The Paradox of Sanctions as a Tool of Statecraft
Abstract
Economic sanctions have been a prominent part of American statecraft since World War II, and increasingly so since the end of the Cold War. This is something of a paradox, however, since most researchers agree that sanctions have at best a mixed or even a poor record of success. This paper attempts to explain this paradox by summarizing major trends in the U.S. use of negative economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era. My major findings are that, contrary to the traditional liberal view that sanctions occupy the middle ground between diplomacy (persuasion) and force (coercion), in practice our objectives have gravitated away from this middle ground in either direction. Sanctions that have shifted toward the forceful end of the spectrum have helped protect U.S. vital interests, but have had negative consequences for our humanitarian interests. Sanctions that have tried to affect public or international opinion on humanitarian issues have had little favorable impact, and have instead diluted the potency of suasion as a tool of U.S. statecraft.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA430993
Entities
People
- Ronald J Moore
Organizations
- National Defense University