

LASSWELL'S GARRISON STATE RECONSIDERED: EXPLORING A PARADIGM
SHIFT IN U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS RESEARCH

by

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ABSTRACT

The plausibility of performing trend analyses of the political influence of the United States' military on value allocations of income, safety, and deference was explored. This approach was taken to assess the viability of Harold D. Lasswell's garrison state construct in which he hypothesized that the trend of the world was that it was evolving toward a time when virtually all aspects of governance would come under military control (most notably in the value areas previously listed), even in democracies. The study differs from previous civil-military research in that it attempts to quantify and graphically display the trends in value allocations that may indicate such an evolution in the United States. By adapting currently available data to this study, the extant trends in income (annual percentage pay increases), safety (socialization of the threat of war as indicated by trends in death rates), and deference (indicated by institutional confidence) were developed. The findings provide a quantitative indication supportive of Lasswell's hypothesis; although the significance of the results is largely subjective. Moreover, the study demonstrates that Lasswell's call for trend analysis, to determine a state's movement on the continuum from a business state to a garrison state existence, is a valid approach in the study of civil-military relations. Future studies should seek to refine existing data or develop new databases to allow more rigorous statistical analyses.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Nearly two-thirds of a century has passed since the late Harold Lasswell's (1941) seminal work, "The Garrison State," was published in the *American Journal of Sociology*. His thesis provided a "developmental construct" that has proven useful in the scientific study of world politics for several generations. Influenced by political and military events in Germany and Soviet Russia during the Second World War, and especially the advent of aerial bombardment, Lasswell's thesis was that trends of the time pointed toward "a world in which the specialists on violence [read soldiers] are the most powerful group in society" (1941; 455). Arguably, the contextual basis of Lasswell's claim is the underlying premise for contemporary conceptualization of a military state, one reflecting Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union. These negative images of a garrison state have undoubtedly served as motivation for civil-military relations research of the last half century--most notably in regard to the proper political role of the uniformed military in a democracy such as the United States. Moreover, Lasswell's garrison state construct provided "... the first conscious, systematic, and sophisticated theory of civil-military relations" (Huntington 1957, 346; see also Stanley 1997).

Scholars addressing Lasswell's hypothesis have tended to focus on the postulated methods through which the governing elite of a garrison state would wield power. These methods are condensed into what Samuel Fitch terms "garrison state practices--

(1) centralization of power, (2) manipulation of international crises, and (3) restriction of civil or political liberties in the name of security” (1985, 33).¹ Scholars, most often through case analyses of post-World War II politico-military history, have demonstrated that a garrison state existence has not occurred in the United States, thus bringing the viability of Lasswell’s garrison state construct into question. An example of a critique of the garrison state construct is seen in Samuel P. Huntington’s charge that Lasswell’s hypothesis was “unscientific,” thereby necessitating use of the term “construct”: a claim supported by referring to the failed “bourgeois-proletariat formulation” of Marx and Engels (Huntington 1962, 79).² Without fully debating the appropriateness of Huntington’s analogy, one could argue that determining the accuracy of any prophecy occurs only through trend analysis of appropriate indicators, or by case analysis at some future point in which history, as it pertains to that particular prophecy, is considered complete. Support for the propriety of using a construct was continually defended by Lasswell, as seen in his statement that “A developmental construct characterizes a possible sequence of events running from a selected cross-section of the past to a cross-section of the future” (1951d, 4); in other words, a trend.

Concerning the prophetic nature of Lasswell’s construct, one need only peruse the findings in the myriad books, articles, and papers dedicated to the study of civil-military relations in the United States to realize that establishment of a garrison state has not yet occurred. However, this does not negate the possibility that the United States may be

¹ When one views Fitch’s condensed version of the characteristics associated with a garrison state, it is tempting to allege their existence in post-9/11 America. This study is concerned with the development and analysis of quantifiable indicators through which trends attributed to the development of a garrison can be discerned. Given that post-9/11 issues are still being unraveled, no attempt is made to follow daily news events. However, some information pertaining to recent acts of terrorism and military operations is used to facilitate analysis of available data and development of future research questions.

² It is noteworthy that by the end of Huntington’s article he believed the world was indeed heading toward a garrison state existence (Huntington 1962).

moving rather insidiously toward an existence wherein the armed forces becomes the most influential group in society.

The wealth of literature on civil-military relations, particularly that written in the past sixty-plus years, reflects at least an academic interest and concern about the maintenance of a proper relationship between military members and their civilian leaders. This study steps away from the normal analysis of extant political characteristics via case study by exploring the plausibility of quantifiable indicators that may be graphed so as to show a rise or decline in the political influence of the uniformed services. In doing so, potential movement toward a garrison state existence in the United States may be more readily discerned and corrective or preventive measures considered if necessary.

Statement of the Problem

Explaining his interest in the garrison state construct, Jay Stanley stated that the primary question of civil-military relations research is "... at what point will the military elite of a society exercise undue influence on the policies of the government and the organization of the society" (1997, 20; see also Gibson and Snider 1999). He then points out that this is a "... significantly different question than when the military might overthrow civilian government" (Stanley 1997, 20).³ As was previously discussed, it seems that by focusing on the existence or nonexistence of the characteristics of a garrison state, it is the latter interpretation of the central civil-military question to which most scholars subscribe (Bland 1999; Burk 2002).

³ An example of concern about a *coup d'état* is discussed in the introductory chapter of Peter D. Feaver's Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. 2003. Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press. See also Bland 1999, and Burk 2002.

In a fairly recent piece concerned with Lasswell's garrison state construct, Aaron Friedberg makes the audacious claim "But Lasswell was wrong" (1992, 113). Focusing primarily on the military-industrial complex,⁴ Friedberg supports his assertion by stating that "Even under the intense pressures of its confrontation with the Soviet Union, America did not transform itself into anything resembling a 'garrison state'" (1992, 113). He posits that as a result of the Cold War the United States became a "contract state" in comparison to its "garrison state" enemy. Friedberg's further claim that spending on arms could have been much greater, and therefore more in line with the concept of a garrison state had the United States adopted the Soviet model of state-run arms industry, is probably accurate. However, it appears that calling the United States' Cold War politico-military existence a "contract state" versus a "garrison state" is merely manipulation of words or symbols, a characteristic that Lasswell predicted would be prevalent in a garrison state (Friedberg 1992; Lasswell 1941). Apart from ideological and political arguments about the Cold War, it appears that in this context a plausible distinction between the United States and the Soviet Union is that the former used the seductive capacity of capitalism to fund weapons production, and the latter used what many Americans viewed as the coercive practices of communism.

The conclusions reached by Friedberg demonstrate the continued emphasis placed on the characteristics associated with a garrison state in civil-military relations research. Such treatment of the topic is not incorrect per se, but studies focusing primarily on time-specific cases may overlook the existence of long-term trends in political influence

⁴ President Dwight D. Eisenhower coined the phrase "military-industrial complex" in his farewell speech, 17 January 1961. He was concerned that the combined political strength of the armed forces and private defense industry would become overbearing. This concern developed largely from recognition of the increasing tendency for America to rely on expensive, technologically advanced weaponry through which national security could be maintained (see especially, Eisenhower in Kozak and Keagle 1988; see also, Snow and Brown 2000, 227-28).

exercised by the armed forces. Analysis of trends is key to validation of Lasswell's overarching premise that the world "...is moving *toward* a system of garrison states" (1941, 455, emphasis added; 1951d).

The previous discussion takes us back to Stanley's premise that civil-military relations research is primarily concerned with ascertaining when government policy may become inordinately influenced by the uniformed services (1997; see also Gibson and Snider 1999). Lasswell addressed the issue of influence in his original work wherein, after elaborating on the characteristics associated with a garrison state, he posed the following question, "How will the various kinds of influence be distributed in the state?" (1941, 463). A cursory overview of what Lasswell meant by influence is instructive at this point.

Lasswell postulated that "influence is measured by control over values" (1941, 463). The specific values he analyzed, and those pertinent to this study, are income, safety, and deference. He predicted that, in a garrison state, there would be an effort to equalize income to some degree in order to maintain morale; the propensity for individuals to be affected by war would be socialized (due to airpower no distinction could be made between soldier and civilian in war); and deference (respect and power) would be bestowed on those in the armed forces (Lasswell 1941).

It is from Lasswell's query and conjecture that two questions for this study are derived: (1) What indicators exist that may adequately demonstrate the influence of the armed forces on the value allocations of income, safety, and deference? (2) What are the trends of those indicators? By adopting an "itemistic" approach toward answering these questions the research paradigm is shifted from the normal cross-sectional analysis of civil-military relations to a more substantive prediction of the future based on trends in value

distribution (Lasswell 1941, 456; Lasswell 1951d). Such an approach is in keeping with Lasswell's intent.

Purpose of the Research

Evidence of concern about the influence of the military in the political processes of the United States government, predominately that of higher ranking officers, is provided in numerous texts. One example is Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957). Huntington expounds on the political influence of the military in general, but his discussion of the political activity of the National Guard Association provides an example of policy influence wielded by military organizations. Although this association is not a legislatively established military organization such as the Army or Navy, it can be viewed as a proxy military staff organization since its membership is predominately made up of current members in the National Guards of the fifty states. Reflecting on the successful lobbying efforts of the National Guard Association with the Eightieth Congress, a former association president is cited as wondering whether "... any organization has been so successful in the legislative field in so brief a period ..." (Huntington 1957, 174-76). A public statement such as this, which seems to flout the political influence of the military, is sure to raise the eyebrows of politicians, academicians, and citizens alike who are interested in maintaining civilian control of the military.

Another noteworthy author concerned about elitism is C. Wright Mills (1957), who published *Power Elite* in the same year as Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. Mills saw no distinction between professions insofar as political influence was concerned. His thesis was that the "power elite" were individuals who, by virtue of position, were able to

transcend the political and socioeconomic existence of most citizens resulting in increased opportunities to influence policy. He believed that the domains of national power--economic, political, and military--were interdependent, each one wielding influence over the other two. The opinion of Mills most pertinent to this study is that those making up the elite have more of the things valued by other citizens: money, power, and prestige.

A more recent example of the concern about military influence is an article by Richard H. Kohn in the *Naval War College Review*. He does not view the possibility of a coup d'état in the United States as the utmost concern, but sees instead the increasing political clout of the military as being most problematic. Kohn believes the military's influence has risen to such a degree that as an institution "it can impose its own perspective on many policies and decisions" (2002, 9). Based on the fact that each of the armed services maintains legislative liaisons and public affairs staffs, the belief that the Joint Staff is a very powerful entity in its own right, and the fact that the commanders-in-chief of the various geographic regions appear to have more political recognition than the ambassadors, Kohn posits that it is becoming increasingly accurate to view the military as arbiters of foreign policy.⁵ If Kohn's assertion has any validity one should also be concerned that the military's policy influence regarding international matters may spill over to domestic policy issues as well.

This blurring of policy domains is addressed by Donald M. Snow wherein he adopts the widely accepted term "intermestic" to describe a policy world that often deals with aspects of both international and domestic prominence concomitantly (1999, 134; see

⁵ For more fully developed discourse concerning the policy process, size, structure, and budgetary aspects of the Defense and State Departments see *Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990's* and *United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Waters Edge* 2d ed., both by Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, 1994 and 2000 respectively. Concerning the issue of regional commanders, again see Snow and Brown (1994), and Christopher M Bourne's piece entitled "Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act" in the spring 1998 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

also Kegley and Wittkopf 2001, 56). Snow (1999) points out that public awareness of the government's dealings in international issues should improve as the two issue domains are increasingly intertwined. The question as to whether the general public has been made more aware of international issues is left for other studies. However, amongst academicians there appears to be a heightened awareness of the intermestic quality of international and domestic policies, especially in the post-Gulf War period. Richard Kohn discusses the breakdown in civilian control of the military and boldly proclaims that the military's "very size gave [it] unexpected influence over the nation's [sic] foreign policy and domestic affairs" (1994, para. 8).

The arguments of Huntington, Mills, and Kohn were predominately based on synthesis of select instances or cases, and are unquestionably valuable to the body of knowledge. However, Lasswell postulated that only by graphically depicting past trends could a realistic forecast of future events be made (1941; 1951d). The major problem in developing trend charts has been the difficulty in finding adequate and accurate quantitative indicators of influence, a core task of this research effort.

Given that there are no universally accepted indicators of influence, this study, by necessity, is more exploratory than explanatory in nature. The overarching goal is to assess the validity of Lasswell's predicted trends concerning military influence. To do so, adequate indicators of influence relating to the Lasswellian factors of income, safety, and deference must first be developed. By charting the values of each indicator, a more accurate assessment of the United States' movement toward or away from a garrison state existence may be made. The conceptual emphasis of the last sentence is important. It does not infer determination of a final, static state of being but rather a graphic depiction of a

dynamic progression to, or regression from, a hypothetical end-state (Lasswell 1941; Stanley 1997).

Significance of the Research

If one goal of a democratic society is to maintain civilian control of the military in order to prevent establishment of a garrison state, it follows that continuous tracking of pertinent trends associated with such development is critical. The findings of this study are especially important to such an enterprise given that widely accepted indicators of influence are not known to exist.

This research endeavor is also important in that it reinforces a critical yet often overlooked aspect of Lasswell's original work. As previously mentioned, it seems forgotten that the critical question that civil-military relations scholars should be asking is, "... at what point will the military elite of a society exercise undue influence on the policies of the government and the organization of the society? ... [a] significantly different question than when the military might overthrow civilian government" (Stanley 1997, 20; see also, Clotfelter 1973; Gibson and Snider 1999). In view of the inordinate amount of attention given to searching for attributes of a garrison state in society, it appears that most scholars subscribe to the latter interpretation of the central civil-military question (see Bland 1999; Burk 2002; Feaver 2003). Therefore, the primary significance of this study is that it alters the paradigmatic approach toward the study of civil-military relations by focusing on the former issue espoused by Stanley (1997): discerning when the military's political influence might be considered inappropriate or challenging to democratic governance. Development and analysis of trends in military influence will improve the

potential to make such a contribution. Furthermore, by establishing criteria to aid in the depiction of trends in military influence, future studies may be designed for more timely and accurate assessment of the policy process.

The outcome of this research effort is made more relevant given the various military conflicts and terrorist activities around the globe; the reality that military and security issues seem to dominate executive and legislative activity; and the public display of tensions in civil-military relations seen in the numerous congressional hearings about military operations throughout the world, most notably the Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. These examples, though not exhaustive, support the earlier assertion that certain characteristics of a garrison state are evident in the post-9/11 United States. Again, it is not the goal of this study to provide up-to-the-minute, adequate, and accurate analysis of the current dynamic political environment relative to the garrison state construct. However, data pertaining to recent terrorist activities and selected military operations in the post-Gulf War period are presented to aid in the analysis and projection process.

Definition of Terms

An important aspect of any study is to ensure that what one writes about is understood in proper context, and that certain terms hold the same meaning for those who may read the results. This seems especially important in the often nebulous environment of the social sciences.⁶

Total Deaths: The combination of “combat deaths” (killed in action or dead of wounds) and “other deaths” (death from disease, privation, and accidents; and death

⁶ All dictionary definitions are placed in quotations and are taken from *The New American Webster Handy College Dictionary*. All other definitions are cited as necessary.

among prisoners of war) as indicated in the USCWC *Statistical Summary: America's Major Wars*.

Employment Cost Index (ECI): “A quarterly measure of the rate of change in compensation per hour worked” (CBO 1999, 14). This study will only reference the “wage and salary component” of the index which is “derived from estimates of average straight-time hourly earnings in an occupation” (CBO 1999, 14).

Military: In its noun form the term simply means “the army.” In most writings about civil-military relations the term is a broader reference to the various branches of military service (Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and Air Force), either individually or collectively. It is also used as an adjective defined as “pertaining to the army, a soldier, or affairs of war; soldierly.” It is the adjective form that is most common in this study since it does not overtly make a distinction between civilian employees of the Department of Defense and uniformed members of the Armed Forces. Any use of the noun form will be obvious to the reader and there is no distinction made between ranks in the military. Synonyms that may be found throughout the study are armed forces, armed services, military forces, military services, Pentagon, Department of Defense, and defense department.

Garrison: The noun form means “troops stationed in a fort or fortified town.” The verb form means “to provide with or occupy as a garrison.” It seems that Lasswell exercised literary license in using “garrison” as an adjective to modify the noun “state.” Used in combination, “garrison state” simply refers to a society in which the most powerful people are members of the defense establishment. Samuel Huntington points out that Lasswell often used “garrison-police state” or “garrison prison state”

interchangeably with “garrison state” in order to emphasize that all specialists in violence are included in the concept (1962, 81). For the purpose of this study only the military, as defined above, is considered.

Influence: Although Peter Beckman wrote that “much of the political science inquiry rests on some notion of influence,” (1974, 16) arriving at a clear-cut definition remains problematic largely due to its tautological nature. Webster’s defines it as the “power to control or affect others by authority, persuasion, example, etc.” As seen below, power can be defined as influence. Beckman attempted to remedy the tautological dilemma by arguing that the difference between power and influence is similar to the distinction between coercion and persuasion (1974). The concept of power is more appropriate when dealing with a coup d’état, and persuasion more accurate in studying the more subtle issue of political influence. Samuel Finer defines political influence of the military as “... the effort to convince civilian authorities by appealing to their reason or their emotions” (quoted in Beckman 1974, 63). Since this study explores the possibility that indicators of influence exist, it is logical to accept the latter definition, especially since the focus is on policy outcomes. Should outright coercion exist, policy decisions would be made by military personnel versus elected officials indicating, at the extreme, that a coup d’état may have occurred.

Power: “Physical or mental strength or energy; influence; control.” As discussed above, power and influence are often interchangeable. The term “power” is used in this study when directly quoting another scholar, and even then an attempt is made to ensure it is in context of persuasion rather than coercion.

Income: Although there are numerous special pays, incentives, bonuses, etc. allowed by Congress, for the purposes of this study only the base pay of military members, and the average salary of civil service (general schedule) employees is considered.

Safety: To understand what is meant by “safety,” Lasswell’s original concept is adopted, which states, “... there will be a strong tendency toward equalizing the distribution of safety throughout the community (that is, negative safety, the socialization of threat in modern war)” (1941, 463). He based his hypothesis on the fact that aircraft were being used in ever increasing numbers in warfare, and that aerial bombardment increased the propensity for both collateral damage and civilian casualties in war.

Deference: Lasswell stated that “To be deferred to is to be taken into consideration by the environment” (1941, 463). He then split the concept into the two distinct elements of power and respect. Power was measured in terms of participation in decision making, and respect weighed in terms of “reciprocal intimacy” (Lasswell 1941, 463).

Military-Industrial Complex: A conceptualization of an environment wherein a Congressional committee, an agency of the federal government, and a business or interest group collaborate on the expenditure of public funds for various programs desired by the agency and manufactured or provided by the private business; also referred to as an iron triangle (Snow and Brown 2000).

Assumptions

The major assumption in this study is that analysis of aggregate level data in the areas of income, safety, and deference over time is more indicative of the long-term political influence of the military as an institution in comparison to traditional cross-sectional studies, which may measure only the personal persuasive capability of a senior Pentagon official whose tenure is limited.

