



HOW AIRLIFT MEETS U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND'S REQUIREMENTS

GRADUATE RESEARCH PROJECT

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Table of Contents

	Page
Acknowledgments.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
List of Figures.....	viii
List of Tables	ix
Abstract.....	x
I. Introduction	1
Background.....	1
Problem Statement.....	4
Impact on Mission.....	5
Investigative Questions.....	6
II. Legal Considerations and Constraints.....	7
Constitutional Statutes	7
Posse Comitatus Act	7
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act	9
Economy Act	10
Insurrection Act	11
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.....	11
Orders and Directives	12
Executive Order 12656	12
Department of Defense Directive 3025.1	13
Department of Defense Directive 3025.12	14
Department of Defense Directive 5525.5	15
III. Interagency Coordination.....	17
Supporting Relationship to Lead Federal Agency	17
Crisis Management versus Consequence Management.....	17
Mission and Responsibilities	19
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).....	19
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).....	19
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	20

Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS)	21
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).....	22
Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS)	23
Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS)	23
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)	24
U.S. Air Force (USAF)	24
AF Agency for National Security and Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP).....	25
Air Mobility Command (AMC).....	25
Civil Support.....	26
Civil Support Missions	26
Civil Support Response Levels.....	27
IV. The Primary Users of Airlift.....	31
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	31
Federal Response Plan (FRP)	32
Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN)	34
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).....	35
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs).....	36
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).....	38
Technical Escort Unit (TEU)	39
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) / Ready Reaction Force (RRF)	39
V. Tasking Airlift.....	41
Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)	41
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD).....	41
TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI)	42
TPFDD Development	42
TPFDD Validation Process.....	44
Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Priority System.....	46
U.S. Northern Command's TPFDD Movement (Notional).....	48
Supporting a Lead Federal Agency.....	48
Supporting the Department of Defense.....	50
VI. Force Management	52
Presentation of Forces.....	52
Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF).....	52
Air Mobility Command's Aerospace Expeditionary Force Implementation.....	54
Federal Forces (Title 10) vs. Militia Forces (Title 32)	55
Control of Forces	57

Combatant Command (COCOM)	58
Operational Control (OPCON)	58
Tactical Control (TACON)	59
Administrative Control (ADCON)	60
Coordinating Authority	60
Key Players	61
Joint Force Commander (JFC).....	61
Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)	61
Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR).....	62
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).....	63
U.S. Northern Command’s Task Force Structures (Notional).....	64
Single Service Task Force	65
Single Service Task Force thru Air Component Commander	66
Joint Task Force	67
Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (S-JTFHQ)	68
VII. Conclusion.....	70
Conclusion	70
Recommendations.....	73
Areas for Further Research	74
List of Acronyms	76
Bibliography	81
Vita.....	86

List of Figures

Figure	Page
1. Spectrum of Air Force Contributions	3
2. Crisis and Consequence Management	18
3. Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions	31
4. Federal Response Plan Elements	33
5. Current States with WMD-CSTs	37
6. TPFDD Movement [MSCA/MACA/MACDIS]	49
7. TPFDD Movement [QRF/JTF-CS/CLEAR SKIES]	51
8. Single Service Task Force	65
9. Single Service Task Force thru Air Component	66
10. Joint Task Force	68
11. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters	69

List of Tables

Table	Page
1. Civil Support Response Levels.....	28
2. JCS Priority Designators.....	47

Abstract

The role of the military in civil affairs has seemed to present distinct challenges. Whether the constraints are legal, physical, or simply a lack of appropriate guidance and training, the process by which the military is tasked and how the assets are allocated has changed with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and its military arm, U.S. Northern Command. The research completed in this paper provides a look at the key elements and factors affecting the use of military airlift in support of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security. The end result is a starting point for U.S. Northern Command's airlift planners in understanding many of the legal, doctrinal, and physical factors which impact the way in which airlift is utilized for civil support. A final emphasis is on how the Air Force can present airlift forces, preferable in the form of an AETF, to support a Joint Task Force supporting U.S. Northern Command's mission.

The findings include how legal constraints on the military, while providing civil assistance, might be outdated and need to change to reflect the current climate of the United States. The movement of civilian agency assets, such as those from FEMA, brings unique challenges which can be overcome with effective deliberate planning. The need for education on the TPFDD process and instilling TPFDD discipline within the echelons will enhance the flow of forces to support civilian agencies. The need to redesign the JCS Priority System is necessary to aid in stratifying movements with the same priority. The Air Force must appropriately tailor their AETFs to support the JTF's or SSTF's specific requirements. The use of Standing JTFs are effective, provide continuity, and foster long-term interagency relationships. Finally, USNORTHCOM must evaluate the impact the ARC has on its ability to accomplish their mission.

HOW AIRLIFT MEETS U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND'S REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, against domestic Violence.

Article IV, Section 4
United States Constitution

Background

The role of the military in civil affairs has seemed to present distinct challenges. Whether the constraints are legal, physical, or simply a lack of appropriate guidance and training, the process by which the military is tasked and how the assets are allocated has changed with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and its military arm, U.S. Northern Command. The President, as the Chief Executive Officer of the United States (U.S.) Government and Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of all U.S. military forces, authorizes the use of federal resources for domestic support operations. During disasters or other periods of national emergency, the President “provides guidance and direction to federal departments, agencies, activities, and other organizations.” (DA, 1993:2-1) The unique capabilities of the military enable it to support federal, state, or local civilian agencies. “In most circumstances, the Department of Defense (DOD) is one of many federal agencies reacting to a domestic emergency or crisis, playing a subordinate, supporting role to a lead, civilian agency.” (DA, 1993:3-0)

The majority of domestic support the United States military provides is categorized as Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) or Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACDIS). This support to civilian agencies can take several forms. At the state level, a governor can employ National Guard (either Army National Guard or Air National Guard) forces in state active-duty status in response to natural disasters, civil disturbances, and other extreme circumstances. If an incident results in requirements that exceed the state's ability to respond, the governor may request assistance from the President of the United States (POTUS), who can then order the employment of federal forces. In most instances, military assets are deployed domestically in a supporting role to the Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) only when DOD assistance is explicitly requested and approved by the President. (Hook, 2003) To assist in this process the DOD determined there was a need for a centralized point of contact for all military assistance in domestic affairs. On October 1, 2002, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) stood up, a new unified command with the geographic responsibility of the United States and its territories, focused on Homeland Defense/ Homeland Security (HLD/HLS). (JCS, 2002b) President Bush, in concurrence with Congress, determined the need for a department level agency with the focus on HLD/HLS was critical to ensuring the safety and way of life of Americans. On March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stood up, realigning many existing organizations under a single umbrella, such as FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard.

These newest additions will ensure both federal and military organizations have clear lines of communication and command to enable effective prevention of terrorist

activities and rapid response to domestic emergencies. However, from an aspect of military support, the true challenge is to efficiently manage the Active, Reserve, and Guard resources available while still maintaining the ongoing operational commitments abroad, such as Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, Joint Guardian, and Joint Forge, and traditional training at home to ensure the units are prepared for their wartime mission. The restructuring and absorption of organizations through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command has made previously used processes obsolete and the new processes unclear.




Figure 1. Spectrum of Air Force Contributions (DAF, 2002c:10)

Air Mobility Command's C-130 will be the workhorse in fulfilling the air movement of people and equipment within USNORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR). The C-130 is imbedded in all three facets of the 'total force' paradigm, Active, Reserve, and National Guard. The function of the C-130 will be to provide the intra-theater airlift for USNORTHCOM.

As a geographic command, USNORTHCOM should be able to employ forces in a similar manner as any other geographic command, in the form of Joint Task Forces (JTF). This was seen recently, when JTF-Columbia stood up in response to the Shuttle Columbia disaster. The specific JTFs will be tailored and sized to meet the specific force level allocated by the President. Realizing the need for rapid response to a crisis or disaster, USNORTHCOM has designated two permanent JTFs designate Standing-JTF Civil Support (S-JTF-CS) and Standing-JTF Homeland Security (S-JTF-HLS). Through this structure USNORTHCOM can take appropriate control of the airlift assets to employ them throughout the theater.

Problem Statement

The role of the military in civil affairs is constrained legally, physically, and lacks current guidance and training; the process by which the military is tasked and how the assets are allocated has changed with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and its military arm, U.S. Northern Command. These new entities have promise to be an effective solution to the patchwork of agencies and organizations which required extensive coordination to provide the needed capabilities to protect Americans and their way of life in the past. Additionally, these creations have brought a tremendous number

of resources under their control; however, both DHS and USNORTHCOM are still ironing out the processes by which to manage their respective assets.

By understanding the legal constraints and procedures imposed on the military, such as the Posse Comitatus Act, it will allow us to understand the restrictions placed on the DOD in supporting civil affairs. We can provide valuable insight into ‘where’ the airlift assets are the right tool for the job by defining the responsibilities of the key organizations, from the Department of Homeland Security down to Air Mobility Command. We can provide valuable insight into ‘what’ the airlift assets will be transporting by looking at the primary users; whether they are Quick Reaction Forces (QRF), Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), or simply humanitarian supplies. Finally, we can provide valuable insight into ‘how’ the airlift assets will be tasked to support the requirements of USNORTHCOM. With this insight, when applied to current joint doctrine, we should be able to determine how to effectively employ airlift in support as an element of a joint or single service task force.

Impact on Mission

The research completed in this paper should provide a look at the key elements and factors affecting the use of military airlift in support of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security. The end result should provide a starting point for USNORTHCOM airlift planners in understanding many of the legal, doctrinal, and physical factors which impact the way in which airlift is utilized for civil support. This paper could provide a basis for follow-on questions, such as the assignment of Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations to USNORTHCOM or permanent assignment of airlift assets under

USNORTHCOM, as already seen in Pacific Command (PACOM) and European Command (EUCOM).

Investigative Questions

How can USNORTHCOM effectively manage the flow of its forces in supporting a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) during MACA or MACDIS operations? Specifically, how the role of airlift, predominately the C-130, can help facilitate the phasing of people and equipment into the necessary locations to effectively meet the needs of the LFA. In fulfilling my research objectives, this paper will attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What legal constraints and guidance currently dictate the way the military is tasked and employed in support of civil affairs and civil disturbances?
2. Who are the key governmental organizations and how they linked in the supporting the role of Homeland Defense / Homeland Security?
3. Who are the primary users of military airlift assets and what are their possible requirements in support of civil affairs and civil disturbances?
4. What is the process by which airlift is tasked, prioritized, and managed?
5. How can USNORTHCOM employ current doctrine to employ airlift as part of an Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF)?

In summary, the need to rapidly respond to a crisis or a natural disaster is crucial to mitigating their effects on U.S. soil. Airlift can be an effective enabler in providing this rapid response. Evaluating how the military manages these assets, may provide insight into more efficient means and answer the question; how airlift meets U.S. Northern Command's requirements?

II. Legal Considerations and Constraints

The Constitution, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues limit the use of federal military personnel in domestic support operations.

United States Army Field Manual 100-19
Domestic Support Operations

Constitutional Statutes

“Under the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the authority to raise and support an army, provide and maintain a navy, and make rules for governing and regulating the land and naval forces.” (DA, 1993:3-0) The Constitution places the military under civilian control and designates the President as commander-in-chief. Statutes provide for civilian leadership in the form of a secretary of defense, service secretaries, and various other civilian authorities. Within the United States, civilian agencies, not the military, provide for the needs of the citizens. Laws governing the use of the military in domestic operations are complex, subtle, and evolving. Therefore, there should be a clear understanding when a request for aid is presented, ensuring the military conforms to statutory requirements. (DA, 1993:3-0)

Posse Comitatus Act.

The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC § 1385) states, "whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned." (U.S. Congress, 2002b:Sec 1385) The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) generally prohibits U.S. military personnel from interdicting vehicles, vessels and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and

seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military's role in domestic affairs.

The PCA restricts direct military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEA) for law enforcement purposes, except as authorized by Congress or the United States Constitution. Prohibited direct support includes actions in which the military “pervades LEA activities, or that subject civilians to compulsory, proscriptive military power.” (DAF, 2002c:56) However, the PCA does not apply to National Guard units in non-Federal status, commonly referred to as state active duty or ‘militia’ status, under the direction of their respective State Governor.

