

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**TRAINING JUNIOR OFFICERS IN THE
ART OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP**

by

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ABSTRACT

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After review of a recent Army War College study on strategic leadership competencies, and after reading about junior officer experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom, I perceived a general ignorance across the military as to the importance of junior officer's development. All leaders need grounding in strategic leader competencies before conducting a mission. I propose that our training and leader developers integrate several strategic leader competencies into junior officer development. I will identify which strategic leader competencies are important to teach junior leaders and why, when the Army should train junior leaders in the strategic competencies, and how the Army should go about providing the strategic competency training. This project includes data from a number of studies focusing primarily on the commissioned officer population.

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TRAINING JUNIOR OFFICERS IN THE ART OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

Our Soldiers are world-class: they fight valiantly and demonstrate a true warrior spirit. But they also have in their hearts a very compassionate spirit, and we see that demonstrated all around the world – on playgrounds in Iraq, in hospitals and orphanages in Afghanistan and in small villages in Africa. The American Soldier is a warrior who offers an extended hand of help and compassion.

—Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker,
Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower luncheon,
Association of the United States Army Conference,
Oct. 7, 2003

WHY STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP METACOMPETENCIES

Before the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon September 11, 2001, but after the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as a global power with no real peer competitors. Many senior military leaders advised the US civilian leadership to remain responsive against military powers capable of mounting focused conventional campaigns against the US.

Then 9-11 occurred. Global conflict hit home. In addressing the post 9-11 Global War on Terrorism environment, military leadership embarked on a quest to produce a leader development system that included training of a more lethal, adaptable, flexible, and deployable joint force, one that could operate more effectively within a coalition as well as within a joint interagency task force. Doctor Leonard Wong and his team from the Army War College had just completed a study in response to a Chief of Staff of the Army tasking. The tasking amounted to identifying the strategic leadership attributes required by 21st century leaders fighting a 21st century asymmetric threat. After reading this study, I realized our Army did not emphasize developing leaders in these strategic leader competencies, at least not at the junior leader's level.

My focus in this paper is to answer the question: Should junior leaders need to acquire strategic leader competencies sooner rather than later and which competencies should we teach junior leaders? My focus is on company grade commissioned officers.

I began my research by first falling back on the doctrine that fed my early officer development experiences. The Army's Field Manual (FM) 22-100: Army Leadership provides an elementary concept of what leadership skills reside in Army doctrine and are integrated into the training curriculum. This manual is a doctrinal layout of the knowledge, skills, and abilities inherent to military leaders.¹ I was not convinced; however, that FM 22-100 was robust enough

to guarantee junior leaders success in dealing with 21st century warfare. I began reading accounts from officers serving in Iraq that gave me the impression there was a leader training deficiency in preparing them for Operation Iraqi Freedom. My doubt that FM 22-100 was all it could be increased when I found that Doctor Wong's study, sponsored by the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, introduced the importance of two newly emerging concepts affecting leadership not found in FM 22-100: twenty-first century technology and unconventional warfare from a new breed of adversaries. It appeared to me that Doctor Wong and his colleagues did a great job attempting to take current Army doctrine to the next level by overlaying these new concepts on leadership competencies.

By consolidating in theory the numerous knowledge, skills, and abilities from FM 22-100 along with the two emerging concepts, the Army War College study introduced six new strategic leader competencies they coined as Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies.² These metacompetencies included: identity, mental agility, crosses cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. That combination of something old (FM 22-100) and something new (Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies) might just be the answer to enhancing junior officer professional development that would in turn increase their capabilities in missions such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The military would then enjoy greater measures of success in dealing with unconventional operations like Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, very possibly with less manpower and fewer or shorter deployments. However, that is another research project for another day.

