




Managing Instability



A PRE-CRISIS APPROACH

CONFERENCE REPORT

Bradd C. Hayes
Theophilos C. Gemelas



Report 00-4

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MANAGING INSTABILITY: A PRE-CRISIS APPROACH

Bradd C. Hayes
Theophilos C. Gemelas

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PREFACE

This report is the second in a series that will explore the concept of cooperative peacetime engagement. The first report, Formative Peacetime Engagement Workshop Report (Newport, RI: Decision Strategies Department Report 99-3), examined how the project's sponsor, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CNE), could partner with other department and agencies in the United States Government. It was the result of a workshop held at The Aspen Institute in Washington, DC, in the fall of 1999. The conference analyzed in this report built on the previous workshop and broadened the list of potential partners to include those in the business, financial and international sectors as well as the assisted nations themselves. Project leaders are Professors Theophilos C. Gemelas and Bradd C. Hayes of the U.S. Naval War College located in Newport, RI. This report is also available on the College web site <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws>.


Special appreciation is extended to CAPT Woody Shortt, USN, LtCol Brian Catlin, USMC, and other members of the CNE Plans, Policy and Requirements staff who were instrumental in organizing the conference.

INTRODUCTION

Recognizing that the military in general and the Navy specifically are neither assigned to resolve nor equipped to handle the challenges underlying internal foreign instability, the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CNE), began searching for an approach that would allow them to get more benefit out of the peacetime engagement activities it conducted. CNE personnel quickly recognized that the best way to leverage scarce military resources was to support appropriate activities already underway in other sectors — be they commercial, diplomatic, humanitarian, or economic activities. They coined the term "formative engagement" to describe these supporting military missions. As a result of conference discussions, the term was changed to "cooperative engagement" to better reflect the military's desire to work **with** not **on** host nations.



The CNE staff also recognized that in order to make positive, long-term differences in targeted countries and to achieve the greatest effectiveness, this engagement strategy had to be adopted theater-wide by all the services. To this end, CNE involved the staff of the European Command (EUCOM) early in the process. Each step along the way, EUCOM has played an important role, providing both support and guidance. This inclusive approach to engagement also found ready support elsewhere among policymakers.



The National Security Strategy of the United States, for example, directs the military, along with other departments and agencies, to engage overseas in support of American foreign policy objectives. According to that document, "success requires an integrated approach that brings all the capabilities needed to achieve our strategic [engagement] objectives. ... The United States seeks to shape the international environment through a variety of means, including diplomacy, economic cooperation, international assistance, arms control and nonproliferation, and health initiatives."¹ The challenges of the new century are so difficult and diverse that others trying to address them have also adopted a similar broad-based approach. Some of these other partnership approaches will be discussed later. Karin von Hippel agrees that coordination is a necessary condition for achieving progress in troubled states and asserts that the "five international communities that require coordination are nongovernmental organizations,


¹ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), pp. 4–5.

donors/governments, multilateral organizations, militaries, and, significantly, the private sector."²

Cooperative engagement is not altogether altruistic since its success results in significant infrastructure, personnel, and financial savings for the military as crises are prevented or their consequences mitigated. Although the process may restructure engagement activities, no increase in available assets is anticipated. The aim is to accomplish more with what is already available. To help participants understand what assets are available, they were briefed on the scope and direction of the U.S. Navy's current European Engagement Strategy. CNE then asked four basic questions. **Where** do we engage? **When** do we engage? **What** do we do when we engage? **Who** do we engage with?

Provided with the opportunity to respond to the current strategy, some participants expressed concern with the term "shaping," which they felt implied a new kind of U.S. imperialism. Others feared that U.S. national interests could be defined so narrowly that they could undermine any attempt to find common ground with non-U.S. Government partners. Still others worried that the U.S. foreign policy objectives of fostering democracy, free markets, and human rights will become mantras that prevent a flexible approach to achieving sustainable development in the industrializing world. Finally, some conferees advised that in pursuing partnerships the Navy should not look for nor hope to achieve "unity of effort." Rather, the military should assume that complementary approaches are the best that can be attained.


CONFERENCE OVERVIEW



The objective of the conference, held at CNE headquarters in London, was to bring together senior policymakers from various sectors to determine whether a cooperative engagement approach (including cross-sector partnerships) was both plausible and supportable. If support for the concept was received, it was hoped that concrete proposals for how to proceed would emerge. Conference participants were carefully selected and brought with them an impressive array of expertise from a variety of backgrounds (see Appendix A). They included six flag officers (five active and one retired), two ambassadors (one active, one retired), three high-ranking government officials (two U.S., the other foreign), two participants from the financial sector (one from a private institution, the other from the World Bank), three participants from the commercial sector (one of whom represents hundreds of businesses operating overseas), two participants from the health and humanitarian sector, two from the international organization sector, and an academic.

² Karin von Hippel, "Democracy by Force: Renewed Commitment to Nation Building," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2000, p. 110.

Since military engagement and partnerships were new topics for most participants, the sponsor felt that putting these topics in an appropriate context was important in order to enhance conference discussions. Therefore, they decided to divide the agenda into three segments and enlist speakers who could provide an appropriate backdrop for discussion. The three segments were case studies, business, and international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The first segment, case




studies, was further divided into two parts. In the first part, participants were briefed on Somalia and Rwanda so that they could understand the kinds of conditions that have fomented past crises. In the second part, they were provided examples of the kinds of governmental preventive activities that are currently underway in the Black Sea region. During the second (business) segment, they were exposed to the kinds of challenges and activities that involve the commercial sector in developing states. Specifically, they were briefed on engagement activities and security challenges. Finally, conferees were provided an overview of international and non-governmental organization perspectives and the challenges that partnerships in that area confront. Discussions were conducted under Chatham House Rules (that is, non-attributable). All unidentified quotations in this report are participant comments.

Case Studies

Too often, conceptual discussions remain at the academic or theoretical level and fail to reach the plane of the individual victim of crisis. In order to ensure that a human face was overlaid on the discussions, two crises, involving millions of people, were reviewed and discussed — as noted above, the cases were Somalia and Rwanda. The cases were reviewed both to remind participants about the kinds of tragedies that cooperative engagement is aimed at preventing and to learn from them the kinds of pre-crisis activities that might have achieved that goal.

Somalia




The history leading up to the Somali crisis, the international response to it, and its eventual outcome were all reviewed for participants. It was noted that the intervention was inevitable because the kinds of pre-crisis activities that could have prevented the crisis

were not even considered at the time that they would have done the most good. Most analysts, including former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mohamed Sahnoun, have dwelt on missed opportunities for intervention that would have mitigated, but not prevented the crisis. The underlying problem in Somalia was that Siad Barre's administration had systematically benefited certain factions at the expense of others. By the time anti-Barre sentiments erupted into violence, it was too late to prevent civil war. The assertion was made that pre-crisis activity must begin at least five years ahead of a crisis, otherwise it takes on a life of its own.

Hence, the first lesson learned about a pre-crisis approach to engagement is that a political willingness to act (and to act early) is essential. In the case of Somalia (and Rwanda, as will be discussed), helping governments and militaries form appropriate relationships among themselves and with the people are types of institution building activities that should form the foundation of cooperative engagement. The earlier that potential problems can be identified and addressed, the more effective the engagement.

