

United States Naval War College
Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Navy, International Programs
Navy Sea Power 21 Allies Project

Workshop One and Follow-up Analysis

December 2004



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It has been three years since the CNO first presented the Sea Power 21 (SP21) vision at the Current Strategies Forum in Newport, RI. The major pillars of SP21 recognized the power of rapidly evolving technology to empower an information-dominated warfare battlespace, and thus signaled the movement away from a platform based acquisition focus to a capabilities-based approach for the U.S. Navy. The SP21 vision would guide the U.S. Navy to rapidly invest in transforming capabilities that are expensive and expansive. SP21 has clearly led to a focused and prioritized U.S. Navy requirements generation process, but subsequently has led to a concern among some who are beginning to sense a growing gap between U.S. Navy transformation and that of its key allies. This project, therefore, has sought out to assess a potential unintended consequence of Sea Power 21 that it could be the orphaning allied and friendly navies, unless they too share the underlying assumptions provided by SP21, and a resolve to accelerate their capabilities accordingly. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for International Programs and the Naval War College have partnered to provide an assessment of this issue, and possible assistance for leadership to create desired long term outcomes with our vital and key foreign naval partners.

The first of two workshops to assess the future of naval allies and the U.S. Navy was held at the Naval War College in December 2004. Over 40 subject matter experts convened for one day representing active duty U.S. Navy, industry and government experience. The outline of the workshop was as follows:

- OSD Strategic Planning Framework
- Alternative Strategic Futures
- Current International Cooperative Sitrep
- Exploration of Key Issues
- Initial Discussion of On-ramps and Bridges

The following represent the key findings of the first workshop:

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none">- There is a possible role for an expanded SP21 vision which incorporates future complementary foreign navy capabilities.- The USN should explore options to transform our thinking about international acquisition processes and programs to induce better cooperation and outcomes.- There is a vital role for a more specific maritime strategy to better detail missions for international navies and harmonize capability requirements.- There are changes to USN organizational structures that would provide a more powerful and effective 'voice' in the strategy and requirements generation processes within OPNAV. |
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There will be a second workshop to explore these as well as other findings, and in addition provide possible tangible solutions to leadership.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The United States Naval War College (NWC) in partnership with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, International Programs Office (NIPO) agreed to undertake an eight month assessment of the impact of the CNO's Sea Power 21 vision on U.S Navy and U.S. allied partnerships. The working title for this project is: *"How Allied Navies Can Partner with the U.S. Navy under Sea Power 21 Through Sea Engagement; And Why They Should"*

1.2 The objective of the project is to jointly assess the major tenets of Sea Power 21 (SP21) as to how they are interpreted by key allied navies. The project will then assess the potential outcomes of a SP21 'capabilities-based' strategy versus a more traditional threat-based strategy as has been done in the past. It will lastly offer various practical 'on-ramps' and 'bridges' for allied navies to partner with the U.S. Navy to hopefully culminate in greater capability across nations in the maritime domain.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 The CNO's vision Sea Power 21 was introduced in Newport in 2002 as a coherent framework for the U.S. Navy to reorganize and focus on critical maritime capabilities to provide two fundamental outcomes for the nation: (1) Win the War on Terror; and (2) Provide Ready and Flexible Options for the President. The principal target audience for Sea Power 21 was the U.S. Navy and its leadership. Few, if any, words used in the subsequent Proceedings articles on SP21 address allied participation in the vision. SP21 did not discuss how the Navy would achieve allied interoperability or enhance allied contributions. SP21 focused entirely on how the USN would accelerate its technological prowess, accelerate its transformation to defeat all forms of traditional and asymmetric threats, and accelerate its recapitalization of human and material capabilities—all either directly or indirectly inferring a self sufficiency through such means as advanced Sea Strike, Sea Basing, Sea Shield and FORCEnet. By inference, SP21 communicated to allies that the U.S. Navy was going to dramatically increase the pace of transformation, as well as the spending devoted to it, and would do so unilaterally, whether or not allies attempt to keep pace and increase their own spending.

2.2 The overall purpose of this joint project between DASN International Programs Office and the Naval War College is to explore maritime strategic options that enfold the tenets of Sea Power 21 and provide a framework for allied countries to develop complementary capabilities and requirements.. The first objective is to assess the impact of SP21 on the early trends respective to allied navy and US Navy program alignment and interoperability. As SP21 relies on capability-based planning, the second objective is to assess options to interlink capability-based planning with threat-based planning as a way to enhance allied incentive to invest in SP21 capabilities.

