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**PUBLIC OPINION AND MEDIA COVERAGE DURING THE IRAQ WAR:
AN EXAMINATION OF MEDIA FRAMING AND PRIMING**

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Master of Arts in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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ABSTRACT

Media frames are vital to peoples' understanding of issues and events, but this study's findings highlight the importance of internal frames, or primary frameworks, in shaping public opinion. A rally 'round the flag effect did occur at the outset of the Iraq War, which caused Republicans, Democrats and Independents to support the war. Both party affiliation and news attentiveness explained a significant amount of variability in a person's opinion of the war in 2003. The party affiliation framework is much more vital in determining support for the war when media content is negative. Viewers support media frames that reflect their belief system, and this explains why in 2004 Republicans were supportive of the war yet Democrats and Independents were not.

Dedicated to Bishop Martha L. Edwards

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

March 20, 2003, the war in Iraq began. Media coverage was intense from the beginning, and America watched as explosions rocked the capital city of Baghdad. Unlike other wars, this one would allow news audiences to ride along with soldiers and marines as they made the treacherous trek from southern Iraq. Embedded journalists brought coverage of gun battles and fierce urban warfare into the living rooms of American homes. Much of the coverage during the initial months highlighted the progress of the war. Did this intense coverage lead to the extremely high public support of the war? The percentage of those who felt the war was going “very well” was 71% at the height of the bombing of Baghdad during the first two days of the war. This opinion level dropped to 35% as American POWs were taken, but increased to 61% after Jessica Lynch and the other POWs were rescued (Pew, 2003). One year later, did coverage of suicide bombings and mounting casualties lead to lower public support? In February 2004, those who felt the decision to use military force against Iraq was the correct one fell to 56%, from the 74% level in April, 2003 (Pew, 2004). This study will attempt to answer these questions by explicating the concepts of framing and priming, as well as through the use of multiple regression on 2003 and 2004

Pew Center polling data sets. Frames, as defined by Goffman (1974), are “definitions of situations built up in accordance with principles of an organization which govern events and our subjective involvement in them” (p. 10). The manner in which a news story is framed can have a lasting impression on someone’s perspective of world events as well as their political discourse. The media select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text (Entman, 1993, p. 53). Priming theory helps explain the processes by which framed media messages affect individual judgments. By unearthing the discourse origins of these two theories, conducting a content analysis, and using causal modeling of secondary data, this study will determine if the framing of the war by media outlets affected the public opinion about this campaign.

How did the framing of coverage during the Iraq War influence public opinion? Framing and priming theories offers an excellent way to answer this question. Several studies have examined the influence of media frames on public opinion regarding presidents, campaigns and foreign countries (Brewer et. al, 2003; Brannon & Krosnick, 1992; Pan & Kosicki, 1994, 1997; Park & Kosicki, 1995; Shah et. al, 2001). These articles offer a solid foundation in tackling the question of whether or not media coverage of the Iraq War influenced public opinion. Shah et. al (2001) studied the link between the way media coverage frames politicians and political issues, and the priming that affects public opinion. They discovered that value-framing information can shape individuals’ interpretations of issues and can “encourage voters to make attributions about candidate character, apply social cognitions to policy evaluations, and modify their decision-making process” (Shah et. al, 2001, p. 228). In order to assess the media’s ability to shape

public opinion and the decision-making of the electorate, one must determine how closely people were attending to the news. In other words, was there an *issue regime* in the media? Was there an identifiable time period in which coverage of the Iraq War dominated the amount of attention resources available in the public arena? The answer to both these questions is a resounding yes. According to a Pew Center (2003), “public interest in the war in Iraq and attention to news coverage have been consistently high over the past two weeks.” It is clear that people were attending to the news because 54% reported that they watched the news closely. An overwhelming majority of Americans felt the military action was the right decision (76%) during this period.

1.1 Context of the Iraq War

During the State of the Union Address on Jan. 28, 2003, President George W. Bush expressed his willingness to attack Iraq without United Nations approval. “The dictator is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving. If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him” (Bush, 2003). On February 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the U.N. in a final attempt to obtain Security Council approval for a preemptive strike against Iraq. In his presentation, Powell played audio clips of communication between Iraqi military officers discussing how to conceal evidence of banned weapons. Hans Blix, executive chairman of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), announced on February 14 that there had been some progress with his inspection teams. But, President Bush viewed Hussein’s acquiescence as a ploy. “He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country” (Bush, 2003). The president referred to Hussein’s violation of U.N. Resolution

687, passed after the first Gulf War, and Resolution 1441 which was passed on November 8, 2002. The latter resolution imposed stricter inspections for weapons of mass destruction.

The U.S. launched operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003. The first attacks were aimed at Saddam Hussein and his senior leadership, and involved Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117 stealth fighters (CNN, 2003a). Troops entered southern Iraq through Kuwait and began the trek to Baghdad. Four days later, U.S. forces were 50 miles from the city and faced stiff resistance from Iraqi troops (infoplease, 2003). On March 30, Marine and Army forces came face-to-face with the Medina and Baghdad divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard in Karbala (CNN, 2003b). Even though news during the initial weeks of the war was predominantly positive, coverage of the ambush and killing of the U.S. Army maintenance personnel on March 23 received extensive publicity. But, the news of the daring rescue of Jessica Lynch by U.S. Special Forces was overwhelmingly positive. Three days later, soldiers and tanks from the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions entered Baghdad and engaged Iraqi forces (CNN, 2003c). On April 9, Baghdad fell to U.S. Forces and images of the large black Saddam Hussein statue being pulled down by a Marine armored vehicle flooded television and newspaper coverage. Kirkuk, the strategically vital northern Iraqi city, fell to Kurdish fighters backed by U.S. Special Forces on April 11. Lynch's five fellow POWs, taken captive during the March 23 ambush, were rescued along with two U.S. Army apache helicopter pilots by Marines on April 13 (CNN, 2003d).

President Bush declared the end of all major combat operations on May 2, while on board the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. Following that declaration, continued looting

and lawlessness were well documented by the press. U.S. Diplomat Paul Bremer became the new civil administrator charged with restoring order to Iraq. On May 16, Bremer instituted a “de-Baathification” policy which banned nearly 30,000 senior Baath party members from holding positions in the future administration. Bremer stated the policy would “ensure that the representative government in Iraq [was] not threatened by Baathist elements returning to power and that those in positions of authority in the future [would be] acceptable to the people of Iraq” (Farrell & Philip, 2003). May 22, U.N. Resolution 1483 was lifted after 13 years, and paved the way for the United States and Britain to temporarily run the country until an official government could be established. On July 13, Iraq’s interim governing council was in place, and two days later U.S. forces began Operation Desert Scorpion to combat organized insurgency. The first major negative stories, after operations were declared over, involved the July 7 admission by the Bush administration that there was inaccurate intelligence regarding Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. After this announcement, those who felt that the military campaign was successful fell from 52% to 39% (see Fig. 2.1). But, 55% of Americans still approved of the policy in Iraq, and 63% still felt it was worth going to Iraq (polling report, 2004). On July 22, U.S. troops surrounded a palace in Mosul and killed Hussein’s two sons Uday and Qusay.

From August until November 2003, deadly attacks continued to occur in Iraq. August 19, a suicide bombing claimed the life of the UN’s top envoy, Sergio Viera de Mello, and wounded 100 others (CNN, 2003e). President Bush announced that \$87 billion would be needed to pay for rising military and rebuilding costs. October 27 was a deadly day in which four suicide attacks killed 43, and wounded more than 200 others at the

headquarters building of the Red Crescent and three police stations. The U.S. Army faced more losses on November 2 when insurgents downed a helicopter which resulted in the deaths of 16 soldiers and 21 being injured (infoplease, 2004). The most positive news event for U.S forces since the fall of Baghdad occurred on December 14, when Saddam Hussein was captured outside his hometown of Tikrit in an underground hole (CNN, 2003f). This news led to a spike in the approval rating for the policy in Iraq. The month prior, 50% of respondents approved of the policy but that number jumped to 59% in mid-December. Those who felt the military campaign in Iraq was successful jumped from 25% in November to 43% in December.

In January a disagreement occurred between Grand Ayatolla Ali al-Sistani, a Shiite cleric, and the U.S. Sistani wanted the new government to be elected by direct vote. On January 19, nearly 100,000 Shiites took to the streets of Baghdad for a peaceful demonstration demanding that direct elections take place. U.N. Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi reported to the U.N. Security Council that the earliest possible election date would not be until late 2004 or early 2005. He also deduced that the Iraqi-selected provisional government should govern the country from the June 30 handover until the direct elections. David Kay, former leader of the U.S. weapons inspection team in Iraq, announced on January 28 that pre-war intelligence about Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program was inaccurate (CNN, 2004a). Following this revelation, public opinion data revealed a decrease from 62% to 55% in respondents' belief that the right decision was made to take military action in Iraq. A majority of Americans still supported the war, although a smaller percentage than when the war began.

On February 2, in response to the report, President Bush requested an independent commission be formed to investigate the intelligence failures. Eight days later, a car bomb ripped through a police station, killing 54 applicants. On February 11, a similar attack occurred but this time the victims were army enlistees waiting outside a recruiting station. The bloodiest day, since the beginning of the war, took place March 2 when suicide attacks killed 85 Iraqis and wounded 233 others during the Ashura Shiite festival in Karbala. Coordinated attacks in Baghdad left 32 people dead and 78 wounded the same day (CNN, 2004b). Less than a week later, Iraq's interim constitution was signed, which consisted of a bill of rights as well as a military that would be subject to the authority of a civilian governing body. The document also granted Iraqis the right to free expression, protection from police searches, and freedom of religion (Kaplow, 2004). Public opinion wasn't overwhelmingly higher after the new constitution was signed. About 46% of Americans approved of the handling of the situation in Iraq at the end of February, but this number increased to 49% the week after the document was signed (polling report, 2004).

1.2 Rally 'Round the Flag Effect

The rally 'round the flag effect is particularly germane when discussing public opinion surrounding a major international event like the Iraq War. The effect is essentially "the tendency for public support of the president to increase during times of crisis" (Chapman & Reiter, 2004, p. 886). As discussed earlier, public opinion was overwhelmingly supportive of both the war in Iraq and President Bush during the initial months of the war as is evident in Figure 2.1. Mueller (1973) was the foremost researcher and cited patriotism as a determining factor of whether or not a rally will occur. Brody (1994)

states that “the patriotic response manifests itself in an increase in approval for the most visible American political institution, the presidency” (p. 212). Brody offered specific criteria with which to evaluate an increase in public support for the president during a crisis. He posited that if there is an absence of criticism of presidential decisions regarding international crises on the part of elected officials, a rally will occur. But, if an “opinion leader publicly interpret[s] a crisis as a result of policy failure, a rally will not take place” (p. 212). An example the author uses is the Reykjavik Summit, which was portrayed in the media as a presidential policy failure. Yet, there was a rally in presidential approval because there was little criticism from elites. “In the absence of criticism from opinion leaders, the public at large increased in its approval of the way President Reagan was doing his job” (Brody & Shapiro, 1989, pg. 360).

It is evident that a rally did occur at the commencement of the Iraq War. Chapman and Reiter (2004) researched the increased rally that occurs after a president secures U.N. Security Council approval prior to making a decision to go to war. The authors state the following:

The 2003 Iraq war is a possible anomaly to this trend because the U.N. Security Council refused to pass a second resolution explicitly authorizing action in early 2003, yet public approval for the war was high (76%) and there was a rally favoring President George W. Bush (13 points)” (Reiter & Chapman, 2004, pg. 893).