Participants noted that there are numerous organizations in position to provide indications and warning of impending crises to those who can act to diffuse them, but those policymakers seldom have the political will to act. As former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted, "It is recognized that prevention is less costly, in terms of human and material resources, than cure. But we now see an emerging pattern of unwillingness to prevent, control or stop a wide range of conflicts, followed by a readiness to step in after the killing is over and carnage has subsided. I recall, here, the Chinese proverb that it is difficult to find money for medicine, but easy to find it for the coffin. Preventive action still needs to come into its own, as a major focus of multilateral diplomacy."³ Even though political will is out of the military's control, appropriate and effective engagement can still take place, barring the need for significant amounts of new resources.

Rwanda



As with the Somali case, the history, events, operations, and outcomes of the Rwandan crisis were explored. In examining the Rwanda case, it was noted that policymakers and pundits should not be too quick to accept easy explanations of the causes of crises or the belief that crises are inevitable. The commonly accepted cause of the Rwandan crisis was historical animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. It was pointed out, however, that tribal distinction is an artifact of colonialism that did not previously exist. Nevertheless, once in place tribal rivalry festered and the result was a series of governments

³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Secretary-General Calls for Focus on Preventive Action in Peacemaking," press release, United Nations Department of Public Information, 9 September 1996.

that adopted policies of exclusion and favoritism that resulted in the displacement of millions of people. Fear and hatred were the devastating byproducts. One participant noted that "the United States does not do well handling hatred."

As in Somalia, pre-crisis activities aimed at invigorating and strengthening inclusive policies and leaders and vigorous implementation of peace accords could have made a difference. Generally, it was agreed that governments, regardless of their form, that seek to include or represent the interests of all citizens, seldom confront destabilizing opposition. It was also noted that post-crisis activities aimed at strengthening appropriate policies and leaders should be viewed as follow-on crisis prevention as well.

The Black Sea Region and Newly Independent States



Following discussions concerning the traumatic events in Somalia and Rwanda, conferees turned their attention to ongoing preventive activities in the Black Sea region being conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). [See Appendix B] Most of the current focus is on oil spill prevention and response. This non-controversial area was selected in order to get littoral states used to cooperating with each other — something that did not occur during the Cold War. It also provides a good basis for partnerships outside of the government-to-government arena. The Department of Energy is currently establishing supporting networks between policymakers, non-governmental organizations, marine scientists, and oil spill planners (some of whom are in the commercial sector). DOE personnel believe that this is also an excellent area for military partnerships, using U.S. Navy oil spill planning and response expertise as well as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Information Management System.⁴ Department of Energy personnel indicated their enthusiastic support for cooperative engagement and would like to see it encompass support for a network of scientists and accompanying database. They are also eager to engage the Navy in regional training exercises. More information concerning DOE activity in the Black Sea can be found on the internet at <http://pims.ed.ornl.gov/blacksea/>.

There was strong support during the conference for taking a regional (vice bilateral) approach to engagement. DOE's Black Sea Initiative was a good example of how such an approach can address serious transnational issues and foster cross-sector partnerships.

Some participants were struck by the similarities between the fight against pollution and other "adversarial" pursuits and openly wondered if lessons from

⁴ The Department of Energy has established working relationships with the Navy Staff (N45 – Environmental Protection, Safety, and Occupational Health Division), and with the Navy Sea Systems Command (OOC – Supervisor of Salvage and Diving).

one area could be applied in the other. Others expressed that it was important to discuss and plan for "doable" activities, insisting that an engagement program must take small steps before leaping into large projects. Still others wanted to make clear that they understood the differences in magnitude between the challenges and consequences addressed during the Black Sea presentation and those previously discussed in Somalia and Rwanda.

Business Sector

Overseas Engagement

Discussions concerning the business sector opened with a presentation on the benefits of open markets and free trade. The presentation noted that unilateral sanctions had the double drawback of hurting U.S. businesses while at the same time reducing the influence of the United States in target states at critical times. The presentation also noted some of the peripheral projects that have been undertaken by U.S. businesses to support the civil sector of society. These projects appear to be potential candidates for partnerships with the military during routine port visits. Examples of business engagement activities include:



AMERICAN EXPRESS has served as the founding sponsor since 1996 of an innovative international program established by the World Monuments Fund to identify cultural heritage sites that are at risk and to seek funds for their rescue. American Express helped launch the World Monument Watch's annual list of the 100 Most Endangered Sites program and has committed financial resources to the program over the course of its first five years.

ARCO has constructed a junior high school and three elementary schools as well as housing for teachers and a paramedic on the Indonesian island of Pagerungan. ARCO also built the island's first ice plant and cold storage facility that has enhanced the local fishing industry. It has reconstructed a mosque and built a village hall, youth centers and health clinics. ARCO has also increased the supply of fresh water and electricity on the island.

BOEING is a leading sponsor of UPLIFT International, a non-profit organization that provides humanitarian medical assistance to the people of Southeast Asia. Boeing has also developed an International Relief Flight Program to transport food, medical supplies, clothing, books, and blankets to people in need throughout the world. When delivering new aircraft, it coordinates with relief agencies and customers to assure that the planes are loaded with humanitarian aid delivered free of charge.

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE has for over 100 years been committed to providing oral health education to children and adults throughout the world. Its *Bright Smiles, Bright Futures* program has been implemented in more than 60 countries, reaching 43 million children annually.

CONOCO, when first operating in the Congo, saw the urgent need for medical care. It immediately built a clinic and hired a physician and a nursing staff that cared for over 700 people. It has constructed similar healthcare facilities around the world. In Angola, Conoco disbursed significant funds for 35 community development projects, including an orphanage, school, and farm for war orphans. It also helps run a meal factory that prepares up to 10,000 lunches a day for workers. It has also repaired dangerous roads and provided outboard motors to local fishermen.

The discussion following the business engagement presentation focused on the value of targeted sanctions (those specifically aimed at influencing leaders) as opposed to general sanctions that most often adversely affect common citizens. When the conversation turned to engagement, participants felt that there would be no legal difficulties associated with partnerships that concentrated on civic projects not directly supporting a specific company's business activity. The biggest obstacle to overcome would be coordination between the two sectors. It was recommended that the local offices of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce be used as the primary venue for coordination. Karin von Hippel noted that the contribution of multinational corporations should not be underestimated.

Many mining and oil companies ... have a large stake in unstable regions and often wield enormous influence with whatever remnant of a government exists and, even in some cases, with rebel groups. They also offer the employment that is so essential during rehabilitation. Coordination of international efforts in reconstruction is particularly vital for the following reasons:

- to facilitate the adoption of common policies and responses;
- to prevent overlap of programs
- to maximize the effective use of available resources; and
- to promote a secure operational environment for aid activities (e.g., a united front against hostage-taking, harassment, or extortion)⁵

This last point segues nicely into the next discussion area.

Security Perspectives of Multinational Corporations

The nexus between corporate and military security is currently quite small, coming together primarily during crises for the protection of American citizens and their property. Corporate security forces spend most of their time dealing

⁵ von Hippel, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

with personal security, corporate espionage, corruption, and fraud. Although corporations are concerned with terrorism, crime, economic conditions, and political stability, their security forces play a very small role in dealing with them.

