

# *R* **Research** *Memorandum*

## **Sources of Instability:**

**A Sampling from the United Nations  
Secretariat**

**By**

**Bradd C. Hayes**

**Jeffrey I. Sands**

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE



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WARFARE STUDIES

## Report Documentation Page

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# **Sources of Instability: A Sampling from the United Nations Secretariat**

by Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands

## **INTRODUCTION**

This analysis is a supplement to a broader project sponsored by the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC).<sup>1</sup> This portion of the project, funded by the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), addresses the sources of instability in today's security environment as viewed by staff personnel in the United Nations (UN). We traveled to New York on 29 May 1997, with COL Alan Stolberg, USA, to brief members of the UN Secretariat and the United States (US) Permanent Mission to the United Nations on the preliminary results of the JWAC project and to solicit their reactions. Following the briefing to UN personnel, we conducted a 61-question poll of the participants using electronic voting boxes. Our goal was to see if UN personnel had a different view of complex emergencies (and their sources) than participants in three workshops conducted as part of the JWAC project.

The briefing at the United Nations was held in the Situation Center conference room and was attended by nine people representing various departments and divisions of the Secretariat. They included participants from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Situation Center, the Field Administration and Logistics Division, and the Library and Publications Division. In Annex A to this report we provide the questions we used during the survey and the raw scores from the voting. Given the small sampling size of the UN group (nine participants), it would be misleading to draw too many conclusions from the voting results or our subsequent analysis. Unexpected outcomes could well be anomalies that would disappear were a different and/or larger group sampled. Our analysis suggests that the UN is aware of its limitations, prefers diplomacy to coercion, and is increasingly pragmatic in its approach to maintaining international peace and security. Nevertheless, based on our results, the military—including the US military—will continue to respond to complex emergencies largely in the context of UN Security Council authorization and should therefore prepare itself for those eventualities.

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<sup>1</sup> This memorandum is a supplement to the larger project report, *Doing Windows: Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies*, Decision Support Department Research Report 97-1 (Newport: Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1997).

## ANALYSIS

In designing the poll, we had three objectives in mind. First, we wanted to find out how UN personnel viewed the need for international inter-organizational planning. Second, we wanted to learn which operational sectors of a complex contingency operation UN personnel thought were most critical during the various phases of a complex emergency. Third, we wanted to determine if UN personnel believed there were any new sources of instability in the world and, if so, what they might be. We address each of these issues in turn.

### *Inter-organizational Planning*

When Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserted that “it is necessary to enunciate a coherent vision, strategy and plan of action which integrate all the relevant dimensions of the problem, including humanitarian, political and security.”<sup>2</sup> To date, however, civil-military operations could be reasonably characterized as sincere but disjointed efforts. To overcome this challenge, the Congressional Hunger Center has developed a framework for drafting a civilian comprehensive campaign plan.<sup>3</sup> We asked UN respondents whether they thought a civilian comprehensive campaign plan was a good idea; uniformly, the answer was yes.<sup>4</sup> Next, we asked them who should be responsible for drafting such a plan, offering the following options:<sup>5</sup>

- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO)
- UN Department of Political Affairs (UN DPA)
- UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN DHA)
- A UN committee (composition undetermined)
- The nation leading the international response (lead nation)
- The International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent
- The UN Development Program

Not surprisingly, UN respondents, as shown in Figure 1, overwhelmingly believed that the United Nations should have the lead in developing a civilian comprehensive campaign plan. Precisely whom in the United Nations should be responsible was a matter of debate, with the plurality of UN respondents voting for a committee.


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<sup>2</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations in Somalia 1992-1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 85.

<sup>3</sup> See Arthur E. Dewey, “Peace/Humanitarian Operations, Introducing the ‘Comprehensive Campaign Plan’: A Humanitarian/Political/Military Partnership in ‘Total Asset’ Planning for Complex Humanitarian Emergencies,” unpublished paper, Congressional Hunger Center, September 1996 draft.