An examination of the congressional vote to authorize the use of force against Hussein, if he would not disarm, offers excellent support for why the rally effect occurred. The House and Senate voted overwhelmingly to authorize President Bush to use force if Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as stipulated by the U.N., with a

296 to 133 and 77 to 23 vote respectively (CNN, 2002). It is quite possible that after this resolution was passed, which was approved by a greater margin than the first Gulf War, opposing elected officials were less likely to speak against it. Democratic Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, who stated publicly that he would support the impending vote on Iraq, said "it is important for the country to speak with one voice at this critical moment" (CNN, 2002). This directly supports Chapman and Reiter (2004), who state "lack of critical statements by the opposition or, more important, open support from the opposition constitutes a credible signal to the public that the proposed use of force is consistent with public preferences." Public opinion was strongly supportive of the president's Iraq policies at this time. According to CNN (2003), 66% of Americans approved of the president's ultimatum to Hussein in which he gave the dictator until March 19 to leave the country or be invaded. Thus, the rally effect will be vital to an interpretation of the 2003 Pew Center data because there should be support for the war across party lines. In the next section, framing and priming will be discussed as vital components in the formation of public opinion.




Figure 2.1: Opinion of the Iraq war and presidential approval. All in all, do you think it was worth going to war in Iraq or not? (Gallup, 2003) Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president? (Pew, 2005)

CHAPTER 2

FRAMING AND PRIMING

2.1 Framing

In a discussion of framing it is essential to discuss authors who have defined framing in an attempt to deconstruct this concept. Goffman (1974) begins his discussion of frames with the definition of a strip. The term strip refers to “a slice or cut from a stream of ongoing activity. It refers to any batch of occurrences one wants to draw attention to as a starting point for analysis.” Frames are definitions of situations “built up in accordance with principles of an organization which govern events and our subjective involvement in them” (p. 10). Therefore, frames make sense of the world and the activities which occur within it. They establish our notion of reality. At the heart of Goffman’s book seems to be an analysis of social reality. Goffman wanted to look at everyday activities and see what is really going on behind those experiences and interactions. He used ethnography and case analysis in order to determine how reality is formed in various ways throughout society. His goal was to isolate society’s frameworks of understanding. He seems to have a situational perspective, and was interested in examining what someone can be alive to at a specific period of time. This world view, or framework, is at the center of this fascinating look at frames.

The definition Goffman uses to explicate frames is borrowed from Bateson (1972, p. 21). The aforementioned definitions of a situation make up a schema of interpretation and are further defined as a "primary framework." Primary frameworks "render a meaningless aspect of the scene into a meaningful one." We all have a perspective which helps us make sense of what we see and hear. We use frameworks to describe the event in the context of that framework. The two types of primary frameworks are natural and social. Natural frameworks identify what we see as purely physical, whereas social frameworks provide a "background of understanding that incorporates the will, aim, and effort of intelligence" (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). Social frameworks involve a set of rules that govern various activities. Our activities are guided by various occurrences in our world. When it rains, we carry our umbrellas so we don't get wet. The fact that it is raining guides our actions.

Another concept that is central to an explication of frames involves "the key." A key is a "set of conventions by which a given activity (one already meaningful in terms of a primary framework) is transformed into something patterned on this activity by the participants to be something else" (Goffman, 1974, p. 43). An example Goffman uses to describe this concept is play fighting. When two animals are playing, the primary framework of fighting is transformed into playing. To an uninformed viewer, the animals might be viewed as fighting over territory but that would not be correct because the participants have transformed this primary framework, and a fight is not literally occurring. This playfulness is a form of "make believe or fantasy." In society, such transformations have moral limits.

Another example of the keying of primary frameworks involves “technical redoings” or practicing. If the Army wants its soldiers to be proficient in fighting ground wars, they will not use live ammunition. Though this involves keying, the soldiers take it seriously. The idea of a “dry run” shows that even though the action is in a simulated environment, the participants are approaching the real primary framework conditions. These dry runs can involve higher concentration and more difficult situations than they will face in combat. The author also uses the military prisoner of war (POW) training schools as an example. During WWII, the Army would train its POW interrogators by placing them against an actor who had actual interrogation experience. The trainees would be more prepared for the “real world.”

Goffman talks extensively about fabrications in his analysis of frames. Every fabrication has two elements: a moral one relating to how reputable the deceiver is, and a strategic one relating to the altering of the victim’s perception and his response. Fabrications involve keying, but the “dupe” or victim of the fabrication may think in terms of a primary framework. Goffman defines the outward appearance of a framework as the rim, which is constructed in the case of a fabrication. It is therefore necessary to deconstruct the term deception. Deception is a “falsehood intendedly produced by persons not taken in by their own fabrication” (Goffman, 1974, p. 112). Thus the deceiver alone is aware that the primary framework rim is a mere construction. One type is the benign playful deceit, which can vary in their level of organization and complexity. They are a form of “harmless unserious, typically brief entertainment.” These include practical

jokes, which are “elaborate fabrications of the victim’s nonverbal environment in order to lead him into a misconception of what is happening.”

Next I would like to look at a person’s ability to focus on certain activities, while ignoring others. This subject is at the heart of Goffman’s frame analysis, because it goes back to what an individual can be alive to at a certain moment. He defines this as a selective perception, which causes an individual to ignore or “disattend” competing events. The example Goffman (1974) uses is when soldiers, in the heat of battle, can suffer wounds without feeling any pain. In this example, pain is “systematically disattended and treated as out of frame, something not to be given any concern or attention” (p. 208). He describes tracks, or channels that organize our everyday experiences. The aforementioned example would be the disattend track, “encompassing locally occurring events to be treated as not relevantly occurring.” Those involved in the activity that is being attended to can be classified as being in a certain status. When both participants are able to listen and talk, they are said to have “full participation status.” Something or someone is said to have toy status when “they are treated as if they are in the frame, an object to address acts to or remarks about, but out of frame (disattendable) in regard to its capacity to hear and talk” (Goffman, 1974, p. 224). A child may assume this toy role, and is supported by the adage “it’s better to be seen and not heard.” Bystanders or observers of activities have “onlooker status.” This could be an audience at a sporting event, or a witness to a car accident. Whatever the participants are doing then becomes a sort of performance. A performance is an “arrangement which transforms an individual into a stage performer.”

This leads to a discussion of theatrical frames, and the role of the audience. It is important that the audience knows what is happening. Goffman (1974) defines this as a directional stream called "connectives." He states that "in all activity, especially spoken activity, it is crucial to be able to locate who is doing what at the moment it is being done" (p. 211). This obviously applies to everyday interactions as well. Those who are viewing a theatrical production can be classified as having varying degrees of purity. Purity is defined as "the exclusiveness of the claim of the watchers on the activity they watch" (Goffman, 1974, p. 125). The activity that is the most pure, or dependent on the audience, is a dramatic scripting. Put simply, if there is no audience, then there is no performance. These include plays, orchestra concerts and ballets. The next level, which decreases in its dependence on an audience, is contests or matches that are presented for viewing. Sporting events or contests fall into this category. Next, personal ceremonies such as weddings and funerals are much less dependent on onlookers. The least pure activity is work performances, such as construction sites or even play rehearsals. These categorizations refer to the outward appearance the activity, and do not address the latent character or intent behind the activities. The example Goffman uses to illustrate this is a political trial. The trial may be presented as a contest between the government and the defendant, but may in fact be a scripted dramatic fabrication.

Theatrical frames are organized on "two different levels or orders, two different systems of reference, two different elements." These two levels involve the actors who are in the production, and the characters in a simulated interaction. This supports the earlier description of our ability to disattend certain actions or individuals. In movies, the

camera makes this decision for us because it changes from one actor or activity to another. This is a manipulation of framing, because in a theatrical performance the audience is free to concentrate on any activity on stage. The multiple-channel effect is evident when “an individual is an immediate witness to an actual scene. Events tend to present themselves through multiple channels, the focus of the participant shifting from moment to moment from one channel to another” (Goffman, 1974, p.145). The onlooker’s focus shifts from moment to moment and from channel to channel. Thus, some events or participants in scenes will have more salience than others. Entman (1993) says that framing “essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 52). Whatever the viewer is attending to becomes the most salient and significant event or issue to that person. Salience is defined as “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences. An increase in salience enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory” (Entman, 1993, p. 53).

Goffman’s definition of framing is very similar to Entman (1993), who states that frames have four functions. These include “defining problems...determine what causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values” (p. 52). Second, frames also diagnose causes and pinpoint the “forces” that are causing the problem. Third, frames make moral judgments thus estimating causes and effects. Lastly, frames suggest remedies and “offer and justify treatments for problems and predict their likely effects. Further, frames are located in four places in the

communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture.” Everyone has a frame which may or may not be shared by the person we communicate with. Entman (1993) states that “the frames that guide the receiver’s thinking and conclusion may or may not reflect the frames in the text and the framing intention of the communicator” (p. 52). This seems intuitive because we come from different backgrounds, have different experiences and come from different cultures. He defines culture as “the stock of commonly invoked frames; in fact, culture might be defined as the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping” (Entman, 1993, p. 53). This is at the heart of cultural communication, and explains why citizens of different countries can have drastic differences in the way they communicate based on frames of reference and perspective. Even advertisements could have very different meanings in various countries, especially when symbols are used that have no significance in another culture. The issue of salience becomes a factor in this example because the advertisement will only be effective if it agrees with the audiences’ schemata in their belief system. Entman (1993) further states that “communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgments in deciding what to say, guided by frames (often called schemata) that organize their belief system” (p. 53). As stated by Goffman, these schemata make up our primary framework, which serve as our means of interpretation. It seems that the explication of frames is exactly the same for the two authors.

Scheufele (1999) applies many of the same aforementioned concepts in the context of the media. He states that the “mass media actively set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 105). These

frames of reference sound exactly like Goffman's primary frameworks. Therefore when viewers watch or read news, they are provided a framework for comprehending news by the media. Scheufele (1999) states "individual frames are mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals' processing of information" (p. 107). It appears that the manner in which a news story is framed can have a lasting impression on someone's perspective of world events as well as their political discourse. Scheufele states quite clearly that "short-term, issue-related frames of reference can have a significant impact on perceiving, organizing, and interpreting incoming information and on drawing inferences from that information." He defines a media frame as a central idea or story line that gives meaning to an unfolding strip of events. The frame suggests what the conflict is about and provides the meaning of an issue. The term strip seems to be synonymous with Goffman's. Media and news frames are essential, and turn "meaningless and nonrecognizable happenings into a discernible event. The news frame organizes everyday reality and the news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality" (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106). This could be a quote taken directly from Goffman, and matches up almost verbatim to the definition of a primary framework. The news provides us with a primary framework with which we view and understand the world around us.

