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REPORTERS ON THE GROUND

By Professor Michael Pasquarett
Department of the Army Support Branch

During the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Department of Defense (DoD) developed an embedded media program that planned for large numbers of embedded reporters in military units. The efficacy of this program was the subject of a workshop conducted by the United States Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership. The event, *Reporters on the Ground: The Military and the Media's Joint Experience During Operation Iraqi Freedom*, was held from 3 to 5 September 2003.

The workshop consisted of three consecutive panels: Tactical, Operational, and Futures. The event led off with the Tactical Panel, where Marine and Army commanders who had reporters embedded in their units shared equal voice with the embedded reporters themselves. Many of these commanders are currently U.S. Army War College (USAWC) students. Following the Tactical Panel, the Operational Panel focused on the higher levels of command in Iraq and the reporting from those military headquarters. The workshop concluded with the Futures Panel, which looked at the future of the program and its long-term implications for the media and the military and their increasingly complex relationship.

During the event, participants also heard presentations by author and reporter, Mr. Joe Galloway, and Brigadier General Vince Brooks, U.S. Central Command spokesman during the conflict. During the final day, Major General J. D. Thurman, Chief of Operations for the Land Component Commander, presented his view of the strategic aspect of the media-military relationship during the planning for and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Tactical panel discussions focused on the military-media ground rules, building trust between soldiers and reporters, and the consequences of breaking that trust. Trust became an extremely important bond, but there were many opinions on both sides whether this familiarity between the military and the media detracted from the American people receiving the total war story. It was also obvious that the American public responded positively to this new way of reporting war—being able to look through the eyes of their favorite reporters as they rode with military units.

After discussing the ground rules, trust and many objectivity issues, the tactical panel was almost in universal agreement that the embedded reporter model is the way to cover future conflicts. After much discussion, the military and the media participants failed to come to a consensus as to whether an embedded reporter can report about a unit with complete objectivity. More important to the American public may be that trust and confidence between the embedded reporter and their units provides a new and different kind of war reporting that they will now expect to see in all future conflicts.

The Operational panel focused on the military's use of the media in the conduct of information operations. Military leaders were candid in detailing how they used the media to help dominate the information battle. A number of media players accepted this as a reality in modern warfare. The panel concluded that embedded reporters helped balance "good" and "bad" news, and that their absence in Iraq today may account for the near absence of positive reporting.

The Futures panel sketched out the "Battle After Next" as a dispersed, isolated, and even empty battle space with heavy use of robotics and aerial maneuvers. Enemies will be more adaptive and technologically sophisticated; cultural wars will be haphazard and bloody. If the use of coalitions increases, there will be an upsurge in foreign media members, which has the potential to create security dilemmas. In the future, all media, whether embedded or unilateral, will need their own transportation and communications systems. Transportation for reporters should be armored and communications secure. Technology will drive military battlefield transformation and media coverage will need to acquire similar capabilities quickly. Many issues and recommendations arose, to include the following:

a. Ground Rules. The "eight page" list of ground rules was too lengthy to be of practical use. The group recommended that embedded journalists write a follow-on set of rules and then distribute them to all participants to review and subsequent DoD approval.

b. Training. Recommendations were made from both military and media representatives to toughen the pre-deployment media training and to make it available for attendance for potential embeds quarterly.

c. Media Self-policing. It was recommended that the media continue to develop procedures that could be accepted and implemented industry-wide within the U.S., and perhaps

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BG Vince Brooks, USCENTCOM spokesman, contributes to the discussion

internationally. All media present were unanimous in their support for this concept.

d. Permanent Embedding. The military could follow the examples of police departments, sports teams and political campaigns and have permanently embedded reporters.

e. Military Casualty Reporting. The instantaneous nature of modern battlefield communications and reporting has challenged the military's very deliberate casualty reporting and notification system.

The embedded media program placed journalists, soldiers, and marines together in the same environment. Under such circumstances whether reporters can or cannot be objective may be irrelevant. What is important is the trust and confidence built between those embattled soldiers and the embedded media that accompany and report on them and their actions. This unique kind of war reporting appears to have won the trust and confidence of the American public. Such success increases the burden on both the military and the media to ensure continued integrity of the reporting within a program that has heightened the expectations of the American public.