<sup>4</sup> See Question 6, Annex A.

<sup>5</sup> See Question 7, Annex A. We also offered an “Other” and “No opinion” response.



**Figure 1. Who should be responsible for drafting a Comprehensive Campaign Plan?**

### ***Importance of Operational Phases, Activities, and Sectors***

Our second objective was to compare how the views of UN personnel compared to JWAC workshop participants with regard to the importance of various types of activities during the different phases of complex emergencies.


#### **Complex emergency phases**

We used the breakdown of complex emergency phases developed by JWAC participants. While recognizing that there could be an infinite number of ways of breaking up and applying the contexts within which peace operations take place, JWAC workshop participants developed a five-stage continuum with the following working definitions:

- *Pre-crisis*: A situation is developing for which a peace operation may yet be mandated, but no external actors have altered existing assistance patterns in response.
- *Expansion*: Policy decisions trigger a significant increase in external assistance. This stage is usually the period of greatest international attention as peace operations are established.
- *Stabilization*: Primarily because of the establishment of the peace operation, the situation on the ground has stabilized, but a return to ‘normalcy’ (i.e., pre-crisis) is still uncertain.

- *Drawdown*: The attention of external actors decreases, as does their presence, as the peace operation begins to wind down (or transition).
- *Post-crisis*: A return to normalcy, though under conditions that may differ sharply from those of the pre-crisis stage. A stage extending as far as three years beyond the cessation of the initial peace operation.

Each stage is important in and of itself. In Figure 2, we compare the ratings (inferred from individual votes) of JWAC participants and UN respondents regarding the importance of each phase of a complex emergency.<sup>6</sup>



**Figure 2. Comparison of phase importance**

As might be expected, UN participants believed the initial phases of a crisis are the most important. During side discussions, they indicated their strong belief that prevention was better than cure. Hence, if there is a surprise in the outcome, it is that the pre-crisis phase was not given more importance. It is not surprising that JWAC participants believed the three middle phases were the most important because they consisted primarily of practitioners who naturally focus on the challenges of contingency operations which take place during the period covered by those phases.


<sup>6</sup> In questions 8 through 27, we asked UN participants to rate the importance of each assistance type across the continuum by answering the following question for each: “Is the assistance type: (1) extremely important; (2) reasonably important; or (3) slightly important in the phase, or (4) does it have no role?” We then weighted the results shown in Annex A (multiplying the resulting percentages by four, three, two, and one, respectively) and then compared the cumulative weighted scores for each phase. The percentages shown in Figure 2 for the UN respondents are the percent of each phase’s cumulative score compared to the overall cumulative score. The JWAC participants voted on vote prioritizations for each assistance type across the continuum. We inferred the relative priority of the stages by using the mean score for each across the types of external assistance. Using these mean scores, we then charted the cumulative mean score for each continuum stage.

### International response activities

Next, we wanted to evaluate how important different aspects of international efforts were viewed across the phases of a complex emergency. We did this first by comparing the importance of four types of activities:

- Military
- UN non-military
- Non-UN (i.e., individual nation or coalition) non-military
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

Figure 3 displays the results of the voting.<sup>7</sup>




**Figure 3. Importance of various types of international activity**

Overall, UN respondents believed that non-military types of assistance are three times as important as military assistance. In terms of who should be providing that non-military assistance, UN respondents were almost equally split between assistance provided by the United Nations, individual states or coalitions, or NGOs (though in that order).

<sup>7</sup> Using weighted scores from questions 8-27 (see note 6), we calculated the cumulative importance of each type of assistance across all five stages of the continuum. In Figure 3, we report the percent of each type compared to the overall scores.

### Types of assistance by complex emergency phase

Figure 4 brings it all together by showing what types of assistance were considered important during which phase of the complex emergency. Throughout an emergency, as noted above, non-military assistance is recommended nearly three-to-one over military activities.