2.3 Key Assumptions to the Project. The following assumptions are directly relevant to this study:

- U.S. and even its closest allies no longer agree on the scope and scale of the international security threat. This limits U.S. ability to use threat-based planning for strategy and have it provide a solid link to the allies.
- DOD and USN will not slow down the pace of military transformation on behalf of any ally regardless of their ability need to catch up.
- DOD and USN will continue to leverage any/all appropriate new technology to accelerate the pace and scale of Navy transformation.
- Greater cooperation and interoperability are and will remain U.S. goals. The CNO's FY05-FY06 Maritime Security Cooperation Guidance (a classified document not releasable to allies) serves as the primary guidance for allied cooperation and plans, and does not align or prioritize Sea Power 21 capabilities.

3. PROCESS

3.1 Research and discussion among subject matter experts for this project will take place in a series of informal and formal workshops from December 2004 through April 2005. The workshops will address the strategic environment and how navies will need to respond to emerging threats around the globe. This will lead to workshops focused on capabilities, regional ally strengths and weaknesses, and collection of data on trends in sea systems programs. This report provides analysis of the first Newport workshop held 8 December 2004.

3.2 First Workshop. The first workshop held at the Naval War College on 8 December 2004 was conducted using Web-IQ group decision support software and facilitation. Attending were over 40 participants including flag-level representation from the U.S. Navy, major industry, academia, policy think-tanks, and executive agency staffs in Washington.

4. WORKSHOP DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 The primary objectives for the first workshop were:

- to provide workshop participants a background in national security objectives and strategic framework.
- to provide a structure for discussing/assessing maritime roles and missions.
- to identify and assess trends in allied navy responses to SP21; and subsequent early trends in modernization programs.
- to brainstorm initial options for the USN to incentivize cooperative and complementary programs in allied nations.

4.2 The workshop's first session provided an overview of the relevant components of superior national strategy documents for the U.S. beginning with the National Security Strategy [*"In an increasingly interconnected world, regional crisis can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability"*], continuing with the National Defense Strategy [*"International partnerships continue to be a principal source of our strength. Shared principles, a common view of threats and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than we could achieve on our own"*] and ending with the National Military Strategy [*"Our forces, including those rotationally deployed and those stationed forward, will work cooperatively with other nations to encourage regional partners to eliminate threats and patrol ungoverned space. More directly, deployed military units will work closely with international partners and other US government agencies to take the battle to the enemy – engaging terrorist forces, terrorist collaborators and those governments harboring terrorists"*].

4.3 First Exercise. The first exercise in the workshop asked the following of the participants: *Provide your perceptions of whether U.S. foreign policy, Sea Power 21, and other trends foster multinational naval cooperation.*

Results: While the majority of participants agreed that U.S. foreign policy encouraged multinational/international cooperation, the majority disagree that SP21 does the same. Furthermore, a solid majority believed that technology will play a pervasive role in

distancing the U.S. Navy from its allies instead of providing a general solution for allied interoperability. A vast majority felt that current concerns regarding allied interoperability (regarding SP21 capabilities) are not overstated, and need to be addressed in a systematic fashion by corporate Navy to ensure down-range capability issues are not exacerbated. Comments amplified the findings, and discussion supported a clear consensus that, left alone, SP21 does not serve as a tool to incentivize allies to keep up with the U.S. Navy transformation, even in areas of comparative advantage. The assessment




Figure (1)

continued that, absent a leadership strategy, allies will tend to (1) choose to either 'free ride' on the most costly or complex capabilities, (2) choose to simply continue their own modernization programs in relative independence/isolation of the U.S. Navy roadmap, or (3) choose to cooperate, but usually late and ineffectively (given continued direction by the CNO to continually accelerate the transformation).