There are exceptions to the PCA, which provide some flexibility to employ military assets; when necessary to protect civilian property and functions, or when necessary to protect federal property and functions. (NICI, 1998:6-4) Additionally, the Defense Drug Interdiction Assistance Act (10 USC §§ 371-380) allows military personnel to provide “limited support to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) indirectly” (NICI, 1998:6-5) to prevent drugs from entering the United States. This act allows the military to share certain information and provide equipment, facilities, and other service to LEAs. This enables the military to support civilian authorities in fighting illegal drug trafficking. Finally, in emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction Unites States Code (USC) 10 permits the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance in support of Department of Justice “during an emergency situation involving a biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction.” (U.S. Congress, 2002a:Sec 382) So, when the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense

jointly determine an ‘emergency situation’ exists which poses a serious threat to U.S. interests and is beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies, Department of Defense personnel may assist the Department of Justice in enforcing prohibitions regarding biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is commonly executed with WMD-Civil Support Teams or Chemical/Biological Incident Response Forces.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 USC §§ 5121-5122), also known as the Stafford Act, provides procedures for declaring an emergency or major disaster, as well as the type and amount of federal assistance available to support disaster relief operations. The Act authorizes the President to provide DOD assets for relief once a disaster is declared. DOD may use resources to “save lives, protect property” and avert future threats. The President may also provide DOD assets for emergency work on a limited basis prior to the declaration. (U.S. Congress, 2001c:Sec 5121)

The Stafford Act defines the two distinct instances whereby Federal assistance is required based on a ‘determination’ of the President. The following are the definitions, which allude to the differences between ‘crisis management’ (emergency) and ‘consequence management’ (major disaster):

Emergency - any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. (U.S. Congress, 2001c:Sec 5122)

Major Disaster - any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption,

landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. (U.S. Congress, 2001c:Sec 5122)

Essentially, the difference between an emergency and a major disaster is “one of duration, degree of damage, and extent of assistance needed.” (NICI, 1998:6-6)

Economy Act.

The Economy Act (31 USC § 1535) governs transfer of material between Executive Branch agencies within the Federal Government. It provides the ability for an “agency or major organizational unit within an agency to place an order with a major organizational unit within the same agency or another agency for goods or services.” (U.S. Congress, 2001a:Sec 1535) In this instance the Lead Federal Agency is allowed the opportunity to order airlift from the DOD as long as the order is in the best interest of the United States Government and the “ordered services cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise.” (U.S. Congress, 2001a:Sec 1535) The Economy Act does not apply to the transfer of material to non-Federal LEAs. “Reimbursement to the Department of Defense from non-Federal agencies is authorized under 10 USC § 377 to the extent such would be authorized under The Economy Act.” (DAF, 2002c:57) Essentially, the Economy Act provides for the transfer of material and services provided by the DOD, supporting a LFA, on a reimbursable basis, but does not apply to non-Federal agencies, such as the Red Cross.

Insurrection Act.

The Insurrection Act (10 USC §§ 331-334) allows the President to use federal troops to enforce federal laws when a rebellion against the authority of the United States makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States. The Insurrection Act states:

Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection. (U.S. Congress, 2001a:Sec 331)

The Insurrection Act is specific exception to the PCA, and permits the President to “use federal forces in response to a request from a state or territory, to enforce federal authority, or to protect Constitutional rights.” (DAF, 2002c:57) This act allows for the employment of military forces in order to stabilize the region, enabling Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) to accomplish their intended mission.

Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (50 USC §§ 2301-2367) provides guidance for the “development of, and allocation of responsibilities for, effective countermeasures to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism in the United States.” (U.S. Congress, 2001d:Sec 2301) Additionally, it stresses the requirement for well coordinated participation of many Federal agencies, and careful planning by the Federal Government and State and local governments in order to effectively defend against WMD. The act defines “weapon of mass destruction” as:

Any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release,

dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or radioactivity. (U.S. Congress, 2001d:Sec 2302)

It requires DOD coordination with WMD response agencies and authorizes DOD support to DOJ to enforce laws involving WMD. This occurs when “DOJ requests support, and SECDEF and Attorney General jointly determine that a WMD threat exists and civil authorities lack capabilities.” (DAF, 2002c:58) It was the catalyst to allow the DOD to establish Chemical-Biological Emergency Response Teams for rapid response to domestic terrorism, which were later, designated Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

Orders and Directives

Executive Order 12656.

Executive Order (EO) 12656 sets forth policy on assigning Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities. It defines a ‘national security emergency’ as “any occurrence, including disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States.” (Reagan, 1988:Sec 101-a) Additionally, it provides specific guidance for federal agencies which have an integral role in emergency preparedness and response. EO 12656 focuses on the lead and supporting roles of all federal departments; however, three of these agencies are of particular interest. It provides the following guidance for the DOD, DOJ, and the Department of Transportation (DOT):

The Department of Defense shall:

Ensure military preparedness and readiness to respond to national security emergencies. (Reagan, 1988:Sec 501-1)

Develop and maintain, in cooperation with the heads of other departments and agencies, national security emergency plans, programs, and mechanisms to ensure effective mutual support between and among the military, civil government, and the private sector. (Reagan, 1988:Sec 501-3)

Arrange, through agreements with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, for the transfer of certain Federal resources to the jurisdiction and/or operational control of the Department of Defense in national security emergencies. (Reagan, 1988:Sec 501-5)

Coordinate with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency [for] the development of plans for mutual civil-military support during national security emergencies. (Reagan, 1988:Sec 502-7)

The Department of Justice shall:

Coordinate contingency planning for national security emergency law enforcement activities that are beyond the capabilities of State and local agencies. (Reagan, 1988:Sec 1101-3)

Develop intergovernmental and interagency law enforcement plans and counterterrorism programs to interdict and respond to terrorism incidents in the United States that may result in a national security emergency or that occur during such an emergency. (Reagan, 1988:Sec 1101-7)

The Department of Transportation shall:

Develop plans to promulgate and manage overall national policies, programs, procedures, and systems to meet essential civil and military transportation needs in national security emergencies. (Reagan, 1988:Sec 1401-1)

This executive order provides a first step in understanding the need for extensive interagency cooperation. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security it is expected this executive order will be modified to incorporate the new roles and responsibilities inherent with this new department.

Department of Defense Directive 3025.1.

The DOD Directive (DODD) 3025.1, *Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA)*, provides DOD policies and procedures to be followed with respect to Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA). It “governs all planning and response by DOD

Components for civil defense or other assistance to civil authorities, with the exception of military support to law enforcement operations under DOD Directive 3025.12.” (DOD, 1993:4) It dictates when DOD assets will be used.

DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities (as determined by FEMA or another lead Federal Agency for emergency response). (DOD, 1993:6)

Army and Air National Guard forces, acting under State orders (i.e., not in Federal service), have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to State and local government agencies in civil emergencies. (DOD, 1993:6)

However, it does not address military support to law enforcement operations, which is under DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

Department of Defense Directive 3025.12.

The DOD Directive (DODD) 3025.12, *Military Support for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)*, provides DOD policies and procedures to be followed with respect to Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. It states military forces will not be used for MACDIS unless specifically authorized by the President, except in the following emergency circumstances:

When the use of Military Forces is necessary to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning and public order. That "emergency authority" applies when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances (including civil disturbances incident to earthquake, fire, flood, or other such calamity endangering life) occur, if duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior authorization by the President. (DOD, 1994:5)

When duly constituted State or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal Governmental functions, Federal action including the use of Military Forces) is authorized, as necessary, to protect the Federal property or functions. (DOD, 1994:5)

Department of Defense Directive 5525.5.

The DOD Directive (DODD) 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, provides uniform DOD policies and procedures to be followed with respect to support provided to Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement efforts; and assigns responsibilities. It is DOD policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials to the extent practical. The “implementation of this policy shall be consistent with the needs of national security and military preparedness, the historic tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities, and the requirements of applicable law.” (DOD, 1989:2)

However, the following provides direct guidance of two instances when it is permissible to employ military forces under DOD Directive 3025.12, without violating the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act:

The emergency authority authorizes prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property and to restore governmental functioning and public order when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disaster, or calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation. (DOD, 1989:15)

Protection of Federal property and functions authorizes Federal action, including the use of military forces, to protect Federal property and Federal Government functions when the need for protection exists and duly constituted local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection. (DOD, 1989:15)

There are many statutes and directives governing the use of military assets to support civil authorities. With an understanding of the restrictions placed upon the military, we can begin to understand how U.S. Northern Command is constantly challenged to provide the maximum level of assistance while still maintaining the letter of the law. In order to

do this effectively we must look at the numerous agencies and organizations, which are all part of the patchwork necessary to provide assistance and must work together in order to effectively, prevent or mitigate the effects of disasters, emergencies, or acts of terrorism.

III. Interagency Coordination

Our job will be to preserve the Nation's security by defending the American people where they live and work, and support civilian authorities as needed. We will also prepare for the inevitability of uncertainty and surprise. This will be a team effort from start to finish--our servicemen and women are ready for the challenge.

General Ralph Eberhart
Commander, U.S. Northern Command

Supporting Relationship to Lead Federal Agency

Crisis Management versus Consequence Management.

Due to several of the legal constraints and statutes discussed, the Department of Defense is unable to lead efforts in support of domestic emergencies. As such, the DOD finds itself in a supporting a role to the organization being designated as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). Air Force's contributions in civil support operations will be in "support of a lead federal agency, designated by the President or as indicated in the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan [CONPLAN], or other federal response plans." (DAF, 2002c:11) Under Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) policy guidance was provided for combating terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. PDD-39 directed efforts to combat terrorism include "reducing vulnerabilities to terrorism, deterring and responding to terrorist acts, [and] having capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of NBC weapons, including those of mass destruction." (Clinton, 1995) Additionally, the FBI was designated as the LFA of crisis management and FEMA was designated as the Lead Federal Agency for consequence management. The relationship between crisis and consequence management can be seen in Figure 2

and are defined by the Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) as:

Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a terrorist incident, a crisis management response may include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations, forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support missions, such as agent identification, search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and limited decontamination. (TAG, 2001:7)

Consequence management is predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. In an actual or potential terrorist incident, a consequence management response will be managed by FEMA using structures and resources of the Federal Response Plan (FRP). (TAG, 2001:7)




Figure 2: Crisis and Consequence Management (DAF, 2002c:11)

The bottom line, “military resources temporarily support and augment, but do not replace local, state, and federal civilian agencies that have primary authority and responsibility

for domestic disaster assistance.” (DAF, 2002c:11) In most cases, the military will be supporting either the FBI or FEMA.

Mission and Responsibilities

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Department of Homeland Security has three primary missions; “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters.” (DHS, 2003c) The Department of Homeland Security is transforming and realigning the current patchwork of government activities into a single department. DHS will “give state and local officials one primary contact instead of many, an important advantage when it comes to matters related to training, equipment, planning, exercises and other critical homeland security needs.” (DHS, 2003c) The Department of Homeland Security is comprised of four major directorates: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. (DHS, 2003a) Air Mobility Command’s preponderance of taskings will likely be in support of the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) directorate, where the Federal Emergency Management Agency now resides.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

As an organization within the Department of Justice, the FBI’s role is to “protect the United States from foreign intelligence and terrorist activities and to provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to federal, state, local, and international agencies.” (FBI, 2003) The FBI, as the primary execution arm of the Department of Justice, has been designated the Lead Federal Agency for crisis management. “As the

lead agency for crisis management, the FBI will implement a Federal crisis management response.” (TAG, 2001:3) Additionally, as the LFA, the FBI will “designate a Federal on-scene commander to ensure appropriate coordination of the overall United States Government response with Federal, State and local authorities until such time as the Attorney General transfers the overall LFA role to FEMA.” (TAG, 2001:3) Within the FBI are two elements whose mobility requirements should be met through DOD airlift assets, the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) and the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG). The DEST is a “rapidly deployable, inter-agency team responsible for providing the FBI expert advice and support concerning the U.S. Government’s capabilities in resolving the terrorist threat or incident.” (TAG, 2001:28) The FBI “will form and coordinate the deployment of a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) with other agencies, when appropriate, and seek appropriate Federal support based on the nature of the situation.” (TAG, 2001:3) The exact composition of the DEST will be determined by the specific nature of the incident and will include, when appropriate, advisory modules for WMD conditions. (Blitzer, 1997) The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) facilitates the FBI’s rapid response to, and the management of, crisis incidents. CIRG will deploy “investigative specialists to respond to terrorist activities, hostage takings, child abductions and other high-risk repetitive violent crimes.” (FBI, 2003) Other major incidents the FBI will likely play an integral role in are prison riots, bombings, or air and train crashes.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

On March 1, 2003, FEMA became part of the Department of Homeland Security’s Division for Emergency Preparedness and Response. (DHS, 2003b) The mission of the

EP&R is “to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect our nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery.” (DHS, 2003a) FEMA's Office of National Preparedness was given responsibility for helping to ensure the nation's first responders are trained and equipped to deal with weapons of mass destruction. FEMA has been designated the Lead Federal Agency for consequence management. As the lead agency for consequence management, FEMA will “manage and coordinate any Federal consequence management response in support of State and local governments in accordance with its statutory authorities.” (TAG, 2001:4) FEMA's role is not just in response to natural disasters; in response to a threat or act of terrorism FEMA's responsibilities are to:

Advise the FBI of consequence management considerations, verify that the State and local governments have been notified, and notify other Federal agencies under the FRP, as appropriate. (TAG, 2001:28)

Activate the appropriate FRP elements, designate and deploy an individual to serve as the Senior FEMA Official to the [Joint Operations Center] JOC, identify the appropriate agencies to staff the JOC Consequence Management Group, and with FBI concurrence, notify consequence management agencies to request they deploy representatives to the JOC. (TAG, 2001:29)

It is apparent; FEMA will most likely be a player in both crisis management and consequence management. FEMA's airlift requirements can be minimal, but in many cases, such as Hurricane Georges' relief efforts, airlift can play a critical enabler to allowing FEMA the ability to execute their mission.

Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS).

Effective no later than May 16, 2003 the office known as the Director of Military Support (DOMS) will no longer be in effect. (SECDEF, 2003) DOMS will be re-

designated, the Joint Director of Military Support, JDOMS. This office will fall under the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security (ASD-HD). The role of JDOMS will be the same as its predecessor; “responsible for validating requests for military assistance from Lead Federal Agencies (LFAs), planning, coordinating, and executing the Department of Defense’s civil support activities.” (Global Security, 2003c) JDOMS activates and controls a joint staff to conduct operations during declared disasters, emergencies, and/or terrorist events. The JDOMS is the DOD’s representative on the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG). The CDRG is “the national-level coordinating group that addresses policy issues and support requirements for LFAs during a disaster, emergency and/or terrorist event.” (Global Security, 2003c)

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).

United States Northern Command, headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado, conducts operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within their assigned areas of responsibility. (USNORTHCOM, 2003c) Additionally, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. Northern Command provides military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management operations. (USNORTHCOM, 2003c) U.S. Northern Command's area of responsibility includes the continental United States, Canada, Mexico and portions of the Caribbean region. While Alaska is included in this assignment, Alaskan Command forces will remain assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. The commander of U.S. Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) will also be responsible for security cooperation and military coordination with Canada and Mexico.

(JCS, 2002b) The vision for USNORTHCOM is to be the focal point in providing the U.S. government ‘one-stop shopping’ of military assistance in support of Homeland Defense / Homeland Security issues, as well as, support for relief efforts following domestic emergencies and disasters.

Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS).

Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS), located in Norfolk, Virginia, is the homeland security component of U.S. Northern Command. JFHQ-HLS coordinates the land and maritime defense of the continental United States, as well as military assistance to civil authorities. JFHQ-HLS “plans and integrates the full spectrum of homeland defense and civil support to lead federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Prevention, crisis response and consequence management are capabilities included within that spectrum of support.”

(USNORTHCOM, 2003a) JFHQ-HLS, in coordination with other federal, state and local agencies, constantly evaluates events and locations for potential vulnerability as targets of terrorism. JFHQ-HLS “provides situational awareness to military commands and civilian agencies throughout the U.S. to aid in their homeland security awareness and planning.” (USNORTHCOM, 2003a)

Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS).

Joint Task Force Civil Support, located in Norfolk, Virginia, “plans and integrates DOD support to the designated Lead Federal Agency for domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive (CBRNE) consequence management operations.” (USNORTHCOM, 2003b) When directed by the commander of U.S. Northern Command, JTF-CS will “deploy to the incident site, establish command and

control of designated DOD forces, and provide military assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support.”

(USNORTHCOM, 2003b)

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

United States Transportation Command conducts operations to provide air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense both in time of peace and time of war. (USTRANSCOM, 2003) The Commander, U.S. Transportation Command provides “detailed air, land, and sea transportation and common-user port management for the Department of Defense across the range of military operations through the transportation component commands.” (JCS, 1997:v-vi) Composed of three component commands; The Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), “USTRANSCOM skillfully coordinates missions worldwide using both military and commercial transportation resources.” (Global Security, 2003e) The system by which U.S. Transportation Command coordinates the global movement of people and goods is known as the Defense Transportation System (DTS). This system “includes the effective use of theater military and commercial transportation assets identified during and coordinated through the combatant command’s joint movement center through plan development.” (JCS, 1997:vi) U.S. Transportation Command is the focal point for all military transportation requests, via air, sea, or ground.

U.S. Air Force (USAF).

The mission of the U.S. Air Force is to defend the United States and protect its interests through aerospace power. One of the six core competencies is ‘Rapid Global

Mobility’, which is defined as “being able to respond quickly and decisively anywhere we’re needed is key to maintaining rapid global mobility.” (DAF, 2003a)

AF Agency for National Security and Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP).

Air Force Agency for National Security and Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP) “oversees all aspects of Air Force Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA), Continuity of Operations for the Air Staff (COOP), is the Principle USAF Point of Contact for Homeland Security and is the liaison with other federal agencies in all these areas.” (Global Security, 2003b) The AFNSEP Domestic Support Operations Division (DSO) serves as the Air Force’s Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for “all Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) issues. This includes Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA), [and] Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA).” (Global Security, 2003b)

Air Mobility Command (AMC).

Air Mobility Command's primary mission is rapid, global mobility and sustainment for America's armed forces. The command also plays a crucial role in providing humanitarian support at home and around the world. “Air Mobility Command -- active duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and civilians -- provide tactical and strategic airlift and aerial refueling for all of America's armed forces.” (AMC, 2003) The bottom-line is AMC “provides airlift, air refueling, special air mission, and aeromedical evacuation for U.S. forces.” (USTRANSCOM, 2000:2) Inevitably, it is AMC’s aircraft, from the C-5 to the C-21, which will provide the necessary military airlift support to the Lead Federal Agency.

Civil Support

Civil Support Missions.

The following are several missions in which the Department of Defense can play crucial roles in supporting civil support (DAF, 2002c:8):

- | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--|
| • Debris Impact | • Hurricane/Typhoon | • Military Support to Civil Authorities |
| • Enemy Attack | • Volcanic Eruption | • Military Support for Civil Law Enforcement |
| • Insurrection | • Landslide | • Military Support for Civil Disturbances |
| • Civil Disturbance | • Biological Incident | • Counter Drug Operations |
| • Earthquake | • Explosion | • Critical Infrastructure Protection |
| • Fire | • Radiological Incident | • Continuity of Operations |
| • Flood | • Snowstorm | • Counter Terrorism |
| • Tsunami/Tidal Wave | • Drought | • State Funerals |
| • Meteor Impact | • Oil Spill | |
| • Tornado | • Chemical Incident | |
| • Space Debris Impact | • Epidemic | |
| • Mass Immigration | • Postal Work Stoppage | |

U.S. Northern Command will require airlift assets to effectively support many of these missions. The past has proven airlift was instrumental in supporting humanitarian relief for natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods.

The Air Force's response to these missions, if tasked will fall into four categories; memorandum of understanding/memorandum of agreement (MOU/MOA), immediate response, 10 day rule, and disaster/emergency. (DAF, 2002b:9) MOUs/MOAs are generally set forth by an earlier agreement between the installation commander and the local civil authorities. This could include mutual assistance agreements with the local community in the areas of medical evacuation, fire fighting, or other appropriate areas. Immediate response occurs when guidance from higher headquarters cannot be obtained on a timely basis, due to an attack on the United States or other emergency circumstance. Under immediate response the Air Force must continue to abide by the DOD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA)*. Under the 10 day rule, Air Force

units may be directed by the President to perform work which is essential for the preservation of life or property. These operations might occur in anticipation of a declaration of a major disaster or emergency from the President. Under the Stafford Act involvement under this provision cannot exceed 10 days. Finally, in the event of a disaster or emergency the Air Force will provide the necessary people and equipment as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The tasking will originate from a designated Lead Federal Agency, such as FEMA, and will be coordinated through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The Air Force “should respond to all Federal taskings, withholding only those resources required to conduct their immediate wartime mission and maintain force protection requirements.” (DAF, 2002b:9)

Civil Support Response Levels.

The Air Force has “always responded to a wide variety of requests for support from civil authorities, and will continue to support such requests to the maximum extent practical, consistent with applicable laws, DOD and AF guidance, and readiness and mission requirements.” (DAF, 2002c:14) The level of response is “dependent on the nature of the request and the type of incident. Typically, a response will either be at the request of local officials, state officials, or as part of a coordinated federal effort.” (DAF, 2002c:15) The response authority, airman in charge, command and control, and legal authority vary dependent on the level of response. In all cases the state governor will play an integral role in either directing the response efforts or requesting additional federal forces to support the state forces, when the disaster or crisis overwhelms their ability to manage the response. Federal forces may be employed, even at the local level, if it is determined an ‘immediate response’ is necessary to save lives and property. Table

1 depicts the varying levels of response with the associated individuals or organizations capable of responding to the disaster or crisis.

Table 1. Civil Support Response Levels (DAF, 2002c:15)

Level Of Response	Response Authority	Airman in Charge	Command and Control	Legal Authority and Cmd Relations
Local	Immed. Resp MOU / MOA	Installation Commander	Wing Staff Wing Cmd Post	“Normal” Chain of Cmd
	Governor	TAG / Senior ANG	TAG Staff EOC	Title 32
State	Immed. Resp MOU / MOA	Installation Commander	Wing Staff Wing Cmd Post	Title 10
	Governor	TAG / Senior ANG	TAG Staff EOC	Title 32 State Active Duty
Federal	Federal Response Plan (FRP) National Security Special Events	COMAFFOR	EOC, AOC, TACC (J) Ops Center	JTF/CC, LFA Title 32 / Title 10

“Local responses are limited, localized requests for assistance and are not dependent on a Presidential declaration of a disaster or emergency.” (DAF, 2002c:15)

Installation commanders may support requests from local authorities based on mutual aid agreements (MOUs/MOAs) with the local community in areas such as fire fighting, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) handling, medical evacuation, or other appropriate areas. An installation commander may respond to a request based on inherent ‘immediate response’ authority, in order to save lives, prevent suffering, and/or to mitigate great property damage. Local responses will typically not involve extensive coordination with state officials or agencies, such as the National Guard. Similarly, cost reimbursement issues are limited and typically anticipated within the mutual aid agreement. The response authority will generally fall under the purview of the state’s governor and the employment of military personnel and equipment at the direction of the

state's attorney general. The military personnel and equipment will fall under Title 32 authority, in a 'militia' status. (DAF, 2002c:15)

“State level responses are conducted either in anticipation of a Presidential declaration, or pursuant to an installation commander's 'immediate response' authority when guidance cannot be obtained from higher headquarters due to an emergency situation.” (DAF, 2002c:16) Under the '10-day rule,' Air Force units may be directed by the President to perform emergency assistance and operations of this type will generally follow a request by a State Governor under the Stafford Act, and can not exceed 10 days. State level responses require some level of coordination with state and likely with federal officials and agencies, as well as higher headquarters. (DAF, 2002c:16) Similar to a local response, the authority will fall under the purview of the state's governor and the employment of military personnel and equipment at the direction of the state's attorney general. However, depending on the level of response needed the military personnel and equipment may be a combination of Title 32 authority, as well as, activated troops under Title 10 authority. (DAF, 2002c:15)

Federal level responses involve “forces as part of a coordinated federal response to a request for emergency assistance as a result of a natural disaster, attack, civil disturbance, or as an element in a formalized, regularly occurring civil support program.” (DAF, 2002:16) The appropriate Lead Federal Agency (LFA) will submit requests for federal assistance. LFAs typically request Air Force resources when requirements are beyond the capabilities of local, state, or federal civil authorities. “Federal level responses involve extensive planning and coordination with other federal agencies (FEMA, DOJ, etc), as well as state and local authorities.” (DAF, 2002:16) Air Force

forces will be presented to U.S. Northern Command for these operations in accordance with procedures established by the DOD Directives. The Air Force typically presents its forces in the form of an air and space expeditionary task force (AETF), to be deployed either as a single service task force (TF), or as the air component of a joint task force (JTF). “Air Force forces will be tasked with a clear understanding as to command relationships between various deployed military units.” (DAF, 2002:16) When presented as a Task Force, whether single service or joint, the Air Force assets will be commanded by a designated Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). Command and control will generally be executed through either AMC’s Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) or a designated Air Operations Center (AOC). In almost all cases there will be federal personnel and equipment under Title 10 authority, and there will also be state owned personnel and equipment under Title 32 authority. (DAF, 2002c:16)

In conclusion, interagency coordination is critical to ensure effective homeland defense capabilities. The patchwork of expertise spans multiple organizations at varying levels. The military tenet, unity of command, can be applied to homeland defense under the direction and guidance of the Department of Homeland Security. With the unity of command both the federal agencies can effectively and efficiently prevent and mitigate the effects of terrorism, disturbances, and natural disasters. In all instances the military must understand how their role in working with these federal agencies.

