



Sustained Coercive Air Presence

Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and the Future of Airpower in Peace Enforcement

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THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES,
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF
GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1995-96.

Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

February 2001

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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE FEB 2001		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sustained Coercive Air Presence Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and the Future of Airpower in Peace Enforcement				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air University Press,Maxwell AFB,AL,36112				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 66	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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Abstract

Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SCAP) is an airpower approach to peace enforcement designed to impose a cease-fire on an unwilling belligerent and then use a prolonged air presence to enhance long-term diplomatic efforts that seek a political solution. In an era of scarce resources, the United States (US) military would rather concentrate on defending the republic than engaging in peace enforcement. However, civilian leaders will continue to appease and court public opinion as well as other governments with limited airpower options that attempt to produce meaningful results. The time has come to articulate a strategy that reconciles the demands of politicians with the strengths and limitations of combat airpower. SCAP orchestrates precision air strikes, a long-term air presence, and the limited use of ground forces to create a seamless coercive military effort that enhances the overarching diplomatic process.

The distinctly American quest for quick and inexpensive victory through airpower came to a dramatic end over the skies of Iraq in 1991. The application of airpower in Operation Desert Storm discredited gradualism and minimum force approaches such that the American norm is now to commit overwhelming force to control the level of violence and resolve disputes quickly. Overwhelming yet discriminating force is often necessary in peace enforcement to impose a cease-fire on belligerents who increasingly possess modern weapons and indiscriminately use them on civilians. A compelling air campaign can often pressure a belligerent to make political concessions with few casualties on either side.

A successful airpower approach to peace enforcement must support the long-term diplomatic process necessary to convert short-term political concessions into a lasting political solution. Modern airpower can maintain a long-term coercive presence with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability linked to precision-guided munitions (PGM). Nevertheless, a short land campaign is still necessary to separate belligerents, provide humanitarian aide, create safe havens to resettle refugees, and ensure the establishment of a trustworthy police force. However, a continuing air presence enforces regional security and provides the coercion necessary for a political settlement.

Air operations over Iraq and Bosnia demonstrate the problems associated with a long-term air presence and suggest the need for doctrine that adapts combat airpower to the SCAP mission. Therefore, this study will begin the doctrine development process by examining the theoretical, historical, operational, and technological aspects of SCAP. The focus of this study is to determine the mechanisms, strengths, and limitations of how combat air power can persuade determined belligerents to stop fighting and then maintain a secure environment to facilitate the continuing diplomatic process.

The primary conclusion of this study is that SCAP can impose a cease-fire, create a tenable environment for a short ground campaign, and maintain long-term regional stability by engaging and threatening a belligerent's strategic-level value systems. The most significant limitation of a SCAP strategy is that the belligerent must have strategic assets that are held dear and vulnerable to PGMs.

The competing agendas and political infighting associated with United Nations and coalition operations also seriously hinders a SCAP strategy. Nonetheless, if politicians decide on an airpower approach to peace enforcement, SCAP in concert with the economic, informational, and political instruments of power is a viable strategy against a modern, well-armed foe.

About the Author

Maj George D. Kramlinger graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1982 with a BS in astronautical engineering. After graduating from undergraduate pilot training at Vance Air Force Base (AFB), Oklahoma, in 1983, he flew KC-135s at K. I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, from 1983 to 1985. Major Kramlinger transitioned to FB-111s and was assigned to Pease AFB, New Hampshire, from 1986 to 1990. While at Pease he served as wing weapons officer and Stan/Eval flight examiner and led the transfer of the FB-111 to Tactical Air Command's 27th Tactical Fighter Wing at Cannon AFB, New Mexico, in 1990. While at Cannon, Major Kramlinger graduated from the F-111 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course and won squadron Top Gun honors. He served as the 523d Fighter Squadron's operations officer during a five-month deployment to Operation Provide Comfort and flew 50 combat missions over northern Iraq. Major Kramlinger was selected as Air Combat Command's (ACC) 1993 flight commander of the year and was the ACC nominee for the Air Force Lance P. Sijan leadership award. He is a 1995 distinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College. He graduated from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, where he was awarded a master of airpower art and science degree. In July 1996 Major Kramlinger was assigned to NATO AIRSOUTH at Naples, Italy.

Acknowledgments

I thank Col Maris “Buster” McCrabb and Lt Col (Col-select) Robert C. Owen for their counsel, patience, encouragement, and insight. Thanks also to Col Phillip S. Meilinger, dean of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, for his encouragement and vision in creating an environment conducive to airpower thought and scholarship. Without the patience, love, and support of my wife Elizabeth and daughter Jacqueline, completing this thesis would not have been possible.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Crises and Lesser Conflicts (CALCs) can be quagmires. If airpower is to offer a significant military alternative for the nation's leadership, it must not be held hostage by having to put people—airmen or soldiers—in harm's way, just to support air operations. Airpower must provide independent means for doing the things that must be done in CALCs without committing people to the ground, even in supporting roles. This is not the traditional call for the independence of airpower from ground commanders; it is a call for airpower to give the nation's leadership an alternative that does not trap the nation in someone else's conflict.

—Carl H. Builder and Theodore W. Karasik
*Organizing, Training, and Equipping the
Air Force for Crises and Lesser Conflicts*

Above the rocky plains of northern Iraq and over the fog-shrouded mountains of Bosnia–Herzegovina, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fighters roam the sky in an effort to impose peace on belligerents driven by ethnic hatred. The conflict in Kurdistan and the Balkans is representative of the new international security environment where ethnic, religious, and territorial tensions once constrained by the pressures of the cold war now spawn armed struggles throughout much of the world.¹ These localized conflicts are generally internal and often pose no direct threat to United States (US) vital interests. However, the international community feels an ever-increasing obligation to “do something” in a world more sensitive to human suffering and regional instability. Despite military downsizing and a renewed emphasis on war fighting, the United States is frequently persuaded to lead multinational peace enforcement missions.² Peace enforcement is a politically risky strategy that must minimize casualties, avoid long-term entanglement, and trample softly on the notion of national sovereignty. Consequently, US political leaders will likely turn to the advantages of airpower with the hope of achieving quick results while minimizing political costs. As Dr. Eliot A. Cohen observes, “Airpower is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment.”³

The distinctly American quest for quick and inexpensive victory through airpower came to a dramatic end over the skies of Iraq in 1991. During Operation Desert Storm, airpower demonstrated a maturity that made it overwhelming and decisive in the high-intensity arena of modern mechanized warfare. Experience, technology, and doctrine combined to enable airpower to finally fulfill the promises made by its early prophets.⁴ The application of airpower in Desert Storm discredited gradualism and minimum force approaches such that the American norm is now to commit

overwhelming force to control the level of violence and resolve disputes quickly.⁵ Overwhelming yet discriminating force is often necessary in peace enforcement to impose a cease-fire on belligerents who increasingly possess modern weapons and indiscriminately use them on civilians. An airpower-oriented approach to peace enforcement responds faster and cheaper than other forms of military force, typically puts far fewer people in harm's way, and may provide the only way for the United States to intervene at an acceptable level of political risk.⁶ A compelling air campaign using the mobility, high technology, and precision weapons of American airpower can often pressure a belligerent to make political concessions with few casualties on either side.⁷ In his book *Airpower: A Centennial Appraisal*, Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason states that "frequently, the potential contribution of airpower to peace enforcement was debated but seldom was the debate extensive or informed. Inevitably, it became ensnared in the political considerations of the governments involved. Ironically, its application became strenuously demanded by many civilians who had previously been skeptical or pessimistic about the use of airpower in the Gulf."

A successful airpower approach to peace enforcement must support the long-term diplomatic process necessary to convert short-term political concessions into a lasting political solution. Movement toward a negotiated settlement is a lengthy process that requires security, stability, and a degree of pressure on unwilling belligerents. Historically, the Army and Marine Corps have accomplished these tasks, with airpower providing only an auxiliary function. However, modern airpower can maintain a long-term coercive presence with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability linked to precision-guided munitions (PGM). Nevertheless, a short land campaign is still necessary to separate belligerents, provide humanitarian aid, create safe havens to resettle refugees, and ensure the establishment of a trustworthy police force. Highly visible air patrols minimize the necessary ground contingent with a constant presence that deters organized aggression and reassures the victims. In this way the ground component is withdrawn as soon as civilian aid agencies can assume the relief effort and a trained police force is in place to maintain local law and order. A continuing air presence enforces regional security and provides the coercion necessary for a political settlement. An airpower approach to this phase of peace enforcement is politically attractive because it is less intrusive than a lengthy land campaign and avoids the domestic political underpinnings associated with the long-term commitment of ground troops. In *The Emerging System of Systems*, Adm William A. Owens states, "It is no longer simply a matter of thinking it enough to counter successfully a defined military threat; we must design military forces more specifically in terms of their political purposes. In short, we must rebuild an intellectual framework that links our forces to our policy."

Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SCAP) is an airpower-oriented peace enforcement strategy designed to impose a cease-fire on an unwilling belligerent and then use a prolonged air presence to enhance the long-term diplomatic process. In an era of scarce resources, the US military would rather concentrate on defending the republic than engaging in peace enforcement. However, civilian leaders will continue to appease and court public opinion as well as other governments with limited airpower options that attempt to produce meaningful results. The time has come to articulate a strategy that reconciles the demands of politicians with the strengths and limitations of combat airpower. SCAP orchestrates precision air strikes, a long-term air presence, and the limited use of ground forces to create a seamless coercive military effort that enhances the overarching diplomatic process. In some respects SCAP is similar to the British interwar air control strategy.⁸ However, SCAP is much more than a tactical-level, constabulary air policing mission. In fact, SCAP derives the greatest economy of force by coercing a belligerent at his operational or strategic level. SCAP uses modern airpower to asymmetrically counter highly motivated and well-armed belligerents within the political restrictions of peace enforcement.

Air operations over Iraq and Bosnia demonstrate the problems associated with a long-term air presence and suggest the need for doctrine that adapts combat airpower to the SCAP mission. Although politically attractive, SCAP entails significant military costs. An air presence mission uses up the precious service life of aircraft as well as weapons, forces units to work at an extremely high operations tempo, and limits the opportunity to practice perishable combat skills. There currently is no doctrine that guides the employment of war-fighting airpower in a SCAP-like mission. Therefore, this study begins the doctrine development process by examining the theoretical, historical, operational, and technological aspects of SCAP. The focus is to determine the mechanisms, strengths, and limitations of how combat airpower can persuade determined belligerents to stop fighting and then maintain a secure environment to facilitate the continuing diplomatic process.

Methodology

The development of the SCAP theory begins in chapter 2 by briefly establishing a theoretical foundation in a handful of relevant areas. This foundation includes an examination of the international security environment in an interdependent world and a discussion of the politics and ethics of military intervention. The chapter briefly traces the evolution of peace enforcement and then contrasts peace enforcement from peace-keeping. Next, coercion theory is examined with emphasis on the “compellence,” deterrence, and reassurance necessary for SCAP. Finally, the discussion centers on the unique attributes of modern airpower that make SCAP possible.

Chapter 3 is an in-depth case study of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). OPC began as a humanitarian aid operation and quickly escalated to a peace enforcement mission that established a large Kurdish safe area in northern Iraq. The long-term security for this safe area is provided by coalition aircraft maintaining an air presence over a large portion of Iraqi Kurdistan. OPC is examined in light of the theory presented in chapter 2 and offers several lessons for the development of SCAP theory.

Chapter 4 is an in-depth case study of air operations over Bosnia. Operation Deny Flight began as a limited peace enforcement operation designed to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from conducting air attacks against the Bosnian Muslims. Deny Flight evolved into a more aggressive peace enforcement mission that included close air support (CAS) for United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. A discussion of the Operation Deliberate Force air campaign that compelled the Bosnian Serbs to make political concessions and created the environment that led to the Dayton peace talks concludes this section. Deny Flight and Deliberate Force are examined in light of the theory presented in chapter 2 and offer numerous lessons for the development of the SCAP theory.

Chapter 5 synthesizes the theoretical foundation from chapter 2 with the lessons derived from chapters 3 and 4. This section suggests the mechanisms, strengths, and limitations of how SCAP can persuade determined belligerents to stop fighting and then maintain a secure environment to facilitate the continuing diplomatic process.

Limitations

The major limitation of this study is that both OPC and the air operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina are ongoing missions. Consequently, there is a limited amount of unclassified open source data. Thus the conclusions drawn and the inferences made may be somewhat premature.

Notes

1. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), ii.

2. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations," draft, 9 January 1995, IV-1; and *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, Va., 28 February 1995, iv. Peace enforcement is an internationally sanctioned application or threat of military force to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peace enforcement may require combat and the successful application of warfighting skills. Combat power is used only to coerce the belligerents to withdraw or comply with an international mandate. Force is always restrained and employed in such a way as to minimize collateral damage.

3. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Airpower," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 (January/February 1994): 109.

4. Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired, "Desert Storm As a Symbol: Implications of the Air War in the Desert," *Airpower Journal*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 6.
5. Gen Larry D. Welch, USAF, Retired, "Air Power in Low- and Midintensity Conflict," in *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*, eds. Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1992), 161.
6. Col John A. Warden III, USAF, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," in *Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns*, ed. Dr. Karl P. Magyar et al. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1994), 330.
7. Col John A. Warden III, USAF, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*, eds. Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press 1992), 61.
8. Philip Anthony Towle, *Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare, 1918–1988* (London: Brassey's, 1989); David E. Omissi, *Airpower and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1990); and David J. Dean, *Airpower in Small Wars: The British Air Control Experience* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1985). Following World War I, the British government used a relatively inexpensive air control strategy to police the vast expanses of its newly acquired Middle Eastern territories. Nomadic tribesmen in Iraq, Aden, and Afghanistan regarded fighting as a noble pastime and constantly challenged the order of the British government. The biplanes of the Royal Air Force (RAF) dropped leaflets, broadcast propaganda, and conducted punitive air strikes against these unsophisticated desert inhabitants. Throughout the 1920s, the RAF developed a highly refined air control doctrine that made air policing relatively effective against the unorganized and geographically separated troublemakers. Aspects of this doctrine included a cultural awareness coupled with good intelligence to determine where to apply force; a limited objective of maintaining stability to facilitate negotiations rather than quickly achieving a defined end state; establishing clearly understood ultimatums; the minimum use of force to provide coercion without alienation; and the employment of aircraft to avoid the cost and hazards associated with putting troops in harm's way. The British air control strategy was effective at maintaining regional order by influencing events at the tactical level against dispersed and primitive tribes.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Foundation of Sustained Coercive Air Presence

More than most other forms of military power, politicians find airpower easy to manipulate, to employ or withhold, in the hope of achieving nicely measured political effects.

—Eliot A. Cohen
The Meaning and Future of Airpower

In the future the US military could very likely find itself enforcing peace on belligerents who are willing to fight to the death over deeply rooted ethnic or religious differences. Indirect threats to national interests and public outrage over human rights violations necessitate and justify some form of intervention in an increasingly interdependent world. Intervention is a risky and complex endeavor in an environment that defies a political solution and often elicits less than the necessary response from the international community. Air operations over Iraq and Bosnia suggest that US leaders will increasingly turn to coercive airpower as a means to minimize the political cost of committing to peace enforcement. A brief analysis of the international security environment, the politics and ethics of intervention, peace enforcement, coercion theory, and the attributes of modern airpower will lay the foundation for the development of a SCAP theory.

International Security Environment

The end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet empire triggered the beginning of a new international security environment characterized by nationalistic aggression, ethnic conflict, and civil war. In countries with borders drawn irrespective of cultural considerations, ancient tensions long suppressed by European communism exploded into open warfare. Ethnic nationalism, originating in the breakup of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires as well as the end of European colonialism, continues to surge in the wake of superpower retrenchment. Extreme ideological movements, such as religious fundamentalism and irredentism, continue to expand.¹ Newly independent multinational states and former colonies constantly struggle with economic despair, corrupt governments, and scarce resources. Political structures crumble and secessionist uprisings push nations toward fragmentation.² Fighting is more dangerous than ever as conventional weapons proliferate and more states pursue weapons of mass destruction.³ Although the conflicts in this “new world

order” are widespread, uncertain, and unpredictable, most individually pose no direct military threat to America’s vital national interests.⁴

US security interests are shaped increasingly by economic interdependence or the public’s conscience rather than pure military threats.⁵ The United States is undergoing a fundamental transformation where economic rather than military means increasingly determines international power and security.⁶ Economic prosperity is closely tied to stability with an increasingly interdependent world economy.⁷ The cumulative effect of a series of economic collapses or governmental failures caused by internal conflict could eventually threaten national security by closing markets necessary for America’s economic growth.⁸ Refugees seeking freedom from localized conflict can overwhelm and upset the fragile market systems of friends and allies.⁹ The plight of refugees and persecution of innocent civilians broadcast by the global media heightens America’s conscience and adds a sense of urgency to any crisis.¹⁰ Brutal warfare against civilians produces moral outrage and creates an ethical perception to do something despite the political case for doing nothing.¹¹ The unchecked rise of internal conflict challenges the good order necessary for economic prosperity and threatens to undermine the international norms of behavior protecting innocent human life.¹²

Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention

Intervention to maintain regional security or protect human rights justifies ignoring the tradition of state sovereignty and loosely interpreting the laws of armed conflict.¹³ There is a growing feeling that a state’s claim to sovereignty deserves respect only as long as it protects the basic rights of its citizens.¹⁴ Additionally, internal situations that create external repercussions no longer fall under the sacred domain of domestic jurisdiction.¹⁵ According to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed.”¹⁶ Since intervention into the internal affairs of another state is not clearly governed by either the laws of war or peace, the UN must establish the terms of reference when sanctioning an intervention.¹⁷ Unfortunately, the UN was designed to deal with conflict between nation-states rather than armed intervention into domestic affairs. Many members of the UN who recently fought long and hard for independence against imperial masters are often unwilling to vote against sovereignty and self-determination. Consequently, politics often interferes with writing a clear statement of scope when crafting a UN resolution.

Intervention in internal struggles is a risky proposition that must reconcile differences between what is ethically right, politically necessary, and economically possible. The global media present images that not only call for intervention but also raise questions of cost and risk.¹⁸ Democratic populations demand intervention on humanitarian grounds but do not understand that military force is often necessary to create a receptive

environment. The collapse of communism and the growing interdependence among nations makes it difficult to distinguish the national security interests of one state from another.¹⁹ Many members of the UN are unwilling to commit the resources necessary to impose peace in situations that do not directly or immediately affect their vital national interests.²⁰ The cost and commitment for intervention and the long-term nation-building efforts that should follow are unsustainable for democratically elected governments in marginal situations far from national interests. The United States is increasingly resistant to unilateral intervention, and indecisiveness in the UN muddles collective intervention and the articulation of long-term goals.

