

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

EFFECT OF GLOBAL POSTURE STRATEGY
ON U.S. INFLUENCE IN EUROPE

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Bush administration's adoption of an Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy that significantly reduces U.S. force presence in Europe will be politically challenging. The withdrawal of U.S. forces to some is a signal to a lessening of U.S. interest in NATO and Europe. Will following this new strategy take the U.S. across an invisible threshold where its force presence in Europe no longer guarantees leadership and influence in NATO? How is U.S. leadership in NATO defined? This paper examines U.S. influence and leadership in NATO and the potential effect Global Presence and Basing Strategy may have.

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EFFECT OF GLOBAL POSTURE STRATEGY ON U.S. INFLUENCE IN EUROPE

Over the coming decade, we will deploy a more agile and more flexible force, which means that more of our troops will be stationed and deployed from here at home. We will move some of our troops and capabilities to new locations, so they can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats. We'll take advantage of 21st century military technologies to rapidly deploy increased combat power. The new plan will help us fight and win these wars of the 21st century. It will strengthen our alliances around the world, while we build new partnerships to better preserve the peace.

—President George W. Bush

The U.S. has embarked on a major transformation of its overseas forces stationed in Europe over the next five to ten years. President Bush announced a global posture strategy in August 2004 to redeploy about 70,000 troops, plus 100,000 family members and civilian workers from Europe and Asia. This strategy under development for the last three years is envisioned to take about eight to ten years to complete.¹ The lion's share of these forces would come from Army troops stationed in Germany; about two-thirds or 37,000 of the Army's total force of 62,000 to include two heavy divisions, will return to the continental U.S. (CONUS) and be replaced by the Army's new Stryker Brigade, an additional airborne battalion and a rotational ground maneuver brigade from CONUS.² At end state, America's land force presence in Europe will be significantly smaller with the remaining forces being transformed into an agile expeditionary force. For some, shifting from "Cold War" heavy structure to a smaller, lighter, more deployable force, exemplifies America's leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To others, withdrawal of more forces signals a lessening of U.S. interest in NATO and Europe. As stated in the National Security Strategy (NSS)³, and reinforced in recent remarks by President Bush⁴, the U.S. remains committed to a strong and vibrant NATO alliance and close transatlantic ties.

As America prepares to redeploy and restructure its forces in Europe under this new Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS)⁵, will the U.S. cross an invisible threshold where its force presence in Europe no longer guarantees leadership and influence in NATO? This paper examines the effect the IGPBS will have on U.S. influence and leadership in NATO. Following a description of the details of IGPBS and NATO transformation, this analysis will define U.S. leadership in NATO through an evaluation of the elements of national power and assess the impact of IGPBS on U.S. leadership in Europe. Recommendations will be presented to mitigate any potential negative impact of this strategy.

IGPBS

The origins of the IGPBS can be traced back at least three years to the guidance contained in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Section IV of the QDR, Reorienting the U.S. Military Global Posture, states that the current posture of U.S. forces in Western Europe is inadequate to meet the future strategic environment. It indicates that forward deployed forces in the future must provide deterrence based on resident capabilities to include combat and expeditionary forces and forcible entry forces, along with C2 assets, combined with flexible basing and assured access.⁶ Additional guidance followed in the classified pages of the 2003 Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). Combatant commanders were tasked to conduct a global posture review, in coordination with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), to explore and prepare options for a new global posture for America's military forces. This new strategy offered OSD an opportunity to eliminate less than useful "Cold War" forces from Europe, reduce the number of PCS rotations to Outside Continental U.S. (OCONUS)⁷ and rationalize/rightsize overseas basing structure, all residual problems leftover from the drawdown of the 1990s.