One area of concern raised during the conference was the extent to which corporations are using mercenary forces to protect their infrastructure. Currently, they have only sparingly used the services of companies like Executive Outcomes, who have worked almost exclusively for sovereign governments. Some participants noted, however, that subsidiary companies have started offering their services to corporations.⁶ Such arrangements are not unprecedented. "In 1815, the East India Company, which colonized India on behalf of the British government, boasted an army of 150,000 soldiers."⁷ In a crisis, international forces may have to work with or against such forces depending upon the circumstances and knowing more about them and their activities during the pre-crisis phase could prove valuable. Since corporate armies are not subject to the Geneva Conventions, they could prove problematic in future crises. As David Shearer has written, "Coupling multinational companies with an external security force potentially gives foreigners powerful leverage over a government and its affairs — a risk that some governments appear willing to take."⁸

International and Non-governmental Organizations



The presentation on this sector focused primarily on partnering with the United Nations. It was noted that the very nature of international organizations makes them unwieldy and inefficient. For those reasons, partnering with the United Nations can be both frustrating and difficult. The United

Nations system spreads itself over dozens of agencies and departments that seldom coordinate their activities, either administratively or in the field. As a result, "shortfalls between expectations and performance will persist."

Similar challenges exist when trying to deal with NGOs. Each NGO has its own policies, headquarters, and agenda. Many are suspicious of the military and have only recently found cooperating with the military to be to their advantage. P.J. Simmons has stated that "the real challenge is figuring out how to incorporate NGOs into the international system in a way that takes account of their diversity and scope, their various strengths and weaknesses, and their capacity to disrupt as well as to create." He went on to note that "NGOs affect national governments, multilateral institutions, and national and multinational corporations in four ways: setting agendas, negotiating outcomes, conferring legitimacy, and

⁶ The British company Defence Systems Ltd. guards embassies and protects the interests of corporations in unstable areas.

⁷ David Shearer, "Outsourcing War," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1998, p. 70.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

implementing solutions."⁹ NGOs are also big business. "The Red Cross reckons that NGOs now disburse more money than the World Bank."¹⁰ That being the case, as potential partners they cannot be ignored. They can often accomplish what no other organization can, and can promote societal changes necessary to ensure sustainable development. Some analysts bemoan the fact that public-sector funding now accounts for approximately 40 percent of NGO budgets (compared to 1.5 percent in 1970), but this also provides better opportunities to partner with them using the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as a coordinating partner.

During the conference dinner, the keynote speaker discussed another oft-overlooked segment of society, the religious community. [See Appendix C] New training being offered to Navy chaplains will make them an even more valuable resource for engagement before, during, and after crises. Historically, chaplains have been the focal point of much of the humanitarian activity that has been performed by ship personnel when in port.

Next Steps

In considering what steps to take next, two courses of action need to be pursued. The first course leads to identification of the types of activities that can be undertaken immediately as well as in the longer term. The second course is to identify the proper coordinating process to ensure that the program remains useful and is sustainable. There were some muted warnings about trying to take the program too far, too fast. "With all the enthusiasm for seeing if navies can coordinate with business, we need to remember that the government's investment in naval ships is huge, and governments need to see a return. ... There may be better vehicles for some liaison activities with business that are more cost effective." CNE certainly agrees with this sentiment, and as noted earlier, that is one reason they believe this approach must include all services in order to be successful.

Activities

Numerous ideas for engagement activities emerged during the conference. Many of them focused on grand concepts that dealt with increasing the economic capacity of states, or strengthening their governmental institutions (especially the judiciary), or helping rid them of corruption. While these are all worthwhile goals and essential to the development of stable societies, most conferees believed that the military should be less ambitious in the beginning. Participants recommended that the military "find practical vehicles for pre-crisis collaboration,"

⁹ P.J. Simmons, "Learning to Live with NGOs," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1998, p. 83 & 84.


¹⁰ "Sins of the secular missionaries," *The Economist*, 29 January 2000, p. 25.

and offered a number of concrete proposals for next steps in the process. Most agreed that CNE should "focus on a regional approach first." One conferee even recommended a focus region. "I think that Azerbaijan and the Caspian area offer a grand opportunity for an exercise which would validate the concepts we have discussed and developed here." At the end of the day, it was agreed that taking small practical steps toward cooperative engagement partnerships was the best course to pursue.

Three projects emerged that could proceed forward immediately:

- Partnerships involving DOE's Black Sea Initiative
- New approaches to partnering in conjunction with West Africa Training Cruises (WATC)
- A planning conference and follow-on exercise involving Newly Independent States in the Black Sea region.


DOE's Black Sea Initiative



The Black Sea oil spill prevention program outlined by the Department of Energy was the most operational proposal to emerge during the conference. It offers an immediate opportunity to partner with another U.S. Government department as well as littoral states and businesses. It also allows the military to assume an appropriate supporting role.

West Africa Training Cruises


These cruises have a long history and are likely to continue. Past coordination with the Coast Guard has provided appropriate opportunities for educational and operational interplay with host nation militaries. One participant recommended that the next cruise include a representative from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who could lead discussions with host nationals about "responsibilities of militaries to act consistent with proper humanitarian and human rights principles." The ICRC has a program underway that could support this concept. Other partnering opportunities should also be examined.



Newly Independent States in the Black Sea Region Exercise

The offer to host an exercise (or event) in eastern Black Sea region by one of the participants opened the most promising avenue for testing cooperative engagement from the ground up. CNE took under advisement the idea of hosting an initial planning conference to consider an appropriate exercise to conduct.

Conference organizers conducted a brief brainstorming exercise at the end of conference to see if they could entice participants to generate new ways of partnering with the military. Each participant was asked to list a pre-crisis development activity his or her organization (or sector) is currently involved in. Each participant was then provided with someone else's activity and were asked how their organization might partner with the idea they were currently examining. Finally, they were asked how the military might partner with the idea. For example, one participant from a health organization discussed providing public health education while others recommended doing it in conjunction with a port visit. With some refinement, this process holds promise for developing innovative partnership ideas.



Coordinating Process

Some conferees recommended that the group "be transformed into a permanent, but virtual, working group," and expressed their desire to stay with the process. Most participants believed that there was "no need for a new, formal coordinating structure." In fact, they agreed that a formal structure would discourage rather than encourage participation by the non-governmental sectors. Recognizing both the political and practical sensibility of these comments, the notion of establishing "communities of practice" to foster cross-partnerships was discussed.

This approach has worked successfully at the World Bank. Etienne Wenger and William Snyder define communities of practice as "groups of people informally bound together by shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise."¹¹ These groups have shown an ability to foster new ideas and implement creative approaches to problems. Because communities of practice are voluntary and informal, they are particularly well suited for participation by NGOs and corporations.

A community of practice could be established for each region of interest. "A community can be made up of tens or even hundreds of people, but typically it has a core of participants whose passion for the topic energizes the community and who provide the intellectual and social leadership."¹² Communities just don't spontaneously emerge. They must be cultivated. As one participant noted, the military "must create a market for its partnerships." Starting with the current engagement structure, communities could be established involving military

¹¹ Etienne C. Wenger and William M. Snyder, "Communities of Practice: The Organizational Frontier," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 2000, p. 139.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 141.

officers, country teams, and Chambers of Commerce. As projects emerge, "members ... invite someone to join ... [using] a gut sense of the prospective member's appropriateness for the group."¹³ At the end of the day, however, communities of practice "organize themselves, meaning they set their own agendas and establish their own leadership."¹⁴

Such an arrangement is ideal for the military since it assumes a supportive role in cooperative engagement. Even though "communities of practice are fundamentally informal and self-organizing, they benefit from cultivation."¹⁵ They need someone to get them going and to sustain them as well as provide "the infrastructure that will support such communities and enable them to apply their expertise effectively."¹⁶ This would appear to be a natural role for the military. The World Bank's experience with communities of practice has been very positive. Wenger and Snyder conclude that "they may seem unfamiliar now, but in five to ten years they may be as common to discussion about organization as business units and teams are today."¹⁷ The military could be on the leading edge of this innovation.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

One participant noted that "the idea of cross-sector cooperation may well be the key to future engagement success." But that comment was tempered by others who noted that "we are still a long way from creating the culture of cross-sector partnerships" and that the conference offered an important, but "modest start," on the process. However, based on the modest objectives of the conference — determining whether the cooperative engagement approach (including cross-sector partnerships) was both plausible and supportable and, if so, developing concrete proposals — it must be judged an unqualified success.