In Somalia and Bosnia, the United Nations responded to the human tragedy and challenge to regional stability with a confusing series of peacekeeping operations whose size, complexity, and function bore little resemblance to the peacekeeping label of the past.²¹ During the cold war, a divided Security Council rarely invoked the conflict intervention provision in chapter 7 of the Charter of the UN. Consequently, UN military operations authorized under the provisions of chapter 6 of the UN charter were labeled as peacekeeping and came to be associated with mediating cease-fire agreements.²² In the 1990s a Security Council unhindered by the political baggage of the cold war thrust peacekeepers into situations better suited for intervention in the name of collective security. UN peacekeeping acquired a certain “doctrinal elasticity” with missions that exceeded the limited capability developed during the cold war. As a result, *UN peacekeeping* has become a catchall term covering not only the monitoring of cease-fire agreements, but also an entire range of humanitarian and conflict resolution activities including “ambitious attempts to impose peace on hostile forces determined to keep fighting.”²³

Peace Enforcement

The United States created the broad doctrinal concept of peace operations to better articulate the best way to approach the spectrum of activity commonly referred to as peacekeeping. Peace operations include both the neutral military presence known as peacekeeping and the armed intervention known as peace enforcement.²⁴ Intervention with a peace operation is likely when there is a significant threat to international peace and security or the political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction are considered unacceptable.²⁵ Peace operations focus on military effort in order to create or sustain conditions that facilitate the diplomatic process.²⁶ Political objectives drive military decisions, and even the most tactical level actions may have enormous political implications.²⁷ The United States currently views peace operations as a tool to create a finite window of opportunity for combatants to resolve their differences or for failed societies to reconstitute themselves.²⁸

Peacekeeping is a noncombat military mission traditionally conducted by lightly armed forces to monitor cease-fires, supervise truces, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.²⁹ A peacekeeping mission requires a clear, realistic, and unbiased mandate that is understood by all participants. Peacekeeping operations require the consent of all major parties to the dispute and should begin only after a credible truce or cease-fire is in place. Legitimacy for the mission is derived by the peacekeeper's impartiality and neutrality in the eyes of all major parties. The primary function of the peacekeeping force is to establish a presence that inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties. A major challenge for the peacekeeping force is to deal with situations of extreme tension without becoming participants. The rules of engagement (ROE) are highly restrictive and allow the use of force only for self-defense. Although peacekeeping and peace enforcement are both classified as peace operations, they are not part of the same continuum but rather have a distinct demarcation line characterized by the factors of consent, impartiality, legitimacy, and the use of force.³⁰

Peace enforcement is an armed intervention that uses the threat or application of military force to coerce unwilling belligerents to comply with internationally sanctioned political resolutions.³¹ In peace enforcement, the objective is a political settlement, not a military victory; and the conflict, rather than the belligerent, is the enemy. Combat power and economic sanctions are interwoven to coerce the belligerents into withdrawing or complying with an international mandate. Force is always restrained and employed in such a way as to minimize collateral damage.³² The consent of the disputing parties is not required, and impartiality is not normally an issue. Legitimacy is derived from the international community and sanctioned through chapter 7 of the UN charter. Peace enforcement can include the enforcement of exclusion zones, protection of humanitarian assistance, operations to restore order, and the forcible separation of belligerents.³³ Peace enforcement "may do no more than provide a window of opportunity" where belligerents are separated, ethnic passions are allowed to cool, and diplomacy is used to forge a long-term peaceful settlement.³⁴

Outside military intervention to restore stability or impose a cease-fire is a complex endeavor that often occurs in a highly charged and confused political environment.³⁵ The political solutions necessary for a long-term peaceful settlement are often difficult to define or rooted in age-old animosity.³⁶ The brutality of the conflict often feeds passions that inhibit rational political compromise. The objective of the conflict may be the territorial displacement of an entire ethnic group.³⁷ There are often multiple and competing sources of power with differing agendas rather than a single, definable national government entity.³⁸ The belligerents may include loosely organized groups of irregulars, guerrillas, or rogue military units that do not reliably respond to any chain of command or central authority. The key to a peace enforcement strategy is determining who and what

to apply pressure against while avoiding actions that drive a belligerent to a fanatical or irrational resistance.

Coercion Theory

Coercion is the use of military force to influence an adversary's behavior by threatening to hurt or destroy something he values. The object of coercion in peace enforcement is not to destroy the belligerents but rather to persuade them to change their behavior or discontinue some undesirable activity. Coercion depends more on the threat of what is to come than on the damage already done. Effective use of the threat of further violence requires that targets of value be kept in reserve so that the belligerents still have something to lose. Coercion exploits a belligerent's wants and fears. This requires a belligerent that can feel pain and has something to lose.³⁹ Actions intended to hold something at risk must be chosen carefully and sensitively in accordance with the structure and evolution of the given situation.⁴⁰ Military action must communicate a continued threat. If the power to hurt can get at something of value, then the expectation of more violence may actually achieve the desired behavior.⁴¹

Unlike brute force, coercion is an exercise in bargaining where the belligerent agrees to change his behavior in exchange for the power to hurt being withheld. The give and take associated with bargaining will only work if the interests of each side are not diametrically opposed.⁴² The belligerent may feel obligated to fight on if his vital interests are threatened by asking for too much or using too much force too fast. The key to coercion is identifying and then threatening something of value that is politically acceptable to both sides.

A SCAP strategy must be based on a clear understanding of the beliefs and commitments of the belligerents, the international community as a whole, and the individual states participating in the mission. Each side has a concept of what is at stake in the conflict, the importance of the various interests, and the level of risk and cost acceptable in the pursuit of the competing objectives. The demands of the peace enforcement mandate will influence not only the strength of the belligerent's motivation to resist but also the strength of those nations engaged in the SCAP mission. Unfortunately, the peace enforcement mandate is often muddled by the competing interests, motivation, and political agendas of the participating nations. If the international community pursues disjointed objectives or infringes upon the vital interests of the belligerents, then the belligerents benefit from what Alexander L. George describes as an "asymmetry of interests."⁴³ In short, the strategic interests of all participants determine asymmetric interests and have a direct bearing on the cost-benefit analysis of a peace enforcement mission.

SCAP requires a multifaceted concept of coercion that includes compellence to reverse acts already committed, deterrence to prevent future action, and reassurance to convince some factions and other countries

that it is not necessary to continue fighting. A compellent air campaign can create a tenable environment for ground troops and initialize the conditions necessary for a long-term political solution. Highly visible air patrols, along with a short-term land campaign, offer the deterrence and reassurance to maintain an acceptable security environment for the continuing peace process. Elements of compellence, deterrence, and reassurance occur in varying degrees and in a delicate balance throughout the duration of a SCAP mission.

Compellence

It is so important to know who is in charge on the other side, what he treasures, what he can do for us and how long it will take him and why we have the hard choice between being clear so that he knows what we want or vague so that he does not seem too submissive when he complies.

—Thomas C. Schelling
Arms and Influence

When a state's centers of gravity are put under sufficient pressure, either the state will make the appropriate concessions to relieve the pressure (the anticipated costs of not doing so are too high for likely gains) or it will make concessions because the pressure has become so intense that it is no longer physically capable of continuing its prior course.

—Col John A. Warden III
Employing Airpower in the Twenty-first Century

A SCAP strategy often begins with a compellent air campaign to halt a belligerent's action or reverse something that he has already done.⁴⁴ Compellence is offensive and action-oriented and takes the form of delivered damage that will cease only if the belligerents alter their behavior and comply with what is being asked of them.⁴⁵ The goal of compellence is to force compliance with an "impressive unspent capacity for damage that is kept in reserve."⁴⁶ Targeting entails specific attention to where, what kind, and how much airpower is used to convince the belligerents to comply. The targeting process must be based on a sophisticated knowledge of the cultural and contextual factors surrounding the belligerents as well as their commitment and resolve.⁴⁷ In addition to the immediate effects of force application, the targeting process must also consider potential unintended results as well as the belligerent's ability to adapt and compensate.⁴⁸ The challenge is to identify relationships between complex elements within a belligerent's system, determine how best to threaten or disrupt them, and then measure the cascading effect when stress is induced.⁴⁹

The pace of diplomacy rather than the pace of battle governs the tempo of a compellent air campaign. Compliance in the face of a compellent threat often requires collective decisions within the belligerent's leadership structure that depend on internal politics, interest groups,

and individual values. Decisions by the belligerents require political and bureaucratic readjustment, which takes time to arrange in order to save face or avoid the appearance of being submissive.⁵⁰ This is not a call for the gradualism demonstrated during the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign of North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968. Rather, it is a recognition that the demands attached to a compellent air campaign are reconcilable only if the application of force is allocated over time and apportioned in intensity. Determining what a belligerent considers valuable, how dearly he holds it, and the balance point between force application and time compression is an extraordinarily difficult task. The goal is to rapidly induce compliance rather than sparring with a series of reprisals and counteractions.⁵¹ Too little time and compliance becomes impossible. Too much time and compliance becomes unnecessary. Exhausting the belligerents so that they have nothing to lose or bankrupting the interventionists through a protracted air campaign defeats the purpose of compellence.

Deterrence

Deterrence uses the passive threat of military force to persuade a belligerent that the cost of pursuing a military solution to his political problems will far outweigh any benefits.⁵² Deterrence involves setting a trip wire and then waiting. Unlike compellence, the timing associated with deterrence tends to be indefinite. The belligerents must clearly understand what behavior is undesirable and must fear the response should they cross the line. If the credibility of the deterrent threat is challenged, hot pursuit or a reprisal is required to demonstrate credibility and enhance future deterrence. Generally, a reprisal is a response to an isolated infraction that is proportional, linked in time, and capable of being closed to avoid a spiraling series of exchanges that evolve into a competition to see who has the last word. However, reprisals can also display determination and impetuosity to communicate a much broader threat than just dissuading a repetition of the infraction. Hot pursuit is also an isolated event where the offending belligerents are pursued into their own territory and the fight taken to their own bases. Although it can happen as often as necessary, the penetration of the belligerent's territory in hot pursuit is not an open declaration of war but rather an action taken to police the credibility of deterrent threat.⁵³ Deterrence is highly effective if resolve and commitment are demonstrated during the course of a related compellent campaign.

Reassurance

Reassurance in a SCAP strategy is the positive aspect of coercion that attempts to instill confidence in the peace process by providing a degree of security for all parties.⁵⁴ Reassurance is necessary to persuade certain parties to the conflict that it is safe to put down their arms and either

withdraw or go home. Reassurance is used to convince the weaker parties and outsiders contemplating intervention on their behalf that airpower will provide the security necessary for their safety. The success of reassurance is tied directly to the credibility of deterrence and compellence. Reassurance is necessary to create the general sense of security necessary for a long-term political settlement. Air patrols offer a highly visible measure of reassurance without the intrusiveness of a ground occupation.

The Attributes of Modern Coercive Airpower

If diplomacy and other means have proven inadequate, airpower provides a highly sophisticated capability to persuade opponents to alter their political and military behavior. For example one might seek to compel an adversary to reduce political objectives, withdraw military force, accept a cease-fire, or give up/destroy critical military capabilities. What these policy objectives have in common is that they stop short of complete defeat and unconditional surrender of an opponent's military force. Across the spectrum of conflict—particularly at the conventional level and below—if compellence is the policy goal, modern airpower has emerged as one of the primary instruments to accomplish it.

—Richard H. Shultz Jr.
*The Future of Airpower in the
Aftermath of the Gulf War*

The most important virtue that coercive airpower brings to a peace enforcement strategy is the ability to fight asymmetric motivations with asymmetric means. The mobility, range, reconnaissance capability, and PGMs of combat airpower obviate the need to confront terrain, weather, and—most importantly—the belligerent's infantry to threaten or strike directly and precisely at something of value.⁵⁵ American ground casualties in a distant land and far removed from vital national interests instantly become a political liability that seriously threatens the success of any peace enforcement mission. Events in Cyprus indicate that the temptation to leave forces in place too long can lead to a status quo of indifference where there is little motivation to work toward a long-term political settlement. The desire for quick, decisive, and bloodless results is “fixed in the consciousness” of the American people as a result of the Persian Gulf War victory.⁵⁶ A SCAP strategy minimizes domestic political costs and enhances long-term political motivation by minimizing the long-term commitment of ground troops and thus avoiding casualties.

The loss of air superiority put Iraq completely under the power of the coalition; what would be destroyed and what would survive was up to the coalition and Iraq could do nothing. It lay as defenseless as if occupied by a million men. For practical purposes, it had become a state occupied from the air.

—Col John A. Warden III
The Enemy As a System

In essence, airpower is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.

—Col Phillip S. Meilinger
10 Propositions Regarding Airpower

Airpower can roam nearly unhindered in the sky above an ethnic war to find, attack, and then observe those elements of value identified as bargaining chips in a SCAP strategy. The United States's single-minded and successful quest for air superiority, along with the advent of Stealth, enabled American airpower to *reconquest* the middle altitudes during the Gulf War.⁵⁷ Medium altitude is ideally suited for the deliberate process of target acquisition, accurate attack, and the observation of damage and effects.⁵⁸ The continued exploitation of satellites, synthetic aperture radar, and unmanned aerial vehicles makes finding a belligerent's strategic-level value systems less difficult. PGMs connect political objectives to military execution with greater discrimination, proportionality, and reliability than ever before.⁵⁹ The penetration of PGMs has made almost all targets vulnerable, even many designed to withstand a nuclear blast.⁶⁰ Advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) techniques coupled with improved command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) systems improve the ability to assess the effects of precision attack. ISR combined with C⁴I increasingly enables the feedback necessary to maintain the validity of target selection as well as rapidly react to the adjustments and countermoves of the belligerents.

A SCAP peace enforcement strategy overcomes the multifaceted limitations of time by responding quickly, threatening or striking across a broad target spectrum rapidly, and remaining deployed for a protracted period to facilitate stability. Airpower can prepare and execute a coercive peace enforcement strategy more rapidly than any other type of military force.⁶¹ This is especially critical in the new world order where threats are ill defined, and it is difficult to predict where, when, and against whom an intervention might be directed. Although belligerents with increasingly dangerous military capabilities can move quickly on their objectives, they may not be able to consolidate their gains in the face of a rapid response by airpower.⁶² Airpower can concentrate restrained firepower nearly simultaneously across the depth and breadth of a belligerent's system. The belligerents are vulnerable almost every place and almost all the time because the capability to be strong everywhere is nearly impossible.⁶³ A properly timed, nearly simultaneous campaign induces just enough physical and psychological shock to add a sense of urgency to a compelling situation.⁶⁴ The long diplomatic process requires various applications of compellence, deterrence, and reassurance. SCAP flown from bases outside the belligerent's territory is started, increased, reduced, suspended, or terminated within hours and without the complications of inserting or extracting a large ground force.⁶⁵

Summary

SCAP is an airpower approach to peace enforcement that requires the successful transformation of coercion theory into practice using modern conventional airpower. SCAP is most effective against a belligerent who has strategic assets that are held dear and vulnerable to destruction by PGMs. A compelling air campaign can impose a cease-fire or elicit other political concessions. An enduring air presence offers the deterrence and reassurance necessary to facilitate a long-term political settlement. However, the motivation and mandate for peace enforcement is often clouded by competing interests within the international community. Thus, a SCAP strategy requires the successful application of coercion theory using modern airpower within the political constraints of peace enforcement. A successful SCAP strategy enhances the diplomatic process, establishes a tenable environment for a short land campaign, and maintains the stability necessary for a long-term political settlement. The theoretical aspects of SCAP offer a basis for the examination of Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight.

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Chapter 3

Operation Provide Comfort

The Kurdish people of the Middle East are the region's fourth largest national group and the largest ethnic minority in the world without a homeland of their own. Although their early history is shrouded in mystery, they lived in the region known as Kurdistan long before the Turks, Persians, and Arabs inhabited the area.¹ Throughout much of the last 500 years, the Kurds have enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy under the nominal sovereignty of Turkish and Persian empires. However, in the mid-nineteenth century, frontier control became more important; and Kurdish self-determination gave way to centralized authority. The Kurds became a disadvantaged and oppressed minority—leading to the birth of Kurdish nationalism and a series of rebellions in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq that continue to this day.²

Britain and France tried unsuccessfully to create an independent Kurdistan as they partitioned the Turkish Ottoman Empire after World War I. The Allies decided that the Kurds should be granted autonomy in what is now eastern Turkey as well as the former Ottoman *vilayet* (province) of Mosul (currently northeastern Iraq).³ However, a defeated Turkey—under the nationalist leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—managed to reject the 1920 Sevres Treaty and avoid the issue of an independent Kurdistan.⁴ Britain—acting as a League of Nations Mandatory Power over a portion of the former Ottoman Empire—artificially created the nation of Iraq by combining the *vilayets* of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basrah.⁵ Although sympathetic to the issue of Kurdish autonomy, Britain deemed Mosul's oil revenues necessary to the economic viability of the new Iraq.⁶ The Kurds in Mosul rose up in protest. British air control operations suppressed the revolt by bombing Kurdish villages with mustard gas.⁷ Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq have been in a near constant state of revolt and the respective governments have vehemently opposed Kurdish attempts to gain greater autonomy.⁸

As the Gulf War reached a crescendo in mid-February 1991, President George Bush urged the Iraqi people to “take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”⁹ The Iraqi Kurdish leaders interpreted this statement as an offer of support for such an effort despite the historical unreliability of Western assistance to their cause. In early March rebel Kurdish groups in the north as well as Shiite opposition forces in the south took advantage of Baghdad's temporary paralysis and initiated separate insurrections.¹⁰ Rival Kurdish guerrilla groups put aside their differences for the first time in their history and formed the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF).¹¹ By 20 March the IKF had ousted the Iraqi

army, secret police, and Baath party from most of Iraqi Kurdistan and taken control of several major urban areas, including the oil center of Kirkuk.¹² As the uprising approached the culminating point, the Kurds looked to the United States and other Western nations for help.