Most studies of the influence of the military on policy decisions are qualitative and utilize observations of the activities of individuals (normally high-ranking officers) to make inferences about the level of influence of the armed forces as a whole (see, for example, Mills 1957; Finer 1962; Bourne 1988; Weigley 1993; Kohn 1994; Avant, 1998; Foster 1993; Roman and Tarr 2001). Such notable historic figures as MacArthur, Lemay, Westmoreland, and Powell are but a few names easily associated with military influence at the highest levels of government. However, in the daily exercise of their duties these individuals would probably garner little attention because their positions mandated involvement in the political process. Most often their names, and concomitantly the armed services in general, became noteworthy in politics when controversial issues pitted the military against civilian leadership and the ensuing debates became public knowledge. The outcome of these debates, or rather the end product of the political process, is what interests most people who desire to know which side “won.”

Limitations

The best explanation of the overarching limits involved in this study is provided by Harold Lasswell:

The task of locating ourselves as talkers and writers in relation to the pyramids of safety, income, and deference is insuperable at present, since requisite information about the world is compiled in fragmentary form. Material units of income have been partially compared, and regional, social, and biopsychic traits of those receiving income have been sporadically studied. Rather few efforts have been made to cope with the more elusive pyramids of deference. The relatively simpler task of studying the man who gets killed in wars, revolutions, revolts, feuds, mobs, gang struggles and judicial administration is carried but a little way. (1977, 148)

Lasswell's lament of the scarcity of data (thirty-six years after his original publication) is echoed in this study. The problems involved with development of acceptable indicators of influence, or control, over the three values—income, safety, and deference—mirror the difficulty of definition as seen in a previous section. In a separate study performed by Lasswell, he remarked on this very issue by stating that “The moment anyone tries to pass from the ‘ambiguous’ to the ‘operational,’ empirical questions arise” (1951a, 12; see also Beckman 1974). It is probable that ambiguity is a primary inhibiting factor for most scholars wishing to tackle the trend analysis advocated in Lasswell's (1941) garrison state construct. As stated before, this study differs from most in that it does not attempt to explain the reasons why the United States is not a garrison state, but rather it seeks to determine whether there are any plausible indicators of a trend toward such an existence.

Finding an acceptable indicator of political influence of the armed services over incomes appears to be fairly straightforward, but only insofar as assessing those incomes that policymakers directly control such as military and civil-service. This is a limited approach compared to the expectations espoused in Lasswell's original work. He predicted the “moderation of huge differences in individual income, (flattening the pyramid at the top, bulging it out in the upper-middle and middle zones) in reference to

income distribution of the society as a whole” (Lasswell 1941, 463). It seems logical that for this to occur, a garrison state existence would be in place, thereby rendering moot any effort to search for a trend. At this point in time the government only has direct control of the pay for individuals in its employment. Although it does track the wages of United States citizens, accurate comparisons are made difficult due to the categorization of occupations; twenty-two major occupational groups were listed in the 2002 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates report (U.S. Department of Labor 2002).

Lasswell’s concept of safety indicates that all members of a society will be threatened by the prospect of war (1941). This assumption was based on the reality that aerial bombardment increased the potential for civilians to become casualties of war on par (at least hypothetically) with those in uniform. As stated previously, this hypothesis was possibly more applicable to the threats posed by the nuclear arsenals maintained by the superpowers during the Cold War. The twenty-first century offers yet another application of the threat hypothesis in the increasing threat of global terrorism; it is open to debate as to whether terrorist activity and actions taken to counter it warrant use of the term “war.” One might also assert that utilizing private contractors to perform certain missions of the military is indicative of socializing the inherent dangers of military operations.

Finding an acceptable indicator of safety poses the same limitations as does the concept of deference. Short of public opinion polls, which might give some indication of how people feel about their safety in relation to war, quantifying the propensity for civilians to become casualties of war is problematic at best. Absent any widely accepted data concerning casualty projections, one is forced to adapt. Comparison of military and

civilian casualty rates in past conflicts is adopted so as to provide empirical information about each group. As with income and deference, the extant trends are analyzed to determine the viability of the indicators and to make recommendations for future studies and policies.

The very concept of deference posed by Lasswell is limiting. How does one measure the degree to which any group is “taken into consideration” (Lasswell 1941, 463) in policy process? Whether deliberating on issues of force development or employment; weapon systems procurement; or roles and missions of the various services, policy makers seek the technical and professional advice of members of the armed forces. This in itself connotes deference, but what does it mean?

Huntington wrote, “... it is extremely difficult to draw the line between the soldier giving professional advice to Congress on what the country needs for its defense and the soldier lobbying with Congress for the administration. The two roles are distinct in theory but blended in practice” (1956, 691). This demonstrates the two-fold problem of pitting the executive against the legislative branches with the military owing a certain amount of allegiance to both (Huntington 1956). Similarly, both arms of government exhibit deference to the military simply due to the fact the military is both obligated and encouraged to participate in the political process.

To overcome the limitation in measuring deference a proxy must be used. Although more fully discussed in the methodology section of this dissertation, it is believed that trends in public opinion toward the armed forces offers the best, albeit imperfect substitute. Basic support for this methodology comes from Samuel P. Huntington and Philip E. Converse. Huntington wrote:

In a democracy the policies of the government, including military policy, are shaped by public opinion. ... Public opinion not only determines the level of military magnitude ... it also tends to restrict, reduce, and limit that magnitude. ... "Mass opinion" is difficult to identify, much less measure. Public opinion polls have their limitations, but they are the best source available. (1961a, 235)

Philip Converse made note of studies by experts on public opinion such as Warren Miller and Donald Stokes; Sidney Verba and Norman Nie; and Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, wherein they demonstrated a "considerable degree of congruence between popular opinion and policy outcomes" (1987, S52). Converse emphasized the point that those scholars wrote of agreement between the issues of opinion and policy, which does not imply any notion of causality. Notwithstanding this caveat, public opinion concerning military issues appears to be the most appropriate source of data from which trends can be developed and analyzed.

Due to the difficulties brought about by the subject itself and the lack of widely accepted measurement criteria, this study is limited to analysis of military and civil-service annual percentage pay increases from 1945 to 2004; combat casualty information from 1941 to 1991 (data from the Revolutionary War to the 9/11 terrorist attack are provided for context and comparison); and public opinion data concerning citizens' feelings toward the military from 1973 to 2003. Together these data are assessed as to their viability as indicators of the level of political influence the military services wield.

The policy process is complicated, and the political influence of the military is but one variable requiring consideration. However, the data trends concerning the armed services' level of political clout should provide some indication of whether or not the United States is moving toward a garrison state existence; that is to say, a situation in which the military becomes increasingly influential.

Summary

This reappraisal of Lasswell's garrison state construct is undertaken to determine whether indicators exist that may plausibly demonstrate, in a quantitative manner, the influence the United States military brings to bear on policy-makers, and how that influence has changed over time. In doing so, it shifts the emphasis in civil-military relations research away from simply ascertaining whether or not characteristics attributed to a garrison state exist at a specific point in time. The appropriateness of resurrecting Lasswell's garrison state as the contextual base for this study is best expressed in the closing paragraph of his original work:

The function of any developmental construct, such as the present one about the garrison state, is to clarify to the specialist the possible relevance of his research to impending events that concern the values of which he approves as a citizen. Although they are neither scientific laws nor dogmatic forecasts, developmental constructs aid in the timing of scientific work, stimulating both planned observation of the future and renewed interest in whatever past events are of greatest probable pertinence to the emerging future. Within the general structure of the science of society there is place for many special sciences devoted to the study of all factors that condition the survival of selected values. This is the sense in which there can be a science of democracy, or a science of political psychiatry, within the framework of social science. If the garrison state is probable, the timing of special research is urgent. (Lasswell 1941, 468)

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Concern over undue influence by the military in American politics has existed since the earliest days of the United States (Huntington 1956; Millis et al. 1958; Clotfelter 1973; Beckman 1974). Of the myriad books, articles, and papers dedicated to the subject of proper civil-military relations,⁷ Richard Kohn's *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802* (1975) provides one of the more comprehensive records about the origin of worry concerning a politically powerful military. Kohn provides evidence of disparate views in his introductory chapter by contrasting the beliefs held by Samuel Adams and John Hancock. Adams' opinion was that individual liberty would be jeopardized by the existence of a standing army. Hancock believed that the goals of militia members matched those of the state, thereby mitigating any anxiety about its members endangering their attainment. The fundamental ideas of these two American forefathers helped form the base assumptions concerning civil-military relations held by scholars, politicians, servicemen, and citizens in general (Kohn 1975).

As Russell Weigley points out in "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell (1993)" the nineteenth century's relative tranquility offered little in the way of challenges to the concept of civilian superiority

⁷ On the issue of "proper" civil-military relations, noted scholar Michael Desch opens one of his texts by stating "Civil-military-relations is a very complicated issue. Analysts disagree about how to define and measure civil-military relations as a dependent variable [for two reasons:] (1) Difficult to separate issues into neat piles of ownership. (2) We're not sure what is 'good' or 'bad' civ-mil relations" (Desch 1999, 3).

and military subordination. Moreover, the need for the United States to maintain a large standing army was not fully realized until the Cold War period following World War II. Although the existing Cold War security threats were considered serious enough to necessitate creation of a force-in-being, maintenance of such a force ran counter to long-held views of democratic governance. Weigley also believes that the end of the Second World War and subsequent Cold War era witnessed an increase in the number of political decisions being made that blurred the boundaries between diplomacy and strategy. As such, policy-making necessarily became an enterprise requiring collaboration between political and military officials. Considering that a large standing army was still perceived as a threat to freedom and the reality that the military appeared to be increasingly involved and influential in the political decisions of the country, the original debate of Adams and Hancock was revived.

Literature Review Format

This literature review follows the chronological development of the civil-military relations literature. Borrowing from Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn's *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (2001; see also Langston 2003), it is arranged according to the "three waves" of modern scholarly debate on civil-military relations in the United States. Incorporating the concept of waves or distinct periods of research into the subject of civil-military relations does not imply that there is an expectation of major differences between the periods that will spring forth from the analysis of trends. Instead, the waves metaphorically capture the essence of a perceived

rise and fall of scholarly interest in the subject; interest that is usually piqued by some significant event or activity of an important person or group.

Further reason for approaching this literature review in a chronological manner stems from the lack of a widely accepted theory of civil-military relations around which a topical discourse may be more easily established. In “Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology,” Guy Siebold also decries the lack of a “core theory of military sociology” (2001, 140-41). He further states that “without a center, there has been more of a continuing dialogue than an accumulation of theoretical or practical evidence that one might call knowledge of the sub-field” (Siebold 2001, 140-41). The format of this literature review is demonstrative of that continuing dialogue.

The first wave of literature can be attributed to the period following the Korean War and ends roughly at the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) concept in 1973. One of the primary concerns during this era was the proper role of a large standing army; a concern made more prominent since military members (especially officers) were considered to be far more conservative than the general population, resulting in an ideological gap between the two groups. In view of these ideological differences, the crux of the debate was the issue of maintaining civilian control of the armed forces in a democracy. Although the issue of political influence of the that was at the center of the early research.

A second wave of writings picks up with the post-conscript military in 1973 and continues through the first Gulf War. This wave of literature centered on problems resulting from the Vietnam War and the end of conscription. The war appeared to fuel an enmity between the military and civilian sectors of society causing the ideological gap to

grow. Adoption of the AVF required the armed forces to compete with the civilian sector and civil service for qualified personnel. This resulted in what is commonly referred to as the self-selective nature of the armed forces, which is alleged to have further exacerbated existing differences between the two groups. These differences would cause some to be even more concerned that the growing military bureaucracy might seek primarily to satisfy its own bureaucratic needs and wants potentially at the expense of the society it served. As a bureaucracy, it can only be expected that the military would seek to increase its influence among policy-makers in order to improve its capacity to obtain scarce resources.

The first-wave debate concerning disparate values held by military members in comparison to society at large was resurrected in the 1990s, launching a third round of scholarly interest in civil-military relations. Impetus for the revived concern about the civil-military gap is attributed partly to the fall of the former Soviet Union; fundamental changes in use of the military abroad (couched in terms of the debate over roles and missions); and what some authors considered to be a war of cultures in the United States (Ricks 1997; Feaver and Kohn 2001). In this period the emphasis on the political influence of the military on policy comes to the forefront, most notably in regard to the political activities of General Colin Powell, which were often seen as inappropriate (see Weigley 1993; Kohn 1994; Avant, 1998; Foster 1993; Roman and Tarr 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Feaver 2003).

In effect, evidence of a cyclical interest in civil-military relations over the past half-century lends some credence to the overarching concern at the core of this study. At issue is the desire to determine whether there are some plausible indicators of political influence of the military on policy that can be graphed to demonstrate their historical trend. The

primary goal then becomes the ability to discern whether there is a gradual movement toward or away from the creation of a garrison state. To do so, we must first attempt to understand what the research can tell us about the issue of civil-military relations as it relates to the possibility that the military institution is becoming more influential in politics.

The First Wave

“The Garrison State” (Lasswell 1941) is not normally attributed to any of the three waves of twentieth-century literature concerning civil-military relations. However, it can be argued that the garrison state construct established the theoretical and conceptual base for modern study of civil-military relations (Huntington 1957; Stanley 1997). The gist of the garrison state hypothesis has been discussed previously but merits emphasis.

The majority of research addresses the expected end-state characteristics of the garrison state, or what Lasswell referred to in the abstract to his article as “methods” the ruling elite would use to govern society (1941, 455). He predicted that the military elite of such a society would be skilled in management practices normally ascribed to businessmen. A skill of critical importance would be the ability to manipulate symbols so as to maintain morale and positive relations with the citizens. He was of the opinion that unemployment would be abolished, at least in the mind of the general public, and that most of the violence in society would be aimed at its less skillful members along with those who openly express their disdain for the power elite. It was also believed that government would somehow create a degree of parity in income levels; ostensibly to maintain the morale of the citizens in the midst of unrest created by an increasing sense of peril. Lastly, Lasswell believed that

authority would be “dictatorial, governmentalized, centralized, [and] integrated (1941, 455).

Lasswell used the majority of his thesis to expand on the methodologies of governance used by the elite in a garrison state, but he also reflected on the manner in which influence⁸ would be manifest in such a society. Influence, in this context, was viewed as a measure of control the military would exercise over the values of income, safety, and deference (Lasswell 1941; Lasswell 1951c).

By changing the central point of his thesis, Lasswell (1941) was, in essence, signaling the reader to recognize that an outright coup d'état was not necessary for the establishment of a garrison state. As Lasswellian scholar Jay Stanley noted, “... weakening of civil supremacy can occur within an effective democratic structure” (1997, 23; see also Huntington 1962). For this reason it is instructive to view the garrison state construct in terms of a continuum. There is the “business state” beginning and the assumed “garrison state” ending (Lasswell 1941, 463)

Ideally, demonstration of movement along that continuum would be accomplished by performing multiple, cross-sectional assessments of the trends in development of the characteristics of a garrison state. Unfortunately, previous research appears to have been focused more on determining whether the expected characteristics of a garrison state were present at a point in time specified by the researcher. Although it is purely conjecture, this approach to the subject may have been used because the characteristics of a garrison state

⁸ Lasswell's concept of influence was first documented in *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, originally published in 1936, wherein he wrote, “The study of politics is the study of influence and the influential. ... The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get. Available values may be classified as *deference, income, safety*. Those who get the most are the *elite*; the rest are *mass*” (Lasswell 1951c; emphasis in the original).

appear to be dichotomous in nature; they either do or do not exist, which greatly hinders use of trend analysis to determine movement along the development continuum.

In view of the previous discussion, Lasswell's (1941) seminal work appears to be rightly considered the genesis of twentieth-century theory on civil-military relations. However, the debate between Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz in the mid-fifties is often regarded as a catalyst in the resurgence in research about civil-military relations. The fundamental issue of the Huntington-Janowitz debate concerned the appropriate model for civilian control of the armed forces.

Many scholars refer to Huntington's, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* as his seminal work on the topic. However, prior to that book, Huntington published an article in the *American Political Science Review* entitled "Civilian Control and the Constitution." In this study Huntington claimed that "... the American Constitution in the twentieth century obstructs the achievement of civilian control" (1956, 676). He posited that the writers of the Constitution viewed control of the military more in context of its employment rather than complete and total control of every aspect of day-to-day operations. The framers appeared to be more fearful of military force misused by politicians than of political capability wrongly used by officers of the armed forces (Huntington 1956). He supported this notion by referring to the Constitutional division of responsibility for the military between the legislative and executive branches of government. Huntington maintained that it is the separation of powers that actually "... foster[s] the direct access of the professional military authorities to the highest levels of government" (1956, 682). In effect, it appears that the Constitution invites the military into

politics, which by its very nature necessitates development of the capability to influence those people involved in policy-making decisions.

Huntington (1957) introduced the concepts of subjective and objective civilian control of the military. Subjective control equaled civilianization of the military, “making them the mirror of the state,” which purportedly obligates its senior members to participate in the political process. Objective control is equated to militarization of the military: “making them the tool of the state,” which requires the military to refrain from politics (Huntington 1956, 678). Referring to such issues as industrialization, technological development, and increasing population, Huntington (1956) believed that subjective control became outdated in the nineteenth century due to societal changes that necessitated professionalization of the military, especially the officer corps. Because of these environmental changes, the relationship between military and civilian leaders was altered in that subjective control gave way to objective control; the military were allowed to focus on honing the skills necessary to wage modern war and became primarily advisors to the politician in such matters. Ideally, civilian leaders would maintain objective control over the military by granting the military a large degree of autonomy in their area of expertise. By obeying the decisions of political leaders, notwithstanding any debate or disagreement, the military demonstrate their professionalism, which bolsters the viability of objective civilian control (Huntington 1956). Fortunately or unfortunately, the objective control of the military witnessed in the 1800s would not remain intact through the middle of the twentieth century.

In his study of civil-military relations in the period between 1946 and 1955, Huntington (1957) claimed that servicemen wielded far greater influence on modern

society than they did during the Second World War (see also Mills 1957). His conclusion was based on evidence of the increased use of officers in government positions normally held by civilians, development of connections between officers and businessmen, and heightened respect and familiarity of popular or heroic servicemen demonstrated by public opinion polls (Huntington 1957; see also Mills 1957; Gallup 1972; Feaver and Kohn 2001).

In view of the issues cited above, Huntington (1957) questioned whether the newfound political and economic power of the military was simply a fleeting reaction to the outcome of World War II, or whether a fundamental shift had occurred in the reception of military advice on the part of civilian leaders. In trying to determine which of the two was correct, Huntington argued that “The political influence of a group is even more difficult to judge than their formal authority” (1957, 88). Regardless of the reason, a reciprocal feeling of respect existed between the two groups who, prior to the war, displayed a hefty amount of mutual animosity. In fact, the relationship between the military, defense-related industry, and congressional committees became so strong that President Eisenhower cautioned the nation about its possible negative ramifications concomitantly coining the term “military-industrial complex”⁹ (Eisenhower 1961; Snow and Brown 2000). However, Huntington viewed the relationship between the military, civil industry, and the government in a positive light. He wrote that “In general, the defense businesses supported for economic reasons the same military policies which the [military] officers supported for professional reasons” (Huntington 1957, 366). In a sense the military-industrial complex was seen as a win-win proposition for the country in matters of national security. In spite of the potentially positive aspects of the tripartite

⁹ The military-industrial complex is only referred to as matter of historic context. It is beyond the scope of this study to address the plethora of information concerning the topic.

relationship, the issue raised a few eyebrows concerning the prospect for indiscriminate influence of the military, defense industries, or a combination thereof on policy-makers which may result in less than optimum policy decisions.