**Figure 4. Importance of assistant types across complex emergency phases.**

Finally, we compared the assessment of the importance of eight operational sectors for a complex contingency operation conducted in response to a complex emergency. These sectors were drawn from Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, signed by the president 20 May 1997.<sup>8</sup> In order of presentation in the plan, the sectors are:<sup>9</sup>

- Diplomacy
- Military Activities
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Internal Politics
- Civil Law and Order/Public Security

<sup>8</sup> At our third JWAC workshop, a representative from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources presented a paper on the "Generic Pol-Mil Plan," derived from the draft Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) then under consideration by an interagency group. Note that the PDD itself does not include a listing of major functional component tasks, but does provide a listing of critical parts of the operation that generally (though not precisely) mirrors the operational sectors. Nevertheless, the Generic Pol-Mil Plan's operational sectors are still used by the interagency community in developing a Pol-Mil Plan. We have updated the listing of major functional component tasks detailed under each operational sector from a 4 August 1997 version of the Generic Pol-Mil Plan provided by the National Security Council staff.

<sup>9</sup> The sector names have changed slightly from the earlier draft used for polling.

- Public Information and Education
- Infrastructure and Economic Restoration
- Human Rights and Social Development

### **Details by phase**

The point of the voting was not to determine precise priorities across stages or to determine statistically significant differences across assistance types within stages, but rather to determine general trends. Based on participants' vote prioritizations, the message is that there is a role for all types of external assistance. As the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) notes in its 1996 Strategic Plan:

The much discussed issue of a relief to development 'continuum' is often misunderstood as implying a linear process of development which is disrupted by a crisis. Rather there are ongoing, often overlapping and irregular, phases of relief, rehabilitation, and development.<sup>10</sup>

Even though all types of assistance are important, clearly their emphasis changes across each phase of a complex emergency, which we will examine in turn.

#### **Pre-Crisis Phase**

When asked, "Which operational sector is most important during the pre-crisis phase," the UN respondents believed that two sectors (diplomacy, and human rights & social services) play the most important role (with 63 percent of those responding naming one of them).<sup>11</sup> The three other sectors named (internal politics, public security, and infrastructure & economy) received one vote each. Using pairwise comparisons, UN respondents consistently ranked United Nations and individual state (or coalition) *non-military activities* as more important than other kinds.<sup>12</sup> When compared head-to-head, these two types of *non-military activities* received an equal number of votes.<sup>13</sup> The underlying belief appears to be that a combination of UN and member state involvement is required during the pre-crisis phase in order to prevent a smoldering complex emergency crisis from igniting. These groups should be engaged in diplomatic activities to prevent the outbreak of violence and protect human rights.

#### **Expansion Phase**

If expansion of international activity occurs in response to an unfolding complex emergency, it means preventive measures have failed and violence has erupted. As a direct consequence, participants voted public security/law and order as the most important sector during this phase (38 percent), followed by the military and diplomatic sectors which each

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<sup>10</sup> Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, *Strategic Plan* (Washington, DC: USAID, 1996), p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> See Question 1, Annex A.

<sup>12</sup> See Questions 28–33, Annex A.

<sup>13</sup> See Question 31, Annex A.

received 25 percent of the votes.<sup>14</sup> The only other sector receiving a vote was internal politics. Analyzing the pairwise comparisons, military activities are more important than any of the others during this phase.<sup>15</sup> Military activities are followed in importance by UN non-military and individual state (or coalition) activities. The fact that internal politics received only one vote is a bit surprising, though the small sampling size could account for this result.<sup>16</sup> In a recent edited volume, Michael Brown asserts that “most major internal conflicts are triggered by internal, elite-level actors—to put it bluntly, bad leaders—contrary to what policymakers, popular commentary, and the scholarly literature on the subject generally suggest.”<sup>17</sup> If correct, Brown’s conclusion suggests that significant attention needs to be paid to internal politics throughout a crisis.