ASSISTING PROFESSIONAL MILITARIES IN LATIN AMERICA

By Professor Bernard F. Griffard and LTC Todd M. Wheeler

Joint and Multinational Initiatives Branch

At the request of the Commander, United States Southern Command, and in support of their efforts to assist the nations of Central and South America in developing a strategic planning process, the Center for Strategic Leadership conducted a National Security Strategy Development Workshop in La Paz, Bolivia, from 28 July to 1 August 2003. The Bolivian National War College, the Escuela de Altos Estudios Nacionales (E.A.E.N.), hosted the event, which included the current class of 61 students (36 military, 5 national police, and 20 civilian government personnel).

Collaborating with the E.A.E.N. created a non-threatening, academic environment that provided a viable military-civilian decision-making forum

to address the difficult issues that will shape Bolivia's twenty-first century national identity.

Using the Democratization Initiatives Support Simulation (DISS), a low-tech "desktop" solution that mimics the U.S. national strategy planning process, E.A.E.N. participants wrestled with the proper roles for their political, economic, social, and military sectors. Guided by a CSL facilitator, they developed a national vision, reviewed available national guidance, direction, and projections, and produced an outline strategy for the elected government.

The development and refinement of a national defense strategy is a significant undertaking for any country. As this reality became apparent, the scheduled weeklong seminar came to be viewed as an initial phase in a lengthy but necessary process in the development of a national defense strategy.

By employing the workshop's strategic planning methodology, the Bolivian Ministry of Defense will be able to better define and develop their national defense strategy requirements so that they support the people of Bolivia and their democratically elected officials, who determine the ultimate path for the policy and the country.

Instituting strategic planning as part of the E.A.E.N. curriculum pays dividends on a national scale. Within a few years, the cadre of trained strategic planners this program produces will allow the military and other government agencies to develop supportable national and military strategies. This effort is a significant contribution to the professionalization initiatives between the United States and the countries of the Western Hemisphere as they work together in strengthening the military community's ability to support democratic institutions.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM INITIAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS EXERCISE

By COL Dale Eiekmeier

Joint and Multinational Initiatives Branch

The Center for Strategic Leadership hosted the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Initial Defensive Operations (IDO) Exercise from 14 to 18 July 2003.

The BMDS IDO exercises bring together the entire missile defense community, including new members, NORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland Security, that are collectively charged with executing a series of complex, interrelated missile defense tasks and activities within compressed timelines and under challenging resource and environmental conditions. The objectives of the exercise series are to establish a common understanding of initial defense operations, facilitate the fielding of follow-on systems, exercise agency interfaces and processes, identify and resolve issues and mitigate risk, train

personnel, synchronize BMDS efforts for IDO, and rehearse and exercise plans for an initial defensive capability in September 2004. Based on these objectives, the exercises are designed to improve the coordination of the programs' key plans, to clarify organizational roles and missions, to increase the number of knowledgeable and trained personnel associated with the various missile defense programs, and to apprise key senior leaders of the issues and insights associated with the development and integration of missile defense systems. The end state is a synchronized and executable plan.

The July exercise had more than 400 attendees from twenty-seven various commands, agencies, contractors and other stakeholders. The next exercise is scheduled for late fall of 2003.

BUILDING EFFECTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS: US-INDIA

By Professor Bernard F. Griffard

Joint and Multinational Initiatives Branch

Management of the environmental consequences of manmade, terrorist, or natural disasters is proving to be a military-to-military cooperation vehicle that benefits the regional powers and supports the national security interests of the United States. In November 2001, the Indian Ministry of Defence (IMOD) expressed a strong interest in establishing a military-to-military relationship with the United States on environmental issues. This interest was reinforced in May 2002, when the Indian Defense Policy Group supported pursuing a bilateral US-India environmental program. Recognizing the value of this effort, the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment [ODUSD(I&E)] and the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) sponsored an Indo-U.S. tabletop exercise, *Responding to a Maritime Environmental Crisis*, on 16-17 September 2003, that brought together American and Indian military and Coast Guard officers (active and retired) to explore the elements of a joint military response plan to address multiple near-simultaneous oil spills caused by coordinated terrorist actions in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. The U.S. defense contracting firm, Booz Allen Hamilton, acted as agents for the ODUSD (I&E) in the design, planning, and execution of this event. At the invitation of the ODUSD (I&E), the Center for Strategic Leadership participated in scenario and methodology review activities and provided the Team Leader/Facilitator for the exercise's American Response Team.

The exercise was organized around three major exercise events that individually addressed the oil spill crisis, the response to the maritime terrorist threat in the region, and the outlines of a blueprint for a joint response plan in the region. During this process, the participants identified a major

regional vulnerability: there are few mechanisms to support joint or regional disaster response planning and coordination in response to future maritime terrorist-initiated environmental crises. This finding supported the stated need for a joint military response plan.