Such reviews and realignments are not new. The Pentagon conducted four previous rounds of base closures in the United States and will conduct its fifth in 2005. In 1991, with the Cold War won and the end of the first Gulf War in sight, the last and only OCONUS restructuring plans were being finalized. The political euphoria following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the swift defeat of Iraq heightened claims of a "new world order" and demands for a "peace dividend." Absent a Soviet threat and related justification for a large NATO Alliance, U.S. policy planners lacked a strategic rationale for U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) force of approximately 315,000 troops in Europe. The end of the Gulf War provided the impetus for a politically driven solution. Lacking a viable threat, a politically expedient decision was reached in Washington that the Peace Dividend should be realized by reducing U.S. forces in Europe by two thirds, from 315,000 down to approximately 100,000. Washington politics were straightforward: this was to be the minimum force presence in Europe required to sustain U.S. leadership in NATO and desired influence in Europe. The number 100,000 was the politically established force ceiling within which military planners were then tasked to craft a joint force structure. The declarative Bush (41) administration policy created by GEN Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, set forth a strategy for a smaller U.S. military; a force sufficient to fight two nearly simultaneously regional contingencies, one in the Persian Gulf and the other in Northeast Asia, with a minimum focus in Europe.

One decade later, a similar politically driven scenario is being played out. Washington politics, not military necessity, is the prime driver in determining the troop level for U.S. forces in Europe. A principal focus of this global posture review is on Europe, specifically the Army's forces in Germany. The approximate 30 to 40 percent reduction of USEUCOM's forces, particularly the two-thirds Army reduction, was politically driven from Washington. The fundamental political question today, similar to that of the early 90s, is determination of the minimum force presence necessary to secure a strong and viable NATO Alliance under U.S. leadership and with maximum American influence in Europe. Either case should bring little surprise to an astute observer. More often than not politics drives all other competing strategic factors when shaping national strategy. In both cases, the framing of the force was not derived through a rigorous mission to force structure analysis. This is not to say that the unspoken political guidance was in some way wrong. These observations, though difficult to demonstrate with physical evidence, are founded on the author's personnel experience and direct knowledge of the unwritten events. Placing this in a larger context, quite often military planners are given politically established end state constraints and then must backwards engineer the best force to meet the mission. Today many competing factors beyond military necessity drive decisions such as diplomatic relationships, economics, domestic politics (base closures), global force commitments, demands of transformation and OPTEMPO, all influencing IGPBS.

REVIEW IN NUMBERS

Under the current Global Posture Review USEUCOM bears the predominance of the overseas restructuring. The largest of these changes is a two-thirds reduction in U.S. Army Forces Europe (USAREUR) from 62,000 to about 25,000 troops. Under the plan, two heavy divisions, totaling 25,000, along with 12,000 corps and theater level combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) troops will return to CONUS. Replacing these formations will be the Army's lethal new German-based Stryker Brigade, a force of about 4,000, providing a lighter and more agile force that will be paired up with a modular 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Italy. A third rotational ground maneuver brigade (from CONUS), based on the Black Sea, will round out USAREUR's land combat force. USAREUR HQs and V Corps HQs shall be consolidated into the Army's new Unit of Employment y (UEy) HQs. Further reductions are found in consolidation of the 19 theater and Corps level combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units into seven new tailored, separate battalion/brigade size "Units of Action" (UA). U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE), currently a force of 33,000, comprised of seven squadrons, will reduce to approximately 29,000. Included is the consolidation of USAFE HQs

and its Numbered Air Force HQs to improve and streamline command and control. This shifts the historical dominating service (numerically) within USEUCOM from USAREUR to USAFE. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) will close its HQs in London and consolidate with 6th Fleet HQs in Naples resulting in little change to the total force of 10,000. The 1,500 Special Operations Forces (SOF) are projected to grow by one or two battalions and possibly move south of the Alps. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) has no permanently assigned units and rotational Expeditionary Strike Group presence is limited.⁸




FIGURE 1

SMALLER MAY BE BETTER

To meet the demands of the 21st century security environment USEUCOM requires an expeditionary joint team capable of operating either unilaterally or as part of an alliance or coalition; able to conduct full spectrum operations, equipped with excellent command and control (C2) and based in the right locations with assured access to key regions. Is a force more than one-third smaller capable of fulfilling these requirements?