Cooperative engagement will undoubtedly remain controversial. There will be those who feel that attempts to get the military involved in sustainable development are wrongheaded and misguided, and they will see cooperative engagement as a step down that road. CNE's strategy, however, is to utilize ongoing engagement events in creative ways that accomplish both military and development objectives without having to involve the military directly in activities best left to others.

The time for exploring the concept has passed. It's time to put thoughts into action. The three projects discussed above are an excellent start, since each explores partnering in a different way, with different partners. The "communities

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

of practice" concept also offers a way of enhancing the program without having to establish an entirely new process or assume leadership when support is what is required. As one conference participant has noted previously, for this kind of approach to succeed, you need three things: commitment, cooperation, and creativity.¹⁸ As the process develops, new and innovative ways to partner are bound to emerge. Traditional maritime aid programs like PROJECT HANDCLASP will also get better and find a natural niche in the process.

Following the implementation of the projects mentioned above, the process should move to its natural home — the European Command — where its full potential can be realized throughout its area of responsibility.



¹⁸ Thomas C Knudson, "Sustainable development: Does the oil and gas industry have a leg to stand on?" address to the Scottish Oil Club, 7 October 1999.

Appendix A: Participants

Dr. Richard Alderslade	Regional Adviser, Partnerships in Health and Emergency Assistance, World Health Organization
Ms. Betty Bigombe	Social Development Department, World Bank Group
Mr. John Butterworth	Director, Strategy and Marketing, Nomura Principal Finance Group
RADM Richard Cobbold, RN (ret) CB FRAES	Director, Royal United Services Institute
RADM Terry M. Cross, USCG	Director, Operations Policy, United States Coast Guard
Dr. Donald C.F. Daniel	Chairman, Strategic Research Department, U.S. Naval War College
ADM James O. Ellis, Jr., USN	Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
AMB Stanley T. Escudero	U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Azerbaijan
Hon. Theresa M. Fariello	Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Energy, Policy, Trade and Investment, U.S. Department of Energy
RADM Michael D. Haskins, USN	Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe
Dr. Douglas M. Johnston	President and Founder, International Center for Religion and Diplomacy

Mr. Frank Kittredge	President, National Foreign Trade Council Inc., and Vice Chairman, USA☆ENGAGE
Mr. Thomas C. Knudson	Chairman, Conoco Exploration Production Ltd., Europe
Mr. Frank G. Madsen	Director, Corporate Security International, Bristol-Myers Squibb
AMB (ret) Robert B. Oakley	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
LtGen Peter Pace, USMC	Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe
RMDL Isaac E. Richardson, III, USN	Deputy Director, Plans and Policy, European Command
LCOL David L. Roberts (ret), MBE, LL.M.	Delegate to the Armed and Security Forces, International Committee of the Red Cross
Dr. Théogène Rudasingwa	Director of Cabinet, Office of the Vice-President, Republic of Rwanda
Dr. Enid C. B. Schoettle	Special Adviser, U.S. National Intelligence Council
Mr. Charles R. Snyder	Director, Office of African Regional Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Appendix B

BUILDING NETWORKS IN THE BLACK SEA: OIL SPILL RESPONSE CASE STUDY

Theresa M. Fariello
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Energy Policy
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I will begin by thanking the Navy and Admiral Ellis for inviting me to this seminar. It provides an excellent forum to explore opportunities for working together in a region of the world where positive engagement can produce significant dividends. The Initiative that I will discuss is a priority for Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, who, over a year ago, sent a letter to the Secretary of the Navy asking for a partnership with the Navy to assist Black Sea countries to develop an oil spill response system. I am grateful for the assistance that the Navy has provided in recent months and look forward to exploring new ways in which the Department of Energy and the U.S. Navy can cooperate in the future, not only in the Black Sea, but in other waters in other regions, where the threat of oil spills exists.

An oil spill does not necessarily have to result in a crisis. Despite modern technology and great efforts to prevent spills, they do sometimes occur. We need to be prepared to respond quickly and completely. Policymakers, navies, the private sector all need to work together — and plan.

With the Black Sea Initiative we are addressing ways in which to avoid a crisis by planning, prevention and cooperation — the foundation of the Navy's formative engagement concept. The Black Sea is home to a very complex and sensitive ecosystem. Three-quarters of the sea is deep (up to 2,200 meters), and the remainder includes an extensive northwest shelf and the shallow Sea of Azov. The Black Sea is permanently oxygenless below 150 to 200 meters. The Sea was, until recently, home to fisheries that were five times richer than those of the Mediterranean. Its vulnerability results significantly from its isolation and the total size of land-based sources of pollution. The Black Sea drainage basin covers large areas of the coastal countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) and large areas of 11 other countries from Germany to Belarus. One hundred and sixty five million people contribute to the pollution of one of the most seriously degraded seas on earth.

The economic losses from pollution are staggering. For the fishing and tourist sections alone, they are estimated to exceed US \$500 million a year. Other costs — such as working days lost and health care costs due to waterborne diseases, the value of lost species, and the cost of rehabilitation and clean-up of coastal zones — may push the costs to more than \$1 billion a year, according to the

United Nations Development Program.

The Black Sea region offers the United States both opportunities and challenges. The six countries that border the sea have a long and troubled history. The strategic importance of the sea and its many natural resources have, at times, made it a battleground. There is little history of cooperation to resolve issues. However, the countries are working together now, with the U.S., to address oil spill contingency planning.

The Department of Energy approached the Black Sea from its own unique perspective. The Black Sea is a major transport corridor for oil from Central Asia. The discovery of significant new oil and gas reserves and the potential for even larger discoveries has made this region's importance to the energy security of the United States expand dramatically in recent years. The more prepared the region is for an accident, the more comfortable people can be about the high volume of shipping. Proper planning is prudent for shippers, insurers, navies and municipalities.

Within the region, the Sea has always been an important economic and transportation resource for the six littoral states. Environmental deterioration has led to a significant decline in this economic resource, a fact recognized by all six border countries. Concern over the environment, some of which stems from the Chernobyl disaster, is building in all six countries. We decided to build on these three common interests — energy security, economic loss, environmental concern — to establish networks for cooperation.

About a year and a half ago, the Department created an interagency working group to look at different ideas for working in the region. The interagency working group included representatives from many federal agencies, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, Commerce, Interior, EPA, and USAID. It also included representatives of the U.S. Navy, whose active engagement has proven to be invaluable. The idea was to build on common and growing concerns about threats to the environment in the region, to identify areas where the U.S. had expertise and resources that could play a positive role, and to establish networks in the region that would encourage long-term commitments to achieving common goals.