If Huntington is considered a proponent of objective control of the military, then Morris Janowitz can be pegged to its antithesis: subjective control. Writing *The Professional Soldier* just a few short years after Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, Janowitz analyzed the political changes in the military profession. One of Janowitz's hypotheses was that the increasing managerial and political responsibilities required of a large government organization such as the United States military were diminishing its members' "self-image and sense of honor" (1960, 12). The military was becoming civilianized, the effects of which would be debated for years to come.

Janowitz believed that due to the decreasing need for technical skill in the military profession, military leaders took on a more managerial, or business-like role, which caused the development of an increasingly political persona. This characteristic was further driven by the tendency to intertwine aspects of external and internal politics. Internal politics was seen as the attempt to influence "legislative and administrative decisions regarding national security policies and affairs," and external politics as the "consequences of military action on international balance of power" (Janowitz 1960, 12). The military's involvement in politics seemed to be in keeping with the other government agencies; all of them exhibit a high degree of self-preservation and personal interest that is endemic to bureaucratic politics.

Although the above scenario seems to depict a natural evolution in the civil-military relationship, involvement of military personnel in either domestic or foreign policy

decisions had not previously been lauded. For example, Janowitz found the military derided for being politically inept and segregated from society, yet simultaneously charged with exercising undue influence on public opinion and the foreign policy process. If Janowitz was writing on the very same topic today he could probably make an even stronger claim; the military has become increasingly adept in politics, and is considered a key broker in foreign policy.¹⁰

In his epilogue, Janowitz justified his support for subjective control, or civilianization of the military. He believed the military was becoming a constabulary force versus a garrison force for three reasons. First, the armed forces were maintaining a constant state of readiness. Second, the use of minimum force necessary to accomplish its mission had become the rule rather than the exception. Third, and last, by adopting a more protective or deterrent stance, it was more conducive to diplomatic efforts in international relations versus portraying itself as only being concerned about assuring victory by projecting its overwhelming power. By developing into a constabulary force, members of the military would serve because of personal convictions about the morality and legitimacy of the military mission, as compared to serving for reasons of national honor and survival found in a garrison state, or to accomplish certain career milestones as occurs in political democracies. However, Janowitz does not address how subjective control of the military would curb the inherent bureaucratic nature to influence the decisions of policy-makers upon which the military would rely for support and funding. On its face, subjective control appears to increase the potential for increasing the political influence of the military.

¹⁰ See Christopher M. Bourne. 1998. "Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act." Joint Force Quarterly (spring) 18: 99-108. The basic slant of Bourne's piece is that creation of the positions of regional commanders-in-chief who are directly under the President in the operational chain of command, and raising the importance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has ostensibly undermined the importance of diplomacy along with the authority and influence of the Secretaries of Defense and State on presidential decisions.

A very cogent depiction of the increasing political influence of the military is found in C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite* (1957). Echoing Huntington, Mills emphatically stated, "But they [the military] are now more powerful than they have ever been in the history of the American elite" (1957, 198; see also Kohn 1994). He felt that the senior officers in the military were more able to exercise their power because they often controlled the definition of reality concerning military issues and foreign affairs. This capacity was augmented when a senior officer was given the position of ambassador or special envoy to some foreign country. Likewise, their frequent dealings with senior elected officials, and sometimes lengthy assignments to the Washington D.C. area, helped some officers develop the personal ability to raise policy issues above the political fray (see Gibson and Snider 1999). In Mills' view the "power elite" was comprised of corporate heads, politicians, and military leaders; the three were interdependent. What seemed to impact Mills most was the notion that the influence of the armed services was trumping the diplomatic capability of the United States at a point in history when, arguably, diplomacy seemed the only hope to abate the threat of nuclear war.

After reading Mills' account, one might question the appropriateness of any intervention of the military into the political processes of the state. Walter Millis, Harvey Mansfield, and Harold Stein wrote that

The civil and military elements in our society have become so deeply intermeshed that neither the uniformed officers nor the administrative bureaucracy nor the representative legislature speak from any firm, independent position of principle or policy. (1958, 412)

It would appear that Millis and his coauthors were decrying the inability to separate issues between military and civilian domains in the United States. Instead, they were simply elucidating the political reality that the country's place in the world had evolved;

isolationism was no longer an option. Democracy demanded provision for defense of the sovereign as well as promotion of the general welfare of its people. This required development of a relationship based on reciprocity between civilian leaders and the military. The ensuing challenge would be for both agencies to maintain a balanced approach in their dealings with the other group.

The propriety of civilian involvement in military matters should not normally be an issue prompting debate. However, military interposition on domestic or foreign political issues is often seen as inappropriate and problematic, especially when it appears that the military position is adopted. Gene Lyons, one of the early researchers in civil-military relations, saw little reason for concern about military influence on policy. He believed that “without firm agreement on priorities, there is little reason to expect that the military can control government policy even if civilian authorities abdicate responsibility for basic decisions” (Lyons 1961, 53). Although he uses the term control, it is arguably difficult to control that which one exercises little influence over. More importantly, Lyons’ comment implies that civilian leaders often allow policy decisions to be made by uniformed officers. This may be true in occasional circumstances, but such a situation is more likely to occur at a lower level of decision making (operational or tactical) than at the strategic or national policy level. What is more likely is the military member using his or her expertise in an effort to alter or reinforce a policy-maker’s decision at those higher levels of policy formulation. But Lyons’ concern was exactly opposite that just considered.

Lyons was primarily concerned about the perceptible diminution of the policy maker’s acceptance of the uniformed military’s professional expertise on technical issues. To explain his concern Lyons offered the following thought:

Professionalization is taking other forms as well—the influence of career executives in the development of major policy decisions, innovations in administration which have brought outside experts into government through a variety of institutional devices, and a growing interest in military affairs among civilians outside government. (1961, 59)

It appeared to Lyons that the military was becoming more civilianized and the civilians more militarized. The lines of distinction between military and civilian were being blurred largely due to the rapid advancements in technology, especially in the area of nuclear weapons. A key point made by Lyons was that the policy process favored those who had long-term careers in specific policy areas, whether they were a civilian or military member. Perhaps due to the assignment rotation policies of the military, the advantage often went to the civilian. Lyons quotes a senior military officer as saying, "... the Civil Service employees ... in the Department of Defense ... probably have more impact [read influence] on decision making ... than any other individual or group of individuals, military or civilian" (1961, 59). Although it appears correct to make distinctions between the military and civil service, one could argue that in the process of formulating defense policy, the two entities collectively represent a politically powerful defense establishment; a conglomeration of individuals; separate smaller internal government agencies; and interdependent private industry capable of wielding a formidable degree of influence on the political process.

The author noted most for his approach toward the issue of the military as an "independent political force" was Samuel E. Finer (1962, 4). In his widely acclaimed book, *The Man on Horseback*, Finer indicated that not many scholars attempt to differentiate the manner in which military intervention (or influence) in politics occurs. The common belief is that military intervention happens via forceful coup d'état.

However, Finer postulated that "...the modes of military intervention are as often latent or indirect as they are overt or direct. [Furthermore,] the phenomenon appears ... distinctive, persistent, and widespread" (1962, 4).

To explain himself, Finer proffered four methods through which the military could intervene in politics: influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplanting. The most benign of the four is the constitutionally approved means of influence; simply providing advice and information as appropriate and allowed by the law and structure of the government. Another type of influence, more malignant in nature, would be via collusion with, or competing against, civil authorities. The second method of intervention—blackmail—can also take on collusive or competitive characteristics. It can also manifest itself as outright intimidation or complete uncooperativeness. Being uncooperative, or worse, purposively failing to accomplish the military mission can qualify as displacement, the third type of intervention. Lastly, and most severe, is the actual supplanting of the government. This normally occurs by violent means commonly referred to as a coup d'état. If military intervention in politics is as common as Finer asserts, then the question remains: Is such activity appropriate?

Finer addresses that very question by claiming that

There is a common assumption, an unreflecting belief that it is somehow 'natural' for the armed forces to obey the civil power. ... But no reason is adduced for showing that civilian control of the armed forces is, in fact, 'natural.' Is it? Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. (1962, 5)

Finer's basic philosophy was that from a position of morality, civilian agencies and the armed forces should be considered coequal in their right to influence political leaders in a democracy. He believed that "Any imbalance in military influence in politico-military

affairs is the fault of civilian leadership” (Finer 1962, 146). The critical question that remains unanswered throughout the early literature is: What indicators would one analyze to determine whether an imbalance in political influence existed? Interestingly and perhaps even prophetically, Finer’s philosophy would be at the core of a several decades-long and arguably continuous debate about the appropriate balance in civil-military relations.

The Second Wave

The second round of research in civil-military relations came about in the waning years of Vietnam and continued through the fall of the Soviet Union. Alleged catalysts of changing civil-military relations were: perceived mismanagement of the Vietnam conflict; awareness that ending the draft resulted in the view of military service as an occupational choice versus a moral or civic obligation; a divergence between ideologies and values held by military members and those of society; and realization on the military’s part that they now had to compete with the civilian sector (including the civil service) for qualified personnel.

One of the more prominent texts of this era was Charles Moskos’ anthology, *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*. The book dealt with issues facing the military establishment as a result of dynamic societal and world events. Moskos illuminated a key problem of the ongoing debate concerning the military’s proper role by stating:

Public discussion on the role of the military in American society is too often dominated by either antimilitary polemicists or apologists of the warfare state. If our society is ever to fulfill its democratic promise, the relationships between its civilian and military structures require especially informed and sustained attention. (1971, xvi)

As had been the case when Lasswell (1941) penned his initial concept of the garrison state, through the early writings on civil-military relations discussed previously, the Moskos (1971) study found that both citizens and academics defined the military in one of two manners. At one end of the spectrum were those who believed the military to be a reflection of the state wholly subordinated to its elected leaders. On the opposite side were people who focused on the different values held by the military as compared to society with special concern about the military's influence on civilian leadership. It appeared that the issue of civil-military relations was often addressed as a zero-sum game rather than the true give-and-take reality of politics in a democracy.

The reality of the political process in Washington D.C., as it relates to civil-military relations and the military's ability to influence policy, was captured rather well in James Clotfelter's, *The Military in American Politics*. His assessment of the civil-military relationship was that

Civilian control of the military, while a general concern of congressmen, can be a conscious day-to-day goal of the Defense Department. The prize is determination of [read influence on] defense policy: Who decides between rival military strategies, which entails substantially different internal allocation of resources; who decides on the advice to be given the President and Congress on prospective foreign policies and weapons policies; and who controls implementation of these policies by the nation's [sic] largest bureaucracy. (1973, 183; see also Beckman 1974)

Although Clotfelter's description of the relationship is plausible, it leaves one with the impression that the resultant policy process becomes a winner-take-all endeavor.

Fortunately, the framers of the constitution established a tripartite system of political control in our democracy that should alleviate the fear of any one agency or arm of government becoming inordinately powerful. Notwithstanding these structural or

institutional safeguards, there continues to be concern that the military is becoming more politically influential over time.

Further discussion of the United States' constitutional system of checks and balances is provided in Allan Reed Millett's (1979) comprehensive historical analysis of the civil-military relations debate. His study, as with the majority of research on the topic, dealt with the issue of civilian control of the military. However, he harbored a more optimistic view of government's ability to maintain a power (or influence) equilibrium amongst the various government agencies. Echoing Clotfelter, Millett emphasized that the constitutional system of checks and balances should mitigate any fear of either the executive or military dominating policy. He viewed the civil-military relations issue as a manifestation of a historical conflict about the proper role government should play in the lives of the citizen; the effectiveness of using military power to solve conflicts between peoples; and the importance of public service for the betterment of society (see also Perlmutter 1977).

The way in which Millett (1979) distinguished himself from the majority of scholars on the topic was by his infusion of the judicial branch into the debate. He believed that the judiciary was important in maintaining proper civilian control of the military in three ways. First, it provides a restraint on the inception of martial law. Second, it protects civil liberties from abuse during war for both civilians and military members. Lastly, it offers the military member similar legal protections accorded civilians in the federal court system. Millett believed that maintenance of proper control of the military arm of government was a crucial test of the constitutional system of government, a system designed to limit the level of influence that any one person, group, or institution would

have on the political process. However, it is important to bear in mind that the constitutional system has imperfections and is constantly susceptible to challenge.

Shortly after Millett's (1979) book was published, Samuel Huntington (1982) rejoined the civil-military relations debate with the article, "American Ideals versus American Institutions." The thrust of his thesis was that the argument about civilian control of the military was not a singular problem but rather a component of a larger issue; the gap between what Americans believe their society should be and how it actually exists. Huntington claimed that

This gap between ideals and institutional practice has generated continuing disharmony between normative and existential dimensions of American politics. Being human, Americans have never been able to live up to their ideals; being Americans, they have also been unable to abandon them. They have instead existed in a state of national cognitive dissonance, which they have attempted to relieve through various combinations of moralism, cynicism, complacency, and hypocrisy. (1982, 1)

The ideals Huntington was referring to are democracy, liberalism, egalitarianism, and individualism—"the American Creed" (1982, 1).¹¹ These values are at odds with the "functional imperatives" of some government institutions such as the military (Huntington 1982, 15). The nature of the military mission requires subordination of self; acceptance of a more authoritarian structure; and a more conservative approach to problem solving. For some people, the existence of differing value systems appears untenable. Their fear is that the values they oppose may be thrust upon them by the government. In the case of civil-military relations both sides view the opposite's ideals as threatening, which has created an ideological chasm. However, it appears rather naïve to assume that through debate,

¹¹ Huntington attributes "the American Creed" to Gunnar Myrdal (Huntington 1982, 1).

reorganization, or legislation this gap will ever be completely eradicated. Perhaps the bigger question is whether or not any attempt should be made to do so.

Huntington (1982) claims that the existing tension between liberalism and realism is what defines American politics; should this tension vanish, the country's very existence would be jeopardized. Consequently, American citizens must cope with the cognitive dissonance referred to previously. In doing so, Huntington posits that they must also recognize that they should not so much fear the gap in ideals, but rather the promotion of efforts to deal with the issue through extreme forms of "moralism, hypocrisy, cynicism, or complacency" (1982, 1 and 36). In effect Huntington supports Finer's assertion that all agencies in a democracy have an equal right, and possibly even an obligation, to influence the political process. That being said, we are reminded of the long-held view that the military should remain as apolitical as possible and any attempt to involve itself in the political process risks exacerbating the existing state of tension between ideals and reality to which Huntington refers.

The extreme to which the response to ideological tensions can go is wittily depicted in Charles Dunlap's fictional tale entitled "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012" (1992-93). Although Dunlap's article straddles the timeframe between the second and third waves of civil-military relations research, its inclusion at this point is fitting in view of the previous discussion of Huntington's work. Dunlap describes his article as simply an effort to document his concern about the manner in which the military was dealing with contemporary issues. Notwithstanding that caveat, he bases the story in solid academic and legal sources making it particularly pertinent to any study concerned with the level of influence the military institution wields in the political process.

Dunlap addresses the issue of an increasingly, politically influential military in the format of a letter written from a former military officer held in prison for attempting to thwart a fictional coup d'état, to another officer in order to document the societal changes that allowed the coup to occur. His overarching premise was that American citizens had become convinced that the government was unable to deal with the multiple issues it faced. For a variety of reasons the citizenry, as well as some government officials, saw the military as the only institution capable of providing solutions. Consequently, the military was being ordered to perform missions outside its area of expertise; for the most part, non-combat operations. Because of these new responsibilities, the military was inexorably forced into the political process at a level of participation never witnessed before. The stage was set for a rather surreptitious increase in the potential for the military to become influential in both foreign and domestic policy—but hardly anyone in America considered the possibility that this increase in political influence would result in an actual coup. (One could argue that this lack of awareness was a result of the failure to realize that a garrison state can evolve in a democracy. An evolution arguably made easier because of the lack of trend analysis of potential indicators of military influence which would allow measurement of the movement toward a garrison state, or coup as Dunlap prefers.)

Dunlap provides a quotation of Andrew Janos which he felt accurately portrayed the sentiment of post-World War II America.

A coup d'état in the United States would be too fantastic to contemplate, not only because few would actually entertain the idea, but also because the bulk of the people are strongly attached to the prevailing political system and would rise in defense of a political leader even though they might not like him. The environment most hospitable to coups d'état is one in which political apathy prevails as the dominant style. (quoted in Dunlap 1992-93, para. 10)

Dunlap uses this quotation to skillfully introduce some important data depicting the growing apathy on the part of Americans in the country's political affairs.

The fictitious colonel in Dunlap's tale reminds his friend that nearly 62 percent of eligible voters voted in the 1964 election, and that the number had fallen to just over 50 percent by 1988--if the trend continued it would reverse itself by 2012 with almost 62 percent not voting. Equally troubling was the reality that in 1992 approximately 9-percent of American's believed the country was heading in the wrong direction. This pessimistic view of America was attributed to "the perception [that government] has evolved from something that provides democracy's framework into something that provides obstacles, from something to celebrate into something to ignore" (Finkle in Dunlap 1992-93, para. 13).

The incarcerated colonel points out that one government agency the people seemed incapable of ignoring was the military. Largely due to its quick success in Desert Storm, the public's confidence rating of the armed forces approached 85 percent, which was far higher than any other government agency. This positive feeling toward the military caused many in America to rethink their attitude toward the military's involvement in civil issues. Although Dunlap does not state it explicitly, it appears that the population by and large became apathetic to the notion that the military might actually become increasingly influential in policy decisions. Regarding this changing ideology Dunlap cites James Fallows as saying, "I am beginning to think that the only way the national [sic] government can do anything worthwhile is to invent a security threat and turn the job over to the military" (1992-93, 17). The military's influence, or possibly the misplaced trust in the

military on behalf of the country's citizens was growing, which, after a series of events, would eventually lead to the fictional coup in 2012.

The responsibility to check the apparent growth of military influence in politics rests squarely on the military as far as Dunlap was concerned. This view was directly opposite that espoused thirty years earlier by Samuel Finer who felt that the civilian was responsible to maintain the balance of power (or influence) among the various government institutions. Dunlap's position was that the military has an obligation to voice their concern about institutional problems. He supported his belief by offering the following thought: "The soldier fails to live up to his oath to serve the country if he does not speak out when he sees his civilian or military superiors executing policies he feels to be wrong" (Richard Gabriel quoted in Dunlap 1992-93, 9). It may be fair to say that the military institution has a responsibility to raise its collective voice concerning matters of national security. But to demand that its views become policy or to attempt to inappropriately influence policy-makers to adopt the military's institutional views steps over the line of professional decorum, not to mention giving the impression that the military has overtaken civilian governance of the country--effectively portraying a characteristic of a garrison state.

Fortunately, Dunlap's article was a fictional account. But as the 1990s wore on there was evidence of growing acrimony between the armed forces and its civilian leaders, due in part to the very issues that Dunlap raised, and equally because of what some claimed was a worsening clash of cultures in America. A new wave of research and interest in civil-military relations resulted and it is in this period that an increased concern about the political influence of the military is witnessed.

The Third Wave

It is difficult to establish precise dates in which the various resurgences in research about civil-military relations began. For this reason the analogy of a wave is most appropriate in that the topic seems to rise and fall at random, yet one can accurately predict that indeed other waves will follow. Such is the case of the third wave.