2.2 Historical Roots

Goffman was introduced to the term "frame" after reading *A Theory of Play and Fantasy* (Bateson, 1972). The aforementioned essay is one of several in Bateson's book entitled *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (1972). Goffman's description of keying, and primary frameworks strongly relied on the concepts used in Bateson's piece. Goffman (1974) defined keying as a "set of conventions by which a given activity (one already

meaningful in terms of a primary framework) is transformed into something patterned on this activity by the participants to be something else” (p. 45). Bateson did not use these terms, but instead discussed explicit and implicit messages which he called “metalinguistic” or “metacommunicative.” He set out to observe animals at San Francisco’s Fleishhacker Zoo in order to determine “whether any given organism is or is not able to recognize that signals emitted by itself and other members of the species are signals” (Bateson, 1972, p. 179). He wanted to see if animals communicate in ways such that standard meanings are understood as signals, or keyings as Goffman described. He goes on to say “in theory, I thought out what such criteria might look like—that the occurrence of metacommunicative signs (or signals) in the stream of interaction between the animals would indicate that the animals have at least some awareness (conscious or unconscious) that the signs about which they metacommunicate are signals” (Bateson, 1972, p. 179). He found that animals in fact exchange signals that carry the message “this is play.” He concluded this after observing two monkeys “*playing* i.e, engaging in an interactive sequence of which the unit actions or signals were similar but not the same as those of combat” (Bateson, 1972, p. 179). Bateson describes two factors involved in play. The first is the “messages or signals exchanged in play are in a certain sense untrue or not meant.” And the second is “that which is denoted by these signals is nonexistent.” When two children are playing and one playfully strikes the other, the punch doesn’t denote what would normally be denoted by a punch. The playful strike is fictional, and this is what Bateson describes as a “paradox.”

This idea was central to Goffman’s description of frames, and he used the aforementioned ideas to further describe keying as fabrication and deception, which he

defined as a "falsehood intendedly produced by persons not taken in by their own fabrication." Goffman's description of keying came from Bateson's description of signals, which can be "trusted, distrusted, falsified, denied, amplified, corrected, and so forth" (Bateson, 1972, p. 178). He further states that deceit, including bluffing and playful threats "form together a single total complex of phenomena." Another example Bateson uses to describe this phenomenon is the rituals of the inhabitants of the Andaman Islands, located near Indonesia. "Peace is concluded after each side has been given ceremonial freedom to strike the other. This example, however, also illustrates the labile nature of the frame 'This is play,' or 'This is ritual.'" A frame "delimits a class or set of messages (or meaningful actions)." This definition helps clarify the play example, because a playful frame delimits all messages and meaningful actions within that frame. In fabrication the keying of the primary framework is understood by all participants as is the case in the Andaman Island inhabitants. "In many instances, the frame is consciously recognized and even represented in vocabulary ('play,' 'movie,' 'interview,' 'job,' 'interview,' etc). In other cases, there may be no explicit verbal reference to the frame, and the subject may have no consciousness of it." This is evident in the example Bateson used with animals, because though they don't have the ability to speak, their metacommunicative signals are understood by the members of that particular species.

A frame, Bateson further explicates, is a psychological concept that is analogous to a picture frame. "The actual physical frame is, we believe, added by human beings to physical pictures because these human beings operate more easily in a universe in which some of their psychological characteristics are externalized" (Bateson, 1972, p. 187). Attending to certain frames while ignoring others is key to Goffman's frame analysis,

because it addresses what an individual can be aware of at a given time. This is selective perception, which causes a person to ignore or “disattend” competing events. Whatever an individual is not aware of at a certain time is “systematically disattended and treated as out of frame, something not to be given any concern or attention” (Goffman, 1974, p. 202). He further states that things we are not attending to “encompass locally occurring events to be treated as not relevantly occurring.” Bateson uses these exact terms when describing frames, and says “psychological frames are exclusive, i.e., by including certain messages (or meaningful actions) within a frame, certain other messages are excluded. The frame around a picture, if we consider this frame as a message intended to order or organize the perception of the viewer, says, “Attend to what is within and do not attend to what is outside.” (Bateson, 1972, p. 187). The picture frame tells the viewer to interpret the wallpaper outside the frame in a different way than the painting within the frame. “The frame is involved in the evaluation of the messages which it contains, or the frame merely assists the mind in understanding the contained messages by reminding the thinker that these messages are mutually relevant and the messages outside the frame may be ignored” (Bateson, 1972, p. 188).

Bateson’s frame terminology is steeped in the Gestalt psychological traditions. Gestalt is German for “configuration” (Gestalt, 2002). Fancher (1996, p. 174) defines the term as “form” or “shape.” In describing frames, Bateson discussed attending to certain messages while ignoring those messages that are outside the frame. This is another way of describing perception, which the originators of Gestalt psychology wrote extensively about. “Mental processes resemble logic in needing an outer frame to delimit the ground against which the figures are to be perceived. The picture frame then, because it delimits

a background, is here regarded as an external representation of a very special and important type of psychological frame—namely a frame whose function is to delimit a logical type” (Bateson, 1972, p. 188). Gestalt psychology dealt primarily with the processes of perception, which Bateson and Goffman used to describe frames. According to the Encarta Encyclopedia’s description of Gestalt psychology, “images are perceived as a pattern or a whole rather than merely as a sum of distinct parts. The context of an image plays a key role.” Their description of context sounds similar to Goffman’s primary frameworks which “render a meaningless aspect of the scene into a meaningful one” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21).

The term Gestalt was first used by Christian von Ehrenfels in 1890. Ehrenfels wrote about form qualities that “could not be broken down into separate sensory elements, but instead resided in the overall configuration of objects or ideas” (Fancher, 1996, p. 174). When someone sings a song in a different key than originally composed, it doesn’t change the melody because “the essence of [the song’s] melody lies not in specific notes, but in the relationships among its notes.” Ehrenfel’s student Max Wertheimer took the basic principles of Gestalt psychology and developed the principles for which it is now known. According to Fancher (1996), “Wertheimer’s inspiration was to study the optical illusion of apparent movement” (p. 175). He demonstrated that an observer, once shown examples of real movement and similar apparent movement, could not tell the difference. He further proved that “some of the processes responsible for the perception of movement take place at a neurological level higher than the retina. Movement is an attribute that may be imposed upon stationary images by the higher brain processes.” It seems that optical illusions and perception worked hand in hand. This experimentation

led Wertheimer and his colleagues, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Kohler, to examine Ehrenfels' ideas about wholes and parts.

Human perception, they reasoned, "imposes its own order and dynamic organization upon the individual elements of sensation. The mind seems to organize the elements of experiences into wholes, whose significance completely transcends that of their summed individual parts" (Fancher, 1996, p. 176). Thus, a melody is more than the sum of the individual notes and is a "dynamic entity of [its] own whose parts [are] defined by their relationships to the whole." They further deduced that perception always happens in a field separated into the figure and ground. The figure is the "whole percept immediately attended to in consciousness, and the ground the necessary backdrop against which the figure must define itself." The example Fancher (1996) uses is when we read a book. Without the lighter ground, we couldn't perceive the black words which are the figure. In other words, "figure and ground may never both be in consciousness simultaneously. Thus the whole figures—or 'Gestalts'—in your perceptual field constantly changes, but each always appears as only a part of the entire field, standing out against the background" (Fancher, 1996, p. 177). Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler stated that "perceived Gestalts tend[ed] to simplify and organize the perceptual fields in which they occur," much like Goffman's primary frameworks.

2.3 Recent Treatments

Rousseau, et al, 2000 addressed the interactive effect between foreign policy beliefs and framing by the media. The authors did not believe that frames in the media arbitrarily affect people who watch the news, nor did they believe that "individuals possess[ing] strong foreign policy beliefs [would] render them impervious to the framing of issues in

public debate” (Rousseau, et al, 2000, p. 4). The authors argue that the interactive process is generalizable across time and space because of the inherent cognitive processes involved. In other words, people don’t construct opinion “‘on-the fly’—i.e., when the individual is confronted by a new question” (Rousseau, et al, 2000). People retrieve information and decide which frames, or primary frameworks, are most relevant, and make a judgment. The authors make a statement that resembles Entman (1993) when they state, “by making certain topics and decision criteria salient or readily available, the television news coverage ha[s] the power to alter public opinion and, ultimately, the democratic process” (Rousseau, et al., 2000, p. 5). Entman (1993) states that framing “essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 52). Whichever frame the viewer is attending to becomes the most salient and significant event or issue to that person. Entman defines salience as “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences. An increase in salience enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory” (Entman, 1993, p. 53).

Essentially, Rousseau, et al. contend that when there is an interaction it is between individual frames, or internal beliefs, and external frames. Thus, the authors don’t portray viewers as helpless victims of media frames.

Some writers on media content ignore the decoding process, assuming an undifferentiated audience in which the dominant meaning will be passively accepted by everybody. The very vulnerability of the framing process makes it a locus of potential struggle, not a leaden reality to which we all inevitably must yield. [Viewers]

control their own media dependence, in part, through their willingness and ability to draw on popular wisdom and experiential knowledge (Gamson, et. al., 1992, p. 179). Goffman, Gamson and Rousseau, et al. were concerned with the same issue: how people construct meaning. Media frames define the problem and identify pertinent information with which to make a decision or judgment. To understand social interactions and media content, individuals draw from traditions, cultural norms, routines, past experiences and knowledge of events. "Making sense of the world around us has much to do with what we already know and can differ significantly from the media's portrayal of an event" (Rousseau, et al., 2000, p. 7).

What Rousseau, et al. found an interaction effect taking place between internal beliefs and external frames. This supports Gamson's (1992) findings because there is a decoding process that is involved. People are more likely to support policy that is framed by the media in a manner that supports preexisting beliefs. "Realists are not simply more likely to support military interventions; they support interventions that are framed in a manner that reflects their belief system" (Rousseau, et al., 2000, p. 10).

Rousseau and colleagues discussed how viewers' internal beliefs determine whether or not a frame is accepted, but Druckman (2001) states the credibility of a frame's source is an integral component for whether or not a frame is accepted. He states the following about the decision-making process of audiences:

Framing effects may occur because citizens delegate to ostensibly credible elites to help them sort through many possible frames. In this portrayal, people turn to elites for guidance and they are thus selective about which frames they believe—they only believe frames that come from sources they perceive to be credible. In short, the

existence of framing effects may not indicate that elites are engaging in 'freewheeling exercise in manipulation,' but rather, they may reflect citizens seeking guidance from credible elites (Druckman, 2001, p. 1042).

From this quote, it is clear that Rousseau, et al. and Druckman believed that there are other moderating variables in a particular frame's influence on a viewer's support for a frame. Credibility, the author explains, consists of two components. "(1) The speaker possesses knowledge about which considerations are actually relevant to the decision at hand and (2) the speaker's target audience must believe that the speaker can be trusted to reveal what he or she knows" (Druckman, 2001, 1045). The author identifies a gap in current framing research, which to this point hasn't addressed the hypothesis that a source's credibility determines whether or not framing is successful.

The participants did not support a proposal from a noncredible source. Thus a frame's affect on public support is moderated by the source's credibility. Druckman concludes that "framing effects occur, not because elites seek to manipulate citizens, but rather because citizens delegate to credible elites for guidance. In so doing, they choose which frames to follow in a systematic and sensible way" (Druckman, 2001, p. 1061). Barker (2002) examines the influence of talk radio on American political behavior. Instead of source credibility impacting whether or not an audience member accepts a particular message, the message itself is critical to persuasion. The authors state "the reputation or credibility of the source may not be as relevant to the persuasion situation when heresthetic is being employed as it would be under rhetorical situations" (p. 31). The author defines heresthetic as "the strategic redefinition of an issue by manipulation of the salience of considerations through framing and priming" (p. 31). The reason source

credibility is not as relevant is because the message sender is not trying to change what the receivers believe factually. If a disreputable or noncredible source causes the audience to think about a value that is clear to them then they will accept the message. Thus, "the audience member does not have to decide whether or not to believe the info being given by the source—thus rendering source credibility irrelevant" (Barker, 2002, p. 31).