The working group identified the following areas:

- Oil Spill Contingency Planning and Response;
- Efficient use of Energy in economic and municipal activities around the sea;
- Increased utilization of environmental technologies and processes.

Of these three areas, we have made greatest progress in oil spill planning and response and I will focus my remarks on this program.

Let's look first at the type of crisis an oil spill presents. Four minutes after midnight on March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez hit Bligh Reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound spilling eleven million gallons of North Slope oil. Crude oil spread over an area covering 10,000 square miles, an area the size of Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island, and 25 Washington, DCs, combined. Within a week, currents and winds pushed the slick 90 miles from the site of the tanker, out of Prince William Sound into the Gulf of Alaska. It eventually reached nearly 600 miles away, contaminating 1,500 miles of shoreline, about the length of California's coast. This spill killed more wildlife than any other environmental disaster in our nation's recorded history. It is estimated that:

- 3,500 to 5,500 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, and 14 to 22 killer whales were killed;
- critical spawning and rearing habitats for fish were damaged;
- Harlequin ducks did not reproduce in Prince William Sound for over three years following the spill;
- a quarter of a million sea birds died; reproductive failure, genetic damage, curved spines, lowered growth and body weights, altered feeding habits, reduced egg volume, liver damage, eye tumors, and debilitating brain lesions were observed in fish and other wildlife;
- eleven years later oil continues to contaminate some shore line and sea beds, e.g., mussel beds;
- many people were also adversely affected. Professional fishermen, fishery operators, the tourist industry and other support industries suffered devastating losses.
- Exxon spent \$2.3 billion on clean-up operations.

The Exxon Valdez is only one example. We are all familiar with the recent spill off the coast of France. There have been similar spills in the North Sea, off the coast of the UK, and in other areas around the world. It is useful and instructive to look at the statistics from the Exxon Valdez as an example. If this kind of devastation can happen in the United States with a long history of response to environmental crises, what might be predicted for the Black Sea as its use as a transport corridor for oil increases its risks? Put simply, spills occur in different places, but consequences are always potentially severe.

When the interagency group began debating this issue, the World Bank's Global

Environmental Facility (GEF) had already provided some resources to the Black Sea countries to support regional planning for oil spill response. Under this program, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was also working in the region. The program was not making rapid headway, but the framework was in place. We invited U.S. embassies in the six countries to identify decision-makers in oil spill response. This proved to be a difficult task, and it took eight months before we were comfortable that we had identified the right people. A key part of the problem was the fact that this issue had not received high-level attention in countries struggling to remake their political and economic structures following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Our efforts helped give the need for oil spill response planning the visibility it needed.

We brought the group together in Seattle, Washington, almost a year ago, to talk about their goals. Using the feedback from that meeting, and working with U.S. industry, we developed an agenda for a workshop to address the major issues associated with developing a regional response plan. That workshop took place in Odessa, Ukraine, in September 1999. The participating countries agreed on a work plan, identifying areas where the United States could support the broader effort underway with IMO assistance. We agreed to focus on the legal and legislative issues that will be critical to each country's ability to implement both their national and a regional contingency plan when these are complete, to support momentum and high level interest by bringing the group together on a regular basis to identify problems and support the search for solutions, and to help find resources to support implementation once the plans are in place. We learned many lessons at Odessa. Most important, perhaps, was that the six bordering Black Sea states want to work with each other and with the U.S. to protect the magnificent Black Sea should an accident occur. The foresight and leadership of the United States brought representatives from these states around a table to plan to prevent a crisis — formative engagement was at work in Odessa. We hope to conduct workshops on legal/legislative issues in each of the six countries and to bring the group back together in June in Romania. The six littoral states have adopted a goal of completing their national and regional contingency plans by the end of December 2000.

The interagency team identified other networks with which we could work to support the oil spill group. The most important of these are the marine scientists in the research institutes, most of which are located on the Black Sea. Many of these scientists have been active in the World Bank/GEF program and some of them have responsibility for developing their country's oil spill response plan. For example, in Romania a research scientist from the Marine Research Institute in Constanta has the primary responsibility for drafting the Romanian national oil spill response plan. Scientists from all of the countries participated in the drafting of the Environmental Strategic Action Plans developed under the GEF program. We have invited the scientists to participate in the oil spill response planning meetings. At the same time, we worked with them to develop a proposal for a benchline study of pollutants in the Black Sea. This proposal is now ready and

we are looking for funding so that the study can begin. The study, which would conduct a three-year program of pollution testing throughout the Sea, will cost \$1.5 million. Scientists from all six countries will work together to conduct the testing and to analyze and present the data. A solid database in which all countries have confidence would provide sound science with which informed policy decisions on environmental issues can be made by leadership in these countries. We are also working with this group of scientists to gather historical data on pollution testing and to make this data available to western researchers, NGOs and policymakers. This is the area where the Department of Defense has given us the strongest support.

The Department of Energy funded the creation of a website, called the *Black Sea Information Center*. The internet address for this site is [<http://pims.ed.oml.gov/blacksea/>]. The purpose of the web site is to serve as a tool for the networks with which we are working. The web site provides a home for contact information, for information on laws and regulations, information on oil spill training tools, for information on commercial, environmental, technologies available from U.S. and Black Sea countries, and for scientists to post proposals for joint research. It will also contain the historical pollution testing data that we are working with Black Sea scientists to place in electronic formats. We have formed a partnership with the World Federation of Scientists and have established a WFS panel of scientists to provide peer review for databases that will be added to the web site. We are working now with the Ukrainian Center for Sea Ecology to place 30 years of Black Sea monitoring data on the web site. Most of this data has never before been shared with scientists outside of Ukraine.

The website is hosted on a DOD server provided by the Partnership for Peace Information Management System (PIMS). PIMS also provided a computer station to the Ukrainian Center for Sea Ecology for the database project and to government agencies responsible for oil spill planning and response. We hope that PIMS funding will be available to provide similar systems for all of the countries that qualify for participation in the PIMS program.

Within the interagency process, one of the most impressive discoveries was learning how much knowledge the U.S. Navy possesses in the area of oil spill response and clean-up. The U.S. Navy provided critical support in several areas, including:

- developing the agenda for the Seattle meeting with the Black Sea Oil Spill Group and identifying appropriate site visits;
- developing the agenda for the workshop in Odessa;
- providing staff expertise for training sessions in Odessa.

The U.S. Navy's expertise in the oil spill area is very impressive.

As we have worked with the countries of the region, one issue with which they have all struggled is establishing responsibilities and roles for various agencies within their governments. And within this overall struggle, the role of their navies has also been an issue. In countries like Turkey, the Navies/Coast Guards have had a long-standing role in oil spill response. In countries like Romania, there is no history of military cooperation on this type of issue. The Romanians have rewritten their plan twice because of disagreements on the role of the navy and the issue is still not resolved. I suggest that this is an area where the U.S. Navy might join with us to bring the regional navies together with the civil authorities with whom we have been working to brainstorm this issue and develop models that might meet the needs of both groups. We believe this is a positive fit with the idea of formative engagement that provides the framework for our discussions today and tomorrow.

In fact, CINCUSNAVEUR planned a "shaping availability" in Constanta last March. It was planned that this ship visit would demonstrate shipboard oil spill response and conduct spill response training for local port and Romanian Navy personnel. The Navy also invited the civil authorities with whom we are working. The visit was postponed because of operational needs associated with Bosnia, but I understand that it is still being considered. This and other similar visits will support the overall program.

