Joint Logistics Cannot Work Without Legislative Enforcement of Title 10, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Logistics Reorganization
Abstract
The contributions of logistics have been widely recognized as being the key to a successful military operation or when executed poorly a primary reason for failure. For the modern United States military the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) changed years of standard practice as to how the Services conducted military operations and empowered the Combatant Commanders to operate as Joint Task Forces. DOD logistics support for the Combatant Commanders lies with the Services. Title 10 requires the Services be responsible for their logistics functions (supplying equipping servicing mobilizing demobilizing and maintaining). Therefore neither the Combatant Commander as an individual or the Services as a whole can meet Title 10 obligations and GNA objectives effectively - especially when it comes to the support and distribution of logistics to the warfighter. The establishment of a Unified Logistics Agency (ULA) and Joint Logistics Commands (JLCs) by the Department of Defense (DOD) would provide the Combatant Commanders the necessary command and control planning and training therefore DOD would have the necessary logistics capabilities to support joint logistics. This paper will propose an alternative to sustain the Combatant Commander's logistical capability in an operational environment in accordance with his Title 10 and GNA requirements.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 31, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA432194
Entities
People
- Robin B. Akin
Organizations
- United States Army War College