Continuing my quest in defense of why the Army should teach Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies to junior leaders I navigated to additional references found on the Army web page with remarks by the Chief of Staff of the Army. General Schoomaker, as well as other senior leaders, was becoming more widely accepting that training all leaders to be adaptable, understanding of strategic implications in all we do, as well as able to interact with global partners was critical to our success in engaging the Global War on Terrorism.³ General Schoomaker put it best in his stated vision for the Army, "Today's terrorist threat is unprecedented—it is transnational with a vast array of resources and sponsors, including nation states. The Army must adapt its forces to meet that threat. Given the fanatical commitment, asymmetric capabilities, and adaptability of the threat, it is vitally important to defeat our enemies wherever our military finds them. We need to develop in our leaders, Soldiers, and Department of the Army civilians, an unprecedented level of adaptability. We must have balance in our forces, with the ability to operate decisively in an uncertain environment against an unpredictable threat that will make every attempt to avoid our strengths".⁴ The attributes he

mentioned closely mirror the competencies from the Army War College study. The Army needed to take his remarks as guidance and integrate his points into leadership development.

I found excerpts from a few Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom after-action reports suggesting that officers and soldiers alike faced an environment of uncertainty, complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity. They faced circumstances that were not commonly characteristic to our former cold-war mindset.⁵ They faced a new adversary they were not prepared for through any type of formal training unless you consider current operations the formal training. Our service members were ill prepared to conduct missions in the Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom environment. They needed skills not taught to any level of significance in our military education system. These skill sets however do match up against the leadership competencies mentioned in the Army War College strategic leadership competencies study. So, what exactly are these Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies?

The Army War College research group described the first Strategic Leadership Metacompetency, identity, as the ability of a service member to gather self-feedback, to form an accurate self-perception on performance, and to conduct a self-assessment that included addressing his individual weaknesses.⁶ This attribute conceivably matures as you gain experience. The second metacompetency, mental agility, is the enduring capability of adapting to change.⁷ Various reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom mentioned mental agility as the attribute all leaders who engaged in counterinsurgency operations should possess no matter where you found yourself in the chain-of-command. The next metacompetency, cross-cultural savvy, is an attribute requiring leaders be well versed in interacting with diverse cultures.⁸ This is certainly a critical attribute when engaged in coalition warfare as the US is in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The fourth Strategic Leadership Metacompetency is interpersonal maturity. Interpersonal maturity is an individual's ability to display compassion when dealing with subordinates on sensitive issues required by leaders at all levels.⁹ The Army War College group took this Strategic Leadership Metacompetency concept beyond the operational level to the strategic level implying that working in a strategic collaborate environment with non-governmental organizations and host nation agencies alike occurs at all levels in the leader hierarchy. Senior leaders are not the only officers that interact with outside organizations. Implications of national impact can overshadow the organization with any missteps. Another Strategic Leadership Metacompetency, world-class warrior, entails the leader's understanding the impact of all the elements of national power coupled with emerging technology across the entire spectrum of operations.¹⁰ Officer development instructors should plant the seeds of this metacompetency early in the program of

instruction covering military history studies, possibly as early as pre-commissioning.¹¹ Along with mentoring and coaching, this metacompetency builds on maturity and experience. The last metacompetency, professional astuteness, calls on leaders to be team players first before self.¹² This metacompetency exemplifies those leaders who take their oath of professional responsibility seriously. Armed with a definition for each Strategic Leadership Metacompetency, my next dilemma was to identify which metacompetencies the Army should program into junior officers development programs.

WHICH STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP METACOMPETENCIES SHOULD WE TEACH JUNIOR OFFICERS?

At the very least the Army needs junior leaders who understand and possess the nature of mental agility (adaptability to changing environments), cross cultural savvy (well versed in interacting with cultures outside the US), and the world-class warrior ethos (ability to invoke or at least be aware of implications regarding all elements of national power against decision making).¹³ I believe that besides addressing the CSA concerns stated in the study, these three Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies also address the following two 21st-century phenomenons. First, importance of their introduction into junior level development will help them see how the US National Security Strategy propels us into a global environment replete with multiple cultures, legal systems, and governing methodologies. Groups of people, levels of intolerance and violent natures not strongly understood by western cultures like the US, represent this global environment. As well, technological advancements in the tools used by our adversaries and ourselves should cause us to revisit how the US military confronts and adapts to modern warfare, causing us to train for the appropriate response.¹⁴ The military needs to address leadership characteristics that deal with these new environmental issues not inherent to the leader development provided throughout the Cold War era. These reasons together should behoove us as military leaders to be more innovative and forward thinking about how we address military training transformation to meet our evolving mission requirements. To support this argument, I incorporated references from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom after-action reports, military and non-military senior leader speeches, US Military Academy curriculum, Army leader development studies, and various publications and articles where individuals described various schools of thought regarding the leader attribute required for leaders in the 21st century.