### **Stabilization Phase**

Fully 50 percent of the respondents felt that the military activity sector was the most important during the stabilization phase.<sup>18</sup> The remaining votes were equally split among the public security and humanitarian assistance sectors. The only surprise, and one which might have been eliminated had a larger sample been taken, was that no one cast a vote for the diplomatic activity sector. According to the participants in other workshops, diplomatic activities remain important throughout a crisis. This outcome was even more surprising since the UN respondents voted almost 2 to 1 that UN non-military activities were more important than military activities, or any other kind of activities, during this phase.<sup>19</sup> Military activity finished second in importance. In this instance, the respondents true feelings are more likely expressed in the pairwise comparison votes than in the single vote asking which is most important.

### **Drawdown Phase**

Protecting human rights and providing adequate social services were the areas UN respondents considered most critical during the drawdown phase.<sup>20</sup> Whether a crisis ends in outright victory, or through intervention and mediation, the thirst for revenge remains strong. The difference is that an international presence may be able to prevent it. Charles King noted that when the international community is not involved and a civil war ends in victory for one side, it is not unusual for the victory to be “associated with widespread human-rights abuses, atrocities, genocide, environmental degradation and a host of other ills

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<sup>14</sup> See Question 2, Annex A.

<sup>15</sup> See Questions 34–39, Annex A.

<sup>16</sup> See Question 2, Annex A.

<sup>17</sup> Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 571.

<sup>18</sup> See Question 3, Annex A.

<sup>19</sup> See Questions 40–45, Annex A.

<sup>20</sup> See Question 4, Annex A.

which make economic reconstruction and political reconciliation especially difficult.”<sup>21</sup> As King’s quotation might suggest, the complementary areas of public security and infrastructure/economy also received strong support. Military activities also received a vote, but clearly the importance of the military was diminished during this phase. In fact, during the pairwise comparisons, all other activities were deemed more important than those of the military.<sup>22</sup> UN activities were considered the most important, with non-governmental organization and individual state (or coalition) activities receiving an equal vote.<sup>23</sup>

### **Post-crisis Phase**

The crux of the JWAC project was to determine what the military could do during its time in country to help others achieve success in the post-crisis phase. The Infrastructure/Economy sector received all but one vote as the most important sector during this phase.<sup>24</sup> The outlier vote was for the human rights/social services sector. Based on that vote, the activities of NGOs and individual states and coalitions should have been deemed the most essential. While those sectors did receive strong support, UN activities received even stronger support.<sup>25</sup> This anomaly is best explained by the bias of the respondents for the United Nations and its activities, and the fact that they are very aware of the United Nation’s important work during both crisis and peace.

## **NEW SOURCES OF INSTABILITY**

When asked if the sources of international or internal instability have changed, the UN respondents unanimously agreed that they had,<sup>26</sup> offering the following new sources:

- Splintering states
- Nationalism
- Declining international involvement
- Increasing international crime
- New belief systems (including religious fundamentalism)
- Removal of the bloc system

The last of these sources of instability has not been the catalyst for violence, but rather a necessary condition that allowed the other sources to emerge. The inclusion of international crime on the list should give the military pause. Although the military has expended

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<sup>21</sup> Charles King, *Ending Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 308 (London: IISS, 1997), pp. 12-13.

<sup>22</sup> See Questions 46–51, Annex A.

<sup>23</sup> See Question 51, Annex A.

<sup>24</sup> See Question 5, Annex A.

<sup>25</sup> See Questions 52–57, Annex A.

<sup>26</sup> See Question 60, Annex A.

considerable resources in the fight against drugs, few if any military leaders believe crime-fighting is a mission suited for the armed forces. As other types of crime increase, the military may find itself dragged into an expanding quagmire of law enforcement operations. Two analysts conclude in a recent article: "As national security experts continue to evaluate the global environment, strategic assessments will likely include the issues concerning transnational threats such as drug trafficking, terrorism, international organized crime, and failed or failing nations."<sup>27</sup> Even if the military is able to sidestep the crime arena, it will be drawn into the other areas—almost all of which involve smaller scale contingencies.