America's greatest military strength is arguably found in its peerless joint and combined C2 capabilities. The foremost aspect of restructuring is to streamline the number of service headquarters and at the same time provide Commander USEUCOM (COMEUR) with transformed C2. To achieve this each four-star service component headquarters will combine

with its subordinate three-star headquarters. This accomplishes several desired effects: headquarters structures are streamlined, service theater functions are retained, new separable/deployable operational level headquarters are created and four-star service commands are retained. USAREUR, NAVEUR and USAFE each also maintain their dual NATO billets as Commander, Component Command Land HQ. Heidelberg; Commander, Joint Force Command HQ. Naples; Commander, Component Command Air HQ. Ramstein correspondingly. Direct links into NATO at the senior command level provides the optimal means for sharing the benefits of U.S. transformation with NATO. These headquarters are the primary tool COMEUR will use to engage NATO and individual nations, shape political–military relations, build multinational partnerships, expand C2 interoperability within the alliance or with coalition partners, and set the example for a professional democratic armed forces to other nations.

In the future COMEUR will become more reliant on what will become the USAREUR/Task Force 5 (TF5) HQs than the other component headquarters to meet contingency requirements and to work closely with NATO. This is based on the limited availability of Marine or Navy rotational combat forces and USAFE more often serving in a supporting role for another service. As a land centric alliance it is logical for COMEUR to turn to his Army component as the primary tool for security cooperation with individual nations, and NATO as a whole. Increased flexibility and capability is provided to COMEUR with USAREUR's new UEy headquarters, which can deploy three separate task force headquarters. The UEy in place headquarters, staffed predominantly by civilians and contractors provides service component and Title X support to the theater and reach back for deployed headquarters. The preponderance of military staff is deployable, with the capability to man three task force headquarters. Each headquarters is capable of conducting joint operations across the full spectrum based on joint augmentation.

- TF5, derived from the current V Corps headquarters, is a three-star Joint Task Force (JTF) capable headquarters, stationed in Germany fulfilling COMEUR's requirement for large contingencies. TF5 can be tailored to serve as a three-star JTF or Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) headquarters, and will employ the most modern and combat proven Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems available in the Army today.
- Southern European Task Force (SETAF) will remain a two-star JTF capable headquarters, stationed in Italy. Rapidly deployable anywhere within 24 hours of alert notification, SETAF's focus is toward early-entry and crisis response operations. The

- Eastern European Task Force (EETAF) is to be new smaller forward stationed headquarters on the Black Sea with an assigned rotational heavy or light brigade. Stationed on NATO's eastern frontier, EETAF's primary mission is to train and exercise with new NATO partners in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea region. EETAF is also intended to be used in small-scale contingencies similar to SETAF.

SOF ground and air capabilities in USEUCOM are to increase with plans to consolidate all SOF into a single facility south of the Alps. These expanded SOF capabilities combined with USAREUR's Airborne UA and Stryker Brigade and air assets under USAFE provide COMEURL with an unequalled potent expeditionary force serving as a regional deterrent or responding to crisis with forcible-entry and early-entry capabilities.



Combining advanced expeditionary maneuver forces with streamlined deployable headquarters presents a model transformed force to NATO and also demonstrates a renewed commitment to Europe and NATO. The U.S. will now have stationed in Europe the ideal force to contribute to NATO Response Force (NRF) rotations further emphasizing America's commitment to NATO. For COMEURL, scalable, agile and lethal expeditionary land forces are ideal not just for crisis response but for peace time engagement and deterrence in key regions. Finally either TF5 or SETAF headquarters could serve as an experimental Standing JTF for developing new joint tactics, techniques and procedures for joint and coalition forcible/early-entry operations to inform U.S. and NATO transformation efforts.

TRANSFORMATION OF NATO

Transforming the U.S. military posture in Europe complements NATO's own effort to transform. Alliance members face a new range of global transnational security challenges in the 21st century from instability created by failed states to terrorists with weapons of mass destruction all beyond Europe's borders. With geography and distance no longer providing relative security, NATO collectively recognizes the need to transform. Initial attempts, led by the U.S. to transform NATO met with varied success. The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched at the Washington Summit in April 1999, intended to reverse the growing capability gap between the U.S. and Europe through increased modernization spending. Nations, in principal, committed to supporting increased defense funding for 58 specific deficient capabilities areas, grouped in five broad categories - deployability, sustainability, survivability, communications and effective engagement. But across Europe, parliaments with flattened defense spending and lacking the political desire never supported DCI totally.¹⁰ Beginning around 1999, due to some prodding by the U.S., individual nations were tasked in NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) to begin transforming their large heavy non-deployable territorial defense forces to smaller more deployable and sustainable expeditionary forces.¹¹ Progress toward these force goals has generally been slow and sporadic among European allies.