Despite his previous encouragement to revolt against Saddam Hussein, President Bush initially characterized the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings as well as the subsequent Iraqi response as an “internal matter” that did not warrant a military response.¹³ However, congressional Democrats, including Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Maine), urged the president to order US forces to shoot down Iraqi helicopters flying missions against the insurgents. The State Department rebuffed Mitchell asking, “Once you make that decision then aren’t you taking on tanks? Why aren’t you taking on artillery? How do you decide who is going to lead (Iraq) should you decide to go in militarily?”¹⁴ There was concern that assistance to diverse insurgent groups might “Lebanonize” Iraq by fragmenting it into spheres of influence controlled by different factions, thus creating a power vacuum that Islamic Iran would quickly move to fill.¹⁵ Although President Bush encouraged the Iraqis to rise up against Saddam Hussein, he never promised that the United States would help militarily.¹⁶

Without external intervention, the Kurdish uprising ended in a crushing defeat. After controlling the Shiites in Basrah, Saddam Hussein swung his Republican Guard divisions north to engage the IKF guerrillas. By 20 March helicopter gunships and fixed-wing fighter-bombers flew north in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 686, attacking insurgents and civilians in Kirkuk and other cities.¹⁷ Although US Air Force (USAF) F-15Cs flying out of Incirlik Air Base (AB), Turkey, downed Soviet-built Iraqi Su-22 fighter-bombers on 20 and 22 March, Iraqi helicopter gunships continued to operate with impunity.¹⁸ By 30 March the IKF guerrillas were unable to resist the firepower of the Iraqi military, and the Kurdish civilians fled toward Turkey and Iran through the snow-covered mountains of northern Iraq. The Iraqis attacked convoys of fleeing civilians, and the mountain retreats became free-fire zones for helicopter gunships.¹⁹ Turkey and Iran challenged the UN to articulate and legitimize some sort of collective response, arguing that the influx of refugees along with Iraqi transborder military incursions posed a threat to regional stability.²⁰ A lack of Western action, combined with the media images of a million starving Kurds huddled in the mountains on both sides of Iraq’s border, threatened to taint the “moral crusade” of the Gulf War.

After some waffling within the international community, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991, demanding that Iraq end its internal repression of the Kurds and allow immediate access to its territory for the purpose of humanitarian relief. The debate over Resolution 688 involved issues of humanitarian aid, regional security, and—most importantly—the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs. States with internal problems of their own were fearful that Resolution 688 could establish a precedent that might be misused in the

future. France argued that a state loses its sovereignty if human rights violations “take on such proportions that they assume the dimension of a crime against humanity.” Other nations argued that the flow of refugees across international borders is a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 688 did not expressly authorize military force to protect the Kurds and avoided the issue of Kurdish self-determination.²¹ Like most UN resolutions, 688 was somewhat vague—muddled by competing interests and differing agendas within the Security Council.

On 6 April the United States declared a no-fly zone (NFZ) in Iraq north of the 36th parallel and specifically banned all Iraqi air activity, including helicopter operations. The US also warned Iraq not to take any military action against its Kurdish refugees.²² USAF and US Navy (USN) fighters supported by airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and tankers enforced the NFZ with continuous combat air patrols over northern Iraq. In addition, tactical reconnaissance aircraft roamed the NFZ tracking refugees and Iraqi troop movements.²³ The US State Department indicated that the flight ban would not interfere with Iraqi attempts to suppress any future uprisings within its borders as long as flights were not made north of the 36th parallel and humanitarian efforts were not hindered.²⁴ However, the very credible threat to shoot down Iraqi aircraft and helicopters was welcome news for the Kurds. Iraq’s one major advantage in defeating the Kurdish insurrection was airpower.²⁵ Although Iraq had effectively crushed the current rebellion, the imposition of the NFZ gave the Kurds a certain degree of military parity as they continued sporadic fighting throughout northern Iraq.

On 7 April the United States initiated a massive humanitarian relief operation to air-drop supplies to Kurdish refugees in the mountains along both sides of the Turkish–Iraqi border.²⁶ A-10s configured for precision attack scouted for refugee camps that were inaccessible to supply trucks and provided escort for tactical transports dropping emergency supplies.²⁷ On 8 April, US Secretary of State James A. Baker III visited a refugee camp just inside the Turkish border. The beginnings of a riot allowed Baker to stay on the ground only seven minutes as angry Kurds wanted to know why President Bush had done nothing on their behalf.²⁸ Baker stressed the need for a massive international relief campaign, but Kurdish leaders and Turkish officials argued that the scale of this disaster was beyond simple humanitarian aid.²⁹ If the Kurds perched on the mountain were to stop dying, one of two things had to happen—either the Turks had to let the Kurds descend from the mountains or the Kurds had to turn around and go back to Iraq.³⁰ Turkish authorities were afraid that an influx of great numbers of refugees would generate pressure for an independent Kurdish state on Turkish soil.³¹ The Kurds were fearful of returning to their homes or moving to the valleys of northern Iraq despite Saddam Hussein’s offer of amnesty.³²

On 13 April the United States launched OPC to better provide for the needs of those Kurds in the most remote encampments. Soldiers supported

by helicopters arrived to better distribute the aid and care for the sick, but the problems were bigger than the limited contingent could handle. Diarrhea and dehydration were widespread in all the camps; and exposure to the cold mountain climate was causing many deaths, especially among the children and elderly.³³ Several nations suggested that the UN should order peacekeeping forces to establish and supervise safe zones in northern Iraq where the refugees could be cared for and protected from harassment by the Iraqi army. Iraq announced that it would “resist with all means” any attempt to establish special protected zones.³⁴ Initially, the United States opposed the establishment of a safe zone for fear of becoming enmeshed in a seemingly endless conflict between Baghdad and the Kurds.³⁵ However, media coverage brought home the fact that as many as 1,000 refugees a day were dying and more would continue to die if they did not get off the mountains.³⁶ Concerted pressure from Britain, France, and Turkey finally persuaded the United States to lead a coalition operation to create and protect refugee camps in northern Iraq.³⁷

On 16 April President Bush announced that French, British, and American troops would establish a Kurdish security zone in the flatlands of northern Iraq and build refugee camps in order to get the Kurds off the mountains.³⁸ The president insisted that the decision was “purely humanitarian” and was not a step toward the long-term occupation of Iraq or intervention in Iraq’s internal affairs. He also stressed that the construction of the camps was an interim measure that was not intended to establish an autonomous Kurdish region within Iraq’s borders. President Bush said that the decision to maintain and protect the camps with military personnel was consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 688.³⁹ However, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar felt that foreign military presence on Iraqi territory required either Iraqi consent or the express authorization of the Security Council. Iraq denounced the Allied operation as an intervention in its internal affairs and insisted that the UN operate any relief centers on Iraqi territory.⁴⁰ The president expressed a hope that the UN would take over the administration of the camps as soon as possible, but he acknowledged that a new UN Security Council resolution authorizing a peacekeeping force would likely be held up by political disagreements.⁴¹

US airpower provided a powerful coercive force as a coalition task force led by the US Marine Corps established a security zone around the Iraqi border town of Zakho. On 19 April, with jet noise in the background, OPC Combined Task Force (CTF) Commander Lt Gen John M. Shalikashvili met with an Iraqi military delegation at the Habur river bridge border crossing. General Shalikashvili informed the Iraqis that they were to withdraw from the area surrounding Zakho and offer no resistance as the coalition established the security zone. The following day, US Marines made a heliborne assault into the Zakho valley protected by USAF A-10s, F-16s, and F-15s. The Iraqi army watched precariously from the high ground surrounding Zakho, and Marine forward air controllers (FAC)

called in mock air strikes on their positions to coerce them into leaving.⁴² USAF and USN aircraft continued to enforce the NFZ, providing a 24-hour-a-day presence over coalition ground forces and conducting tactical reconnaissance missions to track refugees and the Iraqi military.

The CTF formed a military coordination center (MCC) in Zakho to maintain direct communication with both Kurdish and Iraqi authorities. By 23 April the Iraqi army withdrew outside artillery range but attempted to maintain control of Zakho by leaving 200–300 Iraqi paramilitary police armed with automatic weapons to patrol the streets. Kurdish residents recognized the police as Iraqi soldiers who had changed uniforms and returned after their units had withdrawn.⁴³ The MCC quickly negotiated an agreement whereby the Iraqi government could have only 50 uniformed policemen in Zakho at any one time. The agreement dictated that the policemen must be indigenous to the region, carry only one pistol, and display coalition force identification badges at all times.⁴⁴ Operations in and around Zakho demonstrated the importance of both ground forces and airpower during this phase of peace enforcement.

In early May 1991, the United States decided to extend the security zone deeper into Iraqi territory. Coalition military leaders hoped to further reassure Kurdish refugees and entice more of them to leave their mountain camps and the overflowing refugee centers around Zakho by expanding the security zone to include the regional capital of Dohuk.⁴⁵ Coalition ground forces did not seek combat but rather coerced the enemy out of the constantly expanding security zone with threats of force. The sight and sound of orbiting airpower convinced many Iraqis to withdraw as coalition ground forces made a patient but determined advance. Coercive force, held in reserve, was apparently effective on many Iraqi commanders who had experienced US firepower in Operation Desert Storm.⁴⁶ Reassured by the presence of friendly troops and with top cover provided by Allied airpower, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees left the mountains for the camps or their homes in the security zone.⁴⁷ A US State Department disaster assistance relief team coordinated the actions of many multinational and nongovernmental relief organizations.⁴⁸ By the end of May, coalition troops and relief workers occupied Dohuk; and nearly all the camps in Turkey administered by the coalition at the height of the crisis were empty.⁴⁹

In mid-May the United States began turning over administration of the refugee camps near Zakho to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR). However, many Kurds expressed a lack of confidence in the UN's ability to protect them from attacks by Iraqi soldiers and police. Iraq rejected a UN proposal to deploy lightly armed UN civilian police to protect returning refugees. Without Iraq's approval the necessary Security Council resolution to deploy a police force would likely be vetoed by China and the USSR as opposition mounted against further meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. The Soviet foreign minister stated that there is a "thin line that separates the necessity for humanitarian support

and the concern for the sovereignty of a country.” Baghdad eventually agreed to allow a force of 400–500 lightly armed UN guards to protect UN civilian workers in order to facilitate the departure of coalition troops from Iraqi soil. However, the agreement prevented the guards from providing security for the refugees.⁵⁰ Without a UN police force, the Kurds would have to fight for themselves. The long-term commitment of airpower offered an opportunity to level the playing field for the Kurds and deter Saddam Hussein from widescale organized aggression.

In July 1991 coalition ground elements withdrew from the Kurdish safe haven. A daily air presence along with an airmobile, multinational reinforced battalion stationed just inside the Turkish border provided coercion against further Iraqi aggression. The coalition warned Iraq not to send army troops, special police, or border guards into the area that had been the coalition safe zone. The warning also reiterated the terms of the NFZ above the 36th parallel.⁵¹ An MCC team of eight to 10 officers continued to work from a small compound in Zakho to oversee issues in the security zone and help resolve conflicts between the Kurds and Iraqi forces.⁵² The coalition promised to respond militarily to any Iraqi activity that disturbed the peace.⁵³ However, given the sensitivity to Iraq’s sovereignty, ground troops would likely have been introduced only if Iraqi aggression threatened another exodus of refugees toward Turkey.⁵⁴

In late September 1991, coalition commanders withdrew the quick reaction force. The change occurred for a number of reasons. First, with limited political resolve, the quick-reaction battalion offered little deterrent value. Iraq seemed content to ignore the security zone as a small price to pay for the freedom to operate elsewhere without the fear of air strikes. Second, the quick-reaction battalion was in danger of becoming a target for Turkey’s separatist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) guerrillas. Some PKK attacks occurred dangerously close to the battalion, and fears of another Beirut may have prompted American commanders to expedite the withdrawal. Third, the quick-reaction battalion found itself in a politically confusing situation as Turkey mounted attacks against PKK strongholds near the security zone in northern Iraq. Although the PKK is not allied with the Iraqi Kurds, Turkey responded with a series of “hot pursuit” raids that, according to UN aid workers, indiscriminately bombed Iraqi Kurdish refugee and civilian settlements.⁵⁵ Although the PKK and Turkish activity did not occur in the security zone, the escalating violence threatened to make the coalition culpable by proximity.

With the change in OPC, the Turkish military became an equal partner in the CTF in order to massage Turkish national pride and ensure that the protection of Iraqi Kurds did not interfere with counterinsurgency operations against the PKK.⁵⁶ Shortly after the withdrawal of the quick-reaction battalion, Turkish fighters bombed Iraqi Kurd villages in the security zone; and soldiers backed by helicopters conducted several search and destroy missions in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turkish government canceled OPC missions when conducting their own bombing raids in order to avoid

being shot down by CTF aircraft and as a measure of secrecy over their counterinsurgency operations. As an added measure of sovereign control, senior Turkish military officials approved every OPC mission; and Turkish controllers flew aboard every AWACS sortie. The Turks monitored their own bombing missions as well as coalition activity with AWACS data downlinked through a Turkish ground station. The Turks had access to tactical reconnaissance gathered by OPC aircraft and attended all meetings between the Kurds and MCC.⁵⁷ Ironically, the Turkish government manipulated CTF efforts to protect Iraqi Kurds while conducting its own counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK.

The coalition boosted the deep-strike capability of OPC airpower after PGM-capable F-111F fighter-bombers along with EF-111A jamming aircraft replaced Incirlik's contingent of A-10s.⁵⁸ The Turkish government limits the total number of aircraft deployed to Incirlik at any one time; and without the quick-reaction force, the CAS capability of the A-10 was no longer necessary. With the withdrawal of the quick-reaction battalion, the United States perhaps viewed leverage against strategic-level value systems as an inexpensive way to deter Baghdad from further aggression in northern Iraq. The United States may have viewed a deep-strike capable, coercive air presence over northern Iraq as the beginning of a plan to deal with Iraq's noncompliance with UN demands to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. Throughout September Iraq detained UN weapons inspectors or prevented them from examining various research facilities. In late September the United States threatened to send helicopters and fighters to staging locations in Saudi Arabia for the purpose of conducting attacks on the Iraqi nuclear facilities. The attacks were called off when the Iraqis released a group of detained inspectors.⁵⁹ With the freedom to operate up to the 36th parallel, OPC F-111Fs presented a credible threat capable of going south to nuclear targets in and around Baghdad.

OPC's continuing sustained air presence offers a credible deterrent because of the resolve and capability that coalition airpower demonstrated during Desert Storm.⁶⁰ Many experts argue that OPC is nothing more than a logical extension of the Gulf War. OPC is a peace enforcement mission distinct and separate from the war. Desert Storm provided the opportunity for the Kurdish uprising.⁶¹ Based on past history, another widescale Kurdish insurrection was likely to occur sooner or later. However, it appears that the success of OPC is directly related to the effectiveness of the coalition's classic compellent strategic air campaign against the Baghdad regime. The power to hurt strategic value systems demonstrated during the Gulf War and held in reserve during OPC appeared to deter the Iraqis from further aggression. The addition of the PGM-capable F-111Fs to the CTF completed a link where the successful strategic compellence demonstrated during Desert Storm bolstered the deterrence and reassurance of OPC.

OPC's air presence maintained regional stability by leveling the playing field for the Kurds and threatening Iraq's strategic-level value systems

rather than controlling events at the tactical level. Throughout the fall of 1991, Kurdish guerrillas enjoyed moderate success in fighting the Iraqi army for control of several cities outside the security zone.⁶² However, an Iraqi counteroffensive that shelled several cities forced 200,000 Kurds to flee for Iran.⁶³ The advantage changed several more times; and in late October Iraqi forces withdrew from Kurdish-controlled territory, and Baghdad imposed an internal economic embargo against the Kurds. In December Kurdish leaders suspended autonomy negotiations with Baghdad and announced that they would elect a leader of the Kurdish political movement and create a Kurdish national assembly.⁶⁴ Coalition airpower deterred Saddam Hussein from widescale aggression, thus enabling the Kurds to achieve an unprecedented degree of autonomy from Baghdad. Any fighting or conflict remained outside the purview of patrolling coalition fighters; refugees were not a burden on Turkey, and as far as the coalition was concerned the situation was stable.

Kurdish independence is an explosive issue not only to Baghdad but also to Turkey, Iran, and Syria.⁶⁵ The Kurdish elections of 19 May 1992 produced a draw between the two major Kurdish parties, who then agreed that political autonomy within Iraq rather than independence was more prudent. Kurdish leaders distanced themselves from the PKK and reassured Turkish president Turgut Özal that they did not share the PKK desire for a Greater Kurdistan but only wanted autonomy inside Iraq.⁶⁶ Both sides understood that Iraqi Kurdish autonomy was largely dependent on coalition airpower maintaining an air presence over northern Iraq. Furthermore, each side understood that OPC was contingent on Turkey's willingness to renew the agreement allowing the coalition aircraft to operate from Incirlik AB. Consequently, the Iraqi Kurds and Özal came to a tacit understanding that Turkey would allow OPC to continue as long as the Iraqi Kurds opposed the separatist efforts of the PKK. Turkey's campaign to eradicate the PKK's sanctuary in northern Iraq along with the desire to avoid another influx of Kurdish refugees made OPC an exceedingly delicate political issue.⁶⁷

Coalition airpower offered a credible deterrent despite Saddam Hussein's attempts to intimidate the Turkish debate over extending OPC. Throughout the first half of 1992, the Iraqis doubled their troop strength to 40,000 on the edge of the NFZ, and the Iraqi air force resumed flying south of the 36th parallel.⁶⁸ Troops in scattered positions above the 36th parallel—but outside of the security zone—manned surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) emplacements. Despite the continuing Iraqi buildup, the Turkish government continued to limit the coalition to 48 fighter aircraft deployed to Incirlik AB at any one time. Turkey limited the CTF to daylight operations, and the small contingent of aircraft flew 40 sorties a day at random times to keep the Iraqis off guard.⁶⁹ All fighters would occasionally operate in one large package, flying over the urban areas to reassure the Kurds and pass just north of the 36th parallel as a show of force against the massed Iraqi army.⁷⁰ The

Turkish parliament had to balance the nationalistic opposition to an increased foreign military presence and the continuing PKK sanctuary in northern Iraq with the potential influx of Iraqi Kurds should Saddam Hussein regain control of Iraqi Kurdistan.⁷¹ Apparently, the Turkish parliament viewed coalition airpower as a limited, nonintrusive, and politically acceptable method to reconcile the problems in Iraq with their own PKK counterinsurgency and voted to continue OPC.