Barker (2002) uses experimentation to determine under what circumstances people accept a political message. The author used 11-minute excerpts from Rush Limbaugh's nationally syndicated radio program to provide the stimuli for the college-student participants. Two manipulations were used in which Limbaugh argues that federal government spending for liberal programs designed to help social ills are wrong. One message appealed to emotion, reason, and provided the listeners with new information that could be used to make an evaluation. The other message was a value-heresthetic-stimulus that appealed to the core values of individual liberty, economic freedom, and self-reliance. The authors found that, independent of perceived source credibility, the participants were more likely to support a message that appealed to the aforementioned core values. Messages that appeal to values will guide policy preferences.

Entman's (1991) study examines how the media can frame events in such a way that it leads people to view the events in a certain way. "News frames help establish the literally 'common sense' (i.e. widespread) interpretation of events" (Entman, 1991, p. 6). Entman addresses the internal question, similar to Rousseau, et. al, Druckman and Gamson, et al. "News frames exist at two levels: as mentally stored principles for information processing and as characteristics of the news text. Examples of frames as internalized

guides are the cold war frame imposed on international affairs and the horse race frame imposed on election campaigns; in this sense frames are information-processing schemata” (Entman, 1991, p. 7). This ties back to Bateson’s (1972) definition of a frame. Goffman states that these definitions of a situation make up a schema of interpretation and are further defined as a “primary framework.” Therefore, Entman is arguing that the media creates these situational definitions, thus providing viewers with a primary framework for a situation or event. He states the following:

Frames can be detected by probing for particular words and visual images that consistently appear in a narrative and convey thematically consonant meanings across media and time. By providing, repeating, and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference some ideas but not others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so—and others entirely invisible” (Entman, 1991, p. 7).

Entman is arguing that by focusing on certain aspects of an event, the media causes viewers to attend to those aspects while disattending what the media does not focus on. He further states the following:

Through repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others. The frame thus makes opposing information more difficult for the typical, inexpert audience member to discern and employ in developing an independent interpretation” (Entman, 1991, p. 7).

In stating that typical audiences are “inexpert,” Entman fails to consider one a point brought out by Goffman and Rousseau, et al. Namely, the audience does not blindly

follow the frames, but instead attends to what is commensurate with their internal beliefs and disattends, or ignores, whatever is not consistent with those beliefs. If a person is supportive of the war in Iraq and has strong beliefs in support of the goals and aims of the president, then their individual interpretation of media frames will be in accordance with their worldview.

Entman content analyzed *Time*, *Newsweek*, CBS, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* following the downing of a Korean Airlines (KAL) flight by the Russian military as well as the downing of an Iran Air flight by the U.S. Navy in 1983 and 1988 respectively. Entman looked at the graphics and key words in order to determine if the U.S. media framed the events differently. "The essence of framing is sizing—magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient" (Entman, 1991, p.9). The coverage of the incident involving the Russian military was far more pronounced on the covers of the two magazines, including graphics of a plane in crosshairs. Entman argues that the magazines' choice of artwork provided salience, and helped to produce a moral frame. This was done not only through graphics, but through consistent word choices. The author's argument is that the facts surrounding both incidents were similar. "Nothing inherent in the reality of the events compelled the starkly differently framing that the data demonstrate. In each incident, deadly military force was applied against nearly 300 innocent human beings" (Entman, 1991, p. 10). At the outset, Entman points out that the Russian incident received twice as much coverage in print and broadcast media than the American incident. Not only was there more coverage of the former incident, but the "KAL frame was that the Soviet government knowingly acted to annihilate a civilian airliner. The event was defined as yet another

instance of Soviet evil, a callous act of violence confirming established moral assessments of the U.S.S.R” (Entman, 1991, p.11).

The media coverage did not highlight the fact that the military was responsible, but indicted the Soviet government. The U.S. media associated the event with the most familiar symbol of communism, particularly the hammer and sickle. Thus, the incident was blamed on the Soviet form of government. On the other hand, coverage of the U.S. incident did not attribute the tragedy to any specific agency. The language used did not highlight “who did wrong but what went wrong. Central to the narrative from the very first words about the incident on the ‘CBS Evening News’ was the understandable absence of guilty knowledge” (Entman, 1991, p. 13). Coverage of the Soviet incident highlighted the suffering of the passengers through an empathy frame. “The KAL victims were humanized in the verbal and visual messages, encouraging identification with them. The Iran Air victims were much less visible, the information less centered on the humanity they shared with audience members, and thus less likely to evoke empathy. The visual embodiments of the victims as identifiable human beings were absent in the Iran Air coverage.” (Entman, 1991, p. 15). Some of the terms used in the KAL incident were “loved ones,” “victims,” and “travelers.” The content analysis revealed the news sources used the word “tragedy” much more frequently in the coverage of the Iran Air downing, whereas “attack” was used three times as many times in coverage of the KAL downing. Coverage of the Soviet incident also used “deliberate” almost five times more frequently than the U.S. incident, whereas “mistake” was used to describe the Iran Air downing. Entman states that the use of key words to describe the Soviet incident evoked a moral evaluation. Therefore, the author argues that coverage of both incidents did not allow

opposing views of the accepted frames. Framing does not eliminate questions about the dominant story line, but it undermines the story line's influence by decreasing salience. Therefore, the public's responses to the story line are vulnerable to a variety of media frames. Correctly, Entman identifies that more research on audience autonomy must be done. "Members of the mass audience are theoretically free to draw their own varied meaning from media messages" (Entman, 1991, p. 24).

Robinson's (2000) study, very similar to Entman, addresses the affect of certain frames. But, Robinson examines the effect on politicians and their decision to deploy military forces in response to humanitarian crises. Robinson created a policy-media interaction model to examine the effectiveness of certain frames on policy makers. "Media coverage can drive policy when there exists policy uncertainty as well as critical and empathizing media coverage. Alternatively, when there exists policy certainty, not even critical and empathy framed coverage can force a policy change" (Robinson, 2000, p. 1). Policy uncertainty, he defines, is when "the executive has *no* policy with regard to an issue or when policy makers are *divided* over the appropriate course of action to take." Empathy and critical framed coverage is defined as "front page news stories and headline TV news persisting for several days that both empathizes with suffering people (empathy framing) and criticizes (either explicitly or implicitly) government inaction" (Robinson, 2000, p. 2). Further, policy makers can take action for fear that their inaction will lead to negative coverage." Robinson uses anecdotal evidence and content analysis to study the events surrounding the decision to deploy troops in Somalia and Bosnia. Despite popular belief, the author argues, media frames did not cause policy makers to send troops into Somalia. Though there was coverage, it was "too little for it to have compelled policy

makers to intervene. Journalists framed reports in a way that was supportive of Bush's decision [to send troops into Somalia]" (Robinson, 2000, p. 4).

Media coverage did not compel the first Bush administration to take action, but helped build support for the decision. Robinson concludes that when an administration is *certain* on taking a particular action, the media can help "mobilize support for an executive intent on intervening during a humanitarian crisis." But, media frames will not affect their decision. The second example was Clinton's decision to order air strikes in defense of the Gorazde "safe area" in Bosnia. Robinson's content analysis revealed that "media coverage empathized with the refugees from Srebrenica. It was also critical of Western policy for having failed to protect the 'safe area'" (Robinson, 2000, p. 5). The combination of these two factors, along with policy uncertainty led to the media playing a pivotal role in President Clinton's decision to use the Air Force to defend the area. Robinson is very similar to Rousseau, et al. and Druckman in that his research looks for alternatives to the notion that viewers blindly accept media frames.

Ross (2002) examines how the Palestinian/Israeli conflict is framed in editorial discourse within the *New York Times*. Much like Entman (1993) and Rousseau, et al. (2000), Ross believed that "news frames establish the salience of issues, influence how people think and understand the world around them, and contribute to the formation of stereotypes, judgments, and decisions. Media framing generally legitimates some worldviews and de-legitimates others" (Ross, 2002, p. 5). By using a content analysis, Ross examined every editorial between March 2001 and March 2002, and coded 34 editorials. The author found that the frame that mostly dominated all editorial discourse was the "strategic interest frame." In this type of frame, "the story is not the conflict itself

but rather the importance of the region in a 'global chess game'" (Ross, 2002, p. 6). Thus, the *New York Times* editorial readers have their "attention pointed to 'the diplomatic balance' needed in the region, the posture of the Bush White House, 'America's Mideast responsibilities,' and the missed opportunity of the Camp David accords." The other frame that was prevalent in the editorials was the "victimization of Israel frame." In this frame "the entire Palestinian population often is defined as suicide bombers. The editorials present Palestinians as a conflagration of hate, a plague of death, a suicide cult, a puppet spouting anti-American and anti-Israeli vitriol" (Ross, 2002, p. 14). Ross's assessment is very similar to that of Rousseau, et. al who found that media frames help define the issue for the audience. Ross neither examines how the audience decodes the information, nor what affect internal beliefs play on the acceptance of frames.

Liebes (2000) examined the media framing of a speech by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1998. At the conclusion of a soccer match between Israeli and Palestinian teams, Netanyahu gave a congratulatory message to the Israeli team. Before the address, the crowd from a soccer match began shouting "death to the Arabs." The controversy surrounded the Public Broadcasting station's coverage of the event. Netanyahu's appointed station director punished two editors for editing out 40 seconds of the coverage. Therefore, Netanyahu appeared to have smiled and acknowledged the chants prior to giving his speech. "The allegation that the item was edited to give viewers the impression that the PM heard the shouting reframes the item from either a commemorative story about the celebration or a 'hard news' story about racist shouting in the presence of the PM to one about the PM's possible acquiescence" (Liebes, 2000, p. 302). The director fired the editors, "accusing them of the high crime of ideological

framing.” He later rehired them after they admitted “they had edited the item irresponsibly but without intentional manipulation.” The second part of this article examined the “studio framing” of Netanyahu’s rebuke of those who did chant. The prime minister stated that he “did not hear the shouting and ardently condemn[ed] it” (Liebes, 2000, p. 303). The anchor stated the reaction as fact, and did not report that Netanyahu was involved in a similar incident two years earlier. His supporters hung a large defamatory poster of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin above the podium from which he delivered his address. He claimed that he was not aware of the poster. Therefore, due to the lack of context the public was presented with a competing frame, according to Liebes. The author concludes that editorial choices, which audiences were not privy to, shape audiences’ worldview. This article is similar to Entman’s assessment of the impact of frames on the salience of issues. Liebes argues that editors and reporters’ decisions should be open to the public, thus allowing them to make more informed decisions about issues.

2.4 Priming

Priming offers a way to examine the power individuals have when receiving messages from the media. It is clear that the media has the ability to frame messages and are able to make certain events more salient in the minds of individuals. But, what psychological processes are involved when someone is exposed to media coverage, and how does this impact public opinion? Priming literature offers a convincing way to answer these questions. Price and Tewksbury (1997) state that “characteristics of news content (some would say ‘news values’ or ‘news biases’) might, through priming and framing, lead to important differences in attitudes and evaluations among media audiences” (p. 175).

These attitudes and evaluations are at the heart of public opinion. Priming, as defined by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), is when the media affect “the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged” (p. 147). Saliency is at the heart of this definition because the media concentrate on certain issues while ignoring others. “Saliency of certain issues as portrayed in mass media influences individuals’ perceptions of the president because respondents will use issues that they perceive as more salient as standards for evaluating the president” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 149). The authors’ experiments examined the impact of the simulated news broadcasts on the manner in which audiences make judgments about the president. Depending on which issue was highlighted in the news, national defense or inflation, the respondents rated the president on these issues. Therefore priming occurs when media attention to an issue causes people to put special emphasis on that issue when constructing their evaluations.

