Efficient Mechanisms to Allocate Assignment Incentives in the Navy

Abstract

In 1973, the United States Navy moved from being a conscription force to being an all-volunteer force. All assignments, however, may not necessarily be voluntary. These assignments (jobs) have been labeled as "hard to fill" by Navy leadership, and the Navy has implemented market-based, cash stipends to attract Sailors to these jobs. An auction has been determined to be the method used for distributing the stipends. The current format of the auction is often described as a first-price sealed-bid, but it is actually a multi-attribute auction, since the lowest bidder for an assignment may not receive it due to other factors considered in the assignment process, such as skills match, timing, moving costs, etc. This report investigates various auction formats with respect to efficiency, suitability, and feasibility.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 01, 2005
Accession Number
ADA432048

Entities

People

  • Hossam Zaki
  • R. W. Nimon
  • Ricky D. Hall

Organizations

  • Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology

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  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems

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  • Business Administration
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  • Military Personnel
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  • Computational Modeling and Simulation
  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Military Leadership and Professional Education.