It must be remembered that the list generated above does not represent all, or even most, of the root causes of instability. We asked the UN respondents for *new* sources of instability. Respondents assumed that most, if not all, of the old causes still posed problems as well. Ambassador Robert Oakley detailed some these systemic factors:

Unrest in troubled states is fueled by long-term, systemic crises such as overpopulation, environmental damage, food shortages, poverty, income disparity, corruption, and bad governance as well as societal divisions. There is also a propensity to appeal to ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or other forms of separatism for solace, protection, and identity.<sup>28</sup>

Oakley recommends an international approach that deals simultaneously with both the symptoms and causes of crisis. If the former are ignored, chaos and killing are the inevitable end. If the latter are ignored, the international community will find themselves repeating the same operation time and again. For the military, this means anticipating having to perform more non-traditional missions during complex contingency operations. Recently, such activities have fallen under the pejorative label of "mission creep"—a term which first appeared in response to the Unified Task Force operation in Somalia. As Dayton Maxwell of World Vision International laments, "Political sensitivities connected with 'mission creep' are currently keeping the range of on-the-ground military activities in peace operations to a minimum, even though traditional military assistance programs for years have worked in civic action programs."<sup>29</sup> General Anthony Zinni, USMC, agrees with our assessment. "I am in the minority," he writes, "but I believe that we need to take on some of these missions."<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> William W. Mendel and Murl D. Munger, "The Drug Threat: Getting Priorities Straight," *Parameters*, Summer 1997, p. 122

<sup>28</sup> Robert B. Oakley, "Developing a Strategy for Troubled States," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1996, p. 82

<sup>29</sup> Dayton Maxwell, "Can I Do That and My Job, Too?" Paper presented at the Cornwallis Group conference, Analysis and the Resolution of Conflict, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, April 1997, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Anthony Zinni, "The SJA in Future Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 1996, p. 16.

## *Stability and change*

We know of no one who believes the world will not continue to change. In fact, for most of this decade one of the primary goals of the National Security Strategy of the United States has been promoting international change. There has been considerable debate, however, whether or not change inevitably leads to instability. Those responsible for drafting the National Security Strategy believe that stability can be maintained—even enhanced—by change. This view is also apparently held by UN personnel. Those sampled overwhelmingly believed that change and stability can be promoted simultaneously.<sup>31</sup>

## **PARTICIPANT BIAS?**

To determine any biases, we asked participants to select the United Nations' most and least important of four UN missions—prevention, peacekeeping, inducement, and enforcement—during complex emergencies.<sup>32</sup> UN respondents were more readily able to agree on the least important of these missions for the United Nations to perform—enforcement. This is a widely held belief both within the UN and among its member states, and it is undoubtedly the result of the experiences the UN has suffered in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda.<sup>33</sup> Member nations, especially the United States, have demonstrated time and again their unwillingness to entrust any operation to the United Nations which poses a significant risk to a nation's own participating forces. The UN's financial crisis, precipitated largely by the US Congress' reluctance to remit the money the United Nations deems owed it by the United States, also partially accounts for the United Nations' distaste for enforcement (in part because enforcement costs more than traditional peacekeeping operations).

Participants were fairly evenly split between prevention, peacekeeping, and inducement as missions the United Nations ought to undertake.<sup>34</sup> One conclusion which can be inferred from the voting patterns is that UN participants see the United Nations primarily as a forum for diplomatic initiatives, not military ones. As a result, they expressed the view that the United Nations has a continuing diplomatic role to play in any complex emergency,

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<sup>31</sup> See Question 61, Annex A.

<sup>32</sup> See Questions 58 and 59, Annex A.

