Counterinsurgency: Relearning How to Think
Abstract
The U.S. military's experience with insurgencies spans its history from the American Revolution to its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current geostrategic environment is fertile for global insurgency, primarily the threat of radical Islamic extremists who have learned to leverage 21st century technologies to enhance their strategic power projection capability. This paper will examine the adequacy of current U.S. counterinsurgency strategic policy, operational concepts and doctrine. Through the review of two case studies, the British Army in Malaya 1948-1960 and the United States Army in the Philippines 1898-1902, insights for strategic leaders and planners will be gleaned and proposed for inclusion in future doctrinal updates.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 18, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA432422
Entities
People
- Gerald E. Galloway
Organizations
- United States Army War College