IV. The Primary Users of Airlift

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

As discussed earlier, FEMA is designated as the Lead Federal Agency for consequence management, protecting public health and safety, restoring essential government services, and providing emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism or natural disaster. To help facilitate this role, FEMA subdivided the United States into regions. Figure 3 depicts how FEMA is subdivided into 10 geographic regions with its national level headquarters located in Washington, D.C. as an element of the Department of Homeland Security.




Figure 3. Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions

The function of the national level headquarters is to facilitate the link between the DHS, and other governmental agencies, with the regional headquarters; providing guidance and

tasking as necessary. The function of the regional headquarters is to direct and execute FEMA operations within the specified region. FEMA's regional staffs work "directly with states to plan for disasters, to develop mitigation programs, and to meet needs when major disasters occur." (UF, 2003:3.7-3)

Federal Response Plan (FRP).

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) outlines how the Federal Government implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act "to assist State and local governments when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively to save lives; protect public health, safety, and property; and restore their communities." (FEMA, 2003a) The FRP describes the policies, planning assumptions, concept of operations, response and recovery actions, and responsibilities of 27 Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross. It "provides the mechanism for coordinating delivery of federal assistance and resources to augment efforts of state and local governments overwhelmed by a major disaster or emergency." (FEMA, 2003a) By signing the Federal Responses Plan, Federal departments and agencies commit to (FEMA, 2003a):

- Supporting the FRP concept of operations and carry out their assigned functional responsibilities to ensure the orderly, timely delivery of Federal assistance.
- Cooperate with the Federal Coordinating Officer appointed by the President to provide effective oversight of disaster operations.
- Make maximum use of existing authorities, organizations, resources, systems, and programs to reduce disaster relief costs.
- Form partnerships with counterpart State agencies, voluntary disaster relief organizations, and the private sector to take advantage of all existing resources.
- Continue to develop and refine headquarters and regional planning, exercise, and training activities to maintain necessary operational capabilities.

The FRP also may be implemented in response to the consequences of terrorism, in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 and 62, which set forth U.S.

counter terrorism policies. The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex describes the concept of operations for a unified response to a terrorism incident involving two or more of the following plans: the FRP, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Incident Contingency Plan. Figure 4 represents the elements and flow of the Federal Response plan from disaster to employment of response teams.




Figure 4. Federal Response Plan Elements (DAF, 2002c)

Two examples of a Federal Response Plan in action are FEMA's actions following Hurricane Andrew's devastation of Florida (FEMA Region IV) in 1992 and Hurricane Georges' devastation of Puerto Rico (FEMA Region II) in 1998. Following Hurricane Andrew's devastation of southern Florida, FEMA's request for federal forces stood-up Joint Task Force Andrew. Airlift was an important aspect of the relief efforts providing equipment and a necessary sustainment flow. Just one example of this airlift support

provided was the employment of 5 New York Air National Guard C-5s. These C-5s, from the 105th Airlift Wing, responded to Hurricane Andrew; “delivering 1,289,953 pounds of food, tents, mobile kitchens, vehicles, and emergency services personnel to the Homestead area of South Florida.” (Global Security, 2003a) Another, even larger, example of airlift support to the FRP was during the aftermath of Hurricane Georges’ devastation of Puerto Rico. During this natural disaster relief effort FEMA spent close to \$30 million on DOD airlift missions. The 24 missions consisted of transporting goods and equipment ranging from medical supplies, bottled water, ice, plastic sheeting, emergency supplies, wood furring strips, and generators. The airlift missions also transported a Marine Air-Ground Task Force Unit and the personnel comprising Joint Task Force Full Provider. Since Puerto Rico is not part of the continental United States (CONUS), airlift was critical in allowing FEMA to provide the necessary relief. If this had occurred in CONUS, utilization of DOD airlift would have probably been reduced significantly, but it demonstrates how the DOD can play an integral role in supporting a Lead Federal Agency and the Federal Response Plan. (McCarty, 2003)

Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN).

The CONPLAN “provides overall guidance to federal, state and local agencies concerning how the federal government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving WMD.” (FEMA, 2003b) It establishes “conceptual guidance for assessing and monitoring a developing threat, notifying appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies of the threat, and deploying the requisite advisory and technical resources to assist the Lead Federal

Agency (LFA)” (DAF, 2002c:59) The CONPLAN is a classified document available on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

As previously discussed, the Department of Justice, through the FBI is designated “the Lead Federal Agency for crisis management and operational response to a weapon of mass destruction incident.” (Clinton, 1998) “It is increasingly likely that terrorist groups, or individuals with criminal intent, may use unconventional methods to disrupt the Nation's critical infrastructure or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against our citizens.” (Clinton, 1998) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are “weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people.” (JCS, 2003:569) These weapons can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological in nature. The FBI has several resources available to combat terrorism and mitigate the effects of WMD on the U.S. citizens and its infrastructure. The “DOD, in coordination with other Federal Departments and agencies, will provide training to metropolitan first responders and will maintain trained military units to assist State and local responders.” (Clinton 1998) Airlift is also crucial in supporting the FBI, as “the Defense Department shall provide timely transportation for ESTs [Emergency Support Teams].” (Clinton, 1998) There are four specially trained and equipped military emergency support teams capable to support the FBI’s role in crisis management; Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, Chemical/Biological Incident Response Forces, Technical Escort Units, and Quick Reaction Forces/Ready Reaction Forces; all designed to deploy on military airlift assets.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs).

The mission of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) is to “support local and state authorities at domestic WMD/NBC incident sites by identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional military support.” (Global Security, 2003d) The WMD-CSTs were established to “deploy rapidly, assist local first-responders in determining the nature of an attack, provide medical and technical advice, and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets.” (Global Security, 2003d) They provide initial advice on the agent, assist first responders in the detection assessment process, and are the first military responders at the scene. They can serve as an advance party, which can liaise, with the Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS). “The U.S. military already has several rapid response units that can perform a civil support mission for consequence management such as the Army's Technical Escort Units and the Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, however the WMD-CST are uniquely state-based in nature.” (Global Security, 2003d) “Each unit is co-located with Air National Guard aviation units to facilitate coordination of troop and equipment airlifts.” (Clark, 2003) Congress has thus far authorized thirty-two teams, with teams located in 26 states. Location selection is based on access to the greatest number of people in order to minimize response time within a given geographical area. Also critical, is reducing overlap with other teams' areas of responsibility. The resulting distribution is intended to provide optimum response coverage for entire U.S. populace. Figure 5 shows those states currently assigned WMD-CSTs and the 9 states with congressionally certified

WMD-CSTs. There is a correlation to the original certified WMD-CSTs and the FEMA regions previously discussed. Every FEMA region except VII has a congressionally certified WMD-CST designated to support their area of responsibility.




Figure 5. Current States with WMD-CSTs

Teams will always work in support of civilian agencies under the jurisdiction of the governor. Unless federalized, WMD-CST teams will remain under the control of the governor of the host state. If the situation evolves into an event that overwhelms local and state officials, federal agencies and military personnel may enter the scene after a declaration of disaster or emergency. At this point, the team will be subject to the direction of the federal authorities. The team would continue to support local officials but would also assist in channeling additional military and other federal assets in support of the local commander. (Clark, 2003) The equipment and supplies WMD-CSTs require for lift are C-130 transportable. They include a wide array of detection equipment, field laboratory, and enough food and water to be self-sustaining for 48 to 72 hours. WMD-

CSTs are ready to deploy within four hours to anywhere within their area of responsibility. (Clark, 2003)

Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).

The U.S. Marine Corp's Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) "is a standing, highly trained consequence management force tailored for short notice response to terrorist initiated chemical and/or biological incidents." (Newberry, 1999)

The CBIRF's mission is to:

respond to a credible chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) terrorist incident in order to assist local, state or federal agencies and designated combatant commanders in the conduct of consequence management operations by providing capabilities for agent detection and identification; casualty search, rescue and personnel decontamination; and emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated personnel. (4th MEB, 2003)

The CBIRF provides expert and robust decontamination capability that can augment other response capabilities by being prepositioned or quickly deployed for an incident in support of consequence management. (Newberry, 1999) When directed, CBIRF reports to the Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support, to provide support for consequence management of terrorist incidents within the United States. (4th MEB, 2003) The CBIRF has two response force options (4th MEB, 2003):

An Initial Response Force (IRF) of approximately 90 personnel maintains a 24-hour readiness posture in the event of a terrorist incident and can deploy via ground transportation within one hour of notification and will be prepared to depart a designated Aerial Port of Embarkation within four hours of notification.

A Follow-on Force (FOF) of approximately 200 personnel that can either constitute an additional IRF or augment the standing IRF for sustained operations.

Both response options would entail multiple C-130s to transport the CBIRF to their aerial port of embarkation (APOE). Their equipment includes two MOBILABS, a "Ford E-350

diesel van, equipped with onboard, real-time analytical systems to provide rapid detection and identification of CB agents in response to terrorist attacks”. (SOC, 2003) The vans were selected and configured to fit onto a C-130 aircraft for rapid deployment. (SOC, 2003)

Technical Escort Unit (TEU).

The U.S. Army’s Technical Escort Unit (TEU) “provides worldwide escort, neutralization, disposal, and emergency response to toxic chemicals and biological agents, munitions, certain nuclear and other hazardous materials.” (Newberry, 1999) The TEU maintains a 24-hour a day on-call emergency response capability to respond to a chemical or biological incident with personnel “trained in chemical, biological, and explosive ordnance disposal operations to perform render safe procedures, damage limitation, reconnaissance, recovery, sampling, mitigation, decontamination, and transportation.” (Newberry, 1999) Their mission areas include: “support to DOD combatant commanders; emergency/installation response; remediation and restoration of designated sites to include formerly used defense sites; homeland defense; emergency preparedness; support to civil authorities; and escorts.” (DA, 2002) The TEU also performs or recommends final disposition of weaponized and non-weaponized chemical or biological materials and hazards. (Newberry, 1999) The equipment and supplies TEUs require for lift are C-130 transportable. They include a wide array of detection, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and transport equipment.

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) / Ready Reaction Force (RRF).

The intent of the U.S. Army’s Quick Reaction Force/Ready Reaction Force (QRF/RRF) is to establish a lightly armed force that is quickly deployable with minimal

lift and is capable of providing an immediate, or emergency response to threats consistent with the law and DOD policy. Upon notification (N-Hour), deploy a QRF and/or RRF within designated regions in support of Homeland Security Operations. RRFs, a battalion-size element, consist of multiple QRFs, a company-size element, and are directed by the President and SECDEF to control civil disturbances (MACDIS), operating under the Department of Defense, directly supporting the Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation. Air mobility support of QRFs/RRFs must possess short field capability to allow for maximum flexibility. (Tillery, 2003)

V. Tasking Airlift

In war, nothing is achieved except by calculation. Everything that is not soundly planned in its detail yields no result.

The Maxims of Napoleon

Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the “single source for deployment/redeployment planning and execution resource information.”

(JDTC, 2003a) JOPES “furnishes joint commander and war planners at all levels standardized policies, procedures, and formats to produce and execute a variety of required tasks.” (JCS, 1995:i) These tasks include:

Planning - writing operations plans (OPLANs), operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), functional plans, campaign plans, and operation orders (OPORDs). (JCS, 1995:i)

Execution and Deployment Management - defining requirements for, and gaining visibility of, the movement of forces into the combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). (JCS, 1995:i)

Essentially, JOPES is the software by which the combatant commander develops and controls the joint task force’s deployment/redeployment flow.

Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD)

During crises, “JOPES planners and operators build their Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), initially emphasizing the Unit Line Numbers (ULN) that will deploy in the first few days.” (JCS, 2001a:B-1) However, the “TPFDD is constantly being updated and is not completed until the operation is over.” (JCS, 2001a:B-1) The foundation to TPFDD development is the supported commander, in coordination with

component commanders, determines the type of capabilities, quantity, and timing of forces required to accomplish assigned tasks. (JCS, 2001b) The TPFDD process can be broken into two phases, a planning phase with TPFDD development, and an execution phase with TPFDD validation, with overall guidance provided through a TPFDD LOI.

TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI).

The Joint TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) found in Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.02B “directs the single process and standard procedures to be used in developing and executing TPFDDs during crisis operations and exercises.” (JDTC, 2003b) To supplement the Joint TPFDD LOI, “during execution planning the supported Combatant Commander normally publishes a TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) with planning guidance, procedures, and coordinating instructions.” (JDTC, 2003b) This provides additional guidance specific to theater requirements. The intent of the TPFDD LOI is to “eliminate confusion, facilitate parallel planning, and expedite TPFDD refinement by providing commands, supporting commands, and agencies.” (JDTC, 2003b) The TPFDD LOI would likely include general guidance on the TPFDD development process, the ULN structure, the ULN development, and the Force Module (FM) structure. (JDTC, 2003b)

TPFDD Development.

The TPFDD development is “based on three main processes: force planning, support planning, and transportation planning.” (JDTC,2003a) The first step in TPFDD development is planning guidance. First, the supported commander is responsible for establishing internal procedures to supplement the Joint TPFDD LOI with AOR specific instructions in the form of a Combatant Commander’s TPFDD LOI. “Major components

of the supplemental instructions are the supported commander's desired Battle Rhythm and planning constraints, such as lift apportionments to Service components.” (JCS, 2001a:B-1) The next step is to establish the TPFDD Coordination Newsgroups to coordinate “TPFDD development, deployment planning, ULN verification or validation messages, and execution issues. At a minimum, commanders post alert orders, warning orders, planning orders, deployment and execute orders, and requests for forces (RFF) messages.” (JCS, 2001a:B-1) Once the newsgroups are established the “supported commander, in coordination with component commanders, determines the type of capabilities, quantity, and timing of forces required to accomplish assigned tasks.” (JCS, 2001a:B-2) The supported commander then submits this in the form of a RFF message to the Joint Staff J-3, requesting sourcing of forces external to the AOR. Then the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) “deployment orders subsequently direct supporting commanders to source force requirements and conduct deployment support operations.” (JCS, 2001a:B-2) The supported command components “translate task-organized force lists for mission accomplishment into force requirement records in the TPFDD database.” (JCS, 2001a:B-2) The supported commander components enter individual force requirement records in the TPFDD, assigning each a ULN. Each ULN in the TPFDD can “represent any size force from an aircraft carrier to a one-person augmentee. Unit Type Codes (UTCs), established by the Services to represent a standard force type, such as an infantry battalion or fighter squadron.” (JCS, 2001a:B-2). Once the ULNs and their respective UTCs are assigned, the supported component commanders enter the combat commander's required delivery date (RDD) at final destination, and routing and time-phasing data [earliest arrival date (EAD)/latest arrival date (LAD)] for arrival at Point of

Debarkation (POD). For ULNs to move by air, the preferred EAD/LAD window, the gap between the EAD and the LAD, is 3 days. ULNs can be logically grouped into force modules to aid in organizing the TPFDD. The final phase of TPFDD development is when the requirements are sourced in response to the SECDEF deployment order. “Prior to receipt of a SECDEF deployment order, or when deployments appear imminent, the supported commander may request, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that supporting commanders conduct preliminary sourcing of TPFDD requirements.” (JCS, 2001a:B-3) This can enable accelerating the TPFDD development process and compensate for constricted execution timelines. In sourcing the requirements supporting commanders or supported commander’s service components identify the units and accomplish unit-related time-phasing by planning backwards from the supported commander’s required delivery date, which in turn provides units accurate ready-to-load dates (RLD) and available-to-load dates (ALD) at port of embarkation (POE). (JCS, 2001a:B-3) The final sourcing task is to select the appropriate POE. “Airports of embarkation (APOEs) are normally selected based on proximity to unit or requirement origin.” (JCS, 2001a:B-3) However, in many cases a consolidation or aggregation point APOE must be used. “Air Mobility Command (AMC) will support movement of small requirements only when consolidation is not possible and there is no alternative way to satisfy the mission requirement.” (JCS, 2001a:B-3) The 5 major consolidation APOEs are Charleston AFB, Dover AFB, McCord AFB, McGuire AFB, and Travis AFB.

TPFDD Validation Process.

The TPFDD validation process starts with the supported commander, announcing “the block of requirements (ULNs) to be validated for movement based on the earliest

arrival date and latest arrival date in theater.” (JCS, 2001a:B-3) After the ULNs are designated for movement the next step is for the force provider to verify sourcing to fill the ULNs. The force provider enters a ‘S’ in the TPFDD project code field. The ‘S’ confirms the following:

ULNs are sourced and cargo is tailored to the appropriate level of detail (normally level-4, equipment item detail), ULNs are free of errors that prevent scheduling (fatal errors), ULNs accurately reflect the current attributes and availability of each force, forces have been alerted for deployment, and the sourcing process has been coordinated with supported command components. (JCS, 2001a: B-4)

Upon completion of sourcing the supported command component confirms the mission requirements are met. After reviewing the actual units sourced, the supported command component enters a ‘SC’ in the TPFDD project code field and transmits a verification message to the supported commander. The verification message and ‘SC’ designation “confirm that ULNs meet mission requirements, unit aggregation, conform to component’s lift apportionment and the component is prepared to receive the forces at the POD [Port of Debarkation].” (JCS, 2001a:B-4) The next step in the validation process requires the supported commander to review the ULNs verified by service components “to ensure forces satisfy concept of deployment and mission requirements, and are approved for deployment by the National Command Authorities.” (JCS, 2001a:B-4) The supported commander places a ‘V’ in the TPFDD Scheduled Status Flag (SSF) field indicating the ULNs are validated for transportation scheduling. Once the TPFDD is validated for scheduling the lift provider reviews the validated requirements and arranges for the appropriate lift. If USTRANSCOM is providing the lift, “USTRANSCOM places a ‘T’ in the Scheduled Status Flag (SSF) after ensuring unit data is complete, movement windows are logical, aggregation of smaller moves is annotated, and apportioned lift has

not been exceeded.” (JCS, 2001a:B-4) USTRANSCOM component commands then schedule lift to meet the supported commander’s requirements. If the requirement is moving by airlift, AMC will “schedule airlift and allocate airlift missions to ULNs, and later manifest ULNs when the aircraft departs the port of embarkation.” (JCS, 2001a:B-4) The status of airlift scheduling can be tracked using the TPFDD schedule status flag data element. Once an “airlift requirement is scheduled, AMC places an ‘A’ in the SSF, indicating the ULN has been allocated lift. When the aircraft is manifested, the SSF will change to a ‘M’. When both allocated and manifested, the SSF for the ULN will reflect a ‘B’.” (JCS, 2001a:B-4) The time standard for TPFDD validation “shall be 72 hours from notification and receipt by the supported commander to validation of TPFDD-level 4 detail-for the first 7 days of the mission.” (JCS, 2001a:B-4) TPFDD and movement changes during execution are inevitable and should not be considered lightly. “TPFDD changes should be avoided inside the validated window as they may affect the transportation flow. Management of changes is possible if changes are held to a minimum and require supported the Combatant Commander’s approval.” (JDTC, 2003a)

Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Priority System

“When requirements exceed capability, the CJCS prioritization system enables logistics managers to determine mode and sequence of movement.” (JCS, 1997:A-1) The priority system consists of a 3 digit alphanumeric assigned to the transportation request. There are 8 levels of priority ranging from 1A to 4B with numerous additional sublevels available. Table 2 provides a list of the priority designations eligible traffic can be assigned to help stratify transportation requests and aid USTRANSCOM in prioritizing air transportation requests.

Table 2. JCS Priority Designators (JCS, 1997:A-4, A-5)

Priority 1A	1A1	A Presidentially-directed mission
	1A2	US forces and other forces or activities in combat designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with applicable Secretary of Defense guidance
	1A3	Programs approved by the President for top national priority
	1A4	Special weapons
Priority 1B	1B1	Missions specially directed by the Secretary of Defense
	1B2	Units, projects, or plans specially approved for implementation by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
	1B3	Validated minimal frequency channels
Priority 2A	2A1	US forces or activities and foreign forces or activities deploying or positioned and maintained in a state of readiness for immediate combat, combat support, or combat service support missions
	2A2	Industrial production activities engaged in repair, modification, or manufacture of primary weapons, equipment, and supplies to prevent an impending work stoppage or to reinstitute production in the event a stoppage has already occurred or when the material is required to accomplish emergency or controlling jobs
Priority 2B	2B1	CJCS-sponsored exercises
	2B2	CJCS-sponsored exercises
Priority 3A	3A1	Readiness or evaluation tests when airlift is required in support of the unit inspection or evaluation tests
	3A2	US forces or activities and foreign forces or activities that are maintained in a state of readiness to deploy for combat and other activities essential to combat forces
	3A3	Approved requirements channels
Priority 3B	3B1	Service training when airborne operations or airlift support is integral
	3B2	Combat support training
	3B3	Service schools requiring airborne, airdrop, or air transportability training as part of the program of instruction
	3B4	Airdrop/air transportability or aircraft certification of new or modified equipment

Priority 4A	4A1	US forces and foreign forces or activities tasked for employment in support of approved war plans and support activities essential to such forces
	4A2	Static loading exercises for those units specifically tasked to perform air transportability missions
Priority 4B	4B1	Other US forces or activities and foreign forces or activities
	4B2	Other non-DOD activities that cannot be accommodated by commercial airlift
	4B3	Static display for public and military events

“Sometimes the characteristics of the cargo (e.g., size, weight, hazards) preclude air shipment. In these cases, the cargo is diverted to surface.” (JCS, 1997:A-1) In most instances, since airlift in support of USNORTHCOM will originate from a Secretary of Defense directive, one could anticipate JCS priority of 1B1 for most operations. This presents a distinct challenge since most movements will have the same priority. It is important not to under estimate the JCS priority system; since airlift is not unlimited, there will be many instances where USTRANSCOM is unable to fill all requests forcing them to turn back requests with lower priority levels. However, USTRANSCOM may still have a difficult time making the cut when all the movements have the same JCS priority, a challenge they faced during Operation Enduring Freedom.

U.S. Northern Command’s TPFDD Movement (Notional)

Supporting a Lead Federal Agency.

The process by which USNORTHCOM manages their TPFDDs follows joint doctrine and the Joint TPFDD LOI. Figure 6 represents the notional process by which TPFDDs are processed when a Lead Federal Agency requests military lift to support civil affairs, to include natural disasters and civil disturbances.




Figure 6. TPFDD Movement [MSCA/MACA/MACDIS] (Bozdech-Veater, 2003b)

Once the President has declared a disaster or emergency, the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) will determine the requirements. A request will be made in writing a Request for Federal Assistance (RFA), which is FEMA's official obligating document for a mission assignment. If the request is initially made verbally, it will be followed promptly by an RFA. (DA, 1998:4-1) The authority for tasking DOD assets begins with the SECDEF. The initial DOD tasking in support of an emergency or disaster will flow from FEMA to the SECDEF through JDOMS to the supported command, USNORTHCOM, in the form

of an Execution Order (EXORD). USNORTHCOM, based on the EXORD, plans, coordinates, and assesses the resources committed by JDOMS. For requirements beyond USNORTHCOM's capabilities and/or capacity, forces may be attached to participate in MSCA operations by direction of the SECDEF via the EXORD. If the CDRNORTHCOM has been authorized to task Services, then Air Force assets may be tasked through USNORTHCOM's air component, NORTHAF. USNORTHCOM's forces, excluding mobility assets, are provided through U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Therefore, USJFCOM will verify the requirements based on the people and equipment being transported. After USNORTHCOM's air component confirms the requirement ('SC') the USNORTHCOM J-3 validates the requirement ('V') and passes it the Joint Mobility Operations Center (JMOC) within USTRANSCOM. The JMOC then confirms the transportation feasibility and coordinates movement ('T'). Finally, if the mode of transportation is air, USTRANSCOM's air component AMC is then tasked and the aircraft and crews are scheduled against the requirements for execution. (Bozdech-Veater, 2003a)

Supporting the Department of Defense.

