Sea Swap
Abstract
In early 2001 the Vice Chief of Naval Operations established a series of task forces to look at various challenges facing the Navy, one of those task forces dubbed Task Force Sierra was asked to examine how the Navy should structure itself to ensure it remained an effective forward-deployed force. These were pre- 9/11 days and it appeared that defense budgets would remain flat even without a funding challenge from a new Department of Homeland Security. Flat budgets meant a serious reduction in force structure which in turn meant a likely and significant decrease in forward presence. The Navy wanted to ensure this wouldn't happen. One of the touchstones used by Task Force Sierra was a statement issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. "The possible solution set to this dilemma is small%" he wrote "an increase to our budget top line a procurement strategy that invests maximum combat capability acceptance of the operational and strategic implications that flow from a potentially smaller Navy or some combination of the above." We looked at options for maintaining current levels of presence with a reduced force or increasing forward presence using a stable force. Since then the CNO has raised the bar and called for a fleet of 375 ships (using a high/low mix). The war on Iraq, during which the Navy and Marine Corps deployed half their forces, resulted in a reconstitution" dilemma (and transformation opportunity) that has kept the idea of Sea Swap alive. The current Sea Swap experiment is Sea Swap" in name only. It ignores almost all recommendations made in this report as well as the lessons learned from the past.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA430071
Entities
People
- Bradd C. Hayes
- Hank Kamradt
Organizations
- Naval War College