The second wave of interest was piqued by issues stemming from the United States' involvement in Vietnam and Americans' growing disdain for the government as a whole. Yet again in the early 1990s, the approximate beginning of the third wave in civil-military relations research, America found herself at war, this time in Iraq. The actual combat phase of the war was relatively uneventful; casualties were exponentially lower than expected; and the country saw the successful use of high-tech weaponry. Because of the Gulf War's outcome, the stigma of Vietnam had supposedly been rectified, and the armed forces were riding high on their success--so high, in fact, that military leaders began to openly debate the rightfulness of decisions made by the country's civilian leaders, especially the decision to use the military for non-combat operations (see Weigley 1993; Kohn 1994; "Out of Control" 1994; Diamond and Plattner 1996; Avant 1998; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Roman and Tarr 2001; and Feaver 2003). Exacerbating the problem was the military's openly expressed contempt for the newly elected president (see Feaver and Kohn 2001); the challenge of control over the armed forces--more precisely the issue of control dealt head-on with curbing the increasing political clout of the military--was begun anew.

In 1996, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner published their book, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Their text was a compilation of writings by noted scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Joseph Nye, Jr., and Michael Desch. In their introduction,

Diamond and Plattner approached the subject of civilian leadership's use of the armed forces in what most military leaders viewed as non-military operations. They commented that "military officials, having learned through their experiences in power that many economic, social, and political problems have no easy solutions" (Diamond and Plattner 1996, xii). They argued on the one hand, that by involving the military in foreign social and economic growth projects the distinctive role of the military as a professional combat force would be diminished. On the other hand, they argued that civilian leaders should have more control over all aspects of the military. Moreover, they felt that military officers should focus their training on border defense and sea-lane protection along with peace operations.

The position held by Diamond and Plattner is indicative of one problem in civil-military relations--there is no consensus on the appropriate roles and missions of the military. It is no surprise that the major civil-military relation issue at the time of their writing was the increasing resistance of military leaders (most notably former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell) to perform roles and missions the military deemed inappropriate (see Weigley 1993; Kohn 1994; Avant, 1998; Foster 1993; Roman and Tarr 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Feaver 2003). The net effect of this resistance was the appearance that the military was using its political influence to dictate to the country's elected leaders the tasks that it would and would not undertake. It was rather obvious that the military had in fact increased its ability to influence policy, but it should be understood that this capability had not occurred overnight; it had developed over time, but it appears that no one had developed an ability to track its progressive development.

Attempting to provide a solution to the roles and missions debate, Louis Goodman offered three criteria to determine the propriety of any given military mission. First, policy makers should ensure that assignment of the mission does not inappropriately exclude another government agency while inhibiting the military's capability to develop its core skills. Second, civilian leaders should take care that assumption of the mission does not provoke sentiments of increased privilege and prestige on the military's part that would necessarily be construed to indicate an inappropriate level of influence in the decision-making process. This concern stems from the propensity for such missions to promote the establishment of a special-interest group that may only be concerned with promoting its institutional interest; the military is not immune to such bureaucratic behavior. Finally, officials must be vigilant to detect any decrease in the military's attention to its primary role of national defense. Any noticeable neglect in this area as a result of the assignment of another mission is an indication that the secondary mission is inappropriately assigned.

Theoretically, Goodman's criteria make a great deal of sense. In practice, however, adhering to them is problematic. Outwardly, it appears that assignment of missions is performed in a rather ad hoc fashion (this mission should belong to X, that mission to Y, etc.) with little attention given to the reality that most missions require a coordinated multi-agency effort. Charles Fairbanks, Jr., wrote in "The Post-Communist Wars" that "We talk about economic reform and democracy-building but never about army-building, which is the indispensable foundation of both" (1996, 145). It seems odd that this could be true given the appearance that the military is often more focused on the first two missions, but not the last for which it should be most qualified. This may be a result of the United States'

tendency to use the military to solve any and every issue as James Fallows posited in Dunlap's fictional account of an American coup (Dunlap 1992-93; para. 17)

Fairbanks quotes Andrew Bacevich as purporting that the problem in determining appropriate roles and missions stems from America's approach to civil-military relations.

Bacevich contends that

The conventional Western model of civil-military relations emerged out of the experience of the West in the three and a half centuries between the end of the Thirty Years War (1618-48) and the fall of the Soviet Union, when there were fairly clear distinctions between war and peace, war and economic life, warrior and civilian. (quoted in Fairbanks 1996, 147-48)

The distinctions referred to above had become blurred in the era of low intensity conflict in which Fairbanks wrote (perhaps they have become even more obscure in the post-9/11 world where terrorism is arguably the most imminent threat to national security.) He believed that in these new, limited conflicts, civilians could be both a victim and an active participant; it would be difficult to distinguish between the soldier and the criminal; and most perplexing, no difference would easily be made between war and peace. These new characteristics of conflict--predicted in Lasswell's *Garrison State* in 1941--would undoubtedly confound both policy-makers and the military in determining roles and missions, resulting in a worsening relationship between the two groups.

In the epilogue to Diamond and Plattner's book, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., addresses the very issue of strained civil-military relations. He provides a straightforward, no-nonsense, ideological approach to the civil-military relations issue. Nye admonishes us to remember that

The liberal tradition, which is a key product of our democratic heritage, establishes specific responsibilities for both the military and civilian leaders. The military must recognize that 1) armed forces are accountable to the rule of law and obliged to

respect civilian authority, and that 2) armed forces are nonpartisan and remain above politics.

Civilians are required to 1) recognize that armed forces are legitimate tools of democratic states; 2) fund and respect properly developed military roles and missions; and 3) educate themselves about defense issues and military culture. (Nye in Diamond and Plattner 1996, 153)

Acceptance of this ideology by both civilian leadership and members of the armed forces would go far in minimizing the potential for problems to arise as a result of the appearance of undue influence of the military. Furthermore, Nye's approach offers a remedy for the ideological rift between civilian and military by recognizing that the more conservative ideology of the military must exist within the context of the traditional liberal ideology of America at large--the two ideologies are a necessary part of American culture (see also Huntington 1982).

In the interim between the publishing of Dunlap's fictional account of a coup in the United States and Diamond and Plattner's anthology, several scholars addressed the issue of civilian control of the military. Noted military historian Russell Weigley penned "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell" (1993). His use of Powell's name in the title juxtaposed with McClellan's is a stark indicator of the level of concern about an improper level of political clout exercised by the military. Weigley maintains that Powell unduly influenced the decision to launch the attack on Iraq in the first Gulf War, which effectively forced the theater commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, into a campaign prior to the expenditure of all possible diplomatic efforts to avoid the conflict. (It appears an irony that General Powell as Secretary of State could be accused of performing the same act in the second Gulf War). Conversely, Powell openly debated the necessity for the use of American forces in Bosnia. What is at issue in both of

these accounts is the intermixing of political and professional opinions when the military (represented by General Powell) advises its civilian superiors.

In view of the two disparate instances of military influence or attempted influence on policy just described, Weigley also demonstrates that there is a risk in the military being too unwilling to offer substantive advice. As an example, he relates the story of General George Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark being so inculcated with the spirit of an apolitical military that they regarded advising President Roosevelt of the possible failure of America to hold the Philippines as a serious breakdown in the separation between civilian leaders and the military. Although negative in its results, the previous story is yet another indicator of an influential military. As trusted agents, the military's failure to offer negative information can be read as an implicit indicator that all is well which can potentially influence the policy-makers thought process as well. In such an occurrence the decisions made by the civilian leadership are potentially flawed at the outset.¹²

It appears that by the end of World War II the military had become less myopic and more willing to participate in the policy and strategy development processes. As it was pointed out in an earlier section of this study, Professor Weigley recognized that the Cold War period created a situation in which the military and civilian collaborated to a degree never before witnessed in the history of the republic. However, this newfound trust and camaraderie may have served as a catalyst for future development of a contemptuous relationship between military and civilian, which Weigley postulates came to a head with the resignation threat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff en masse in 1967. Such a public display of displeasure by the military toward the country's elected leaders smacks of the

¹² Peter Feaver's most recent work fully develops the agent-principle theory to demonstrate the military's ability to "work" or "shirk." Feaver, Peter D. 2003. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press.

“blackmail” approach to influence that Finer wrote of in 1962. One could also argue that this type of activity was actually mutinous in intent. Notwithstanding the potentially unending debate on the severity of these actions, the relationship between military and civilian had grown worse--and it appeared to be due, in part, to an increasingly influential military institution.

Richard Kohn, another highly regarded historian, clearly displayed his concern about the growing political influence of the military in his 1994 paper titled, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations.” In the abstract to his article, Kohn claims that the influence of the military on policy grew at an unprecedented pace in the Reagan and Bush (41) years, which manifested itself in the political capability of Colin Powell. Although Kohn does not offer any quantitative interpretation of the growth trend in the military’s political influence, he does provide a chronology of warnings, which, in the glare of hindsight, should have been instant “red flags” that something was amiss in the relationship between the military and civilian leadership (see also Avant 1999; “Out of Control” 1994).

One of the signposts of trouble, cited by Kohn, was the necessity for the crew aboard the carrier *USS Roosevelt* to be coached in proper behavior when President Clinton arrived for a visit. It is one thing for a group of young sailors to be reminded of proper decorum during a presidential visit, but yet another when a gathering of seasoned veterans, at an Association of the United States Army convention, openly applauded a speaker’s mentioning that the late Senator Strom Thurmond had switched from the Democratic party to the Republican party--a clear indication of the political ideology of the military at large. Clearly these issues can be blown out of proportion and completely removed from context,

but they are indicative of a growing polarization of the military in regard to their political ideology, which can have a deleterious effect if allowed to impact its ability to perform the mission or taint the professional advice given to civilian leaders.

Kohn further postulates that the root of the modern issue of civil-military relations has its roots in the growth of the military-industrial complex as described by former president Dwight Eisenhower (see Eisenhower 1961). He also believes that the tenure of former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, in which the military was seen to have little to no influence on policy, contributed to the desire on behalf of the military never to be placed in such a dilemma again. The military debacle of the attempted rescue of American hostages in Iran in 1979 raised the ire of the military because they felt the civilians were too involved in operational decisions. It also prompted members of Congress to take action in an effort to improve the communication and cooperation within the military as well as between military and civilian leaders.

Without fully elaborating on the process involved, one result of the fiasco in Iran was passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which effectively placed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs above the Secretary of Defense as the principle military advisor to the President (see also Weigley 1993; Bourne 1988; Avant 1998; "Out of Control" 1994; Roman and Tarr 2001). Similarly, the military commanders responsible for major geographic areas of the world report directly to the Commander-in-Chief insofar as their chain of command is concerned, although they normally channel communication through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The new structure seemed to provide a clear channel through which the military could influence the executive. Aside from the ability of the military to influence policy decisions regarding the

use of force, Kohn ends his article by claiming that the core problem in civil-military relations also includes the ability of the military to impact decisions involving foreign relations, defense policy, economic strategy, and social issues because of its pervasiveness in the fabric of America.

Deborah Avant picks up on Kohn's concern and posits that the "crisis" in civil military relations can be broken down into three categorical concepts. First is the "level of military influence on policy"; second, "the degree to which the military is representative of society"; and third, "the level of civil-military tension" (Avant 1998, abstract). In her opinion, to attempt to reconcile civil-military relations in all three categories simultaneously is basically impossible, which leads to her thesis that the core issue thus becomes an issue of accountability and efficiency of the military.

To demonstrate the level of military influence on policy Avant, as do many other researchers, points toward the alleged influence of Colin Powell on the policy decisions concerning force size and structure and the use of force in Bosnia (see Weigley 1993; Kohn 1994; Foster 1993; Roman and Tarr 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Feaver 2003).

The issue of the military being representative of society rests on the concern that the military is becoming increasingly separated ideologically, politically, religiously, and geographically (a disproportionate number of military members hail from the south), and in levels of technical expertise (see also Feaver and Kohn 2001). This concern sets the stage for what is to become a trend in the civil-military relations research, that trend being to approach the subject by using principle-agent theory. Avant suggests that "good civil-military relations depends on the degree to which the military looks like the society from which it is drawn" (1998, para. 13).

Avant's third category of civil-military relations indicators is the level of tension which exists between military members and civilian leaders. Unfortunately, Avant offers no suggestions as to how to quantitatively assess this level of tension. Instead she provides examples of various contentious debates between the military and civilian leaders. Probably the most well-known issue was that concerning the acceptance of gays in the military service. She reminds us of the issue of former President Clinton's visit to the Navy carrier (see also Kohn, 1994) and Peter Feaver's contention that there is increased friction in civil-military relations (with no examples provided).

In closing this section of her paper, Avant refers to Rebecca Schiff's suggestion that "what is important in the United States today is not adherence to a particular model of civil-military relations, but the degree to which there is agreement among political elites, the citizenry, and the military about the proper role for the military in decision making" (Avant 1998, para. 15). In effect, Schiff is stating the obvious. The key to solving the problems in civil-military relations rests on the simple decision of all parties involved to agree on the level of influence each is willing to accept from the other. Aside from the fact that many bright, well-educated people have been attempting to find the answer to that question for the past fifty-plus years, the approach Avant and others use involves the analysis of the actions of individuals. Any reaction to such activity is fleeting due to the propensity for people to move in and out of influential positions. The key is to discern the trends in influence of the military as an institution over time in order understand the effects of the military on policy; this study will demonstrate such trends on key value areas.

Shortly after Kohn's and Avant's pieces concerning military influence, Christopher Gibson and Don Snider also addressed the growing concern that the armed forces of the

United States had become too influential in high-level policy-making circles. The opinion of the time was that the military had in fact become increasingly influential in the decision-making process. Grounds for such claims stemmed from a belief that there had been a steady increase in the political experience of senior personnel in the defense establishment.

Gibson and Snider adopted a principal-agent approach to research the subject, which necessitated documenting both knowledge and experience levels of involved parties. Recognizing that the most noticeable increase in alleged political influence emanated from the uniformed military, the authors caution us that this did not negate the potential for civilian agents of the defense department to become more influential as well. They also reiterated the reality that the policy-making process was a multifaceted affair; some aspects of the process could be measured, some could not. One critical factor in the process was the need for all participants in the development of policy to have well-honed interpersonal skills that “defy quantification” (Gibson and Snider 1999, 203).

Gibson and Snider concluded that the military’s ability to work in the highest political circles had improved over time based on the pattern of operational assignments and levels of education held by senior military officers. Along with assigning officers to some critical political billets, the education level of the military had grown significantly. A particularly interesting finding was that “the percentage of senior military officers with advanced degrees has virtually doubled [since the 1960s] from fifty percent to eighty-nine percent” (Gibson and Snider 1999, 206). However, they made special note of the fact that their findings were insufficient to allow for prediction of the military’s ability to be successful in politico-military affairs. They claimed only that the variables they studied

were “indicators of potential influence within the policy-making network” (Gibson and Snider 1999, 211).

Returning to the theoretical aspect of civilian-military relations, Guy Siebold claimed that there really is no core theory of “military sociology” (2001, 140-41). He made the poignant statement that “without a center, there has been more of a continuing dialogue than an accumulation of theoretical or practical evidence that one might call the knowledge of the sub-field” (Siebold 2001, 140-41). Siebold agreed with Michael Desch about the difficulty in researching the civil-military relations subject. He attributes much of the problem to the reality that “much of the research ... tends to be nebulous and qualitative. Partially this is due to the abstract nature of the subject matter, the degree of learning required before one is capable of addressing it well, and the limited population of societies from which to draw samples” (Siebold 2001, 152).

The dialogue that Siebold referred to was the continuous debate about whether or not the military was becoming less institutional and more occupational in nature. An institutional military is one that is oriented to tradition, patriotism, and sense of community. Conversely, a military that is more occupational in nature is one that orients itself to economics and accepted business principles. Siebold claimed that the prevailing view was that the military had indeed become more occupational in nature, but that it maintained a distinct institutional identity. Some would be concerned that, notwithstanding the growing occupational nature of the military, maintenance of its distinct institutional identity was potentially worsening the ideological separation between the armed forces and its civilian leaders. However, one could argue that in acquiring a more occupational persona the

military risks becoming more bureaucratic further increasing the potential that it will use its influence to garner necessary resources.

Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn's book, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), provides an anthology of numerous studies and writings on the civil-military relations topic. The genesis of their study, aside from the extant literature on the topic, was the questions raised during the first Gulf War, particularly about the level of influence general officers were perceived to have on defense and foreign policy. This issue, combined with Thomas Ricks' book, *Making the Corps*, placed the civil-military relations topic into the broader debate concerning culture wars in America.¹³

The TISS research project sought to build on the empirical and anecdotal information found in the first and second wave studies. Although their study did not provide closure to the subject, it documents an increasing gap between military and civilian elites in areas of conservatism; concern over society's alleged moral decay; religiosity; stereotypical attitudes toward the other group; political ideology; and party affiliation. As regards politico-military influence the TISS study exposed an especially troubling issue-- the existence of a defiant officer corps. Feaver and Kohn indicate that some high ranking military officers "believe that it is their role to insist rather than merely advise or advocate in private, on key decisions, particularly those involving the use of force" (2001, 464-65). This belief has evidently caused some service members to eschew the traditional premise that the decisions of civilian leaders were to be accepted even when deemed incorrect.

¹³ Rick's (1998) premise is that America's military members (although not perfect), are becoming more conservative than the general public. One can argue which way the tide is flowing, but it appears the general consensus is that the moral fiber of American citizens has diminished in the past few decades. This appears to be creating a chasm between the necessary communalism of military life and liberal individualism valued by a majority of Americans. The "culture war" is caused by the military's general contempt for those seen as causing America's alleged moral demise.

In their closing chapter, Feaver and Kohn (2001) addressed the various factors that are widely believed to influence the gap. They cited adverse media coverage of military activity; overly positive portrayals of military members by film-makers; demographics of the military; downsizing of the armed forces; influence of military retirees; and self-selection of military members as possible contributors. It appears the synthesis of these factors helped create a situation in which military leaders feel free to challenge civilian authority. In essence, the TISS studies appear to partially validate Lasswell's (1941) concern that a country would follow an evolutionary process toward a garrison state existence rather than experience a coup d'état. As it relates to this study, the evolution may be more readily discerned by finding plausible indicators of military influence and displaying their trends over time.

Of the numerous studies contained in Feaver and Kohn's (2001) book, the one most applicable to this research effort was done by James Burk. In "The Military's Presence in American Society, 1950-2000," Burk acknowledges the fact that the military had become a well respected institution in the eyes of most Americans. What concerned Burk was the possibility that military members in senior positions were becoming overly politicized and were "trying to exert influence over policy decisions that are rightfully reserved for civilian leaders to make" (in Feaver and Kohn 2001, 247-48).

In similar fashion to this study, Burk's focus was at the institutional level rather than at the elite or individual level. He believes the ability of the military to influence policy is directly related to its "institutional presence" (Burk in Feaver and Kohn 2001, 249). This concept refers to the amount of significance an institution has in society; a concept that has both material and moral aspects. The material aspect relates to the level

of social integration the military has with society, or put another way, its salience across the broad social spectrum. Moral presence is the “degree to which an institution has to be considered an important actor in the normative order, that is, in our understanding of what constitutes a good society” (Burk in Feaver and Kohn 2001, 250).