Realizing NATO transformation was not achieving tangible results due to European domestic politics, lead time for initiatives, under funded defense budgets and objectives being too broad, the U.S. pushed for a more focused set of limited but achievable objectives at the 2002 Prague Summit. Alliance leaders emerged from the summit heralding the new Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), as a concentrated effort to bring forward transformed military

capabilities to meet the security requirements of the 21st century. The 58 DCI areas were scaled down to a manageable eight:

- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition.
- Air-to-ground surveillance.
- Command, control and communications.
- Combat effectiveness (precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses)
- Strategic lift - air and sea.
- Air-to-air refueling.
- Deployable CS and CSS units.

To make this even more politically and economically appealing, nations were given the option of alternative approaches to achieve these capabilities. They could work collectively as a group on single capability; nations could pursue single niche capabilities or nations could drop from one program to work on another.

Approval was also given for an NRF that would provide for a highly flexible and modern force rapidly deployable and sustainable with interoperable land, sea, and air forces. The NRF was another transformation initiative from the U.S. having been proposed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld at a NATO meeting in September 2002. Finally, NATO would streamline its command structure eliminating unnecessary and inefficient components and creating more flexible and deployable commands.¹²

The Prague Summit provided the critically needed momentum of change to ensure continued relevance and strength of the Alliance through transformation. By the 2004 Istanbul Summit, Secretary Rumsfeld and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer were touting the successful start of the NRF. Secretary Rumsfeld further stated, "The reality is that NATO is a military alliance that has no real relevance unless it has the ability to fairly rapidly deploy military capabilities."¹³ GEN Jones, dual hatted as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of USEUCOM, described the NRF as the "transformational vehicle for the Alliance."¹⁴

The NRF has achieved initial operating capability as a functional 20,000 man multi-service organization of land, sea and air forces deployable worldwide within 5-30 days.¹⁵ Nations contribute forces on six-month standby rotations. Its' land component is a rapidly deployable combined arms brigade size formation and is self-sustainable for up to 30 days using organic

CS and CSS capability. For the U.S., the NRF also serves as the primary vehicle to prompt nations toward transformational reform. Nations are able to expand experience and knowledge gained by their own upgraded and trained units committed to the NRF. As this cycle repeats itself, ultimately the majority of alliance members will experience transformational change.¹⁶ Although nations have embraced the NRF concept to a degree, rotations continue to be plagued by shortfalls.

DEFINING U.S. LEADERSHIP IN NATO

The restructuring of USEUCOM will lead to one of three outcomes for U.S. leadership and influence in NATO: strengthened, weakened or unchanged. To discern the most likely outcome one must first establish the basis from which U.S. leadership in NATO is derived. The adage “where one sits is where one stands” may best describe the diverse and nebulous views of what defines U.S. leadership and influence. Perspectives vary across the different levels within the current Administration along with perceptions from our allies; all which contribute to forming the basis of U.S. leadership. Unfortunately, there is no one accepted definition and/or set of attributes that qualifies or quantifies U.S. leadership in NATO. Absent an established definition for U.S. leadership, a working definition might be framed around the elements of national power. Using elements of national power from the MIDLIFE model (military, information, diplomatic, legal, intelligence, finance, and economic elements) may provide a means to roughly frame the basic key components of American leadership and influence.