In early January 1993, Baghdad hoped to take advantage of any indecision during the final weeks of the Bush presidency and openly challenged coalition efforts to protect Iraqi Kurds and Shiites.⁷² The Iraqis moved additional SAMs into both the southern⁷³ and northern NFZs and displayed hostile intent by using SAM radars to track coalition aircraft on routine patrol.⁷⁴ Iraqi aircraft also made feints into the southern NFZ in an attempt to lure coalition aircraft into concentrated SAM traps.⁷⁵ On 6 January the coalition gave Iraq an ultimatum to remove the SAMs from the southern NFZ within 48 hours.⁷⁶ Iraq ignored the ultimatum and instead shuffled the SA-2s and SA-3s in the southern NFZ between prepared sites in an attempt to hide them from the coalition. Coalition forces planned to attack the airfields north of the 32d parallel used for the NFZ incurious as well as various integrated air defense system (IADS) targets in both the southern and northern NFZs.⁷⁷ However, political concerns regarding proportionality and linkage resulted in authorization for a limited reprisal against command bunkers and SAM sites only in the southern NFZ.⁷⁸

On 16 January 1993, coalition aircraft conducted a limited reprisal raid in the southern NFZ that achieved the desired effect despite poor bombing accuracy. The coalition conducted the mission at night and flew above 10,000 feet to avoid AAA in an effort to minimize any chance that they would have to negotiate with the Iraqis for a downed flier. Cloud cover disrupted laser guidance systems, and the winds aloft caused inaccuracies for aircraft using radar to drop nonguided "dumb" bombs. The seeker units on some laser-guided bombs (LGB) failed as a result of the "wear and tear" from being carried aloft day after day on routine patrols. A bomb dropped from a USAF aircraft hit an apartment building, killing two civilians and injuring seven. The coalition hit only 17 of 34 planned aim points, damaging three of four interceptor operations centers (IOC) and only one of four mobile SAM batteries. The undamaged SAM sites were quickly dismantled and moved. On 18 January a subsequent daylight raid revisited three of the IOCs from the previous attack, while a mission planned against an SA-3 site was canceled at the last minute because the Iraqis moved the missiles within the US intelligence cycle. Although the mobile missiles continued to move around, the destruction of the IOCs prevented the Iraqis from offering a coordinated attack. After the bombing raids, air defense radars stopped locking onto coalition aircraft; and the Iraqis became less aggressive in the southern NFZ.⁷⁹

Iraq skirmished with OPC aircraft throughout the first half of 1993, but Turkey seemed reluctant to authorize a proactive reprisal similar to the

attacks in the southern NFZ. Numerous times between 17 and 23 January, coalition airpower fired high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) at hostile Iraqi radars and used cluster munitions against active AAA sites.⁸⁰ On 17 January a USAF F-16 downed an Iraqi MiG-23 that may have been attempting to lure coalition aircraft into a SAM trap.⁸¹ On 9 April four coalition fighters employed cluster munitions against an active AAA site near the Saddam Dam.⁸² The Cable News Network showed the spent “clam shells” of a cluster munition dispenser resting near a family picnicking on the shore of Saddam’s lake. On 19 August PGM-equipped F-15Es destroyed an SA-3 site west of Mosul that had fired two missiles at other coalition aircraft on routine patrol.⁸³ The aggression in the northern NFZ should have been countered with an extensive reprisal against the Iraqi IADS. As another example of the difficulties of working within a coalition, it is quite likely that Turkey overruled the CTF commander’s desire for a more impetuous attack in an effort to court Iraqi trade favors in anticipation of an ending of the UN economic embargo.⁸⁴

Reprisals at the tactical level combined with limited compellent attacks at the strategic level reinforced the deterrence provided by the air presence over northern and southern Iraq. Critics of the reprisals in the NFZs charged that an overwhelming and decisive use of force should have been used to bend a defiant and unrepentant Saddam Hussein into complying with UN nuclear weapons resolutions. However, a widespread bombing campaign in the NFZ would have had no linkage to the nuclear problem. Rather, the bombings in the NFZs were proportional and linked to an individual infraction without widening or targeting the underlying cause of the political dispute. On 17 January 1993, the United States unilaterally launched 23 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM) against the inactive Zafraniyah Nuclear Fabrication Facility south of Baghdad. Political disagreements within the coalition and concerns over aircrew safety prevented aircraft from conducting the raid. Although US allies condemned the Zafraniyah raid, Iraq was quick to guarantee the safety of UN arms inspectors—thus resolving the widespread impasse that led to the attack.⁸⁵ In April Iraqi intelligence agents attempted to assassinate former President Bush when he visited Kuwait. On 26 June TLAMs attacked Iraqi intelligence headquarters in a suburb of Baghdad as punishment for what President William J. Clinton called “an attack against our country.” The June attack received widespread support, and the Baghdad regime became relatively quiet.⁸⁶ Baghdad’s resistance over the nuclear problem and attempted assassination of former President Bush required an impetuous, compellent attack against a strategic-level value system to demonstrate resolve and remind the Iraqis of the power to hurt.

Iraq has many strategic-level value systems susceptible to an asymmetric air campaign if further compellence is necessary to counter widespread aggression. Saddam Hussein values his rebuilt electrical power grid, oil refining facilities, national command and control (C²) system, transportation infrastructure, Republican Guard divisions and 80–200

remaining Scud missiles.⁸⁷ However, Scuds are still difficult to find and attack as evidenced by attempts to destroy mobile SAMs in January 1993. Baghdad could potentially resist an asymmetric air campaign with asymmetric Scud attacks that attempt to undermine political relationships or directly attack coalition air bases.⁸⁸ Consequently, compellence through an asymmetric air campaign will increasingly require the capability to find and destroy theater ballistic missiles.

Maintaining the credibility of the NFZs, as well as compelling changes in Iraqi behavior, demonstrated the necessity and limitations of precision munitions in limiting collateral damage. Events in the NFZs indicate that unguided "iron bombs" or cluster munitions employed from medium altitude were ineffective against SAMs and AAA. Cloudy weather foiled LGBs, and HARMs are incapable of guiding if the radar is simply turned off. The beating that LGBs and missiles take during constant patrols may decrease their reliability or shorten their useful life. Stockpiles of PGMs are not extensive; yet in a world of trial by television, every tactical level event requires precision.⁸⁹ Collateral damage is politically unacceptable in peace enforcement, and the coalition came dangerously close to inflicting serious civilian damage on several occasions. Consequently, continued weapons development is necessary to ensure that air presence missions fly predominately with PGMs impervious to weather and resistant to the rigors of sustained flight.

Avoiding collateral damage in peace enforcement requires effective C², strict ROE, and refined training to avoid complacency. Sustained air presence is characterized by long periods of routine operations with occasional spikes of tension.⁹⁰ A tragic example of everything gone wrong occurred on 14 April 1994 when two USAF F-15C fighters shot down two US Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters operating in the northern NFZ, killing all 26 aboard. The F-15s mistakenly identified the UH-60s as Iraqi Hind helicopters.⁹¹ The UH-60s were carrying American, British, French, Kurdish, and Turkish military officers and diplomats from the MCC to a meeting with other Kurdish leaders south of the security zone. The incident highlighted organizational disconnects in the CTF that prevented the proper coordination of Army helicopter activities with USAF operations to enforce the NFZ. The helicopters tended to operate autonomously without following proper electronic identification procedures, and the F-15 pilots displayed poor visual recognition skills. Furthermore, poor coordination aboard the AWACS prevented the exchange of information that could have prevented the tragedy.⁹² The incident highlighted the pitfalls of deadly force in an NFZ and emphasized the importance of distinguishing friend from foe in an environment where individual players on both sides fly the same or similar type aircraft.

Throughout 1994 and 1995, Turkey seriously endangered CTF operations with an intensive counterinsurgency bombing campaign against PKK strongholds in northern Iraq.⁹³ Turkey manipulated OPC operations in order to conduct its own bombing raids and ground offensives in the

NFZ. On occasion, Turkey suspended OPC flight operations in order for Iran to also conduct bombing raids against PKK camps in the sanctuary of northern Iraq.⁹⁴ The PKK fought back using small arms fire to down a Turkish UH-60 helicopter operating in the NFZ.⁹⁵ On 20 March 1995, Turkish forces conducted their largest incursion into northern Iraq; and OPC was suspended for several weeks after PKK guerrillas fired on CTF aircraft.⁹⁶ The continued Turkish attacks will likely motivate the PKK to acquire shoulder-fired SAMs in an attempt to counter the Turkish airpower—much like the Mujahiden fought Soviet airpower in Afghanistan. Shoulder-fired SAMs in the hands of those who cannot tell the difference between an American and Turkish F-16 will greatly constrain the CTF's freedom of action.

It is quite possible that OPC could continue as an open-ended military commitment that hurts America's long-term war-fighting readiness. However, bloody infighting among Iraqi Kurds threatens to waste the opportunity for greater autonomy and democracy provided by OPC. Kurdish rivalries seriously hamper coalition efforts to build the Kurdish dominated Iraqi National Congress (INC) opposition movement into a viable political entity capable of challenging Saddam Hussein. A united INC could likely stand up to Baghdad and potentially obviate the need for the coalition air presence. Much of the Kurdish infighting is over the allocation of the \$100,000–\$150,000 a day in taxes collected at the Habur river border crossing from tankers carrying contraband refined oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey in defiance of UN sanctions. The fight over money and other issues has led the various factions to shell each other's cities. If the OPC air presence is withdrawn, the Iraqi military will likely unleash its full and bloody power to retake the Kurdish autonomous region. However, it is more likely that the Kurdish movement will destruct from within.⁹⁷ OPC demonstrates that military force can create a window of opportunity for diplomacy to help a society work toward a political solution. However, the creation of stable and legitimate domestic order can only be accomplished by the society itself.

Summary

A coercive air presence that threatened strategic-level value systems, economic sanctions, and diplomatic efforts combined to maintain regional stability and level the playing field for the Kurds. Airpower policed the deterrent characteristic of the NFZ with proportionate reprisals at the tactical level and limited compellent attacks at the strategic level. A sustained air presence along with the political and economic instruments of power continues to hold the Baghdad regime at bay over a significant portion of their own territory despite continued tactical-level fighting between the Iraqis, Kurds, Turks, and PKK. As a result, an important ally is unburdened from a refugee problem; the Kurds are free from persecution by modern conventional and chemical weapons; and an

uneasy power structure prevails that balances Iraqi Kurdish autonomy against the competing interests of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The success of early relief operations as well as the continuing stability is a direct result of the powerful effects of coercive airpower.

The nonintrusive aspect of coercive airpower was especially important as the coalition broke down the traditional barrier of noninterference in a state's domestic affairs. Many UN members fear that internal conflict or human rights issues will become a pretext for intervention by big powers in the legitimate internal affairs of small states. Consequently, the UN Security Council treated the Kurdish problem as a humanitarian aid issue and did not explicitly authorize the use of military force to stop Iraq from repressing its own citizens. The secretary-general argued that the coalition military action required more specific Security Council authorization. However, the coalition countered that Resolution 688 was sufficiently open-ended and that Iraq was already subject to enforcement action under chapter 7. The vagueness of Resolution 688 helped win approval and proved beneficial when the United States, Britain, and France decided to intervene militarily. Perhaps the Chinese and others who opposed intervention tolerated the military action because of the short-term ground campaign and the nonintrusive nature of an air presence. Likewise, few states raised legal objections when the United States, Britain and France invoked Resolution 688 to impose the NFZ over southern Iraq.⁹⁸

The establishment of a safe zone enforced by airpower may serve as a model for future peace enforcement situations. The great success of OPC is how quickly the refugees returned to their homeland and then were protected with a modest air presence. As the UN Secretary-General observed: "Given the traditional plight of refugees throughout the world, who spend years—even decades—in refugee camps far from their homes, this early, voluntary return was a major achievement."⁹⁹ However, the secretary-general reiterated that the UN cannot deploy peacekeeping or police forces on a state's territory unless the Security Council mandates them under chapter 7 of the UN charter or unless the parties and Security Council give their consent as in a chapter 6 peacekeeping action. Coalition airpower, diplomatic maneuvering, and a trade embargo held the full force of the Iraqi military at bay—thus enabling the Kurds to provide their own police protection and security. The safe haven, UN guards, humanitarian relief, and coercive air presence worked in the case of OPC without much opposition from anyone but Saddam Hussein.¹⁰⁰ The challenge for the future is not to apply a successful aspect of the OPC formula without creating the conditions for successful execution. In particular, the notion of an NFZ offers an attractive policy option but by itself cannot enforce peace on an unwilling belligerent.

Notes

1. "Facts on the Kurds," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 270; and David Bradshaw, "After the Gulf War: The Kurds," *The World Today* 47, no. 5 (May 1991): 78. For thousands of

years, the Kurds have lived in the Taurus and Zagros mountains in a region that is now part of the territory of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria, and portions of the former Soviet Union. The Kurds are of Indo-European racial origin; and the Kurdish language is closer to Persian, Armenian, and Greek than it is to Arabic. Like many mountain peoples, the Kurds are independent, tribal, fractious, warlike, and hospitable. The Kurds are partly nomadic, partly settled in villages and towns, and have never been unified under a single leader.

2. Bradshaw, 78.

3. Ibid.

4. Jane E. Stromseth, "Iraq's Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Challenges," in *Enforcing Restraint*, ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 80.

5. L. S. Stavrianos, *The World Since 1500: A Global History, Sixth Edition* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1991), 621–23; and Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation in Northern Iraq, 1991," in *Peacekeeping and the Challenges of Civil Conflict Resolution*, ed. David A. Charters (New Brunswick, Canada: University of New Brunswick Centre for Conflict Studies, September 1994), 97.

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations referred to the inhabitants of colonies taken from the central powers as "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." Consequently, Article 22 enacted a modified form of imperial rule known as the mandate system. Advanced nations—by virtue of their resources, experience, and geographical position—were designated as Mandatory Powers to guide the former colonies until they could get on their feet. The Mandatory Powers assumed specific obligations toward the inhabitants of the mandate territories. Although the mandate system represented an improvement over the traditional division of colonial booty by the victors in war, it ignored national aspirations and the principle of self-determination. The inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire did not want mandate status, and the system was to lead to uprisings in the colonial world during the postwar years.

6. Stromseth, 80.

7. Bradshaw, 79.

8. Ibid., 78–79. Kurds in one country have frequently allied themselves with a neighboring state who is simultaneously repressing their own Kurdish population. From 1974 to 1975, Iran and the Central Intelligence Agency supported a Kurdish insurrection to weaken the Baghdad regime. In 1975 the Shah of Iran settled his differences with Baghdad, stopped arming the Iraqi Kurds, and then stood by as the rebellion collapsed and the Iraqi army exacted a savage revenge. Syria provides arms, training, and sanctuary to Turkish Kurd PKK guerrillas to use as leverage in negotiations with Turkey over water and river issues. During the Iraq–Iran war, Iran supplied arms to Iraqi Kurds in order to pin down part of the Iraqi army in northern Iraq while Iraq attempted to start an Iranian Kurdish revolt. In 1988 Saddam Hussein bulldozed Kurdish villages, used poison gas, and killed 5,000 civilians in retaliation for Kurdish sympathy toward Iran. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled to Iran and Turkey.

9. Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 488.

10. Stromseth, 83.

11. Ahmed Hasim, "Iraq, the Pariah State," *Current History* 91, no. 561 (January 1992): 13.

12. "US Shoots Down Iraqi Planes as Unrest Continues," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 181; "The Kurd's Bid for Freedom," *The Economist* 319, no. 7700 (30 March 1991): 3; and Hasim, 13.

13. Stromseth, 84.

14. "UN Passes Persian Gulf Cease-fire Resolution: Iraqi Forces Rout Kurds," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 230.

15. "U.S. Bars Aid to Iraqi Rebels; Unrest Against Hussein Continues; UN Reports on Damage," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 213.

16. "Operation Desertion," *The Economist* 319, no. 7702 (13 April 1991): 25.
17. "Cease-fire Holds in Persian Gulf; Iraq Commanders Agree to Allied Terms; POWs Freed," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 150; "Revolts Against Saddam Hussein Continue in Iraq; Unrest Spreads to Baghdad," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 165; "U.S. Shoots Down Iraqi Planes as Unrest Continues"; and "U.S. Bars Aid to Iraqi Rebels; Unrest Against Hussein Continues; UN Reports on Damage." UN Security Council Resolution 686 set the terms for a formal end to hostilities in the Persian Gulf. There is considerable debate as to whether or not Resolution 686 forbade the operation of armed helicopters over Iraqi-held territory. On 3 March 1991, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, Coalition Military Commander, met Iraqi Lt Gen Sultan Hashim Ahmad at Safwan Airfield, Iraq, to accept the Iraqi cease-fire and dictate the terms of the agreement. Ahmad asked Schwarzkopf if Iraqi helicopters could carry government officials from place to place because the roads and bridges were out. Schwarzkopf hesitated, then said "as long as the flights are not over the part we are in that is absolutely no problem—I want to make sure that's recorded: that military helicopters can fly over Iraq. Not fighters, not bombers." Ahmad skeptically asked, "So you mean even armed helicopters can fly in Iraqi skies?" Schwarzkopf responded, "I will instruct our Air Force not to shoot any helicopters that are flying over the territory of Iraq." UN Security Council Resolution 686 approved on 2 March 1991 and accepted the next day by Iraq stated that Iraq must: "Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all member states, including missile attacks and flights of combat aircraft." On 13 March 1991, President Bush said that the use of helicopters by Iraq against insurgents violated the terms of the cease-fire agreement between Iraq and the multinational coalition. On 14 March the British commander in the region, Lt Gen Sir Peter de la Billiere, disagreed with President Bush saying that "there were constraints put on the flight of any Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft but not on helicopters. This was because the Iraqis have asked if they could use helicopters for moving casualties from the battlefield." On 17 March Schwarzkopf sent a letter to Iraqi commanders warning them against the use of fixed-wing aircraft.
18. Jeffrey M Lenorovitz, "Allies Fly Defensive Missions After Air War Smashes Iraq," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 134, no. 4 (11 March 1991): 18; "U.S. Bars Aid to Iraqi Rebels; Unrest Against Hussein Continues; U.N. Reports on Damage"; "U.S. Shoots Down Iraqi Planes as Unrest Continues"; and Stromseth, 83. Coalition fighters continued to fly defensive combat air patrols (CAP) following Iraq's capitulation in order to cover the coalition's phased pullout of military forces and enforce the terms of the cease-fire. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Colin L. Powell indicated that the aerial combat did not represent an attempt by US forces to influence Iraq's ongoing struggles.
19. "Iraq Accepts U.N. Cease-fire Terms for a Formal End to the Persian Gulf War," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 253; and Hasim, 13.
20. Stromseth, 85.
21. *Ibid.*, 84–89.
22. "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up as Refugee Crisis Escalates; U.S. to Build Camps in Iraqi Territory," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 269. The United States used UN Resolution 688 to legitimize the imposition of the no-fly zone (NFZ). Resolution 688 was sufficiently vague, and little resistance was offered by the international community.
23. Tim Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort," *World Airpower Journal* 7 (Autumn/Winter 1991): 29.
24. "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up As Refugee Crisis Escalates; U.S. to Build Camps in Iraqi Territory."
25. Tim Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort II: Western Force Protects Kurds," *International Defense Review* 24, no. 10 (October 1991): 1056.
26. "Four Months in Review—April 1991," *Current History* 90, no. 557 (September 1991): 283.
27. Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort," 28.