Echoing General Schoomaker's vision of adaptable, innovative, and culturally savvy leaders, Colonel (Ret.) Danny McKnight shared in a leadership discussion he gave recently that leadership does make a difference. Through this personal talk, Colonel McKnight shared that

having superior leadership at the lowest possible level could make the difference between success and failure.¹⁵ His comments reflected an air of similarity to the strategic leader metacompetencies and recognition that our nation needs leaders that are adaptable, able to continue operations in an ambiguous environment, and aware of the strategic implications their decisions could have.

To further support the concept of providing junior leaders development in mental agility, cross cultural savvy, and world class warrior ethos, I found a series of Army Training and Leader Development Panel studies, comprehensive reports containing ideas filling that gap between FM 22-100 and the Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies. As a principal research group for the Army, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel recently conducted numerous leadership development studies across all soldier populations. Part of their report mentioned ideas that future leaders needed to possess enduring competencies to include self-awareness and adaptability, reinforcing my argument to include metacompetencies into junior leader development.¹⁶ The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Commissioned Officer Study specifically mentioned the notion that leader need to possess attributes such as adaptability as they take on the mantel of the twenty-first century Objective Force soldier. The Objective Force Soldier encompasses the Army's plan of a future year 2010 soldier/system. Based on these studies, future leadership curriculum will undoubtedly include some form of these metacompetencies specified for various leader levels. I continued to find extensive support for the integration of Army War College study findings and their integration into junior leader education. In my opinion, Doctor Wong was on target in identifying the leader skill sets for a post 9-11 world.

In a recent issue of Military Review, Lieutenant Colonel Pat Donahoe wrote about preparing leaders for nation building. He shared that he believed the Army was making an effort to train leaders to be adaptive, but fell short in training leaders regarding cross-cultural, civic, ethical, and city planning duties.¹⁷ His comments are significant in the grand scheme of operations and supportive to training junior leaders in metacompetencies. The same combat leaders are crossing the divide between combat operations and civil affairs type functions on a daily basis. This transition takes understanding the local culture, language, generally the overall environment not to mention the impact of their actions or decisions on our national elements of power. Fortunately, our junior leaders are somehow picking up the needed attributes (in most cases) in the course of their operational deployments. LTC Donahoe did offer some solutions to addressing leader development shortfalls. Most of these ideas strongly resemble training programs found within the Special Operations arena. He suggested that the military as a whole

could try training more leaders through exchange programs with foreign armies, train or have resident legal experts more readily available for junior leaders to consult, and provide junior leaders a better understanding of the strategic consequences for minor “bad decisions.”¹⁸ I recommend we capitalize on these opportunities and inject into training for our junior leaders, features of the strategic leadership metacompetencies.

Another supporter for training military leaders across the Army in strategic competencies was Doctor Rod Magee, a previous faculty member with the Army War College Department of Command Leadership Management. He authored a publication in 1998, later updated in 2004, and entitled “Strategic Leadership Primer.” In his 1998 document, he claimed that leadership requirements introduced at lower levels build the foundation of strategic leader competencies.¹⁹ Further refined in the 2004 update, he stated that leaders must be comfortable with abstracts and concepts common in the strategic environment.²⁰ His studies follow along with my argument that the US military needs to train leaders on Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies that specifically deal with abstracts (mental agility). I hope that the above accounts provide a basis of support to spiraling of strategic leadership attributes down to junior leaders. There are a number of opportunities in the officer education system when the military should integrate the Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies .

WHEN TO BEGIN JUNIOR LEADER SLM DEVELOPMENT AND WHY

Historically, it was not until officers attended senior service college that they would receive Strategic Leadership Metacompetency type skill enhancement. I found that the Army's FM 22-100 supported the concept reserving training in these metacompetencies for flag officers, defining strategic leaders as general officers and members of the Army's Senior Executive Service.²¹ I got the impression there was reluctance by senior leaders to support the idea that junior leaders had as much need to assimilate certain Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies as they themselves commit to needing. As mentioned in several Army War College studies, there had been little acknowledgement and encouragement to develop Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies in our junior leaders. I could not find only a few mentions of leader development attributes resembling the strategic leadership metacompetencies in current junior leader development doctrine.