The military element of power sets the cornerstone for all the others in defining leadership and influence, and it is founded on America’s dominance in force capability, transformation, commitment and presence. A less tangible element of power is information, primarily in the form of public diplomacy, where perceptions by allies and adversaries count and NATO’s credibility can be tied to America’s strength and commitment. Burden sharing plays a crucial role in the context of perceptions by other nations, especially if the U.S. is taking on its fair share of responsibilities, thus contributing to determining U.S. leadership. American diplomatic and political prowess, second only to the military element of power creates the strength of U.S. leadership and influence. The diplomatic element of power provides the primary medium for America to communicate its strategic intent and message (information). U.S. leadership is also derived from consensus building and resolving perceived inequalities; a role other nations like France, Germany and UK can not fill. Resolute commitment to treaty compliance and multinational institutions are legal aspects of U.S. strengths provided to NATO. Continued strong U.S. commitment to the Alliance underwrites its level of international credibility and

authority. U.S. intelligence resources, regionally and globally in collection technology and analysis, are unsurpassed within NATO. In the areas of finance and economics, America secures its leadership through its unequaled expenditure on research and development (R&D), acquisition of advanced weapons systems, military transformation and the sheer size of the U.S. military. European nations are increasingly reliant on U.S. funded technology and R&D to fill their future defense needs. Collaboration with U.S. industry and military is driven by American dominance innovations and technology. Finally, America funds 24% of the NATO common budgets.

As we embark upon this important endeavor we must be mindful of our unique leadership responsibilities we enjoy in the community of nations, and we must ensure the measures we undertake, in its end state, increase our strategic effectiveness

—General James L. Jones
(Commander USEUCOM)

ASSESSING THE ELEMENTS OF POWER

Armed with a linkage between the base elements and U.S. leadership, an assessment can then be made on how each may be impacted by the restructuring of U.S. forces in Europe. Working from the easiest, the assessment will begin with the diplomatic, finance and economic elements of power. Critics argue that the timing of this new withdrawal is intended to penalize those nations who did not support the U.S. in its Iraq policy. Yet, ongoing senior-level consultations with NATO allies over the past year have created a positive understanding and acceptance within affected national capitals. Further, there have been no major objections to or indications of shifts in relations following the President's announcement of the planned withdrawal. As stated in the paper's introduction, America remains committed to a strong and vibrant NATO alliance and close transatlantic ties. It is reasonable to predict that there is an extremely low probability that U.S. diplomatic and political power within NATO will be affected one way or the other by a troop reduction.¹⁷

Regarding finance and economic impacts, the U.S. remains the highest contributor to the NATO common budgets at 24% and U.S. overall defense expenditures exceed all of the other NATO allies combined by one-third.¹⁸ The U.S. financial contribution to the Alliance will be unaffected by a redeployment of U.S. forces. Restructuring to a transformed expeditionary force, with streamlined headquarters leveraging the newest C2 technology, showcases American leadership in advanced capabilities and weapons systems. Allied desire for

America's newest technology will continue to maintain if not advance American dominance in the fields of innovation and technology. One can expect that diplomatic and economic elements of U.S. power will remain unchanged in relationship to the proposed withdrawal of forces from Europe.

U.S. force realignment should communicate a strong message that America will lead NATO transformation by example and actions, not just words. Replacing heavy legacy forces with the newest and advanced expeditionary forces is the message of example. General Jones refers to restructuring as USEUCOM's "theater transformation."¹⁹ Placement of U.S. forces and headquarters' flag on the Black Sea reaffirms NATO's commitment and interest toward its new southeastern boarder. This is a major psychological statement to potential adversaries and our allies, one that only America could make with credibility. These are concrete actions that communicate America's strength and commitment reinforcing the informational element of power.

Burden sharing is a second aspect of information as an element of U.S. power. Burden sharing is clearly a two-way street of perceptions between America and its allies. For the purpose of this assessment, consideration is focused on the allied perspective since it is from that perspective we derive our leadership and influence. In the Cold War, Europeans viewed burden sharing as the common risk that U.S. stationed troops shared with European forces against an attack by the Soviets. Today, burden sharing is best characterized by European expectations of working together as one team with everyone pulling their fair share. Over the last several years, Europeans have seen a continuous drop in availability of U.S. forces to participate in NATO exercises and training events due mainly to our global commitments. A prime example can be found with the NRF. As noted previously, the NRF continues to face manning short falls, with America as one of the lowest contributors. Even though it is an American initiative and there are sound reasons for limited participation; the perspective of the allies is quite different. A European analogy might be – America acts like a superstar player, having no time and being too good to practice with the team and desiring only to play in the big games. The withdrawal of significant forces from Europe may well reinforce such a view. U.S. leadership from a holistic information perspective can be characterized as slightly positive. The positive effects of transformation are offset slightly by corresponding negative ones from problems associated with burden sharing.