One of the implications of Burk’s study that is germane to this effort is that we should not be so naïve as to assume that a society that has a “morally integrated and materially salient” military will necessarily enjoy an amicable relationship between the military and its civilian leaders (Burk in Feaver and Kohn 2001, 272). Burk asserts that “there is no reason to suppose that elites representing various central institutions--the military included--will not compete for influence and power to promote the aims of the institutions they represent” (Burk in Feaver and Kohn 2001, 272-73). Conflicts between agencies on policy issues are expected; however, the process must remain under civilian control.

One of the most recent additions to the literature on civil-military relations is Peter Feaver’s *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. In this text, Feaver studies the interaction between the military and its civilian leaders to develop a new theory of civil-military relations. Rather than address the topic as a complicated, ethereal concept, he asks the simple question, “How does the control relationship play out on a day-to-day level?” (Feaver 2003, 1). Using the principal-agent concept¹⁴ Feaver develops an “agency theory” of civil-military relations (2003, 1). Development of this theory was driven by his recognition of the fact that the theoretical literature had not

¹⁴ See also: Gibson, Christopher and Don M. Snider. 1999. “Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision Making Process.” *Armed Forces and Society* 25, no. 2: 193-218. Available at *AF & S Online*, <http://www.bsos.umd/ius/Journal.html>.

changed in any noticeable manner in the nearly half-century since Huntington (1957) first offered his theories of objective and subjective civilian control.

Feaver describes the relationship between the civilian leadership (principal) and the military (agent) as a paradoxical arrangement. “The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity” (Feaver 2003, 4). Even with that realization, he claims that Huntington’s (1957) theory of objective civilian control continues to reign despite the numerous efforts to develop an alternative. One of the problems with Huntington’s theory is that the ability to measure control is, at best, extremely difficult. Consequently, any judgment concerning civilian control over the military is open to debate.

Considering the issue of control in context of the principle-agent model, one must realize that although the agent is in many aspects subordinate to the principal, it will seek ways in which to exercise some control over the principal. In the case of civil-military relations, Feaver argues that the military attempts to “manipulate the relationship so as to prevail in policy disputes” (2003, 57). The reason for this is that the military, as with any other government agency, has a “substantive interest in the policy itself” (Feaver 2003, 63).

At first glance it would appear that Feaver oversimplifies the civil-military relations issue. He addresses that charge by stating that

Every theory of civil-military relations must make some simplifications to make sense of [the] welter of players, and I know of no analysis (whether theoretically or historically oriented) that is not vulnerable to the charge that the actual practice of civil-military relations is more complicated than the analysis reflects. (Feaver 2003, 99)

Feaver's agency theory simplifies the topic only insofar as it places it in a different context. Rather than focusing on the possibility of a coup d'état, agency theory forces one to address the civil-military debate in terms of the incentive for both entities to cooperate. Cooperation is critical to civil-military relations as reflected in Feaver's claim that

There is no such thing as perfect civilian control. The challenge for democratic civil-military relations is thus to minimize what civilian officials must concede to the military agent, recognizing that the decision is revisited and tested every day in multiple dimensions and issues. (2003, 286)

Summary

Research in civil-military relations has tended to ebb and flow depending on the existing political environment and the personal characteristics of key people in the highest position in the military and government. As such, it is possible that scholars may never reach a consensus on an overarching theory of civil-military relation. However, Harold Laswell's (1941) prediction that there would come a time in which the military (more specifically the "specialists on violence" (1941, 455) would come to be the most influential group in society is arguably the one theory that has survived the test of time and is at the center of all debates about civil-military relations. Although Lasswell's prediction was couched in terms of the existence of a garrison state, he did allow for the possibility that the military's influence could develop even in a democracy and without the necessity of a coup d'état.

The preceding literature review provides empirical and anecdotal evidence that in fact the military has become increasingly influential in the policy-making process. Beginning with the Huntington-Janowitz debate and continuing all the way through to

Peter Feaver's development of an agency theory to explain civil-military relations, the common theme has been concern over maintaining civilian control of the military arm of the United States. This issue of control seems to have become increasingly centered on control of the level of influence the military wields on the decisions of civilian political leaders. The problem remains that discerning the level of influence is still left up to the individual's interpretation of past events and the ability to intuit its relative trend.

However, any actions taken by either the military or civilian leadership to strike a better balance in their relationship risks "knee-jerking" because they may be reacting to a singular event or the personal activities of an official whose tenure may be short lived.

This study will demonstrate the trend in influence of the military institution over time and in the value areas that Lasswell considered key to the ability of a "garrison state" to maintain its authority. When these trends are combined with the empirical indications of such activity as seen in the review of the literature, America's trend toward or away from a garrison state existence may be more readily discerned. That is the core issue of civil-military relations in any democracy, but most especially in the United States.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter first addresses the theoretical basis for the study. Second, it explains and justifies the methodology used to answer the study's two key questions: (1) What indicators exist that may adequately demonstrate the influence of the armed forces on the value allocations of income, safety, and deference? (2) What are the trends of those indicators? Lastly, within the three areas of influence being studied--income, safety, and deference—the rationale for the choice of data is provided along with predictions of the trends.

Theoretical Model

The theory behind this study was borrowed from that espoused by the late Harold D. Lasswell in his garrison state construct, which holds that “we are moving toward a world of ‘garrison states’--a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society” (1941, 455). Samuel Huntington referred to Lasswell's construct as the “...first conscious, systematic, and sophisticated theory of civil-military relations” (Huntington 1957, 346; see also Stanley 1997). Whereas Lasswell was referring to the world at large, this study focuses only on the United States.

We are reminded of Jay Stanley's premise that civil-military relations research is primarily concerned with ascertaining when government policy may become inordinately influenced by the uniformed services (1997; see also Gibson and Snider 1999). This is an

important clarification given that most of the scholarly literature documents multiple attempts either to develop new theories of civil-military relations, or to determine what constitutes proper or improper civilian control of the military arm of the United States government. Based on review of the extant literature, it is evident that neither approach to the subject has resulted in a widely accepted, singular theory of civil-military relations nor widespread agreement about the type of civilian control—subjective or objective—that should be exercised in a democracy.

Many of the previous studies of civil-military relations seemed to approach the topic as if to determine whether the government displayed any characteristics that might indicate that a coup d'état had occurred, or that the potential for such an event existed. That approach is logical given the belief that Lasswell's garrison state construct serves as the theoretical foundation for contemporary research of civil-military relations (Huntington 1957, 346; see also Stanley 1997). It is perhaps even more logical given that the better part of Lasswell's (1941) garrison state construct dealt primarily with the various methods a military government might use to control the populace once it had obtained power.

Notwithstanding the contextual emphasis of his construct, Lasswell addressed the issue of influence in his original work wherein he asked the rhetorical question, "How will the various kinds of influence be distributed in the state?" (1941, 463). He answered his own question by stating that political influence would best be indicated by "control over values" (Lasswell 1941, 463), and then offered the categories of income, safety, and deference for consideration.¹⁵ He predicted that there would be an effort to equalize

¹⁵ Lasswell also wrote, "The values of deference, safety, and income which have just been singled out are representative and not exclusive values. Political analysis could make use of other values, and the resulting elite comparisons would differ" (1930, 297). Similarly he stated that "The influential cannot be satisfactorily described by the use of a single index. To some extent influence is indicated by claims over values like deference, income, safety. But deference may not go to the rich, and safety

income to some degree in order to maintain morale; the propensity for individuals to be affected by war would be socialized; and deference would be shown to those in the armed forces (Lasswell 1941).

Undoubtedly, Lasswell was predicating control over these values on the fact that a state had already developed a garrison existence. However, he believed that a coup was not necessary for a garrison state to emerge; in essence, it could occur through an evolutionary process. Because of this, Lasswell advocated trend analysis to determine a state's progression from a situation wherein businessmen are the primary political powerbrokers to a time when military personnel wield the most influence in the politics of the state (Lasswell 1941). Rather than focusing on the characteristics of a garrison state, this study breaks from tradition by focusing on the three areas of influence discussed in Lasswell's original work. The principal goal of this research effort is to determine whether there are any viable, quantifiable indicators of the military's influence in the political process of the government. A secondary goal is to display the trends of these indicators to determine whether there may be evidence that the military has become less or more influential over time, which may indicate movement toward a time when the United States government reflects the characteristics associated with a garrison state.

Design of the Study

It was stated in the introductory chapter that this study is more exploratory than explanatory in nature. This approach is driven by the reality that although much has been written about political influence, little has been accomplished regarding the development of

may not go to the distinguished. Plainly different results may be obtained by different criteria of influence" (Lasswell 1930, 443).

quantifiable indicators of the concept. This problem was discussed as a limitation of this study but bears repeating in order to justify its design. Regarding the values over which political participants seek control, Lasswell wrote:

The task of locating ourselves as talkers and writers in relation to the pyramids of safety, income, and deference is insuperable at present, since requisite information about the world is compiled in fragmentary form. Material units of income have been partially compared, and regional, social, and biopsychic traits of those receiving income have been sporadically studied. Rather few efforts have been made to cope with the more elusive pyramids of deference. The relatively simpler task of studying the man who gets killed in wars, revolutions, revolts, feuds, mobs, gang struggles and judicial administration is carried but a little way. (1977, 148)

This research endeavor seeks to address to some degree the seemingly insurmountable problems, discussed above, that seem to be endemic to the study of political influence. To do so means exploring the possibility that there exists, among the vast amounts of available data, some viable indicators of military influence in the policy areas affecting its collective income, safety, and potential for deferential treatment by elected leaders. It also requires taking some risks in selecting the sources of data that will be used.¹⁶ Although the rationale for data selection in each value area is discussed more fully in the sections below, the basic approach to the study is discussed briefly.

The issue of income is addressed by comparing the historical trend of percentage increases in the basic pay of the military to that of civil service employees since these are incomes over which political leaders exercise control. Both trends are also compared to the trend line of inflation rates for the same period to provide a frame of reference as to the potential efficacy of the annual pay increases. Data concerning the Employment Cost Index (ECI) are also displayed and discussed to provide a comparison of military pay

¹⁶ In his dissertation, *The Influence of the American Military Establishment on American Foreign Policy*, Peter Beckman stated “There will always be a strong element of risk in intellectual inquiry” (1974, 22). His comment was made after elaborating on the difficulty in finding “good” data for his study. Lasswell wrote in *The World Revolution of Our Time* that “the moment anyone tries to pass from the ‘ambiguous’ to the ‘operational,’ empirical questions arise” (1951d, 12).

increases to those of American citizens in general. This information is important given that recent legislation requires annual military basic pay increases to be maintained at a level above the ECI (U. S. Office of the Secretary of Defense 2004; U. S. Congressional Budget Office, 1999; Asch and Hosek, 1999), and recent debates have occurred concerning disparity in pay increase desires between the executive and legislative branches of government (Lee, 2004). Despite imperfect data and its inability to completely capture the intricacies of the budget process of the federal government, the resultant trends allow for development of general suppositions regarding military influence and provoke questions for future research.

The concept of safety, as Lasswell (1941) described it, offers unique challenges because there is no known source that measures the relative risk of becoming a casualty during conflict for either noncombatant civilians or military members. It is understood that Lasswell was making predictions about influence based on the notion that a country had already become a garrison state, which connotes population-wide participation in war and the state's preparation for such. Nonetheless, if a country can evolve into a garrison state, it is reasonable to assume that at some point in time there should be an indication that the general population and military members share equally in the risks inherent to maintenance of the state's security. Such an indication may exist by proxy, but it requires manipulation of the concept. Rather than trying to determine whether civilians are becoming more at risk, the decision was made to look at the trends in combat casualty rates of military personnel over time. By coupling casualty trends with information about the public's feelings toward combat casualties and documented policy preferences espoused by the military regarding force employment, one can make inferences about the concept of safety

as it applies to the garrison state construct. To offer a more contemporary look at this issue, trends of the data concerning United States military deaths as a result of military conflict and acts terrorism are compared to the number of United States civilian deaths as a result terrorism for the period 1980 to 2001 (see Table 4 footnotes). The rationale for providing this trend analysis is based on the view that since Lasswell's construct was developed in view of the then contemporary threat of airpower, any subsequent studies must adapt and take into account any changes in the perceived threat to the population—currently one could argue that terrorism in the post-9/11 era may have supplanted aerial bombardment as a greater threat to citizens of the United States.

Finding some plausible indicators of deference is problematic because it requires measurement of intentions or feelings on the part of civilian policy-makers. Given that there is some validity to the thought that politicians pay attention to public opinion and possibly base their actions on such information, poll data regarding citizens' feeling toward the military is chosen to provide some indication of the potential influence, albeit indirect, that the military has on policy-makers. Philip Converse offered the following analogy concerning the use of polling data by politicians: "Purchasing polling data is like a riverboat captain purchasing the latest map--it gives them a sense of what to emphasize and what to avoid" (1987, S22).

The overall design of the study follows that which Lasswell (1941) advocated: trend analysis. Selection of plausible indicators of military influence over policy-makers in the value areas of income, safety, and deference is accomplished first. Trend charts are developed to visually depict the direction the indicators take over time followed by

discussion of the findings. The results of the findings will be summarized; implications of the findings documented; and recommendations offered.

At the outset, questions concerning the choice of descriptive data are expected. Lasswell reflected on this issue in his book *The World Revolution of our Time*, wherein he wrote of the difficulty in studying contemporary concern over the issue of human dignity. In striking similarity to our current preoccupation with political influence, Lasswell argued that “The moment anyone tries to pass from the ‘ambiguous’ to the ‘operational,’ empirical questions arise” (1951d, 12). Peter Beckman attempted to operationalize the concept of influence by counting the frequency in which the military or military members were mentioned per one-thousand lines of text in the *Department of State Bulletin* (Clotfelter 1973). His decision to do so was motivated by the reality that the only alternative was to perform an experiment in a laboratory setting, a problem exacerbated by what is referred to as the “chameleon problem”—not knowing who influences whom if both sides have preexisting policy stances that happen to coincide (Beckman 1974, see also Clotfelter 1973, 201).¹⁷ His findings were less than conclusive in part because of the aforementioned problem of the often bidirectional characteristic of influence, a situation further exacerbated by the lack of a concrete definition of influence.

In view of the potential problems one can incur due to limited data and methodological preferences held by other scholars, it is assumed that cautioning the reader and future researchers of these difficulties beforehand is preferable to not attempting the

¹⁷ Samuel Huntington addresses the same issue from the perspective of the interactivity of fiscal, foreign, and domestic policy. He looked at military policy as being influenced by both international and domestic politics. He wrote of military policy being “Janus faced”—international politics traded largely in military capability; domestic politics traded in materiel, money, and manpower—“any major decision in military policy influences and is influenced by both worlds” (Huntington 1961a, xi-xii; see also Beckman 1974).

study at all.¹⁸ That being said, we now turn to the research method and predicted outcomes for each of the value areas being studied.

Income

Although it has been reiterated numerous times, the contextual basis for Lasswell's (1941) claims concerning the allocation of values warrants repeating once again. His predictions concerning the distribution of income, as well as safety and deference, were predicated on the existence of a garrison state. Since we have established that this has not occurred in the United States, we turn our attention toward ascertaining whether or not it is progressing toward such an existence due to the increasing influence of the military on policy, specifically on issues concerning its members' income, safety, and deference.

Although elected leaders of the country have no direct influence on the incomes of the population (notwithstanding the effects of tax legislation, changes in the minimum wage law, and periodic attempts at wage and price controls), a comparison of military incomes versus those of American citizens in general arguably offers little indication of the influence the military wields in this area. However, comparing average annual percentage basic pay increase trends of the military to the average annual wage increase trends of the civil service (general schedule salaries) may offer some indication as to which of the two groups holds more sway on pay issues within the government. The percentage pay increase comparisons are based on data found in the *National Defense Budget Estimates for*

¹⁸ This sentiment echoes that of Peter Beckman who wrote the following when referring to the problems of studying a nebulous concept such as influence: "I assumed that it was better to work with something than not work at all" (1974, 21). He also stated, "...[the] conclusion seems to be that rather than do nothing it is preferable to start with bad data, warn everyone about the defects and limitations, and aim at gradual improvement through use" (Beckman 1974, 22).

*FY2004*¹⁹ (U.S. Department of Defense 2003) for the years 1945 through 2004 (roughly covering the period from Lasswell's original piece to the present). We expect to find an upward trend in average military percentage pay increases that may reflect a faster gain in income compared to the trend for civil-service employees. To provide a frame of reference against which to assess the efficacy of the pay increase trends, the trend for annual inflation rates²⁰ is shown as well.

To provide a more complete picture of the income issue, Employment Cost Index (ECI) data is added to the military and civil service percentage pay increase data and the inflation rate data for the period 1973 to the present (pay and inflation data begin 1973; ECI data are from 1976-2003). Addition of the ECI data does not offer any direct means to draw conclusions as to the military's influence in this area since the government has no direct control over private sector incomes as previously noted. However, there are legislative requirements that increases in military pay be tied to the ECI (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2004; Congressional Budget Office, 1999; Asch and Hosek, 1999). Viewing the data in this way provides an opportunity to assess the government's adherence to its own legislation as well as providing a means to compare military and civil service pay to the private sector. The addition of inflation rate trends for the period also offers a means to discern which group is fairing better in the actual benefits of a pay increase.

¹⁹ The Department of Defense (DoD) data provide a direct percentage comparison in tabular form. The civil service percentages are accepted in this table although there may be minor differences based on the geographical location of the employee, as was found in the *Average Salary Tables for Civil Service Employees, 1949-2002*, provided by the Office of Workforce Information, U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The percentage increases annotated in the DoD budget information were randomly cross-checked with the OPM data. The differences were minor--in the tenths of percentages or less--between the two.

²⁰ Source: InflationData.com. ©2003-2004. Affiliated with *Financial Trend Forecaster*®. Published by Capital Professional Services. Available at InflationData.com, http://inflationdata.com/inflationInflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx?dsInflation_current, accessed 10 July 2004.

The rationale for comparing these two groups in this way is based on the “bureaucratic politics” approach to policy making which may be described thus: “Agencies and bureaucracies are involved in an incessant competition, struggling for various stakes and prizes ... jockeying for power, position and prestige” (Kozak 1988, 7; see also Allison 1999; Fordham 2001). Keagle offers a more specific rendition of this concept wherein he quotes Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter as stating, “Organizations acquire lives of their own so as to influence the policy process so the outcomes maintain or improve their (1) essential role, (2) domain, (3) autonomy, (4) **morale** ..., and (5) **budgets**” (quoted in Keagle 1988, 19; emphasis added). In effect, these two quotations are different ways of describing politics as Lasswell did; it is a name given to the process of determining “who gets what, when, how” (Lasswell 1951c). Arguably, the more influential an agency becomes the more likely it is that it will triumph in resource allocation battles.

Safety

Lasswell predicted that in a garrison state there would be a “tendency toward equalizing the distribution in safety throughout the community (that is, negative safety, the socialization of threat in modern war)” (1941, 463). This prediction was derived from evidence of the increasing use of aircraft in war,²¹ which appears somewhat intuitive with the benefit of over sixty years of historical hindsight. Although purely anecdotal, the argument could be made that the socialization of threat reached its zenith during the Cold War due to the threat of nuclear weapons (especially long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles), a menace that exists to this day.

²¹ Although not stated, one can infer that the overarching concern about the use of aircraft in war was the relative inaccuracy of bombardment and resultant increase in civilian casualties.

