A Joint and Interagency Unconventional Warfare Training Strategy for Special Forces in the 21st Century
Abstract
In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the President, as Commander-in-Chief and as authorized by congress in a Joint Resolution 23, ordered our armed forces into combat to Afghanistan in order to defeat the al-Qaeda terror organization and the repressive Taliban regime that harbored them. The President wanted to execute this war in an unconventional manner. He turned to the experts in unconventional warfare, the Army Special Forces and tasked them to take the rag tag Northern Alliance and execute an unconventional warfare campaign the like that the world had never seen. In only 60 days the Special Forces units defeated both the al-Qaeda and the Taliban and for the first time in 23 years the Afghan people were free from oppression. This strategy research paper explores the training deficiencies the Special Forces units identified while prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. This paper will discuss how we currently train our Special Forces officers and noncommissioned officers in unconventional warfare, identify new unconventional warfare training opportunities, and ultimately make recommendations on how to improve unconventional warfare training. Operation Enduring Freedom was Special Forces' finest hour. To ensure that Special Forces remains the world's premiere unconventional war fighting force during the Global War on Terrorism today and in the future it must improve the way it trains its soldiers and units.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 04, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA432023
Entities
People
- David G. Fox
Organizations
- United States Army War College