Pan and Kosicki (1997) conducted a similar study in which they examined the impact of the Gulf War and the economic recession on President George H. Bush’s approval rating. They determined the presence of two distinct *issue regimes*, or identifiable time periods in which one issue absorbs the dominant amount of attention resources available in the public arena. “One issue may emerge as the dominant one because of its absorption of the largest share of limited resources available” (Pan & Kosicki, 1997, p. 4). Through content analysis and examining approval rating data, they determined that during the height of the war, Bush enjoyed extremely high ratings. But, as war stories declined and eventually ended, stories about the economy became a new issue regime. At this time,

Bush's approval rating drastically declined to nearly 30 percent. Their study confirmed Iyengar and Kinder's (1984) findings. The authors state the following:

The results thus reveal clearly the so-called hydraulic pattern of priming. That is, because of competition for attention resources among various issues, the increasing weight accorded to the dominant issue corresponds with decreasing weights accorded to the less salient issues (Pan & Kosicki, 1997, p. 19).

2.5 Psychological Principles of Priming: Information Processing

According to Iyengar and Kinder (1987), priming is based on the people's tendency to be "miserly in expending cognitive effort when processing political information. Rather than processing all available information in memory, people tend to draw a convenience sample from the knowledge that appears to be pertinent to whatever task is at hand" (p. 148). This knowledge sounds very similar to Goffman's primary framework. Price and Tewksbury (1997) state "news influences audience evaluations via intermediate effects on knowledge activation" (p. 181). That is, by activating some ideas rather than others, the news can encourage particular trains of thought about political phenomena. Thus, by making certain issues more salient to the audience the press is able to impact their judgments. Certain issues are more likely to come to the fore when people make a decision about an elected official or political event. Media coverage doesn't make the judgment for the audience, but serves as a "tool or resource that people have available, in varying degrees, to help them make sense of issues in the news (Gamson, et al., 1992, p. 389).

At the heart of priming is the term *activation*, which occurs when "any particular element (or 'node') in a network is brought into focal awareness (or 'activated'), the

activation radiates from that node to others with which it is associated, resulting in an increased likelihood that they will also be activated. For example, if the construct of 'Richard Nixon' is activated, there is a heightened likelihood that such related constructs as Watergate, détente, or distrust may also be activated. Activation amounts to a process of bringing information into working memory, thereby making it available for conscious consideration and use in evaluation."(Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 186). The aforementioned network is further defined as a *knowledge store*, or a group of interconnected constructs including social attributes, goals, values, motivations, and affective or emotional states. Again, we can hearken back to Goffman's primary frameworks. This is clear when the authors state "people have chronically accessible goals, values, and motivations that help structure their thinking and inform their evaluations across numerous topical domains and situations." The media is able to trigger certain aspects of peoples' primary frameworks when they make evaluations. "People are cognitive misers. In other words, they do not necessarily conduct exhaustive searches for all appropriate constructs before forming their evaluations or action plans. Rather, they tend to accept as adequate those constructs that are most accessible" (Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 185).

Another essential term in priming theory is *accessibility*, and is defined as the activation potential of available knowledge (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). "Accessibility is the foundation of a memory-based model of information processing, which assumes that individuals make judgments about other people or issues based on information easily available and retrievable from memory at the time the questions is asked" (Sheuefele, 2000, p. 299). This supports Price and Tewksbury's statement that people don't usually

go out of their way to search for constructs when making evaluations and judgments. "The potential for activation is at least partly dependent on the energy level associated with that construct." This energy is the construct's excitation level. Price & Tewksbury (1997) state the following:

When constructs are activated, they are imbued with a certain level of residual energy as a product of that process. A person's available constructs are all those contained in the knowledge store. The accessible constructs are those that, owing perhaps to their excitation levels, are more likely than others to be activated in any given situation (p. 189)."

If a construct is "primed" then it is used by the individual in their evaluation. The stimulus is the framed media message. "The vividness of news media reports help to arouse, sustain, and renew various affective and emotional experiences about an issue" (Kosicki, 2002, p. 68). In true Goffman form, Price and Tewksbury (1997) state "not all attributes of a stimulus are attended to and used in categorization and evaluation" (p. 188).

Continuing in the discussion of information processing, Kosicki and McCleod (1989, p. 75) discussed three information processing strategies for mass-mediated information. Quite accurately, the authors state that there is an interaction of a single individual and the news media. The first strategy is *selective scanning* and is defined as "tuning out items that are not of interest or use to the audience member." This can be compared to attending and disattending as defined by Goffman. This illustrates the power that individuals have in their news selection. "Selective scanning represents a kind of coping mechanism for the volume of news and information available to audience members."

There could not possibly be any media effects if someone does not attend to that particular information. The next strategy is *active processing* and “reflects the audience member’s attempt to make sense of the story, going beyond the exact information given to interpret the information according to his or her own needs.” This act of interpretation, through a particular perception construct/world view, relates to the aforementioned activation. The final information-processing strategy is *reflective integration*, and is the “final step in sense-making, which can take place either through pondering or social interaction.” It is during this social interaction and discussion that can further develop the perceptive construct or primary framework individuals use to interpret the news. It would seem that this is a cyclical process.

2.6 Summary

I have discussed the roots of the framing concept and discussed how Goffman concentrated on explaining social reality. He wanted to closely examine how we understand our world through frames. He defined frames as “definitions of a situation built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events (social ones) and our subjective involvement in them.” Goffman looked at seemingly disparate examples of framing, including fabrications which varied from benign to malicious. The victim’s primary framework, in these examples, was simply a key or a construction made by the deceiver. He then looked at our ability to focus on certain events while disattending, or ignoring, others. This brought out the notion of salience, which Entman addressed in his research, as it relates to theatrical frames. The theater provided a good practical reference for the concepts of framing, particularly the multiple-channel effect. This effect is applicable to our daily lives because our focus shifts from moment to

moment and channel to channel. Both Entman and Scheufele defined frames in the exact same way as Goffman. Clearly, Goffman is the foundation upon which current researchers are basing their studies of media effects.

The concept of framing, though commonly thought to have originated from Goffman, was created by Bateson. Goffman was first introduced to this concept while reading Bateson's essay *A Theory of Play and Fantasy*. In this work Bateson, much like Goffman, addressed the play of animals to illustrate how signals or primary frameworks can imitate reality. Thus, to the participants reality is a game or keying of reality. To the observer, the perceived reality is not a game. Bateson clearly referenced the Gestalt psychological traditions when he referred to figure and ground when describing frames. A picture frame, much like mental frames, designates what will be attended to and what will be ignored. Framing, although researched extensively in the communications field, has deep psychological roots.

The underlying theme in many of the current framing studies is the issue of whether or not frames are accepted by audiences without question. Rousseau, et. al. (2000) tested whether there was an interaction between internal beliefs and viewers' acceptance of external frames. People draw from existing knowledge when viewing frames, and accept or reject them based on their consistency with their internal beliefs. Similarly, Druckman (2001) searched for the existence of a moderating variable in the relationship between frames and audience acceptance. Through experimentation, he discovered that source credibility was a moderating variable. Entman (1991), upon discovering the differences in the framing of the KAL and Iran Air incidents, came to the realization that more research needed to be done on audience autonomy. It appears as though Rousseau, et al.,

Druckman and Robinson (2000) were attempting to do just that. Robinson examined when media frames affect policy decisions. He determined that when there is policy uncertainty coupled with critical or empathy framed coverage of humanitarian crises, politicians will use airpower to intervene. He demonstrated this through his content analysis of the media coverage surrounding President Clinton's decision to use the Air Force to defend the Gorazde "safe area" in Bosnia. Ross (2000) looked at the editorial discourse in the *New York Times* and determined that the prevalent frames were the "strategic interest" and "victimization of Israel" frames. Liebes (2000) shows that framing exists in Israeli media as well. In her case study, she argues that audience worldviews are shaped by editorial choices.

Priming theory helps explain the processes by which framed media messages can affect individual judgments regarding politicians and political issues. Salience is a key component of this process, as stated by Iyengar and Kinder (1987). Media attention has the ability to lead people to place special emphasis on certain issues when making evaluations. Similar to framing priming theory is steeped in psychological traditions, and involves *activation* and *accessibility*. When the media focuses on certain events, this has the potential to activate nodes or thoughts associated with that particular issue or topic. *Accessibility* involves that information which is retrieved from memory and eventually is activated in the process of making judgments about political leaders or issues.

2.7 Theoretical Model and Conceptual Hypotheses

In light of the theoretical implications of framing and priming, media influence of framed coverage can have a variety of effects. If media coverage of the Iraq War was mainly positive and focused on the progress of the war, this could have led to the high

level of public support that was present during April 2003. Conversely, if the media coverage of the Iraq War was predominantly negative in 2004, this could have led to the 20 percent decrease in public support for the war.

H₁: Media coverage on the major networks and cable news stations was predominantly positive during the initial months of the Iraq War.

H₂: Positive framing in media coverage during the beginning of the war indirectly led to an increase in public support for the war.

As stated earlier, frames make sense of the world and the activities which occur within it. This is particularly applicable in a discussion of the Iraq War, because the dominant media frame helps to establish the notion of success or failure. Ross (2002) established that media framing of issues, along with dominant coverage, helps establish a notion of reality for the reader or viewer. If people truly are cognitive misers and expend little effort when processing political information, as argued by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), then the dominant theme would create the constructs by which people judge the success of a war or military occupation. The media frames dominant in the war coverage helped to form a knowledge store that viewers drew from when making evaluations.

Thus, if the media coverage was positive, this stimulus could have “helped to arouse, sustain, and renew various affective and emotional experiences about [this] issue” (Kosicki, 2002, p. 68). Even if audiences did not attend to every attribute of the media-framed coverage, it is argued that the positive salient messages in 2003 and negative salient messages in 2004 “primed” and were subsequently used by the viewers when making evaluations of the war. A year later, only 55% of Americans felt sending troops to Iraq was the right decision (Pew, 2004). “Public attitudes toward most aspects of the

U.S. mission in Iraq have turned more negative since January” (Pew, 2004). This leads to the following hypotheses:

H₃: Media coverage on the major networks and cable news stations was predominantly negative one year after the initial operations began.

H₄: Negative media coverage of the war in 2004 indirectly led to a decrease in public support for the war through priming and the information processes of activation and accessibility.

Visual images are a vital part of media stories and help determine the salience of issues, so it is essential to examine photos as well. Entman (1991) stated that “through repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others” (p. 7). Through repetition of particular images or words, the overall frame becomes more salient to the viewer. Photos and graphics can be enlarged “so that media reports may penetrate the consciousness of a mass public that is minimally aware of most specific issues and events” (Entman, 1991, p. 9). Conversely, smaller photos or graphics can minimize the importance of issues and events. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H₅: The majority of the *New York Times* photos that accompany stories about the Iraq War in 2003 will be positive or neutral in light of the success achieved during the initial months of the war. There will be fewer negative photos.

H₆: The positive visual images compounded the effect of the print and broadcast messages in solidifying public support for the war.

H₇: The majority of the *New York Times* photos that accompany stories about the Iraq War in 2004 will be negative or neutral due to the increasing number of suicide bombings and casualties. There will be fewer positive photos.