Notwithstanding the obviously inherent dangers of aerial bombardment and nuclear weapons to the general public, the concept of safety as Lasswell defined it is challenging insofar as measurement is concerned. The perplexing problem is determining how to gauge, quantify, and display a trend in the risk of becoming a casualty during conflict whether referring to the military member or citizen. This elicits a question more germane to this study. How does one demonstrate the level of influence the military brings to bear on policy-makers in regard to safety? The answer requires an alternative concept of safety—one that stands Lasswell's concept on its head.

It must be remembered that the emphasis in this study is on determining whether the military is becoming more or less influential in the political processes of the state. By altering the approach toward safety from one of trying to determine whether civilians are increasingly at risk of becoming combat casualties to one aimed at determining whether military members' risk of becoming a casualty is decreasing, we may sufficiently discern the trend in military influence on policy. Any perceived influence may actually be an indirect product of public opinion, but it is influence based upon and beneficial to the armed forces nonetheless.

The trend in combat casualties will be developed with primary focus on the period covering the United States' declared involvement in World War II (1941) through the end of the first Gulf War (1991) (roughly the period following the publishing of Lasswell's construct through the conclusion of the United States' last major conflict).²² Casualty information from the Revolutionary War to the Persian Gulf War is also shown to provide a

²² Due to the ongoing hostilities in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Desert Shield/Desert Storm is chosen as the last major conflict from which data will be utilized for the primary purpose of this study. Data from minor military conflicts and terrorist activities post-1980 are offered in the analysis chapter primarily for the purpose of providing context and development of questions for future studies.

means of historical comparison and trend analysis. Similarly, casualty information pertaining to the United States' military's involvement in various conflicts in the post-All Volunteer Force (AVF) era along with United States civilian casualties as a result of acts of terrorism in the homeland are shown. This analysis is undertaken to assess the potential that terrorism is a contemporary threat to the general population similar to aerial bombardment at the time of Lasswell's (1941) writing. Data for analysis of the safety concept is primarily taken from the websites of Louisiana State University's United States Civil War Center (USCWC); United States Department of Defense; United States Department of State; and the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (see Table 4 footnotes).

The rationale for adopting this approach toward the issue of safety may be best explained by example. Writing in regard to Congress's spending on defense materiel, Donald Kagan posited, "The American desire to avoid casualties and the American willingness to spend heavily on new military technology provided the United States with a formidable military capability that gave it deadly accuracy from great distances with lower risk to forces" (2003, 23). If one accepts the aforementioned hypothesis on the public's influence on Congressional spending and combines it with examples wherein senior military leaders were able to achieve their policy goals regarding force employment issues, the resultant trends may be seen as important indicators of military influence on policy as it relates to Lasswell's prediction concerning safety of the masses. No attempt is made to differentiate between the military's desire to limit casualties in combat and the fact that development of weapons and materiel allowing a reduction in casualty numbers has occurred. What may have taken place is the development of strategy and tactics seeking

“to substitute fire and steel for American blood” (Snow and Drew 2000, 347-48).

Capitalizing on technology for force protection is a noble enterprise; however, it need not come at the expense of American civilian lives. Analyzing casualty trends of both military and civilians in the manner described above may provide an indication as to whether or not such policy decisions are being made, which, in turn, may provide some indication of the influence of the military in this area.

Deference

Lasswell (1941) stipulated that deference has two parts: power and respect. Measuring power as a “degree of participation in important decisions” (Lasswell 1941, 463) is made difficult by the very nature of our political system. Huntington wrote, “... it is extremely difficult to draw the line between the soldier giving professional advice to Congress on what the country needs for its defense and the soldier lobbying with Congress for the administration. The two roles are distinct in theory but blended in practice” (1956, 691). This demonstrates the two-fold problem of pitting the executive branch against the legislative branch of government with the military owing a certain amount of allegiance to both (Huntington 1956). Similarly, both branches of government may be said to owe reciprocal allegiance to the military given that it is regarded as a “symbol of American national identity and purpose” (Langston 2000, para. 19). For this reason the aspect of respect is arguably more salient when discussing the level of influence the armed forces wields. This influence may be manifest in deferential treatment toward the military on the part of policy-makers. But how does one measure deferential treatment?

Perhaps the only accurate means to discern the level of respect the country's elected leaders have for the military is to perform a survey. It could be argued, however, that for myriad reasons most political leaders would be loath to admit harboring any amount of disdain for the institution of the United States military. One only need read the newspaper or watch the nightly news to witness any number of elected officials extolling the virtues of the United States military as an institution. Given the many potential problems in performing such a survey, a proxy measurement is needed.

As was discussed in the introductory chapter, trends in public opinion toward the military offer perhaps the best alternative to a direct survey. Samuel Huntington offers support for this approach in the following statement:

In a democracy the policies of the government, including military policy, are shaped by public opinion. ... Public opinion not only determines the level of military magnitude ... it also tends to restrict, reduce, and limit that magnitude. ... 'Mass opinion' is difficult to identify, much less measure. Public opinion polls have their limitations, but they are the best source available. (1961, 235)

Philip Converse provided further support for this methodology by noting studies performed by various public opinion experts that demonstrated a "considerable degree of congruence between popular opinion and policy outcomes" (1987, S52). It should be emphasized that the scholars Converse wrote of demonstrated only an agreement or correlation between policy and opinion--not causality. Although this portion of the study is not concerned with policy outcomes per se, the level of deference (read as respect) a political leader holds for the military is undoubtedly impacted by public opinion, thus potentially influencing their decisions on military matters.

Data used for the proxy measurement of deference are taken from the *CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll* (2004). Gallup Polls containing questions about the military go as far

back as 1938 but the type of questions and regularity in their use was inconsistent until 1983. The Gallup Poll's most consistent indicator of the public's regard for the military is found in the survey question pertaining to institutional confidence. Although the survey question has basically remained the same since 1973, it was asked on an approximately biannual basis from that time until 1983 then annually from that point to the present year.²³ The time period for the assessment of deference covers the years 1973 to 2003, with data points missing for years 2001 and 2002 (see footnote 23 below). We expect to see a fairly consistent upward trend in public confidence in the military.

Summary

To provide some quantifiable means of determining whether or not the military's level of influence has increased or decreased over time requires adoption of plausible indicators. Harold Lasswell consistently ascribed control over the value allocations of income, deference, and safety to those most influential in a society; particularly to the military should a garrison state existence become a reality. However, it is recognized that a country need not experience a coup d'état for the government to take on the characteristics of a garrison state; it could evolve into such an existence. If so, then it seems probable that the military would necessarily need to become increasingly influential in the areas of income, deference, and safety; in effect, an insidious approach toward development of a garrison state.

²³ The information provided by the Gallup organization covers the biannual survey results from 1973 to 1983; annual results from 1984 to 2000; and then results for the year 2003. Despite the lack of data for years 2001 and 2002, the Gallup representative assured me that the poll question has been asked annually since 1983. Rationale for the missing data is unexplainable at this time; however, it does not detract from the trend analysis.

To determine the directional trend in the military's level of influence on policy, plausible indicators are selected and trends charted. Using the trend as the level of analysis allows demonstration of the movement along a virtual continuum from one state of existence to another.²⁴ Doing so requires the use of "not ideal data" (Fitch 1985, 41) for the development of trend charts. In spite of the data limitations, we are reminded of Lasswell's statements that "trend reporting procedures are none too meager and uncorrelated to provide political scientists with needed bases of inference" and that "trends do not live in isolation" (1951b, 135-36).

²⁴ Derek McDougal (1984) cites five levels of analysis that are important to the study of international relations as espoused by Harold Lasswell: 1) value clarification, 2) trend analysis, 3) factor analysis, 4) prediction, and 5) action. Arguably these same levels of analysis are applicable to the study of civil-military relations.

CHAPTER 4

TREND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents graphic depictions of the trends in income, safety, and deference as developed in the methodology section. The first section displays the comparative trends in military versus civil service annual percentage pay increases with reference trends added for the Economic Cost Index (ECI) and annual inflation rates. In the second section the subject of safety is addressed by displaying trends in the death rates of military members in all the United States' principal wars to first establish a historical perspective of the topic. Then the trend in death rates for the United States military in major conflicts from World War II through the first Gulf War (the period following Lasswell's writings) are displayed in a separate chart. Within this section a separate graph displays military deaths (actual numbers) in the United States' lesser conflicts (post-AVF) in comparison to the number of United States civilians killed in acts of terrorism. Third, and last, the topic of deference is addressed by charting the trend in confidence the United States public holds toward the military compared to its confidence in relation to the three branches of the federal government as well as private institutions.

Income Trend Analysis

Beth Asch and John Warner indicate that the question of "how to efficiently and fairly compensate military personnel has been an ongoing concern for policymakers

...punctuated over the past 20 years with the advent of the *All-Volunteer Force*, and the *dramatic technological improvements* that have increased ... the overall skill level required [of military personnel]" (1994, xiii, emphasis in the original; see also U. S. Congressional Budget Office 1999; Lee 2004). Of special concern was the belief that there existed, at times, a significant gap in pay levels between military members and those in the private sector performing similar type work (Hosek et al. 1992; Asch and Hosek 1999; Hosek and Sharp, 2001). This concern about maintaining parity in incomes between military and civilian is, interestingly, 180-degrees opposite the concern in Lasswell's (1941) garrison state construct. In a garrison state the focus would be toward improving the citizen's morale by attempting to create basically level incomes among the population.

It is important to bear in mind that this study seeks to determine whether there are quantifiable indicators that may demonstrate an increase in the level of influence of the military on policy, specifically in the areas of income, safety, and deference. The resultant trends may indicate an insidious trend away from or toward the development of a garrison state; the latter case is one that can plausibly occur absent a military coup d'état.

In this section, more specifically, we are concerned with the trend in income increases or decreases among those government agencies over which elected leaders have a large degree of control and which are therefore subject to attempted influence by the affected parties. To do so, we first plot the trend in the annual percentage increases in military basic pay and civil service pay in juxtaposition to the annual rate of inflation for the period 1945 to 2004 (with projections out to 2009).

In figure 1 below (see Table 1 in appendix for sources) we can readily see that the trend in civil service annual percentage pay increases was above that of the military




Figure 1. Military-civilian pay increase and inflation rate trends.

roughly from 1945 through 1957. From that point forward, the trend seems to indicate a growing divergence in military to civilian pay increases with the military trend being consistently above that of the civil service. The trend in the rate of inflation appears to hold fairly stable at just below 5 percent. It is interesting, however, that the trend lines of inflation rates and civil service pay increase percentages converge in 1992 with the civil service falling behind the rate of inflation from that point forward. The military percentage pay increase trend line does not converge with the inflation rate trend line until 2004 and, of course, it is only a guess as to their actual relationship in future years. Based on the trends as shown, the argument can be made--regardless of the myriad reasons--that the military appears to possibly wield more influence in regards to policy decisions concerning

pay increases only insofar as it relates to the civil service. It was expected that the trend line would actually have an upward movement which is surprisingly not the case.

Again, it is beyond the scope of this study to delve into the extensive and intricate aspects of budgetary policy regarding pay increases. For such information, various studies performed by RAND Corporation and a variety of government agencies are recommended (see Hosek et al. 1992; Asch and Warner 1994; Asch and Hosek 1999; and Hosek and Sharp 2001). However, it is apparent that much of the reason for the changing trends in military pay increases has to do with the end of conscription and beginning of the AVF, as well as the large pay raises garnered by former President Ronald Reagan as seen in the spikes in military pay percentage increases in 1971 and 1981 respectively. Similarly, as seen in the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 and the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act as just two examples, there was a concerted effort on the part of the United States' political leadership to close the purported disparity in pay between both the military and civil service when compared to private sector wages (see Hosek and Sharp 2001; Congressional Budget Office 1999; Office of the Secretary of Defense 2004; and Lee, 2004).

Another interesting aspect of figure 1 is the indication of sporadic and disparate pay policies in the years 1945 to 1972. Part of the reason for this seemingly unstructured approach toward pay increases for both military and civil service seems to be the timing of budget decisions and effective dates for raises when they occurred (see U.S. Department of Defense 2003). Often the raises for both groups of personnel occurred in either separate years or in different months of the same year (see Table 1 footnotes for explanation of chart development), which may have reinforced any belief that the two groups were being treated

differently by policy-makers. If one looks closely at the chart, it should be obvious that the relationship between the trend lines is somewhat skewed due to the fact that there were glaring disparities in annual percentage increases of one group compared to the other--most notably in the forties and fifties--which necessarily compresses the grid lines on the trend chart. Notwithstanding the difficulties in graphically displaying the data, the two groups were not necessarily in competition for the same personnel in that era due to conscription--a situation reversed in the post-AVF era. The post-AVF data (shown in figure 2) paints a significantly different picture of the trend in percentage pay increase between the two groups and is arguably more supportive of the concern about military influence demonstrated by the literature of the 1990s.




Figure 2. Military-civil service pay increase and ECI trends.

In spite of the spikes in the percentage annual pay increases for the military in 1981 and 2003, the data points in figure 2 depict a smoother and more consistent approach toward the budget process, at least regarding military and civilian pay issues. Again, we see that the assumption that there would be an upward trend in military pay increase percentages compared to those of the civil service is invalidated. Regardless of that issue, there are seven aspects of the trend chart that warrant discussion.

First, when we look at the trend lines beginning in 1973, we notice that the rate of inflation during this period is substantially higher trend-wise than that seen in figure 1. Looking back at figure 1, we see that inflation rates were relatively low prior to the 1970s with the first significant jump coming in 1974 and the second major spike in 1980. As such, trends in percentage increases for military, civil service, and the general public (as demonstrated by the ECI) fall below the inflation rate trend. It appears that there is an approximate 1 percent difference in the trend-lines between all three income groups.

Second, the year 1984 sees convergence of the ECI trend with the rate of inflation trend with the two running parallel (ECI being above inflation rates by a relatively small amount) until approximately 1992, and we find a growing divergence between ECI and inflation rates demonstrating the private sector's ability to gain some ground in beating inflation. In this same year we see the trend in military pay increase percentages converging with the ECI. However, the nearly 1 percent difference between military and civilian pay appears to remain constant, with the military trend retaining its position above that of the civil service.

Third, we observe the convergence of the trend in military pay increases and the rate of inflation in approximately 1985-86. Unlike the relationship between the ECI and

inflation rate trends, the divergence between the trends in military pay percentage increases and inflation rates grows at a faster rate. The disparity between the military pay increase rate trend and that of the civil service remains at approximately 1 percent, but it becomes obvious that the military pay increase rate is rapidly closing the gap with the average annual ECI rate.

Fourth, in 1997 the gap is closed on the annual percentage pay increase rate for the military and the ECI. The difference in rates between the military and civil service rates remains constant. We begin to see, however, that the civil service trend line is converging with the inflation rate and ECI trends.

Fifth, in 1990 the civil service annual percentage pay increase trend converges with the ECI. As with the military pay increase trend, the resulting divergence (civil service rate increase trending above the inflation rate) is greater than that of the ECI--so much greater that we realize that the civil service trend is rapidly converging with the ECI trend.

Sixth, in 1994 the trend-line for civil service annual percentage pay increases converges with the ECI trend and appears to be closing in on the military annual percentage pay increase trend-line.

The seventh and last aspect of the chart to note is at the current year 2004. We see a near reversal in the position of the trend-lines. The rate of inflation trend-line, originally conceived to be displayed as a reference point, is on the bottom. The ECI, although diverging from the inflation rate has taken the military's original position. The Civil service trend-line is now where the ECI began, and the military's pay increase trend-line has now come out on top.

Income Trend Summary

On their face, the resultant trends of the data chosen for this study clearly demonstrate that the military has continued, and possibly will continue, to reap greater monetary reward in the way of annual percentage pay increases when compared to civil service employees. This trend may be an indication of a growing degree of influence in the income policy-making process, which supports Lasswell's contention as adapted to this study. Further evidence of the military's potentially growing political influence, at least with the executive branch, is seen in its most recent pay increase proposal for the military (see Lee 2004).

Although there exists no legislation requiring that civil service pay increases match those for the military, it has been a fairly well followed tradition that they do so (see figure 2, years 1987-1993 and 1995-200, plus projections for 2005 forward). Notwithstanding that tradition, the current administration proposed a military pay raise for 2005 that would be more than twice that for the civil service (Lee 2004). As it currently stands, the military raise is mandated; greater increases are at the discretion of the Congress (U. S. Office of the Secretary of Defense 2004). Admittedly, the pay policy process is far more intricate and involved than these issues depict. However, combined with the trends noted above, it appears that the military has and will possibly continue to come out on top in the policy issue concerning basic compensation, which is a plausible indicator of influence. It should be of some concern as to how the Congress votes on the budget issues in future years, especially in regard to increases in military pay.

Safety Trend Analysis of the United States' Major Wars and Conflicts

It was stated in the methodology section that measuring safety, as Lasswell conceptualized it, offers some unique challenges. His premise, based on the evident threat to noncombatants brought about by aerial bombardment, was that the threat of war in modern society would be pervasive; war would be less discriminate in its effect on the non-military members of a society. Conceptually his thoughts are nearly inarguable. Moreover, the global threat posed by nuclear weapons during the Cold War--a threat which still exists--makes testing of his hypothesis virtually unnecessary. The existence of nuclear weapons effectively puts all of society in a threatened position, which automatically requires an affirmative answer to the question of whether or not we exist in a garrison state at present, at least insofar as the concept of the socialization of threat is concerned. However, to quantitatively assess and trend the socialization of threat is a daunting task at best. Due to the inability to conceptualize a direct method or means to measure "negative safety" (Lasswell 1941, 463) a proxy must be used; in our case, an analysis of the trend in death rates of military members in conflicts and major wars and the potential for civilian deaths as a result of terrorism.

Professor Lasswell (1977) was concerned about the difficulty in measuring the value allocations of income, safety, and deference. Regarding deaths due to combat, he believed that the United States had improved considerably in archiving such information over the course of its history. As will be seen in figures 3 through 7 (supported by tables 2 and 3 in the appendices), there seems to be no shortage of casualty data for military members. Unfortunately, similarly extensive data for the civilian casualties of war is lacking. Being armed with such information would make the business of assessing the

socialization of the effects of war much easier and straightforward; without it we are left to anecdotally assess the level of threat socialization as it relates to the possibility that we are moving toward a garrison state existence.

Rather than remaining in a quandary about the issue, we can utilize existing information in such a way as to focus on the key question for this section: Is the military becoming more influential in the policy area of safety as Lasswell conceived it? Although not actually concerned with death rates per se, by inverting Lasswell's concept of safety and measuring the rise or decline in the trend for military members' risk of becoming a casualty in war, we can draw some conclusions about the influence of the military on policies that may effect the socialization of the threat of war.

Figures 3 and 4 offer a historic perspective for military deaths in all major wars. Figure 3 differs from figure 4 only in that the Civil War data (asterisked in both charts) contains information for both Union and Confederate deaths; figure 4 accounts only for Union casualties.²⁵ In figure 5, we can see the information for the United States' major wars and conflicts in the era following Lasswell's publishing of *The Garrison State* (1941). The last two charts (figures 6 and 7) introduce data of a more modern nature: deaths due to acts of terrorism. Although different sources offer different accountings as well as categorizations of terrorist activity, the information provided offers an alternative

²⁵ Figure 3 displays the combined data pertaining to Union and Confederate militaries during the U. S. Civil War as found in the USCWC Statistical Summary listed in footnote one above. The DoD data pertaining to U. S. principal wars does not include confederate military personnel in their calculation due to conflicting data. However, if one were to use the maximum estimate of 1.5 million confederate troops serving and the maximum estimated total deaths (combat and other) of 164,821, the death rate for the confederacy at its lowest estimate would be 10.9 percent. Using the minimum estimate of 600,000 confederate military personnel and the minimum estimated total deaths (combat and other) of 159,821 the death rate for the confederacy at its highest would be 26.6 percent. The USCWC data used in this study claims that 1,064,200 confederate military personnel served and total deaths were 198,524 resulting in a death rate of 18.7 percent, which nearly splits the difference between the DoD estimates.

assessment concerning the socialization of the threat of war, one that simply brings Lasswell's original thesis forward to the twenty-first century.