There are other opportunities for cooperation further down the road. At the Odessa conference, the Russians recommended that the six littoral states and the United States sponsor a full-scale exercise once the regional contingency plan is complete. This is an area where the U.S. Navy could take the lead. We would like to conduct a computer desktop training exercise as a first step towards implementation of the regional plan, also an area where the U.S. Navy has the expertise. The countries are eager to learn. They told us repeatedly of the need for education and training. Off spill response plans are vital to have in place, but they do no good if there are no trained personnel to carry them out.

I mentioned earlier that the effort to engage other countries on environmental issues was a priority of Secretary Richardson. In December he hosted a meeting of 43 African energy ministers in Tucson, Arizona. One of the outcomes of the U.S.-Africa Energy Ministerial, of which the Secretary is most proud, is the agreement to work together on oil spill response. We will begin this program with an oil spill response workshop for Gulf of Guinea countries next September. We hope that the Navy will partner with us on this effort as well.

We believe that formative engagement is an important tool to promote U.S. political and economic objectives — that it will encourage political stability and long-term, sustainable economic growth in Eastern Europe and Central Asia — that it will help to establish the United States as a reliable political, economic and military ally of the countries in this region. We have an opportunity, with the Black Sea Environmental Initiative, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the

environment as well, and to lead through formative engagement. We hope that we can continue to work together in the Black Sea and other areas of the world.



Appendix C

Religion and Foreign Policy

Keynote address by
Dr. Douglas Johnston

Admiral Ellis, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be with you this evening in this truly magnificent naval setting. I would like to begin by congratulating Admiral Ellis for sponsoring a conference such as this. With the planned follow-through, it could represent a real milestone in the art of military planning. That said, preventive diplomacy — which is what this is largely about — is not as easy as it sounds. I say this for three reasons:

- First, it requires thinking beyond the crisis of the immediate in thoughtful and discerning ways
- Second, it is inherently difficult to demonstrate the effectiveness of such initiatives (like nuclear deterrence, how do you prove that something would not have happened anyway?)
- Finally, there is the overriding problem of mustering the political will to take action.

A recent case in point — for several years, we lamented the likelihood that the tinderbox of Kosovo would ignite at any time, yet did next to nothing to prevent it. Of course, we were absorbed in Bosnia at the time, which points to another related problem: the difficulty of addressing more than one crisis at a time.

The problem runs even deeper, however, as evidenced by the substantial cuts in the foreign affairs budget in recent years — this at a time when the world is becoming increasingly interdependent and when the United States needs to become even more engaged diplomatically.

Even before the cuts, though, political will was a problem. Another case in point: sometime back when Bill Owens was Sixth Fleet Commander, he received a message request from the then President of Yugoslavia for more port visits by U.S. naval vessels — to show the flag and help keep the lid on. The State Department recommended against it and the request was denied. The reason given was that the United States should not get involved in what was seen to be a European problem. Whether or not such visits could have made a difference is something we'll never know. But when you contrast the cost of doing that versus the price we are now paying in Bosnia and Kosovo, it causes one to wonder what might have been.

All this is by way of saying that preventive diplomacy or even preventive defense is something that doesn't come naturally in a democracy where outright crisis is the normal prerequisite for intervention. Thus it becomes all the more essential that the military CINCs — who are better positioned than anyone to take such considerations into account and act upon them — show the same kind of far-sightedness that this conference represents.

So again, my compliments to the chef as we now turn to the topic of religion and foreign policy, an area that deserves much closer scrutiny than we have given it in the past.

At the beginning of the last millennium, the West was locked in mortal combat with Islam over control of the Holy Lands. Almost a thousand years later, it feels as though little has changed. Why is it that the two leading monotheistic religions that share more in common with one another than they do with other religions focus only on their differences as they either talk past one another or resort to conflict to settle those differences?

While the advances in technology that have taken place over the past thousand years are nothing short of breathtaking, one cannot help but puzzle over the all-but-total absence of progress in our ability to resolve differences through peaceful means. To the extent that advancing one's interests while avoiding conflict can be considered a cardinal tenet of diplomatic exchange, this to some extent becomes an indictment of "traditional" diplomacy. This failure stands in stark contrast to our skyrocketing ability to inflict harm. Indeed, as the global competition of armaments has yielded increasingly lethal weaponry, the byproduct has been the most brutal century in human history.

Yes, we live in an age of turmoil, and much of it is religious-based. Almost anywhere you turn — Kashmir, Chechnya, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Sri Lanka — one finds a religious dimension at play. Whether religion is the root cause of a particular conflict or merely a mobilizing vehicle for nationalist or ethnic passions, it is central to much of the strife currently taking place around the globe. Equally sobering, the level of discontent is likely to grow worse over time as (1) economic globalization produces profound confrontations with traditional values, often embedded in religion, (2) as an increasing fraction of the world's population is left behind by rapid technological change, (3) as the economic gap continues to widen between the "haves and have nots", and (4) as secular governments in hard-pressed areas fail to meet the legitimate expectations of their populations.

With people increasingly turning to religion in such situations, western governments are ill-equipped to deal with the consequences. As evidenced by our missteps in handling situations from the Iranian Revolution of 1979 to the later intervention in Lebanon to the breakup of Yugoslavia and beyond, traditional

diplomacy's neglect of religious factors has rendered the West ineffective both in dealing with religious differences and in combating demagogues who adeptly manipulate religious labels to their own purposes.

Adding to the problem and as amply illustrated by the list of conflicts mentioned earlier is the fact that religious institutions have on more than a few occasions strayed from their original purpose and become an integral part of the problem. Rather than alleviating human suffering, they have ended up exacerbating it. This divisive influence of religion has long been recognized. Its more helpful aspects have not. In the West, this is largely the result of over two hundred years of post-Enlightenment prejudice in which religion was seen to have a declining influence in the affairs of state. Hans Morgenthau's nation-state model, which has served as the paradigm for international relations since the late 1940s, attaches virtually no significance to religion as a factor in the policymaker's calculus.

This oversight is further complicated by an interpretation of religious freedom that effectively places religion outside the bounds of critical analysis. Indeed, in the United States the rigorous constitutional separation of church and state so relegates religion to the realm of the personal that most Americans feel awkward, if not totally embarrassed, discussing their religious convictions in any sort of professional context.

Religion as a Positive Force

To explore the utility of religion in peacemaking, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) undertook a study in 1985 that resulted in a book entitled Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft. Published in August 1994, by Oxford University Press, this book examines through a series of case studies the positive role that religious or spiritual factors can play in actually preventing or resolving conflict while advancing social change based on justice and reconciliation. Already in its tenth printing and second foreign language translation, the book is now required reading at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute and has been incorporated in the curriculums of numerous colleges, universities, and seminaries. Further, and indicative of the response the book has been receiving around the world, it was cited a year ago by *Sapio*, Japan's equivalent to *Time Magazine*, as one of the eight most important books to read in preparing for the 21st century.

Major Findings

Among the major findings to evolve from the study, two particularly stand out: (1) religious contributions to peacemaking have been under-appreciated, if not totally ignored, by most foreign policy practitioners and (2) there are substantial under-utilized assets within religious communities which, if properly trained, could be applied to peacemaking.

