The Implications of Network-Centric Warfare for United States and Multinational Military Operations
Abstract
The development of information technology has revolutionized both society and the way it conducts business. Companies that have been able to adapt to and exploit these fundamental changes have prospered; those that have not have often been left behind. The United States Navy's network-centric warfare (NCW) concept is based on the premise that the networking of sensors, weapons, and information systems, if coupled with appropriate operational concepts, tactics, and organizational structures, will likewise revolutionize the capabilities of the military. It will, it is claimed, fundamentally change the nature of war. In theory, a common, comprehensive, and comprehensible near-real-time view of the battlefield will enable a new and faster form of warfare characterized by the concepts of "speed of command" and "self-synchronization." Speed of command enables our forces to act, and react to enemy actions and changing vulnerabilities, so quickly and effectively that we "lock out" all possible alternate enemy strategies, forcing capitulation or stopping enemy actions before they begin. Comprehensive knowledge of the battlefield also allows self-synchronization--the ability of forces to organize from the bottom up. Bottom-up organizations are perceived as being better able to adapt to the dynamic, fast-paced, complex, fluid nature of military operations, and better able to rapidly exploit opportunities and enemy vulnerabilities. The network-centric warfare architecture will consist of three separate, but related, systems of systems--a sensor grid, an engagement grid, and an information backplane.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 31, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA430553
Entities
People
- Douglas Macdonald
- Henry Kamradt
Organizations
- Naval War College