In the event USNORTHCOM has lift requirements, which are not in support of a LFA, such as deploying a QRF for rapid response to an imminent threat, or repositioning air defense assets (CLEAR SKIES) the process is abbreviated. The SECDEF does not require direct coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's JDOMS office and simply publishes an appropriate EXORD to task USNORTHCOM appropriately. Figure 7 represents the abbreviated process (Note: The JOPES sourcing, validation, and scheduling processes are virtually unchanged)




Figure 7. TPFDD Movement [QRF/JTF-CS/CLEAR SKIES] (Bozdech-Veater, 2003b)

Understanding the TPFDD process, both in development and execution, emphasizes the importance of planning and the level of coordination necessary to provide support in a timely and efficient manner. Deliberate planning and clear lines of communication are necessary in order to flow a TPFDD in the compressed period of time during a crisis or following a disaster. In many of the instances USNORTHCOM is called to duty there will be little to no warning and minimal time to respond, planners can not expect to be able to begin the planning process after the EXORD is published.

VI. Force Management

Presentation of Forces

“Effective civil support operations require an appropriate organization that includes the requisite command relationships both within the Air Force organization and between Air Force forces and other agencies.” (DAF, 2002c:25) The need to tailor our forces with both the capabilities required and the appropriate command structure within them should be the basis for presenting an effective force to the combatant commander.

Past civil support operations, even though successfully conducted, have frequently involved ad hoc organizations and command relationships. Although the precise nature and makeup of the resulting command relationships will depend on the specific situation, Air Force and Joint doctrine provide a solid foundation for the establishment of command relationships. In all cases, organizations should be founded in Air Force doctrine and in accordance with Joint doctrine. (DAF, 2002c:25)

The concept of standing up a Task Force (TF), a “temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission” (JCS, 2003) has been around for many years. The Air Force has strived to transform itself into a force capable of supporting this concept. Doctrinally, the Air Force will present itself to the combatant commander in the form of a task force tailored to meet the capabilities required to fulfill USNORTHCOM’s requirements, as an Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force.

Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF).

The Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF) “concept has two fundamental principles: first, to provide trained and ready aerospace forces for national defense, and second, to meet national commitments through a structured approach which enhances Total Force readiness and sustainment.” (DAF,2002a:6) The objective is to

“meet theater combatant commander needs by providing tailored and responsive AETFs that create the required strategic, operational, or tactical effects.” (DAF, 2002a:9) As part of the AETF concept, AFI 10-400, *Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning*, outlines responsibilities of the Unified Command, defines the Mobility Air Force (MAF) scheduling process, and provides further guidance on the use of Reserve and National Guard assets. As the applicable Unified Command, USNORTHCOM should:

Establish and identify aerospace, manpower, and equipment requirements, using standard UTCs to be sourced from the on-call [Aerospace Expeditionary Force] AEFs and [Air Expeditionary Wing] AEW. (DAF, 2002a:12)

Develop supporting plans with corresponding TPFDD and DRMD [Deployment Requirements Manning Document] line-level detail as required to meet theater and supporting combatant commander mission requirements. (DAF, 2002a:12)

Coordinate planning activities and combatant commander requirements with the AEFC [Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center]. (DAF, 2002a:12)

Work with the AEFC to establish guidance for the rotation of forces for steady state and crisis operations. (DAF, 2002a:12)

These responsibilities are necessary since the Air Force’s preferred method of force presentation to a Unified Command is in the form of an AETF. Additionally, understanding how the MAF is scheduled to support the AETF concept provides USNORTHCOM the insight to assist in determining their requirements and eventually know which airlift assets are available to support the rotating AEF cycles. The following is the process by which MAF rotation scheduling is accomplished:

MAF aviation requirements are built by the supported command with AMC guidance. AEFC builds rotations as requested by AMC. AEFC receives file from AMC and nominates sourcing to Deployment Requirements Document (DRD) line-level detail. AEFC then builds rotations for tasked AFRC [Air Force Reserve Command] and ANG [Air National Guard] units and flows applicable UTCs and ULNs from the TPFDD library so units can build DRMDs. (DAF, 2002a:21)

This process provides guidance on how the AEFC builds MAF support for AETFs. One aspect, which is not fully explored, is USNORTHCOM may not need to reposition MAF assets away from their home station in order to employ them to support their mission. This should simplify the process and make it even more responsive to the needs of USNORTHCOM. Another concern AFI 10-400 discusses is the status the Air Reserve Component (ARC), Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, can be in while supporting the AETF, voluntary or involuntary.

Volunteer Status: In support of these requirements, a member volunteering to serve a minimum of 15 days in theater is ordered to active duty IAW Title 10, Section 12301, paragraph (d), which requires the consent of the member and, in the case of ANG members, the Governor, with coordination through the member's unit of assignment. It also requires such tours be extended only with the consent of the member, the member's home unit, and AFRC or ANG. Reference AFH 10-416, *Personnel Readiness and Mobilization*. (DAF, 2002a:14)

Involuntary Status: AFRC and ANG members may be involuntarily ordered to active duty for longer periods of time pursuant to Presidential Reserve Call-Up, Partial Mobilization, Full Mobilization, and Total Mobilization authorities, but will mirror the rotation policy for active duty forces. (DAF, 2002a:14)

The ARC cannot be underestimated; U.S. Transportation Command relies heavily on the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard components as they provide 46% of their entire airlift requirements. (USTRANSCOM, 2000:2-3)

Air Mobility Command's Aerospace Expeditionary Force Implementation.

In response to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) directive, the USAF will begin a process of transforming itself into an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF); Air Mobility Command drafted a roadmap to aid in their transformation. (Note: the term EAF has since been redesignated as AEF) This roadmap, AMC Programming Plan 99-03, addresses how Air Mobility Command will transform to meet the CSAF's Expeditionary Aerospace Force vision. (HQ AMC, 1999)

The EAF concept compartmentalizes USAF forces into three categories; Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) and Air Expeditionary Wings (AEWs) to provide steady-state and quick-response forces for small-scale and/or steady state contingencies (SSCs); Enabler Forces to support strategic or common-user operations; and Service forces to perform the Air Force's organic "train, organize, and equip" functions. (HQ AMC, 1999:1)

AMC assigns C-130 units to an AEF/AEW structure, allowing them to become direct assets of an AETF. Additionally, AMC provides "enabler forces (not specifically assigned to individual AEFs but tasked to meet mission requirements) [which] include inter-theater airlift, [and] Global Reach Laydown [assets] (AMOGS, TALCEs, etc)." (HQ AMC, 1999:2-2) It is a combination of both the AEF assigned C-130s and the enabler forces' C-17 and C-5s, which will provide the airlift element to meet USNORTHCOM's requirements. "The global mobility capabilities of Air Mobility Command will play a key and integral role in the EAF; air mobility is both a force enabler and a force provider." (HQ AMC, 1999:i) Unfortunately, many of AMC's air assets are under the control of Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. Control of these forces may not be available to AMC at all times, so understanding the limitations of having such a large percentage of mobility assets in the ARC will help overcome their effects on mission execution.

Federal Forces (Title 10) vs. Militia Forces (Title 32).

Federal (Title 10) forces include active duty forces, reserve forces, and 'federalized' National Guard forces. "Command and control extends from the local commander to the President, and discipline is enforced pursuant to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)." (DAF, 2001c:16) There are financial concerns for civil support operations involving Title 10 forces, which require reimbursement of services from local authorities. National Guard forces are federalized through the Secretary of

Defense requesting and the President approving their mobilization for a period up to 2 years in duration. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), which limits direct law enforcement actions by Title 10 forces, applies directly to all federalized forces. (DAF, 2001c:16)

When National Guard forces are not federalized, they are “subject to the command and control of the Governor, and are disciplined in accordance with state law.” (DAF, 2001c:17) Non-federalized National Guard forces are typically categorized as either in ‘militia’ or Title 32 status. Militia status exists for missions solely directed by state authorities under the direction of the Governor, paid for by the state, and for state purposes. These missions are generally the first involvement of any military presence supporting a natural disaster, civil disturbance, or other extreme circumstance. Forces in militia status committing negligent or wrongful acts are subject to state law not the UCMJ. The financial concerns center on the Anti-Deficiency Act; use of Title 32 funding is restricted to purely state activities. When not federalized, National Guard forces are not subject to the PCA. In many cases the state Governor may be able to handle the situation without federal assistance, allowing the Air National Guard and National Guard to maintain militia status. However, in the event federal assistance is required, there can be an expectation both ‘federal’ forces and ‘militia’ forces will be working side by side. (DAF, 2001c:17)

Air Reserve Technicians (ART) and National Guard Technicians (NGT) are civilian employees of the United States government. “Their respective employment rights as civilians are delineated in Title 5 (ART) and Title 32 (NGT). Their civilian status is eliminated when placed in military status, and they are subject to the same duties as any other military [Federalized] member.” (DAF, 2001c:17)

Based on actual events in civil support operations, even when an overall Joint Task Force is organized, not all forces will be activated as ‘federalized’ forces.

Recent examples of this have occurred in wildland forest fire operations when Air Force participants include Active Duty, ANG federalized to Title 10 status, non-federalized ANG forces loaned from their home state to a neighboring state, and ANG members that are strictly volunteers. (DAF, 2002c:27)

This example stresses the challenges in unity of command when dealing with personnel and equipment falling under Title 5, Title 10, and Title 32 regulatory restrictions.

Controlling such a diverse force will require significant coordination in conjunction with well defined memorandums of understanding (MOU) or memorandums of agreement (MOA) in order to effectively and efficiently command and execute the mission.

Control of Forces

Forces “assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President.” (JCS, 2001b:x) “When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise over those forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense.” (JCS, 2001b:x) In the case of U.S. Northern Command, there are no air mobility assets permanently assigned to the command. This in turn necessitates forces to be provided to USNORTHCOM in the event forces are required to execute their directed mission. These forces can be provided with variety of command relationships. An example of the difference in command relationships can be seen in how C-130s are provided to a combatant command versus C-17s. There are four types of command relationships; combatant command (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical

control (TACON), and support. Additionally, there are three types of authority which do not include direct command; coordinating authority, administrative control (ADCON), and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). In the control of forces, five of these can be applicable to presenting forces in support of USNORTHCOM's mission; COCOM, OPCON, TACON, ADCON and coordinating authority.

Combatant Command (COCOM).

COCOM is “the only operational command relationship authority established by law and is found in Title 10, Section 164, United States Code (USC).” (AFDC, 1999a) It can be directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred. (JCS, 2001b:xi) It is defined as:

the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

In the instance of USNORTHCOM, there are no permanently assigned air mobility assets in which the Commander, U.S. Northern Command has COCOM. U.S. Transportation Command will provide the mobility assets in a supporting role through Air Mobility Command, one of their three component commands. Depending on the airlift asset, the control can range from operational control to coordinating authority.

Operational Control (OPCON).

OPCON provides the commander the authority to accomplish the assigned operational mission. OPCON is the “authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to

accomplish the mission.” (JCS, 2001b:xi) OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. To accomplish an assigned mission, the combatant commander normally delegates OPCON of assigned or attached forces to the appropriate subordinate component commanders. “Depending upon what organizational scheme the CINC may choose to employ, this may be either a Functional Component Commander (e.g. JFACC) or it may be a Service Component Commander (e.g. COMAFFOR).” (AFDC, 1999b) AMC’s continental United States (CONUS) based active-duty C-130s are traditionally given to the supported combatant commander with operational control (OPCON). However, AMC’s active-duty strategic airlift assets, such as the C-17 and the C-5, are presented with not direct command relationship, but rather a coordinating authority relationship.

Tactical Control (TACON).

The service component commander, COMAFFOR, or the functional component commander, JFACC, typically exercises TACON. TACON is the “authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.” (JCS, 2001b:xi) TACON does not include authority to change the organization of forces and excludes administrative and logistical support. “For example, if the JFACC is given TACON of another service’s aircraft, then the JFACC will task those aircraft via the air tasking order, but will not have the authority to alter the structure or command relationships of those forces, or to discipline personnel.” (AFDC, 1999c) TACON is “inherent in

OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.” (JCS, 2001b:xi)

Administrative Control (ADCON).

ADCON provides “the necessary legal authority and mechanism for the Services and their commanders to prepare military forces, to administer their organizations, to train and equip those forces, and to support them.” (AFDC, 2000) It is defined as:

the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (JCS, 2001b:xii)

This is the authority “necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support.” (JCS, 2001b:xii) In many instances only aspects of ADCON will be delegated in the event forces are provided to a combatant command. An example of this is U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) may have C-130’s presented with OPCON and ADCON. However, the ADCON with regards to unit training and equipping will still be maintained by the combatant command, USTRANSCOM, who maintains COCOM of the forces.

Coordinating Authority.

