forces as an additional leverage to become members of the Atlantic Alliance, thus securing their defense interests towards Communist encroachment.¹¹⁶

By 1951 the situation in the two countries had been sufficiently stabilized to allow them to participate in planning for the defense of the Mediterranean region. NATO meanwhile studied both political and military aspects, of the accession of the two countries, with a favorable outcome. A protocol inviting Greece and Turkey to join the Atlantic Treaty which modified the definition of the territories and forces contained in Article 6 of the Treaty was signed by the Council Deputies on October 1951. In February 1952, the two Mediterranean countries became formal members of the Alliance, thus initiating NATO's first enlargement process as expressed in Article 10¹¹⁷ of the Atlantic Treaty and

¹¹⁵ Celic, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 36.

¹¹⁶ Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 51. It must also be noted that according to President Inonu, Turkey view its participation in NATO as being accepted as "a respected member of the civilized world," as quoted in Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 117.

¹¹⁷ Article 10 of NATO's founding treaty stipulates that:

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

See NATO Basic Texts, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, available from [<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>]; Internet, accessed on October 22, 2004.

thereby strengthening the Alliance's southern flank.¹¹⁸ At the time and throughout the Cold War both countries were considered as "... strategic Siamese twins guarding the vital gates of warm water entry into the Black Sea, and at the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union."¹¹⁹

In general and after a close examination of the exchange of visits of government official as well as military and bureaucracy officials, one can firmly support the argument that the two countries were deepening their relationship. It is imperative to note that even the Greek king visited Ankara and Istanbul during June of 1952, spurring a sequence of visit exchanges in a mutually cordial atmosphere.¹²⁰ This improvement in Greek-Turkish relations was reflected in the rhetoric used in the statements of the officials of both countries which, while exploiting symbolism, significantly raised expectations. The Turkish President Celal Bayar, during his state visit to Greece in January 1954, described Greek-Turkish cooperation as "the best example of how two countries who mistakenly mistrusted each other for centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal collaboration as a result of recognition of the realities of life."¹²¹ During an official visit in Ankara the Greek Prime Minister Papagos declared that "... there is no issue between the two countries that cannot be resolved in a friendly way."¹²²

¹¹⁸ Lord Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954*, (Paris, 1954), 39-40.

¹¹⁹ Theodore A. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*, Studies of influence in international relations (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1983), 24.

¹²⁰ Alexandris, "The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954," 120-121.

¹²¹ *New York Times*, January 30, 1954, as cited in Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 228.

¹²² Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations, 1918-1974*, (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), 227.

As part of the regional cooperation and with U.S. encouragement and guidance,¹²³ both countries began discussions with Yugoslavia in an effort to revive the '*Entente Cordiale*' of the 1930s. This resulted in 1953 in the signing of an "Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation" that obliged the members to consult each other on matters of common interest, as well as on military affairs. The Agreement was transformed in the second formal Balkan Defense Pact in 1954, with common defense provisions similar NATO's Article 5. However, the pact proved to be "stillborn" and completely lost its significance with the improvement of the Russian Yugoslav relations after 1955.¹²⁴

Historical scrutiny of the domestic policies of Turkey after the Second World War and through the early Cold War years demonstrates the "transition [of the country] from a single party to a multi party system."¹²⁵ For Turkey to become "a member of the Western comity of nations"¹²⁶ was imperative to advance its domestic politics to a more pluralistic context. Although "[t]he multiparty period in the history of the Turkish republic officially started in July 1945 ...,"¹²⁷ the democratization process did not entailed for Turkey the anticipated results. In stark contrast with Western societies, Turkish democratization led to a revitalization of Islam in society. This fact stemmed from the corruption of the

¹²³ One author further suggests that the greater strategic aim of the Balkan Pact was to indirectly link Yugoslavia to NATO and more broadly the West, serving as an example of cooperation for the other Balkan and Eastern European countries. See N.A Staurou, "Greek American relations and Their Impact on Balkan Cooperation," in Theodore A. Coulombis and John O. Iatrides, *Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review*, (New York, NY: Pella Pub. Co., 1980), 155. Turkey's participation in the Balkan Pact was part of a prevailing trend of participating in regional security arrangements that included the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which was in 1960 transformed into CENTO. See Celic, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 37-80.

¹²⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 124-125.; see also Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 170.

¹²⁵ Celic, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 38

¹²⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 116-117

¹²⁷ Celic, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 39

new social elites and "... the new ruling group, [which] used highly undemocratic methods, stifled freedom of expression and appeared to jeopardize Kemalist reforms."¹²⁸

The trend in the bilateral relations context was once again sharply reversed after September 6, 1955 as a result of the thoroughly organized multilevel riots against the Greek-orthodox minority of Istanbul. Furthermore, it must be noted that the riots were extended even to the Greek contingent serving at NATO Regional Headquarters in Izmir.¹²⁹ The riots were carried out by the nationalistic citizen's association, "Cyprus is Turkish," led by Hikmet Bil, editor of the newspaper *Hurriyet*. Moreover, the unrest was extended to looting, property destruction, and loss of life and intimidation of the Greek-Orthodox minority.¹³⁰ However, the unrest was not an isolated incident but part of a well orchestrated policy aiming to exert further leverage during ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus issue.¹³¹ In other words, the Menderes government "involved" in a way the Greek-Orthodox minority, since it was a well known, sensitive "nerve" of the Greek foreign policy, dating from the Venizelos era. Thus the Turkish policy of encroachment of the Greek-Orthodox minority was not aimed primarily at the

¹²⁸ Váli, *Bridge Across The Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 64-65. It should be noted that at a later stage the direct corollary was the military coup of May 27, 1960 that lasted 18 months.

¹²⁹ The riots were organized as a "spontaneous" answer to rumors of two bomb explosions at the Atatürk's birthplace and the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, Greece. The latter, 25 years were proved to be fabricated and organized by the Turkish Consultant General in Thessalonica, see *Hurriyet*, September 7, 1980 as referenced in Alexandris, "To Meionotiko Zitima 1954-1987 [The Minority Issue 1954-1987] in Thanos Veremis, *Istoria ton Ellinotourkikon sxeseon 1453-2003 [History of Greek-Turkish Relations 1453-2003]*, (Athens: Sideris, 2003), p. 496 and p. 542 endnote 7.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 495-501.

¹³¹ Cyprus was under British rule, recognized by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. After WWII and the Atlantic Charter declaration, the international climate favored decolonization and movements of self-determination. In the context of the Island's self-determination in 1950 a plebiscite was organized among the members of the Greek-Cypriot majority, favored union (*enosis*) with Greece. Such a plan was by and large unfavorable for the Turkish-Cypriot minority, the U.K. and Turkey as it was seen by the latter as a Greek encirclement. However, after a long and bloody struggle the Greek Cypriots managed to make a strong case for the Island's self determination movement. However, at that point the British applying a *divide et impera* policy, since the Lausanne Treaty had no clause for justifying Turkish participation in any kind of negotiations pertinent to Cyprus, invited Greece and Turkey to participate in the so called tripartite discussions concerning the Island's future. See Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, 31-35.

minority itself (though the results of such policy were a favorable byproduct) but at the Greek side, in the view of the tripartite discussions among Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom for the future of Cyprus that were under way in London since August of the same year.¹³² Moreover, it should also be emphasized that according to Hale the Menderes government utilized the mounting of the anti-minority sentiment as "... means of distracting attention from [its] domestic failures."¹³³

The Greek-Turkish cooperation on one hand after the Second World War was cautious at its beginning primarily due to the Greek suspicion over the real Turkish intentions. On the other hand it succeeded primarily due to the existence of the common Soviet threat and the consequent will of both Greece and Turkey to join NATO.¹³⁴ Moreover during the starting years of the Cold War both countries largely influenced by the U.S. and to a lesser extent by Great Britain 'subordinated their own national interests at the behest of alliance cohesion and the need for collective action'.¹³⁵ In a repeating pattern when Turkey perceived her interests threatened in the context of the Cyprus issue, she did not hesitate to torpedo the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of the 1950's. As Bahcheli further asserts "[a]s long as Greek and Turkish interests coincided, as they did for nearly a decade after the Second World War, there was no reason why their warming relationship could not have made further progress."¹³⁶ This progress never occurred. The next period of rapprochement was initiated almost thirty years later and will be explored by the next section of this chapter.

¹³² The allegation was proven true five years later, at the 1960-61 Yassıada trials, during which Prime Minister İnönü and his foreign minister Zorlu were found guilty of having masterminded the riots. See Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1963), 33-35.

¹³³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 131.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 124.

¹³⁵ Stephan F. Larabee, "The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey," in Paul S. Shoup and George W. Hoffman, *Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s*, (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center Press, 1990), 175.

¹³⁶ Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, 16.

D. THE LATE COLD WAR ATTEMPTS: 1988-1989

This period marks a great milestone in Word Affairs, as the precipitating events in the Soviet Union brought an abrupt end to the Cold War. In a parallel manner, this period also marked another “dramatic” Greek-Turkish rapprochement that would prove to be shortlived. This new effort came eight months after the high intense crisis of March 1987, over oil exploitation rights in the Aegean seabed.¹³⁷ The issue of the Aegean Continental Shelf had resurfaced in January 1987 and the crisis reached its apex in the last days of March, bringing the two countries at brink of war for the first time since 1976.¹³⁸

In late January 1988 the two Prime Ministers, Turgut Ozal of Turkey and Andreas Papandreou of Greece, met during the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland. The two-day meetings took place in a mutually cordial atmosphere. A joint *communiqué* largely revealed the main motivation for the meetings and emphasized the necessity of avoiding confrontations that have the potential of escalating to hostilities. Specifically, paragraph 3 of the *communiqué* stipulated that:

The Prime Ministers [...] further elaborated on the recent crisis in the Aegean which brought the two countries at the brink of war, expressed at the same time their optimism introduced as the consequence of exchanged messages between them. They agreed that from now on such a crisis should never be repeated and both sides must concentrate their efforts for the establishment of lasting peaceful relations.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ For a summary and assessment of the 1987 crisis see “AEGEAN SEA III,” *International Crisis Behavior (ICB) online*, available from [<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>]; Internet, accessed on October 20, 2004.

¹³⁸ Further details in Chapter IV.

¹³⁹ *Greek-Turkish Communiqué*, January 31, 1988 at Davos Switzerland, par. 3 in United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs., United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East., and Library of Congress. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division., *Greek-Turkish Relations: Beginning of a New Era?: Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S. House of Representatives*, (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1989), 13. Interesting is the fact that paragraph 2 of the communiqué without elaborating referred to “certain circles” that exploit the differences between the two countries,[emphasis mine].

Moreover, they called for intensification of bilateral contacts, reciprocal visits at all levels with emphasis on the encouragement of tourism and cultural exchanges. To this end two committees were established; an economic committee to explore the areas of cooperation, such as trade, joint ventures, tourism, etc., and a political committee which aimed to define the problematic issues, explore the potential of mutually identifying them and seek long lasting solutions. Moreover, a hotline between Ankara and Athens was established.¹⁴⁰ The aforementioned momentum was thereafter referred as “the spirit of Davos.”

With the trend in bilateral relations slowly restoring, the Turkish government in a gesture of goodwill rescinded a 1964 decree that restricted property rights of Greek nationals in Turkey, and lifted visa requirements for Greeks visiting Turkey. In a reciprocal gesture Greece lifted its objections for the reactivation of the 1964 Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community.¹⁴¹ In the months that followed the Davos breakthrough, numerous meetings of the established committees, and reciprocal visits of various level officials at the two capitals, took place. Most noticeably, in May military and diplomatic experts concluded an agreement on confidence-building measures (CBM's), based on a Memorandum of Understanding under the auspices of NATO's Secretary. It included *inter alia* a pledge “... to respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each other and their rights to use the high seas and international airspace of the Aegean.”¹⁴² Finally, in September, Foreign Ministers Karolos Papoulias and Mesut Yilmaz adopted a document

¹⁴⁰ *Greek-Turkish Communiqué*, January 31, 1988 at Davos Switzerland, paragraph 7 in *ibid.*

¹⁴¹ The stagnation of the association agreement was a corollary of the 1980 military coup, see Demetri Konstas, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, (London: Macmillan, 1991), 20-21.