<sup>33</sup> See Donald C.F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, *Talons of the Dove: Coercive Inducement and the Containment of Crises* (draft manuscript).

<sup>34</sup> Inducement is “a process of persuading, bringing about or causing. Inducement casts its net over all forms of influence from reasoned discussion to threat of military force. This option is premised on the possibility that the consent of critical parties is fragile or ambiguous and that the role of UN-sanctioned forces is to convince all concerned to assent, even if only grudgingly, without conducting widespread and sustained combat operations.” Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, “Securing Observance of UN Mandates Through the Employment of Military Force,” in Michael Pugh, ed., *The UN, Peace and Force* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 108.

regardless of the phase or type of mission involved. This is in line with the views of the participants in our first JWAC workshop.<sup>35</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

The United Nations remains most comfortable (and is best adapted for) dealing with small, traditional peace operations (i.e., like those the United Nations conducted prior to 1990). The recent media and congressional focus on Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and the like has provided the mistaken impression that the UN is primarily an inept peacekeeping organization. Its quiet successes in peacekeeping and other areas have been overlooked or ignored. The fact that the United Nations has become the US Congress' favorite target and scapegoat has not helped. Our study indicates that the UN is aware of its limitations, prefers diplomacy to coercion, but is increasingly pragmatic in its approach to maintaining international peace and security. It also indicates that UN personnel recognize there are new sources of instability which will challenge both them and other international players.

As the UN's resources continue to decrease, so too must its level of activity. Unfortunately, there are no apparent groups waiting on the sidelines to shoulder the load. Although the importance of other international actors, such as non-governmental organizations, may increase, they, too, are trying to stem off significant decreases in the governmental resources available to them. Even states which have for years offered their good offices and resources primarily out of altruism, are basing their decisions more and more on self-interest.<sup>36</sup> When taken together, this means that little political will be generated for either crisis prevention or early intervention. This means the military will continue to be thrust into smaller scale contingencies at their peak of intractability.

The military cannot by itself solve any of the underlying causes of complex emergencies. Its role is to buy time for other instruments of foreign policy to work. Lacking the availability or utilization of those other instruments, the military's best course appears trying to dissuade policymakers from inserting military forces for other than humanitarian purposes. At the end of day, however, the decision of when and to what extent US forces will get involved in a complex contingency operation is political not military. We conclude in our larger study that the military will continue to respond to complex emergencies and that it should prepare itself for those eventualities.

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
<sup>35</sup> As shown in Figure 1, the JWAC participants also believed that diplomatic (labeled below as political) activity has an important and continuing role during all phases of a contingency (averaging about one-fifth of the entire effort throughout).

<sup>36</sup> See Bo Huldt, "Working Multilaterally: The Old Peacekeepers' Viewpoint," in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995), p. 114.

**Annex A:  
Survey Listing and Voting Data**

**1. Which operational sector is most important during the pre-crisis phase?**


Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Diplomacy	3	38%
2 - Military Activities	0	0%
3 - Internal Politics	1	13%
4 - Public Security / Law and	1	13%
5 - Humanitarian Assistance	0	0%
6 - Infrastructure and Econo	1	13%
7 - Human Rights and Social	2	25%
8 - Public Information and Ed	0	0%
9 - No opinion	0	0%



1 - 38% 2 - 0% 3 - 13% 4 - 13% 5 - 0% 6 - 13% 7 - 25% 8 - 0% 9 - 0%

**2. Which operational sector is most important during the expansion phase?**


Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Diplomacy	2	25%
2 - Military Activities	2	25%
3 - Internal Politics	1	13%
4 - Public Security / Law and	3	38%
5 - Humanitarian Assistance	0	0%
6 - Infrastructure and Econo	0	0%
7 - Human Rights and Social	0	0%
8 - Public Information and Ed	0	0%
9 - No opinion	0	0%