4.4 Developing Alternative Futures. Analysis began with a description of the current OSD framework for assessing international security risk (Figure 1). However, these OSD futures simply describe 'states,' and do not in themselves imply strategic force employment options. Professor Bradd Hayes presented a framework for discussing alternative employment options, focusing and defining four potential outcomes: *Fortress America*, *Firewall America*, *S.W.A.T.* and *On the Beat*, briefly described as follows (Figure 2):

- *Fortress America*: Globalization fails and the world splits into regional economic and defense blocks.
- *Firewall America*: Most of the globalized world (except the U.S.) cuts a "virtual" deal with militant Islam. Terrorists are free to focus on regional regime change and America, making homeland defense/homeland security the top U.S. priority.
- *S.W.A.T.*: Rise of the near peer (i.e. China). U.S. forces are primarily CONUS-based, but the U.S. maintains widespread international interests.
- *On the Beat*: Global war on terrorism continues, with the globalized world working in concert to maintain economic growth. U.S. military more focused on overseas operations than on homeland defense (although HD is still important).

Workshop participants were then asked to rank the futures by how well they foster coalition cooperation.



Figure (2)

Results: *On the Beat* was overwhelmingly chosen by participants as the scenario that most fostered coalition cooperation. 25 of 35 participants ranked it number one or two. One participant commented that the global war on terrorism will last at least a generation and that *On the Beat* is more likely than *SWAT* because we cannot sustain a pace of one conflict per year due to force structure constraints and increasing allied reluctance to support those operations. He also remarked that a near peer will rise, but may be more regionally focused, and that *Firewall America* would be a strong possibility if GWOT, especially counterinsurgency, does not show rapid sustained success.

The next question, using the same scenarios, was: “What percentage of the military’s effort do you think will be spent dealing with challenges in each alternative future?”

Results: The graph below shows that participants clearly expect that our future military efforts will be focused toward dealing with Non-State adversaries in an “Away game” situation (figure 3).




Figure (3)

4.5 Scene-Setter Briefing. To provide the workshop participants a potential vocabulary to work through the complex security environment of the 21st Century, Professor Tom Barnett outlined his analysis dividing the world into globalized “Core” countries and “Gap” countries that are outside of the global mainstream. He then shared his vision for a new American military composed of two very different forces: A “*Leviathan*” force would take on conventional opponents, while a “*System Administrator*” or “*SysAdmin*” force would engage in nation building during peacetime and after major conflicts. Participants were invited to respond electronically to Professor Barnett’s brief (Figure 4).




Figure (4)

Results: This framework influenced discussions throughout the remainder of the workshop. While not universally agreed to, it provided a common language and concept for analysis, and more importantly measures of effectiveness. The United States Navy is certainly postured and equipped for effectual use in one system (where the Leviathan rules), but seems much more dependent (or interdependent) in the other system (SysAdmin). One comment thread suggested that perhaps the US could provide “Leviathan” forces and our allies “Sysadmin” forces. The benefit to our allies would be more affordable military spending for them. “The effect on our foreign policy would be to move it toward more collaboration and division of labor.” Another participant commented that it is “More important to have their (our allies) participation than being able to match our defense budget!!” Other participants felt that this approach to interoperability with allies was very different from current thinking, but the consensus seemed to be that it would be feasible. An advantage of this division of responsibilities would be that the degree of interoperability needed, especially from the perspective of investments needed for “force net”, would be less for “Sysadmin” forces.

4.6 PSI Briefing. Professor Robert (“Barney”) Rubel, Chairman of the War Gaming Department, briefed the results and lessons learned from the Proliferation Security Initiative War Game held at the Naval War College in September/October 2004. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The Proliferation Security Initiative reflects the need for a more dynamic, active approach to the global proliferation problem. It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities (principally intelligence and maritime interdiction capabilities) to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic,

economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related equipment and technologies.

The final effectiveness of PSI, much like other initiatives including the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in the Pacific Command (PACOM), seems very dependent on true allied naval interoperability and complementary capabilities. As Prof. Rubel highlighted, the results of the Newport War Game convinced game participants (both U.S. and allied) that effective interdiction cannot be done by U.S. maritime forces alone. Extensive 'cradle to grave' coordination was required to thwart shipments at sea, much of which (coordination) was sophisticated, networked, and dependent upon specific equipment. The workshop discussed the major trends that indicate these kinds of coordinated navy to navy activities will only increase in the near future.

Professor Ruble's presentation generated significant participant feedback, especially around the area of collaboration with allies and interoperability. One participant highlighted what was learned from the PSI game as follows:

"I agree with [the] proposition that collaborating with allies over specific mission sets is a realistic basis for engaging allies. Eliminating barriers to this and moving toward enabling this sort of collaboration systematically demands a deliberate, comprehensive effort and a strategy that values the allied contribution."