¹⁴² Memorandum of Understanding, May 27, 1988, par. 2 in United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs., United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East., and Library of Congress. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division., *Greek-Turkish Relations: Beginning of a New Era?: Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S. House of Representatives*, 15-16.

containing the “Guidelines for the prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace.”¹⁴³

The “Spirit of Davos” culminated in May 1988, with the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Ozal in Athens, which was the first visit at this level for thirty-five years. With his rhetoric Ozal exploited symbolism, speaking about the history of the two nations and their grievances, as well as the period of cooperation between Venizelos and Atatürk. According to Volcan, Ozal’s “physiologically informed speech” was intended to “extend olive branch to Greece.”¹⁴⁴ The Greek public opinion, however, did not react as in previous eras. As a result Birand asserts that the visit failed to meet its starting expectations.¹⁴⁵ However, one must note, setting aside the public opinion sentiment, that within NATO both countries continued to veto each other’s country chapter at the NATO Defense Committee. Moreover, Greece objected Mersin’s port exclusion during negotiations of the conventional forces in Europe treaty in the frame of CSCE. As a final point astonishingly throughout this period the Greek and Turkish air forces were still engaged on an almost daily basis in dogfights over disputed parts of the Aegean airspace. In this manner the prospect of hostilities still remained a plausible option.¹⁴⁶

The Davos meeting and its consequent achievements marked a significant departure from previous policies, especially for Greece and A. Papandreou. Papandreou was first elected in 1981, employing strongly anti-west and anti-NATO rhetoric, based on the notion of “independent” foreign policy. In relation to Turkey he was highly critical of the previous conservative Karamanlis

¹⁴³ Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey Aegean Issues-Background and Recent Development,” 5.

¹⁴⁴ Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict*, (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1994), 158-159.; While Papandreou had scheduled a reciprocal visit to Ankara later that year, the visit never materialized as he became ill and was hospitalized in England for a significant period of time in the second half of 1988.

¹⁴⁵ Mehmet Ali Birand, “Turkey and the ‘Davos Process’: experiences and Prospects,” in Konstas, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, 35-36. According to Birand, most of his analysis is based on information obtained during interviews primarily with the Turkish Prime Minister.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 2.

government, accusing it for unilateral concessions. After his election the policy was transformed towards more pragmatic grounds, contrary to the previous inflexible ideological positions.¹⁴⁷ In relation to Turkey he claimed that the precondition for normalization of bilateral relations and resumption of dialogue was the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces from Cyprus. Moreover, in December 1984 he made public the adoption of a new defense doctrine, according to which the main threat was perceived as stemming from Turkey, instead of the Warsaw Pact. Greece in the context of this defense doctrine gradually built a deterrent posture¹⁴⁸ in an effort to deter the perceived Turkish revisionism leaving aside reactive policies.¹⁴⁹ Methodologically the process initiated at Davos was the triumph of personal diplomacy for the Greek prime minister.

As a result one can argue that Papandreou's incentives for the Davos process can be attributed to the following: First, the Greek prime minister realized abruptly that Greece almost reached a state of war, which would have had devastating effects on the fragile Greek economy. Economic issues were of paramount importance, since Greece from 1985 had been in a period of austerity. Contemplated defense cuts could redirect economic recourses to finance more popular social policies. Second, although the Cyprus problem was de-coupled from the process, a potential rapprochement was expected to have positive influences on the Turkish Cypriot side. Turkish Cypriots were anticipated

¹⁴⁷ Fotini Bellou, "The political Scene: Consolidating Democracy," in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore C. Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou, *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, (Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2003), 163-164.

¹⁴⁸ The fundamental turning point in the Greek strategic thinking occurred in 1974 after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, which followed the ill conceived, by the Greek military junta, coup against the Cypriot government. The conservative Karamanlis government after 1974 and the subsequent socialist of Papandreou after 1981 formulated a deterrent strategy, with the threat publicized after 1984. For analysis see Athanasios Platias, "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In search of Autonomy and Deterrence," in Konstas, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, 91-108.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., and Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey," in *ibid.*, 46. In relations to the likelihood of reconstituting a bilateral dialogue over the Aegean issues Papandreou opposed it emphasizing that

'a dialogue is meant give and take, and in our case is only to give. We have no claims, and therefore there can be nothing positive for Greece from such dialogue.'
As quoted in *ibid.*, 47.

to be encouraged to adopt more flexible positions. Finally, the East-West rapprochement, corollary of the Reagan-Gorbachev summitry, appeared to have provided Papandreou with an impetus to solve the regional problems through cooperative initiatives.¹⁵⁰

On the other hand, Turgut Ozal ascended to power as his party achieved “a landslide victory with over 45 percent of the vote ...” in the November 1983 [elections and was aiming to] [...] consequent restoration of democracy[; he] thus ha[d] a clear mandate to fully implement his reformist program.”¹⁵¹ He was reelected in November 1987 and his agenda included mainly economic reforms aiming to open and liberalize the country’s economy. Moreover, he sought to minimize the military interference in politics. Ozal’s overall strategic vision was outlined in a speech at the Turkish parliament when he stated that “the aim of the economic liberalization program and our reforms was to facilitate our integration into the European Community as a full member.”¹⁵² As it has been argued, “Ozal’s eagerness for the Davos process to succeed reflects his desire to demonstrate Turkey’s political and diplomatic acceptability in Europe.”¹⁵³

Additionally, according to Birand the Turkish Prime Minister sought to improve bilateral relations with all neighboring countries. While promoting economic interdependence with the countries of the region, he held the issue of improving the Greek-Turkish relations high at his agenda, and took initiatives that could create an atmosphere of trust. The Davos process was also a triumph of

¹⁵⁰ United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs., United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East., and Library of Congress. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division., *Greek-Turkish Relations: Beginning of a New Era?: Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S. House of Representatives*, 4-5., see also Coufoudakis, “Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey,” 50.

¹⁵¹ Celic, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 69.

¹⁵² Quoted in Meltem Muftuler, “Turkish Economic Liberalization and European Integration,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 31, (1995), p.95, as referenced in Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 178.

¹⁵³ United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs., United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East., and Library of Congress. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division., *Greek-Turkish Relations: Beginning of a New Era?: Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S. House of Representatives*, 5.

Ozal's personal diplomatic skills, as he maintained that a new *datum* for the Greek-Turkish relations was possible if "... a system of fossilized bureaucracy and a rigid [military] establishment," could be overcome.¹⁵⁴ Papandreou and Ozal shared similar perceptions in relation with the economic burdens of a protracted arms race between the two countries and this served an additional incentive for the Davos initiative. Both leaders recognized that it was for their countries' best interest to redirect resources of the budget from defense expenditures to social policies promoting welfare.

Despite the expectations raised in its start, the "Spirit of Davos" proved to be short-lived failing to produce long lasting results. As early as 1989, signs of reversal were visible and included, *inter alia*, Increased numbers of Turkish violations of Greek airspace, provocations and pertinent rhetoric related to the Muslim minority of Western Thrace,¹⁵⁵ and failure of the political committee to achieve consensus and develop fresh ideas to the resolution of the issues in question. As a final point it must be noted that both sides had their share in undermining the process. For example, the Greek government spokesperson repeated the Greek position that the only outstanding difference is the delimitation of the Continental shelf, while the Turkish foreign Minister spokesperson, Inal Batu, reciprocated, claiming the irregularities of the Greek

¹⁵⁴ Birand, "Turkey and the 'Davos Process': Experiences and Prospects," 29-31. These early initiatives, however, were rebuffed by the Greek government as insincere, since the practice of the Turkish government was perceived to be not in compliance with the employed cooperative rhetoric. For example, Turkey diplomatically recognized the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRC), making it the only state that has done so. The action was explicitly condemned by the United Nations Security Council at May 11, 1984, with the adoption of Resolution 550 (paragraph 2); for its complete content see [\[http://odsddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/487/80/IMG/NR048780.pdf?OpenElement;\]](http://odsddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/487/80/IMG/NR048780.pdf?OpenElement;) Internet, accessed on October 31, 2004.

¹⁵⁵ The treatment of the Muslim minority in Thrace is often referred to as a strained point in bilateral relations, as the Turkish government has often accused the Greek government of neglecting their economic, educational and religious rights. It is interesting to note, however, that the Muslim minority in Thrace is increasing, numbering an estimated 125,000, which is an indicator that the community is flourishing. This contrasts sharply with the Greek-Orthodox minority in Istanbul that has shrunk to 3,000 members, and in Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) it is practically non-existent. See Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge Concise Histories (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 208; see also Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, 176-185.

airspace, militarization of the Aegean Islands and expanded search and rescue responsibility, in the Aegean, for Turkey.¹⁵⁶

As discussed above, the process was based on both leaders' personal views and conduct. In the Greek domestic politics sphere Papandreou was heavily criticized by the opposition party. This critique broke the general domestic consensus that had been in force between the major Greek political parties in relation to the Cyprus imbroglio since 1974. The basic premise of the opposition politics in Greece against the negotiation process was that Papandreou conceded to a rapprochement with Turkey, thereby abandoning the Cyprus issue. Moreover, he was criticized for sustaining the procedure without having any concrete reciprocal gestures from Turkey.¹⁵⁷ This last argument must be noted, as it will be reiterated in the future, and major analysts and scholars agree upon it. As Pridham observes, the process failed to diffuse amongst the populace, and the rapprochement was supported by only 30 per cent of the Greek population.¹⁵⁸ Papandreou's illness during the second half of 1988, combined with personal as well as financial scandals during the 1989 electoral campaign, made the process domestically unsustainable, and it finally collapsed during the early 1990's.¹⁵⁹

Similar was the case of Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, who became enmeshed in various political concerns, including internal party opposition. Moreover, in a manner parallel to that of the Greek populace issue just discussed, 45 percent of the Turkish public rejected any unilateral partial removal of Turkish forces from Cyprus.¹⁶⁰ Finally, one can argue that although Ozal was

¹⁵⁶ Coufoudakis, "Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974-89," 53 and Richard Clogg, "Greek-Turkish Relations post 1974," in Konstas, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, 21.

¹⁵⁷ Coufoudakis, "Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974-89," 52; see also Volkan and Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict*, 159-160.

¹⁵⁸ Geoffrey Pridham, "Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement," in Konstas, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, 85. See also Mustafa Aydin, "Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities," in Aydin and Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*, 32.

¹⁵⁹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 187-199.

¹⁶⁰ Pridham, "Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement," 85.

pursuing an olive branch policy, he was not substantially abiding by it, conveying mixed messages. According to Kramer

[the] personal flexibility of the Turkish prime minister should not, however, be confused with a readiness for a hasty abandonment of political positions. On the contrary, Ozal generally has a very precise idea of his policy goals [...]. This could be seen very clearly during the 'Davos process' when Ozal refused any moves that went beyond the phase of confidence building and could give rise to the impression that he might be ready to deal with the substantial issues of the Greek-Turkish conflict.¹⁶¹

Consistent with the above mentioned notion, he was at the same time articulating, in moderate terms, confusing rhetoric. As an example, in 1989 he fully supported the Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktas's suspension of ongoing consultation with the Cypriot President Vassiliou and the consequent rejection of the de Cuellar plan for the solution of the Cyprus issue.¹⁶²

E. CONCLUSION

The Greek Turkish reconciliation and détente, although difficult due to chronic, deeply embedded, controversial feelings and views among the two nations, is not an impossible task to achieve. However, such an achievement can not be deduced to the simplistic will of two disputants to "bury the hatchet" of war and live in peace. The reviewed cases of rapprochement suggest that all three attempts at rapprochement had been instrumental in their conception and stemmed from divergent starting points.

All three case studies discussed above have more or less the same characteristics. One can argue based on hindsight that the three case studies

¹⁶¹ Heinz Kramer, "Turkey's Relations with Greece," in Konstas, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, 67.

¹⁶² Coufoudakis, "Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974-89," 53. Ozal's ambiguity became visible after 1991 when he supported Pan-Turkism. To that extent he declared for Turkey that "the shrinking process that began at the walls of Vienna had been reversed" and the notion of a "Turkish speaking community of states stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" became part of the official discourse; as quoted in Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 176 and 179.

were initiated when strong and stable governments were leading both countries. The Venizelos and Papandreou cases were also based on the personal views of both leaders who pursued their policies without co-opting influential bureaucracies. The case of the early 1950s, though not a product of personal diplomacy, had also a strong incentive taking into account the international and regional security status of the era. The common enemy and the common beneficiary provided the necessary incentives for the rapprochement. Thus the common denominator for the initiation of the rapprochement processes under examination is a set of the following attributes:

Strong leadership in both countries. The cases above suggest that when prominent political figures are in power in both countries there are better chances for a process to be initiated. These statesmen are eager to take upon themselves the burdens of diplomatic discourse and willing to circumvent the political inertia of bureaucracy and public opinion.

Mutually shared or least not opposite national interests. History proves that when the national interests of two countries converge, there is an increased likelihood for a rapprochement process. Venizelos and Kemal both sought to approach one another in a tumultuous era to consolidate their countries' territorial boundaries. Moreover, the Turkish side sought also for financial compensation, a pattern that in an analogy will be reiterated in the future. The Soviet empire and the threat it presented to both countries provided them an excellent opportunity to enter the Western Countries' club. Through NATO both Greece and Turkey managed to modernize their armed forces and guarantee their territorial integrity when both had borders with Warsaw Pact countries.

In the Papandreou-Ozal case both countries were facing financial issues. Notwithstanding the different nature and magnitude of these issues, it was not to Greece's or to Turkey's benefit to initiate and engage in an armed confrontation. Both countries realized that cooperative policies were more beneficial and thus the process culminated with the signing of the confidence building measures agreement.