American preeminence in intelligence gathering, assessment and dissemination and its positive impact of U.S. leadership will remain unchanged.

The final element of power to consider is military with its associated components of force transformation, commitment, presence and capability. As stated earlier, the core source of U.S. leadership today stems from transformation. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer reaffirmed NATO's need for transformed forces when he said, "We need forces that are slimmer, tougher, and faster...more deployable and usable."²⁰ Replacing two heavy legacy divisions with the Army's premier transformational maneuver unit, the Stryker Brigade, is an irrefutable indication of America leading NATO's transformation effort. The transformed mix of forces (Stryker, airborne and heavy) provides full-spectrum capability (early/forcible entry and high intensity) to NATO while achieving the Secretary General's call for slimmer, tougher, more deployable and usable forces. These forces are examples of achievable transformation that is affordable for allies in both size and type forces. By consolidating and streamlining headquarters, the U.S. is further demonstrating how and why these types of transformational changes are achievable and necessary. USEUCOM's restructured force will serve as a model for NATO nations to achieve the force as outlined by the Secretary General. Physical transformation of the force will also bring an expeditionary mindset and planning capabilities as well as new joint warfighting doctrine and techniques. All of which are the attributes Alliance members are seeking for their own forces.

While the analysis of the military element thus far is very positive based on transformation, the same may not be said for the commitment of forces. Similar to burden sharing, force commitment faces a significant perception problem. Force commitments are a result of detailed defense planning and negotiations between the NATO Defense Planning Committee and individual nations. Nations declare their forces available to NATO in the DPQ. To ensure transparency in force planning and commitment the DPQ is published and distributed to all member nations. The U.S. declares all forces stationed in Europe as available as NATO Rapid Reaction Forces. These type forces are expected not only to be deployable but also available for NATO exercises and training to ensure interoperability. The withdrawal of 37,000 troops to include two divisions will create new interoperability issues. Allies will watch closely how in the future America deals with the issue of interoperability and the declaration of forces.

Burden sharing may be an issue that will haunt the U.S. for some time. For the last several years U.S. land forces based in Europe have been committed to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan making them unavailable for NATO deployments, exercises or the NRF. Given global commitments and a future land force of a little over one division stationed on the European continent, the U.S. may no longer be able to consistently meet common training and exercise requirements with NATO allies. Further contributing to this problem are the

multinational formations that the U.S. agreed to participate in to bolster allied formations and capabilities. Under these agreements, one U.S. armored division is committed to the British lead Allied Command Europe Rapid Response Corps (ARRC),²¹ along with a tailored corps level CS and CSS package. America has also committed one division to the German/U.S. Corps.²² These issues will be resolved over time, but collectively from an allied point of view, there is likely to be a perceived overall lowering of America's military commitment.

Adding to this perception of lower force commitment is the issue of force presence. The problems of force presence parallel those already listed above. Reducing by two-thirds America's ground force presence, combined with an already previously reduced marine and naval presence will have a marked impact on NATO. This also equates to less opportunity for exercise, training and interoperability between NATO and the U.S. with theater-based forces. CONUS based forces, though declared in the DPQ, cannot provide the requisite opportunities for interoperability, training and exercising. Increasing U.S. Air and SOF events²³ may partially offset this problem, but in a land oriented alliance it is the connection with traditional land forces that the European nations seek to retain. From an allied perspective if forces are not able to be stationed in Europe then they are most likely committed to something else and thus not available to NATO. As General Jones noted in a briefing, "virtual presence is actual absence."²⁴

The last category within the military element of power is force capability. Here is a case where less can be more. The current security situation demands less heavy forces; lighter forces will be more effective and relevant. USAREUR's transformed ground forces will be ideally suited for expeditionary missions, optimized for early-entry and forcible-entry operations and able to prepare the theater for arriving CONUS based or NATO follow-on forces. From a C2 perspective, USEUCOM will possess three separate rapidly deployable headquarters outfitted with the newest C4ISR capabilities linked to a transformed intelligence network that will be unequaled among European allies.²⁵ Transformed forces with enhanced capability will bolster U.S. leadership. However, from a European perspective of America's military involvement, smaller force commitment and reduced force presence could create an overall negative view.

