Deterrence and the 9-11 Terrorists

Abstract

Terrorists must exercise extreme caution to survive in hostile environments. Forcing them to enhance their caution might be interpreted as a form of deterrence. This paper examines the openly published events leading up to the 9-11 attacks to identify qualitative failures to deter and quantitative evidence for a deterrence delay. Practice flights in the U.S. appear just sufficient to satisfy the willingness conditions from our deterrence model.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 2003
Accession Number
ADA430351

Entities

People

  • Robert W. Anthony

Organizations

  • Institute for Defense Analyses

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Aircrafts
  • Commercial Aircraft
  • Crime
  • Criminals
  • Department Of Defense
  • Detection
  • Deterrence
  • Drug Trafficking
  • Human Behavior
  • Mathematical Models
  • Military Aircraft
  • Models
  • Psychology
  • Security
  • Terrorists
  • United States

Readers

  • Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Cyberspace Operations against Adversarial Threats.
  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.
  • Systems Analysis and Design