Another workshop participant added, *"With maritime domain awareness depending upon similar linkages between navies to support a "Maritime Norad" approach to enforcement/tracking at sea, will the USN be able to incentivize complementary capabilities [and] will the commitment to capabilities be counted on in such a way [as] to preclude redundant acquisition spending?"*

Finally, another workshop participant noted the radical changes to the requirements for navies to work together in the maritime domain to create real 'awareness,' *"Information, logistics and communications are "commons of the commons". They were once industrial age supply functions; today they are information age demand functions. All current national security management processes, especially in USN and DoD, continue to view them as supply functions. The cost of gathering information is directly related to the size of an organization...energy transfer functions should no longer dominate. The only thing that matters is the performance and ultimate effectiveness of the total system (sensor/weapon reach, network information flow, speed of command). Without allies inherently capable, we will probably lose."*

4.7 IPO Briefing/Maritime Strategy Recommendation Exercise. Mr. Rino Pivrotto of the Navy International Programs Office briefed how international acquisition programs fit into the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. The presentation highlighted the benefits to both the U.S. Navy and our allies that accrue from international acquisition programs. It also presented potential levers that could link our allies into Seapower 21 and debunked misconceptions held by US players and foreign partners (see boxes).

International Acquisition Cooperation Misconceptions

Possible US Misconceptions

- The US is the technology leader. We don't gain technology from International cooperation.
- The commitments involved in International Agreements restrict our flexibility. In the past the DoN was limited in its ability to cut lower priority cooperative programs in times of austere budgets.
- The bureaucracy of IAs (especially multilateral) is significant. The added coordination required results in program delays. Work-share directed to foreign participants results in additional overall program costs. All this is not offset by partner's small financial contributions to the program.
- Only our lower priority programs ought to be available for cooperative development or production. Allies ought to stick to purchasing US equipment (via FMS or DCS) and quit buying inferior European equipment because of political pressure

International Acquisition Cooperation Misconceptions

Possible Foreign Partner Misconceptions

- The US has a "Not invented here" syndrome as big as the state of Texas. In many cases, Allied technology is as good as or better than US technology.
- The US idea of cooperation is the US sells and the Allies buy -- no questions asked.
- If Allies can't share in US technology, then Allies shouldn't spend their limited resources on US equipment. Cooperation is not practical just on size differences alone.
- Allies normally share cost on an offset basis and that doesn't work with the US. Allies need to support industry at home -- that will be the major criteria in Allied contract awards
- European nations (or other regions) need to stick together (in opposition to big brother).

Results: The IPO briefings strongly reinforced the direct link between the nations' [*US and Allied*] maritime strategy, program acquisition management, and security outcomes. These outcomes are both economically beneficial to all partners, as well as (most importantly) effective in establishing interoperable and complementary capabilities required for the complex security environment as postured by Dr. Barnett, the PSI war game results, and other analyses (see Figure 5).

Benefits to DoN/Allies

Item	Benefit
US Transfers (FMS, DCS, grants, loans, and leases)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lowers Unit Cost • Increases interoperability • Enables continuity of production
US Purchase from friends	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lowers Unit Cost • Increases interoperability
Industry-to-Industry cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maximizes use of best technologies • Encourages efficient production techniques
Joint purchase, development or maintenance (IAs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensures cooperation at early planning stages • Partners share investment costs • Lowers Unit Cost and possibility of excess capacity
Other Collaborative Programs (Exchanges, FCT, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shares Technology • Increases communication, education and training

Figure (5)

However, as the IPO briefings highlighted, the complex processes required to achieve successful international program management success depend on several elements.

These include:

- A national strategy where the major tenets are accepted by allies;
- A maritime strategy to link the roles and missions of navies together;
- A future capabilities roadmap that communicates requirements and opportunities for navy to navy cooperation (research, development, procurement) ;
- Specific acquisitions strategies that fully incorporate allied participation wherever feasible (see Figure 6).



