Iraq and Failures in U.S. Compellence Policy 1990-2003
Abstract
Image matters; it is regularly funneled through prevailing world leaders and governments using mechanisms to maintain national interest, power, and security. One such instrument is the use of coercive force or compellence. Compellence is a strategy of control designed to impose change, using limited military or non-military methods, upon an opponent. The United States implements compellence policy through a mixture of key actors who portray powerful images to the rest of the world. Its leaders reinforce these images internally (with self, local, regional, cultural ties) and externally (with othersbased, foreign perception on a larger international scope). As U.S.-led forces in Iraq affect America's image throughout the Middle East and the world, its image of Iraq remains opaque due to U.S. perception and misperception. Is compellence policy conducive to future U.S.-Iraqi relations? How effective is it? And why did U.S. compellence policy in Iraq succeed on some levels and not on others? This thesis examines the effectiveness of U.S. compellence policy as a viable method in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003. Key operations and players will be evaluated and an analysis will explore political, social and economic levels of effectiveness of compellence policy in Iraq.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA429987
Entities
People
- Esther R. Robinson
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School