Coordinating Authority is the “authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service.” (JCS, 2001b:xii) The “commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement.” (JCS, 2001b:xii) This relationship is present with any ‘non-federalized’

forces under Title 32, such as non-activated Air National Guard assets. Additionally, AMC's strategic airlift assets, the C-17 and C-5, will require direct coordination with USTRANSCOM since USNORTHCOM should not expect to have OPCON or TACON over these assets. Coordinating Authority does not provide unity of command but does enable unity of effort without usurping the authority of the governors, over their state forces, or the combatant commanders, over their assigned assets. (DAF, 2002c:26)

Key Players

Joint Force Commander (JFC).

In the event the combatant commander, CDRUSNORTHCOM, determines it necessary to standup a joint task force in order to support a Lead Federal Agency, the individual in command of the joint task force is the Joint Forces Commander (JFC). The JFC "determines appropriate objectives and sets priorities for the entire joint force." (DAF, 2002c:30) "Command (the lawful authority of a commander) and control (the regulation of forces and functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent) is the most important function undertaken by a JFC." (JCS, 2001b:xiii) "Command and Control is the means by which a JFC synchronizes and/or integrates joint force activities in order to achieve unity of command and unity of effort." (JCS, 2001b:xiii) The JFC represents the combatant commander and should set goals and objectives to meet the commander's intent.

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR).

The Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) is the single Air Force officer in command of the Air Force component within a joint task force. The key elements regarding a COMAFFOR are (AFDC, 2002):

- A COMAFFOR exists only within the context of an organized joint force.
- The COMAFFOR is the only USAF component commander in a joint force.
- The JFC exercises OPCON over the COMAFFOR.
- There is no U.S. Air Force commander between a COMAFFOR and the JFC.

“If the JTF has a functional air component, the JFC normally selects the Service component commander with the preponderance of air and space assets, and the ability to plan, task and control joint air and space operations as the JFACC.” (AFDC, 2002) This is usually the Air Force component commander, the COMAFFOR. This provides OPCON of the Air Force component forces, and as JFACC, TACON of forces from other Service components. The COMAFFOR falls under two different chains of command; the joint operational chain, and the Service administrative chain. “The COMAFFOR takes operational orders from the JFC, but must also continue to be responsive to his/her senior Air Force commander, through the ADCON chain, for assigned and attached Air Force forces.” (AFDC, 2002) The COMAFFOR receives Service support from and responds to ADCON orders from their Service chain, as long as there is no conflict with the OPCON orders from the JFC. The COMAFFOR “is the senior Air Force war fighter in a joint force, who responds to two superiors in two different chains, the operational and administrative, and has an AOC to command air and space power.” (AFDC, 2002)

Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR).

The Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) is “the Commander of Air Force Forces' (COMAFFOR's) or Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC's) designated coordinating authority for air mobility with all commands and agencies both internal and external to the JTF.” (AFDC, 2003) The DIRMOBFOR provides direction to the Air Mobility Division (AMD) in the AOC and normally will be a senior officer familiar with the AOR. The COMAFFOR exercises ADCON over the DIRMOBFOR.

However, the DIRMOBFOR reports operationally to the JFACC. “For operations where the preponderance of forces are air mobility assets, or for air mobility-only operations, the DIRMOBFOR may be dual-hatted as the JFACC/COMAFFOR.” (AFDC, 2003) The DIRMOBFOR is responsible for directing the Air Mobility Division (AMD) of the AOC. Under the direction of the DIRMOBFOR, the AMD normally has the following responsibilities (AFDC, 2003):

- Direct the integration of intertheater air mobility support provided by USTRANSCOM-assigned mobility forces.
- Coordinate the tasking of USTRANSCOM intertheater air mobility forces (air and ground) attached (TACON) to the JFC.
- Direct the tasking of intratheater air mobility forces (air and ground) attached (either OPCON or TACON) to the JFC.
- Coordinate with the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), through the Air Mobility Division (AMD), all intertheater air mobility missions to ensure the most effective use of these resources in accomplishing the JFC, theater, and USTRANSCOM missions.

The DIRMOBFOR is the JTF’s link to USTRANSCOM and inevitably AMC’s airlift assets, but one of the DIRMOBFOR’s greatest challenges is he/she has no direct command of any of the airlift assets, inter or intratheater.

Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).

The Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is the “focal point of any DOD response to a particular disaster. The DCO is a military or civilian official designated by the responsible DOD Component to coordinate MSCA activities in accordance with DOD Directive 3025.1.” (CDMHA, 2003:4-1) The DCO and JTF commander should not be the same individual because they have different responsibilities and assets. “The separation of these distinct functions allows the commander the flexibility to operate freely in the disaster area while the DCO focuses on task validation and coordinating DOD response activities in the Disaster Field Office.” (CDMHA, 2003:4-4) “Because

the DOD could have a supporting role in any federal emergency, close cooperation between the JTF and other federal agencies is required through the supported combatant commander's DCO." (DAF, 2002c:30) The DCO and the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) provide interface with the federal response effort for this coordination and the DCO normally works for the JFC as a special staff officer. (DAF, 2002c:31)

The roles of the JFC, COMAFFOR, DIRMOBFOR, and DCO may be essential depending on the magnitude of operations and the command structure the Commander, U.S. Northern Command chooses to present in responding to a request to assist in civil affairs.

U.S. Northern Command's Task Force Structures (Notional)

Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, states the unified commander can adapt a command structure using any of the following six options; Subordinate Unified Command, Joint Task Force (JTF), Functional Component, Service Component, Single-Service Force, or Specific Operational Forces. (JCS, 2001b:xvii) In the event U.S. Northern Command must respond to a natural disaster, civil disturbance, or other extreme circumstance, it is expected there will be the creation of either a Single-Service Task Force (SSTF) or a Joint Task Force (JTF). If the response is relatively simple, for example only requiring the use of a single C-17 or a handful of C-130s to transport people and equipment throughout the United States, then a Single Service Task Force may be appropriate. Due to their relative simplicity, the SSTF can be "conducted with existing Service organizations and Service chains of command for Service forces and complemented by Coordinating Authority for those assets that are not under Air Force Title 10 authority." (DAF, 2002c:26)

Single Service Task Force.

In the presentation of a Single Service Task Force under the direct control of the combatant commander, CDRUSNORTHCOM maintains OPCON of the task force and the Air Force stands up an AETF to support the task force. “The designated AETF COMAFFOR would respond to the direct OPCON of the combatant commander.” (DAF, 2002c:28) Figure 8 represents the structure of Task Force XRAY (notional). The command relationships within the AEG/AEW would be established with a COMAFFOR in charge of the AETF. In the event there is representation of forces in ‘militia’ status (Title 32) the COMAFFOR would not be able to exercise OPCON or ADCON over these forces. Through Coordinating Authority with the appropriate state governor(s), the COMAFFOR can design MOUs or MOAs to achieve unity of effort.




Figure 8. Single Service Task Force (DAF, 2002c:51)

“This method of presentation of forces is allowed for under JP 0-2 but is not in accordance with Air Force doctrine as established in AFDD 1 and AFDD 2.” (DAF, 2002c:28) Air Force Doctrine would suggest the AETF fall under the combatant commander’s air component if it is a single service operation.

Single Service Task Force thru Air Component Commander.

In the presentation of a Single Service Task Force thru USNORTHCOM's air component commander, NORTHAF/CC, the task force would be under the command of a designated AEG or AEW commander who would in turn be under the OPCON of the NORTHAF commander. (DAF, 2002c:28) Figure 9 represents the structure of Air Expeditionary Task Force XRAY (notional). OPCON "should normally be specified from the combatant commander to the Air Force component commander who should normally, in turn, specify OPCON over the AEG/AEW to its designated commander." (DAF, 2002c:28) The command relationships within the AEG/AEW would be established with a COMAFFOR in charge of the AETF. In the event there is representation of forces in 'militia' status (Title 32) the COMAFFOR would not be able to exercise OPCON or ADCON over these forces. Through Coordinating Authority with the appropriate state governor(s), the COMAFFOR can design MOUs or MOAs to achieve unity of effort.




Figure 9. Single Service Task Force thru Air Component (DAF, 2002c:53)

This is the "appropriate presentation of forces and command relationships under AFDD 1 and AFDD 2, and in accordance with the UNAAF, when a combatant commander tasks

his service component commander to establish a single service task force.” (DAF, 2002c:28)

Joint Task Force.

As operations expand in scope beyond the local area or to more challenging scenarios such as hurricane relief, or a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) events, there will inevitably involve joint operations. (DAF, 2002c:26) Operational control must shift from a Single Service Task Force to unified action encompassing a broad scope of activities and service requirements. This unified direction is normally accomplished by

establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning and/or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission. (JCS, 2001b:viii)

A JTF is a joint force that is “constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing JTF commander.” (JCS, 2001b:xviii) A JTF may be established on a “geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.” (JCS, 2001b:xviii) Figure 10 represents the structure of Joint Task Force XRAY (notional). If the standard organization of joint forces is required for civil support operations, the CDRUSNORTHCOM would establish a subordinate joint task force (JTF) which is specifically focused on joint civil support operations. The Air Force would then provide a capability organized AETF to the combatant command, USNORTHCOM, with a designated COMAFFOR, which would be attached to the JTF with OPCON to the JTF commander. The JTF commander would

delegate OPCON of the AETF to the COMAFFOR. If all of the Air Force forces fall under ‘federal’ status (Title 10) then the COMAFFOR would exercise OPCON and specified elements of ADCON over all Air Force forces participating in the operation. However, in the event there is a mix of ‘federal’ and ‘militia’ status forces then the same requirements as previously stated would be required to achieve unity of effort. (DAF, 2002c:27)




Figure 10. Joint Task Force (DAF, 2002c:54)

This is the appropriate presentation of forces and command relationships in accordance with the UNAAF, when a combatant commander tasks his service components to establish a joint task force.

Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (S-JTFHQ).

The combatant commander, CDRUSNORTHCOM, may elect to establish standing JTFs for Civil Support (CS) and Homeland Security (HLS). “This is a variation of the previous JTF structure except there is a standing HQ staff, and subordinate JTFs are established (ad hoc) for each civil support operation. The Defense Planning Guidance

directs Unified Commands to establish S-JTFs.” (DAF 2002c:55) “Standing JTFs for civil support and consequence management have tended not to be organized by Service component, but rather by function. The result is a JFC supported by a series of functional task forces.” (DAF, 2002c:30-31) Figure 11 represents the structure of Standing Joint Task Forces CS and HLS (notional). (Note: S-JTF-CS would stand-up JTFs as needed to support specific functions) Due to the rapid response USNORTHCOM requires to prevent or mitigate the effects of disasters or disturbances, having a standing command structure would significantly enhance their capability to react in a timely fashion.




Figure 11. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (DAF, 2002c:55)

A significant advantage to this command structure is the “S-JTF staff would have visibility and planning capability for developing CS contingency response; significant continuity; and opportunities to build long-term interagency relationships.” (DAF, 2002c:55) Unfortunately, it would require significant reach back by the staff of the AETF-X.

VII. Conclusion

Conclusion

Understanding the numerous Constitutional Statutes, Orders, and Directives which provide the framework and limitations the Department of Defense can operate in helps shape how the military can provide airlift assistance to civil authorities. As with any policy decision, there can be changes, amendments, and ratifications, which can either, tighten or loosen restrictions on the Department of Defense. It is undoubtedly as the Global War on Terrorism extends and the Department of Homeland Security matures there will undoubtedly be new guidance and I would expect the restrictions would be loosened as time prevails. Already we now ‘routinely’ see the use of military in roles protecting civil airports and as security for major events, such as the Olympics. The original Posse Comitatus Act was based on the attitudes and concerns prevalent of a nation reeling from the American Civil War having just ended the Reconstruction Era. I would contend this is not necessarily the attitude of today’s America and may bring a significant change to the wording of the Posse Comitatus in the near future.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, bringing a single agency in charge of a patchwork of separate agencies, supports the ideal in military terms known as ‘unity of command’. This unity is really untested to date, but the promise for a more efficient, faster responding, and more resourceful organization appears to be the outcome of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation has a solid foundation, proven procedures, and processes in place to support their role in Homeland Security. From the military perspective, the creation of U.S. Northern Command will do for the military what the Department of Homeland Security

is doing for the civilian side of the government. U.S. Northern command has no published lessons learned to date, but it has had the opportunity to stretch its wings more than once, with the Columbia Disaster as an excellent example. This paper did not look in depth into the structures within these organizations, DHS and USNORTHCOM, but from my research I was extremely impressed by the level of cooperation and the ‘team effort’ being expressed by the staffed personnel. Both U.S. Transportation Command and its air component, Air Mobility Command, are well prepared to support U.S. Northern Command. However, the true limitation of AMC’s airlift support is and will still be for some time, the limited number of aircraft against the limitless requests for airlift. The procurement of additional C-17s in the near future may alleviate this issue.