Figure (6)

The IPO briefing then addressed the role of Sea Power 21 in this process as it relates (or does not relate) to international naval acquisition program management. The workshop participants discussed the virtues of Sea Power 21 (SP21), which were captured as follows:

- SP21 provides the U.S. Navy with good focus on capability requirements for the 21st Century maritime domain.
- SP21 is a vision which serves to lead the U.S. Navy to achieve the CNO's two major objectives: win the global war on terror and provide flexible options for the President of the United States.

While SP21 serves an important role for the United States Navy, workshop participants shared the view that it perhaps does not “communicate” strategic direction for allied navies. Supporting that theme, the IPO presentation concluded by summarizing the potential value of additional means to strengthen multi-national naval cooperation and effectiveness:

- Sea Power 21 could benefit from a multi-national naval force perspective;
- Such a focus is consistent with draft SECDEF Security Cooperation Guidance;
- DoN International Acquisition Programs (IAPs) have a wide range of benefits;
- Linkages, levers, on-ramps, and off-ramps need to be identified to enable development of a multi-national naval strategy -- the roadmap to the future

4.8 On-Ramps and Bridges. The IPO presentation led into a discussion and assessment of areas and processes that would provide 'on-ramps' and bridges for international naval partners to SP21 future capabilities and implied/stated missions. As a basis for the discussion, participants were provided the following key assumptions:

- The U.S. Navy is not going to slow the pace of technological adaptation;
- U.S. foreign policy is not going to become more multilateral;
- In the short term proliferation concerns will **not** [?] be mitigated or profoundly changed.

The key question during this session was: *"What can be done in the technological, political, and industrial arenas to foster better international cooperation?"* Potential enablers were offered by IPO:

- Invite selected countries to jointly develop or produce significant DoN weapon systems;
- Make elements of Sea Power 21 implementation multinational by means of a specific multinational team or committee;
-
- Take Sea Power 21 international “road shows” to allies and potential coalition partners and collect feedback;
- Mutually embed international exchange personnel in Strategic Planning Offices;
- Establish a multinational FORCENet Planning Team;

- Reinvigorate 'Requirement Harmonization' with our allies.

These enablers would then provide the basis for more formal and institutional Navy-to-Navy processes that would establish a true bridge for acquisition cooperation leading to effective interoperability across the spectrum of capabilities -- all the SP21 major pillars.

The subject of the next workshop will be to explore options and establish institutional processes to create bridges.

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 The workshop concluded with a session to explore the different facets and complexities of creating better strategic cooperation with international navies. Several comments tackled pieces of the puzzle, and are worth highlighting:

Security Complexity

"There is currently no physical model and information age metrics are just beginning to emerge. In plain talk, we have not populated the knowledge base. Architectures are meant to enable better and more timely national security decision making. Just as our nation has leveraged National Training Center and the Nellis ranges to work across the national security community, why do we not as a nation have a National Seaborne Experimentation Center? The maritime domain is lagging. We (executive/legislative) need to be creating the capacity for change. It demands a holistic approach (technology, organization, processes, culture). This is because the littoral is a complex adaptive environment, and the nexus of all lines of the "commons of the commons" (information, logistics [commerce], communications). It is where wealth is created, power generated."

Insular Planning and Exercise Structure

"The ability for the DoD to conduct PSI at our own national level is also a pivotal aspect of how we are trying to meet our maritime GWOT responsibilities in harnessing the ability to detect and track weapons of mass destruction on the high seas. Exercises in this area are currently being conducted, but none (that I am aware of) in an international collaborative [environment] because of the sensitive nature of our ISR methods. Can we incentivize increased Allied participation by refocusing on what and how we share technology for these operations? Who will start the "next steps" to begin advancing this process?"

The Utility of Sea Power 21 and Interoperability

*"Our acquisition focus for SP21, especially from a **foreign** perspective, remains directed on Joint Interoperability. As we continue to "neck down" to a common joint capability - it provides for international coalition partners to provide single touch points and systems that provide for interoperability beyond those that are limited to one respective service, and allow more multi-service coalition interoperability."*

"We should focus regionally on how we can get our Allies to contribute in each of the 4 quadrants defining how we resource training, equipment, and force administration - Fortress

America, Firewall America, S.W.A.T, or On the Beat. Each region will have different priorities. Include more integration of Coast Guard activities."

"Unless you put SP21 in an operational context (both capabilities and interoperability) (both Leviathan and SysAdmin) and move it out of the purely procurement business, you will not be able to link the allies in."