28. "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up As Refugee Crisis Escalates; U.S. to Build Camps in Iraqi Territory."
29. "Iraq Accepts U.N. Cease-fire Terms for a Formal End to the Persian Gulf War."
30. "On Misery Mountain," *The Economist* 319, no. 7702 (13 April 1991): 40; and "Cavalry to the Rescue," *The Economist* 319, no. 7703 (20 April 1991): 41.
31. "Iraq Accepts U.N. Cease-fire Terms for a Formal End to the Persian Gulf War."
32. "Cavalry to the Rescue."
33. "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up As Refugee Crisis Escalates; U.S. to Build Camps in Iraqi Territory."
34. "Iraq Accepts U.N. Cease-fire Terms for a Formal End to the Persian Gulf War."
35. Gunter, 99. Other arguments against establishing a safe haven included a resulting semiautonomous Kurdish northern Iraq would act as an unwanted model for Turkish Kurds; a safe area in northern Iraq could serve as a base for both Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas to stage raids on Turkey or against Saddam Hussein; and a semiautonomous northern Iraq might result in a Gaza strip-like arrangement and become home to generations of permanent refugees who are stateless and embittered and, therefore, become disruptive.
36. Donna Miles, "Helping the Kurds," *Soldiers* 46, no. 7 (July 1991): 14.
37. Stromseth, 89.
38. "Four Months in Review—April 1991."
39. "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up as Refugee Crisis Escalates; U.S. to Build Camps in Iraqi Territory."
40. Stromseth, 90.
41. "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up as Refugee Crisis Escalates; U.S. to Build Camps in Iraqi Territory."
42. Jim Wolffe, "This Place Is . . . Very Dangerous," *Air Force Times* 51, no. 42 (27 May 1991): 13.
43. "U.S. Allied Troops Establish Refugee Havens in Iraq; Kurds, Hussein Reach Agreement on Autonomy," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 293.
44. Col James L. Jones, USMC, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette* 75, no. 11 (November 1991): 101.
45. "Thousands of Kurdish Refugees Return to Iraq," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 309. Nearly 200,000 of the refugees who had fled to Turkey had come from Dohuk.
46. Lt Col John P. Abizaid, USA, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," *Military Review* 73, no. 3 (March 1993): 15.
47. "Trekking Home," *The Economist* 319, no. 7705 (4 May 1991): 40.
48. Jones, 102.
49. "Iraq Cedes Key City to Relief Workers," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 393.
50. "U.N. Takes Over Safe-Zone Camp for Iraqi Kurds," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 349.
51. "Last Allied Troops Leave," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 527; and Stromseth, 92.
52. Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort II: Western Force Protects Kurds," 1055; and Stromseth, 92. Once the coalition forces departed the "safe haven" it was referred to as the "security zone."
53. "Last Allied Troops Leave."
54. Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort II: Western Force Protects Kurds."
55. "Turkish Troops Attack Kurds," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 606.
56. Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort II: Western Force Protects Kurds."
57. Vago Muradian, "Is US Intelligence Being Misused?" *Air Force Times* 55, no. 19 (12 December 1994): 20.
58. Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort II: Western Force Protects Kurds."
59. "U.N. Weapons Inspectors in Stand-off with Iraqi Troops," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 709.

60. For a short review of the Desert Storm air campaign see Col Edward G. Mann III, USAF, *Thunder and Lightning* (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala: Air University Press, April 1995); and Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, *Gulf War Airpower Survey Summary Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993).

61. The mass exodus of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq was likely motivated by Saddam Hussein's brutal response to the insurrection of 1988 rather than any attempt to invoke the help of the West following Desert Storm.

62. "Kurds, Army Clash in Northern Cities," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 551.

63. "Kurdistan Tensions Renewed," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 964.

64. Stromseth, 93, 96.

65. Ibid.

66. Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort II: Western Force Protects Kurds."

67. Stromseth, 95.

68. Julie Bird, "Provide Comfort Extended As Iraqi Force Grows," *Air Force Times* 52, no. 49 (13 July 1992): 4; and Paul Jackson, "Iraq's Northern 'No-Fly' Zone," *AirForces Monthly* 60 (March 1993): 27.

69. Bird, 4; and Jackson, 26–29. Through the summer and fall of 1991, British and French aircraft joined the Combined Task Force to enforce the NFZ. In June 1992 the fighters deployed to Incirlik included 10 F-16s for air superiority, eight French Mirage F1s and eight British Jaguars for tactical reconnaissance, six A-10s for CAS, 11 F-111Fs for hard-target precision attack, and five EF-111s for electronic countermeasure support. On a typical day, an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft departed Incirlik at 0600 followed by the first wave of fighters and tankers at 0700. Additional fighters and tankers continued to take off throughout the day. With AWACS on station, F-16s conducted fighter sweeps through the NFZ then established defensive CAPs. Ground attack aircraft gathered intelligence at low altitude and conducted mock attacks on various targets. British Jaguars and French F1s made low-level reconnaissance runs over troop concentrations, SAM sites, and holding areas. All aircraft returned before dark.

70. Jackson, 27.

71. "Other Developments," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 494.

72. "U.S. and Allies Bomb Iraqi Missile Sites after 'No-Fly Zone' Violations," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 9.

73. "U.S. Allies Set Iraq 'No-Fly Zone'; Bush Scores 'Harsh Repression' of Shiites," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 625; David A. Fulghum, "U.S. Allies Plan Aircraft Deployment to Enforce Iraqi Exclusion Zone," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 137, no. 8 (24 August 1992): 22; "Allies Flying Over Iraq to Enforce U.N. Sanctions," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 137, no. 9 (31 August 1992): 26; "Nothing Major," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 137, no. 13 (28 September 1992): 19; Ken Delve, "Iraq's Southern No-Fly Zone," *AirForces Monthly* 60 (March 1993): 31–33; David A. Fulghum, "Clashes with Iraq Continue After Week of Heavy Air Strikes," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 138, no. 4 (25 January 1993): 38; and "U.S. Downs Iraqi Warplane In 'No-Fly Zone,'" *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 967. In August 1992 the United States, along with France and Britain, invoked UN Security Council Resolution 688 again to establish an NFZ over southern Iraq south of the 32d parallel. This operation, named Southern Watch, is in many respects similar to OPC. Throughout July and August 1992, the Iraqi military averaged 25 fighter-bomber and helicopter gunship sorties a day against separatist Shiite positions in southern Iraq. British Prime Minister John Major accused the Iraqi government of systematic murder and genocide in the year-long campaign against the Shiites. The stated purpose of Southern Watch was to shield the Shiites from Saddam Hussein's airpower. Some Iraqi opposition leaders in exile asserted that Iraqi artillery and tanks threatened the Shiite villages more than the air attacks. They warned that the NFZ could prove to be an effective half-measure. The air armada assigned to Southern Watch consisted of over 200 aircraft, including F-15s, F-16s, F-117s, A-10s, EF-111s, F-15Es, AV-8s, U-2s, RC-135s, E-3s, KC-135s, KC-10s, VC-10s, British Tornados, French Mirages, and a carrier air wing afloat. It

appears that Allied planners anticipated more than simply enforcing an NFZ. Southern Watch may have been initiated to put the coalition in a better position to respond to Iraq's resistance to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors and dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program. The Iraqis claimed that they had rebuilt their air defense network, and coalition aircraft patrolled at medium altitude to avoid antiaircraft artillery and shoulder-fired SAMs. Throughout the fall of 1992, coalition forces flew 100 sorties per day, including night patrols. On 27 December 1992, an Iraqi MiG penetrated the NFZ. A USAF F-16 shot down the MiG after it ignored verbal warnings and "turned to confront" the patrolling fighters.

74. Mike Spick, "Gulf War Return?" *AirForces Monthly* 60 (March 1993): 17; and "U.S., Allies Bomb Iraqi Missile Sites after 'No-Fly Zone' Violations," 10.

75. Fulghum, "Clashes with Iraq Continue After Week of Heavy Air Strikes," 38.

76. David H. Fulghum, "Allies Strike Iraq for Defying U.N.," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 138, no. 3 (18 January 1993): 22.

77. "A Second Storm," *AirForces Monthly* 60, (March 1993): 20-21; and Mike Gains, "Allied Iraqi Strikes 'Partially Successful,'" *Flight International* 143, no. 4353 (20-26 January 1993): 5.

78. Fulghum, "Allies Strike Iraq For Defying U.N."

79. The US intelligence cycle required 24 hours to locate, identify, and attack a mobile target. See Fulghum, "Allies Strike Iraq For Defying U.N."; Fulghum, "Clashes with Iraq Continue After Week of Heavy Air Strikes"; and U.S., Allies Bomb Iraqi Missile Sites after 'No-Fly' Zone Violations," 9.

80. "Iraq Declares Cease-fire after More Attacks by U.S., Allies," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 29.

81. "A Second Storm," 23.

82. "U.S., Iraq Trade Fire in Northern 'No-Fly Zone,'" *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 263.

83. "Another Iraq Attack," *AirForces Monthly* 67 (October 1993): 6; and "U.S. Planes Hit Missile Battery," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 622.

84. "U.S., Iraq Trade Fire in Northern 'No-Fly Zone';" and James Wyllie, "Turkish Objectives in Northern Iraq," *Janes Intelligence Review* 7 (July 1995): 307. UN sanctions were up for review in March 1993. Turkey was losing billions of dollars in trade while participating in the UN economic embargo.

85. "Iraq Declares Cease-fire after More Attacks by U.S., Allies. "

86. "U.S. Missile Attack Targets Iraqi Intelligence Agency; Baghdad Raid Retaliates for Bush 'Death Plot,'" *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 481.

87. David Hughes, "Weapons Inspector Faults Limited Strategy on Iraq," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 138, no. 3 (18 January 1993): 23.

88. Fulghum, "Allies Strike Iraq for Defying U.N." There was no significant Iraqi military reaction to the January coalition attacks in the southern NFZ. However, US military officials became very concerned about Iraq's hidden Scud capability and stepped up efforts to detect any evidence or preparation for an impending Scud attack.

89. John D. Morrocco, "Raids Highlight Pitfalls of Limited Use of Force," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 138, no. 4 (25 January 1993): 23.

90. Vago Muradian, "New Questions about Shootdown: Judges Report Cites Poor Coordination, Training Problems," *Air Force Times* 55, no. 20 (19 December 1994): 4; "Friendly Fire Tragedy," *AirForces Monthly* 75 (June 1994): 58; and Ronald W. Lewis, "Friendly Fire over Iraq," *AirForces Monthly* 78 (September 1994): 20-25.

91. Lewis, 23. F-15s flying missions over Bosnia as part of Operation Deny Flight in April 1994 were equipped with telescopic sights mounted in the cockpit to identify slow-moving helicopters. The F-15s that shot down the UH-60s apparently were not equipped with a visual scope.

92. Lewis, 23. In 1993 USAF fighters nearly shot down a UN helicopter operating in the southern NFZ. Southern Watch rules of engagement (ROE) apparently allowed the fighters to engage a suspected hostile contact without making a visual identification. An alert

AWACS controller suspected a mistake on the air tasking order that showed a UN helicopter flight scheduled for the next day. The fighters were correctly called off. Southern Watch is run by US Central Command, and OPC is run by US European Command (EUCOM). Either EUCOM did not know about the UN helicopter event in the southern NFZ or chose not to adjust the OPC ROE in light of the near tragedy. However, Deny Flight over Bosnia is run by EUCOM with extremely restricted ROE against helicopters.

93. Christopher Panicio, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict," *Janes Intelligence Review* 7, no. 4 (April 1995): 170.

94. Muradian, "Is US Intelligence Being Misused?" 22.

95. Panicio, 172.

96. "Turkey Loses Patience with PKK," *AirForces Monthly* 86 (May 1995), 2.

97. "Saddam Sits Pretty As Kurd Kills Kurd," *Janes Defense Weekly* 23, no. 8 (25 February 1995): 19–20.

98. Stromseth, 100.

99. Gunter, 107.

100. Stromseth, 97, 100–101.

Chapter 4

Coercive Airpower over Bosnia–Herzegovina

After all, the man in the street, the taxpayer is used to the idea of gallant British officers and their soldiers, standing between various groups of foreigners who are intent on murdering each other. It is less obvious where Tornado Bombers, originally bought for rearranging Warsaw Pact airfields, fit into peacekeeping.

—Wing Comdr T. R. Bonella, Royal Air Force
The Use of Air Power in Peace Support Operations

The former Yugoslavia is a hotbed of ethnic, religious, and political conflict. The passionate strife is the result of centuries of varying political domination that brought about the confluence of Christianity, Orthodoxy, and Islam. Following World War I, with little popular support, the League of Nations artificially created Yugoslavia by combining Orthodox Serbia, Montenegro, and portions of the former Austro–Hungarian empire including Muslim–Slavic Bosnia–Herzegovina. In the aftermath of World War II, Joseph Broz Tito held the inextricably mixed minorities of the Yugoslav federation together under communist rule. However, communist attempts to promote a Yugoslav consciousness through forced integration only fueled growing ethnic grievances. Following Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia began to slowly unravel at the seams.

Yugoslavia disintegrated on 25 June 1991 when the republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from the Yugoslavian Federation.¹ Serbia opposed fragmentation because the Belgrade government wanted to guarantee the rights of ethnic Serb minorities living in the various republics. The Serb minority in Croatia was especially fearful of persecution because they had fought as guerrillas during World War II against the Nazis and Croatian fascists. Consequently, the largely Serb Yugoslavian army (JNA) and air force (JRV) joined Croatian Serb militias to gain control of Croatia's Krajina region and expel non-Serb residents.² Warring Serbs viewed continued international indifference as tacit approval to crush Croatian separatism and work toward a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia.³ The European Community (EC) feared that international recognition of the breakaway republics would deepen the ethnic rifts in Yugoslavia and encourage ethnic separatism throughout eastern Europe. However, in December 1991, Germany broke ranks with the EC and recognized Croatia and Slovenia as independent nations. The rest of the EC had no choice but to follow suit in order to maintain an image of unity and with the hope of achieving a diplomatic solution to the worsening crisis.⁴ EC recognition transformed the internal domestic dispute into an international conflict, allowing the UN to get involved and mediate a cease-fire.⁵

In late 1991, UN special envoy Cyrus R. Vance brokered a cease-fire deal, and the UN Security Council pledged to send a 10,000-member peacekeeping force to Croatia. Over Croat objections, the UN planned to position the peacekeeping force along the Serb–Croat combat lines rather than along the prewar borders.⁶ The decision was consistent with UN peacekeeping tradition but none-the-less beneficial to the Serbs who had seized one-third of Croatian territory. The United States and other Western nations attempted to invoke chapter 7 of the UN charter to impose peace in the likely event that Croatia withdrew consent and continued fighting about disagreements in the political process. However, the EC and United States dropped the issue when India and other third world countries objected.⁷ In early March 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) began deploying peacekeepers throughout Croatia and established its headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia–Herzegovina.⁸

On 1 March 1992 the Muslims and Croats living in Bosnia–Herzegovina voted for independence from the Yugoslavian Federation in an election boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs.⁹ In early April the United States recognized Bosnia in the hope that international recognition would dampen hostilities and deter Serbia from engaging in aggressive activities. However, the 30-percent Serb minority living in this “complicated mosaic of ethnic and religious communities” opposed formal separation from Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs were terrified at the prospect of another domination by a Croat–Muslim alliance supported by Germany.¹⁰ The Bosnian Serbs rose in rebellion to create the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Bosnia. Bosnian Serb irregulars backed by the JNA and JRV easily outgunned a hastily organized and ill-equipped force of Bosnian Muslims and Croats.¹¹ Serb forces set out to alter the demographic structure of Bosnia by brutally forcing Muslim and Croat civilians out of Serb-controlled territory in a practice described as “ethnic cleansing.” Muslim and Croat paramilitary forces often defended and advanced their own interests with equal brutality.¹² The fighting created more than a million refugees, and the people of Sarajevo began to starve under the pressure of a Serb siege.¹³

Through the summer of 1992, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions enacting harsh economic sanctions against Serbia and extending UNPROFOR’s mandate to Bosnia.¹⁴ The Security Council invoked chapter 7 of the UN charter tasking UNPROFOR to take all measures necessary to deliver humanitarian aid to all Bosnians. The resolution then confused the issue with wording that did not reflect the political will for peace enforcement. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was extremely concerned that the actual use of force to push aid through could endanger the peacekeepers by eliminating their impartiality.¹⁵ Consequently, UNPROFOR troops were directed to follow normal peacekeeping ROE, including the use of force only for self-defense.¹⁶ The combatants continued to block relief convoys, and the UNPROFOR armed escorts could do little more than offer benign persuasion at simple roadblocks. Although

there was growing impatience with the situation on the ground, there was little will among the UNPROFOR participants to accept a shift towards peace enforcement.¹⁷

In early October 1992, the United States proposed the establishment of an NFZ to curb Bosnian Serb air attacks on Muslim and Croat villages in what President George Bush called a “flagrant disregard for human life.” The Bosnian Serbs possessed 40 light attack fighters and helicopter gunships operating predominantly from a former federal airfield near Banja Luka in northwestern Bosnia. France and Great Britain initially rejected the idea of an NFZ, fearing that it would result in Serb retaliation against their ground troops who made up the bulk of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission. However, on 9 October the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 781 banning all military flights over Bosnia. In effect, the resolution created an NFZ but stopped short of military action to enforce the ban. The resolution called for the stationing of monitors at all known Serb-controlled airfields and “technical monitoring” of air activity over Bosnia. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic responded to Resolution 781 by saying that the ban was unnecessary and that he had already decided to halt further bombings by his aircraft. However, the day after Karadzic’s assurances, Bosnian Serb aircraft attacked three villages—killing 19 and wounding 30.¹⁸ On 16 October 1992, NATO AWACS commenced Operation Sky Monitor to survey Bosnian air activity from orbits over the Adriatic Sea and Hungary.¹⁹

On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 816 empowering NATO to enforce a flight ban on all fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in Bosnian airspace not authorized by UNPROFOR.²⁰ The world media increasingly stirred the world’s collective conscience with stories of Muslim persecution at the hands of the Serbs. Muslim nations in the Middle East demanded that the enforcement of UN resolutions against Iraq be matched by equivalent responses to protect Bosnian Muslims from Serb aggression.²¹ Through early 1993 NATO AWACS detected nearly 500 violations of the NFZ, and on 16 March warplanes supporting a Serb offensive bombed villages near the besieged Muslim enclave of Srebrenica. Perhaps fearing genocide from the air or as a means to appease Middle Eastern opinion, the United States persuaded the UN Security Council to vote in favor of enforcing the NFZ and invoke chapter 7 of the UN charter.²² Although many violators came from Yugoslavia and the Serbs continued to pound the Muslims with artillery, Resolution 816 did not permit NATO aircraft to pursue violators outside of Bosnian airspace or attack targets on the ground.²³

NATO’s established command structure was ideally suited to enforce the Bosnian NFZ on behalf of the UN. The UN has neither the resources or experience for such a military task and wisely chose to ask an established collective security organization for help. NATO is well organized, trained, and equipped for air operations after 40 years of preparation for a Warsaw Pact invasion that never happened. NATO’s clear chain of com-

mand runs from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to the commander in chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCAFSOUTH), headquartered in Naples, Italy. CINCAFSOUTH delegated control of the NFZ enforcement to the commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), who then delegated day-to-day mission tasking to the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (5ATAF) headquartered at Vicenza, Italy. Fifth ATAF's combined air operations center (CAOC) at Vicenza produced the air tasking message (ATM), coordinated day-to-day operations, and prepared battle plans based on tasking from higher headquarters. High-level coordination occurred between the NAC and UN secretary-general while the CAOC and UNPROFOR exchanged representatives to ensure awareness and coordination of UN helicopter flights.