The primary users of airlift, their location, size, and lift requirements, are well defined for military organizations. Such units from WMD-CSTs to TALCEs have definable Unit Line Numbers (ULNs) and Unit Type Codes (UTCs). Additionally, military units have been structured to design their equipment to meet military airlift capability, and in some cases they are designed specifically to operate with C-130s in mind. This makes the cargo and personnel easier to process, manifest, and monitor on JOPES than their civilian counterparts. It is the civilian counterparts, such as FEMA or the FBI who may bring to the fight a wide array of personnel and cargo, which is not designed for routine airlift and generally much harder to manifest, with no associated UTCs. This presents an immediate breakdown in the efficiency U.S. Northern Command is able to obtain in the planning and execution of the TPFDD. Another aspect which differs between the military and civilian user is the origination location. The military has well defined APOEs for most of their units, and in some cases such as WMD-CSTs, they

are intentionally collocated with their designated APOE. This is definitely not the case for the civilian counterparts; there will likely be issues with designating APOEs, consolidating movements, and integrating it all into JOPES.

The TPFDD process has is a proven effective method to transform the requirements of the combatant commander to an effective plan and inevitably the actual flow of forces. The TPFDD is a living entity, with the ability to flex, but there needs to be a solid foundation to build upon. This solid foundation is the TPFDD Letter of Instruction and the necessary deliberate planning. Utilizing the total participation of the commander and his/her staff during ‘peace-time’ operations facilitate the building of operational plans or concepts of operation. These now become the basis for crisis action planning when reacting to a disaster. The TPFDD LOI is necessary to ensure the planning and coordination is in line with the combatant commander’s vision or intent. There must be an emphasis on TPFDD discipline from USNORTHCOM all the way to the individual Installation Deployment Officer (IDO). This will prevent such errors as the TPFDD disagreeing with the tasking, use of non-standard UTCs, use of outdated UTCs, UTCs without the required items to perform the mission, or even taskings without UTCs, ULNs or increment numbers. This has always seemed to be a lesson observed and not a lesson learned. The JCS Priority System is ineffective when trying to make decisions on which movements make the cut when all of the movements have the same priority. This process increases the coordination and time required to execute the airlift.

The presentation of forces to USNORTHCOM and the command and control of those forces should be in line with current Joint and Air Force doctrine. The USAF must ensure the forces presented, in the form of AETFs, are tailored appropriately to meet the

requirements of USNORTHCOM. The role of key personnel such as the COMAFFOR and the DIRMObFOR should be included in the presentation of forces, even if they are one in the same. The fact almost every operation will include both Title 10 and Title 32 forces, means thought must be given to ensure appropriate command and control, either OPCON, TACON, ADCON, or Coordinating Authority, is established clearly during operations to mitigate confusion and promote unity of command. These forces should be presented to the SSTF or JTF as an AETF. The implementation of a S-JTF is preferred, since it is a significant enabler by providing increased visibility, planning capability, continuity, and the ability to build long-term interagency relationships.

Finally, an aspect which was not discussed but seemed to be a concern to many individuals within U.S. Northern Command is the role of the Air Reserve Component (ARC), the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard, has in executing their mission. USNORTHCOM realizes much of their airlift assets provided by USTRANSCOM are products of the ARC. Current operations, OEF and OIF, have seen large activations of these forces which pose a significant concern when these troops meet their 2 year activation limit, many in 2004. This must be evaluated to determine its future impact on USNORTHCOM's ability to fulfill their designated mission.

Recommendations

Coordinate with FEMA to provide tailored packages to support specific incidents, allowing USNORTHCOM planners the ability to create credible plans during the deliberate planning phase.

Coordinate with FEMA to designate primary APOEs and consolidation points for their package requirements.

Increase the number of JOPES trained individuals within USNORTHCOM, and ensure the right JOPESters are in the right positions.

Establish and implement a USNORTHCOM TPFDD Letter of Instruction.

Implement a training program to enhance the knowledge of JOPES and the TPFDD process to those planners and executors in the J-3 Operations, J-4 Logistics, and J-5 Strategic Plans Directorates.

Reevaluate the JCS Priority System to include the ability to increase stratification of priority well beyond its current capability.

Maintain the Standing Joint Task Force (S-JTF) structure for Homeland Security and Civil Support.

Ensure ongoing coordination with the Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC) is established and integrate USNORTHCOM's requirements into the AEF concept.

Establish the process by which a select number of C-130s from each AEF cycle are chopped to USNORTHCOM to support ongoing operations and alert requirements.

NORTHAF, 1st AF, and the AEFC need to designate tailored AETFs to meet a variety of capabilities to support USNORTHCOM's requirements.

Reevaluate the impact the Air Reserve Component's activation during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom will have on fulfilling future requirements once their 2 year windows have expired.

Develop set guidance and procedures to facilitate airlift assets the ability to fly local training sorties while tasked against USNORTHCOM's alert requirements.

Areas for Further Research

The scope of this paper was to provide an overview of how military airlift can be used to support Homeland Defense / Homeland Security through United States Northern Command. Areas of research I feel could be explored and provide valuable insight could include the following:

A heuristic or deterministic approach at optimizing the reaction times required for a Quick Reaction Force / Ready Reaction Force based on the location of aircraft, aerial port of embarkation (APOE) and aerial port of debarkation (APOD).

An examination of the directive and process by which C-130 alert crews and their corresponding aircraft are managed to maximize the flexibility to allow continuation training while still maintain alert status to meet designated response times.

A feasibility study as to U.S. Northern Command being assigned dedicated (Chopped) airlift platforms on an AEF rotation and propositioned in key locations similar to rotations supporting U.S. Central Command.

An examination as to the public policy limiting U.S. military involvement in civil affairs to determine if it is outdated or needs to be changed to reflect the flexibility required maintaining an edge on the war against global terrorism.

List of Acronyms

ACC	Air Combat Command
ADCON	Administrative Control
AEF	Aerospace Expeditionary Force
AEFC	Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center
AEG	Air Expeditionary Group
AES	Air Expeditionary Squadron
AETF	Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force
AEW	Air Expeditionary Wing
AF	Air Force
AFDC	Air Force Doctrine Center
AFDD	Air Force Doctrine Document
AFH	Air Force Handbook
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFNSEP	Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigation
AFRC	Air Force Reserve Command
AFSOF	Air Force Special Operations Forces
ALD	Available to Load
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMD	Air Mobility Division
AMOG	Air Mobility Operations Group
ANG	Air National Guard
AOC	Air Operations Center
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
ARC	Air Reserve Components
ARNORTH	United States Northern Command's Army Component
ART	Air Reserve Technicians
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD-HD	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security
C4I	Comprehensive Command, Control, Computers, and Intelligence
CAG	Commander's Action Group
CB	Chemical, and Biological
CBIRF	Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives

CDRUSNORTHCOM	Commander, United States Northern Command
CINC	Commander In Chief
CIRG	Critical Incident Response Group
CJCS	Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMD	Command
COCOM	Combatant Command
COMAFFOR	Commander, Air Force Forces
CONPLAN	Concept of Operations Plan
CONR	Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense Command Region
CONUS	Continental United States
COOP	Continuity of Operations
COORD AUTH	Coordination Authority
CS	Civil Support
CSAF	Chief of Staff of the Air Force
CST	Civil Support Team
DA	Department of the Army
DAF	Department of the Air Force
DC	District of Columbia
DCE	Defense Coordinating Element
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authorized
DIRMOBFOR	Director of Mobility Forces
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOMS	Director of Military Support
DOT	Department of Transportation
DRD	Deployment Requirements Document
DRMD	Deployments Requirements Manning Document
DSO	Domestic Support Operations
DTS	Defense Transportation System
EAD	Earliest Arrival Date
EAF	Expeditionary Aerospace Force
EO	Executive Order
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP&R	Emergency Preparedness and Response
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ER	Engineer Regulation

EST	Emergency Support Team
EUCOM	European Command
EXORD	Execution Order
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM	Field Manual
FORSCOM	United States Forces Command
FRP	Federal Response Plan
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GPO	Government Publishing Office
HLD	Homeland Defense
HLS	Homeland Security
HQ	Head Quarters
HSA	Homeland Security Act
IDO	Installation Deployment Officer
IRF	Initial Response Force
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JATO	Jet Assisted Take-Off
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDOMS	Joint Director of Military Support
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Forces Commander
JFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
JFHQ	Joint Forces Headquarters
JFHQ-HLS	Joint Forces Headquarters Homeland Security
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JMOC	Joint Mobility Operations Center
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOPES	Joint Operations Planning and Execution System
JP	Joint Publication
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-CS	Joint Task Force Civil Support
LAD	Latest Arrival Date
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOI	Letter of Instruction
MACA	Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
MACDIS	Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance

MAF	Mobility Air Force
MARFOR	Marine Corps Forces
MARNORTH	United States Northern Command's Marine Component
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOBILABS	Mobile Laboratories
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSCLEA	Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NAVFLEET	Naval Fleet
NAVNORTH	United States Northern Command's Naval Component
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NG	National Guard
NGT	National Guard Technicians
N-Hour	Notification Hour
NICI	National Interagency Civil-Military Institute
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHAF	United States Northern Command's Air Forces
NORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
NSEP	National Security Emergency Preparedness
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONE	Operation Noble Eagle
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
PACOM	Pacific Command
PCA	Posse Comitatus Act
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
POD	Port of Debarkation
POTUS	President of the United States
QLR	Quick Look report
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RDD	Required Delivery date
RFA	Request for Federal Assistance
RFF	Request for Forces
RLD	Ready to Load
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force

SEC	Section
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SJFHQ	Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters
S-JTF-CS	Standing Joint Task Force Civil Support
S-JTF-HLS	Standing Joint Task Force Homeland Security
SSC	Small-Scale and/or Steady State Contingency
SSTF	Single-Service Task Force
TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center
TACON	Tactical Control
TAG	The Attorney General
TALCE	Tanker Airlift Control Element
TEU	Technical Escort Unit
TF	Task Force
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UCMJ	Uniformed Code of Military Justice
ULN	Unit Line Number
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USC	United States Code
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	Unit Type Code
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMD-CST	Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team

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Vita

Major Jay L. Junkins received his Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force in May 1992.

Major Junkins' first assignment was at Los Angeles AFB as a modeling and simulation project officer in December 1992. He then attended Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training at Randolph AFB in November 1993. Upon graduation he was assigned to the 23rd Airlift Wing, 2nd Airlift Squadron, Pope AFB in February 1995. While stationed there he worked both squadron and wing tactics, and completed his assignment as the squadron's senior evaluator navigator. He then attended the USAF Weapons Instructor Course (C-130) in January 1999 and upon graduation was reassigned to the 463rd Airlift Group, 50th Airlift Squadron, Little Rock AFB, as the squadron weapons officer and evaluator navigator. In January 2001 he was reassigned to the USAF Weapons Instructor Course (C-130), Little Rock AFB, as a CADRE Instructor and Course Support Flight Commander. In May 2002 he was assigned to the Air Mobility Warfare Center, Fort Dix, as a student of the Advanced Study of Air Mobility program, graduating with a Masters of Air Mobility in June 2003.

Major Junkins was promoted to his current rank on 1 March 2003. He has completed Air Command and Staff College by correspondence in 2003. His next assignment will be in the 621st Air Mobility Operations Group, McGuire AFB as a Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE) Commander. He is married and has one son and one daughter.

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14. ABSTRACT The role of the military in civil affairs is constrained legally, physically, and lacks current guidance and training. The research completed in this paper provides a look at the key elements and factors affecting the use of military airlift in support of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security. The end result is a starting point for U.S. Northern Command's airlift planners in understanding many of the legal, doctrinal, and physical factors which impact the way in which airlift is utilized for civil support. A final emphasis is on how the Air Force can present airlift forces, preferable in the form of an AETF, to support a Joint Task Force supporting U.S. Northern Command's mission. The findings include how legal constraints on the military, while providing civil assistance, might be outdated and need to change to reflect the current climate of the United States. The movement of civilian agency assets, such as those from FEMA, brings unique challenges which can be overcome with effective deliberate planning. The need for education on the TPFDD process and instilling TPFDD discipline within the echelons will enhance the flow of forces to support civilian agencies. The need to redesign the JCS Priority System is necessary to aid in stratifying movements with the same priority. The Air Force must appropriately tailor their AETFs to support the JTF's or SSTF's specific requirements. The use of Standing JTFs are effective, provide continuity, and foster long-term interagency relationships. Finally, USNORTHCOM must evaluate the impact the ARC has on its ability to accomplish their mission.					
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