Within the Army's officer entry training process, only the US Military Academy currently incorporates Strategic Leadership Metacompetency type training into their curriculum. The Academy designed their curriculum to fuse the senior cadet's understanding of the Army's professional practices as they transitioned to the Officer Corps. Using reflection, their courses

examine interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills and how those skills affect organizational environments. These courses referred to as Military Science would further the cadet's understanding of their role as a commissioned officer in the "Profession of Arms" and reinforce the importance of their professional self-development.²² The other Army commissioning sources provide only the basic concepts of leadership knowledge, skills, and abilities found in FM 22-100. Not all commissioning sources provide cadets opportunity to participate in training reflecting strategic leadership metacompetencies. A net result, newly commissioned officers possess varying degrees of adaptive and innovative skills. It was no wonder that as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom missions matured, feedback from the field supported the need for the military to introduce strategic leadership metacompetencies into cadet training.

By all current accounts, it is never too soon to begin developing leaders with the attributes needed to engage our new threat. The Army as an institution has numerous opportunities built in to the training system to address training leaders in all current doctrinal knowledge, skills, and abilities training leaders from pre-commissioning through their entire career. Army leaders and educators need to bridge the gap between FM 22-100 and the Army's changing missions. They need to ensure integration of strategic leadership competencies into the same training cycle as leaders receive from doctrine found in FM 22-100. As the organization responsible for updating FM 22-100, the Training and Doctrine Command is engaged in updating the leadership roles and functions to include strategic leadership type competencies. This publication is one of the many training publications undergoing revision to include leadership competencies that resemble those mentioned in the Army War College study. Besides updating publications, Training and Doctrine Command is also engaged in developing high technology training tools.²³ These changes will take time.

The military should also look to the Training and Doctrine Command's introduction of the Life Long Learning concept as a new tool to introduce strategic leadership competencies into officer development. This training concept also referred to as Task Force Soldier, is a collaborative communications-training tool built on realistic operational scenarios. What better way to grow leaders than to look at it as a life long learning strategy they can engage from any computer terminal using Army Knowledge On-line, any where, any time from commissioning through retirement. According to Gen. Byrnes, the Training and Doctrine Command Commander, lifelong learning is part of the training transformation. The Army needs to be successful on tomorrow's battlefield. Life long learning is becoming a common thread in Training and Doctrine Command's future training and leader development strategy. To

accomplish this, training for all members of the joint team has to be a life long learning experience, integrating innovative techniques, tactics, and procedures along side emerging technology at the earliest opportunity.²⁴

Once cadets receive their commission to become Lieutenants, the integration of strategic competencies remains minimal. The next phase of leader development is the Basic Officer Leadership Course Phase II; phase I was pre-commissioning. This is where newly commissioned officers train in the realm of tactical leadership competencies. This phase reinforces the knowledge, skills, and abilities found in FM 22-100. Integrating the findings and resulting tools from the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Study into this phase should compliment the knowledge, skills, and abilities attained in the pre-commissioning program. This integration offers the Army an Officer who is not only trained in warrior tasks and the warrior Battle Drills, but who is also self-aware and adaptable, an Officer who will not accept defeat and will never quit, who demonstrate the characteristics of an Army leader while living the Army Values; and who embodies the warrior ethos. Upon graduation of this phase, officers will attend their respective basic branch specific courses.²⁵

The Officer Basic Branch Course Phase III is a more technically based program of instruction. Here newly commissioned officers receive the necessary branch specific technical training. The intent of this phase is to equip officers with the basic technical expertise that when melded with Basic Officer Leadership Course phase I and II competencies will best prepare junior officers to hit the ground running to their respective first assignments, very often joining their units directly into combat operations.²⁶ Early officer training pays little emphasis to the art of strategic leadership. Officers may not see further development of strategic competencies until they attend the new Captains Career Course. Phase III should offer the opportunity to exercise the melding of technical and tactical competencies while integrating some degree the Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies as part of the exercise scenarios.