CONCLUSIONS

Using the elements of national power assessment, an informed prediction can be made on the likely impact that the realignment of forces will have on U.S. leadership in Europe. Of the three possible outcomes, the analysis indicates that U.S. leadership will likely remain unchanged, with a slight tendency toward weakening. This conclusion is drawn from the

combined negative impact of minimized burden sharing, reduced force commitment and decreased force presence, all having significant influence on regional perceptions. Though the restructuring of U.S. forces in Europe will be politically challenging, IGPBS brings to Europe and NATO a totally transformed expeditionary force capability designed to meet the threats of the 21st century ranging from international terrorism to failed states. It represents an affordable force capability the U.S. has advocated for NATO's new out-of-area missions. As the leader in NATO, America is taking concrete steps towards transforming NATO forces. Critics only see the withdrawal of forces from Europe, suggesting an undermining of allied confidence America's commitment, leading to an erosion of U.S. leadership and influence in NATO. Today in a world of transformed forces and global commitments; large troop formations can no longer serve as the unit of measure for commitment. It is unlikely that U.S. leadership will change, but there is a potential that allied perceptions could move towards a questioning of U.S. resolve and commitment to the Alliance. Changing force structure alone may not be enough to dissuade skeptics of America's commitment; the strategy must include other tangible signs and actions by the U.S. to reassure those doubting U.S. resolve and support for NATO and Europe. These changes will require rethinking U.S. involvement in NATO activities, roles in multinational formations and the declaration of forces to NATO. Executed properly, IGPBS will not only transform the U.S. force posture, but will include a political declaration of the recommitment of those forces to strengthen the NATO Alliance while sustaining U.S. leadership and influence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are recommended actions the U.S. could take as part of IGPBS to avert potential misperceptions by allies leading to weakened U.S. leadership.

- Expand the participation of U.S. forces in NATO formations, exercises, training and missions. The most crucial of these changes would be to make USAREUR forces available at the earliest date possible for NRF rotations. The commitment of forces, even in small numbers, can not be initiated until other global force requirements subside. In the mean time, a diplomatic policy statement made by the U.S. outlining the recommitment of forces prior to the withdrawal of forces could be made.
- Reevaluate the U.S. commitment to multinational formations associated with NATO - the ARRC, V U.S./GE Corps and II GE/U.S. Corps. The U.S. has committed one heavy division and Corps CS/CSS enablers to the ARRC, which will no longer be present in Europe. An alternative could be for the U.S. to offer the ARRC expeditionary force packages from in-place forces and provide heavy forces as

required from CONUS. This would ensure continued interoperability training, exercising and planning. The bilateral Corps concept with Germany no longer makes operational sense given the fundamental changes to both Corps HQs²⁶, and that divisional forces are not available for interoperability training and exercising. Consideration should be given to an alternative bilateral relationship between the transforming German Armed Forces and American forces, to possibly include a sharing of the rotational presence on the Black Sea.

- Reevaluate how U.S. forces are declared in the DPQ. The U.S. must consider how it describes the availability of those forces stationed in CONUS to ensure allies perceive they can and will be made available to NATO when required.

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ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, "President Speaks at VFW Convention," White House News Release, 16 August 2004; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-12.html>>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2004.

² Jon R. Anderson, "Eastern Task Force among items on Transformation Drawing Board," *European Stars and Stripes*, 29 September 2004; available from <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20040929324459.html>>; Internet; accessed 30 September 2004.

³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002), section 8.

⁴ George W. Bush, "Remarks by President Bush and NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer," White House News Release, 10 November 2004; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041110-6.html>>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2004.