Normally, this type of theater security cooperation exercise would be executed at the Ministry of Defence level. In this case, the United Service Institution of India, an established defense think tank with close ties to the Indian Ministry of Defence, hosted the event. Though expedient, the overall result was limited exposure of the exercise outcomes within the IMOD.

Twelve years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States still finds itself challenged to identify mutual interests with major regional actors. The effort to build effective military-to-military cooperation programs with regional leaders such as India consistently runs into differing perceptions of regional roles. If the United States is serious about developing a Joint Response Plan with the Indian Navy, it must accept that for any type of response plan to be successful it must portray a partnership of equals.

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

*By Professor Bert B. Tussing
National Security Issues Branch*

In response to a request from the United States Central Command, the Center for Strategic Leadership facilitated a discussion and an assessment of the command's Consequence Management (CM) program in support of the nations of the Gulf Cooperative Council as well as Jordan and Egypt. The assessment was the focal event in a conference hosted by the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, held from 15 to 17 September 2003 at the National Defense University. The discussion was facilitated by Prof. Bert Tussing, Dr. Kent Butts, and COL(R) Art Bradshaw, drawing upon a forum of representatives from Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The CM program is a vital component of CENTCOM's Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) against Weapons of Mass Destruction. CDI's overarching intent is to introduce non-offensive aspects of counterproliferation to our military partners in the Middle East. The Consequence Management portion of CDI focuses specifically on the requirements for mitigating the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent release of chemical, biological, or radiological contaminants, or the effects of a high yield conventional explosive that results in mass casualties/mass destruction.

CENTCOM's Consequence Management program for allies and coalition partners takes place in six phases:

- Phase 1: Assessment. Identifies and quantifies existing capabilities;
- Phase 2: Senior Level Policy Workshop. Examines, or begins to establish, a national crisis response policy;
- Phase 3: Seminar. Exercise INITIATE RESPONSE, tests the participating nation's evolving National Response Plan;
- Phase 4: First Responder Seminar. Focuses on the "tactical" requirements of the country's first responders;
- Phase 5: Exercise. Exercise IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, validating the participant nation's National Response Plan;
- Phase 6: Sustainment. This phase emphasizes the value of regional cooperation in these endeavors through multi-national training and exercises.

Levels of progress through the phases of CENTCOM's Consequence Management program vary, but forum participants were able to share their perspectives on phases executed to date. Overall, the Consequence Management program was assessed to be successful in serving the region's needs. There were, however, specific areas of concern raised.

- Interagency myopia among many senior ministries that remain "unaware" or unconvinced of the severity of the threat.
- Constrained resources.
- Reticence of civil first responders towards working in contaminated areas.
- Developing and sustaining strategies to continually exercise, validate, and update response plans after they are developed.

In spite of these concerns, the prevailing atmosphere of the forum showed a clear inclination toward expanding cooperative efforts in the region.

USCENTCOM's initiative in the GCC, Jordan, and Egypt is currently serving as a template for similar efforts underway in the Central Asian States and in the Horn of Africa.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES DISASTER RESPONSE CONFERENCE

*By Professor Bernard F. Griffard, Professor Bert Tussing, & LTC Curtis Turner
Operations & Gaming Division*

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional cooperation in Central Asia has not followed a smooth path. What regional efforts exist are based on the old Soviet regional construct and are reflected most visibly in parallel national organizational structures. Though a basis for coordination, without a genuine commitment by the Central Asian States (CAS) to regional cooperation, the effectiveness of these legacy systems to cooperatively address regional problems, such as the prevention and mitigation

of terrorism, trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), manmade and natural disasters, and managing the consequences of disasters, is questionable.

Beginning in 2001, in an effort to find a common ground for regional cooperation, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) initiated a series of security cooperation initiatives as a complement to military-to-military training exchanges, and the U.S. National Guard's International Workshops on Emergency Response (IWER) program.

The 2003 Central Asian States Disaster Response Conference continues this effort. The conference shifted the focus to exploring the capacity of the CAS to detect, prevent, mitigate, and respond to the consequences of disasters, including those related to terrorism and the trafficking of WMD. Hosted by the Government of Kazakhstan, USCENTCOM conducted the conference in Almaty, Kazakhstan from 29 September to 2 October 2003. Participants included the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. In attendance as observers were representatives from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkmenistan was unable to participate. The Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment [ODUSD (I&E)], and the Center for Strategic Leadership cosponsored the conference. The Center for Strategic Leadership was the lead agency for agenda development, speaker identification, and the production of the conference report.