The Captains Career Course, a newly developed leader development program provides combined arms training to all captains. This course focuses on reestablishing a common Army standard for fighting, leading, and training combined arms units.²⁷ The Captains Career Course provides officers with opportunity to learn from officers with recent combat operational experience. This is a great opportunity to include strategic leader competencies. There may not be any better learning environment outside actual mission execution where you would hear first hand the details if historical cold-war techniques, tactics and procedures worked or did not work. Beyond this course, current doctrine does include officer training in the strategic leader competencies.

WHERE TRAINING TAKES PLACE?

Given the emerging doctrinal updates and technological advances, training our junior leaders can now take place just about anywhere anytime as Training and Doctrine Command continues to revolutionize where, when, and how they will conduct training. There is still a near term requirement for junior officers to attend resident schools, part of the Army's institutional education framework where they pick-up the lion's share of leadership competencies. The Army also trains leaders through a number of combat training centers located across the globe. The combat training centers are the venues where soldiers as part of units come to train by sharing their real-world combat experiences with other units and new unit members. These centers offer units opportunity to practice the skills they picked up through operational deployments, from institutional training settings, and training they participated in as members of units. However, a number of individual officer accounts suggested that the combat training centers have not incorporated Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies into their scenarios. Despite these issues, Training and Doctrine Command is working to improve all of these training venues to include more lessons learned and emerging techniques, tactics, and abilities.

The Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command, General Byrnes, introduced in 2002 a systems approach to training. An officer can now participate in professional development training either in an institutional setting and/or through distance learning from the officer's personal computer. This is a huge improvement.²⁸

In a summer 2004 issue of Military Review, Ken Romaine alluded to research; he conducted outlining developing junior leaders in a transforming Army. Ken argued that the Army needed to do better at anticipating leader attributes from Lieutenant to Colonel. He contended that under the auspices of the three pillars of soldier development, the institutional arm of development still falls short of addressing leader attributes needed for the future leaders. The institutional training division has not integrated the changing nature of conflict.²⁹ He is correct. You will not find specific mentions of strategic leader attributes mentioned on the Training and Doctrine Command web site or regulations. Nevertheless, they have taken notice and do have plans to enhance their training development programs. According to their web site, they plan to include changes on what they will train and the way they conduct training due to a number of developments: a post Cold War environment, an asymmetric adversary, military downsizing, conversion of many military positions to civilian positions, as well as technological advances. All which lend themselves to leaders requiring grounding in some if not all the Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies. Once the Training and Doctrine Command integrates

these attributes or competencies into the systems approach to training, they will become available to junior officer development across all Army training venues.

As I alluded to in the previous section while trying to answer the question of when the education system should conduct metacompetency training, I found that the lifelong learning concept also answers the “where” to integrating metacompetencies. Lifelong learning is the ability of a Soldier to learn, grow and achieve technically and tactically throughout a career, wherever they serve. Lifelong learning begins with recruiter contact and progresses until expiration-term-of-service/retirement. Lifelong learning is a mixture of traditional schoolhouse resident training and training presented in other locations at the individual’s teachable moment. Lifelong learning uses the most effective mix of locations; materials and methods delivered just in time, on demand, and is adaptive to soldiers regardless of location. Distance learning and Web-based education-and-training materials are tools of lifelong learning. Lifelong learning also requests that the student accept and assume higher levels of personal responsibility for his or her education.³⁰ Another concept Training and Doctrine Command is exploring, referred to as assignment-oriented training, further supports the feasibility of teaching strategic leadership metacompetencies to junior leaders based on the type of assignment they face not based on grade.

In a September 9, 2003 speech, General Byrnes attested to the fact that “assignment-oriented training is something working in the schoolhouse that allows us to target soldiers, officers, if we know where they’re going in their first unit. I can modify advanced individual training to make sure we are sure we are targeting them on what they need for the first unit. In the area of self-development, I have to have reach-back capability available for Soldiers so they can get back in and look at being better at their current jobs and at perhaps their next skill level. I have to have this available for officers getting ready to go into staff positions. I don’t know if our current education process for captains is providing that type of opportunity, so we’re going to take a look at our distance learning and make sure those jobs we were satisfying through a longer (Combined Arms and Services Staff School) can provide officers the opportunity to get in to prep for the next position. It has to be a lifelong-learning philosophy.”³¹ Assignment-oriented training has the potential to focus appropriate strategic leadership metacompetencies to the right officer at the right time. Once the military initiates the process to function at the right place and time, the flow of the process becomes the next question I need to answer.