Operation Deny Flight began on 12 April 1993 to enforce the UN-sponsored NFZ over Bosnia–Herzegovina. NATO fighters supported by tankers and AWACS aircraft maintained two round-the-clock CAPs in Bosnian airspace. Aircraft operated from Aviano AB in northern Italy, aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea, and various other bases in the region. The difficulty of 24-hour-a-day operations required significant commitments from many nations including the United States, Netherlands, France, Britain, and even Muslim Turkey. The ROE required issuing repeated warnings to violators, engaging combat aircraft only if they posed a threat, and forcing helicopters to land or exit the airspace. The majority of the continuing violations were helicopters operating away from the battle lines. In the absence of observing a hostile act, it was impossible to determine the combatant status of a helicopter and politically unacceptable to arbitrarily shoot down all unidentified contacts. NATO fighters could do little more than chase the violators away or scare them into landing temporarily.²⁴ As combat airpower attempted to police the NFZ, pressure mounted to use NATO fighters to bomb Serbian artillery.

In the spring of 1993, the Bosnian Serbs rejected several UN peace plans and President Clinton threatened limited air strikes to produce a cease-fire.²⁵ The United States attempted to convince European allies that strikes against artillery positions and armored vehicles hiding in the fog and forests of Bosnia would bring the Serbs to the peace table. Unlike the United States, the British and French had peacekeepers on the ground who were vulnerable to becoming hostages or targets in retaliation for air strikes against Bosnian–Serb positions. Maj Gen John Sheehan, US Marine Corps, testified before the US Congress, saying that US reconnaissance can “clearly locate only one quarter of the Serb’s 600 artillery pieces. To destroy even those guns with some degree of predictability requires people on the ground to identify targets for the warplanes.” Maj Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, also testified that if NATO uses “air strikes alone,” the Serbs “would just ride it out.” The French told the United States that if Washington was serious about solving the Bosnian crisis,

then they should contribute ground troops to protect the Muslim enclaves.²⁶

In the summer of 1993, the UN passed a series of Security Council resolutions to protect five Bosnian enclaves and Sarajevo with UNPROFOR peacekeepers supported by NATO airpower. Throughout the spring the Bosnian Serbs continued a series of relentless offensives in eastern and northwestern Bosnia. Muslims fleeing the Serb onslaught jammed into the Muslim enclaves of Gorazde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, and Bihac. In May the UN declared the five enclaves and Sarajevo as safe areas.²⁷ The UN invoked chapter 7 of the UN charter and expanded UNPROFOR's mandate to include protecting the safe areas. However, the Security Council, unwilling to unleash full enforcement, authorized UNPROFOR to act only in self-defense. NATO fighter-bombers were not authorized to defend the territory of the safe areas or the civilians in them, but rather could only protect UNPROFOR peacekeepers if they came under attack and requested assistance.²⁸

The UN secretary-general shared authorization for the first air strikes with NATO in an effort to preserve the impartial environment necessary for UNPROFOR's humanitarian aid mission. Apparently the secretary-general felt that he was in a better position than the field commanders to determine UNPROFOR's self-protection requirements. The situation on the ground in Bosnia was extremely confused, with intertwined Serbs, Muslims, and Croats all fighting each other and attacking their own people for political sensationalism. UNPROFOR commanders—who depended on the consent of the warring parties for their survival—could best weigh the needs of impartiality and self-protection. However, a request for an air strike passed through two UNPROFOR headquarters to the secretary-general, who then made the final determination. NATO also retained air strike approval authority but delegated the decision to CINCAFSOUTH at Naples, Italy. This complex and cumbersome shared chain of command became known as “dual key control” and threatened to prevent the timely employment of airpower.²⁹

Providing a credible round-the-clock CAS commitment required the deployment of significant resources and close coordination between UNPROFOR and NATO. In July 1993 NATO deployed an additional 60 aircraft to the region, including A-10s, AC-130s, F/A-18s, and EC-130s. The British established a multinational air operations coordination center (AOCC) at UNPROFOR headquarters near Sarajevo using standard NATO communication links to interface with 5ATAF's CAOC. UNPROFOR deployed tactical air control parties (TACP) to act as ground FACs. The EC-130 airborne battlefield command, control, and communications (ABCCC) aircraft managed the tactical fighter resources, acted as a communications relay in the mountainous terrain, and passed the tactical air picture—including threat status—to the CAOC.³⁰ Initially, NATO fighters flew CAS training missions without bombs to practice coordination with

the ABCCC and TACPs as well as gain familiarity with the rugged Bosnian terrain and Serbian threat systems.³¹

A lack of dual-role, PGM-capable aircraft compounded the problems of providing on-call CAS and enforcing the NFZ 24 hours a day. Many likely CAS targets were heavy weapons imbedded among innocent civilians, and few Deny Flight aircraft had laser designation systems.³² Cluster bomb units (CBU) are often the CAS weapon of choice; however, the collateral damage associated with CBU is politically unacceptable when protecting a peacekeeper. Non-PGM fighters were loaded with unguided Mk-82 500-pound bombs, which offered only minimal reduction in collateral damage over the CBU and virtually no chance of an accurate hit at night. With assets stretched thin, those aircraft operating in a swing role and carrying PGMs offered the greatest utility for both day and night employment. Unfortunately, multirole aircraft such as the F-15E and F/A-18, which were capable of enforcing the NFZ and providing accurate CAS with only a two-ship formation in each CAP, were in short supply.³³

Through late 1993 and into early 1994, the situation in Bosnia had settled into a familiar routine of hollow peace talks, broken promises, and brutal sieges. The conflict became more complicated as fighting erupted between Bosnian Croats and Muslims who had previously been allies. Occupied territory represented bargaining power at the endless series of peace talks. The Bosnian Muslims had lost much territory and were generally at a disadvantage in the bargaining process. Attempts to partition the republic along ethnic lines were perceived as unfair by one side or another and rejected. Bosnian Muslim hard-liners believed that it was in their best interest to keep fighting with the hope that NATO would deliver on its promise of air strikes against the Serbs.³⁴ UNPROFOR troops were hindered at every turn in their attempts to deliver humanitarian aid and had varying degrees of success in using patient persuasion instead of armed force to cross roadblocks and siege lines. In the sky above the UNPROFOR convoys, NATO airpower "roared and dived in a show of sound and fury." Oftentimes the convoy drivers could get out of a difficult position by pointing to the sky and flapping their arms.³⁵ However, the Bosnian Serbs often scoffed at the empty threats of air strikes and continued to negotiate from a position of strength.

Following a mortar attack on a Sarajevo market on 5 February 1994, NATO demanded that the Serbs pull back their heavy weapons from the Bosnian capital or run the risk of being attacked by the alliance's warplanes. Sixty-eight people died and 200 were injured when a single 120-millimeter mortar round fired from disputed territory in the hills northeast of the city landed in a crowded, open air market. The horrendous images of dismembered bodies broadcast throughout the world elicited widespread revulsion at the Bosnian Serbs. NATO responded by giving all parties 10 days to remove their heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft guns from a 20-kilometer (12-mile) exclusion zone around Sarajevo or place them under UNPROFOR

control. NATO threatened air attacks against heavy weapons and essential military support facilities if any party violated the exclusion zone. NATO ministers gave blanket approval for air strikes against heavy weapons and UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali widened the UN mandate for air strikes to include attacks against heavy weapons fired at civilians. He also delegated his authority to "turn the key" to his special envoy in the region, Mr. Yasushi Akashi.³⁶

The Serbs avoided the threat of NATO air strikes without fully complying with the demands of the exclusion zone because the UN elected not to turn its key. NATO airpower mounted an intensive photo reconnaissance effort to locate and track every heavy weapon in the exclusion zone and maintained a 24-hour presence directly over Sarajevo.³⁷ The threat to enforce the ultimatum was apparently so real that Hungary announced it would prohibit overflights by AWACS if NATO bombed the Serb positions.³⁸ In a face-saving measure of Slavic solidarity, the Serbs agreed to a cease-fire and weapons withdrawal after Russia promised to send 800 peacekeepers to patrol the lines between the Serbs and Muslims in Sarajevo. However, as the ultimatum deadline approached, poor weather and mechanical difficulties apparently prevented the removal of all heavy weapons.³⁹ Mr. Akashi in consultation with UNPROFOR's commander in Bosnia, British Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, decided that enforcement of the ultimatum was not necessary. Despite the discovery of additional illegal heavy weapons in the exclusion zone, the UN would not agree to the air strikes; and NATO had no choice but to call off the planned attacks.⁴⁰

NATO demonstrated the will to enforce the NFZ by shooting down four Bosnian Serb light attack fighters as they attempted to bomb a Bosnian Muslim munitions factory. Just after dawn on 28 February 1994, both AWACS detected several low and slow contacts moving away from Banja Luka airfield. The F-16s in the Mostar CAP initiated an intercept and visually identified six G-4 Super Galeb light attack aircraft who were warned to land, exit the airspace, or be shot down.⁴¹ The Galebs ignored or never heard the warning and initiated a steep climb for a bombing attack over the town of Novi Travnik. The F-16 pilots witnessed bomb explosions in Novi Travnik and then in rapid succession downed four of the Galebs while the other two escaped back to Banja Luka by taking a circuitous route through Croatian airspace. According to AFSOUTH in Naples, the Galebs missed the munitions factory and instead hit a hospital and storage depot. Although NATO demonstrated the will to enforce the NFZ, the means did not always exist. Many fixed-wing violators made short flights into Bosnian airspace and then exited before NATO fighters could complete an intercept.⁴²

NATO air strikes did not offer the Serbs a credible deterrent, and in late March 1994 they launched an offensive supported by tanks and artillery against the Gorazde safe area. The Serbs ignored UNPROFOR and NATO warnings to pull back; and in the course of executing their offensive, wounded a member of the elite British Special Air Service (SAS)

on duty in Gorazde.⁴³ On 10 April UNPROFOR and NATO agreed to turn the keys, but low clouds and thunderstorms prevented the first arriving NATO fighters from locating the offending tanks. A follow-on flight assisted by a SAS FAC destroyed a Serbian command post and damaged a tank, producing a temporary lull in the shelling. However, the next day the shelling resumed; and General Rose requested that NATO fighters establish a threatening presence over Gorazde but withhold ordnance in an effort to coerce the Serbs to stop their assault. After hours of unsuccessful negotiations via fax machine with the Serbs, the UN agreed to another air strike. A flight of US Marine F/A-18s delivered three 500-pound bombs despite poor weather and hostile fire from Serb AAA. Two of the bombs did not explode—possibly a result of fuse-arming wires rendered defective by the rigors of day-to-day air patrols. The air strike seemed to stop the tank assault, but the guns did not fall silent until several hours later in the afternoon.⁴⁴

The Serbs sieging Gorazde defied the UN despite the threat of NATO air strikes and withdrew only after they had inflicted significant damage. On 16 April NATO and the UN agreed to turn the keys, and a British Sea Harrier was shot down by a Serb shoulder-launched SAM as it made repeated low passes over Gorazde attempting to identify a target. The pilot ejected safely, linked up with the SAS team, and then all evacuated the town to preclude being captured by the Serbs. On 17 April a dozen Serb tanks rolled through the streets of Gorazde pulverizing buildings and spreading panic among the 65,000 inhabitants.⁴⁵ NATO declared a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde and threatened air strikes for noncompliance. The Serbs began a slow withdrawal that failed to meet the NATO ultimatum. However, since the Serbs had started moving, Mr. Akashi and General Rose felt that air strikes were inappropriate. Consequently, the Serbs made a late and defiant withdrawal that included torching buildings and blowing up the town's water treatment plant.⁴⁶ The Serbs never completely withdrew, and the UN was reluctant to unleash NATO airpower. Airpower over Gorazde was somewhat unimpressive, yet the 1995 *National Security Strategy of the United States* proclaimed that "the threat of airpower prevented the fall of Gorazde."⁴⁷

In early August NATO warplanes destroyed a single Bosnian Serb armored vehicle in response to a heavy weapons exclusion zone violation near Sarajevo. In the early morning hours of 5 August, Bosnian Serbs seized a tank, two armored personnel carriers, and an anti-aircraft gun from an UNPROFOR weapons depot in a Sarajevo suburb.⁴⁸ UN forces gave chase in a French Puma helicopter but broke off the pursuit after they were hit several times by small arms fire.⁴⁹ Numerous other violations had occurred recently, but Special Envoy Akashi had repeatedly turned down General Rose's requests for air strikes.⁵⁰ In this instance Akashi was out of the area on vacation and had entrusted General Rose with full authority while he was gone. General Rose warned the Serbs to move away from all the heavy weapons in the exclusion zone. An hour

later, NATO bombed a single armored vehicle in an unpopulated area.⁵¹ Shortly after the bombing, the Serbs contacted UNPROFOR and promised to return the weapons that they had seized earlier in the day. The threat of additional air strikes ceased after the return of the stolen weapons despite numerous other violators in the exclusion zone.⁵²

The Krajina Serbs defied NATO and the UN by bombing the Bihac safe area from sanctuary in Croatia. Bihac is bordered by Krajina on three sides, enabling quick in and out attacks before NATO fighters can respond. On 9 November two Krajina Serb J-22 Orano light attack fighters flying from Udbina airfield rocketed Bihac and wounded 14 civilians. The Serbs also shelled the enclave, and the Bangladeshi UNPROFOR peacekeepers assigned to Bihac had no training or equipment to direct NATO air strikes. The Krajina Serbs refused to allow UN supplies to reach the Bangladeshi peacekeepers, and they also denied a Dutch TACP access to the safe area.⁵³ On 18 November J-22s attacked Bihac with napalm and cluster munitions that were apparently so old that they did not explode.⁵⁴ The following day a J-22 attacking a Muslim munitions factory 10 miles north of the safe area clipped a chimney and crashed into an apartment building, killing the pilot and injuring nine civilians.⁵⁵ The air attacks had little military significance; but in view of the NFZ and previous declarations to defend peacekeepers in the safe areas, NATO and the UN once again looked very impotent.

NATO and the UN attempted to bolster the threat to defend the safe areas with a timely and proportionate reprisal raid on Udbina airfield.⁵⁶ On 21 November British, Dutch, French, and American aircraft attacked AAA sites, SAM batteries, and the runway/taxiway system at Udbina. LGBs precisely created six craters at key points on the runway and taxiways.⁵⁷ The raid did not attempt to target the airport's control tower or the 15 Serb aircraft sitting in the open on the tarmac.⁵⁸ General Rose specifically asked that the J-22s not be hit in order to avoid endangering the civilians living in a small village adjacent to the aircraft parking area. The UN and NATO turned the keys with the understanding that the objective was to send a message and change behavior, not destroy military capability.⁵⁹ Adm Leighton W. Smith, CINCAFSOUTH, indicated that the intent was to limit collateral damage and avoid Serb casualties.⁶⁰ Although the damage to the Udbina airfield would likely be repaired in a matter of days, the raid is a classic example of a reprisal to reinforce a deterrent threat. However, with UNPROFOR peacekeepers as potential hostages, NATO's deterrent airpower had little credibility with the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.

Fifth ATAF stepped up air activity over Bihac, but the Serbs fought back with SAMs and effectively paralyzed NATO airpower by taking UNPROFOR peacekeepers hostage. NATO responded to the Serb missile activity near Bihac by bombing several persistent SAM sites. Karadzic warned General Rose, "don't mess around with us—should you attack from the air or in any other way, it means all-out war." General Rose put UNPROFOR on

alert; but it was too late, as the Serbs took hostages throughout Bosnia as leverage against further air strikes.⁶¹ As the Bihac pocket crumbled, NATO offered CAS to protect the Bangladeshi peacekeepers with the stipulation that the Serb SAM batteries also be subject to attack. However, the UN rejected NATO's offer, saying that "such widespread use of airpower would be tantamount to going to war with the Serbs and place UN troops in jeopardy."⁶² On 2 December NATO and the UN temporarily suspended Deny Flight missions over Bosnia in an effort to appease the Serbs and win the release of the UNPROFOR hostages.⁶³ In response to the rapidly failing policy in Bosnia, the United States further minimized the will to use airpower by changing its policy of endorsing air strikes to push the Serbs to accept a peace agreement.⁶⁴

UNPROFOR hostages and the downing of an American F-16 seriously undermined NATO's ability to use airpower throughout the first half of 1995. In May NATO responded to a heavy weapons violation around Sarajevo by bombing an ammunition depot near the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale. The Bosnian Serbs responded by taking UNPROFOR troops hostage and shelling five of the six UN-declared safe areas.⁶⁵ In June the Bosnian Serbs ambushed an American F-16 in the middle of the night with a mobile SA-6 SAM launched from underneath the Banja Luka CAP.⁶⁶ Electronic sensors in-theater detected the unexpected threat 13 minutes before launch, but a glitch in the communications architecture prevented the pilot from being warned before missile impact.⁶⁷ NATO knew the location of garrisoned SA-6s, but the UN blocked attempts to bomb the sites.⁶⁸ Fortunately, the pilot was rescued—preventing his political exploitation by the Serbs. However, AIRSOUTH made the CAPs ineffectual by moving them out over the Adriatic Sea to preclude another shootdown.⁶⁹ In July the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa fell as the Bosnian Serbs once again used captured peacekeepers as hostages against air strikes. In one instance the Dutch minister of defense overruled UN approval for air strikes after the Serbs threatened to kill captured Dutch peacekeepers.⁷⁰

After the fall of Zepa, NATO decided to draw the line and threaten a "substantial and decisive" air campaign if the Bosnian-Serbs moved against the remaining safe areas. However, in order to make the threat credible, the UN and NATO had to do something about the dual-key policy. On several occasions Special Envoy Akashi had turned down UN and NATO requests for air strikes. A new Security Council resolution streamlining the decision-making process would have likely faced Russian veto. Under pressure from NATO ministers, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali agreed to rescind Special Envoy Akashi's right to veto NATO air strikes and instead transferred that authority to UNPROFOR commander French general Bernard Janvier. More specifically, Janvier would control UN authorization for air strikes designed to punish the belligerents; and British general Rupert Smith, who had replaced General Rose as UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, would control authorization for CAS

requested to protect peacekeepers. CINCAFSOUTH, Admiral Smith, controlled air strike authorization for NATO.⁷¹ With the keys in the hands of the military commanders, the threat of air strikes became considerably more credible.

