Pre-War Planning for a Post-War Iraq
Abstract
The postwar situation in Iraq following Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a result of failed planning efforts between the U.S. State Department and Defense Department. The State Department spent over nine months planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. OSD assumed postwar planning just two months prior to the invasion; while disregarding the efforts team and information already completed by the State Departments Future of Iraq Project. Disagreements and personal beliefs at the heads of the State Department and Defense Department lead to a failed postwar planning effort. The situation in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein was not what the U.S. expected. OSD believed that following the removal of Hussein from power U.S. and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators by the Iraqi people. Soon afterwards looting and lawlessness ensued. U.S. coalition and Iraqi security forces have been battling an insurgency making it extremely difficult to establish effective governance and reconstruction. Over 1500 U.S. military and countless Iraqi civilians have been killed most after major combat ended. Recommendations are made to avoid risk of such failure in postwar efforts in future military operations. Postwar planning must be done early with emphasis in the interagency process with the overall objectives of the U.S. as the goal not personal agendas.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 18, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA432654
Entities
People
- Robert K. Mendenhall
Organizations
- United States Army War College