HOW SHOULD WE CONDUCT THE TRAINING?

How should the military integrate Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies attributes into leader development?

General Byrnes, having oversight for most officers training from pre-commissioning to retirement, provided a vision that I believe included how his organization would integrate Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies into junior officer development through: capitalizing on their systems approach to training; lifelong learning concepts; and better connectivity anywhere a leader is assigned. His visionary goals provide all of us an equation on how to provide the best combination of leadership competencies to our junior leaders.

Even more importantly, I believe we, as senior leaders, need to take greater responsibility for reinforcing the Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies into mentoring our subordinates. We need to become aware of all opportunities, our responsibilities for forwarding these concepts, then ensuring they are included into our mentoring and counseling practices reinforcing the training the junior officers receive in the other venues.

OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION

With any new idea or concept, it is human nature to project resistance. You could even argue the Army education system as it transforms, should expect some degree of resistance. I identified a few expected obstacles to integrating Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies into junior officer development. I divided this section into four parts: (1) teachers, (2) students, (3) curriculum, and (4) technology.

I feel the likelihood of successfully incorporating strategic leadership metacompetencies into junior leader training, resides to a large degree with the teachers and students. In the category of teachers, I include the instructors, supervisors, and mentors. The education system planners and administrators need to ensure they arm instructors with the proper tools and motivation, and effective train-the-trainer programs. Senior leaders, as supervisors and mentors, can affect the process by not embracing change and innovation. They can make or break the opportunity to lay the appropriate strategic leadership competency foundation within the hearts and minds of our junior officers through sincere counseling and mentoring. Our junior officers represent a blemish free canvas. In their young lives, they may not have had the opportunity to develop resistance to new ideas thus remaining open to learning. They should be open to the Army transformation dealing with a 21st century adversary. The only obstacle that the students could affect would be their inability to internalize the importance of the Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies, specifically, cross cultural savvy, the warrior ethos, and mental

agility. The education system needs an assessment that will ensure the student's experiences reflect they received the message.

As we can view on the Training and Doctrine website, our training institutions are working, improving the curriculum to encompass Strategic Leadership Metacompetency attributes. That is still, however, a work in progress. Resourcing could adversely affect success now. Senior military leaders need to ensure budgeting encompasses the entire spectrum of training.

The technology aspect of leader development is constantly changing giving way to many concerns. One concern from a social aspect of teaching is that technology would replace live instructors, undermining success. I believe distance-learning concepts are in many instances the smart move given resource constraints and pace of deployments. However, some leader professional attributes do not translate well from personal encounters to computer screen exchanges. It might be a challenge trying to convey aspects of any one of the three Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies to junior officers through a computer screen. They each have social, personal aspects that require face-to-face interaction. The educators should explore using combinations of techniques where an officer receives the basics from a distance-learning module, but transitions to face-to-face scenarios in practical application. Another aspect where technology can have a negative effect involves the availability of techno-savvy teachers who understand the systems involved in the training process. There is nothing worse than frustrated teachers who cannot use the systems because lack either either of training or lack of system maintenance. Additionally, there is a value to the distance-learning construct to training, responsive tools available anytime anywhere especially as our officers are deployed for longer and more often periods. General Byrnes voiced some concerns regarding the technology aspect of training being available to soldiers. He mentioned in a recent interview, "I have responsibility in the Training and Doctrine Command to support units. I have to be able to provide support to Soldiers and leaders anywhere, anytime. They have to be able to reachback into the schoolhouse, and not just get into the reference library but to get the coursework they need to help train their Soldiers in the tasks ahead. Commanders have to be able to reach back and pull up what they need anywhere, anytime. I would love to be able to immerse a squad leader in the environment and have them fight in that environment in a virtual type of world before (deploying). On the terrain, in the villages, in whatever conditions we employ our soldiers; we could put that training facility out where brigades could access it. That would be a tremendous capability for young officers and noncommissioned officers to have.³² Once the military has tackled the obvious obstacles, we need to ask ourselves, was it all worth the trouble?