1 - 25% 2 - 25% 3 - 13% 4 - 38% 5 - 0% 6 - 0% 7 - 0% 8 - 0% 9 - 0%

**3. Which operational sector is most important during the stabilization phase?**


Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Diplomacy	0	0%
2 - Military Activities	4	50%
3 - Internal Politics	0	0%
4 - Public Security / Law and	2	25%
5 - Humanitarian Assistance	2	25%
6 - Infrastructure and Econo	0	0%
7 - Human Rights and Social	0	0%
8 - Public Information and Ed	0	0%
9 - No opinion	0	0%



1 - 0% 2 - 50% 3 - 0% 4 - 25% 5 - 25% 6 - 0% 7 - 0% 8 - 0% 9 - 0%


4. Which operational sector is most important during the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Diplomacy	0	0%
2 - Military Activities	1	13%
3 - Internal Politics	0	0%
4 - Public Security / Law and	2	25%
5 - Humanitarian Assistance	0	0%
6 - Infrastructure and Econo	2	25%
7 - Human Rights and Social	3	38%
8 - Public Information and Ed	0	0%
9 - No opinion	0	0%



5. Which operational sector is most important during the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Diplomacy	0	0%
2 - Military Activities	0	0%
3 - Internal Politics	0	0%
4 - Public Security / Law and	0	0%
5 - Humanitarian Assistance	0	0%
6 - Infrastructure and Econo	7	88%
7 - Human Rights and Social	1	13%
8 - Public Information and Ed	0	0%
9 - No opinion	0	0%




6. Is a civilian comprehensive campaign a good idea?

Answer	Number	Percent
Yes	8	100%
No	0	0%




7. Who should be responsible for drafting it?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - NGOs	0	0%
2 - Lead nation	1	13%
3 - UN DPKO	1	13%
4 - UN DPA	2	25%
5 - UN DHA	1	13%
6 - UNDP	0	0%
7 - ICRC	0	0%
8 - UN Committee	3	38%
9 - Other	0	0%
10 - No opinion	0	0%




8. How important are military activities in the pre-crisis stage?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	1	13%
2 - Reasonably important	2	25%
3 - Slightly important	3	38%
4 - Has no role	2	25%




9. How important are military activities in the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	4	50%
2 - Reasonably important	4	50%
3 - Slightly important	0	0%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




10. How important are military activities in the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	4	50%
2 - Reasonably important	3	38%
3 - Slightly important	1	13%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




11. How important are military activities in the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	1	13%
2 - Reasonably important	2	25%
3 - Slightly important	5	63%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




12. How important are military activities in the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	0	0%
2 - Reasonably important	2	25%
3 - Slightly important	5	63%
4 - Has no role	1	13%




13. How important are UN non-military activities in the pre-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	5	63%
2 - Reasonably important	3	38%
3 - Slightly important	0	0%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




14. How important are UN non-military activities in the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	7	88%
2 - Reasonably important	1	13%
3 - Slightly important	0	0%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




15. How important are UN non-military activities in the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	6	75%
2 - Reasonably important	2	25%
3 - Slightly important	0	0%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




**16. How important are UN non-military activities in the draw-down phase?**

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	4	50%
2 - Reasonably important	3	38%
3 - Slightly important	1	13%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




**17. How important are UN non-military activities in the post-crisis phase?**

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	2	25%
2 - Reasonably important	4	50%
3 - Slightly important	2	25%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




**18. How important are activities by individual states (and/or coalitions) in the pre-crisis phase?**

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	4	50%
2 - Reasonably important	3	38%
3 - Slightly important	1	13%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




19. How important are activities by individual states (and/or coalitions) in the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	4	50%
2 - Reasonably important	3	38%
3 - Slightly important	1	13%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




20. How important are activities by individual states (and/or coalitions) in the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	2	25%
2 - Reasonably important	5	63%
3 - Slightly important	1	13%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




21. How important are activities by individual states (and/or coalitions) in the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	2	25%
2 - Reasonably important	5	63%
3 - Slightly important	1	13%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