The dissolution of the Greek Turkish rapprochements on the other hand, is equally explainable. Bureaucracies based on the own ill-posed perceptions and mixed messages constitute a general pattern. Moreover, the divergence of national interests instigated by endogenous dynamics further contributes to the erosion of the processes. All the above case studies were initiated in a top down approach and collapsed when the leaders who incepted and implemented them disappeared from the political landscape; or when influential parts of state actors generally in discord with the process were given the opportunity to inflict damage in the procedure, as they feel threatened from it. However, the most recent case of Greek-Turkish rapprochement that will be examined in the following chapter bears at least one significant difference with those already scrutinized; it gained impetus by spontaneous reaction to a physical catastrophe that hit both countries in a short period of time: an earthquake.

IV. THE PERIOD OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS: 1999-2004

A. INTRODUCTION

[A]t crucial moments, at turning points in history, when factors appear more or less equally balanced, chance, individuals and their decisions [...] can determine the course of history.¹⁶³

This chapter will examine the latest of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement efforts initiated in 1999 and anticipated to reach its first major milestone in December 2004. In particular, on December 17, 2004 the EU Council will evaluate the recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress for accession to the Union. The estimate and all reports from scholars, politicians, analysts and technocrats advocate that the EU Council will set the long awaited starting date of accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey sometime in 2005. This will most probably be the initiation of a process that is anticipated to be protracted and probably extend beyond the first decade of the 21st century.

The 1999 initiative did not occur in a vacuum; a series of events preceded it. These events, as well as politics and statesmen in both countries, provided the necessary preconditions and set the political landscape for the reconciliation. This chapter will provide in its first part a brief background of the major pertinent events in the aftermath of the 1996 Imia crisis.¹⁶⁴ These events are accounted as the precursors of the rapprochement under discussion. In a stunning similarity,

¹⁶³ Isaiah Berlin, quoted in Ramin Jahanbegloo, "Philosophy and Life: An Interview," *New York Review of Books*, 39, no. 10 (May 28, 1992), 51 as cited in John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.

¹⁶⁴ During this crisis the two countries came at the brink of war once again. The crisis was de-escalated only after high U.S. official mediation that included President Clinton. For a crisis summary and assessment see "AEGEAN SEA IV," *International Crisis Behavior (ICB) online*, available from [<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>] Internet, accessed on November 8, 2004. See also Carol Migdalovitz, *Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, The Library of Congress, 1996, available from [http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgiisirs/Mon+Nov++8+22:46:56+PST+2004/SIRSI/0/518/0/CRS96-140F.pdf/Content/1?new_gateway_db=HYPERION] Internet, accessed on November 8, 2004. The qualitative difference of the specific crisis from others in the past is that Turkey advanced a novel area of dispute, challenging the status quo in the form of the so called "grey zones." Coining that term, Turkey asserted that numerous islands not mentioned explicitly by name in the pertinent treaties are deemed to fall under this category.

as in 1987 both countries sought to circumvent their differences and reach once more a point where channels of communication could be reestablished. The following chapter will continue with a reference to the events and conditions that actually spurred the current reconciliation. Finally, the third section of the chapter will examine developments in economic and defense fields, the impact of the European Union, the Cyprus issue, and cooperation at the political level. Specifically on the last issue, the study will provide a reference to the so-called “high politics” or areas of increased antagonism between the two neighboring countries.

B. THE PRE-EARTHQUAKE (1999) PERIOD

1. The Madrid Declaration and the 1997 Crete Meeting

In July 1997 Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and his Turkish counterpart, Suleyman Demirel, reached an accord, a.k.a. the Madrid Declaration, at the margins of the Madrid NATO Summit. The U.S., and in particular Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Secretary of State, exerted their influence for this accord. The Madrid Declaration contained stipulations in a form of norms and principles meant to govern the bilateral relations of the signatories. In a way the Madrid text provided a well established roadmap to reduce tension in the Aegean. The qualitative differences of the Madrid Declaration are incorporated in the following three principles:

- [R]espect of each other's legitimate and vital interests and concerns in the Aegean;
- a commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding;
- a commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force or threat of force.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ Embassy of Greece, Press office, *Simitis-Demirel meeting leads to joint communiqué on Greek-Turkish relations*, Washington, D.C., July 9, 1997, available from [\[http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=255&article=1520;\]](http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=255&article=1520) Internet, accessed on October 9, 2004.

Hence, Greece made a reconciliatory gesture towards Turkey by recognizing the latter's "vital interests" in the Aegean, and refraining from exercising its right to the 12 nautical mile limit, as mentioned above. On the other hand, the obligations undertaken by Turkey - third principle, given the 1995 *casus belli* threat¹⁶⁶ - is something that a country as a member of the United Nations is obliged to comply with under the U.N. Charter.¹⁶⁷ As a final point it is imperative to note that while many consider that the Madrid agreement was the precursor of the present reconciliation process, this is not exactly true. Madrid occurred in the aftermath of the Imia crisis and it must be accounted in that context.

As a follow on of the Madrid NATO Summit, Prime Ministers Simitis and Yilmaz met in Crete during the November 1997 Balkan countries conference. The conference was a Greek government's initiative conceived to promote regional cooperation, peace and security. However, the meeting did not produce any breakthrough in reducing tensions between the two countries. It has been argued "[t]he Simitis-Yilmaz meeting in Crete revealed the crux of the Greek-Turkish problems and differences."¹⁶⁸ Like the 1987 period, mixed messages were conveyed, with prominent examples, statements of Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz. In December 1997 he declared that Ankara will "intensify integration" with the Turkish Cypriots in the north, a step that clearly implied the threat of

¹⁶⁶ Further analysis in the section that follows in the present chapter.

¹⁶⁷ Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, stipulates that
[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
See United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, Ch. 1, Article 2, available from [<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>;] Internet, accessed on October 12, 2004.

¹⁶⁸ Athanasopoulos, *Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International Law*, 101-102.

annexation.¹⁶⁹ Furthermore, in April 1998, equating Turkey with the Ottoman Empire, Yilmaz asserted that “Greece has expanded its territory 400 percent at the expense of Turkey since it’s establishment.”¹⁷⁰

2. The Ocalan Case and the Kosovo Imbroglio

Two distinct events mark this period further, serving as turning points that lead to the Greek-Turkish ongoing rapprochement. These are the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) insurgency, and the NATO Kosovo air campaign undertaken to stop the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population by Serbs. Despite the fact that these events are totally diverse this thesis will exhibit their role in the process. The role of the first stemmed from its repercussions in Greek domestic policies and the second galvanized the minds of the Turkish policy makers towards the rapprochement.

In February 1999 Ocalan was arrested in Kenya after an adventurous journey in Europe and Russia, during which he attempted to settle as a political refugee. The entanglement of Greek political and diplomatic authorities in the arrest was heavily reproached by Turkish leadership. Ocalan having passed through Greece, was transported in the Greek Embassy in Kenya where he was

¹⁶⁹ Kelly Couturier, "Ankara Ready to Sever European Ties; Angered by EU Rejection, Turkish Leader Threatens Cyprus Peace Effort," *The Washington Post*, December 15 1997. The statement was made in the wake of the Turkish failure to be admitted to the list of candidate states at the next round of accession negotiations in the December 1997 EU summit meeting in Luxembourg. The statements of the Turkish president were complemented by claims of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem that this would happen “whenever EU began admission talks with the Cyprus government,” see Giannes Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, *Greece the Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 325.

¹⁷⁰ As quoted in Thanos Veremis, “The Protracted Crisis,” in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Brassey's, 2001), 47.

arrested.¹⁷¹ The rhetoric reached points of hyperbole. The Turkish President Demirel argued that

...Greece's continuing support to PKK terrorist organization represents nothing but a grave violation of international law [...] Greece has proven that it does not belong to the civilized world. Accordingly, it should be put on the list of the countries supporting terrorism and harboring terrorists. Such a country can only be defined as a "rogue state."¹⁷²

What is important for this study is that the domestic vibrations of the Ocalan affair in Greece forced Foreign Minister Pangalos to resign from office. Pangalos was considered by many (domestically and abroad) as an intelligent, capable, but hawkish figure of the Greek foreign policy.¹⁷³ Prime Minister Simitis appointed as head of the Greek diplomacy the more judicious and certainly more moderate Alternate Foreign Minister George Papandreou, the elder son of the late Andreas Papandreou. The appointment of Papandreou marked a milestone

¹⁷¹ Turkey had often accused Greece of supporting the PKK separatist insurgency, obviously based on the notion that "my enemy's enemy is my friend." To that extent in 1996 Elekdağ, argued in the Turkish Foreign Minister's official publication that Turkey's ational security strategy should be oriented towards a "two-and-a-half campaigns" in order to deter "Greece and Syria, who have claims on Turkey's vital interests and territory." According to Elekdağ the ½ is represented by the PKK insurgency that Greece and Syria are supporting. For a further analysis see Sükrü Elekdağ, "2 1/2 War Strategy," *Perceptions- Journal of International Affairs* Vol. III, no. 4 (March-May 1996)., available from [<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/i1/default.htm>.] Internet, accessed on October 12, 2004.

¹⁷² "President Demirel Answering to Question Regarding Greek Support to PKK Terrorism," February, 22 1999, *Turkish Foreign Ministry Publications, Greece and PKK Terrorism, Annex VIII*, available from [<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh05/17.htm>.] Internet, accessed on October 12, 2004. As a result of rising tensions, the visa exemption for Greek tourists dating back to the Ozal era was cancelled, and more importantly the private sector Turkish-Greek business agreements were abandoned. See Akiman Nachmani, "What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations," in Barry M. Rubin and Kemal Kirisci, *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 76.

¹⁷³ "Greek Ministers Quit over Ocalan," *BBC News-Europe*, 18 February 1999, available from [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/281815.stm>.] Internet, accessed on October 12, 2004.

for the process since the Turkish side would find in his face someone willing to curb Greek foreign policy towards Turkey and initiate a new era.¹⁷⁴

In both countries roughly at the same period the policy makers were alarmed with the incidents in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The fear of the consequences from a potential spill over of the conflict was evident. Large numbers of ethnic Albanian refugees fled Kosovo under the fear of carnage by the Milocevic regime. NATO exhibited its determination to put an end to the ethnic cleansing and in April 1999 initiated an air campaign which lasted about 11 weeks. As Heraklides notes “[i]t was not until this event that the two governments made a decisive entry as clear supporters of détente. The common fear of destabilization in the region and, most of all, the threat of the possibility of change of boundaries in the vicinity by threat or use of force, intensified the contacts between the two worried sides.”¹⁷⁵ In this wake the two foreign ministers, in June 1999 exchanged a series of letters that emphasized the necessity of improvement of bilateral relations.

Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister who is credited with having initiated the process, in a letter to his Greek counterpart stressed the precondition for improved relations and cooperation between the two countries. In a remarkable parallel to Inonu’s response to Venizelos correspondence in 1930, Cem’s letter reads in part:

...our initial step should be to address the problem of what is perceived in Turkey as links that exist in Greece with terrorist organizations and their systematic encouragement. This is a matter of crucial importance for us and recent events have made it imperative that this issue be handled in an explicit manner and at the bilateral level between our two countries... I further suggest that

¹⁷⁴ There is a general consensus among analysts that the replacement of Foreign Minister Pangalos served as one of the catalysts for the improvement of bilateral relations. See Mumtaz Soysal, “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy,” in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 43; see also Gulden Ayman, “Negotiations and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power Situations: The Turkish-Greek Case,” in Aydin and Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*, 232-233; see also Stephen F. Larrabee, “Security in the Eastern Mediterranean,” in Keridis and Triantaphyllou, *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 236-237.

¹⁷⁵ Alexis Heraclides, “The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation,” in Aydin and Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*, 75.

parallel to the signing and implementation of such an agreement, we could also initiate a plan for reconciliation.¹⁷⁶

Papandreou responded by suggesting that cooperation could potentially be expanded in a wide variety of issues. In his letter Papandreou noted that:

...I would like to welcome the expression of willingness from your side to improve our bilateral relations. This is also the sincere wish of the Greek side. Greece is willing to address the issues in our relations within the framework of International Law and Treaties. I strongly believe that we must adopt a realistic approach which will allow outstanding issues to be dealt with in sequence creating thus both a strengthening sense of confidence in our relations and a perspective of further steps along the way [...]. In parallel, we could also envisage resuming dialogue on issues, many of which we have attempted to deal with in the past. Cooperation in several fields of mutual interest such as culture, tourism, environment, crime, economic cooperation and ecological problems should be amongst the topics of our talks.¹⁷⁷

Closer scrutiny of the exchanged correspondence makes evident that Papandreou, instead of rebuffing the precondition set by Cem,¹⁷⁸ was prepared to engage in a cooperative effort which was planned well in advance. This fact is confirmed by Heraklides who asserts that "...Papandreou had prepared the ground for the thaw in Greek foreign ministry (not without difficulty) well before the exchange of letters."¹⁷⁹ The approach was intended to distinguish the so called "low politics," in which the two countries could proceed in building an atmosphere of cooperation, and mutual trust while initially isolating "high politics" issues where the positions of the two countries diverge.