For example, U.S. foreign policy with its past fixation on economic determinism and ideological confrontation, has tended to miss the mark when dealing with situations in which the imperatives of religion blend inextricably with those of politics and economics. This, in turn, has led to uninformed foreign policy choices in such places as Iran, Lebanon, and even Vietnam. Policymakers simply have not understood the religious dynamics that were playing out. Nor have they recognized the role that religious peacemakers can play in building trust and facilitating understanding and reconciliation. As a result, opportunities have been lost in which the joint application of religious and political assets could lead to a peaceful resolution of differences rather than a resort to violence.

In today's environment of increasing disorder, the world can no longer afford to overlook the significant contribution that religious and spiritual factors can bring to resolving conflict. Not only does the theology of each of the major world religions contain some version of the Golden Rule, but it also incorporates specific moral warrants for peacemaking. The need to apply religious principles and instruments based on these warrants to the practical work of conflict resolution is becoming increasingly urgent.

A Model for the Future

A major reason that the concepts of the book have been so well received is because thoughtful observers are concluding that the time for unconventional approaches is at hand. They see religious reconciliation coupled with official diplomacy as offering a greater potential for dealing with today's problems of communal conflict, particularly those involving ethnic and religious dimensions.

One example of how this works can be found in the successful collaboration between the lay Catholic Community of St. Egidio and official diplomats in resolving the brutal civil war in Mozambique that ended in 1994. The final breakthrough to peace evolved from the Community's recognition that it would have to do something to resolve the conflict if the humanitarian assistance it was providing was to have any useful effect. Accordingly, they set out to win the trust of both sides, taking initiatives that governments would never consider: escorting guerrilla fighters to their first dental appointments; buying them their first spectacles. In short, through winning trust on a personal level, and rehumanizing the situation, they were able to persuade the two sides to come together to negotiate their differences.

It took ten rounds of talks before an agreement was reached to end the war. Early in this process, it became apparent to these religious peacemakers that the overt backing of the international community would be required in order to monitor a cease-fire agreement or to guarantee fair multi-party elections. Accordingly, in the ninth round of talks, they invited diplomats from Italy, the United States, Portugal, France, and the United Nations to attend as official

observers. In the tenth round, they passed the baton to these diplomats who, in turn, brought the resources of their respective nation-states and the UN to bear in overseeing the signing of the peace agreement, the monitoring of the cease-fire, and the holding of fair elections. Today there is peace in Mozambique under a democratically elected government, with the economy on the rebound — at least prior to this week's floods — all because official diplomacy was able to build upon the trust developed by a religious third party.

Walking the Talk

Because of the positive response elicited by Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, a Preventive Diplomacy program was established at CSIS to begin operationalizing some of its concepts. Within this program, we formed a conflict resolution team that was international in its composition. (I didn't want the problem of "here come the Americans trying to tell us what to do again.") So although it was headed by an American male, it included a Russian woman, a Pole and a Dutchman.

For more than four years, this team has been conducting conflict resolution training workshops for religious clergy and laity from all of the ethnic groups and religious faiths in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. The participants typically number between 25 to 35, with the lay representatives consisting of teachers, journalists and others who can leverage the experience.

We undertook these workshops with our eyes open and without any notion that what we were doing was going to affect the then-existing hostilities. After all, there had been joint pronouncements by the leaders of the three major religions condemning the ethnic cleansing and calling for an end to the hostilities, all to no effect. (The initial workshops predated the Dayton Accords by a year, so the team went in harm's way on a number of occasions.) In this instance, as in so many others, religion was effectively co-opted by the forces of nationalism and used as a convenient mobilizing vehicle — a badge of identity — with little to no leverage over the political process. Our hope, instead, was to plant the seeds for longer-term reconciliation — a tall order when one considers the extensive intermarriage that existed and how easy it was for political leaders to turn neighbor against neighbor and worse.

These workshops take place at three levels. In the first level, the team seeks to help the participants overcome their sense of victimhood — to bury the past and begin working together for a better tomorrow. We were pleasantly surprised at the degree to which this has worked, largely because of a "story telling" technique used early in the process. In this phase, a participant will tell the group about the atrocities that have befallen his or her family at the hands of another ethnic group represented around the table. Others from other ethnic groups then follow suit. The stories are too tragic to bear repeating; but they evoke compassion and empathy. After a while, a degree of bonding begins to

take hold as participants are able for the first time to view the problem through a side of the prism other than their own.

At the end of each of these level one workshops and without any prompting from the team, the participants have formulated an action plan to be pursued on an ecumenical basis. In the first workshop in Osijek, Croatia, for example, the group came up with 16 such initiatives, ranging from influencing their political leaders in positive directions to developing multi-faith newsletters for their communities to undertaking helpful initiatives in the schools, and a lot in between. I am pleased to report that a number of these initiatives are, in fact, being pursued.

It is in the second level workshop, that the team actually conveys mediation techniques and conflict resolution skills. I, for one, was surprised by the euphoric response of the participants. At last, they felt equipped to function as peacemakers. Lest I mislead you, though, in each group there have typically been at least two or three participants who had already been doing this sort of thing — Catholic priests and others who had laid their lives on the line to prevent ethnic cleansing between adjacent municipalities. They were the ones who had succeeded and lived through it; others who tried weren't so fortunate.

In the third level workshop, the team assembles graduates from each of the three republics in a neutral location — usually, in Hungary — to begin building community across republic lines and to examine the systemic problems of their respective social systems that contribute to ethnic animosity.

We did all this out of a conviction that no military or diplomatic solution will ever break the cycle of revenge. It is important to recall that although the Serbs are today's perpetrators, they were yesterday's victims. (What the Croats did to the Serbs in World War II was so brutal that the Nazi SS had to hold them back.) Until a spiritual component can be introduced into international politics that gets at the heart of forgiveness and reconciliation, history will be doomed to an endless cycle of returning violence for violence. Barring the unforeseen, by next year the team will meet its goal of establishing an indigenous religious-based peacemaking capability firmly anchored in an NGO in all three republics.

A Need for New Tools

From the research for Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, it became clear that there was a pressing need to carry out four related functions in a coordinated manner:

- To facilitate greater understanding and collaboration between diplomats and religious leaders in addressing confrontations where the normal tools of diplomacy are inadequate;

- To recruit and deploy multi-skilled, inter-religious action teams to trouble spots where conflict threatens or has already broken out;
- To recruit and train religious clergy and laity in the tasks of peacemaking; and
- To provide feedback to theologians and clergy on interpretations of their teachings that are contributing to strife and misunderstanding.

The strategic premise of all this is that religious peacemakers, properly trained and supported, can add a critically important dimension to the work of diplomats and non-governmental organizations in addressing ethnic conflict and other problems of communal identity that are proving beyond the reach of traditional diplomacy. In some situations, this added capability can make the difference between failure and success by providing a transcendent environment for dealing with the secular obstacles and an improved ability to identify and deal with any deep-seated religious issues. This is the premise upon which the new International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) was established in Washington this past July.

Future Applications

The Center's first undertaking has been the highly complex and difficult situation in Sudan, where the Islamic north and the Christian/Animist south have been engaged in hostilities for 16 years and where certain factions in the South have been simultaneously warring with one another for local dominance.

Capitalizing on relationships of trust already established through religious channels, the Center was invited by the government of Khartoum to meet with government officials, opposition leaders and private sector executives to explore the possibilities for facilitating peace in the Sudan and improving relations between Sudan and the United States. Ordinarily, this would be the normal grist of the foreign policy establishment. With the U.S. bombing of the El Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, however, the relationship between our two countries has been in a state of paralysis. This standoff comes at a time when the horrific losses of that conflict (second only to World War II in recent times) demand urgent action to halt the bloodshed.