In late August a mortar attack in Sarajevo prompted NATO and the UN to fulfill their promises and initiate a wide-ranging compellent air campaign. On 28 August a mortar attack killed 37 civilians and wounded more than 80 at the same open air market that was attacked in 1994. The Bosnian Serbs accused the Bosnian Muslims of firing the mortar at their own civilians in an attempt to elicit NATO and UN retaliation. However, General Smith asserted that the analysis of the shrapnel and the radar trajectories led the UN to conclude “beyond all reasonable doubt” that the shells were fired from Serb positions south of Sarajevo. It was an opportune time to coerce the Bosnian Serbs using air strikes. Croatia had broken the siege of Bihac by retaking the Krajina, Belgrade exerted pressure on the Bosnian Serbs in an attempt to avoid continued economic sanctions, and a muscular British–French rapid reaction force (RRF) arrived to protect UNPROFOR.⁷² Twelve hours after the mortar attack, Admiral Smith and General Smith, who was acting on behalf of a temporarily absent General Janvier, agreed to turn the keys.⁷³

NATO crafted Operation Deliberate Force to significantly reduce Bosnian Serb military capability in order to allow UNPROFOR to proceed with its humanitarian mission. The UN and NATO desired to reduce the threat of further attacks on the remaining safe areas, ensure freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, guarantee free access to the Sarajevo airport, and force the withdrawal of all heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone.⁷⁴ The air campaign would also likely level the playing field for the Muslims. Serbia’s declared embargo against the Bosnian Serbs prevented an efficient replenishment of lost military capability. The Bosnian Serb army was relatively small and very dependent on heavy weapons, large stores of ammunition, the bridge network for rapid mobility, and their communication systems to achieve synergy.⁷⁵ Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, COMAIRSOUTH, believed that NATO could compel Bosnian Serb compliance by isolating their army and reducing their military stockpiles. UN intelligence estimated that there were 250 heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone, and Admiral Smith believed that rather than going after each of those 250 “ants” NATO should go after the “ant hill.” NATO planners devised a wide-ranging air campaign to take down the Bosnian Serb air defense and communication systems as well as target ammunition depots, ammunition factories, equipment depots, and artillery bases throughout the country.⁷⁶

UN Security Council Resolution 836 from 4 June 1993 authorized air strikes only for UNPROFOR self-defense when defending a declared safe area.⁷⁷ A Russian veto was guaranteed should the Security Council attempt to pass a new resolution widening the air strike mandate. As a result NATO used a little latitude and divided all of Bosnia into a northwest and

southeast safe area. NATO planned to concentrate the air campaign in southeastern Bosnia around Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Zepa.⁷⁸ However, NATO planned attacks against the entire Bosnian Serb IADS in order to protect its pilots.⁷⁹

The Deliberate Force air campaign began on 30 August 1995 and initially achieved less than the desired results. Before the first bomb fell, General Smith ensured that all UNPROFOR units were in defensible positions and NATO provided dedicated CAS sorties in the event that the Bosnian Serbs turned on UNPROFOR or the RRF.⁸⁰ Initial strike packages focused on attacking the Bosnian Serb IADS. However, the Serbs did not turn on their radars in response to a wave of drones as the Iraqis had during the Gulf War. Consequently, a volley of HARMs had no effect. Although the SAM sites left their radars off, they were still a significant threat as they could come back up at any time and in a different location.⁸¹ In and around Sarajevo, subsequent strike packages bombed ammunition storage areas while the RRF shelled Bosnian Serb artillery positions and IADS targets.⁸² Ten miles east of Sarajevo near the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale, the two-man crew of a French Mirage 2000D ejected and parachuted into Serb-held territory after being shot down by a shoulder-fired SAM.⁸³ Cloud cover and generally poor weather decreased the expected bombing accuracy, while the Navy had difficulty finding and hitting several of their targets at night. Overall, the attacks disappointed NATO commanders.⁸⁴

After two days of bombing, CINCAF SOUTH and the UNPROFOR commander suspended the air campaign in order to conduct diplomatic talks at the request of the Bosnian Serbs. The air attacks stopped in order to ensure General Janvier's safe passage to the meeting site on the Serbian border. Bosnian Serb army commander Gen Ratko Mladic offered Janvier no concessions and attempted to manipulate the situation in his favor. The UNPROFOR commander felt that Mladic did not comprehend the damage done to his military forces by the air campaign. Janvier convinced Admiral Smith to extend the bombing pause 96 hours to allow Mladic to survey his battered army. NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes was furious with Smith, feeling that a four-day bombing moratorium without clear Bosnian Serb concessions would further harm NATO's already damaged credibility. Furthermore, Claes was concerned that the pause might allow the competing interests of NATO's 16 members and the UN to undermine the existing shaky political relationship. During the moratorium, NATO ministers issued an ultimatum to Mladic to halt all attacks on UN safe areas, withdraw heavy weapons from Sarajevo, and guarantee freedom of movement for UNPROFOR as well as free access to Sarajevo's airport. Karadzic stated that he would accept the conditions, but General Mladic said that he had no authority to order an artillery withdrawal.⁸⁵ As the deadline passed, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance data showed that there was no mass exodus of heavy weapons from Sarajevo; and, instead, the Bosnian Serbs were playing a shell game within the

exclusion zone. On 5 September Smith and Janvier turned their keys, and Deliberate Force was back on.⁸⁶

NATO resumed the air campaign using PGMs and strict ROE in order to attack militarily significant targets with minimum collateral damage.⁸⁷ NATO pilots demonstrated good discipline in the face of bad weather by withholding many laser-guided attacks in order to avoid collateral damage. Consequently, NATO airpower patiently revisited many targets and slowly worked through the original target list. Key bridges and choke points were also targeted at the request of UNPROFOR commanders, and NATO provided CAS for beleaguered peacekeepers.⁸⁸ However, continued poor weather, enemy defenses, and hard-to-find aim points contributed to many LGBs missing their targets. Strict ROE prevented many other PGMs from even being dropped. COMAIRSOUTH personally scrutinized each aim point of every target and was unwilling to risk collateral damage by loosening the ROE or using unguided bombs in an attempt to overcome the weather.⁸⁹ The limited stocks of PGMs aboard the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* were often jettisoned into the sea by aircraft that had adhered to the ROE and withheld ordnance but were then too heavy to land aboard the ship with the bombs. The *Roosevelt* seemed to resent the centralized control from COMAIRSOUTH and suggested that they should select the ordnance rather than having it dictated in the ATM.⁹⁰ Although Deliberate Force looked and felt like combat, it was a peace enforcement operation necessitating precision force to minimize collateral damage in the pursuit of political objectives.

Competing interests within NATO and political hesitancy threatened to undermine Deliberate Force's compellent support to the diplomatic peace process. On 9 September NATO began targeting air defense sites in northwestern Bosnia as part of a continuing phased campaign to destroy the entire Bosnian Serb IADS. The following day CINCAFSOUTH ordered a TLAM attack on a heavily defended radar complex in northwestern Bosnia. Many in NATO viewed the TLAM attack as escalatory in light of the growing concern that NATO was running out of targets without meaningful concessions from Bosnian Serbs. However, the dismantling of the IADS was planned from the start; and the use of TLAMs was purely a military rather than a political decision. NATO was prepared to use F-117s on the radar sites, but Italy had denied basing rights for the stealth fighters.⁹¹ The Italians denied the basing rights in retaliation for being excluded from the peace process by the major powers.⁹² Despite political problems within NATO, Deliberate Force continued to support the diplomatic process by pressuring the Bosnian Serbs with a calculated campaign to destroy their military strength.

NATO continued the air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs while Serbia negotiated the principles of a peace plan on their behalf. On 8 September the United States brokered an agreement where the warring parties agreed to a set of principles to stimulate further peace negotiations. Among other things, the proposed principles would give the Bosnian

Serbs 49 percent of Bosnia rather than the 70 percent they currently controlled. Serbia acted on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, who continued to resist the demands of NATO and the UN. Belgrade was conciliatory on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs because they fully appreciated the damage that NATO airpower had inflicted on the Bosnian Serbs' very valuable military capability. Serbia also wished to get out from underneath UN economic sanctions and was continually frustrated by Kradzic's lack of concession. The Bosnian Serb leader was unable to communicate with his military commanders, and he did not comprehend the gravity of the air campaign.⁹³ On 11 September Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces took advantage of NATO air strikes in northwest Bosnia and launched a combined offensive that quickly conquered 1,300 square miles. The captured Serb territory was likely to be ceded in a peace settlement anyway, leading to speculation that the Serbs gave it up without much of a fight.⁹⁴ When the Bosnian Serb leadership finally realized how much of their military capability had been destroyed by NATO airpower, they agreed on 14 September to comply with the UN and NATO demands.

Deliberate Force compelled the Bosnian Serbs to make political concessions and, in the process, created an environment leading to a negotiated settlement. The effectiveness of the air campaign led Belgrade and Pale to conclude that continued fighting in the face of UN demands was not in their best interest.⁹⁵ The compelling air campaign reduced the Bosnian Serb military capability, thus leveling the playing field for the Bosnian Muslim–Croat alliance. The continued Muslim–Croat offensive, elimination of Serb influence in Krajina, and continued pressure from Belgrade backed the Bosnian Serbs into a corner that forced them to negotiate beyond the simple NATO demands. As the diplomatic process continued, the Muslims and Croats attempted to grab as much land as they could, and the Serbs fought back desperately with what little capability they retained.⁹⁶ Through early October NATO's air presence continued to level the playing field by intercepting Serb aircraft flying out of Banja Luka, silencing Serb artillery firing near Tuzla, and firing HARMs at hostile radars.⁹⁷ In addition, NATO aided the Muslim–Croat offensive with UAV reconnaissance data.⁹⁸ In late 1995 the warring parties agreed to a comprehensive peace plan, and NATO agreed to deploy 60,000 troops to implement the peace.

Operation Deny Flight ended on 20 December 1995 when the international implementation force (IFOR) assumed responsibility for the military aspects of implementing the Dayton peace accords.⁹⁹ The United States agreed to deploy 20,000 heavily armed troops to Bosnia for a year as part of a 60,000 strong IFOR. During that year IFOR will separate the belligerents and maintain a stable environment so that the UN and other agencies can create a credible police force, provide humanitarian aid, and rebuild damaged infrastructure. After IFOR withdraws, NATO airpower will likely continue a coercive presence to reassure the victims and deter the belligerents from organized aggression.¹⁰⁰

Summary

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn into, something alien to its nature.

—Carl von Clausewitz
On War

Before Deliberate Force, the UN, United States, and EC never agreed upon a consistent strategy for Bosnia. The UN often applied peacekeeping rules in an environment more suited for peace enforcement. Attempts at peacekeeping often became a substitute for serious negotiations and threatened to prolong or become a permanent feature of the conflict. Without a political settlement or the will for peace enforcement, the safe areas became little more than refugee camps surrounded by hostile forces.¹⁰¹ UNPROFOR was in the untenable position of being dispersed, vulnerable, and dependent on the consent of the belligerents for their day-to-day survival. Consequently, the UN was reluctant to counter Serb aggression with airpower.

Air operations over Bosnia demonstrate that a significant obstacle to using airpower in peace enforcement is the differing agendas and political infighting within a coalition. Initially, the use of airpower was largely symbolic, lacked credibility, and ceded the initiative to the Serbs. If NATO airpower was threatened or actually used, the Serbs would make some small and insignificant concession to satisfy the UN's political leaders who retained the power to turn the key. The Serbs also fought NATO airpower asymmetrically by taking UNPROFOR hostages. Additionally, it was politically impossible to deny flight in the NFZ against the numerous helicopter violations. Furthermore, the Serbs conducted air strikes near their bases where the aircraft could drop their bombs and quickly retreat to the sanctuary of the aerodrome. The dual-key command structure, UN mandates somewhere between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and UNPROFOR's vulnerability effectively paralyzed airpower in Bosnia until Deliberate Force. In *Airpower: A Centennial Appraisal*, Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason states, "It is well argued that airpower cannot hold ground, but it can make it very difficult for hostile forces to do so and it may thereby dissuade recalcitrant political groups from having recourse to armed force, or persuade them to abandon it in pursuit of political objectives. Airpower like any other kind of military power, cannot impose a political settlement, but it can help to create a peacekeeping environment in which a political settlement is preferable to continued conflict."

Deliberate Force demonstrates that the application of airpower at the operational and strategic level can be a powerful coercive force even in the politically limited environment of peace enforcement. After the four-day bombing pause, Deliberate Force proceeded as a classic compellent cam-

campaign that applied the power to hurt against something of value at a tempo that signaled resolve and commitment. Before Deliberate Force, the UN used airpower to signal resolve or send messages with limited engagements against targets of insignificant value at the tactical level. On the other hand, Deliberate Force was a strategic compellent campaign that went after the very core of the Bosnian Serb military capability. In the words of Admiral Smith, Deliberate Force stopped stepping on the ants and went after the ant hill. NATO airpower threatened military capability that the Bosnian Serbs perceived as essential to their survival, forcing political concessions to the UN and NATO and creating an environment that led to a more extensive negotiated settlement.

Notes

1. "Two Yugoslav Republics Declare Independence; Slovenia and Croatia Retain Confederation Option," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 473.
2. "EC Mediation Fails to End Bloodshed," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 599.
3. Lenard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia," *Current History* 91, no. 568 (November 1992): 374.
4. Shanin P. Malik and Andrew M. Dorman, "United Nations and Military Intervention: A Study in Politics of Contradiction," in *Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention*, eds. Andrew M. Dorman and Thomas G. Otte (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1995), 172; and "EC to Recognize Breakaway Yugoslav Republics," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 957.
5. Cohen, 374; and "U.N. Truce Paves Way for Yugoslavia Peace Force," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1991, 898.
6. "EC to Recognize Breakaway Yugoslav Republics."
7. "U.N. Security Council Votes Croatia Peace Force," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 154.
8. "Bosnia-Herzegovina Gains EC, U.S. Recognition," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 253.
9. Malik and Dorman, 173-75; and "U.N. Security Council Votes Croatia Peace Force," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 154. Following international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the EC and UN insisted that the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia could not be changed by force or without the consent of the concerned parties. This implied a united security guarantee for Bosnia-Herzegovina. With Serbia's desire for a greater Serbia, the Bosnian president appears to have viewed international recognition and the security guarantees from the EC and UN as the only way to preserve Bosnia's borders.
10. Cohen, 374.
11. "Bosnia-Herzegovina Gains EC, U.S. Recognition"; and William Mathews, "Are Current Talks the 'Last Chance'?" *Air Force Times* 56, no. 16 (20 November 1995): 18.
12. Cohen.
13. "EC Imposes Trade Embargo on Yugoslavia; Baker Pushes U.S. Allies for Tough Measures," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 381.
14. Malik and Dorman, 174; and "U.N. Security Council Votes Yugoslavia Sanctions; Trade Ban, Assets Freeze Included," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 405. UN Security Council Resolution 757 effectively held Serbia responsible for the continuation of conflict and imposed comprehensive economic sanctions.
15. "United Nations Protection Force 1," 4-5; on-line, Internet, available at http://ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/unprofor_un.html; and James Gow, "Nervous Bunnies: The International Community and the Yugoslav War of Dissolution, the Politics

of Military Intervention in a Time of Change,” in *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 18.

16. “United Nations Protection Force 1,” 5.

17. Gow, 18.

18. “United Nations Votes Bosnian ‘No-Fly Zone’; Serb Warplanes Violate Ban,” *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 761. The Bosnian Serbs were also heavily dependent on Serbian helicopters for resupply.

19. Tim Ripley and C. Scott Barnes, “Operation Deny Flight,” *World Airpower Journal* 16 (Spring 1994): 16. Initially, Operation Sky Monitor was performed by a single AWACS operating over the Adriatic Sea. However, the mountainous terrain over Bosnia prevented full monitoring from the single orbit. By late October NATO reached an agreement with Hungary for the second orbit in order to provide better radar coverage into Bosnia.

20. “United Nations Protection Force 1,” 10.

21. “Allies Edgy on New Attacks,” *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 30.

22. Lon O. Nordeen, “Denying Flight,” *AirForces Monthly* 65 (August 1993): 16; and “United Nations Protection Force 1,” 5.

23. “Bosnian Cease-fire Agreed but Peace Plan Falters,” *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 224.

24. Ripley and Barnes, 16–23.

25. “U.S., European Air Strikes Mulled,” *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 303.

26. “The Sky Above, the Mud Below,” *Newsweek*, 17 May 1993, 30.

27. “Russia, Western Allies Agree on Safe Area Strategy for Bosnia–Herzegovina; U.S. to Provide Air Cover,” *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1992, 386. The president of Bosnia compared the safe areas to American Indian reservations, and a United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees representative warned that the areas could become ghettos where the Muslims would be dependent on international charity for years.

28. “United Nations Protection Force 1,” 17; and “Russia, Western Allies Agree on Safe Area Strategy For Bosnia–Herzegovina; U.S. to Provide Air Cover.”

29. “United Nations Protection Force 1,” 17; and M. J. M. Jenkins, “There Are No Air Force Personnel in Bosnia,” *Air Clues*, April 1994, 124–31.

