Vietnam: Current Operational Lessons From History. ACSC Quick-Look 05-08
Abstract
The US involvement in Vietnam from the Kennedy to the Nixon administrations was marked by changes in strategy. Initial US assistance to the South Vietnamese government centered on President Kennedy's emphasis on counterinsurgency and nation building. Though the State Department accurately characterized the strife as an invasion by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam) early on, the major enemy was still identified as the Viet Cong (VC), or indigenous southern communists. For its part, the DRV attempted to characterize the conflict as a civil war rather than an interstate war. Bungled elections and the subsequent division of Vietnam into North and South lent credibility to the Communist claims that South Vietnam (RVN or Republic of Vietnam) was a US puppet. Tacit US approval of the coup against the Diem regime in 1963 lent additional credence to Communist claims. Early efforts against the VC were guided by advice from Sir Robert Thompson, the British counterinsurgency expert who led the successful long-term campaign to rid Malaya of communist guerrillas. However, contextual elements prevailing in Malaya were notably absent in Vietnam. The idea of concentrating at risk population in strategic hamlets for easier defense worked in Malaya, but failed in Vietnam both because the program was too ambitious and because rural Vietnamese society was traditionally rooted to ancestral land. The plan was eventually abandoned.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA430903
Entities
People
- Charles T. Kamps
Organizations
- Air Command and Staff College