⁵ For the purpose of this paper Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) will be the single term to describe the new U.S. strategy for force presence and basing overseas. There are a number of other terms used interchangeably to describe different aspect of this new strategy. In March of 2003 the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) tasked the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a comprehensive and integrated presence and basing strategy for the next 10 years and was given the title IGPBS. The task for an IGPBS was restated in the classified Strategic Planning Guidance 06-11 (Dec 2003) under the section: Shape Force Posture. The actual study done by OSD Policy and the joint staff for IGPBS is the "Global Posture Review". In September 2004 SECDEF submitted a report to Congress outlining the concepts of the IGPBS titled: "Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture". In the current Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) IGPBS objectives are captured under the term: "Improved Global Force Posture".

⁶ Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington D.C.: 30 September 2001), 25-27.

⁷ PCS = Permanent Change of Station, is the moving of soldiers with their families to a new location normally for a three year tour of duty. The number of PCS moves within the Army plays a key role in an overall equation of available forces for deployment at any one time. By reducing the number of PCS moves within the Army more soldiers are stabilized, thus a greater number are then available at any one time to deploy in support of global contingencies requirements.

⁸ Anderson.

⁹ As part of consolidation of USAREUR and V Corps the existing 19 separate CS/CSS units will be amalgamate to seven that include Military Police, Military Intelligence, Medical, Engineer, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery and Signal.

¹⁰ Steve Meyer, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," *Parameters* (Winter 2003-04): 92-93.

¹¹ COL Harmsmah, Ronald, Dutch Officer assigned to NATO HQs, interviewed by author, 24 January 2005, Carlisle PA.

¹² NATO Prague Summit Declaration, (2002)127, 21 November 2003, NATO on Line Library; available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2005.

¹³ Donna Miles, "NATO Response Force Ready for Duty, Rumsfeld Says," American Forces Press Service, 27 June 2004; available from <http://www.dod.gov/news/Jun2004/n06272004_2004062704.html>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2004.

¹⁴ James L. Jones, "The United States European Command Strategic Theater Transformation: Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC Commander United States European Command," Written statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 23 September 2004, 11.

¹⁵ The NRF achieved initial operational capability in October 2004, full operational capability should be achieved by the fall of 2006.

¹⁶ Stephen J. Mariano and Brendan Wilson, "NATO Response Force: Political Deftness, Economic Efficiency, Military Power," *Center for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insights*, Volume II, Issue 4, April 2003; available from <<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/apr03/europe.asp>>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2004.

¹⁷ Douglas J. Feith, *Prepared Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee*, Washington D.C., 23 June 2004; available from <<http://www.pentagon.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040623-0522.html>>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004.

¹⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, 2002 July 2003*, Report to the U.S. Congress by the Secretary of Defense; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2003/index.html>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004.

¹⁹ Jones, 5.

²⁰ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "NATO Istanbul Summit: New Mission, New Means, 18 June 2004," NATO Secretary General Speeches, NATO on Line Library; available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040618a.htm>>; Internet; accessed 4 October 2004.

²¹ USAREUR Public Affairs "1st Armored Division Joins ARRC Coalition Force," 23 October 2001; available from <http://www.hqusareur.army.mil/htmlinks/Press_Releases/2001/Oct/20011023-01.htm>; Internet: accessed 7 October 2004.

²² Arnold Giesler, "Bi-national Corps Can Still Pay Their Peace Dividend," *Foreign Area Officers Association Journal*; available from <<http://www.faoa.org/journal/bi-corps.html>>; Internet; accessed 4 October 2004.

²³ These events would include NATO interoperability exercise and training.

²⁴ The attributed remark by General James L. Jones is based on comments made during a briefing on USEUCOM Transformation, USEUCOM Headquarters, August 2003.

²⁵ The UEy will provide C4ISR assets to TF5 and EETAF; SETAF will have its own organic capabilities.

²⁶ The II German Corps is now a Joint Operational Planning HQs for contingencies focused toward EU missions. V Corps HQs will become combined with USAREUR eliminating it as a traditional Corps level HQs. Both German and American divisions are committed else where thus limiting the main purpose for these multinational formations that of interoperability training and joint exercising and planning.

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