¹⁷⁶ Letter from Mr Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, Ankara, 24 May 1999, available from [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu_c1.htm]; Internet, accessed on November 1, 2004.

¹⁷⁷ Letter from Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to Mr Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Athens, 25 June 1999, available from [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu_c2.htm]; Internet, accessed on November 1, 2004.

¹⁷⁸ It must be noted that Athens vehemently opposed the allegations that supported the activities of PKK, or that harbored terrorists.

¹⁷⁹ Heraclides' interview with officials in the Greek Foreign Ministry, see Heraclides, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation," p. 91 endnote 37.

C. EARTHQUAKE DIPLOMACY

An unpredictable event and the spontaneous reaction of the populace infused new impetus to the novel Greek-Turkish rapprochement. In August 1999 a devastating earthquake occurred in Turkey. Greece was among the first countries to respond to the catastrophe, dispatching search and rescue teams, as well as materiel support for the victims of the earthquake. One month later a less destructive earthquake occurred in Athens. Turkey reciprocated, responding in an analogous manner, dispatching rescue teams to assist the Greeks in their earthquake plight.¹⁸⁰ The rapid and generous mutual support in time of humanitarian crisis had an important psychological effect among the populace. It helped towards gradually altering each other's negative perspectives accumulated and reinforced over the years. Moreover, it created fertile ground for the emergence of a strong feeling of solidarity among the Greek and Turkish peoples.

This tendency was present in the two countries' news media that in previous occasions had fueled nationalistic passions and infused tensions. A Greek newspaper paraphrasing President's Kennedy speech in Berlin stated in its front page that "[w]e are all Turks."¹⁸¹ In a parallel manner Turkish newspapers initiated a self questioning exercise about the events of 1955. For example Haluk Sakin wrote: "The events of 6-7 September [of 1955] were the beginning of a bad period of our history...."¹⁸²

The catastrophic events of August-September and the feelings of sympathy along the coastlines of the Aegean were the necessary conduit to extend the rapprochement to the population. Moreover, it provided the necessary

¹⁸⁰ Larrabee and Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, 84-85.

¹⁸¹ *Ta Nea*, August 20, 1999 quoted Ayten Gundoglu, "Identities in question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation?," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, no. 1 (March 2001): 5.

¹⁸² Haluk Sahin, "Turkiye ile Yunanistan [Turkey and Greece]," *Hurriyet*, September 11, 1999 as quoted in Faruk Sonmezoglu and Gulden Ayman, "The Roots of Conflict and the Dynamics of Change in Turkish-Greek Relations," in Christos Kollias and Gulay Gunluk-Sensen, *Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation, A political Economy Perspective*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 2003), 85.

leverage for foreign policy decision makers. The momentum provided sustained domestic cover for diplomatic initiatives, which are since known with the term “Earthquake” or “seismic” Diplomacy. This cover ultimately helped in insulating the initiatives from possible domestic criticism that hindered previous attempts, as already mentioned. This is a qualitative difference that the latest process has over its earlier counterparts. In other words, while for example the reconciliation process of the late 1980s was seen as a procedure conducted mainly on the political plane, the late 1990s acquired another actor in the face of the two peoples.

The result was that the two Foreign Ministers utilized the earthquake menace and the following impulsive attitudes of their peoples as a precursor to build further their personal relationship and extend it to diplomacy. In a remarkably similar manner like past processes, both statesmen used their personal influences and conducted a sort of personal diplomacy skirting round bureaucratic impediments.¹⁸³

In this spirit, Papandreou and Cem agreed upon establishing six working groups to explore the possibility of cooperation and agreement in the areas proposed by Papandreou’s letter. The efforts culminated with the reciprocal visits of Papandreou to Ankara in January 2000 and Cem’s, to Athens in February 2000. During these rather symbolic visits nine agreements were signed on the “low politics issues,” which include:

- Cooperation in the field of Tourism
- Economic Cooperation
- Cooperation in Science and Technology
- Maritime Transport
- Cultural Cooperation

¹⁸³ Indicative is the assessment made two years later by the former U.S. ambassador to Greece, Nicolas Burns “What Cem and Papandreou were able to achieve has catapulted their countries’ relations forward.[...] They made a strategic decision that they don’t want to be enemies and they don’t want to spend the next 25 to 30 years in an arms race. They made a strategic decision to pursue rapprochement...,” as quoted in Catherine Collins, “Foreign Ministers’ Expanded Worldview links Turkey, Greece,” *The Chicago Tribune*, January 26, 2001, available from [<http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/articlepage.aspx?articleid=906&language=0;>] Internet, accessed on October 21, 2004.

- Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Customs Administrations
- Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments
- Cooperation on Environmental Protection
- Combating Crime, especially terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration.¹⁸⁴

What is very interesting is that the working groups that had been set up to prepare the aforementioned agreements did not dissolve once their task was completed. Instead they continued overseeing implementation, in periodic meetings in an ongoing consultation process.¹⁸⁵ In itself this is of considerable value since it promotes understanding between the two countries as well as the formerly nonexistent transgovernmental cooperation.

D. POST EARTHQUAKE BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. Development of Economic Relations

The unexpected improvement of Greek-Turkish relations combined with the expressed will of the governments to normalize relations, as demonstrated with the signed agreements, opened new doors of communication between the two countries. It paved the way for the mobilization of various forces in the form of two-track diplomacy.¹⁸⁶ The main driving force was the Greek-Turkish Business Partnership Council. This council resumed operations, in September 1999 (10 years since its 1989 deactivation) and organized workgroups in order to further develop relation and cooperation between the Greek–Turkish business

¹⁸⁴ See “Bilateral Relations (The Rapprochement Process),” *Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, available from [\[http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html\]](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html); Internet, accessed on October 12, 2004.

¹⁸⁵ Heraclides, “The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation,” 78-79.

¹⁸⁶ Two Track diplomacy is defined as “an informal interaction between influential members of opposing groups. Its aim is to define and examine psychological impediments to the peace process, to develop strategies to influence public opinion, and to organize resources in ways favorable to the resolution of conflict.” See Volkan and Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict*, p. 214 footnote 269.

communities. As a result significant numbers of professional, social and business groups were mobilized promoting peace between the two countries.¹⁸⁷

The direct corollary was the initiation of significant projects in both countries. It is noteworthy that Greek-Turkish business exchanges, as early as the year 2000, reached approximately the amount of \$1 billion, whereas, in 1995 they were confined to \$411 million.¹⁸⁸ In addition, Greek exports to Turkey rose significantly to \$592.1 million in 2000, while in 1994 were \$168.7 million. Turkey's exports to Greece rose by 52.8 % in 2003 to \$902.64 million, while Greek exports to Turkey rose 36.16 percent to \$425.45 million. Bilateral trade exceeded \$1.3 billion in 2003, up 39.9 % from the previous year. Several measures accounted for such increase, including the bilateral "Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation" signed in Ankara in December 2003.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, bilateral trade is expected to reach \$5 billion by the year 2005 an unthinkable figure some years ago.¹⁹⁰ The trend and the volume of the bilateral trade since the initiation of the rapprochement effort in 1999 is depicted in Table 1.

¹⁸⁷ *Turkish Daily News*, Ankara, October 19, 1999 available from [\[http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/10_14_99/econ.htm#e1\]](http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/10_14_99/econ.htm#e1); Internet, accessed on October 21, 2004.

¹⁸⁸ Nachmani, "What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations," 88.

¹⁸⁹ "Bilateral Relations (The Rapprochement Process)," *Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*.

¹⁹⁰ For further elaborate analysis of the Greek-Turkish economic cooperation see Panagiotis Liargovas, "The Economic Imperative: Prospects for Trade Integration and Business Integration," in Aydın and Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*, 145-161.

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	Rate of Change % as of Mar-04
Greek Imports	335.4	543.9	395	347.8	528.4	51.93%
Greek Exports	363.3	388.4	492	592.1	870.1	46.79%
Trade Volume	698.7	932.3	887	939.9	1,398.50	39.87%
Trade Balance for Greece	-27.9	155.5	-97	-244.3	-341.7	39.87%

Table 1. Greek-Turkish bilateral trade (million \$).¹⁹¹

The second area which reflects the improvement of bilateral economic interdependence is the tourist industry. Since expansion of economic cooperation requires stabilized relations, the tourist industry has begun to flourish. As Ioakeimidis argues “it was the first time that the two countries’ tourist circles seemed willing to resist so actively to any potential deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations.”¹⁹² Greek and Turkish tourist agencies signed a pertinent “protocol of cooperation,” and organized an enormous number of joint programs that increased significantly the number of tourists in both countries. The total number of Greek tourists visiting Turkey in 2003 was 393,397, an increase of 40.48% over 2002. Moreover, the incremental tendency in the number of visitors in Turkey was sustained notwithstanding the November 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul. Indicative of the trend is that since 2001 the total number of Greek visitors in Turkey has almost doubled. On the other hand the total of Turkish tourists visiting Greece has increased by more than 20% between the years 2001 and 2002, as depicted in tables 2 and 3.

¹⁹¹ Table by the author, data derived from Dionisis Protopapas, *Turkey: Economy, Investment, Trade* (Istanbul: Consultant General of Greece, May 2004), available from [<http://www.eber.gr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=651&sid=aca0a324438c2f80f4b7747d94ff22a0;>] Internet, accessed on November 1, 2004.

¹⁹² Panayiotis Ioakeimidis, “The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities Versus Institutions,” in Theodoros Couloumbis et al. eds., *The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s* (London, UK: Mc Millan Press, 1999), 157.

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan-Nov Change %
2001	10,621	12,832	11,034	18,687	15,284	18,687	20,648	27,803	19,726	15,211	13,389	13,146	197,258	
2002	7,951	14,953	23,002	16,975	27,301	22,059	24,388	34,886	25,185	31,812	24,969	26,552	280,033	41.96%
2003	19,075	16,920	20,876	25,870	26,080	34,233	39,175	61,178	39,562	51,699	30,167	28,366	393,397	40.48%

Table 2. Greek Tourists visiting Turkey.

	2001	2002	Rate of Change
Total	114,354	139,018	21.57%
January	3,280	4,158	26.77%
February	4,329	5,703	31.74%
March	8,422	5,351	-36.46%
April	5,376	6,816	26.79%
May	6,502	7,197	10.69%
June	9,103	17,276	89.78%
July	15,521	28,574	84.10%
August	28,010	27,855	-0.55%
September	14,705	14,174	-3.61%
October	8,499	9,176	7.97%
November	5,871	6,456	9.96%
December	4,737	6,282	32.64%

Table 3. Turkish Tourists visiting Greece.¹⁹³

As a corollary of the ongoing amelioration of tensions in bilateral relations, the interdependence of the two countries in all segments of economic activity has expanded over the last four years. The once nonexistent economic linkages are now more than tangible and continuously growing. In the field of transportation infrastructure, the building of the Egnatia Highway, a 680-kilometers modern motorway that cuts across the mountainous backbone of northern Greece, will link the Black with the Adriatic Sea.

In the energy field, in January 2000, a Greek-Turkish-U.S. consortium announced plans for the construction of a gas-fired power plant in Greece. The plant will be capable of reaching a peak of 600 MW the excess of which will be exported to Turkey. Moreover, in March 2002, the two countries signed a bilateral agreement for an electricity grid connecting the nations' power along the Greek-

¹⁹³ Both tables by author, data derived from Protopapas, *Turkey: Economy, Investment, Trade*.

Turkish border to be in operation by 2006.¹⁹⁴ As a final point the two countries sought and have concluded in March 2002 a \$300 million agreement for the construction of a natural gas pipeline that will feed the energy market in Greece. At a later stage natural gas will be transported through the pipeline and will be exported to the cover expanding energy needs of Europe.¹⁹⁵

2. Defense Issues and NATO

Both Greece and Turkey have long been engaged in a protracted arms race,¹⁹⁶ which is illustrated in Table 4. This was the direct corollary of the “security dilemma” operating on both sides of the Aegean. Consequently both countries, at least for the past twenty years, have had two of the highest defense budgets within NATO, as depicted in Table 5.




Table 4. Greek and Turkish Military Expenditures.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ “Country Analysis Briefs: Greece,” *Energy Information Administration*, October 2004, available from [<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/greece.html#elec;>] Internet, accessed on October 22, 2004.

¹⁹⁵ “US Department of State: Turkey and Greece sign natural gas pipeline agreement,” *M2 Presswire*, December 29, 2003, available from [<http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;>] Internet, accessed on October 22, 2004.