Adding to the paralysis is the fact that certain circles within the United States are demonizing the North because of government-sponsored atrocities taking place in the South. The atrocities are real; and critics have every right to be incensed. Similar brutalities, albeit on a lesser scale, are also being committed by the South. There is precious little innocence to be found on either side; but regardless of which side has done what or how much, the key question — the strategic question — is how best to end the hostilities and lay the groundwork for a lasting peace.

Before going to Khartoum, I did a great deal of homework on events in the South — reading numerous reports by NGOs and journalists, speaking at length with people who had recently been there and observed first-hand the abuses that are taking place, and observing BBC footage on the plight of the natives in the Nuba Mountains. As for the North, I had assumed before my trip that Sudan was being used by the then Speaker of its Parliament, Hasan al-Turabi, as the spearhead for the spread of militant Islam across North Africa and beyond. After my first several days on the ground, however, (including a two-hour session with Dr. Turabi) I acquired a somewhat different impression. While there can be no doubt about Turabi's determination to expand Islam, he is even shrewder than we may think. He is developing and promoting a progressive model of Islam that will have greater appeal to prospective adherents than its harder-line counterparts.

One indication of this is the treatment of women. In Sudan about 20 seats in Parliament are reserved for women. They can hold more if they win the vote (which they usually do), but through this approach, women are guaranteed an ongoing voice in the councils of government. No woman that I saw was wearing a veil, and there are more women than men in the universities (although this may be partly due to war-related attrition among the males). Most surprising of all, there are women and Christians occupying high level ministerial posts in the government. The Minister of Labor at the time of my visit was a Catholic woman, one who was quite vocal about her Catholicism. It is remarkable how quickly simplified stereotypes begin to crumble when subjected to closer scrutiny. The same holds true in the "Christian and Animist" South, where three of the six rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) military commanders are Muslims.

While in Khartoum, I toured what remains of the El Shifa pharmaceutical factory with the plant manager. Without commenting on whether or not the factory was a proper target, we should address the humanitarian consequences of the attack by making pharmaceuticals available through selected NGOs to those impoverished Sudanese who are now going without because we bombed their factory. Not only would this help repair our damaged relationship with Sudan, but we would stand much taller in the eyes of world opinion, where I fear we now appear more than a little arrogant.

Although I was one of the first Americans to visit Khartoum in the wake of the El Shifa bombing, I was well received everywhere I went, even in impromptu settings. Out of my many meetings, including an evening with some 30 opposition leaders, a three-hour exchange with policymakers and scholars at Sudan's Center for Strategic Studies, and interview's with various television and print media, it became very clear that Sudan wants a meaningful dialogue with the United States. However justified our own government's suspicions of Sudanese intent may be, it is my personal view that engaging in such a dialogue

will provide us much greater leverage in our expressed desire to bring a halt to the conflict and sanity to the region.

In the course of these and subsequent interactions, we encouraged the government to seize the high ground in moving toward peace through a number of different initiatives, including enactment of a unilateral, comprehensive cease-fire as a pre-cursor to negotiating terms for an internationally supervised referendum on self-determination for the South. Such a cease-fire was implemented and actually held for about four months before breaking down. At our urging, the government also reversed its earlier confiscation of the headquarters of the Episcopal Diocese of Khartoum and has pledged before both the UN Security Council and General Assembly to devote a major share of its new oil revenues to alleviating hunger and building infrastructure in the South.

Perhaps of even greater significance is the government's agreement to host an ICRD-organized meeting of prominent Sudanese and international religious leaders in Khartoum at the end of this year. The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss issues of religious freedom in the Sudan, and to make related recommendations to the government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Because Dr. Abdul-Rahim Ali, Chair of the Sudan Inter-Religious Council and head of the Congress Party's Consultative Committee, and Dr. Mustah Ismail, Foreign Minister and former chair of the Inter-Religious Council, have agreed to participate, any agreement reached on the central religious questions to be addressed (such as what steps Islamic governments can take to alleviate the second-class status of minorities in a Sharia context) is likely to have a broader applicability to similar situations elsewhere in the world. It is intended that this meeting will complement, but in no way substitute for, the official mediating process (which, as current constituted, is singularly ill-equipped to deal with religious issues).

Because religion has been a major factor in the current conflict, i.e., the North seeking to impose Islamic law on the entire country, the planned meeting of religious leaders will be dealing with issues that lie at the heart of the problem. With hard work and no small degree of luck, these difficult issues can be surmounted and a lasting peace achieved in which the full potential of this troubled but well-endowed country can at last be realized.

To conclude on Sudan, the U.S. policy of confrontation seems an unpromising course. Prolonged economic sanctions against that country have not made a discernible difference in Sudan's behavior, nor is it likely that the United States will engage militarily, despite earlier sense-of-the-Congress legislation calling for the establishment of "no-fly zones" in the South. With their added revenues from new oil production, the North is in a stronger position than ever to prevail against the South. Despite reinforced resistance from hardliners in the North resulting from this new-found wealth and the earlier El Shifa incident, the government is open to renewed dialogue with the United States and has

already shown signs of sincere intent in its new moves toward peace. This opportunity, which will not last indefinitely, should be seized on a priority basis. The countless victims of this sordid conflict deserve no less.

In addition to the humanitarian considerations, there is another compelling reason to break the ice with Sudan. Chief among the potential threats worrying thoughtful observers of the world scene is the possible marriage of religious extremism with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The best defense against such a possibility is having our people on the ground in those areas where we have reason to be concerned. Here, we have one of the seven terrorist states of the world — one we have already attacked because of its alleged involvement with WMD — ready to start mending fences. It is an opportunity we should not let pass.

Moving beyond the Sudan, we had our first exploratory meeting on Kashmir this past week to determine if there is a helpful role to be played there. Despite the intractable nature of that situation, the stakes are simply too high to ignore.


On a final note, let me take us from the realm of rhetoric to the business of practicalities. Early next year, our Center will be involved in training Navy chaplains — all 900+ of them — in the business of religion and statecraft. By so doing, we hope to provide Navy commands and those joint commands that Navy chaplains serve with a new and valuable asset for pursuing the preventive aspects of their missions. By "new," I mean an informed capability for engaging with local religious leaders and developing a better understanding of the religious and cultural influences at play, while spreading a great deal of good will in the process. Armed with these kinds of insights on what is really taking place at the grassroots level and the chaplains' ability to relate them in ways that can facilitate the preventive aspects of the mission, military commanders should find their tasks made a bit more manageable.

Conclusion

In today's world of ethnic strife and high-technology weaponry, old concepts of security based on a competition of armaments will no longer suffice. Increasingly, security will be a function of the strength and durability of national, super-national, and most particularly sub-national relationships. This suggests a need to move toward new mechanisms for international relations that reach beyond the normal methods and channels of diplomacy to uncover and deal with the deeper sources of conflict, to rebuild relationships, and to make the necessary concessionary adjustments wherever possible.

In addition to using chaplains in new and creative ways, this means moving to a new paradigm for international relations that recognizes and builds upon the contributions of NGOs and, in some instances, even individuals — in

other words, one that can help facilitate the Navy's strategy of "formative engagement."



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