22. How important are activities by individual states (and/or coalitions) in the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	3	38%
2 - Reasonably important	2	25%
3 - Slightly important	3	38%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




23. How important are NGOs in the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	0	0%
2 - Reasonably important	6	75%
3 - Slightly important	2	25%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




24. How important are NGOs in the pre-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	1	13%
2 - Reasonably important	2	25%
3 - Slightly important	4	50%
4 - Has no role	1	13%




25. How important are NGOs in the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	3	38%
2 - Reasonably important	4	50%
3 - Slightly important	1	13%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




26. How important are NGOs in the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	3	38%
2 - Reasonably important	5	63%
3 - Slightly important	0	0%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




27. How important are NGOs in the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Extremely important	3	38%
2 - Reasonably important	4	50%
3 - Slightly important	1	13%
4 - Has no role	0	0%




28. Which is more important during the pre-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	0	0%
2 - United Nations non-militar	8	100%




29. Which is more important during the pre-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	1	13%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	7	88%




30. Which is more important during the pre-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	2	25%
2 - NGO activity	6	75%




31. Which is more important during the pre-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	4	50%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	4	50%




32. Which is more important during the pre-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	7	88%
2 - NGO activity	1	13%




33. Which is more important during the pre-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Individual state (or coalitio	8	100%
2 - NGO activity	0	0%




34. Which is more important during the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	6	75%
2 - United Nations non-militar	2	25%




35. Which is more important during the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	5	63%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	3	38%




36. Which is more important during the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	6	75%
2 - NGO activity	2	25%




37. Which is more important during the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	6	75%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	2	25%




38. Which is more important during the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	5	63%
2 - NGO activity	3	38%




39. Which is more important during the expansion phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Individual state (or coalitio	5	63%
2 - NGO activity	3	38%




40. Which is more important during the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	3	38%
2 - United Nations non-militar	5	63%




41. Which is more important during the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	5	63%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	3	38%




42. Which is more important during the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	5	63%
2 - NGO activity	3	38%




43. Which is more important during the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	6	75%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	2	25%




44. Which is more important during the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	8	100%
2 - NGO activity	0	0%




45. Which is more important during the stabilization phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Individual state (or coalitio	5	63%
2 - NGO activity	3	38%




46. Which is more important during the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	0	0%
2 - United Nations non-militar	8	100%




47. Which is more important during the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	3	38%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	5	63%




48. Which is more important during the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	2	25%
2 - NGO activity	6	75%




49. Which is more important during the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	6	75%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	2	25%




50. Which is more important during the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	6	75%
2 - NGO activity	2	25%




51. Which is more important during the draw-down phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Individual state (or coalitio	4	50%
2 - NGO activity	4	50%




52. Which is more important during the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	0	0%
2 - United Nations non-militar	8	100%




53. Which is more important during the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	2	25%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	6	75%




54. Which is more important during the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Military activity	1	13%
2 - NGO activity	7	88%




55. Which is more important during the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	6	75%
2 - Individual state (or coalitio	2	25%




56. Which is more important during the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - United Nations non-militar	4	50%
2 - NGO activity	4	50%




57. Which is more important during the post-crisis phase?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Individual state (or coalitio	4	50%
2 - NGO activity	4	50%




58. What is the most important role for the United Nations in complex emergencies?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Prevention	3	38%
2 - Peacekeeping	2	25%
3 - Inducement	3	38%
4 - Enforcement	0	0%




59. What is the least important role for the United Nations in complex emergencies?

Answer	Number	Percent
1 - Prevention	0	0%
2 - Peacekeeping	0	0%
3 - Inducement	1	13%
4 - Enforcement	7	88%



60. Have the sources of international or internal stability changed?

Answer	Number	Percent
Yes	8	100%
No	0	0%



61. Can change and stability be promoted simultaneously?

Answer	Number	Percent
Yes	7	88%
No	1	13%