¹⁹⁶ The literature on the subject of whether or not bilateral defense expenditures constitute an arms race, is abundant. Generally there is a consensus that “Greek defense spending is not autonomous and but rather its size depends on the size of Turkish military expenditure to a larger extent than Turkish military expenditure depends on Greek defense spending.” See Christos Kollias and Paleologou Suzanna-Maria, “Is There a Greek-Turkish Arms Race? Some Further Empirical Results from Causality Tests,” *Defence and Peace Economics* vol. 13, no. 4, 327.

¹⁹⁷ Table by author, data (constant millions US dollars) derived from, *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), available from [http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php?send;] Internet, accessed on November 11, 2004.




Table 5. NATO Members' Defense Expenditures.¹⁹⁸

At the behest of the rapprochement process Greece initiated a series of cooperative gestures in defense issues, abandoning longstanding policies. In the beginning of April 2001 Greece terminated by decree the state of war and the mobilization of the armed forces dating from the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In the field of budget cuts Greece initiated and Turkey followed shortly a series of expenditure cuts. One prominent example is that Greece deferred the procurement of 60 fourth generation fighter aircrafts. Additionally Greece reduced major defense procurement programs, thus accomplishing total savings of \$4.4 billion. These savings were reflected in the five-year short-term procurement planning which after the Imia crisis had a tendency to increase on a yearly basis. The aforementioned arms procurement cutbacks were reciprocated by Turkey. During the same month, the Turkish government announced suspending arms procurement worth \$19.5 billion.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Table by author, data (percentage of GDP) derived from NATO handbook, chapter 9, *Financial control*, available from [<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb090804.htm>.] Internet, accessed on November 11, 2004.

¹⁹⁹ Andrew Borowiec, "Greek cutbacks ease military tensions," *The Washington Times*, April 10, 2001, available from [<http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil>.] Internet, accessed on November 11, 2004.

Moreover, Defense Minister Akis Tsochantzopoulos set forth a plan for the transformation of the armed forces and the reduction of their manpower from 140,000 to 90,000.²⁰⁰ In 2003, Greek Defense Minister Papantoniou expressed the new goal of reducing arms expenditure from 4.9% of GDP and stabilize it to an average of 2.7%, for the period 2010-2015.²⁰¹ The issue was further pursued in 2004 by the new Karamanlis conservative government. On May 2004, the Defense ministers of Greece and Turkey, Spiliotopoulos and Gonul, announced their intention to reduce defense spending by an average of 5% each year, implementing a pre-election decision by Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Erdogan.²⁰²

The announced arms expenditure reduction proposals more or less follow a reciprocal pattern between the two countries. The majority of the analysts point out that the magnitude of the announced reductions from the beginning has been primarily dictated by economic considerations for both countries.²⁰³ However, such cooperation also demonstrates a plausible effort to escape from the typical Greek-Turkish arms race that is on going for more almost three decades.

In an effort to alleviate mutual suspicion, on October 2000 Greece and Turkey agreed to proceed further and implement a set of Confidence Building

²⁰⁰ Athanasios Tsochantzopoulos, Interview in *Turkish Daily News*, March 25, 2001, available from [http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_25_01/for.htm]; Internet, accessed on October 7, 2004.

²⁰¹ Press Statement, *Hellenic Ministry of National Defense*, , Athens, 20 October 2003, available from, [http://www.mod.mil.gr/mme/all_pressrel_comp.html?dr_html_url=%2Fdocrep%2Fdocs%2FPressReleases%2FYETHA%2F2003%2FOctober%2Fdt20102003&dr_html_lang=gr], Internet, accessed on October 25, 2004.

²⁰² Patrick Quinn, "Leaders of Greece and Turkey had agreed to reduce defense spending before taking office," *Associated Press*, September 14, 2004, available from [<http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil>]; Internet, accessed on October 27, 2004.

²⁰³ For Turkey the underlying cause appears to be the INF directives after the 2001 economic crisis. For Greece two reasons are cited, first, the fear that the high defense budget would undermine the commitments for economic stability and growth potential in the context of euro-zone, and second, the unexpected cost for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games. See Panagiotis Tsakonas, "Turkey's Post Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue," *Turkish Studies* vol. 2, no. 2 (Autumn 2001), 17-18, and Thanos P. Dokos "Tension Reduction and Confidence Building Measures in the Aegean," in Aydin and Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*, 127. See also, Panagiotis J. Tsakonas and Thanos P. Dokos, "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century: A view from Athens," in Martin and Keridis, *The Future of Turkish foreign policy*, 109 footnote 19..

Measures (CBMs). In this context it was agreed that the implementation of the CBMs would be on two levels: at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Directors level, and within NATO under the auspices of Secretary General.

At the Political Directors Level, the two officials agreed on eight CBMs. These are the establishment of direct communication channels at the Foreign Ministry level, the exchange of invitations to attend large-scale military exercise, the exchange of views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the activities of International Organizations relating to military matters in the margins of the meetings of International Organizations, the cooperation for pollution prevention of Evros river, the establishment of a direct phone line between the two Ministers of Defense, the exchange of visits between General Staff Officers, exchange of visits of students of the military academies and the establishment of telemedicine connection between military hospitals.²⁰⁴

In 2003 the two countries elaborated on a series of CBMs under the auspices of NATO's Secretary General Lord Robertson. These include the following:

- Mutual notification of exercise schedules.
- Cooperation between the respective National Defense Colleges, in the field of science and on subjects of mutual interest, such as NATO issues, military doctrines, crisis management, peacekeeping, natural disasters, environmental issues and others.
- Exchange of military personnel for training purposes in the PfP Training Centers of the two countries. in Kilis, and in Ankara.²⁰⁵

As already mentioned both countries within the Alliance, opted a strategy of cross veto employment to the respective defense chapters. The first major breakthrough was achieved in 1999, when the two countries implemented the new (at the time) command structure. Under the rearrangement two Joint Sub-

²⁰⁴ "Bilateral Relations (The Rapprochement Process)," *Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*.

²⁰⁵ "Statement by the Secretary General of NATO," *NATO Press Releases*. July 23, 2003, available from [<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-087e.htm>.] Internet, accessed on October 24, 2004

Regional Headquarters were established in Larissa (with Greek Commanding officer and Turkish Chief of Staff and Izmir (with Turkish Commanding Officer and Greek Chief of Staff).²⁰⁶ The cooperative paradigm in the context of the Atlantic Alliance was taken a step further by Greece during the 2002 Prague Summit. Greece did not veto a relevant decision of the Alliance to adapt a new streamlined and flexible Command structure. With this new structure Turkey retains an operational headquarters functioning as one of the three component commands of Joint Force Command Naples (JFC Naples), while Greece has no analogous command. This constitutes an additional evidence of the shift in Greek policy towards Turkey.

At the operational level cooperative relations have been also initiated. In 2000 both countries participated in the Alliance exercise “Dynamic Mix” that marked the first, after several decades, deployment of Turkish troops and fighter aircrafts in Greece as part of the NATO force.²⁰⁷ Moreover an example of excellent cooperation between Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) 6 in Izmir, Turkey²⁰⁸ and CAOC 7 in Larissa Greece occurred, in March 2003. A hijacked Turkish Airbus 310, was smoothly handed over when the plane reached the international airspace over the Aegean Sea, and successfully landed in Athens International Airport escorted by Hellenic fighters.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ This Command Structure was deactivated in March 2004. For more information on these archival arrangements see “Regional Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe,” *AFSOUTH Fact sheets*, April 13, 2004, available from [\[http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/RHQAFSOUTH.htm;\]](http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/RHQAFSOUTH.htm) Internet, accessed on October 28, 2004.

²⁰⁷ For more information see, “Exercise Dynamic Mix-2000,” *AFSOUTH*, available from [\[http://www.afsouth.nato.int/Exercises/Mix00.htm;\]](http://www.afsouth.nato.int/Exercises/Mix00.htm) Internet, accessed on October 28, 2004.

²⁰⁸ “Combined Air Operations Center 6,” *AFSOUTH Fact sheets* September 2, 2003, available from [\[http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/NATOTurkey/CAOC6Factsheet.htm;\]](http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/NATOTurkey/CAOC6Factsheet.htm) Internet October 28, 2004.

²⁰⁹ “Turkish plane hijacker surrenders,” *CNN*, March 28, 2003, available from [\[http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/28/turkey.hijack/;\]](http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/28/turkey.hijack/) Internet; accessed on October 28 2004.

3. The European Union Factor

Greece became an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1962 and full member in 1981. Turkey on the other hand had been an associate member since 1963 and applied for full membership in 1987. Its application that time was declined primarily due to economic and political reasons.

Greek foreign policy of the 1981-1990 period utilized EEC membership both as a diplomatic lever and as a restraining mechanism in its bilateral relations with Turkey. For Greece a bipartisan policy was adopted based on a stance of “conditionality.” In other words Greece used its membership as a lever designed to convince Turkey that the Turkish-EEC relations could not be normalized unless the Cyprus question was resolved.²¹⁰

In the early 1990s and especially under the Simitis government Greece reoriented its European politics.²¹¹ It emphasized the fact that she was the only Balkan state being a member of the two European pillars: the defensive (NATO) and the political (EU). Greece realized that this simultaneous membership could be used to in a multidimensional policy towards the other Balkan countries, as well as towards the EU and NATO. Greek foreign policy opted to put forward the issues between the two countries in the EU where political conditions are not dominated by any country acting as “primus inter pares.” To that extent one can plausibly assert that the stance of Greece vis-à-vis Turkey’s transformed. The new policy often declared as the European option moved gradually from a strategy of “conditional sanctions” towards one of “conditional rewards”²¹² and included two shifts.

²¹⁰ Theodore A. Couloumbis, “Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities,” in Couloumbis, Kariotis, and Bellou, *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, 34-35.

²¹¹ Costas Simitis succeed Andreas Papandreou as leader of the socialist party (PASOK) in 1996. His “modernization” clause called for a reform process both within the party as well as all aspects of the society. Moreover, “Simitis came to symbolize European normalcy as opposed to Greek exceptionalism.” See Dimitris Keridis, “Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy: Greek Policy Towards Turkey,” in Keridis and Triantaphyllou, *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 7-8.

²¹² Couloumbis and Ifantis, “Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints - A Realist Approach,” 11.

The first shift occurred in March 1995 when Greece lifted its objections to the much-anticipated customs union between Turkey and the EU, and the associated financial protocol. Turkey was the first country in the Union's history to form such a customs union without becoming an EU member first. This policy shift did not improve bilateral relations, as the agreement was associated with EUs' consent to begin accession talks with Cyprus in 1998²¹³ It should be noted at this point that Greek-Turkish relations of that era did not remain stable. On the contrary, they were further exacerbated with the ratification of UNCLOS III by the Greek parliament and the reciprocal Turkish decree containing the *casus belli* clause in 1995, and by the Imia crisis early in 1996.

Relations between the EU and Turkey were further strained after the 1997 Luxemburg Summit. Turkey was not included in the enlargement process, but was given a special status which included an extended perspective of full membership. Turkey was to follow a special "European Strategy" and not a pre-accession one. On the other hand, the "inclusion of Cyprus created [a] deep feeling of resentment [on the Turks]." Cyprus was included in the so-called "fast track" in which accession negotiations would begin in the near future. As Erlep asserts, "[T]he Turkish government regarded the Luxemburg decisions as discriminatory and politicized, and made under the influence of Greece...Ankara thought that this was a clear sign that the EU was taking the Greek side on the Cyprus issue and acting under the Greek influence." ²¹⁴

The second and most spectacular shift occurred in December 1999, during the Helsinki European Council. During the summit that took key decisions on the Union's forthcoming enlargement, Greece lifted its longstanding veto pertinent to Turkey's accession. The corollary was that the summit granted

²¹³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, (235-236. For the financial part see Costas Melakopides, "Turkish Political Culture and the Future of the Greco-Turkish Rapprochement," *Occasional Paper*, (Athens: ELIAMEP,2002), 20 available from http://www.eliamep.gr/admin/upload_publication/324_1en_occ.PDF; Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004. It must be pointed out however, that Greece "[i]n all EU forums, had stalled the aid money to Turkey, an amount that by summer 1999 reached \$500 million," see Nachmani, "What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations," 84.

²¹⁴ Attila Erlep, "Turkey and The European Union," in Martin and Keridis, *The Future of Turkish foreign policy*, 71-72.

Turkey EU candidate status,²¹⁵ accompanied with the approval of a \$600 million financial protocol. This major shift in Greece's strategic approach toward Turkey, was according to Foreign Minister George Papandreou the "...culmination of the new phase in Greek foreign policy."²¹⁶ The aforementioned gesture was part of the initiated "conditional rewards" policy. The aim was to signal Turkey that cooperation is more attractive and rewarding than competition. The new rationale shifted from isolating to engaging Turkey in a careful process aiming to ultimately integrate Turkey into the European system of states. As Couloumbis asserts,

...enmeshing Turkey in the European integration system can help socialize Turkish elites into the European norms of behavior and increase their stake in a reforming course. The more Turkey is integrated into the European system, the less likely is to employ force. Rather, it will act as a prudent and satisfied member of the international system, once it becomes accustomed to the 'rules of the game' and understands the benefits that it can safeguard as well as bestow.²¹⁷

The Helsinki European Council stated that Turkey as a candidate country would join the EU based on the same criteria applied to the other candidate countries. Apart for the political criteria as formulated in 1992 by the Copenhagen European Council,²¹⁸ the Council, however, attached two further explicit obligations. These included the notions of respecting principles of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN, and resolving all outstanding territorial disputes and related issues, or submitting to the adjudication of the

²¹⁵ See Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11, 1999, *Presidency Conclusions*, par. 12, available from [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm.] Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004.