Purists may look at the chart in figure 3 and argue that it portrays an inflated accounting of the percentage killed in action. Their argument has merit because the charts do not depict solely those "killed in action" data. As stated in the definitions section at the beginning of this study, we are concerned with "total deaths" which combines "combat deaths" (killed in action or dead of wounds) and "other deaths" (deaths from disease, privation, accidents, and death among prisoners of war) (see United States Civil War Center website, accessed 2004). It appears to be nothing more than an academic enterprise to differentiate between various causes of death during a conflict; those who perished obviously cannot plead their case. Equally important, Lasswell (1941) wrote of the leadership's ability to manipulate symbols in an effort to maintain morale of the citizenry in a garrison state. It is this author's contention that casualty reporting has become an easily manipulated statistical activity. With that thought in mind, it is believed that the "total death" figures used in this study more accurately represent the true trend in deaths related to combat activity by the United States military.




Figure 3. U. S. war and conflict deaths (Union and Confederate in Civil War).




Figure 4. U. S. war and conflict deaths (Union only in Civil War).

Looking at the trend lines in both figures 3 and 4, one can barely perceive a shift in trend-lines regarding the effect of the different Civil War data use in each chart. What is rather striking is the reality that the Mexican War, although involving less than .001 percent the number of troops involved in the Civil War, resulted in a death rate more than 2 percent higher. Similarly striking is the reality that World War II, America's largest war, especially in terms of manpower, saw a death rate basically equal to that of World War I and less than 2 percent higher than either Korea or Vietnam. The resultant trend is rather obvious. As a percentage of personnel in the armed forces, the trend in death rates has declined significantly from the early 1800s to the present.

Just as the first figure dealing with income appeared to be slightly skewed due to the time span involved, so are figures 3 and 4 involving death rates. By focusing on wars and conflicts of the future, as they would have been relative to the time of Lasswell's writing, figure 5 offers a better visual portrayal of the death rate trends.

It is rather telling that as a percentage of military manpower, the United States has significantly decreased the risk of death due to combat activity for military members. Notwithstanding the reality that the death rate can not dip below zero, as the trend-line indicates, the extremely low number of casualties in Desert Storm demonstrated a resolve on behalf of the United States that casualties would be kept to a minimum. The problem with the depiction of the trend in death rates seen in figures 3, 4, and 5 lies in their simplicity. The trends do not lie, but they are woefully lacking in the necessary detail that may indicate some rationale behind their existence.




Figure 5. U. S. military conflicts post-WWII to Gulf War I.

We are reminded in Donald Snow and Dennis Drew's *From Lexington to Desert Storm and Beyond: War and Politics in the American Experience*, that technological changes have altered the mindset and strategy of conflict throughout history. Describing military conflicts from the age of the smooth-bore musket to the highly computerized "smart bombs" used in the first Gulf War, Snow and Drew provide a crucial part of the explanation for a considerable decrease in the military casualties of war, at least for the American military (see also Kagan 2003). Since this study makes no differentiation between those killed directly by the enemy and those killed by diseases or other causes in conflict, it is equally plausible that marked improvements in medical care, evacuation capability, and post-trauma rehabilitation have also aided in the reduced risk for a military

member to become a statistic as a result of combat activity. But these are operational and tactical issues that unquestionably impact the death rate trends. But what can be said about the military's and public's desire to minimize casualties in military conflicts?

John Mueller's piece, titled "American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in a New Era: Eleven Propositions," offered the following thought:

Americans are inclined to pay little attention to foreign policy issues unless there appears to be a direct threat to the United States. ... They are also very sensitive to the degree to which a policy is likely to cost American lives. So long as American casualties are kept low, the president has quite a bit of leeway to deal with ventures that are not highly valued. ... (in Norrander and Wilcox 2002, 149)

Just how sensitive the American people are to combat casualties is debatable. Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn attempted to dispel the "myth" of a "casualty shy" populace by stating that casualties viewed as necessary to a mission are normally acceptable to the average American based on their 1998 Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) study (2001a, 467). Thomas Langston cautions us to view the assertion made by Feaver and Kohn with some skepticism due to the structure of the question used in their survey. Langston argued that the way in which respondents were queried on the issue may have influenced their responses to match an executive decision that had already been carried out; at least hypothetically (2000, para. 10). Aside from the academic debate about America's dislike of death in combat, one need only reflect on the recent obsession with casualty counts from Operation Iraqi Freedom; the public outcry over the horrific photos of dead American servicemen being dragged through the streets of Somalia; and the obvious effects the "Five O'Clock Follies" (Snow and Drew 2001a, 210 and 250) had on American opinions of the Viet Nam War. Undoubtedly there is some concern about American casualties; its true origin and effect on policy is open for debate. John Mueller's take on the issue is that

“although concern about American lives often seems nuanced when the public assesses foreign affairs there are times when public abhorrence of American casualties becomes so obsessive that policy may suffer (2001, 157).

The preceding discussion about the potential reasons for lower death rates, although not exhaustive, demonstrates the complexity of Lasswell’s concern about the socialization of the threat of war. It is nearly impossible to address the topic in the separate domains of technological capability, political incentive, or public opinion. Technology has no doubt improved the United States’ stand-off capability as well as the accuracy of its weapons. But was the technology driven by public opinion concerning the death of American service personnel? Was it developed solely to satisfy the wants of the military? Or does America have its current arsenal because political leaders desired to reduce their culpability for the deaths of America’s sons and daughters? Finally, one might question if America’s current military capability is due to the profit motive of the numerous defense-related industries, more commonly referred to as the “Military Industrial Complex” (Eisenhower quoted in Kozak and Keagle 1988; Snow and Brown 1994). It is the author’s position that it is the interdependency of these issue domains that allows for the military capability currently “enjoyed” by the military. For this reason we must accept the limitations of the data and resultant trend charts but recognize that there are indications of military influence in the area of safety, however indirect or convoluted it may be. Future studies may be undertaken to flesh out the rationale for the policy decisions in each particular area. But the trends should be watched due to ever-changing security threats and their potential to involve noncombatant civilians, especially in regard to terrorism.

Safety Trend Analysis: Analysis of America's Lesser Conflicts and Terrorism

Given the resultant trends seen in figures 3, 4, and 5 and the realization that the nuclear threat continues to exist--although not the degree seen in the Cold War--one could argue that indeed the threat of war has been socialized. However, the threat of nuclear war seems less and less probable, which may negate Lasswell's concern. We must remember that Lasswell's "developmental construct" (1941, 455) can be adapted to modern security threats, especially the threat of terrorism.

Prior to the events of 11 September 2001, terrorism was widely viewed as a criminal activity albeit with political motives underlying its use. The terrifying pictures of aircraft slamming into the World Trade Center towers altered the outlook on terrorism, and regardless of whether right or wrong, the United States and a majority of existing states declared "war" on terrorism. Using the term "war" and employing the American military to pursue terrorists adds a certain degree of legitimacy to their cause, thus changing the concept of terrorism from a criminal to military activity. As such, it seems wholly appropriate to analyze the potential for civilians to be victims of terrorism (acts of war as currently understood) compared to the likelihood for military members to be casualties of terrorism. The waters are muddied even more due to the fact that it is difficult to determine whether a military member is killed by a "terrorist" or "insurgent" in a combat zone such as we currently see in Iraq. For this reason the data used in figures 6 and 7 (supported by tables 2 and 3 in the appendices) reflect military deaths in lesser conflicts following the AVF and deaths due to terrorist acts of civilians in the United States.




Figure 6. Post-AVF U. S. military conflict and homeland terrorist deaths.

Figure 6 shows the trend in deaths of the military (actual numbers) from the Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt in 1980 to the deaths of military and civilian personnel killed in the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Although the Desert Storm data are used in the figures 3, 4, and 5 concerning the United States' principal wars, it is used again in this chart to provide a continuous assessment of the potential for military members to become casualties. The deaths of military members in the Pentagon on 9/11 were not considered as deaths due to terrorism but rather as deaths due to military activity. This decision was made based on an understanding of the oaths of commissioning and enlistment, which charges compliance against "all enemies." Although nearly imperceptible, it is especially

noteworthy that the number of military deaths was basically held at or below one hundred per conflict for the last two decades of the twentieth century.

The data for civilian deaths due to terrorism (see Table 2 in appendix) and the resultant trend may be deceiving due to the nearly three thousand killed in the World Trade Center towers in the 9/11 terrorist attack. However, if terrorism is a long-term threat, then the existing trend is viable and should be continually assessed. It is plausible that terrorism has supplanted aerial bombardment as the basis for concern about socialization of threat in the twenty-first century. If in the 9/11 attack was a simple anomaly, then figure 7 may more accurately depict the trend in threat socialization when comparing military to civilian.




Figure 7. Post-AVF U. S. military conflict and homeland terrorist deaths (not including 9-11 deaths).

Figure 7 expands the gridlines since the anomaly of 9/11 is removed. As expected the resultant trends demonstrate a higher trend in military deaths than does the trend-line for civilian terrorism casualties. Although inconclusive, figures 6 and 7 are provided simply to provoke thought and provide at least a sense of the cost of both terrorist and military activity in human lives. Although the military is a harder target for the terrorist by design, future trends in these categories may indicate a need to reassess defense programs toward the protection of the civilian population.

Returning to the trends in figure 6, it appears that civilians are at considerably higher risk. This may or may not be as a result of military influence on policy, but one could argue that the military is better funded to protect itself and its assets than is civilian law enforcement for the protection of the citizenry (resurrecting the contentious issue of the military versus legal context of terrorism). Another issue that may skew perceptions is the fact that death rates for the military will probably always surpass the rate for civilians. In the case of the World Trade Center towers, three thousand deaths out of the nearly three hundred million people living in the United States is a rate of 0.001 percent. Desert Storm saw almost three hundred deaths out of nearly three-million in uniform, which resulted in a rate of 0.01 percent. Although both statistics are troubling, when it comes to influencing policy-makers, the more dramatically a case is made, the more likely it is to find support. It appears the military has the ability to plead a better case on statistics alone, an ability possibly enhanced by its access to policy-makers and the concomitant deference they may display toward the military--a subject addressed following the summary of this section.

Safety Trend Summary

It could be argued that with the existence of nuclear weapons and current nuclear proliferation issues the general public is indeed equally as threatened by war as are members of the military--basically all of society shares in the risk. This alone substantiates Lasswell's (1941) notion that due to the advent of airpower such a socialization of threat would occur. However nuclear weapons are not the only risk; people are still being killed by conventional means in a conflict and may be more at risk with the growing threat of terrorism.

If we hold the threat of nuclear weapons constant, we find ourselves in a dilemma as to how to determine whether or not the military and civilian members of a society share equally in the threat of war, and if so, what indications exist that the military is exerting more influence in this policy area than are civilians. To do so we must invert the argument and determine whether the military is becoming less at risk as demonstrated by the rate of death in combat. The resultant trends indicate such a movement, but it remains an insuperable problem to determine the reason for the decreasing death rates for military personnel in combat. When we consider the aspect of terrorism, the resultant trends can be interpreted to indicate an increasing potential for citizens to be adversely affected. This raises the question about the military's ability to influence policy-makers concerning resources for force and military asset protection compared to resources being made available for protecting the civilian population. Although inconclusive, the trends can be interpreted to indicate that the threat of war appears to be increasingly more socialized for civilians, but less so for the military. Analyzing safety in this way, one cannot state unequivocally that the measures used are the best indicator of military

influence in this policy area; however, the trends do not allow us to completely disavow the possibility that continuous analysis of trends in death rates offers at least a good indicator of the changing security environment.

Deference Trend Analysis

Concerning the study of deference, Harold Lasswell (1977) wrote (nearly forty years after his original piece) that there had been relatively few efforts to approach the subject. It is arguable that the lack of studies may have reflected frustration with the vagueness of the concept of deference not to mention the difficulty of measuring a feeling a person or group harbors toward another person or group. Actions a person or group makes based on deference may be confused with preferential treatment rather than the fact that the other group or person was taken into consideration in the decision-making or policy-making process as Lasswell (1941) defined the concept. In regard to the garrison state construct, it is important to know whether there is something that would indicate the trend of influence the military might wield in the area of deference. As discussed in the methodology section, absent a survey of the country's political leaders about their level of deference for the military, we are forced to use a proxy measurement. Public opinion polls concerning the public's confidence in government institutions arguably provide the best alternative to such a survey.

Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro wrote in their article "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy" that "The responsiveness of government policy to citizens' preferences is a central concern in normative democratic theory..." (1983, 175). An earlier study by William Crotty came to the same conclusion as Page and Shapiro. In his

text, Crotty addressed the fact there are numerous factors involved in any attempt to tie public opinion to government policy decisions. However, he came to the conclusion that “possibly the most accurate and publicized means of determining what the electorate is thinking is the ubiquitous public opinion poll” (Crotty 1970, 2004). Robert Erikson and Kent Tedin (2002) remind us that polls rarely track public opinion on specific issues before Congress, which limits the ability to accurately assess its impact on policy. However, they reach the conclusion that many studies support the notion that public opinion is of some consequence to policy outcomes.

One of the earliest factual cases exhibiting the influence of public opinion on policy is found in Hadley Cantril’s *The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research* (1967). Cantril wrote of the reality that presidents must consider the public’s concern for, and understanding of, the various policy decisions he wishes to implement. He specifically cites Franklin Roosevelt’s reliance on public opinion poll results “to help craft the message of the ‘Economic Bill of Rights’ which was vital to [his] ‘selling’ of the post-war European Recovery effort” (Cantril 1967, 95-96)

Although the specific policy outcomes are not known, the following examples of some of the early Gallup Poll results arguably guided policy-makers in the decision-making processes regarding the military and post-World War II domestic issues. An 8 September 1944 Gallup Poll asked the following:

When the war is over and many soldiers return to civilian life, they may not find jobs. Do you think the government should give soldiers money if they find themselves out of work after the war? [The results were: Yes=83 percent; No=13 percent; and No Opinion=4 percent.]

[A second question asked:] Should the government give war workers money if they find themselves out of work when the war is over or nearly over? [The results were: Yes=21 percent; No=71 percent; and No Opinion=8 percent] (Gallup 1972, 460).

The response to the first question was not surprising; it is the outcome of the second question that is more intriguing. For whatever reason, the American public was able to make a distinction between those in uniform and those at home, although a case could be made that many defense industry workers were involved in equally dangerous professions. As will be seen in figures 8 and 9, the public's tendency to support those in uniform, as indicated by public opinion polls concerning institutional confidence, would continue; at least insofar as the available data allow us to determine.²⁶ This confidence level is arguably the best indicator of the amount of deference political leaders hold for the military. Albeit indirect, the military may very well influence policy by virtue of its standing in the public's eye--most politicians would be careful to support the military so as not to alienate themselves from their constituencies.

The trends shown in figure 8 are fairly straightforward. The trend in the public's confidence in the military has remained fairly consistent for the nearly three decades following implementation of the AVF. Although relatively stable, there is indication of an upward trend in the public's confidence in the military as an institution. When one looks at the two branches of government that are constitutionally charged with the leadership and support of the military (Presidency and Congress) we see a seemingly worsening level of confidence the American public has in the institution of Congress. Although not necessarily germane to the issue of civil-military relations and the military's influence on policy, it is interesting to see that the Supreme Court's confidence rating is the most stable of the three branches of government, although their trend-line is

²⁶ Data used for this study were obtained through the CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (see table 4 in appendix) and covers only the period 1973-2003. David Segal and John Blair found that the public's confidence in the military was "very high—between 70 and 75 on a 1-100 scale" in the years 1964 to 1976 (in Feaver 2003, 24).

nearly 20 points below that of the military. The question remains: What do these trends indicate?




Figure 8. Institutional confidence (Federal Government).

Accepting the idea that public officials may use public opinion polls to assist them in making policy-decisions (see Converse 1987), one can easily surmise that in the area of defense issues considerable attention is warranted. It is conceivable that a “coat-tails” effect may be at work. An anecdotal indication of this is the nearly unanimous support for the men and women in uniform currently voiced by members of Congress regardless of personal reservations about the conflict in Iraq. Surely any politician worthy of the title is aware of the disparity in confidence the American public has for their institution versus the military. Although any member of Congress may take a policy

stance that may be seen as anti-military, it is inconceivable that he or she would do so without first explaining that such an action was warranted for reasons other than an effort to potentially undermine the military's effectiveness. That being said, it is virtually impossible to prove that any action taken by a member of Congress was in fact driven by consideration of the military's policy stance or the public's feeling toward that institution over his or her personal consideration of the issue. But it is equally impossible to deny the potential for influence that results of public opinion polls have on elected officials. For these reasons it appears that the public's confidence level is the only plausible indicator of deference toward the military absent a survey of political leaders designed to assess the issue.




Figure 9. Institutional confidence (12 categories).

Figure 9 is provided solely to demonstrate the level of confidence the public has in the military relative to other institutions (public and private) that affect our everyday lives. The most interesting feature of this chart is the indication that the military, the United States Supreme Court, and the Presidency normally rank above all but the police and churches/religion. Congress tracks fairly consistently with organized labor--at the bottom.

Deference Trend Summary

Deference is seen as a combination of power and respect. Power relates to the level of participation a person or group has in decision-making; respect relates to the concept of “reciprocal intimacy” (Lasswell 1941, 463) or a measurement of regard one has for an individual or institution. The trends shown in figures 8 and 9 unquestionably demonstrate a continually high, and trending higher, level of regard the American public has for the military. Since it is clear that there is support for the notion that policy-makers use public opinion data as a guide for decision making as well as framing their agendas and policy stances, it is logical to assume that in the realm of military issues considerable attention is paid to the public’s feelings toward it’s military as well as its political leaders. The true level of influence poll results have on individual policy-makers is difficult to ascertain due to the complexity of the process combined with the virtual impossibility of knowing the policy-maker’s issue stance prior to his or her viewing of poll data. That being said, the combination of the above trends in public confidence and the accessibility of the military to political leaders involved in policy development (power) arguably presents a strong case that the public opinion polls measuring institutional confidence are a plausible indicator of military deference in

regard to the garrison state construct. As such, the trends would indicate that the military's influence on policy, insofar as deference is concerned, is growing.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Introduction

The overarching goal of this study was to assess the validity of Lasswell's predicted trends concerning military influence in a garrison state. To perform such an assessment two questions needed to be answered: (1) What indicators exist that may adequately demonstrate the influence of the armed forces on the value allocations of income, safety, and deference? (2) What are the trends of those indicators? This required choosing plausible indicators of influence that relate to the Lasswellian factors of income, safety and deference and then graphically displaying their increasing or decreasing trends. Charting the information in this manner offers a more quantitative assessment of whether or not the United States is moving toward or away from a garrison state existence than does an effort to synthesize and imagine a trend indicated by empirical evidence of personal influence on policy as found in the extant literature. This concluding chapter provides a brief review of the findings in each value area; offers a subjective appraisal of their potential implications; and finally, offers recommendations for future research efforts.