The "Un" Common Threat Assessment

"Achieving a common threat assessment with allies is the sine qua non for cooperation on the things that matter to us. We need to take the risk of asking open-ended questions to get their input and find the common ground that will form the basis for cooperation. Allies' threat assessments do not have to conform to ours to be meaningful; what is needed are areas of overlap."

"When other navies or nations do not see the threat of terrorism as acutely as the US does, then the invitation to join the GWOT falls short of creating the impetus to cooperate. That means they focus internally. If a Sea Power 21 addendum would express our interests in terms of PSI, MDA and other common maritime activities to counter emerging threats, then we would be able to facilitate a mil to mil link, a common bond, that may transcend the difficult political landscape of preemptive strike doctrine and other post 9/11 messages emanating from the US."

Navy Leadership Dimension

"We have overarching National strategies, COCOM concepts/CONOPS, and highlighted capabilities that, when applied, can achieve those aims. We have an enormous requirements process to ensure US priorities are best funded each year. What process or group in the Navy (and then Jointly) really proactively prioritizes those areas? We want to focus resources on helping our regional partners increase coalition capabilities."

The Ineffectiveness of an Outdated View of Acquisition Strategy

"Are there other items we can provide besides platforms, weapons, and sensors that contribute to the GWOT, especially for those smaller countries that are less connected, but strategically located? How will we measure success?"

"Allied navies and USN develop requirements at different times. Unless there is harmonization, collaborative R&D and procurement will only happen in drips and drabs. Only if we and our allies agree on where a specific allied navy is going [will it be possible] to do collaborative procurement. This will only happen if the Senior Navy Representative process is fixed and we have more focused navy-to-navy discussions that focus on capability and interoperability development. Not just briefing past each other, as often happens today."

"Generally speaking, [the] US should not encourage -- and subliminally discourage -- allied acquisition of major legacy systems. It is precisely allied interest in legacy systems in a period of flat spending that is preventing adequate expenditure on needed capabilities. Nor should we encourage allies to try to maintain well-rounded maritime forces. For expensive, capital-intensive naval forces, we would prefer that allies specialize. Not so sure that USN has all the right doctrine for many "sys-admin" missions. We could learn a lot from allies -- or learn together -- on such challenges as mine-warfare, coastal ops, and choke-point security."

"The assumption that we're the world leader in all areas of maritime (and other) technologies could potentially lead to a strategic failure. If we don't understand the status of R&D in other countries, we increase our chances of being stymied by disruptive technologies. Are they

disruptive because they're truly innovative, or because we didn't put them into context early enough to make preemptive trajectory changes in our own force?"

A Sea Power 21 Vision and Strategy for Coalition Partners

"What do we want our coalition partners to do? What capabilities do they need to acquire to do these things? If we can define this to some level, then how do we convince these coalition partners to acquire these capabilities and do these things? Can Sea Power 21 be the means to do this?"

"It is useful to think outside of the coalition box. It is possible to envision a network: a loosely coupled grouping of countries who are connected by common adherence to the purposes of the network. While formal coalitions may be necessary for high end military operations, networks can contribute vital information and orientation on a day-to-day basis. Additionally, the network concept might serve in high-end operations for everything from deep fires and ISR to theater security functions."

"The Navy historically and now refuses to take the role for which it is naturally suited--it is the service that is by nature international and in contact with many foreign countries, allies, friends, and even competitors. No real FAO programs, no reward for country or regional expertise or languages. All this has to change too if the navy [is] interested in leading, facilitating the System Admin role."

6. NEXT STEPS

6.1 The next steps for this project will be to address the major issues raised by this first workshop:

- the possible role of an expanded SP21 vision to include the future for complementary foreign navy capabilities;
- options to transform our thinking about international acquisition processes and programs to induce better cooperation and outcomes;
- the role of a maritime strategy to better detail missions for international navies and harmonize capability requirements;
- possible changes to USN organizational structures to provide a more powerful and effective 'voice' in the strategy and requirements generation processes within OPNAV.

6.2 The next workshop will also work to identify more specific 'on-ramps' and 'bridges' for international navies to join Sea Power 21 in ways that are mutually beneficial to them and the United States Navy. The next workshop is scheduled for late February 2005. A workshop report will be produced and followed by a comprehensive 'white paper' whose purpose will be to assist leadership in developing options for effective implementation.