²¹⁶ George Papandreou, "Revision in Greek Foreign Policy," *Western Policy Center*, Athens, January 1, 2000, available from, [<http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/articlepage.aspx?articleid=913&language=0&hilit e=western%20policy%20center>.], Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004.

²¹⁷ Couloumbis and Ifantis, "Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints - A Realist Approach," 11.

²¹⁸ These include a general adherence to the political and economic aims of the EU (criterion concerning adoption of the Community *Acquis*), the existence of democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities (political criterion) and finally the existence of a functioning market economy (economic criterion). See Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1, par 7Aiii, available from [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf.] Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004.

International Court of Justice by 2004 at the latest. Moreover, Turkey had to facilitate the process of achieving a solution to the Cyprus political problem.²¹⁹ It is obvious that the conception of resolving the territorial disputes prior to accession was directly related to the Greek-Turkish interaction, as it constituted both an alert and an incentive for Turkey to alter its attitude towards Greece. In other words, the establishment of a closer relationship between the EU and Turkey was related to the latter's renunciation of threats of war and contribution to an acceptable solution of the Cyprus question.²²⁰ Specifically for the latter, Turkey had to make her best efforts towards "the reunification of Cyprus as a federal, bizonal and bicomunal state that is also a member of the European Union."²²¹

Following the Helsinki development the European Commission stipulated a set of short and long term economic and political priorities aiming at the transformation of Turkey according to the Copenhagen Criteria. These were incorporated in the Turkey's Accession Partnership document. Turkey in turn adopted its National Program for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA) in March 2001.²²² The implementation of NPAA took the form of constitutional amendments and 'harmonization laws' that were targeted towards various critical aspects of the Turkish state, whose in place provisions were largely incompatible

²¹⁹ See Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, *Presidency Conclusions*, par. 4 and 9a.

²²⁰ Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities," Couloumbis, Kariotis, and Bellou, *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, 36. Nicolaides, on the other hand, provides a different explanation, describing the EU statement also as a form of "exercise in constructive ubiquity and can be interpreted as more or less constraining on Turkey," as EU representatives have given grounds for such interpretation in their urge to make the deal acceptable to Turkey. See Kalypso Nicolaides, "Europe's Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey's Candidacy Status after Helsinki," 245-247 at Kalypso Nicolaides, "Europe's Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey's Candidacy Status after Helsinki," in Keridis and Triantaphyllou, *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 266

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² For the complete context see *Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis* (NPAA), available from [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/npaa_full.pdf]; Internet, accessed on October, 30, 2004.

with the European practice.²²³ As part of the institutionalization Turkey's candidacy support, a special Greek 'Task Force' was set up to offer European-affairs expertise to the Turkish side. To that extent, several seminars and bilateral meetings have been organized, during which high-ranking officials of the Turkish Administration have been briefed by their Greek counterparts on the EU regulations on various subjects.

The NPAA, however, represented at the same time a delicate balance at the Turkish domestic politics level, namely, the balance between the "anti-EU" coalition or "euro-skeptics" and euro-pros. The former are represented primarily by the major part of the powerful Turkish military establishment, high-level state bureaucrats, major labor associations, conservative political figures in the right-of-center parties, and paradoxically the left-oriented Nationalistic Action Party (MHP) and Democratic Left Party (DSP). The "pro-EU" circles represent the majority of the Turkish society. These circles include representatives of the big business community, namely, the Turkish Industrialists and Business Association (TUSIAD), various liberal think tanks, political parties located at the center-left and center-right parties, and most importantly, the pro-religious Justice and Development Party (AKP).²²⁴ Önis vividly depicted the struggle at the domestic politics level arguing that

...the concrete possibility of the EU membership has resulted in a series of divisions within what could be described as "the ruling bloc" or "power elite." What could be described as "transnational business elites," including domestic business and external investor community with an interest in the Turkish economy saw the EU anchor as means of consolidating the kind of economic environment conducive to their long-term interests. In contrast, the privileged position of military-security establishment, both in terms

²²³ These include political liberalization and democratization of the state including *inter alia* the rights of the Kurdish minority, and the role of the military as expressed by the military dominated National Security Council (NSC). Ziya Önis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 12-13.

²²⁴ Ibid., 17-21. See also Tarik Oguzlu, "The Impact of 'Democratization in the Context of the EU Accession Process' on the Turkish Foreign Policy," *Mediterranean Politics* Vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 2004), 103-106. Interesting, as the author points out, is the Turkish idiosyncrasy that left-wing parties do not espouse liberal ideas as the European social democratic left parties.

of economic weight and social status, appeared to be particularly threatened by the kind of reforms proposed by the EU.²²⁵

Elaborating on the views expressed by these two factions in the domestic level, one should note the following. First, the “euro-skeptics” generally are skeptical about the characteristics of the accession process, as they want to bargain over the terms, rather than comply with EU’s directives. Most importantly, in the foreign politics field, they are inclined to support the proposition that Turkey should formulate and implement foreign policy decisions independently of the external environment. Moreover, the prerequisite in order to follow European oriented foreign policy should be serving Turkey’s national security interests, by and large as defined by the armed forces. Second the “Pro-EU” emphasize that “Turkey should behave [in such a way] that would demonstrate sincerity on EU membership.” They support the view that the country’s democratization should also be extended in foreign policy behavior, suggesting that the country “should not adopt confrontational...and uncompromising attitudes towards foreign policy issues, especially those pertaining to Turkey-EU relations.”²²⁶

Following two severe economic crises in 2001, the coalition government in Turkey collapsed, calling for early elections in November 2002. The combination of the high electoral threshold (10%), social discontent about political corruption, and the state mechanism’s inadequacy, as expressed during the earthquakes, swept away the old political elite and led to the election of the Justice and Development Party with a solid majority.²²⁷ The party’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a moderate Islamist himself, and his government continued major political, constitutional and legislative reforms. Notable examples included, first,

²²⁵ Önis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," 21. The forces described by Önis are also known as “deep state.” Moreover, the role of the Turkish military establishment and its involvement in politics is a study in its own right and falls outside of the scope of this thesis. For an analysis see William M. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, (New York: Routledge, 1994), and, Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003).

²²⁶ Oguzlu, "The Impact of 'Democratization in the Context of the EU Accession Process' on the Turkish Foreign Policy," 106.

²²⁷ Indeed it is the first time since 1991 that the obtained majority of 363 out of the 500 seats of the Turkish National Assembly enabled a single party stable government.

the appointment, for the first time, of a civilian as Secretary General of the controversial NSC, and second, the abolition of State Security Courts. Finally, on October 2004 the Commissioner on EU enlargement released the long-awaited European Commission's recommendation on the formal Accession of Turkey.²²⁸

The report emphasized the progress achieved between 2001 and 2004, in all aspects while pointing out specific shortcomings in all areas of the *Aquis*.²²⁹ Important to this report is that in regard to the enhanced political dialogue the document indicated that "Turkish foreign policy is contributing to regional stability." On the shortcomings side the report notes that while "the process of fully aligning civil-military relations with EU practice is underway; nevertheless, the armed forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of informal mechanisms."²³⁰ Moreover, the irreversibility of the instituted reforms as noted need to be tested over a longer period of time. As a final point, it must be emphasized that the overall recommendation is positive and if approved by the December 2004 European Council, the date for the beginning of the accession negotiations is expected to be set in 2005. However, the whole process itself will most likely be a protracted one lasting at least ten years.

On the other hand, in Greece the Simitis government that instituted the policy shift vis-à-vis Turkey continued to support it. Despite frequent party polarization, mainly for domestic consumption, even in the foreign policy domain there was a consensus among the major political parties for supporting the European perspective of Turkey. Most important, however, is to emphasize the view of the new conservative Karamanlis government that was elected in March

²²⁸ Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession*, Brussels, October 6, 2004, COM(2004), p.1-18, available from [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/tr_recommendation_en.pdf]; Internet, accessed on October 6, 2004.

²²⁹ The report especially credits the Erdogan government for the achieved progress as it recognizes that "[f]ollowing decades of sporadic progress, *there has been substantial legislative and institutional convergence in Turkey towards European standards*, in particular after the 2002 elections." *ibid.*, 3, [emphasis mine].

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

2004.²³¹ While there was an initial concern about the orientation of the Greek foreign policy after the appointment of the new Foreign Minister, Petros Moliviatis,²³² Prime Minister Karamanlis himself clarified the intentions of the new government. He expressed his firm commitment to actively support Turkey's EU aspirations, stating that "I confirm the support of the Greek government and me personally as to Turkey's course towards Europe and Mr. Erdogan's reform program."²³³

4. The Cyprus Question

The Cyprus problem has been an outstanding issue and of concern to the international community for almost fifty years. It was the most controversial and complex point of conflict in the Greek-Turkish relationship since 1955. Notwithstanding the fact that the issue *per se* was disengaged from the rapprochement process, in order to better assess Greek-Turkish relations in the context of this study it is useful to examine how the issue has evolved since 1999. That is due to the symbiotic relations between Turkey and the self-proclaimed TNRC and the Cyprus Republic. Moreover, the European vocation of both Cyprus and Turkey is of equal importance.

The government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) applied for EU-membership in July 1990, and the accession negotiations started in March 1998. As the Greek-Turkish thaw was developing following the 1999 Helsinki decision concerning Turkey's future membership and *in lieu* of RoC's accession (expected in 2003), yet another effort to resolve the Cyprus problem was initiated in

²³¹ Karamanlis' conservative party New Democracy (ND) was elected with 45.36% of the votes and 165 out of the 300 Parliament seats.

²³² The 75year old former ambassador Moliviatis was diplomatic advisor of the late Konstantinos Karamanlis and was considered by analysts to have a Cold War like mentality.

²³³ "Erdogan visit turns new page in ties with Greece," *Turkish Daily News*, Ankara , May 10, 2004, available from [http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/05_10_04/for.htm#f4;] Internet, accessed on November 2, 2004.

December 1999.²³⁴ The rationale was to utilize the momentum created by the expectation of RoC accession in the EU in order to re-unify the long divided island, so that it would enter the EU as a unified entity. The effort included intercommunal “proximity talks” with no preconditions under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General.²³⁵ The proximity talks were held from December 1999 to November 2000 and were followed by direct talks between January 2002 and February 2003. During the instituted process, negotiating bilaterally the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were unable to reach an agreement, and consequently third party contribution was necessary.²³⁶

Accordingly, the Secretary-General submitted a settlement proposal on November 2002, and two consequent revisions in December 2002 and February 2003. The plan was entitled “Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” and at the end of the negotiations process it required a referendum in late March 2003 to approve it, thus permitting the re-unified Cyprus to participate in the ceremonial signing of the Accession Treaty in April 2003.²³⁷ All three proposals were accepted as a basis for discussion by the former and current presidents of the RoC, Clerides and Papadopoulos, but proved unacceptable to Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas. It must be emphasized

²³⁴ Turkish Cypriots leader, Rauf Denktas, was reluctant even to start negotiations, setting as a precondition the recognition of the sovereignty of TNRC. His position was supported by Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit, who stated that “two completely independent states on the islands should be recognized.” See Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 257.

²³⁵ See United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1250, Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus*, Meeting: 4018, June, 29 1999 available from [\[http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/191/38/PDF/N9919138.pdf?OpenElement;\]](http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/191/38/PDF/N9919138.pdf?OpenElement;) Internet, accessed on November 5, 2004.

²³⁶ There was an unbridgeable gap between the Greek Cypriot position aiming at a “federation” and the Turkish Cypriot transformed aim of “Confederation,” or looser form of union. See Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, 258. The confederation argument developed by Denktas in 1998 and supported by the Turkish government, runs as follows: “confederate structure of two peoples and two sovereign states while entrenching special relations with Turkish Cypriots and Turkey and Greek Cypriots and Greece.” See Tozun Bahcheli, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974” in Martin and Keridis, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 220.