Review of the Trend Analysis

Although this study performs a rather simplistic assessment of an intricate and politically volatile aspect of the federal budget process, the resultant trends offer some

indication that the military wields, for myriad reasons, some degree of influence in the value allocation of income as developed in the methodology section. The trend-lines shown in figure 2, which covers the post-AVF period, offer the most obvious indication that the military is benefiting more than the civil service from basic pay increase decisions of the country's elected leaders. In this period the annual percentage pay increase trend has remained above the trend for civil service employees and, since approximately 1986, has risen above the trend in the average wage increases for civilians (as indicated by the ECI) as well as the trend in inflation rates. Although the trends for military and civil service appear to be converging, both trends are diverging from the trends for inflation and the ECI.

Regarding the Lasswellian concept of safety, it is virtually impossible to deny that all civilians are at greater risk of becoming a casualty of war given the threat posed by nuclear weapons. However, such an assessment of the issue offers little indication of the military's influence in this area, which is a necessary condition to determine whether the country is gradually shifting toward a garrison state existence. Without any means to assess an increase in the risk of civilians becoming casualties in war, the concept had to be manipulated. By demonstrating the trend in the likelihood of military members becoming casualties, we may infer the military's level of influence on policy which may have allowed for the technology and manpower necessary for force protection thereby decreasing their propensity for death in war. The overall trend in the death rate for military members in America's major wars has been below 8 percent at its highest point (the Revolutionary War) and .001 percent at its lowest (Desert Storm), which results in a significantly descending trend-line. If we consider only this trend in relation to the aforementioned

nuclear threat we can most assuredly claim that the military is increasingly influential in the value allocation of safety. But the threat of nuclear war is not the only threat.

To bring the issue into a more current context we compared the actual number of military deaths in America's lesser conflicts in the post-AVF era to the number of civilian deaths due to terrorist activity and applied a logarithmic trend-line to the findings. When the nearly three thousand deaths in the World Trade Center attacks are added the trend for deaths of civilians is increasing at an exponentially faster rate than that for the military, which exhibits a relatively significant downward trend. Obviously that large a number being added to the chart may skew the actual trend, which does change significantly when taken out of the equation as seen in figure 7. However, without the advantage of accurate foresight it is difficult to know what the future holds in regard to terrorism. Should instances similar to the 9/11 attacks on America occur in a relatively consistent pattern, then the existing trends seen in figures 3-7 will continue to demonstrate an increase in the socialization of the threat of war (notwithstanding the ever-present nuclear threat) as Lasswell (1941) predicted.

In order to assess the trend in deference bestowed upon the military by its civilian leaders, we had to use a proxy measurement as with the issue of safety. Ideally a survey would be used to measure the feelings of deference the country's leaders hold for the military. It is debatable as to the efficacy of performing such a survey since it is entirely plausible that not many elected officials would--even in a private, non-attributive format--honestly express their opinion. Based on that assumption we relied on the results of public opinion polls that measured the level of confidence the population has in various government and private institutions. This choice was made given the supporting literature

that indicates that political leaders use public opinion polls to develop their position on various issues or to assist them in guiding the American public's opinion on social matters.

Assuming that the trend in public confidence in the military may affect the feelings that politicians hold toward the military, the resultant trend indicates a high and increasing level of deference toward the military. The trend lines applied to the data in figure 8 also demonstrate a diverging level of confidence the public has in the three branches of government compared to the military. By applying the concept of a "coat-tails" effect it becomes evident that any member of Congress, as well as the president, would benefit by making every effort to be seen as supportive of the military. Although the effect is rather indirect, by this measurement the military appears to be increasingly able to influence policy due to a growing level of deference as Lasswell predicted.

Collectively, trend analysis of the three value areas--income, safety, and deference--espoused by Lasswell, validates his hypothesis that "the trend of the time is away from the dominance of the specialist on bargaining, who is the businessman, and toward the supremacy of the specialist on violence, the soldier" (1941, 455). The results do not imply that the country's policies are no longer influenced by business, unions, lobbying groups, and various other private organizations. However, if politics truly is about "who gets what, when, and how" (Lasswell 1951c; from the title) we can make the inference, based on the trends depicted in this study, that it appears the military is indeed becoming more influential in the policy decisions of the country's elected leaders.

Implications

The implications of these trends will vary depending upon the political ideology of the person viewing them. For this reason, it is important that they be analyzed in the context of Lasswell's (1941) garrison state construct. Since the trends appear to validate Lasswell's concern that the military would become more influential, we only need return to his original work to understand the potential implications.

After developing his argument for the garrison state construct, Lasswell stated that

The friend of democracy views the emergence of the garrison state with repugnance and apprehension. He will do whatever is within his power to defer it. Should the garrison state become unavoidable, however, the friend of democracy will seek to conserve as many values as possible within the general framework of the new society. (1941, 467)

It would appear that a major implication of the resultant trends is that growing political influence of the military may negatively impact society's ability to maintain its long-held democratic value. Those values were addressed previously as the "American Creed"-- democracy, liberalism, egalitarianism, and individualism (see Huntington 1982, 1). Effectively, the trends appear to vindicate the belief held by Samuel Adams: a standing army may jeopardize individual liberty, even in a democracy (see Kohn 1975).

Recommendations

Based on results of the trend analysis, conclusions, and implications of this study, recommendations for further research are suggested below. Taken together they encourage a paradigm shift in the approach toward civil-military relations research; a shift that entails development and application of more quantitative analysis. Combining this approach with

qualitative analysis will allow us to more readily discern the level of influence the military has on policy and suggest corrective actions as deemed necessary.

1. Further research should be undertaken to develop a matrix or index that more accurately quantifies the concept of influence. Influence or power is at the core of politics. The ability to provide a quantitative indicator of influence would allow for more stringent statistical analyses of the impact a myriad possible independent variables have on it as the dependent variable. Analysis of trends provides a basis of inference but it lacks the ability to demonstrate any significant correlation among the variables.

2. Studies are also needed to determine what other value areas may be influenced by the military, or for that matter, any other organization or agency of the government. In doing so, other plausible indicators of influence need to be developed that may allow a more accurate assessment of its trend in growth or reduction.

3. Future studies are called for to delve deeper into the issue of compensation for the military. This study dealt only with the issue of basic pay for the military and civil service with the ECI used only for the purpose of demonstration. Subsequent studies that include rates of increase in special duty pays, combat pays, hazardous duty pays, etc., may provide an alternative trend indicating either greater or lesser degrees of influence by the military on policy decisions.

4. Due to limited access to necessary data, this study was unable to demonstrate trends in each of the value areas for the same timeframes. Future research using different databases may be performed that would enable analysis of variance between the extant trends; analysis of variance between different time periods; or analysis of variance between different political parties as just a few examples. Lasswell (1941) admitted that using

different values (as suggested in recommendation number two above) would probably render different results. Similarly, if different data were used and other analyses were performed, the results might differ.

Summary

It is believed that this study has successfully demonstrated the ability to develop and analyze the trends in influence of the military and show that the United States may be gradually moving toward a garrison state existence as Lasswell predicted. This is not to imply that the author believes there exists an imminent danger that the country is at the threshold of a coup or the smooth transition into a purely garrison state. Fortunately, the constitutional system of checks and balances America operates under pretty well negates the possibility of such an occurrence. However, we are reminded that the critical question for civil-military relations scholars to ask is: “At what point will the military elite of a society exercise undue influence on the policies of the government and the organization of the society?” (Stanley 1997, 20; see also Clotfelter 1973; Gibson and Snider 1999). Clearly, this study offers some evidence that perhaps we are at that point which begs the following questions: Is this good or bad? What can be done to change the trend if deemed necessary? Perhaps future scholars will be able to find the answers.

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APPENDIX

Table 1. Military and Civilian Percent Pay Increases and Average Annual Inflation Rates (Used for Figures 1 and 2)²⁷

Effective Date for Pay Raise (Use Year Only For Inflation and ECI)	Military Pay % Annual Increase	General Schedule % Annual Increase	Annual Average % Inflation Rate	Annual Average ECI (Private Industry, Not Seasonally Adjusted)
Jul 45	0	15.9	2.27	
Jul 46	23.7	14.2	8.43	
Jul 48	0	11	7.74	
Oct 49	21.6	4.1	-.95	
Jul 51	0	4.1	7.88	
May 52	10.9	0	2.29	
Mar 55	2.9	7.5	-.28	
Jan 58	6.3	10	2.73	
Jul 60	0	13.2	1.46	
Oct 63	8.4	0	1.24	
Jan 64	1.4	8.3	1.28	
Sep 65	6.4	3.6	1.59	
Jul 66	2.8	2.9	3.01	
Oct 67	4.5	4.5	2.78	
Jul 68	4.9	4.9	4.27	
Jul 69	9.1	9.1	5.46	
Jan 70	6	6	5.84	
Jan 71	19.1	6	4.30	
Jan 72	5.5	5.5	3.27	
Jan 73	9.9	9.9	6.16	
Oct 74	5.5	5.5	11.03	
Oct 75	5	5	9.20	
Oct 76	4.8	4.8	5.75	7.15
Oct 77	7	7	6.50	7
Oct 78	5.5	5.5	7.62	7.65
Oct 79	7	7	11.22	7.93
Oct 80	11.7	9.1	13.58	9.2
Oct 81	14.3	4.8	8.92	9.12
Oct 82	4	4	3.83	7.13
Jan 84	4	4	3.95	4.5
Jan 85	7	4	3.80	4.33
Jan 87	3	3	4.43	3.15
Jan 88	2	2	4.42	3.73

²⁷ Table 1 continues on next page.

Source for military and civilian pay data: U.S. Department of Defense. 2003. *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2004*. Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (see works cited). Values for civilian estimates crosschecked with data from: U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Date Unknown. Office of Workforce Information. *Average Salary Tables for Civil Service Employees, 1949-2002* (see works cited). Some differences exist due to rounding errors but have no impact on trend outcomes.

Data included in table is neither exhaustive nor chronologically perfect. Adjustments were made to count military and civilian pay increases at the same time since they sometimes occurred in different months for the two groups, or one group may receive multiple increases in a given calendar year. This is most notable in the years 1945 to 1965. In the case of multiple raise the two percentages were combined.

Source for inflation rates: InflationData.com. ©2003-2004. Affiliated with *Financial Trend Forecaster*[®]. Published by *Capital Professional Services*. Available at *InflationData.com*, http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx?dsInflation_current, accessed 10 July 2004.

Inflation data used are not exhaustive. Annual inflation rate percentages were used only in the years in which annual percentage increases in military and civilian pay occurred. Annual inflation rate for 2004 was calculated on the monthly average from January to May 2004.

Source for Employment Cost Index Data: U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2004. *Bureau of Labor Statistics Data* (see works cited).

Table 1 (Continued)

Effective Date for Pay Raise (Year Only For Inflation)	Military Pay % Annual Increase	General Schedule % Annual Increase	Annual Average % Inflation Rate	Annual Average ECI (Private Industry, Not Seasonally Adjusted)
Jan 89	4.1	4.1	4.65	4.18
Jan 90	3.6	3.6	6.11	4.23
Jan 91	4.1	4.1	3.06	3.78
Jan 92	4.2	4.2	-2.90	2.93
Jan 93	3.7	3.7	2.96	2.9
Jan 94	2.2	3.6	2.61	2.93
Jan 95	2.6	2.6	2.81	2.88
Jan 96	2.4	2.4	2.93	3.33
Jan 97	3	3.0	2.34	3.8
Jan 98	2.8	2.8	1.55	4.05
Jan 99	3.6	3.6	2.19	3.4
Jan 00	4.8	4.8	3.38	4.08
Jan 01	3.7	3.7	2.83	3.75
Jan 02	6.9	4.6	1.59	3.25
Jan 03	4.7	3.1	2.27	2.9
Jan 04	4.1	2.0	2.14	
Jan 05	3.4	3.4		
Jan 06	3.4	3.4		
Jan 07	3.4	3.4		
Jan 08	3.4	3.4		
Jan 09	3.4	3.4		

Table 2. U.S. Combat Deaths in Principal Wars and Conflicts
(Used for Figures 3, 4, and 5)²⁸

War / Conflict	Total Deaths as a Percent of Total Serving in the Military	Total Military Personnel	Total Deaths ²⁹
Revolutionary War (1775-1783)	2	217,000	4,435
War of 1812 (1812-1815)	0.8	286,730	2,260
Mexican War (1846-1848)	16.8	78,718	13,283
Civil War ³⁰	14.4	3,867,500	558,052
Civil War ³¹	12.8	2,803,300	359,528
Spanish-American War	0.7	306,760	2,446
World War I (1917-1918)	2.5	4,734,991	116,708
World War II (1941-1946)	2.5	16,353,700	407,316
Korean War (1950-1953)	0.6	5,764,100	33,651
Viet Nam Conflict (1964-1973)	0.7	8,744,000	58,168
Persian Gulf War (1990-1991)	0.01	2,750,000	293

²⁸ Sources:

U.S. Department of Defense. Date Unknown. Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. *Principle Wars in Which the United States Participated [Data]*. Available at <http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/casualty/WCPRINCIPAL.pdf>.

U.S. Department of Defense. Date Unknown. Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. *Table 13, Worldwide U.S. Active Duty Military Deaths: Selected Military Operations*. Available at <http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/casualty/table13.htm>, accessed 1 July 2004.

The United States Civil War Center (USCWC). Date Unknown. *Statistical Summary: America's Major Wars*. Available at *Louisiana State University*, <http://www.cwc.lsu.edu/cwc/other/stats/warcost.htm>, accessed on 7 April 2004.

²⁹ Total deaths is the combination of “combat deaths” (killed in action or dead of wounds) and “other deaths” (death from disease, privation, accidents, and death among prisoners of war) as indicated in the USCWC *Statistical Summary: America's Major Wars*.

³⁰ Figure 3 displays the combined data pertaining to Union and Confederate militaries during the US Civil War as found in the USCWC Statistical Summary listed in footnote one above. The DoD data pertaining to US principal wars does not include confederate military personnel in their calculation due to conflicting data. However, if one were to use the maximum estimate of 1.5 million confederate troops serving and the maximum estimated total deaths (combat and other) of 164,821 the death rate for the confederacy at its lowest estimate would be 10.9 percent. Using the minimum estimate of 600,000 confederate military personnel and the minimum estimated total deaths (combat and other) of 159,821 the death rate for the confederacy at its highest would be 26.6 percent. The USCWC data used in this study claims that 1,064,200 confederate military personnel served and total deaths were 198,524 resulting in a death rate of 18.7 percent which nearly splits the difference between the DoD estimates.

³¹ Figure 4 displays only the data pertaining to the Union military during US Civil War.

Table 3. Post-All Volunteer Force U.S. Military Conflict and Homeland Terrorist Deaths (Used for Figures 6 and 7)³²

Operation / Terrorist Incident	Deaths Due to Military Activity	Deaths Due to Terrorist Activity
Iran Hostage Rescue (1980)	8	
Lebanon ³³ (1982-84)	265	
Urgent Fury (1983)	19	
Just Cause (1989)	23	
Desert Shield / Desert Storm (1990-91)	383	
Restore Hope (1992-94)	43	
Oklahoma City Bombing (1985) ³⁴		168
Uphold Democracy (1994-96)	4	
Texas (James Byrd) (1998)		1
Chicago (NeoNazi) (1999)		1
Los Angeles (NeoNazi) (1999)		1
World Trade Center Towers (2001)		2,689
Pentagon (2001) (see footnote 2)	124	64
Flight 93 (Pennsylvania) (2001)		45

³² NOTE: In light of the debate as to whether terrorism is an act of war or a criminal activity, the information in this table is compiled and graphically displayed simply to provide support for the argument that terrorism may be the modern rendition of Lasswell's (1941) concern about the advent of airpower.

Sources:

U.S. Department of State. 2004. *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2003*. Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/33777pf.htm>, accessed on 2 July 2004.

U.S. Department of Defense. Date Unknown. Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. *Table 13, Worldwide U.S. Active Duty Military Deaths: Selected Military Operations*. Available, <http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmids/casualty/table13.htm>, accessed 1 July 2004.

International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Available at <http://www.ict.org.il>, accessed on 2 July 2004.

AmericanHistory About. Date Unknown. Available at <http://americanhistory.about.com/library/pastfacts/blfterrorism.7htm>, accessed on 2 July 2004.

³³ Although the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon was undoubtedly an act of terrorism, for the purpose of this trend analysis, deaths of military personnel are considered duty related regardless of location and manner.

³⁴ It is interesting that the [International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism](http://www.ict.org.il) lists the incidents highlighted in gray as acts of terror. However, they did not list the Oklahoma City Bombing incident nor the 9/11. Information for those incidents was compiled from the U.S. Department of State and [American History](http://americanhistory.about.com) sites listed above.

Table 4. Institutional Confidence (Used for Figures 8 and 9)³⁵
Values Combined Percentages Indicating “Great Deal” and “Quite a Lot”

Poll Date	Church / Religion	The Military	The US Supreme Court	Banks	Public Schools	News-papers	The Congress	TV News	Organized Labor	The Presidency	Police	Medical System
May 73	66		44		58	39	42		30			
May 75	68	58	49				40		38			
Jan 77	64	57	46		54	40			39			
Apr 79	65	54	45	60	53	51	34		36			
Nov 81	64	50	46	46	42	35	29		28			
Aug 83	62	53	42	51	39	38	28		26			
Oct 84	64	58	51	51	47	34	29		30			
May 85	66	61	56	51	48	35	39		28			
Jul 86	57	63	54	49	49	37	41		29			
Jul 87	61	61	52	51	50	31			26			
Sep 88	59	68	56	49	49	36	35		26			
Sep 89	52	63	46	42	43		32					
Aug 90	56	68	47	36	45	39	24		27			
Mar 91	59	85	48	32	44	32	30		25	72		
Oct 91	56	69	39	30	35	32	18		22	50		
Mar 93	53	68	44	37	39	31	18	46	26	43	52	34
Mar 94	54	64	42	35	34	29	18	35	26	38	54	36
Apr 95	57	64	44	43	40	30	21	33	26	45	58	41
May 96	57	66	45	44	38	32	20	36	25	39	60	42
Jul 97	56	60	50	41	40	35	22	34	23	49	59	38
Jun 98	59	64	50	40	37	33	28	34	26	53	58	40
Jun 99	58	68	49	43	36	33	26	34	28	49	57	40
Jun 00	56	64	47	46	37	37	24	36	25	42	54	40
Jun 03	50	82	47	50	40	33	29	35	28	55	61	44

The following information pertains to the data shown in table 5.

Results are based on telephone interviews with-1,029—National Adults, aged 18+, conducted on June 9-10, 2003. For results based on the total sample of National Adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of sampling error is ± 3 percentage points.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls (CNN/USA Today/Gallup 2003; emphasis in original)

The question used for this poll was:

Now I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one – a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little? First, ... Next, [RANDOM ORDER] (CNN/USA Today/Gallup 2003).

³⁵ Source:

CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. 2003. Poll conducted by Jeff Jones and David Moore. Princeton Job #: 03-06-033. Conducted on 9-10 June 2003. Electronic version e-mailed courtesy Myra Schlossberg, Gallup: 14 April 2004.

NOTE: Only the twelve of eighteen institutions in the original poll are included in this study. The primary focus is on federal government institutions as shown in Figure 8, with the remaining seven institutions shown for comparison in Figure 9.