H₈: The negative visual images compounded the effect of the print and broadcast messages in decreasing public support for the war. The overall frame became more memorable and comprehensible to viewers who saw graphic images of suicide bombings and war casualties.

An individual's primary frameworks affect the impact of media framing. The primary framework or worldview of interest is political ideology. Park and Kosicki (1995) reasoned that people who are the same party as the president would have "more positive affect when they evaluate him and would be less motivated to criticize him" (p. 212). Therefore, a person's party affiliation provides them a defense mechanism with which to resist particular news frames. Park and Kosicki (1995) stated that party identification will determine who is more resistant to media frames.

H₉: In 2004, Republicans will be less affected than Democrats or Independents by negative media coverage of the Iraq War in their opinion about the conflict, and will have a higher mean opinion of the war.

H₁₀: Political ideology will moderate the effects of media frames on public opinion regarding the Iraq War in 2004.

H₁₁: Party identification will moderate the effects of media frames on public opinion regarding the Iraq War in 2004.

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter it is first necessary to discuss the Pew Center data and survey questions used in the regression analyses, along with the re-coding that was conducted for the various response categories. Next, the specific content analysis methods will be outlined, along with the coding procedures/categories used for determining the nature of Iraq War coverage in 2003 and 2004. Lastly, the data analysis methods will be described, and will include a description of the methodology used to study public opinion about the war, as well as the effect of news attentiveness, ideology, and party affiliation on that opinion.

3.2 Data

In this section, it is necessary to discuss the nature of the data that was analyzed, and to outline the coding procedures. Data was collected from the April 2003 Pew Research Center Iraq War poll. The Center conducted a telephone survey of 1,733 adults age 18 and older between April 8, 2003 and April 16, 2003. Data was collected from the March 2004 Pew Research Center Iraq War poll titled "A Year after Iraq War." The Center conducted a representative survey of 1,000 adults, 18 years of age or older between February 19, 2004 and March 3, 2004. The margin of sampling error was ± 3.5

percentage points. The weights were removed from all descriptive and regression analyses. The questions of interest in the 2003 and 2004 surveys included support for the war effort and opinion about the progress of the war. The question that was asked was "How well is the U.S. military effort in Iraq going?" The answer choices required the respondents to give an evaluative judgment ranging from 1 to 4, or "not at all well" to "very well." The questions about news attentiveness were also of interest because this assisted in the analysis of media's effect on opinions about the war. The question asked each respondent was how closely they "followed news about the current situation in Iraq." The answer choices were simply frequencies ranging from 1 to 4, or "not at all closely" to "very closely."

Also of interest was the party affiliation and ideology of each respondent. Two questions were asked regarding political affiliation: "Do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent," and the second question was "As of today, do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party." Those who responded as having a Republican lean were grouped with Republicans, and those who responded as having a Democratic lean were grouped with Democrats. A new variable was created and labeled "party1." Following the creation of this variable, dummy coding was completed. Since there were three parties, two new dummy variables were created ($k-1$). The two variables were labeled " X_r " and " X_d ." X_d was set to 1 for all Democrats and X_r was set to 0. Republicans were coded as a 1 for X_r and X_d was set to 0. Independents were the reference group, and were coded as a 0 for X_d and X_r (Hayes, 2003). Respondents were also asked to self-identify their ideology on a 4-point scale ranging from "very liberal" to "very conservative."

3.3 Content Analysis

To determine the volume and nature of the Iraq War coverage, a content analysis was conducted. Because two surveys were used, two time periods were analyzed: April 1, 2003-April 23, 2003 and Feb. 10, 2004 – March 10, 2004. All evening broadcast transcripts from CBS, ABC and CBS were content analyzed. All articles and broadcasts from the *New York Times* and CNN were analyzed as well. *Affective valence* is the “overall tone of media coverage,” and can be classified as the “big message” (Pan & Kosicki, 1997, p. 24). Valence of the coverage was classified as positive, neutral, or negative. In order for a positive story to be classified as such, the overall focus of the story was on the capture of key Iraqi or insurgent figures. Examples of positive language were discussions of Saddam Hussein losing power, minimal resistance to coalition military forces, and Iraqis celebrating the arrival of coalition forces. Articles using such language had a positive affective valence.

The criteria for neutral articles was an article that mentioned attacks, but contained no reference to non-accidental deaths, discussions about the preparations for the rebuilding process, details about contract workers, preparations for the formation of the war crimes tribunal, military technology, and troop movements. Criteria for a negative article included discussions of mounting casualties, continued unrest, waves of terrorist bombings, carnage, and delays in signing the new Iraqi constitution. The overall tone of these articles alluded to unrest and violence. Intercoder reliability was calculated based on the agreement between two coders in coding each article or transcript as positive, neutral, or negative. The coders used the aforementioned description of each category as

a guidebook for coding each article or transcript. A 5% sample of the 421 articles and transcripts comprising the content universe was coded in one of the three categories.

3.4 Data Analysis

Multiple regression was used to analyze the data in order to determine the predicted effect of increased media exposure on public opinion about the Iraq War. Analysis of Variance, ANOVA, was run on the data to determine whether the difference in public opinion between parties, ideologies, gender, and race was statistically significant during 2003 and 2004. Hierarchical multiple regression was used to determine the variability in public opinion uniquely attributable to news attentiveness, party affiliation, and ideology. Moderating hierarchical multiple regression was run on the data in order to determine if the product of ideology and news attentiveness was statistically significant after controlling for demographic variables, as well as the variability uniquely attributable to the moderating relationship between the two predictor variables. This analysis would determine if ideology moderated the effect that attentiveness to the news had on public opinion about the war. The same procedure was carried out looking at the product of party affiliation and news attentiveness to determine if party affiliation moderated the relationship between news attentiveness and opinion of the war.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

4.1 Content Analysis

Inter-coder reliability of the content analysis was acceptable, with .70 percent agreement and .54 Cohen's kappa. There were a total of 854 minutes of evening news devoted to the war (see Fig. 4.2). As predicted in H₁, the coverage of the war was predominantly positive during the initial months of the war. The only news outlet which did not have a majority of its coverage as positive was the *New York Times*. Out of 46 articles during the 20-day period, 16 were negative (36%) and only nine articles were positive (20%). The negative articles centered around the adverse economic impact of the war, including the decline of travel and the effect on tourism. ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC all had predominantly positive coverage with 57%, 75%, 57%, and 74% respectively. The total number of articles and transcripts that were reviewed in 2003 were 148, and of these articles 51% were positive, 22% were negative, and 27% were neutral (see Fig. 4.1). Examples of positive coverage included the achieving of military objectives, the crumbling of Iraqi resistance, the steady loss of Saddam Hussein's power, the rescuing of the seven POWs, and the rescue of Jessica Lynch. One of the most important events that news outlets reported during this period was the fall of Baghdad,

which occurred on April 9, 2003. This incredibly historic event received ample coverage in each media outlet.

There was significantly less network evening news coverage of the war in 2004, with only 195 minutes. H₃ was supported, in that the majority of the 2004 coverage in the major networks and cable news stations was predominantly negative. The *New York Times* had equally negative and neutral coverage (39%), and contained fewer positive articles (22%). ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC all had much more negative coverage with 43%, 73%, 55%, and 55% respectively. The total number of articles and transcripts that were reviewed in 2004 were 273, and of these articles 28% were positive, 46% were negative, and 26% were neutral (see Fig. 4.1). Contained within the articles and transcripts were descriptions of waves of terrorist bombings, strings of deadly attacks, lack of proper armor for Humvees, intelligence failures and ongoing insecurity. The coverage in 2004 clearly shifted from achieved objectives, to failures and setbacks in the objectives for peace and stability in the region.

In 2003, the visual images in the *New York Times* were predominantly positive or neutral (39%, 33%), thus supporting H₅. Examples of positive visual images included photos of the predator unmanned reconnaissance vehicle as well as technological advancements in detecting chemical weapons. Other photos included preparations for Jessica Lynch's homecoming, U.S. Special Forces working closely with Kurdish fighters in preparation for assaults on Iraqi positions, and Iraqi women visiting the Ajil Alyawar Mosque in Mosul to receive medical treatment. The 2004 visual images in the *New York Times* were predominantly neutral or negative (45%, 40%), supporting H₇. The negative photos included the aftermath of an explosion that rocked the playground of the Asmaa

Elementary School, protesting Iraqis expressing outrage after the attacks, a roadside bomb that killed three soldiers, and Iraqi men weeping after finding a relative at a morgue.

4.2 Data Analysis

The mean public opinion of the war in 2003 was 3.6. It is clear that public opinion at this time was very supportive of the war. During the time period that the 2003 poll was taken, the war was going extremely well. Baghdad had just been captured by American forces, Jessica Lynch and the other POWs were rescued, and the vitally important northern city of Kirkuk was bilaterally captured by the U.S. military and Kurdish fighters. The president was enjoying a rally in his job approval rating, and news coverage was overwhelmingly positive. Gallup (2005) reported that 75% of Americans approved of the way President Bush was handling the situation in Iraq, and 76% felt it was worth going to war.

Men were more supportive of the war than women ($M_{\text{Male}} = 3.64$, $M_{\text{Female}} = 3.53$, $p \leq .01$). Whites were more supportive of the war than the other races ($M_{\text{White}} = 3.6$, $M_{\text{Mixed}} = 3.5$, $M_{\text{Black}} = 3.2$, $M_{\text{Asian}} = 3.17$, $p \leq .01$). The differences in public opinion about the war could also be found among the various parties and ideologies. Republicans, who were the most represented group with 48% of the sample, had a higher public opinion than Democrats or Independents ($M_{\text{Republicans}} = 3.75$, $M_{\text{Democrats}} = 3.4$, $M_{\text{Independents}} = 3.57$, $p \leq .01$). Of those surveyed, 43% were Democrats and only 9% were Independents (see Table 4.3). Those who considered themselves liberal or very liberal had a lower support for the war than those who considered themselves moderate, conservative, or very

conservative ($M_{\text{Veryliberal}} = 3.3$, $M_{\text{Liberal}} = 3.4$, $M_{\text{Moderate}} = 3.5$, $M_{\text{Conservative}} = 3.73$, $M_{\text{VeryConservative}} = 3.76$, $p \leq .01$).

In 2004, the mean public opinion of the war was 2.7, clearly showing a decrease. Looking back at the Iraq War context section, it is evident that as the news about the war became increasingly negative, the positive opinion of the war declined. At the time of the March 2004 survey, the Bush administration admitted there were intelligence failures, suicide bombings killed nearly 100 police and army recruits, and over 300 people were killed in Karbala and Baghdad during the Shiite Ashura festival. News was overwhelmingly negative, and public opinion was at an all-time low with only 48% of Americans approving of the Iraq policy. Only 49% of respondents approved of President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq (Gallup, 2005).

Men were still more supportive than women ($M_{\text{Male}} = 2.7$, $M_{\text{Female}} = 2.6$, $p \leq .01$). Whites were again the most supportive among the races ($M_{\text{White}} = 2.7$, $M_{\text{Mixed}} = 2.6$, $M_{\text{Black}} = 2.4$, $M_{\text{Asian}} = 2.4$, $p \leq .01$). Similar to 2003, there were statistically significant differences among the various political parties and ideologies. The Republicans had the strongest support than the other parties, but was lower than the previous year ($M_{\text{Republicans}} = 3.02$, $M_{\text{Democrats}} = 2.4$, $M_{\text{Independents}} = 2.63$, $p \leq .01$). This data supports H_9 because, though there was a decrease in support for the war, Republicans had a higher mean opinion than those who self-identified with other parties. The results of the Gallup poll (2005) are consistent with these findings because the former showed 76% of Republicans felt the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq. But, only 53% of Independents and 25% of Democrats felt the decision to use military force was the right one. Similar to 2003, those who considered themselves liberal or very liberal had a lower support for the

war than those who considered themselves moderate, conservative, or very conservative ($M_{\text{Veryliberal}} = 2.2$, $M_{\text{Liberal}} = 2.3$, $M_{\text{Moderate}} = 2.6$, $M_{\text{Conservative}} = 2.9$, $M_{\text{VeryConservative}} = 3.0$, $p \leq .01$).