During the first half of the conference, a series of expert panels offered presentations defining regional capabilities; identifying resource and information-sharing requirements for the combating of terrorism, trafficking, and proliferation of WMD; and describing responses to natural and man-made disasters in the region (including accidents, neglect, and deliberate terrorist attacks). Detailed information was provided on the practical means to prevent or mitigate these disasters, especially concerning medical surveillance, to reduce the human, infrastructural, and environmental consequences of these disasters. Participants in workshops conducted during the final two days specifically addressed medical surveillance requirements, the need to establish a mechanism to build and sustain a regional cooperative for disaster response, and the employment of WMD detection capabilities and emergency situation monitoring technologies.

The outcomes from these workshops indicate a desire to establish an informal Regional Executive Committee to prioritize regional cooperative efforts and for USCENTCOM to share the experiences and lessons learned from similar regional efforts. Kyrgyzstan has offered to host the first meeting of this coordinating entity within six months.

STRATEGIC LEADER STAFF RIDE PROGRAM

*By LTC Chris Fulton
Department of the Army Support Branch*

The US Army War College Strategic Leader Staff Ride (SLSR) program, coordinated and executed through the Center for Strategic Leadership, applies the lessons of Gettysburg to meet the leadership challenges of today. This program serves as a means to increase awareness and exchange insights on important strategic issues facing the armed forces, academia, the government, and the business community, and through this process to establish a foundation for mutually beneficial, longterm, professional relationships and exchanges.

The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) attended an SLSR in July and was so impressed by the experience that a separate group returned for a second event in September. The initial group, headed by Mr. Sandy Apgar, BCG Director and former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment, studied the strategic lessons of the Gettysburg battlefield on July 8, guided by Professor Len Fullenkamp of the USAWC faculty. The following day at Collins Hall, BCG applied those same lessons to current times through presentations and in-depth discussion by both USAWC faculty and BCG members. Topics of discussion included comparisons of the development of military and corporate strategy, organizational culture, leading and managing change, and the process of developing strategic leaders. The presentations and ensuing discussions, combined with the informal social activities, contributed to an extremely valuable event for the BCG group. As testimony to this, Mr. Apgar and select members of this group returned to Carlisle Barracks in late July to bid farewell to the USAWC Commandant,

MG Bob Ivany, and presented the War College with a historic map from the civil war era.

The second BCG group, in September, approached their SLSR from a slightly different angle, made possible by the tailorable nature of the SLSR program. This BCG entourage had just completed a project with a major corporation and was looking for an opportunity to relate their experience as developers of strategy to the development of strategy leading to and through the battle of Gettysburg. The venue for their visit involved a single day spent on the battlefield under the exceptional guidance of Colonel Jim Embrey from the USAWC faculty. Specific themes were jointly developed prior to the event, and these themes served as the means to gain insights into the strategic linkage of past to present.

The Army Reserve Ambassadors serve as the eyes, ears, and voice of the Chief of the Army Reserves in each state. A group of these ambassadors converged on Carlisle Barracks from September 10 to 12 to participate in an SLSR designed as a pilot program for future events for the Army Reserve Ambassadors. In addition to the memorable day spent at Gettysburg with USAWC faculty historian Dr. Sam Newland, the group shared social activities with MG and Mrs. David Huntoon and exchanged insights on a variety of strategic-level presentations with USAWC faculty on multiple topics of interest. These topics included developing strategic leaders, the Army budget process, issues of homeland security, Army structure, and current affairs of our reserve forces.

The Strategic Leader Staff Ride program continues to support and improve the critical strategic communications objectives of the War College. The outstanding support and energy provided by the USAWC faculty is greatly appreciated in making this program a resounding success.



Major General John Russell Groves, Jr.

In Memoriam

The U.S. Army War College and the Center for Strategic Leadership are deeply saddened by the death of Major General John Russell Groves, Jr., who died in an airplane accident in Kentucky in late September. Major General Groves was a significant contributor to the Center's research and education efforts, participating in multiple events and activities over many years. He always considered thoughtfully and deliberately any contributions he offered to a dialogue, and insisted that his own as well as others' comments be supportable by sustained experience, by an understanding of the value of military cultures and traditions, and by appropriate professional military judgment. At the same time he was a consistently innovative thinker, looking ahead at challenges and for opportunities, and always pushing for broad, deep, and effective professional military education for future leaders. A true warrior-philosopher, perceptive author, genuine mentor, and loyal friend, Major General Russ Groves will be sorely missed.

Douglas B. Campbell
Director,

Collins Center for Strategic Leadership

This publication and other CSL publications can be found online at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp>.

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