30. Tony Capaccio, “The Fully Deployable Air Campaign,” *Air Force Magazine* 77, no. 1 (January 1994): 54; Joris Janssen Lok, “A Plan for Action,” *Janes Defence Weekly* 20, no. 17 (23 October 1993): 32; and “Discipline Guard,” *AirForces Monthly* 66 (September 1993): 2.

31. Craig Covault, “Bosnian Air Ops Test NATO/U.N.,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 139, no. 9 (30 August 1993): 50–51; Idem, “Carrier-Based Recon Vital,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 139, no. 9 (30 August 1993): 51; and Capaccio, 54.

32. In the summer of 1993, PGM-capable aircraft were already deployed to Provide Comfort (F-111s) and Southern Watch (F-15Es). The newest wing of F-15Es at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath was just reaching initial operating capability, and the F-16 fleet had not been fitted with the LANTIRN laser-targeting pod.

33. Joris Janssen Lok, “LANTIRN to Throw Light on ‘Deny Flight,’” *Janes Defence Weekly* 22, no. 7 (20 August 1994): 26; Idem, “A Plan for Action”; and Covault, 50–51.

34. Malik and Dorman, 177–79.

35. Jenkins, 130.

36. “NATO Gives to Bosnian Serbs Besieging Sarajevo 10 Days to Withdraw Weapons; Threatens Air Strikes,” *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 77; and “United Nations Protection Force 1,” 18.

37. Tim Ripley, “Blue Sword over Bosnia,” *World Airpower Journal* 19 (Winter 1994): 19. Fortunately, the Europeans and US Navy have a capable tactical reconnaissance capability. RAF Jaguars, French Entendards, Dutch F-16s, Royal Navy Harriers, and US Navy F-14s photographed up to 20 targets per sortie. The winter weather occasionally prevented tactical reconnaissance sorties, but the thick snow made tank tracks and footprints stand out in the aerial photographs. The ABCCC and CAOC continually updated attack plans as the Serbs slowly moved their heavy weapons. The continuous presence over Sarajevo was

maintained by F-16s, A-10s, F-18s, and French Mirages during the day, and F-15Es, A-6Es, and AC-130s at night.

38. Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, Royal Air Force, Retired, *Airpower: A Centennial Appraisal* (London: Brassey's, 1994), 178. The Hungarians were either frustrated because of inadequate compensation for their losses in the embargo against Serbia or fearful of the 400,000 ethnic Serbs living within their borders. The Hungarian prime minister indicated that Hungary will have to live with Serbia and the Serbian people long after the NATO AWACS are gone. The lack of support for the ultimatum from an important and otherwise supportive ally demonstrates how regional political sensitivities can hinder moves toward greater peace enforcement.

39. "Bosnian Serbs Move Guns from Around Sarajevo; NATO Strikes Averted; Russia Deploys Peacekeepers," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 117.

40. Mason, 179; and "Bosnian Serbs Move Guns from Around Sarajevo; NATO Strikes Averted; Russia Deploys Peacekeepers."

41. "NATO Jets Down Suspected Bosnian Serb Warplanes," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 134.

42. Craig Covault, "AWACS, Command Chain Key to NATO Shootdown," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 140, no. 10 (7 March 1994): 25; and "NATO Jets Down Suspected Bosnian Serb Warplanes."

43. "Bosnian Serbs Attack Moslem Enclave at Gorazde; U.S., U.N. Balk at Military Intervention," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 237.

44. "NATO Aircraft Bomb Serbian Positions in Bosnia; Gorazde Advance Interrupted," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 254.

45. "Serbs Enter Gorazde Despite NATO Action; British Jet Downed," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 269.

46. "Bosnian Serbs Pull Back from Gorazde Enclave Under Threat of NATO Air Strikes," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 293.

47. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 1995), iii.

48. NATO Launches Air Strike Against Bosnian Serbs; Yugoslavia Severs Ties with Rebels," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 561.

49. "NATO Bosnian Action," *AirForces Monthly* 79 (October 1994): 8.

50. John T. Correll, "The Lake Doctrine," *Air Force Magazine* 79, no. 5 (May 1996): 3. In one instance a USAF AC-130 circled above a Bosnian Serb tank that had just fired at a French UNPROFOR position and requested authorization from the UN to open fire. However, UN officials in Zagreb, Croatia, had gone to dinner without their cellular telephones. By the time the UN authorized the gunship to fire, the Serb tank had gone away.

51. NATO Launches Air Strike Against Bosnian Serbs; Yugoslavia Severs Ties with Rebels."

52. "NATO Bosnian Action," 8.

53. Alan Warnes, "Battle for Bihac," *AirForces Monthly* 82 (January 1995): 40; and "Clinton Ends U.S. Enforcement of U.N. Bosnian Arms Embargo; Serbs Regain Lost Territory," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 849.

54. "NATO Planes Bomb Serb Airfield in Croatia," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 874.

55. Warnes, 40.

56. "United Nations Protection Force 1," 32. On 19 November 1994 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 958 which authorized the use of airpower in Croatia if necessary to protect UNPROFOR peacekeepers.

57. William Mathews, "Airstrikes Spark Concern," *Air Force Times* 55, no. 18 (5 December 1994): 22.

58. "NATO Planes Bomb Serb Airfield in Croatia."

59. Warnes, 40.

60. "NATO Planes Bomb Serb Airfield in Croatia."

61. Warnes, 42.

62. "Serbs Surround Bihac in Northwestern Bosnia; Western Allies Fail to Protect 'Safe Zone,'" *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 889.
63. Tim Ripley, "NATO Strikes Back," *World Air Power Journal* 22, (Autumn/Fall 1995): 25; and "United Nation Prepares for Possible Withdrawal of Troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1994, 910. AWACS missions continued from their standard orbits and NATO fighters maintained combat air patrols along Bosnia's southern boundary in the event that UNPROFOR peacekeepers requested CAS. By 4 December the Bosnian Serbs had released the hostages, and NATO resumed Deny Flight operations in Bosnian air space.
64. "Serbs Surround Bihac in Northwestern Bosnia; Western Allies Fail to Protect 'Safe Zone.'"
65. "U.N. Peacekeepers Taken Hostage in Bosnia; Allies Weigh Options for Tougher Action," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1995, 385.
66. Brig Gen Martin R. Bernt, USMC, and Maj Michael C. Jordon, USMC, "The Recovery of Basher 52," *Proceedings* 121, no. 11 (November 1995): 42.
67. "Pilot Downing Blamed on Glitch," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1995, 494.
68. Steven Watkins, "Does Deny Flight Still Work?" *Air Force Times* 55, no. 51 (24 July 1995): 3; and Joris Janssen Lok, "Serbian SAM Site Scrutinized," *Janes Defence Weekly* 21, no. 23 (11 June 1994): 25.
69. Col Maris J. McCrabb, School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) professor and team member of Air University Balkan Air Campaign Survey, interviewed by author, 1 April 1996.
70. Joris Voorhoeve, Dutch minister of defense, "Protecting the Peacekeepers on the Day Srebrenica Fell," *Washington Post*, 20 November 1995.
71. "Zepa Safe Area Falls to Bosnian Serb; Western Allies Threaten Air Strikes," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1995, 529. Another example of the complex nature of the conflict, the difficulties of working within a coalition, and the problems associated with having peacekeepers in an environment better suited for peace enforcement occurred in July 1995. On 22 July Serb attacks near Sarajevo killed two French UNPROFOR peacekeepers. France unilaterally retaliated the next day when a French Air Force Mirage 2000D flying from a base in France dropped a single laser guided bomb on a private residence in the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale.
72. "Bosnian Serbs Shell Sarajevo Market; NATO Bombs Serb Targets in Retaliation," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1995, 629-30.
73. Rick Atkinson, "Air Assault Set Stage for Broader Role," *Washington Post*, 15 November 1995.
74. "NATO Basic Fact Sheet: NATO's Role in Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia," n.p.; on-line, Internet, available at gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00natodata/FACT-SHEET/FACTS/fs04.txt
75. "Croatia Retakes Serb-Held Krajina Region; Thousands of Serb Refugees Flee," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1995, 565.
76. Atkinson.
77. "United Nations Protection Force 1," 12.
78. Atkinson.
79. Ibid., The Bosnian Serb IADS was a sophisticated web of early warning radars, targeting radars, and microwave communication links. The system was built during the cold war, tightly linked to neighboring Yugoslavia, and included the older SA-2 fixed SAM as well as the very dangerous mobile SA-6. NATO planners chose 26 targets with 68 individual aim points that included early warning radar sites, key air defense communication nodes, command and control facilities, known SAM sites, and SAM support facilities. Since the F-16 shootdown in June, US intelligence agencies had been somewhat more sharing with information that they normally kept to themselves. For instance, the National Security Agency provided advice on the Bosnian-Serb communications architecture.

Interestingly, they asked NATO to avoid targeting one particular facility used to eavesdrop on communication between Belgrade and Pale.

80. Atkinson; and "Operation Deliberate Force," 3; on-line, Internet, available at [gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/yugo/df0611](http://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/yugo/df0611).

81. Atkinson.

82. "Bosnian Serbs Shell Sarajevo Market; NATO Bombs Serb Targets in Retaliation."

83. Tim Ripley, "Operation Deliberate Force," *World Air Power Journal* 24 (Spring 1996): 24; and "Bosnian Serbs Shell Sarajevo Market; NATO Bombs Serb Targets in Retaliation." The two-man crew of the French Mirage 2000 were eventually captured by the Bosnian Serbs. NATO launched three combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions using US special operations forces. One CSAR mission came under heavy Bosnian Serb fire, and the other two were aborted due to bad weather. The two French aviators were released in December just prior to the signing of the Dayton peace treaty in Paris.

84. Atkinson.

85. "NATO Resumes Airstrikes Against Bosnian Serbs," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1995, 645.

86. Atkinson.

87. Transcript of press conference, Adm Leighton W. Smith, CINCAFSOUTH, "NATO Recommences Air Strikes Against Bosnian Serbs," n.p.; on-line, Internet, available at <http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/natoun/natostatesp6.html>.

88. Ripley, "Operation Deliberate Force."

89. Atkinson.

90. Jon R. Anderson, "Rivalries on U.S. Side in Airstrikes," *Air Force Times* 56, no. 10 (9 October 1995): 6.

91. Tim Ripley, "Airpower Vindicated," *Flight International* 148, no. 4496 (1 November 1995): 32.

92. "Warring Parties in Former Yugoslavia Agree to U.S.-Brokered Peace Plan," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1995, 662.

93. Lt Col (Col—sel) Robert C. Owen, SAAS professor and team leader of Air University Balkan Air Campaign Survey, interviewed by author, 17 April 1996.

94. "Warring Parties in Former Yugoslavia Agree to U.S.-Brokered Peace Plan"; and Atkinson.

95. "Remarks by Defense Secretary William Perry to Adjutants General Association of the United States," *Federal News Service*, 8 February 1996, A-1. In a speech on 7 February 1996, Secretary of Defense William Perry speaking about Deliberate Force stated, "Quite aside from the military effectiveness of the campaign, we know now in retrospect, having talked to the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Serbs since then, that they were stunned by the power and effectiveness of this campaign; and that more than anything else, that's what led them to conclude that continued fighting was a losing proposition; and they decided to go to the peace table at Dayton."

96. David A. Fulghum, "Bosnian Serb Aircraft Launch Offensive," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 143, no. 14 (2 October 1995): 61.

97. Ripley, "Airpower Vindicated," 33.

98. Fulghum, "Predators Bound for Bosnia Soon," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 143, no. 20, (13 November 1995): 73.

99. "Final Fact Sheet: Operation Deny Flight," n.p.; on-line, Internet, available at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/fs-fin.htm>.

100. Joris Voorhoeve, "Six Essentials for Keeping the Peace in Bosnia," *Houston Chronicle*, 15 November 1995, 27.

101. Susan R. Lamb, "The UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia," in *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, eds. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 82–84.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Air power is an inherently strategic force.

—Col Phillip S. Meilinger
10 Propositions Regarding Air Power

A SCAP approach to peace enforcement can impose a cease-fire, create a tenable environment for a short land campaign, and maintain long-term regional stability by engaging and threatening a belligerent's strategic-level value systems. SCAP, along with economic sanctions, supports the overarching diplomatic process that attempts to reach a long-term political settlement. Operation Deliberate Force demonstrated that a compelling air campaign against the correct strategic-level value system conducted at an appropriate tempo can force a belligerent to make reasonable political concessions. OPC demonstrated that an enduring air presence that threatens strategic-level value systems and polices infractions at the tactical level can—in concert with the economic and political instruments of power—maintain regional stability.

Both the Kurdish oppression in northern Iraq and the Bosnian civil war indicate that in many future internal conflicts, the belligerents are more likely to possess modern weapons and use them freely against civilians. Both conflicts witnessed the use of tanks, artillery, and aircraft against civilians who had no organized military to protect them. Modern mechanized weapons require fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and—most importantly—an integrated C² system to truly achieve synergistic effects. By eliminating these necessities, the effectiveness of any one weapon at the tactical level is severely limited. Critics of early proposals to use airpower in Bosnia proclaimed that airpower could not possibly eliminate every heavy gun and tank. Their statements may be accurate but miss the mark regarding what airpower can do in a peace enforcement situation against belligerents possessing modern weapons. Once the Iraqis and Bosnian Serbs had their strategic military capability threatened, deterrence and reassurance were relatively straightforward. SCAP is a powerful tool for peace enforcement if coercive capability and resolve is demonstrated up front, and the continuing air presence maintains its credibility unhindered by political hesitation or coalition politics.

SCAP's most significant limitation is the requirement for a belligerent who has strategic-level value systems that are held dear and vulnerable to PGMs. OPC airpower offered a credible deterrent against Iraqi aggression because Baghdad feared attacks against the strategic-level value systems that they had worked so hard to rebuild after the Gulf War. Compellence

worked against the Bosnian Serbs because they considered their rapidly diminishing military capability essential to their survival and were willing to make political concessions to avoid further punishment. The key to a SCAP strategy is determining what a belligerent considers valuable, calculating whether the value systems are vulnerable to airpower, and then orchestrating the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of power to achieve the desired political effect.

Another significant limitation to using SCAP as a tool to support the diplomatic efforts of peace enforcement is the competing agendas and political infighting associated with the UN and coalition operations. Turkey continually manipulated the CTF for their own gain to the detriment of the mission's long-term goals. Turkey's apparent lack of consent forced coalition airpower to spar with Iraqi IADS targets in 1993 instead of delivering a more impetuous reprisal. Turkey claimed that the PKK took advantage of the anarchy in northern Iraq, yet the Turks contributed to that anarchy by supplying arms to competing Iraqi Kurdish factions. Other reports claim the Black Hawk helicopter shootdown might not have occurred if the mission had flown on time instead of being delayed for a Turkish bombing mission.

In Bosnia the UN put UNPROFOR in an environment suited for peace enforcement with a confusing mandate that was subject to manipulation by the Bosnian Serbs. Until Deliberate Force, airpower in Bosnia was little more than a symbolic gesture that did little to promote stability, stop the killing, or create a secure environment for serious negotiations. A lack of consensus and political infighting continually frustrated attempts to use airpower. The Bosnian Serbs scoffed at limited air strikes against targets of insignificant value at their tactical level. The political differences over a Bosnian strategy allowed the Bosnian Serbs to fight airpower asymmetrically by taking hostages. A SCAP strategy requires political consensus among all major participants in a peace enforcement mission and a clear mandate from the international community.

Although politically attractive, SCAP entails significant military costs. An air presence mission uses up the precious service life of aircraft as well as weapons, forces units to work at an extremely high operations tempo, and limits the opportunity to practice perishable combat skills. The Black Hawk shootdown in northern Iraq and the F-16 shootdown over Bosnia as well as numerous undocumented "almosts" suggest that SCAP-like missions are a breeding ground for complacency. Senses and skills are dulled while the fatigue of endless 24-hour-a-day patrols begins to take a toll. Units are often so busy enforcing the NFZs that there is little opportunity to hone those skills needed in combat but unused in peace enforcement.

PGMs will likely be the operational linchpin for a SCAP approach to peace enforcement. PGMs are currently limited by weather and susceptible to failure after long periods of captive carry during routine patrol. A SCAP strategy depends on the timely and accurate threat or employment of PGMs. The global positioning system (GPS)-aided joint direct attack

munition (JDAM) is in the final stages of development and will overcome the problems with weather. In addition, JDAM offers aircraft without laser-targeting pods' added accuracy, especially at night. However, JDAM is accurate but not a true PGM. The politically sensitive nature of peace enforcement requires an all-weather, high-precision weapon to achieve desired results and minimize collateral damage. PGMs are expensive, and the downsizing trend indicates that stockpiles will be limited. It is financially impossible to change out PGMs after only a few patrol missions. Consequently, SCAP requires a true all-weather PGM robust enough to hold up to sustained carriage.

Hostage rescue forces are necessary for the implementation of a SCAP approach to peace enforcement. The Bosnian Serbs demonstrated that taking hostages is an effective way to asymmetrically counter airpower in a peace enforcement environment. Hopefully, the UN will never again place peacekeepers in a confused political environment such as Bosnia without the means and mandate to ensure their own protection. The IFOR replacing UNPROFOR is a heavily armed force and appears to have learned the lesson. However, the next belligerent may elect to hold third-party nationals or some other neutral as hostage against the air strikes necessary for a SCAP strategy to succeed. A downed coalition pilot could give a belligerent significant leverage given the "airmen's culture" that exists in advanced Western air forces. Consequently, special operations forces require continued priority to develop low-observable infiltration/extraction vehicles and the capability to conduct hostage rescue missions under the most dire circumstances.

The nation's leaders see an airpower approach to political-military problems as responsive, relatively economical, and politically acceptable. Consequently, the US political leadership will continue to turn to airpower to help restore order to the disorder of the post-cold-war world. Therefore, the US military must articulate an airpower approach to peace enforcement that reconciles the demands of the politicians with the capabilities and limitations of combat airpower. Events in Iraq and Bosnia indicate that airpower can impose a cease-fire on unwilling belligerents and then maintain the long-term stability necessary for political reconciliation. Airpower achieves its greatest synergy and economy of force by engaging and threatening a belligerent's strategic-level value systems. However, airpower can also police challenges to deterrence at the tactical level without widening the underlying causes to the political conflict. The greatest challenges to a SCAP strategy are political rather than technical. The infighting and differing agendas that exist within the UN and a coalition threatens a successful SCAP strategy more so than any technological barrier.