The 2003 data revealed a moderate correlation between attentiveness to news and a person's opinion of war (Pearson $r = .207$, $p \leq .01$). Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was run on the data, isolating the effect of attentiveness to news on public support for the war by controlling for demographics and ideology (see Table 4.1). The results indicated that the variability uniquely attributable to news attentiveness was 3% ($\Delta R^2 = .03$, $p \leq .01$). The regression equation establishes that with demographic variables and ideology remaining constant, a 1 unit increase in attentiveness to news is predicted to result in a .146 increase in a person's opinion of the war, thus supporting H_2 . The positive valence, along with the positive visual images, solidified public support for the war, which supports H_6 . There was a negative correlation between party affiliation and opinion of the war (Pearson $r = -.269$, $p \leq .01$). A change from Republican to Independent or Democrat would lead to a decrease in support for the war. Similar to news attentiveness, party affiliation accounted for 3% of the variability in a person's opinion about the war ($\Delta R^2 = .03$, $p \leq .01$). The regression equation supports the ANOVA in that Independents had a mean opinion of the war that was .106 lower than Republicans and .119 higher than Democrats. Ideology had a weaker correlation with a person's support for the war (Pearson $r = .142$, $p < .01$). The variability uniquely attributable to ideology was 1% ($\Delta R^2 = .010$, $p \leq .01$). The regression equation establishes that with demographics, party affiliation, and news attentiveness remaining constant, a 1 unit increase in ideology is predicted to result in only a .026 increase in public opinion of the war.

In 2004, there was a much weaker correlation between news attentiveness and opinion of the war (Pearson $r = .058$, $p \leq .01$). After isolating the effect of attentiveness to news on public support for the war by controlling for demographics and ideology, the variability uniquely attributable to news attentiveness was found to be much smaller than in 2003, with 0.3% ($\Delta R^2 = .003$, $p \leq .01$). The regression equation establishes that with demographic variables and ideology remaining constant, a 1 unit increase in attentiveness to news is predicted to result in a .061 increase in a person's support for the war. This supports H_4 because the negative valence people attended to in the news led to a smaller increase in support for the war the following year. The negative visual images compounded this effect, supporting H_2 . There was a stronger negative correlation between party affiliation and opinion of the war (Pearson $r = -.352$, $p \leq .01$). A change in party affiliation from 1 to 2 or 2 to 3 (Republican to Independent or Independent to Democrat) would lead to a decrease in support for the war. A change from Republican to Independent or Democrat would lead to a greater decrease in support for the war. Party affiliation accounted for 6.3% of the variability in a person's opinion about the war ($\Delta R^2 = .063$, $p \leq .01$). The regression equation also supports the ANOVA because the difference in public opinion between Independents and Republicans was much greater than the previous year by .296. The difference between Democrats and Independents was also greater, with the former having a mean public opinion .224 less than the latter. Ideology had a much stronger correlation than news attentiveness as well (Pearson $r = .265$, $p \leq .01$).

The variability uniquely attributable to ideology was much higher than attentiveness to news, with 6.8% ($\Delta R^2 = .068$, $p \leq .01$). Therefore, a person's opinion of the war is more attributable to whether they are a liberal or conservative, rather than how closely they

watch the news. The regression equation establishes that with demographics, party affiliation, and news attentiveness remaining constant, a 1 unit increase in ideology is predicted to result in a .149 increase in public opinion of the war. Therefore, the more conservative a person was in 2004, the more likely they were to support the war. In 2003, more of the variability in a person's opinion of the war was uniquely attributable to news attentiveness than to ideology. But, in the following year more of the variability was uniquely attributable to ideology and party affiliation than to news attentiveness. Hierarchical moderating multiple regression revealed that ideology and party affiliation did moderate the effect of news attentiveness on a person's opinion of the war in 2004 but not in 2003, thus supporting H_{10} and H_{11} . The regression coefficient of public opinion varies as a function of the values of ideology. The relationship between news attentiveness and opinion of the war also depended on whether someone identified themselves as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent.

Independent Variables	<i>r</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>B</i>	Std. Error of <i>B</i>	ΔR^2
Demographics					
Sex	0.060	0.062	0.062	0.042	0.042
Race	-0.145	-0.040	-0.040	0.032	
Education	-0.009	-0.018	-0.018	0.013	
Income	0.042	0.020	0.071	0.013	
Political Factors					
Party Identification	-0.269				0.030
Republican		0.105	0.092	0.084	
Democrat		-0.125	-0.108	0.084	
Ideology	0.142	0.034	0.050	0.026	0.010
News Attentiveness	0.207	0.141	0.176	0.03	0.030

Table 4.1: Estimates of the Framing and Priming Model: Regression of public opinion on Demographics, Political Factors, and News Attentiveness for 2003.

Independent Variables	r	b	β	Std. Error of β	ΔR^2
Demographics					
Sex	0.065	0.084	0.048	0.041	0.017
Race	-0.061	-0.007	-0.006	0.03	
Education	-0.095	-0.055	-0.104	0.013	
Income	-0.011	-5.000	0.016	0.009	
Political Factors					
Party Identification	-0.352				0.063
Republican		0.302	0.172	0.089	
Democrat		-0.222	-0.128	0.087	
Ideology	0.265	0.135	0.146	0.024	0.068
News Attentiveness	0.058	0.065	0.060	0.026	0.004

Table 4.2: Estimates of the Framing and Priming Model: Regression of public opinion on Demographics, Political Factors, and News Attentiveness for 2004.

Key Dates	Description of the Event
Jan. 28, 2003	In his State of the Union Address, President Bush expresses his willingness to attack Iraq without U.N. approval
Feb. 5	Secretary of State Colin Powell addresses the U.N. in a final attempt to obtain Security Council approval for a preemptive strike against Iraq
Feb. 14	Hans Blix, chairman of UNMOVIC, announces some progress has been made with his inspection teams
March 20	The U.S launches operation Iraqi Freedom
March 23	A U.S. Army maintenance convoy is ambushed and twelve POWs are taken, including Jessica Lynch
March 30	Marine and Army forces battle the Iraqi Republican Guard in Karbala
April 9	Baghdad falls to U.S forces
May 16	Civilian Administrator Paul Bremer institutes a "de-Baathification" policy which bans nearly 30,000 senior Baath party members from holding positions in the future administration
May 22	U.N. Resolution 1483 is lifted after 13 years, allowing the U.S and Britain to temporarily run the country until an official government is in place
July 7	The Bush administration admits that there were inaccurate intelligence regarding Iraq's nuclear weapons program
July 22	U.S troops kill Sadaam Hussein's two sons Uday and Qusay
Aug. 19	U.N. Envoy Sergio Viera de Mello is killed in a suicide bombing
Oct. 27	Four suicide attacks kill 43, and wound 200 at the headquarters building of the Red Crescent and three police stations
Nov. 2	Insurgents down a U.S Army helicopter killing 16 soldiers and wounding 21
Dec. 14	Sadaam Hussein is captured outside his hometown of Tikrit
Jan. 19, 2004	In a peaceful demonstration, 100,000 Shiites demand direct elections
Jan. 28	David Kay, former leader of the U.S. weapons inspection team in Iraq, announces that pre-war intelligence about Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program was inaccurate
Feb. 2	President Bush requests an independent commission be formed to investigate the intelligence failures
Feb. 10	A car bomb kills 54 applicants waiting outside a police station
March 2	Coordinated suicide attacks kill 85 Iraqis and wound 233 others in Karbala, while 32 are killed and 78 wounded in Baghdad during the Ashura Shiite festival
March 8	Iraq's interim constitution is signed, granting Iraqis the right to free expression, protection from police searches, and freedom of religion

Table 4.3: Key dates of the Iraq War

Variables	2003	2004
Demographics		
% Male	47%	48%
% White	86%	82%
% Black	8%	11%
% Asian	2%	2%
Political Factors		
Party Identification		
Republican	48%	42%
Democrat	43%	51%
Independent	9%	7%
News Attentiveness		
Xbar	3.4	3.3
S.D.	.73	.82
Pres. Approval		
Xbar	.77	.49
S.D.	.42	.50
Opinion of the War		
Xbar	3.6	2.7
S.D.	.62	.88

Table 4.4: The 2003 and 2004 Pew Center survey respondents' demographics, news attentiveness, and presidential approval percentages and means.




Figure 4.1: The total number of Iraq War articles reviewed in the *New York Times*, ABC, NBC, and CNN.




Figure 4.2: The total number of minutes dedicated to the Iraq War during ABC, CBS, and NBC evening broadcasts.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

5.1 Conclusion

In this final chapter I will summarize purpose, major findings, future research possibilities, and limitations of this study. The purpose of this study was to fully explicate the concepts of framing and priming, and to examine the nature of the interaction between external and internal frames. Another purpose was to determine if the high level of public support during the initial months and lower support during the following year was attributable to news attentiveness. It is first important to examine the 2003 rally effect that occurred. It is quite clear after looking at the 2003 opinion data, and the ANOVA of the different party affiliations, that Americans supported the war across party lines. Congressional support was higher in the 2003 Iraq War than in the 1991 Gulf War, and there was very little open criticism by credible elites of the president's decision to attack Iraq. Framing and priming are still an intrinsic part of the differentiation of opinion that did exist along party lines. Republicans, Democrats, and Independents were all supportive but there were differences in their mean opinion of the war. These differences are partly attributable to a person's political primary framework. This particular worldview could be classified as a social framework, which provides a "background of

understanding that incorporates the will, aim, and effort of intelligence” (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). Social frameworks involve rules that govern various activities. It is clear that a person’s political world view helps to shape opinion about the Iraq War, even when a rally exists. The overarching positive public opinion found among the various political groups in 2003 was also attributable to news attentiveness. The survey data did in fact reveal the importance of the media in shaping public opinion. This was the case more in 2003, with more of the variability in public opinion being attributable to attentiveness to the media than to ideology. Party affiliation accounted for the same amount of variability as news attentiveness, but did not moderate the affect of attentiveness in 2003.

At the heart of this research was the question of whether or not the decrease in public opinion about the Iraq War between 2003 and 2004 was attributable to the media coverage surrounding this event. The results of the content analysis illustrated a shift from positive to negative valence. The coverage in 2003 focused on the achieved military objectives, the crumbling of Iraqi resistance, the loss of Saddam Hussein’s power, and the fall of Baghdad. The overall frame people were exposed to when they attended to the news was positive. In 2004, the coverage focused on terrorist bombings, insecurity, unrest, sustained violence, and mounting casualties. The overall frame people were exposed to when they attended to the news was negative. More of the variability in public opinion was attributable to party affiliation and ideology than to news attentiveness. Therefore, the discovery of positive media framing during the initial months of the war helps explain the high levels of support for the war. But, the negative media framing in 2004 was a smaller part of the reason for the decline in public opinion. News attentiveness did have an impact on a person’s opinion of the war, but there was a much

weaker correlation in 2004, and that effect was moderated by ideology and party affiliation. When news coverage is positive, people rely more on media coverage when evaluating a war. When media coverage is negative, people rely more on their political values, primary framework, or worldview, when making judgments. People attend to and accept what is in their frame, and disattend whatever is outside it (Goffman, 1974). If a Republican views coverage that is critical to the president or the war, they are more likely to ignore that coverage because it is incongruent to their primary frameworks.