²³⁷ Directorate-A Division for International and Constitutional Affairs DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR RESEARCH, *Note on the Political and Economic Situation in Cyprus and its Relations with the EU*. (Luxembourg, March 14, 2003), 9, available from [\[http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/cypr/20030409/494068EN.pdf;\]](http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/cypr/20030409/494068EN.pdf) Internet, accessed on November 9, 2004.

that the intransigence of the latter was fully supported by the Turkish general Staff, Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the bureaucracy of the foreign ministry, despite the popular opposition of the Turkish Cypriots, who were in support of the plan.²³⁸ Moreover, according to Birand the Turkish government and the governing AK party

...has been, generally speaking, uninformed and undecided on the Cyprus issue. Rather than taking a political decision and trying to have it implemented the Gul government spent a lot of time by trying to persuade those circles -- that includes Denktas -- who did not believe in a solution. The government chose to postpone the decision. And, in the end, it bowed down to those who hold the opposing view.²³⁹

At that point the Turkish government was pinned down by the indecision exhibited. More analytically, the Accession Partnership between Turkey and the EU was based on the spirit and the wording of the 1999 Helsinki communiqué. The "Principles" chapter of the Accession Partnership stated that "the European Union encourages Turkey, together with all parties, to continue to support the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring the process, aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, to a successful conclusion."²⁴⁰ Turkey, in turn, included the same obligation in its NPAA. The program incorporated the pledge that "Turkey will continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary General, in the context of his good-offices mission aiming at a mutually acceptable

²³⁸ Cengiz Candar, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the War in Iraq," in Martin and Keridis, *The Future of Turkish foreign policy*, (48-49. This assertion was confirmed by the Turkish press. Days prior to the rejection of the plan Denktas was in Ankara for consultations. Birand points out that [t]he Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) played the most effective role in bringing about the rejection of the Annan Plan. [...] The conclusion the TSK has reached is that this plan has hazardous aspects. [...] *This way the TSK has shown everybody who takes the decisions in Turkey.*

See Mehmet Ali Birand, "Denktas wins again," *Turkish Daily News*, March 12, 2003 available from [http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_12_03/birand.htm.] Internet, accessed on November 9, 2004.

²³⁹ Birand, "Denktas wins again."

²⁴⁰ The Council of the European Union, Turkey's Accession Partnership, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, March 8, 2001, available from [http://europa.eu.int/lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_085/l_08520010324en00130023.pdf.] Internet, November 5, 2004. In 2003 it was incorporated in the revised Accession Partnership under the "Short-term" and "Long-term priorities" and with the new title "Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria."

settlement with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities on the Island.”²⁴¹

It is useful to note that the Turkish foreign minister in June 2002, elaborating on the principles of the NPAA, outlined what was acceptable to Turkey in order to break the stalemate in the Cyprus problem. According to Cem, the solution of the Cyprus problem ought to be based on a “*new partnership state*” that would represent “both nations of Cyprus on matters for which it is empowered through an agreement between the *two constituent states*.” Moreover, both sides had to “*agree on all matters that the parties consider as vital*.”²⁴² The notions articulated in the NPAA, as well as the Turkish foreign minister article, do appear to have a striking similarity with Denktas’s preconditions set in 1998 before the initiation of the process.

With the possibility of RoC joining the EU in May 2004, a new effort was undertaken by the UN Secretary-General in February 2004. The new negotiations process had a concluding date of March 31, 2004. The intense month of negotiations that followed did not produce tangible results. During the last phase of negotiations between 24-29 March 2004 in Switzerland, both prime ministers of Greece and Turkey, Karamanlis and Erdogan, were invited to lend their collaboration, and moreover, the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas was excluded or self-excluded for the remainder of the process.²⁴³ However, once

²⁴¹ *Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Aquis*, 5.

²⁴² See Ismail Cem, “A common vision for Cypriots; It’s not too late,” *International Herald Tribune*, March 14, 2002, available from [[http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil](http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;);] Internet, November 9, 2004. [emphasis mine]. The vital matters according to Cem include:

For the Greek party, the confirmation of *a single international personality* to represent Cyprus in international relations and forums;

For the Turkish party, the confirmation of *two equal separate states, each as a sovereign entity*, forming through an agreement *a new partnership state*.

Moreover, the struggle in the Turkish Foreign Minister’s thinking is difficult to follow. On the one hand in the same article he argues about the Greek and Turkish Cypriots that “are two different nations, cultures, religions, languages and states, and a heritage of mistrust and bloody feuds,” difficult to reconcile while he pursues the Greek-Turkish rapprochement were at minimum the same characteristics apply [all emphasis mine].

²⁴³ Esra Aygin, “Missing Denktas” *Associated Press*, Fuerigen, Switzerland, March 29, 2004 available from [http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_29_04/for.htm#f8;] Internet, accessed on November 9, 2004. Interestingly, Denktas remained in northern Cyprus campaigning against the adoption of the plan that was aiming to create a Greek Cypriot republic

more no agreement was reached. The text of the reunification plan was finalized by the Secretary General and submitted to simultaneous referenda in April 2004 by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The Plan was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek Cypriots.²⁴⁴ The reasons however, that that led the Greek Cypriots to reject in the referendum the “Annan Plan” are not important *per se* for the purposes of this thesis. It must however be noted that both the fourth and fifth versions of the “Annan Plan” aiming at persuading the Turkish Cypriot leader to concede to the reunification of the Island, refer to the new anticipated state reflecting not only the spirit but also the wording that the Turkish Foreign Minister used in his 2002 “Common Vision for Cypriots.” Specifically Article 2 of the final version of the “Annan Plan” stipulates that

The status and relationship of the United Cyprus Republic, its federal government, and *its constituent states*, is modeled on the status and relationship of Switzerland, [...]. Accordingly:

a. The United Cyprus Republic is an independent state in the form of an *indissoluble partnership*, with a federal government and *two equal constituent states*, the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. [...]. The United Cyprus Republic is organized under its Constitution in accordance with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality, and *the equal status of the constituent states*.

b. The federal government sovereignty exercises the powers specified in the Constitution, which shall *ensure that Cyprus can speak and act with one voice internationally* and in the European Union, [...]

c. *The constituent states are of equal status*. Within the limits of the Constitution, they sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the federal government, ...²⁴⁵

The second important issue is that the Turkish policy with respect to the solution of the Cyprus political problem appears to be altered. Prime Minister

²⁴⁴ The Turkish Cypriots approved the “Annan Plan” by 64.9%. The Greek Cypriots rejected it by 75.8%. See “Final Results of Cyprus Referenda,” *Athens News Agency*, April 24, 2004 available from [<http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;>] Internet; accessed on November 9, 2004.

²⁴⁵ Available from [[http://194.154.157.106/Main_Articles/MainArticles.pdf;](http://194.154.157.106/Main_Articles/MainArticles.pdf)] Internet, accessed on November 5, 2004, [all emphasis mine].

Erdogan did succeed in isolating the hardliner Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas, and the Turkish Cypriots in the referendum did agree on the finalized version of “Annan plan,” contrary to the Greek Cypriots. This indeed represents a qualitative difference in the Turkish government’s practice, at least at the declaratory level.²⁴⁶ Notwithstanding the fact that the Turkish government appeared to have Denktas isolated, a closer scrutiny reveals that the final version of the Annan plan largely reflects the adamant ideas of the recalcitrant Denktas.²⁴⁷ Turkey clearly opted to serve her own national interest and transcended its domestic policies by isolating extremist Turkish-Cypriot views. In other words, Turkey managed to exhibit good will and reconciliatory politics, at least towards the EU, despite her controversial strategy of not formally recognizing the Cypriot state, a member of the EU, while at the same time expecting consensus from the latter for its accession. Turkey managed to embellish her rhetoric on the Cyprus issue. However, the crux of the arguments on the issue appears to be the same, but in any case Denktas’s marginalization does constitute a noticeable milestone in the process.

5. Cooperation at the Political Plane and the “High Politics” Issues

From the initiation of the rapprochement process, the so called “high politics” or the issues of “increased antagonism” were excluded from the agenda. The rationale was that there could not be any significant breakthrough in a

²⁴⁶ It is worth noting the rhetoric used in November 2000 by the Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit, who claimed that “if a solution on the Cyprus and Aegean issues could not be reached in line with Turkey’s expectations, Turkey’s reaction would not be only verbal [...] The EU deceived Turkey. Turkey cannot give concessions [...] EU members do not have a monopoly of being European. Turkey has been European for the last 600 years.” See Bulent Ecevit, *Turkiye Newspaper*, 23 November 2000, as quoted in Gregory R. Copley, “Asymmetry Among Allies,” *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, Vol. 29, Is. 1, January 2001, 7-8, available from [<http://proquest.umi.com>;] Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004.

²⁴⁷ It is plausible to argue, while not factually confirmed, that the UN Secretary General was aiming to curb Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot intransigence on the issue. In other words, since Cyprus and Greece were aiming at the reunification and were more open to their options to achieve it, Kofi Annan was anxious to get Turkish-Cypriot endorsement of his plan. In this manner he crossed a subtle but important line in his concessions to accommodate Turkish anxieties, which did not allow any further watering down from the Greek-Cypriot side; the direct ramification of this strategy appears to be the rejection of the plan from the Greek-Cypriot side.

prevailing atmosphere of mutual mistrust. As part of its European aspirations and according to the 1999 Helsinki *communiqué* Turkey like all other candidate states has

...to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes
...Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.²⁴⁸

As a follow-on Turkey in its conceived NPAA undertook the pledge that "...[the country] will continue to develop her relations with neighboring countries on the basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy; in this context, Turkey will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems through dialogue with Greece."²⁴⁹ As Ifantis and Ayden asserted "...Turkey's own interest, in advancing towards EU membership has created a strong incentive to solve the Aegean issues."²⁵⁰

In February 2002 Turkish Foreign Minister Cem and his Greek counterpart, Papandreou, exploited the opportunity provided by the World Economic Forum meetings and set forth a procedure focusing on the aforementioned commitments. The two foreign ministers agreed on a series of meetings where diplomats from both sides would touch upon the "high-politics" issues. The delegations of technocrats were headed by Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal and Foreign Ministry Secretary General Anastasios Skopelitis, respectively.²⁵¹ The two delegations initiated a series of "exploratory talks," the aim of which was "...to highlight each [of] the issues each side considers as [of] primary or secondary importance and as negotiable or non-negotiable, as well as

²⁴⁸ Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, *Presidency Conclusions*, par. 4.

²⁴⁹ *Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Aquis*, 5.

²⁵⁰ Aydin and Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*, (10.

²⁵¹ "Greek-Turkish 'exploratory dialogue' begins in Ankara," *Athens News Agency*, February 13, 2002 available from

[<http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=332&article=10099>]; Internet, accessed on November 3, 2004.

the understandings of each other's perceptions, interests, incentives, constraints, preferences, priorities and bottom lines."²⁵²

In the "High politics" issues the staring official positions of the two countries diverge significantly. Both countries are advocating in favor of the *status quo*, as it is respectively understood. For Greece, in terms of International Law the only unresolved issue between the two countries is the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean. The rest of the issues raised by Turkey are characterized by Greece as unilateral claims. Furthermore, Greece supports the argument that this technical issue should be resolved through the ICJ. Turkey, on the other hand, considers the nature of the disputes as political and argues in favor of the balance that the Lausanne Treaty established between the two countries in the Aegean.²⁵³ To that extent, for Turkey, the delimitation of the continental shelf is among a series of interrelated problems that include: the breadth of territorial waters and airspace; the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands; the sovereign status of various islands in the Aegean not explicitly mentioned as ceded to Greece in the Lausanne and Paris Treaties; the lack of an agreement setting the maritime boundaries between the two countries; Search and Rescue (SAR) as well as command and control issues within the Aegean in the context of NATO; and the status of the Muslim minority in Thrace.²⁵⁴

Elaborating further, it is important to note that the breadth of the territorial waters and the delimitation of the continental shelf are closely intertwined issues, since the latter is measured starting at the outer limit of the territorial waters. In

²⁵² Dokos, "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century," 123.

²⁵³ As already noted the Lausanne Treaty excludes the Dodecanese Islands that were ceded to Greece after WWII.

²⁵⁴ For the view from Athens see "Unilateral Turkish Claims in the Aegean," *Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, available from [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims.html]; Internet, accessed on October 19, 2004. For the view from Ankara see "Background Note on the Aegean Dispute," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, July, 29, 2004 available from [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/GreeceLinks/Background_Note_on_Aegean_Dispute.htm]; Internet, accessed on October 19, 2004. For widely accepted synopsis of the origins and the evolution of the Greek-Turkish disputes up to 1979, see Wilson, *The Aegean Dispute*, (5-28, for an updated summary see Carol Migdalovitz, *Greece and Turkey Aegean Issues-Background and Recent Development*, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, The library of Congress, 97-799F, August, 21 1997, 1-4.

turn the breadth of the territorial waters according to 1982 UNCLOS III can extend up to 12 nautical miles. Turkey which is not a signatory part of UNCLOS paradoxically invokes it and argues that if Greece extends its territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles, the Aegean Sea will become *Mare Grecum*. In June 1995, the Turkish National Assembly's responded to the Greek Parliament's May 1995, ratification of the UNCLOS with a *casus belli* threat by unanimously adopting a pertinent resolution.²⁵⁵

The instituted process of approaching the "high politics" issues resembles the similar effort that an identical political committee unsuccessfully undertook within the frame of the 1988 Davos process. Since the inauguration of the "exploratory talks" the two delegations have concluded, as of July 2004, 27 sessions of deliberations. Information from relevant press releases is extremely limited. The process from its beginning is vaguely described as aiming to identify "points of convergence" while the atmosphere in the diplomatic language is referred to as "fruitful and positive."²⁵⁶ Notwithstanding the fact of the scarce information, one can safely presume that Turkey has raised the series of issues which Greece characterizes as unilateral claims. On this point it must be noted that for Greece, the process constitutes in its own right a great departure from its previous adamant position.²⁵⁷ Moreover, the Greek Premier Minister Karamanlis on September 2004 pointed out that the deadline of the Helsinki Communiqué was not feasible, and the talks, as long as progress is maintained, should

²⁵⁵ The resolution stipulates that:

[w]hile hoping that the Greek Government shall not decide to extend its territorial sea in the Aegean beyond the present 6 miles limits, which in turn would ruin the equilibrium established by the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, has decided to grant the Turkish government all powers, *including those in the military field*, for safe guarding and defending the vital interests of Turkey in such eventuality.