SO WHAT

The Global War on Terror is not just a “contingency,” nor is it a temporary “crisis.” The new reality will require constant vigilance. The complexity and uncertainty we now face and envision for the future reinforce the need for adaptation innovation and continuous learning. It means our Army a critical component of the Joint Team, should expect that sustained operations will be the norm and not the exception. This is our new strategic reality. We must think, live, and act within this context. We must develop our Soldiers and our leaders to be more like pentathletes and decathletes and we must build much more adaptable and flexible organizations as we engage our future.

—General Cody, VCSA
Remarks at the AUSA Eisenhower Reception Oct. 26, 2004

I would say based on General Cody’s remarks, it would be hard to put a value on all the effort that is going into transforming our junior officer education system. The benefits will certainly out way any cost. Leaders will always need to adapt to new military missions filled with uncertainty and ambiguous adventure. Leaders will always need to possess the understanding of the elements of our national power overlaid with emerging technologies. These elements are ever changing, taking on new forms and encompassing dimensions faster than policy makers can document. Leaders need to be able to internalize these competencies and share them with their subordinates. No more excuses for tactical mistakes that turn into strategic nightmares because someone did not get it.

I believe it is a fact that junior leaders need a certain level of grounding in strategic leadership competencies. The military leadership cannot deny this given everything we read and see in the course of prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. I believe we cannot wait until our junior leaders become Colonels or Sergeants Major to get this training as most senior leaders had previously claimed. Feedback the military receives from the field of returning Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom service members, Training and Doctrine Command initiatives, and the Army Training and Leader Development Panel studies all support the need to integrate metacompetencies into junior officer training.

Training junior leaders needs to occur all across the leader development continuum. Our leadership development programs need to emphasize the Strategic Leadership Metacompetency type characteristics. The Army is emphasizing these strategic leader competencies through updated education systems, program curriculum; training aids, devices, simulations, and simulations; and combat training centers. Progress is cumbersome. It takes a long time to change a mindset that for decades followed cold war conventional wisdom. There

will always be room for improvement as our adversaries hope and even expect us to become complacent.

These solutions are not cheap. Everything comes with a cost. I believe it is more economical and palatable to invest early in the Army's center-of-gravity, military leaders, than to assume risk leaving it up to figuring it out should the need arise. We as senior leaders need to ensure our subordinates succeed. We need to take a stake in making it happen.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this project was to present the case that the military needs to provide junior leaders a certain level of grounding in Strategic Leader Metacompetencies. I hope I was able to convey the significance of this important issue. I believed it before I started my research and still do feel junior leaders need grounding in leader attributes that we do not currently find in leader development doctrine. I included supporting ideas by pulling together many of the ongoing and emerging discussions on the subject. I tried to identify which and why strategic leader metacompetencies are most important for junior leaders to obtain both through direct feedback from leaders serving in current operations as well as transformational initiatives. I proposed when the Army should begin introducing strategic leader competencies into a junior leader's development process. I outlined where this junior leaders training needs to take place, and finally how the Army should conduct the training.

This project acknowledges that the Army, with the help of the Training and Doctrine Command, is engaged in updating the process of officer leader training. I remain hopeful that they will see the need to integrate the metacompetencies into warrant and non-commissioned officer leader development as well. I also remain vigilant that Army will fully integrate some forms of Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies at all levels in all training components to include the emerging civilian training concepts.

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ENDNOTES

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²⁰Ibid., iv.

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²³Kevin P. Byrnes, GEN, "Life long Learning: A Transformation in Training, Mindset," 24 October 2003; available from <<http://www.tradoc.army.mil.html>>; Internet; accessed 17 November 2004.

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²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., 4.

²⁸Byrnes.

²⁹Kenneth A. Romaine, "Developing Lieutenants in a Transforming Army;" *Military Review* 84 (July-August 2004): 72.

³⁰Byrnes.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

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