The nuances of priming can be detected in the 2004 data. After analyzing the data, the moderating relationship that was discovered clearly shows the impact of an individual's knowledge store. Price and Tewksbury (1997) stated that people have accessible values and motivations that assist the organization of thoughts, which in turn informs their evaluations. Ideology and party affiliation therefore color the lens through which people view the news. The viewers themselves make a determination whether or not to accept the frames presented to them by the media. Because the majority of the news coverage was positive during 2003, the knowledge store was not as essential as it was the following year when coverage was mostly negative. In 2004 a person who self-identified as a Republican and who considered themselves very conservative maintained a positive view of the war, albeit lower than the previous year. Ideology and party affiliation are essential components in the effect that media coverage has on public opinion of the war.

The content analysis showed that certain themes and messages were prevalent in the coverage. Looking at the principles of activation, it is possible that those who self-identified as Democrats or Independents and who classified themselves as liberal or very liberal also viewed the media coverage through a colored lens. It is also possible that

Republicans and conservatives were much less susceptible to the negative coverage. When the construct of the Iraq War was activated, there was a greater likelihood that the related constructs were the aforementioned negative themes dominant in the 2004 coverage. This explains the respondents' negative opinion of the war. Harkening back to the information processing strategies discussed by Kosicki and McLeod (1989), active processing is particularly relevant. Because party affiliation and ideology moderate the effect of news attentiveness on public opinion about the war when coverage is negative, the two predictor variables help a person make sense of news stories and assist the interpretation of information presented to them by the media. Furthermore, party affiliation and ideology can be classified as internal frames or primary frameworks. These findings support Rousseau, et al. (2000) in that people draw from existing knowledge when viewing frames, and accept or reject them based on their consistency with internal beliefs.

These findings make a contribution to current framing research because they highlight the importance of going back to the principles upon which the concept of framing was based. People don't blindly accept everything presented to them through the media. Unfortunately, some of today's studies are based on that assumption. People come from varied backgrounds and have a wealth of experiences and perspectives with which to evaluate what they see in the media. This study attempted to explore some of those perspectives as they impact public opinion about the Iraq War. Ideology and party affiliation only scratch the surface of what people rely on in making their evaluations. But, both world views are intrinsic and highly applicable to the questions surrounding this topic.

5.2 Future Research

Future studies about the Iraq War must determine the types of frames that were present in the coverage. The nuances of media coverage involving the war must also be examined in order to determine the frames people attended to when making evaluations about the war. The 2003 coverage was conclusively positive, but what frames made the coverage positive? This question should be answered because it will provide future researchers with a foundation on which to build framing studies. This type of study could assist military public affairs officers (PAs) effectively structure their messages to highlight the most vital or overlooked aspects of the war effort. If the majority of the initial coverage about a war highlights the strategies, around-the-clock explosions, and glamorous aspects of a campaign, PAs can stress the human element of the war. In this way, PAs could help provide a more realistic portrayal of not only the war at the beginning of a conflict but also during a protracted occupation like Iraq. A study including this type of content analysis could also assist communication researchers identify the existence of media bias, either for or against a military campaign. This might not just include American media, but those major outlets in Europe and the Middle East as well. Opinion of the war was much more negative in other countries, so it would be interesting to quantify the relationship with news attentiveness. The comparison of media coverage and media opinion between the nations would be a study with international relevance and importance.

A future study could include a designed survey, which could determine if patriotism moderates the effect media attentiveness has on a person's opinion about a war. Neither ideology nor party affiliation was found to moderate this relationship in 2003, but

patriotism might. The rally 'round the flag effect is quantified by how Americans support the president during times of international crisis. But, a patriotism index could be created and analyzed using regression and other statistical methods. A content analysis could examine comments made by high ranking political elites to determine whether or not there was significant support or opposition to the president's decision to declare war. If there was a high level of support then the more people attended to the news, the effect on the patriotism index could be measured. Thus, the researcher could determine the strength of the relationship between news attentiveness, patriotism/rally 'round the flag effect, and opinion of the war. Another question that could be addressed is under what circumstances a rally ends during a military campaign. A content analysis could be completed that looks at the speeches and press conferences given by credible elites during the Iraq War. Democratic presidential nominees' comments offer an opportunity to examine the critical opinions they voiced about the war and the president. This would add to the existing knowledge of the rally effect, and more accurately determine the structure of public opinion during a military campaign.

Another variable that could be analyzed is interpersonal communication. Social channels are a vital source of information for some people, and lends to the formation of public opinion. Thus, it would be useful to create an index that measures the frequency of discussion. It would then be possible to determine if there is a correlation between interpersonal communication and a person's opinion of the war. Regression analyses could then be run to determine the effect of an increase in interpersonal discussion on opinion of the war. It would also be beneficial to test whether this index moderates the relationship between news attentiveness and a person's opinion of the war. It would also

be fascinating to explore the two-way relationship between public opinion and media coverage. This study examined how the media impacts public opinion, but not how public opinion impacts coverage. A future qualitative study could involve a case study of reporters and how their personal views impact their reporting. War correspondents from the Iraq War could be interviewed to determine how they cover armed conflict and how that coverage is affected by the declining public support. This would be a way to determine if a reporter's coverage reflects their opinion or the public's. Similarly, it would be possible to conduct a content analysis of briefings given by military leadership. The differences between their view of the war and what is being reported in the news could then be compared. In order to get the perspective from the military personnel deployed to Iraq, a researcher could conduct qualitative interviews with those who patrol the streets of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq in order to get a more accurate picture. The findings could be compared with the results of the content analysis completed in this paper.

The question of media trust could also be examined. Republicans were the only group to support the war in 2004, even when exposed to negative media coverage. There may be other primary frameworks that explain why media coverage did not overwhelmingly sway the opinion of this political group. McQuail (1987) discussed a commonsense theory which he defined as "the knowledge (and ideas) which everyone has, by virtue of direct experience in an audience" (p.5). The person who attends to media coverage has a "set of ideas about the medium in question, what it is, what it is good for, how it fits into daily life, how it should be 'read,' what its connotations are and how it may relate to other aspects of social life. (McQuail, 1987, p. 5). In other words, people accept or reject

media in relation to their primary frameworks. A survey could be created which determines a respondents' level of trust in the media. An index could be created from a series of questions that ask evaluative judgment questions about whether various media have a liberal or conservative bias, are sensationalistic or untrustworthy. This could help answer the question of whether there is bias in the media. The index could then be analyzed using regression methods, and would allow the researcher to determine the effect of a decrease in trust on a person's opinion of the war. Similar to patriotism, there may be a moderating relationship between trust and media attentiveness. Another way to probe the media trust/bias question is to find out if there are statistically significant differences in the opinion of the war between people who receive their news only from certain networks. This could be accomplished through the use of ANOVA, and could be used to determine if there are differences in the mean public opinion between the various groups. The differences in opinion between those who obtained their news from specific cable channels (i.e. CNN, Fox, and MSNBC) versus those who got their news from network news (i.e. ABC, NBC, and CBS) could also be examined. A researcher could also determine the differences among the two types of news sources. If certain groups have lower mean opinions of the war, a content analysis could then study the coverage of those outlets. A comparison of the means and content could shed light on the possibility that certain media are biased.

5.3 Limitations of the Study

Many assertions were based on the findings of the data analysis conducted on two Pew Center surveys. Ideally, analysis could have been run on data sets from every month

from the start of the Iraq War until March 2004. This would have given a much stronger justification for the framing and priming conclusions that were made. This also would have given the reader a better understanding of the relationship between the media and public opinion. Multiple regression analyses from every month would have given a more accurate and quantifiable picture of the inner workings of public opinion about military campaigns. This leads to a discussion of the surveys themselves. Pew Center's high quality data is from a nationally representative sample, and offered a means with which to answer the applicable media-effects questions in this project. Besides the strengths of the data, there were some limitations. The media-use questions in the surveys did not ask respondents to specify what types of media they attended to. The respondents were asked to quantify how closely they attended to coverage of the Iraq War, and this question was used to determine how closely the respondents attended to the news. But, they were not asked how often they watch the news in a given week or where they received the majority of their news. Also missing were questions about interpersonal sources of information such as frequency of political discussions, or exposure to commentaries such as editorials and opinion pieces. Thus, use of the Pew Center surveys slightly limited this study's ability to determine exactly how much respondents attended to the news, where they received the majority of their news, and the interpretation of statistical outcomes.

Another limitation of this study involves the content analysis that was conducted. The coding of each article was based on the valence or overall tone of each article. Specific types of frames were not probed. Current framing researchers often search for various key words, which gives more credibility to their work because frames are clearly defined. If people report they attended to newspapers more than any other type of media,

and certain frames were discovered in newspaper articles involving an event, the researcher could definitively say that people were exposed to that frame. Thus, the content analysis sheds much more light on the data analysis. Entman (1991) looked for certain emotionally charged words in his KAL/Iran Air study. It would have been useful to search for certain key words that are indicative of a positive or negative frame. Another limitation of the content analysis involves the coding of photos and illustrations in the *New York Times*. Ideally, each media outlet's illustrations, images, and videos could have been coded to determine whether the visuals people attended to were positive, neutral, or negative. The photos themselves were not coded, only the captions. Sometimes, a photo can give a different message than the words written by a photographer. Thus, the coding of captions could be a limitation because they are often cut and dry.

APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONS

N.4 How closely have you been following the news about the war in Iraq – very closely, fairly closely, or not too closely?

- 1 Very closely
- 2 Fairly closely
- 3 Not too closely
- 4 Not at all closely

Q.2 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is dealing with the war in Iraq?

- 1 Approve
- 2 Disapprove

Q.4 How well is the U.S military effort in Iraq going?

- 1 Very well
- 2 Fairly well
- 3 Not too well
- 4 Not at all well

PARTY

In politics, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?

- 1 Republican
- 2 Democrat
- 3 Independent
- 4 No Preference

PARTYLN

As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?

- 1 Republican
- 2 Democrat

IDEO

As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?

- 1 Very conservative
- 2 Conservative
- 3 Moderate
- 4 Liberal
- 5 Very Liberal

Table A.1: Survey Questions from 2003 Iraq poll

Q.2 How closely have you been following the news about the current situation in Iraq – very closely, fairly closely, or not too closely?

- 1 Very closely
- 2 Fairly closely
- 3 Not too closely
- 4 Not at all closely

IR.1 Do you think the U.S made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?

- 1 Right decision
- 2 Wrong decision

IR.2 How well is the U.S. military effort in Iraq going?

- 1 Very well
- 2 Fairly well
- 3 Not too well
- 4 Not at all well

PARTY

In politics, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?

- 1 Republican
- 2 Democrat
- 3 Independent
- 4 No Preference

PARTYLN

As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?

- 1 Republican
- 2 Democrat

IDEO

As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?

- 1 Very conservative

Continued

Table A.2: Survey questions from 2004 news interest index questionnaire

Table A.2 Continued

- 2** **Conservative**
- 3** **Moderate**
- 4** **Liberal**
- 5** **Very Liberal**

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