See George P. Politakis, "The Aegean Dispute in the 1990s," in Theodore Kariotis, *Greece and the Law of the Sea*, (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 317, [authors emphasis].

²⁵⁶ "Second round of Greek-Turkish 'exploratory talks' begins," *Athens News Agency*, April 12, 2002 available from <http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=329&article=9221>;] Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004.

²⁵⁷ Irini Karanasopoulou, "Baltonei o dialogos [Dialogue Stall]," *Ta Nea*, Athens, July 12, 2004, available from http://ta-nea.dolnet.gr/neaweb/neafile.pf?entypo=A&my_fyllo=17985;] Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004.

continue into 2005 and beyond. This argument is a further proof of the Greek good will and in many ways entails confidence in the instituted process. In other words Greece takes for granted, at least at the present stage, the sincerity of Turkey's intentions.²⁵⁸

In a manner remarkably parallel with the end stages of the 1988 Davos process, however, Ankara continues to convey mixed messages to Athens. The Turkish Air Force is the main apparatus used as leverage for this task. According to data presented by the Greek Ambassador to Turkey, Cristedes, in June 2003, for the year 2000 the violations of the 10-nautical mile limit total 447. The figure increased to 974 for year 2001. The violations quadrupled to 3,421 in 2002. Furthermore, in the first six months of 2003 there were a total of 2,161 violations. Of these 1,507 came within the three-mile limit, and 72 of the violations involved overflights of Greek settled areas.²⁵⁹ The phenomenon is perpetuating and has been further intensified in the months that followed the end of the Athens 2004 Summer Olympics.

Contrasting the NPAA with the violations of Greek air space reveals a remarkable paradox. Based on European standards as expressed through the *acquis*, it is exceptional for one country to argue and bluntly present claims against another, supporting them by military means²⁶⁰ Moreover, this phenomenon provides conclusive evidence for the existence of a struggle at the

²⁵⁸ The Greek Prime Minister used direct language saying that: [emphasis mine]

I don't believe that *the seabed issue should be treated with the logic of an exclusive December deadline*. It's an issue that has preoccupied us for 30 years.

Should that lead us to reject Turkey's choice to join Europe? ... I say no.

As quoted in Harry Papachristou, "Greek PM praises Turkey's EU-inspired reforms," *Agence France Presse*, September 12, 2003. available from [\[http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;\]](http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;) Internet, accessed on October 31, 2004

²⁵⁹ Sedat Ergin, "Turkey: Greece's Ambassador cites Sharp Increase in Airspace Violations," *Financial Times Information, Global News Wire*, June 19, 2003. available from [\[http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;\]](http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;) Internet, accessed on November 9, 2004.

²⁶⁰ Arguably European continent has to exhibit several antitheses and divergent opinions between the European states. One tangible example is the status of Gibraltar. While Spain argues that British sovereignty over the "Rock" should be terminated at some point, the Spanish air force does not overfly Gibraltar to exhibit Spanish aspirations. In other words even if someone in good faith argued that the extent of Greek airspace constitutes an exceptional case in the International Law realm it is most certain that armed aircraft constantly violating the limit would be considered as provocative behavior.

Turkish domestic level as already noted. Such an assertion is effortlessly supported by the statement of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Hilmi Ozkok who, in June 2003, asserted that the "Turkish jets will fly wherever they want over the Aegean Sea."²⁶¹

While this needless increase in tension is occurring, both countries at the political plane are engaged in cooperative initiatives which reveal the paradox of the relationships. Recognizing the political nature and the potential destabilizing effect of military maneuvers, both countries canceled military exercises in Cyprus. Moreover the Turkish prime minister, during his visit in Greece in May 2004, visited the Muslim minority in Thrace, becoming the first Turkish prime minister to do so since 1952. In his address he used different rhetoric than that used by past Turkish officials. He encouraged the members of the minority to work for a stronger Greece, stating that "I believe wholeheartedly that a strong Greece will provide you with greater benefits."²⁶²

Thus the crux of the paradox is that while Turkey declares in bombastic rhetoric its political will and apparently the will of the majority of its people to transform the Turkish state and adopt the behests of the European practice, at the same time it acts aggressively towards a neighboring country that has made many steps for reconciliation and rapprochement. This is a kind of diglossia, a flip-flop policy. On one hand exhibit good faith and symbolic gestures which by and large mean nothing and deflate after a certain time, while on the other retain antagonism tangibly exhibited even by military means.

²⁶¹ Andrew Borowiec, "Aegean Sea Incident Spurs Anger in Greece; Turkey's bid to join EU seen at risk," *The Washington Times*, June 5, 2003., available from [<http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil>;] Internet, accessed on November 9, 2004.

²⁶² As quoted in "Erdogan visits W. Thrace," *Kathimerini English Edition*, May 5, 2004, available from [<http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/news/content.asp?aid=42624>;] Internet, November 10, 2004.

E. CONCLUSION

Although the thaw in relations since 1999 has provided renewed hopes for a comprehensive reconciliation, the two countries have not reached yet the point where the “security dilemma” can be overcome to make way to peaceful coexistence...”²⁶³ Moreover, it is unknown whether the achieved level of interdependence between the two countries has reached the point of irreversibility, although it has reached unprecedented levels compared with the past. However, one should pay close attention to past historical examples in which the rapprochement was reversed and ultimately vanished.

A series of major shifts in Greek foreign policy have occurred since 1996. The most prominent has been the reversal towards a more relaxed attitude towards Turkey’s European aspirations. Later that attitude would become a complete u-turn with Greece providing full support for Turkey’s accession.

Present reconciliation has reached an astonishing level of cooperation between the two countries. In the “low politics” issues as well as in those perceived as of high friction both Greece and Turkey have exhibited qualitative differences over past periods of détente. However, the issue is whether the rapprochement is self-sustainable regardless of the politics dominating the domestic level of both countries. For Greece one can argue that there is a continuum in the process. The country has moved tacitly and tangibly away from obdurate premises which formerly dominated its foreign policy. For example, whereas Greece was not accepting any other dispute except the demarcation of the continental shelf, it has now entered a bilateral procedure where the Turkish side can raise any issue with no restrictions. Moreover, for Greece the reconciliation process was always to be based on a step-by-step procedure. This is even explicitly declared in Papandreou’s response to Cem’s letter.²⁶⁴ However, the working groups and the commissions of experts between the two countries discuss every issue. Several other examples can be argued from both sides.

²⁶³ Aydin, “Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities,” 22.

²⁶⁴ See page 56 of this study.

Nonetheless, the main issue of the current rapprochement revolves around Turkey's European aspirations and how these will evolve in the near future and in the mid term. Without any doubt, present rapprochement is as much alike as different when contrasted with past efforts. For instance, something like fifteen years earlier the reconciliation process was exhausted in a mixed messages atmosphere, together with massive airspace violations. Roughly the same background exists today. The qualitative difference, however, is that besides policymakers and officials, businesses and people are involved to a greater extent. The earthquakes and the bottom-up approach of the two peoples as already mentioned infused new air into the process. Once such a process is based on the changed perceptions of the populace, the policy will be reoriented as well, except in the case where more extreme views and measures prevail. Moreover, today Europe provides a multilateral-multinational context in which Greek-Turkish relations have to function. This context is dominated and governed by certain rules and norms which have no room for exceptions that undermine them. Extremities are not well perceived by the European nations, which see democracy as the basic premise of cooperation. In fact, extremities are rather measures of self-exclusion from the European family. Most likely the question whether or not the rapprochement has overcome the tipping point will be answered on December 18, 2004.

V. CONCLUSION

Greek-Turkish relations have long constituted one of the thorny issues in international politics and have been a source of instability in the eastern Mediterranean, constituting a potential flashpoint. The periods of *détente*, since they are few and short in duration, obviously suffer from the small-n problem. However, as the former are examined in this thesis, a number of safe historical generalizations can be concluded, and as such they form a historical paradigm of past unsuccessful efforts to normalize bilateral relations.

The analysis in Chapter II demonstrated that cooperative relations are feasible in both worlds, whether realist or liberal. The review of previous attempts at rapprochement in Chapter III revealed that cooperative bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey occurred always in an instrumental manner. That is, the two countries had largely divergent starting points, when potential strong (to a large extent charismatic) leaders could isolate these policies from public pressure. Moreover, these efforts collapsed once the national interests of the two countries diverged.

From the analysis in the Chapter IV it is safe to assume that the latest rapprochement represents not a tactical move but rather a strategic shift and a qualitative paradigm shift in the Greek policy towards Turkey. Greece being part of the EU since 1981 and for over 20 years is gradually becoming a postmodern anti-war state. By lifting its veto Greece, Turkey, denounced the tactics of using the EU membership as a bargaining chip while simultaneously addressed a longstanding Turkish demand. That is to be formally accepted as a member of the European family of nations. Historical analysis however indicates and confirms what contemporary analysts point out. That is that the sustainability of such policy has inherent limits if not accompanied by reciprocal gestures.

Turkey, on the other hand, has limited its contribution in the current rapprochement to employing cooperative rhetoric and symbolic gestures towards Greece. Both rhetoric and gestures appear to represent a qualitative difference but do not address any of the core issues. Moreover, as the empirical evidence

advocate, Turkey has not reciprocated to a substantial degree to Greece's strategic policy shift. Instead it has initiated a sort of mixed messages policy, with the use of its air force making the sustainability of the process at the Greek domestic level ambivalent. The expectation to become a member of the EU resulted in a remarkable number of changes in Turkey's domestic structures that will eventually enhance and deepen the existing level of democracy. However, the accession is not guaranteed, and most certainly its duration will be prolonged. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the future of the rapprochement is directly linked to the anticipated decision of the European Council on December 17, 2004. Furthermore, the outcome of the council will have a definite impact upon the perceptions of the Turkish political elite²⁶⁵ who formulate Turkish foreign policy. As the Commissioner on EU enlargement, Guenter Verheugen, vividly put it, "[T]he real hardship will start after getting the date [to start the accession negotiations]"²⁶⁶

The democratic peace theory may have proved, yet without establishing causality, that democracies do not fight each other. However, as the late president of the United States John Fitzgerald Kennedy has observed, "The mere absence of war is not peace." Moreover, it remains to be seen if the fundamental checks and balances embedded in democracies, and specifically for purposes of this thesis in Greece and Turkey, will allow both countries to resolve issues of friction and fully normalize their relations in the European context.

As Thucydides argued two millennia ago, honor, fear and interests are the causes of war. It appears that Greece has finally worked "to reduce its neighbors'

²⁶⁵ The Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gull was indicative and confirming when he argued about a negative EU decision:

If the political decision is not objective and not fair, then there will be negative repercussions in Turkey, *the EU and across the whole world, because Turkey's membership is very important.* [emphasis mine]
 see *Turkish daily News*, Ankara, September 11, 2004, available from [<http://www.turkishdailynews.com/FrTDN/latest/for.htm#f9;>] Internet accessed on September 11, 2004.

²⁶⁶ As quoted in Mehmet Ali Birand, "The Opinion of Mehmet Ali Birand," *Turkish Daily News*, Ankara, September 11, 2004, available from [<http://www.turkishdailynews.com/FrTDN/latest/birand.htm;>] Internet accessed on September 11, 2004.

fears, to recognize its neighbors' interests and – by doing so – to demonstrate the value of its honor.”²⁶⁷ Greece should continue on the same path, providing its support for Turkey’s aspirations to become a member of the EU. Turkey, on the other hand, has to reciprocate the shift of Greek policy and provide palpable evidence of alignment with the rules of the game in the European practice. A promising start would be revoking the 1995 *casus belli* threat which is certainly not consistent with any good neighboring practice.

²⁶⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Greece & the Balkans: A Moment of Opportunity,” in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaides, *The Greek Paradox: Promise vs. Performance*, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), 149.

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